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## DEUX PAYS POUR VIVRE: CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY AND THE NEW CANADIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

"L'imagination est la reine du vrai, et le possible est une des provinces du vrai."  
Charles Baudelaire, *Curiosités esthétiques*

"Most forward-looking people have their heads turned sideways."  
H.A. Innis, *The Idea File of Harold Adams Innis*

*Ray Morrow*

### Official Canada

On the basis of mass-mediated news and commentary it is tempting to believe that these past couple of years have been among the most momentous of modern Canadian history: the defeat of the Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association, the repatriation of a constitution from Britain and the addition of a bill of rights, a national energy policy oriented toward domestic control of the oil industry, hints of a strengthening of a previously toothless investment review agency, the creation of a royal commission on the newspaper industry and the setting up of a major cultural policy review committee. But are these signs of a fundamental turning point in Canada's development, a creatively adaptive response to the increasingly evident crisis of an advanced, yet peripheral and dependent state? Or are they symptoms of a malaise and thus in principle unable to cope with the increasing pressures for fundamental change?

As the celebration of a constitutional agreement recedes into the immediate past and a semblance of normalcy returns to public discussion, some of the more disturbing features of federal policies may become more evident. For example, despite some signs of discontent within the business community, especially south of the border, the measures which could be linked to a new economic self-assertion are—with the partial exception of the energy policy—extremely timid, scarcely threatening the overall structure of economic power. At all levels of government debts continue to accumulate and the resulting dependence on American and European financial markets increasingly constrains domestic economic policy. Similarly, federal budgets reveal a sense of complete helplessness before the effects of Reagan's economic policies. And now Quebec has been isolated by constitutional negotiations which, even if they had been accompanied by short-term compromises between Trudeau and Lévesque, would not include a sufficient acknowledgement of the special status of Quebec to defuse the discontent articulated by the Parti Québécois. Let us also recall that most of the indices of the structural decline of the Canadian economy and its

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skewed development continue to worsen and the overall structure of cultural dependence remains intact, despite statistically insignificant signs of vitality reported by nationalistic journalists and official publicists. Along with Greece and Italy, Canada still stands at the bottom of the O.E.C.D. list in terms of the level of research and development in relation to GNP.

This discrepancy between the apparent federal mastery of events and the disturbing reality of continued drift are largely masked by the mass media's inability to exert any real autonomy in carrying out its responsibility to critically inform, as well as to entertain, to lead as well as to follow, to create new forms of awareness rather than to merely reflect the inertia of events. What is largely missing in the public, mass-mediated expressions of these symptoms of national crisis is any sense of its longer history, its need to be explicated within the framework of the most advanced forms of modern political and social theory, and its more fundamental implications for a strategy for responding to the future. Even where such matters are discussed it is usually under the influence of the gurus of popular American futurology.

For the forms of interrogation which are attempting to grapple with the most fundamental issues of the crisis in Canada one must look elsewhere, bypassing the mass media and the official responses: to the margins of the academy, to the non-sectarian groups which attempt to articulate the needs and frustrations of marginalized and under-represented populations, to artists and writers, and to the handful of magazines and journals which reach only select audiences. Only here and there is it possible to find the foundations for an alternative discourse on the crisis of Canada and its relation to the crisis of advanced capitalist and industrial societies. But the question remains for those who have glimpsed the symptoms yet have been largely excluded from these underground debates: where to begin?

### The Discourse of the Other Canadas

The most obvious place to turn would be the volume edited by Wallace Clement and Daniel Drache under the heading *A Practical Guide to Canadian Political Economy*.<sup>1</sup> Within its covers the reader is provided with a comprehensive, thematically organized bibliography, a short list of some "Thirty Basic Readings in Political Economy," and a long, informative introduction on "Rediscovering Political Economy" by Drache. However, a closer examination of Drache's perceptive and wide-ranging introduction reveals some disconcerting conclusions: "Yet despite this enormous intellectual output in the last five years, the new political economy has not been able to produce a clearer synthesis of the development crisis."<sup>2</sup> Pursuing this question further, he acknowledges that this continuing difficulty is closely related to a "lack of a cultural self" or a "deculturation" which "has also left its imprint on the resurgence of political economy, both in general and in specific ways." Many of these problems seem to

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reflect the fragmentation which results from the lack of a unifying theoretical and political framework and is manifest in the one-sidedness that comes from emphasizing any single analytical argument at the expense of others. More fundamentally, however, he concludes that it reflects an ambivalent relation to Quebec, a swing between economism in good times and nationalism in bad, an uncritical reliance upon metropolitan Marxist models, and a tendency to pursue economic interpretations for their own sake.<sup>3</sup>

For these and other reasons which will become apparent in the course of this essay, there may be a more instructive and provocative place to begin rethinking of the nature of public life in Canada: a slender volume by Quebec sociologist Marcel Rioux and writer/social critic Susan Crean, *Deux pays pour vivre: un plaidoyer*, which is scheduled to appear in a greatly expanded English version in the spring of 1982.<sup>4</sup> Had it appeared a couple of years earlier, *Deux pays pour vivre* would surely have found a place on Clement and Drache's short list were it to have included any French-language titles. Yet this inclusion would have been misleading to the extent this were taken to imply that its argument could be easily assimilated into the broader tradition of Canadian political economy without raising some fundamental questions about its limits and political implications. Without intending to do so, *Deux pays pour vivre* provides important responses to the very weaknesses identified by Drache in his own assessment. With this in mind, the following essay seeks to undertake a critical reading and analysis of *Deux pays pour vivre* from the perspective of its significance for rethinking both Canadian political economy and the crisis of Canadian development.

It is likely that the English version of *Deux pays pour vivre* will eventually stand in the company of George Grant's *Lament for a Nation* as a milestone in the discussion of the cultural crisis of Canada. Yet, like Grant's study, the reception of *Deux pays pour vivre* will be uneven, confused, and plagued by misunderstandings. This is related not only to the difficulty of serious theoretical discussions to penetrate beyond a small, largely academic public fragmented along regional, disciplinary, and sectarian lines, but is inherent in any text, however introductory and popular in intent, that presupposes theoretical traditions which cannot be fully presented and yet are not generally part of the common knowledge of the intended reader. In its English version, therefore, *Deux pays pour vivre* will suffer from its contradictory objective to provide a popularization of the issues of cultural dependence and at the same time to situate these within the framework of a critical theory of Canadian society. Yet this very weakness as a medium of popularization is simultaneously a manifestation of its movement toward originality: *Deux pays pour vivre* is one of the first major efforts to apply European critical theory to the issues of Canadian and Quebec cultural development.<sup>5</sup>

In the pages that follow Rioux and Crean's study will be explored as a document expressing and articulating the foundations for a new stage in research and discussion on the national and cultural questions in Canada and Quebec. It would be beyond the scope of this essay, in part because of the differences in the

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expanded English version, to attempt any premature assessment of this approach as a whole or to situate it more closely in relation to Rioux's version of critical sociology or the specific traditions from which it draws inspiration.<sup>6</sup> The more immediate task is to facilitate an adequate comprehension of the approach represented by the text and to encourage debate with respect to its implications for the tradition of Canadian political economy. A book such as this does not purport to provide final answers, but seeks rather to cultivate awareness of new concepts and categories of discourse: in the context of social theory mastering the medium (language) reveals the message. To this end, it is necessary to first situate the resulting critical sociology in relation to the more recent history of the nationalist debate, examine some of the implications of the collaboration between Rioux and Crean, and finally turn to a reconstruction of their argument and a tentative exploration of some of its internal tensions and implications for rethinking Canadian political economy.

### Committing Collaboration

An unusual feature of *Deux pays pour vivre* is that it is a rare example of cooperation between the advocates of the anglophone Canadian and franco-phone movements for national autonomy. Whereas this would seem to be a natural form of alliance, one of the characteristics of Canadian politics and culture over the past decade has been the mutual isolation and ignorance of these two movements, a fact which has been costly for both. As Abraham Rotstein affirmed prophetically a decade ago in response to the October Crisis:

Quebec nationalists, of whatever persuasion, must now recognize they cannot achieve their objectives at any reasonable cost without active support from English Canadians. Nationalists in the rest of the country must realize that the continued repression of Quebec will only create a society which is not worth inhabiting.

Our mutual interests must be recognized. The old empathy and passive moral support are no longer sufficient. We must now travel in tandem to create in English Canada active legal, political and institutional channels that support and foster Quebec's legitimate aspirations. It is our only hope of mitigating the impact of the collision which looms ahead.<sup>7</sup>

The failure to have done so is in part responsible for the current situation in which Quebec has been isolated from a constitutional agreement and frustrations within the Parti Québécois threaten an internal split. Reciprocally, few non-francophone Canadians can relate the experience of Quebec to their own

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situation in the larger context of the development of Canada. More generally, of course, this outcome reflects the deliberate strategy of the federal government and Quebec Liberals to isolate the Parti Québécois, cutting it off from outside allies and at the same time hoping to push it toward internal conflict and extremist responses.

The collaboration between Rioux and Crean thus represents a deliberate rejection of the form of political discourse generated by the federal isolation of the Quebec independence movement. Significantly, this subtly taboo form of theoretical "sovereignty-association" took place between representatives of the two different generations which mark, respectively, the cultural watersheds of Quebec and anglophone Canadian politics. What may appear to be an accidental alliance thus turns out on closer examination to have an underlying cross-generational logic. First, there is Marcel Rioux: friend of Trudeau and other Liberals of the *Cité Libre* generation in the 1940's and 1950's, eventually associated with the New Democratic Party and then various socialist groups after making the transition from apolitical anthropologist to radical sociologist by the early 1960's, and finally supporter of the Parti Québécois from its early days. Then Susan Crean: typical female product of upper-middle class Toronto, then member of that generation of Ontario students initially drawn in the late 1960's to Trudeau's vision of Canada, and finally passionate advocate of Canadian cultural independence.<sup>8</sup>

With Rioux, Crean has found the theoretical dimension lacking or only hinted at in her pathbreaking *Who's Afraid of Canadian Culture?*<sup>9</sup> Though especially strong in its description of the many different mechanisms of the American domination of the different spheres of Canadian culture, this study lacked a fully developed critical sociology of culture and thus tended to view national identity in isolation from the broader issues of social justice and the transformation of Canadian society. If there is a cultural and political sense in which Quebec is ahead of the rest of Canada, it is natural that Crean should find theoretical inspiration in Rioux, a man with no theoretical peer among anglophone Canadian sociologists of his generation, let alone the experience of participation in a remarkable cultural movement. In collaboration with Rioux, therefore, there is also a symbolic acknowledgement of the comparative impoverishment of this generation of senior anglophone scholars and intellectuals, depleted by earlier emigration southward and robbed of a creative context for theoretical synthesis by maturation under the debilitating canopy of American hegemony.

What Rioux seems to have gained from Crean is an interlocutor for coming to terms with his ambivalent relation to anglophone Canada and an ally for bringing to both the francophone and anglophone publics an awareness of the divide-and-rule strategy which has served a form of authoritarian federal power and distracted attention from the more fundamental question of American domination. Yet this approach remains a lonely one in Quebec where *Deux pays pour vivre* has fallen on deaf ears. On the one hand, the theme of cultural dependence is already old hat, having received more in-depth treatment elsewhere. On the other hand, to couple this theme with reference to a parallel

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analysis of English Canada is generally greeted with indifference or skepticism, if not downright ridicule. This stems primarily from a pervasive rejection of the assumption that anglo-Canadian culture has any potential at all. And in the present conjuncture, the reality of public debate in francophone circles is the dominating presence of an antagonistic system of federal power, the humiliating experience of constitutional negotiations, and the less than convincing gestures of concern and reconciliation on the part of the Conservative and New Democratic parties. In such an atmosphere, the more popular response is to denounce Quebec Liberals as "traitors" and dallying with the progressive elements of the enemy as an ill-advised waste of time. Yet this unwittingly contributes to the federal strategy of divide-and-rule, both within Quebec and in relation to potential allies elsewhere.

### Stages of Nationalist Discourse

In entering the debate about the national questions in Canada and Quebec, Rioux and Crean write within a tradition of discussion sharply divided along the line of the two official languages. An important difference between these two worlds of discourse is that the francophone version stretches back for more than two centuries, is symbolically defined by a heroic tradition of conquest and revolt, and has fundamentally shaped the development of the human sciences and culture in Quebec.<sup>10</sup> By contrast, the anglophone version has a short and anemic history, is defined by an ambivalent response to the transition from being an English to an American "colony", and marked by a sense of futility and despair expressed only on the margins of the academy or literary culture.<sup>11</sup> Yet even in anglophone Canada over the past decade or so the criticism of the "Americanization" of Canada has at last become a major topic of public debate, through rarely of action.

A striking feature of this anglophone recovery of an understanding of the strategic importance of cultural and economic, as well as political, autonomy in the life of a nation-state is that it bears only a faint resemblance to the conception of Canadian national identity evoked by the advertisements and public relations releases of the federal government. Those who have contributed the most profound meditations on the crisis of Canadian nationhood have consistently defended the privileged status of Quebec within confederation, accepted its right to whatever form of independence it democratically chooses, and acknowledged its inspirational role as a model for the rest of Canada. This contemporary discourse on nationalism in anglophone Canada might be said to have moved through three different stages of development with Rioux and Crean's *Deux pays pour vivre* signalling the third. The first can be precisely dated with the appearance of George Grant's *Lament for a Nation* in 1965, a book which began the process of awakening Canadians from the slumbers of cultural dependence.

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Listen to Grant's pessimistic and conservative diagnosis as formulated nearly two decades ago:

The keystone of a Canadian nation is the French fact; the slightest knowledge of history makes this platitudinous. English-speaking Canadians who desire the survival of their nation have to co-operate with those who seek the continuance of Franco-American civilization.<sup>12</sup>

Or again:

The Liberals have failed in English-speaking Canada. If the nation were to survive, it had to be anchored in both English-speaking and French-speaking Canada, and a *modus vivendi* had to be established between the two. The Liberals failed to recognize that the real danger to nationalism lay in the incipient continentalism of English-speaking society, rather than in any separatism. Their economic policies homogenized the culture of Ontario with that of Michigan and New York.<sup>13</sup>

A second stage of discussion was brought about by the crisis on the left produced by the recognition of the disastrous consequences of an unreflective internationalism which had failed to take into account the specific circumstances of Canada and the inevitable link between any socialist project and a new form of nationalism. This was most clearly expressed in the dissident NDP "Waffle" platform which, in hearkening back to the 1933 Regina Manifesto's call for large-scale nationalization, acknowledged the relation of this strategy to a formation of national purpose which had been eroded by continental integration. Though this economic programme was challenged by those, such as Rotstein, who questioned the capacity of the state to effectively organize a modern industrial system, there was general agreement that overcoming cultural dependence was a necessary condition for any steps toward regaining economic autonomy. Furthermore, it followed from these positions that Quebec had a comparable right to self-determination which should be acknowledged within the federal system.<sup>14</sup>

In what ways does Rioux's and Crean's study mark a third stage in the history of contemporary discussions of the national questions in Canada? To anticipate the subsequent analysis of their position, at least four aspects of their book mark important new steps. First, more than lip-service is given to cooperation between the representatives of the two different national projects through the act of committing collaboration. Secondly, the justification of this position is linked to the central issues of contemporary European social theory, rather than elaborated primarily at the level of a political economic analysis. Though this theoretical dimension was implicit in the theory of modern civilization at the heart of Grant's work, it remained repressed in the nationalist debate unleashed

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under the guidance of political economists and largely carried out in mass-media polemics. Though the categories of political economy greatly facilitated forms of research which demonstrated many of the mechanisms of economic and cultural dependence, they could not—with the partial exception of those who followed Innis—adequately formulate all the bases of a critical sociology of culture. Consequently the resulting debates often oscillated between uncritical pro-Canadianism or dogmatic anti-Americanism, on the one hand, and tendencies toward unmediated reductionism on the other. Accordingly, a third advance signalled by Rioux and Crean's book is the linking up of a form of "cultural Marxism" to the analysis of national self-determination. Finally, the resulting political programme departs sharply from the strategy of bureaucratically-organized nationalization as advocated by classic socialist parties. This is explicit in the concept of "autogestion" which underlies their vision of a new form of society.

To summarize, it might be said that Rioux and Crean's arguments culminate in a threefold cultural, economic, and political radicalization of the anglophone nationalist debate by claiming: (1) the priority of the cultural question in any process of qualitative change which seeks to transcend the limits of industrial societies; (2) the necessity of a fundamental transformation of the organization of the industrial economy, not simply the abolition of its capitalist form; and (3) the self-contradictory character of any political strategy based on the simple expansion of state power or the illusory assumption of its eventual withering away with the abolition of bourgeois class relations. Though these themes have dominated discussions of European critical theory for some time, they have not been systematically respecified in relation to the contemporary crisis of Canada. And though, as we shall see, such a programme might be charged with utopianism, it has the merit of an internal consistency and a libertarian spirit which sets it aside from previous radical diagnoses of the crisis of the two Canadas. In short, it does not suffer from the pessimism of a conservative nationalism trapped in an anti-modernist flight from history, an orthodox socialism waiting patiently for economic contradictions to bring forth the Godot of proletarian consciousness, or a form of social democracy always just an election ahead of its time. Whatever its immediate limitations as a concrete political strategy, in other words, *Deux pays pour vivre* challenges artists, writers, and scholars to what Rioux refers to elsewhere as a categorical "resémantisation" of the world and with that, a rethinking of the possibilities of Canada and Quebec.

### Domination and National Autonomy

Not altogether escaping the pitfalls of eclecticism, Rioux's critical sociology weaves together categories drawn from German critical theory (especially Habermas and Marcuse), the French tradition of existential and humanistic



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Marxism (Sartre, Lefebvre, Castoriadis, etc.) and related sociological approaches, and selected aspects of American cultural anthropology and the youth countercultural movements of the late 1960's.<sup>15</sup> If the European tradition is the basis of the centrality of alienation and domination and hence of the critique of advanced capitalism, ethnography and youth countercultures are the original source of concern for the role of communities and nations in the reconstruction of industrial societies. Whereas the European theorists have tended to take a rather dim view of nationalism, given its abuse as a weapon against working-class movements and a pretext for imperial wars, the situation has been fundamentally different in colonized regions. Although this has long been recognized in the case of the colonies of the Third World, a similar process of domination—requiring a very different analysis—can also be observed within and between advanced societies. For Rioux, therefore, the elaboration of a critical sociology of Canadian society requires a fundamental reinterpretation of the national question which can take into account its potentially progressive features as part of a strategy of the critique and transformation of advanced capitalism.

The goal of linking the theory of domination with that of national communities is announced in the introductory chapter of *Deux pays pour vivre*. Following the tradition of German critical theory, the vision of general human emancipation is taken as the normative foundation of inquiry in the human sciences. From this perspective biographical self-reflection becomes a strategic point of departure and, as previously alluded to, the authors provide a brief sketch of the personal trajectories which resulted in the book in question. But what is of interest here is the outcome of these two struggles for self-understanding: the shared interest of Canada and Quebec is recognizing cultural and economic dependence as the most fundamental obstacle to qualitative social change.

As Rioux and Crean indicate, such an approach is based on a number of assumptions which must be acknowledged, even if for the most part they are not discussed or defended in detail in the text. These include (1) the relative unimportance of political constitutions as a means of resolving fundamental questions; (2) the failure of the strategy of assimilating Quebec and the need to recognize its autonomy; (3) the importance of more general demands for changing the relations between central federal power and that of regions; (4) the emergence in English Canada of an economic nationalism increasingly accompanied by a cultural equivalent in certain areas of the arts and popular culture; (5) a general awakening of consciousness in Canada and Quebec of American imperialism and its effects on their respective economies and cultures; (6) that all of these conflicts take place at a moment when industrial societies have put into question their vision of the world and conception of development.<sup>16</sup>

At the outset, therefore, the authors set the stage for developing the central critical theme of their approach: the rejection of any strategy of analysis which privileges the economic or political at the expense of the cultural dimension of social reality. As they emphasize, any approach which limits discussion to questions of economic benefits and distribution is not only doomed to failure, but

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inevitably culminates in the dangerous complaint that economic dependence has prevented Canada from becoming as "advanced" as the United States, thus implicitly taking for granted a specific model of development as necessary and desirable. For Rioux and Crean, on the other hand, if Canada and Quebec desire autonomy, "ce n'est pas pour continuer la société commerciale mais pour faire autre chose, pour bâtir une autre type de société."<sup>17</sup> From this point of view, moreover, what often appears to be "backwardness" may often conceal hidden advantages, *if* one desires a different type of society.

Furthermore, Rioux and Crean reject any political strategy which fails to privilege national autonomy as the creative nexus around which the struggle against all other forms of domination must be organized. In viewing history as a process of revolt and creative reconstruction acted out at both the individual and collective levels, they consider the question of the relationship between the many forms of domination (between nations, classes, sexes, age and ethnic groups, etc.), concluding that they can be simultaneously reduced only with movement toward a "société autogestionnaire" which extends to both the private and public worlds. And in societies such as Canada and Quebec, this is inevitably linked to gaining the national autonomy which is the condition of all other forms of emancipation. Furthermore, the process of realizing national liberation may serve as a source of apprenticeship for recognizing and coming to terms with all of the others.

Let there be no misunderstanding: this notion of national liberation makes no attempt to draw directly upon the example or rhetoric of Third World liberation movements. The strategy is rather to link the issues of national autonomy in Canada and Quebec to the more general crisis of advanced capitalism and industrial societies generally. Thus, while they follow John Hutchinson in viewing Canada as divided by three major types of conflict (bilingualism, provincial and regional relations, and Canadian/American relations), they also try to situate these within the horizon of the crisis of advanced societies without any simplistic analogies based on liberation movements in underdeveloped countries.

Moreover, as the introductory chapter makes clear, this conception of the nationalist debate in Canada and Quebec has little to do with the classic 19th century romantic veneration of tradition or the subsequent use of nationalism as part of a strategy of imperial aggrandizement. This difference is especially difficult for the American left to grasp in relation to Canada, given the pernicious consequences of nationalism at home and in dominant and aggressive societies elsewhere. But in small and peripheral societies such as Canada and Quebec, with neither militaristic traditions nor a capacity for deep-set xenophobia, the meaning of national self-assertion is fundamentally transformed; it becomes the context of symbolic transfiguration within which a repressed past is recovered, the collective will for the mastery of the contemporary crisis can be mobilized, and the self-construction — rather than importation — of a vision of the future can be initiated.<sup>18</sup> In other words, what is in question here is a form of nationalism whose cultural renaissance takes to heart Walter Benjamin's thesis

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— eloquently expressed in modern Quebec literature — that “there has never been a document of culture which was not at one and the same time a document of barbarism.”<sup>19</sup>

The central chapters of *Deux pays pour vivre* are concerned with developing a complex argument sustaining the specific sense in which the cultural must be privileged theoretically and practically if a new form of society is to be realized. This entails a series of discussions, not always adequately elaborated given the constraints of space in the French version, which can perhaps be more readily grasped when reconstructed in terms of three levels of argumentation: (1) a metatheoretical thesis regarding the problems of conceptualizing the relationship between the economic, political, and cultural aspects of a theory of society in general; (2) a substantive, theoretical thesis regarding the historically-specific status of culture in advanced capitalism, i.e. the notion of cultural domination as the highest stage of imperialism; and (3) a series of strategic arguments, directed at the cases of Canada and Quebec, concerning the potential contribution of certain forms of “culture populaire” as media through which various social groups and communities may take steps toward gaining control of their political and economic existence. Since these three levels of argumentation are not outlined explicitly, and the text tends to meander around them, it is instructive to briefly review the resulting approach from this schematic perspective.

### The Constitutive Primacy of Culture

The first and most abstract level of analysis — a stance with respect to the relationship between the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of society — is the least explicitly developed. To a great extent the authors fall back upon the metatheoretical assumptions of the tradition of critical sociology in which they are working. Accordingly, it is not their task to take up issues such as whether or not the economic is determinant “in the last instance”, as Althusser and others would have it. Yet in their discussion of the problems of defining culture, it is clear that the cultural has a kind of analytical priority as the basis of the moment of historical specification which is the ultimate objective of inquiry. Moreover, it is within the domain of the cultural that the symbolic and categorical foundation of new possibilities are elaborated. This position is linked to both Rioux’s early training in American cultural anthropology, his own fieldwork experiences in Quebec, and similar arguments about the cultural matrix of social formations found in the tradition of historicist Marxism.<sup>20</sup> The strategic importance of this metatheoretical position is that it opens the way for a more positive assessment of the community, as opposed to any absolutization of class, as the political locus for emancipatory movements. Consequently, culture is not something epiphenomenal, frivolous or secondary, something reducible to a mere weapon

within class struggle, but a constitutive dimension of the political and economic, hence a presupposition of their qualitative transformation.<sup>21</sup>

This valorization of the cultural has nothing to do, of course, with any traditional idealistic conception of the pure autonomy of cultural activity or of its capacity to wish away its embeddedness in the economic, technological, or political conditions of society. For this reason, for example, the authors reject the thesis of the neutrality of technology because of the constraints it may impose upon the possible forms of social organization and culture open to a society. Accordingly, Rioux and Crean argue that it may be desirable to select forms of technology on the basis of other criteria than market-mediated assessments of efficiency in order to preserve or construct preferred social and cultural forms of life. More specifically, the authors concur with those who argue that the energy and ecology crises are expressions of a form of industrial society which must dominate nature, as well as create hierarchical forms of social organization and systematically erode cultural differences. Indeed, one of the consequences of this type of society is that it downplays the importance of the cultural because *its* cultural presuppositions privilege the political and economic as more real, thus undermining the capacity to envision cultural options. This position culminates in a kind of negative definition of culture as rooted in the differences which alone can produce concrete paths toward the universality of emancipatory praxis. Hence, a culture ceases to exist when those who are its bearers become submerged by the mental and affective structures of others and thus no longer able to "réinterpréter les emprunts qu'ils font selon leur code propre et ne peuvent plus créer de solutions originales dans la conduite de leur vie collective."<sup>22</sup> The outcome of this epistemological position is, therefore, the rejection of any hypostatization of the imperial nation, the privileged class, or the abstract individual as the locus of emancipation.

### Cultural Domination as the Highest Stage of Imperialism

Much more explicit attention is given to the question of specifying the status of cultural phenomena in the form of society under examination: the advanced but dependent capitalist society. In this context, of course, Canada and Quebec are cited as the primary illustrative examples. Accordingly, chapter two of *Deux pays pour vivre* is concerned with a brief survey of the history of economic and cultural imperialism defined by the triangular relation of dependencies which interlock Canada, Quebec, and the United States.<sup>23</sup> On the one hand, this analysis is critical of the frequent tendency in Quebec to identify its dependence primarily in relation to Ottawa and the rest of Canada, thus glossing over the larger context of American hegemony. This discussion also dispels any suspicion that the authors' emphasis on the priority of the cultural question is linked to a simplistic understanding of the possibility of separating cultural, political, and economic

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issues. As the analysis of the political economy of culture concludes, it is ultimately impossible to separate the maladies of cultural and economic dependence: "La logique de la production des biens symboliques se moule donc sur celle de la production des automobiles."<sup>24</sup> Failure to grasp this point, it is argued, has been at the root of the continuing failure of Canadian governments to effectively deal with the crisis of the economy *or* culture.

The examples of Canada and Quebec thus lead Rioux and Crean to a more general formulation of the processes of cultural domination analysed. This is expressed in the thesis of cultural hegemony as the highest stage of imperialism. Whereas past forms of imperialism emphasized political and economic power, its contemporary form is crowned by ever more subtle cultural processes:

La domination culturelle n'est possible que si existent les hégémonies politique, économique et technologique. L'hégémonie culturelle que la puissance impériale américaine vise viendrait la forme suprême de l'impérialisme puisque les représentations et les valeurs des sociétés dominées s'érodent et sont remplacées par celles de la puissance dominante. Les dominés envient à vouloir et à désirer pour eux ce que charroient les industries culturelles de la métropole et ce que qu'elles privilégient comme souhaitable et désirable. C'est la forme la plus insidieuse d'impérialisme puisqu'il n'y a pas d'occupation militaire ni de brimades économiques et politiques mais des images, des sons, des mots, des formes qui représentent une société d'abondance et de rêves.<sup>25</sup>

Unlike political and economic domination, which are more visible and closely linked to the potential use of force, the processes of cultural domination are veiled behind ideological interpretations of the neutrality of technique, the free movement of information, and the objectivity and rationality of professionalized communicators. In these circumstances, subjects voluntarily comply with relations of domination and even come to actively identify with the perspective of the metropolitan centre, as has been well-documented in the case of Canada. Here, of course, the authors follow the several approaches to cultural reproduction in advanced capitalism, referring somewhat eclectically to such diverse analysts as Habermas, Mattelart, Schiller, Baudrillard, and Bourdieu. An interesting implication of Rioux and Crean's discussion, which they do not sufficiently stress, is the unique context of Canada and Quebec as examples of some of the most subtle and complex forms of inter-cultural domination.

Culture as the Weakest Link: A Populist Counter-Evolutionary Strategy?

But having outlined the grimly deterministic spectre of cultural reproduction, Rioux and Crean then proceed to couple it — unlike most authors in this area — with an attempt to formulate a strategy of escape from the symbolic chains of the consciousness industry and total administration. Somewhat apologetically, to be sure, they conclude that domination can be fought primarily — at least initially — by cultural means; moreover, most efforts proceeding directly from economic to political issues are doomed to repeat the errors of the existing form of industrial society:

Nous croyons, à tort ou à raison, que pour faire à autre chose du point de vue économique, il faut d'abord que change le système de valeurs et de représentations qui, lui seul, peut donner naissance à d'autres projets de bonne vie et de bonne société, ce qui, à notre sens, est éminemment culturel.<sup>26</sup>

At first glance, this position might appear to be consistent with an essentially Gramscian conception of a counter-hegemonic strategy of cultural mobilization. Though there is indeed considerable continuity between aspects of Gramsci's conception of historicist Marxism and Rioux's critical sociology, the latter implicitly re-invokes the historicist principle of specification and is forced to reach rather different strategic conclusions about the form of crisis in advanced capitalist societies such as Canada. The decisive differences here are the recognition of the obsolescence of the classic conception of revolutionary struggle (still entertained in a modified form by Gramsci in a fascist Italy) in the context of an affluent liberal democratic society, and a rejection of any exclusively proletarian or narrowly working-class basis for the development of cultural alternatives. Accordingly, the position of Rioux and Crean diverges sharply from many of those who, following the Birmingham School's reading of Althusser and Gramsci, are tempted to revive a rather orthodox version of Marxism in the avant-garde guise of a variant of cultural Marxism.<sup>27</sup>

What then is this alternative strategy? At the risk of the distortions inherent in any schema, Rioux and Crean's position could be characterized as (1) counter-hegemonic but also countercultural; (2) reflexively nationalist and counter-evolutionary; and (3) populist as opposed to proletarian or elitist. Each of these obviously requires clarification.

The argument of *Deux pays pour vivre* is "countercultural" in the sense and to the degree that its counter-hegemonic plea presupposes a theory of cultural crisis. From this point of view the concept of crisis should not be restricted to its manifestations in the contexts of energy, ecology, economics, or politics. To do so is to run the risk of formulating the problem of opposition to the dominant order

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in terms of concepts and categories which are grounded in its vision of the world. In contrast — and this is the counter-cultural thrust of their argument — industrial civilization is in the midst of a process of cultural mutation which has called into question the conception of economic development running from Adam Smith through Marx and their contemporary representatives. Whether expressed in Habermas' notion of "legitimation crisis" or Bell's reference to the "cultural contradictions of capitalism," it is clear — the authors conclude — that "la crise qui atteint nos sociétés est avant tout une crise de la civilisation et non pas celle des débouchés commerciaux."<sup>28</sup>

Secondly, the resulting strategy is "reflexively nationalist" in relation to peripheral and dependent societies because national aspirations are not an exclusive goal, but are linked with a critique of all other forms of domination. It is also "counter-evolutionary" in the sense that the demystification of any unilinear logic of industrial development, whether in the form of any "convergence theory" or conception of "lead society", paves the way for the recognition of the possibility of divergent strategies of development in advanced societies.<sup>29</sup> If neither the Soviet Union nor the United States represents some hidden logic of history or rationality, then their satellites are no longer bound inexorably to imitation and inferiority. On the contrary, they have an implicit responsibility for innovation, for pointing the way to possibilities not open to imperial centres paralyzed by the inertia of power. In this respect, the situations in Poland and Quebec are essentially parallel.

Finally, the conception of transition proposed is "populist" rather than proletarian or elitist in the sense that it assumes that the ultimate locus of the creative imagination required for an epochal breakthrough is preserved and rekindled in groups and communities whose everyday life experience has not been fully incorporated into the ethos of the dominant civilization.<sup>30</sup> On this account, any abstract identification of the proletariat or state with "progressive" tendencies falls prey to the limits of innovation within the logic of the existing order. An important example of the latter problem can be seen in the paradoxical role of the state in promoting cultural autonomy in a dependent society. As the practices of cultural development in Ottawa and Quebec City demonstrate, there is an inherent tendency to treat cultural development as a simple extension of the logic of economic development; consequently, the citizen is again transformed into a passive consumer by specialized agents of cultural production. These processes are evident in all forms of elitist — official or academic — cultural production and distribution.

Similarly, the working-class does not offer an unproblematic point of departure for cultural resistance and innovation because of its long and largely successful incorporation through the activities of the state and mass cultural industries. Indeed, it was precisely through the process of cultural integration that the proletariat failed to preserve its autonomy and lost its privileged historical position and mission; at the same time, however, "la prise en main de sa destinée commence donc par celle de sa culture."<sup>31</sup> But in the contemporary situation of Canada and Quebec this cannot be readily identified with any specific

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group—such as the working-class or specific unions—because of the extent to which these have been incorporated into “mass culture.”

The strategic possibilities for emancipatory practices are located instead in what the authors refer to as “culture populaire”, a term which translates somewhat misleadingly into “popular culture”, at least to the extent this is associated with “mass” cultural activities in general. Consequently, it is much closer to the use of the notion of popular culture by those concerned with early modern European history and hence with essentially pre-mass-mediated and pre-incorporated forms of working-class leisure and private life. So for Rioux and Crean the concept of “culture populaire” retains a strong positive and normative connotation (given its association with potential for cultural innovation) and a restrictive empirical as a means to indicate those forms of cultural activity and expression which retain local and regional roots, hence considerable autonomy as the repository for the imaginative recovery of the collective will of groups and communities. This “culture populaire”, however, is simultaneously menaced from the elite culture above (official and academic) and the mass culture proceeding from distant centres:

La thèse que nous voudrions défendre c'est que l'apport de la culture populaire est toujours allée en s'amenuisant au détriment de la culture dite d'élite et de la culture de masse, toutes deux aux mains de groupes dominants au sein de chaque pays et à l'échelon international.<sup>32</sup>

Obviously this populist theme and the related typology of forms of culture poses some problems which are not adequately resolved in the next of *Deux pays pour vivre*. It should be noted, however, that these questions are being explored in more detail by Rioux and others in Quebec under the auspices of a major research project.<sup>33</sup>

### From Theory to Political Practice: The Eternal Triangle

This simultaneous refusal of the liberal-pragmatic, pessimistic-conservative, and neo-Marxist strategic options, thus opens up the more specific issue of the implications of Rioux and Crean's conception of critical sociology for contemporary Canadian politics. It would lead far beyond the bounds of this essay, however, to do more than iterate the general strategy of the “plea for two nations” and to note a couple of omissions in their analysis which could lead to unnecessary misunderstandings.



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As previously mentioned, priority is given to a preliminary re-negotiation of the relationship between Canada and Quebec as a necessary prerequisite for freeing both to construct policies oriented toward greater self-determination.<sup>34</sup> The underlying assumption here tends to converge with that of left-nationalism generally: that the political process of attempting to gain greater control of a society's economy and culture is the most powerful means available for creating awareness of the range of forms of domination. From this follows the support (not uncritical) of the Parti Québécois, despite its practice of a rather conventional form of bureaucratic social democracy. This support, however, is based on the assumption that this movement is the carrier of authentic utopian aspirations which transcend both the specific class background of participants and the specific policies forced upon a party in power by the federal government, the general economic crisis, the potential blackmail of capital, and a precarious alliance with unions torn between irresponsibility masked as class militancy and co-operation in a long-term strategy of economic re-organization.

Rioux's response to this situation follows from the general position of his critical sociology in that an ironically Weberian distinction is preserved between the ethics of responsibility for the social democratic politics of the economically possible and the extra-parliamentary ethics of commitment to anticipatory cultural movements. This allows the degree of reconciliation between theory and practice possible under difficult conditions. From this perspective, the practical failure of the Parti Québécois would not refute the justification of support because there is no convincing basis for the assumption that there was a dramatically different alternative. A multidimensional conception of change implies that the process of transition operates at many different levels requiring different time cycles for their realization. Electoral politics is only one of these domains, as are class and other forms of mobilization, cultural movements or one's personal life. None of these is absolutely privileged and setbacks in one may be compensated for by advances in others. Such a flexible reconciliation of theory and practice allows avoidance of both Adorno's metaphysical pessimism and the naive optimism of a political economy waiting for the revolutionary millenium.

A first neglected point in Rioux and Crean's analysis which could lead to misunderstanding is a failure to draw out the consequences of the asymmetry of the actual and potential role of the national questions in the province of Quebec as opposed to elsewhere in Canada. It is questionable whether there are comparable bases for the forms of "culture populaire" which have played such an important part in defining the cultural autonomy of Quebec and its relation to a mass movement. There are thus reasons to believe that any cultural developments in anglophone Canada will be accompanied by a sharp split between indigenous cultural creation appealing to a largely elite audience and the mass audience of imported American culture. To this extent, there is little basis for any short-term reconciliation between cultural anticipation and social democracy of the type now found, even if on a fragile basis, in the Parti Québécois.

Another potentially misleading omission is the absence of a "plea" for a third

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"pays pour vivre," i.e. a process of development in the United States which would complement the aspirations of Canada and Quebec. Equally as pressing as the need for mutual understanding within Canada is the imperative of communicating to sympathetic Americans what is or might be happening north of the 49th parallel. On the one hand, there are voices in America which increasingly articulate a conception of the crisis of advanced capitalism close to that of the critical sociology of Rioux and Crean. Some of these have even drawn similar conclusions in calling for the development of regional "nations" to counter the excessive scale and centralization of American society. As William Appleton Williams has recently pointed out, one of the congenital flaws of the American left has been a blindness, originating in a shared indebtedness to the heritage of Napoleon, Lincoln, and Marx, to the problem of the scale of political communities:

In a fundamental sense, therefore, twentieth-century radicals followed Marx in becoming victims of his fascinating combination of capitalist assumptions and socialist utopianism... (which) led him to believe that a change of class at the center of the metropolis would change the inherent nature of the system.

Unhappily, it was wrong and wrong again. For if capitalism leads to increasing demographic imbalance, the super-centralization of power, and the destruction of community, then surely a rigorous radicalism is defined by regionalism in the international arena...It is easy, and convenient, to dismiss such alternatives as nostalgic nonsense. But they are in truth the guts of a very tough late twentieth-century radicalism. American radicals must face and answer the naughty question: Do they want to manage an essentially unchanged corporate capitalist political economy as little more than especially sensitive and responsible administrators, or do they want to change the world? If the latter, then I suggest that changing the world hinges on breaking the existing system into human-sized components of space, time, place and scale.<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, by omitting the question of internal American developments, it is implied that the "American empire" is a monolithic entity and that Canada and Quebec could successfully negotiate their fate in relation to it. Yet it is obvious that any effort to renegotiate such relations presupposes sympathetic and informed groups which are now — outside of a few cases of cooperation on ecological issues — clearly absent. Even in progressive, cosmopolitan circles there is an abysmal ignorance in America of the Canadian question, a fact which does not bode well for the future. To an extent, Quebec has already committed a

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similar mistake by ignoring the rest of Canada (Rioux is an exception here), leaving the population at the mercy of the mass media and politicians. Does not a dependent culture have a responsibility to bring its message to those groups in the dominant culture which are the potential agents of change? Is not this ambivalence and temerity itself a manifestation of a colonialized culture? In this context the export of creative indigenous cultural productions which are rooted in Canadian experience and not Hollywood imitations becomes (again) more than a question of dollars and cents, for it is the only means to create the respect and understanding necessary for negotiating a new relationship.

### II

#### Political Economy and Critical Theory

The preceding sympathetic reconstruction of Rioux and Crean's critical sociology of culture has set aside many of the more detailed issues which might be of concern in a more comprehensive analysis and critique. The objective has been, rather, to present a "stylized" version of their approach which highlights its implications for Canadian political economy. To make these more explicit, it is instructive to outline an agenda of questions (and challenges) which such a confrontation implies. To be sure, the resulting discussion is selective because limited to problems which arise directly from the formulation of critical sociology utilized; but the advantage is that it narrows an otherwise vast topic, directs attention to a number of fundamental issues, and allows a focus on an example of critical sociology formulated specifically as a response to the crisis of Canada and Quebec.

The more general context of debate here is the future of the human and social sciences in Canada. For some time now there has been extensive discussion within universities of the relations between the development of a "national" tradition of scholarship, the preservation of certain "universal" standards associated with the ideal of a scientific community, and the process of borrowing from other societies, most typically Anglo-American or European.<sup>36</sup> In the case at hand, however, this question is narrowed to those forms of inquiry which, unlike the dominant paradigms of empirical social science, address directly issues concerning the national components of research traditions and their capacity for informing or guiding fundamental — perhaps even radical — social change. With respect to the internal differences which divide those who propose what are in some sense "radical" and "critical" alternatives, the crucial point of contention has been the strategy for appropriating the Marxian tradition, both as a programme of research and as a guide to political change. The resolution of this question defines, in turn, a specific relationship with traditional social scientific theories, methods, and modes of application.

As argued at the onset, Rioux and Crean's critical sociology cannot be readily

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classified within the typology proposed by Drache for understanding the development of the political economy tradition in Canada, the primary discursive framework within which the Marxian tradition has come to influence interpretations of society and history. Aspects of their approach would allow, to be sure, its classification under the heading of the "new political economy" especially those strands with roots in the traditions of the "hinterlanders" and the "post-Innisians." But as the preceding reconstruction has made clear, there are aspects of their critical sociology which call into question its identification, without further ado, with any grouping including people such as Ryerson, Nelles, Watkins, Clement, Drache, and Panitch. Though building upon the work of such authors indirectly, Rioux and Crean's project is animated by different cognitive interests and arrives at some divergent political and strategic conclusions. The simplest solution to this anomaly, therefore, would be to add an eighth phase of development under the heading of "critical sociology and critical theory."<sup>37</sup>

Yet this new category adds as many problems as it solves; it does not follow immanently from the new political economy and cannot be compared to it without addressing some important theoretical and methodological assumptions.<sup>38</sup> Especially important here is the relative heterogeneity of the approaches contrasted and the degree to which they may lie on different theoretical levels because guided by different cognitive interests. If the former presents the potential problem of overgeneralization, the latter creates the risk of constructing a pseudo-debate.

To avoid overgeneralization, the following discussion focuses on the "new" political economy as designated by Drache. This will be taken idealtypically to refer to an approach to the reinterpretation of Canadian economic history guided by a theory of development derived in part from an indigenously constructed dependency model (staples theory) coupled with, in diverse fashions, some more or less conventional neo-Marxian conception of class conflict. Internal debates turn precisely on the question of the relationship between the dependency and internal class relation models, creating a latent tension between the older tradition of economic history and the introduction of contemporary models of neo-Marxist political economy based primarily on the European experience.<sup>39</sup> These explanatory debates do not stand in isolation as manifestations of some kind of value-free science, however, because they are integrally associated with a set of ideological and strategic assumptions rooted in the analysis of the class nature of political conflicts. Again, there are important differences surrounding such questions as the exact status and potential of nationalism in the struggle against inequality, the potential of the state to respond to parliamentary oppositional movements, the class character of farmers and petty commodity producers, etc. Yet there is also a significant degree of consensus about the strategic role of the working class as the objective basis for overcoming the existing system of domination. The result is an approach within which a form of specialized inquiry (political economy) is coupled more or less uncritically with an ideological framework (conception of science, culture, politics, history) to which it has a taken-for-granted relationship.

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Defining the approach of critical theory and sociology is simplified, largely because of its underdevelopment with respect to Canadian issues. And by giving Rioux and Crean's analysis pride of place, the stage has already been set for outlining an agenda of implicit questions for political economy. Suffice it to note that the crucial point of difference is the metatheoretical and sociological framework within which the data of political economic and other forms of social scientific research are reinterpreted. The resulting strategy of inquiry is thus marked by a different knowledge-guiding interest than that which informs the research practices of those concerned with the theory of Canadian economic development. In this respect Rioux and Crean implicitly follow the model of "critical" theory in their concern with the conditions of possibility of qualitative change, as opposed to the priority of an empirical-analytical analysis of the determinants of the existing form of society. This disjuncture is based on the assumption that the analysis of economic relations no longer (if it ever did) provides an adequate account of how a new form of society might be constructed. The consequence is that the meaning and significance of political economic findings are transformed by their incorporation into a more general theory of society and cultural critique.

To avoid a pseudo-debate, it is important to stress that the relationship between political economy and critical theory is best referred to as a dialogue rather than as a question of theory competition in the strict sense in which one must be false if the other be true. But this also presupposes differentiating between political economy as a specialized discipline and its loosely associated aspiration to be the basis for a general theory of politics, culture, and the human sciences. At the empirical level, political economy and critical sociology are in principle complementary, even if the latter draws upon aspects of more traditional historical, sociological, and social psychological research to qualify, challenge, or reinterpret many of the analytical explanations of political economy. For critical sociology the exact significance of economic phenomena (itself a problematic manner of slicing social reality) is an empirical question which can only be determined from within the framework of a given sociocultural totality.

Political economy and critical theory are, on the other hand, largely competing and antagonistic at the metatheoretical and strategic level because of divergent conceptions of the relation between theory, practice, and radical change in advanced capitalist societies. This stance is closely linked to critical theory's claim, expressed in various ways, that the world-historical mission of the proletariat, as originally envisioned by Marx, has failed and that invoking its spectre increasingly distracts from conceptualizing the new historical possibilities. (The Third World obviously requires a rather different analysis.) Moreover, this position emerged from within the tradition of Marxism itself. Whether it be the Frankfurt School or its inheritors, or the ex-Trotskyites who are so numerous among the critical sociologists of France, or the theoretical offspring of the Anglo-American New Left, this response has proceeded by way of an immanent critique of Marxism.

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One of the earliest and most poignant expressions of this was Karl Korsch's 1931 essay on the "Crisis of Marxism" which begins with the acknowledgement that "Marxism as a movement and as a theory is in a state of crisis. This is no longer a crisis *within Marxism*, but a crisis of *Marxism itself*."<sup>40</sup> Those who followed to the bitter end the underlying principles of historical specificity and the unity of theory and praxis were forced to recognize a fundamental transformation of the place of the economic process within advanced capitalism and the enhanced significance of the state and the new forms of cultural reproduction. In the Canadian context the initial failure of traditional Marxist analysis was therefore not only that it was "metropolitan"; it was also dogmatic, hence unable to revitalize its own theoretical categories. Not surprisingly, there has often been much more to learn from Marxism's best critics: "bourgeois" theorists animated by a desire to come to terms with the crisis of modern civilization. For this reason, the major original contributions to Canadian political economy were those of Innis and his followers who elaborated a theory of economic development on the basis of an empiricist concern with historical specificity. This would have been impossible within the Marxism of the day and Innis' strategy was in many respects comparable to that of Max Weber in Wilhelmian Germany a generation before: they both used economic history *against* Marxism, provoking awareness of the need for its renewal. In the process, of course, they were forced to become much more than economic historians by acknowledging the need for a complementary theory of society and culture. And as a consequence, there is a sense in which the students of Innis (as those of Weber) were forced to return to Marx as part of the process of going beyond both.

In the course of this return to Marx, however, the indigenous tradition of Canadian political economy has experienced difficulties related to a tendency toward excessive empiricism, an absence of metatheoretical reflection, working within an impoverished and dependent cultural tradition, and a suspicious attitude toward European social theory. One of the greatest sources of appeal of a more systematic neo-Marxist form of political economy is that it offers, in its revitalized and highly sophisticated manifestations, an almost ready-made resolution of these past difficulties. In the process the peculiarities of Canada can be acknowledged in a manner previously impossible for Marxist theorists and many of the pretensions of staples theory can be demolished (whether validly or not) because of its lack of a more comprehensive theoretical programme. And it is precisely for not moving far enough in this direction that Panitch has recently chided the new political economy:

A more precise source of the weakness of the new political economy than nationalism, however, may be said to be its insufficiently *dialectical* approach to social phenomena...The failure to take *this* approach, which stems from a failure to take Marxism seriously enough, rather than from any

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necessary 'contamination' which results from incorporating certain expressions of nationalism (or insights of Innis) into a Marxian framework, may be said to lie at the core of the new political economy's weaknesses.<sup>41</sup>

Even if this be accepted in general terms, paths begin to part over the question of precisely what it means to be "sufficiently dialectical" and to "take Marxism seriously enough." *This* is the most fundamental issue, not the danger of importing "metropolitan Marxism" as Drache warns. For this reason Panitch is again on solid ground when he suggests that nationalism has been a source of weakness not for political reasons, but because of "a certain insularity of focus that tends to discourage ( and not count as part of *Canadian* political economy) contributions to general theoretical debates or to comparative research."<sup>42</sup> Though this very insularity *was* a primary source of its capacity to theoretically articulate the unique features of Canadian economic development, beyond a certain point it must re-examine its assumptions in relation to these larger debates if it is to enter a new stage of creative research, especially in relation to the contemporary crisis. The real question is *which* debates and *which* forms of comparative research are to be taken to inspire reflections on the reinterpretation of Canadian social, political, and economic theory.

So-called "metropolitan Marxism" is itself a highly heterogenous phenomenon with a long history and divergent tributaries of development. For this reason it is important to stress the strategic difference between the sophisticated form of neo-Marxist political economy advocated by Panitch and the critical sociology of culture proposed by Rioux and Crean. These represent two fundamentally different strategies for drawing upon European discussions as a basis for rethinking the problematic of Canadian dependence and development. Whereas the first appeals to a restoration of Marx's programme via a theory of monopoly capitalism, the latter draws inspiration from a counter-response based on the assumption of the *failure* of that original project. At the same time this post-Marxist discourse claims to have neither abandoned the search for a critical theory of society nor for a strategy of political and cultural renewal.

### An Agenda of Questions for the New Political Economy

The following agenda of questions alludes to the larger European context of division, even as it directs attention to its specific manifestations within Canada. Partly because of the previous monopoly of discussion by the new political economy, the exposition is weighted toward a series of challenges posed by critical theory which have been rarely voiced, even in muted form. These

questions are not, however, directed at the strictly empirical issues which divide political economists, might become the basis for forms of empirical critical sociology, and can only be resolved within the parameters of a cumulative research tradition. The points of contention touch rather upon problems of generalizing those findings, relating them to those of other disciplines, and translating them into political and cultural strategies. Since the indigenous variant of Canadian political economy is silent on many of these types of issues, discussion is also weighted toward the temptation of following the rejuvenated models of neo-Marxist political economy as the strategy for moving from economic history to a theory of society and politics. How these and related types of questions are resolved will determine, for better or worse, the future of critical social science in Canada. Defined thematically, these should include: (1) metatheoretical assumptions about the nature of social inquiry; (2) conceptions of cultural analysis and critique; (3) social psychological presuppositions about the agents of change; (4) political strategies of change; and (5) the form of utopian imagination underlying the project of cultural transformation. The significance of the differences within each of these can be grasped by a brief review of the contrasting tendencies expressed in the new political economy and Rioux and Crean's critical sociology.

(1) *Metatheoretical Assumptions: What Kind of Critical Social Science?*

Why is it that the Canadian political economy tradition is characterized by an almost complete avoidance of the metatheoretical debates which have transformed our understanding of the human sciences over the past decade or so?<sup>43</sup> After all, Toronto has been the site of the publication of one of the most important journals in the philosophy of the social sciences and a centre for the study of European and Anglo-American social theory for nearly a decade. Yet one looks in vain for either any reference to these discussions by political economists or any interventions which seek to contribute to them. (Reciprocally, those interested in the theory of the human sciences have also largely ignored Canadian political economy.) At best, those who identify more strongly with a general neo-Marxist form of political economy can passively fall back upon the rich Anglo-American and European literature which has rehabilitated this approach within the academy. But again, one finds few sustained, metatheoretically sophisticated debates concerning the problems of translation implied by a historically specific Canadian political economy.<sup>44</sup> All in all, therefore, the Canadian political economy tradition has completely failed to specify and secure its scientific status or relation to other disciplines, irrespective of its immense contributions to a theory of Canadian economic development. What this failure seems to betray is a lack of reflexivity linked to sub-disciplinary isolation, a lack of philosophical sophistication, and embeddedness in pre-existing ideological formations which have only occasionally been called into question. Even where there are the beginnings of such an interrogation, as in the case of Innis' fragmentary observations on the crisis of civilization and the role of value in



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social science, they have not been systematically followed up or linked with contemporary debates.<sup>45</sup>

In contrast, Rioux and Crean ride on the wake of the elaborate and wide-ranging discussions in the philosophy of social sciences associated with Jurgen Habermas and others in West Germany, Goldmann, Lefebvre, Sartre, Castoriadis, Morin, Bourdieu, etc. in France, and Anglo-American contributions influenced by these. Of particular importance is that these European discussions originated as internal and immanent critiques of classical Marxism confronted with the twin challenge of the crisis of advanced capitalism and empirical social science. Whereas these tendencies have influenced much research in Quebec, they have been largely ignored by the tradition of anglophone political economy, even if there have been a number of interpretive commentaries by other Canadian scholars.

A practical consequence of the approach of Rioux and Crean is that they can operate with an implicit conception of the complementarity of their use of political economy and their own critical sociology.<sup>46</sup> For instance, they rely upon the results of political economy for understanding the context of economic and cultural domination which structures the relations between Quebec, anglophone Canada, and the United States. Yet this conception of complementarity is coupled with grave reservations about the capacity of political economic research can it react to this challenge? Other than through vague references to "idealism" or "anarchism", the absence of a well-defined metatheoretical discourse renders Canadian political economy almost helpless to respond to a critical sociology of culture, even where this may be called for. And without the development of such a metatheoretical competence a fruitful and constructive, hence mutually beneficial, dialogue will not be possible.

### *(2) Forms of Cultural Analysis: Cultural Reproduction or Cultural Anticipation?*

With reference to Canadian political economy, it could be argued that there is already a relatively rich tradition of research in the areas of culture, nationalism, and ideology. But this claim can be sustained only by overlooking at least three problematic characteristics of this work: an inordinate emphasis on classical forms of political ideology at the expense of cultural phenomena generally, especially as expressed in everyday life; a lack of theoretical and methodological sophistication in analyzing ideological and cultural phenomena beyond the sheer description of contents or their reduction to economic variables; and a chronic inability to appropriate some of the most innovative and suggestive contributions to cultural analysis within the Canadian tradition, i.e. McLuhan, Frye, and Innis.<sup>47</sup> In these circumstances, is Canadian political economy in a strong position to remedy these difficulties by importing some variety of European cultural Marxism to fill the gap without running the risk of a superficial and inadequately mediated application of "metropolitan" Marxism?

This situation suggests a couple of important questions: why this general neglect and impoverishment of cultural studies in the first place, and what is the most appropriate way to overcome this deficiency in the long run? As for the first

point, the most obvious response is to refer to the process of repressing Canadian identity linked to the "Americanization" of the economy, culture, and human sciences. Without denying the strategic significance of these factors, it is also plausible to add that political economy, to the extent that it necessarily privileges an economic interpretation of cultural reality, is inherently limited in its capacity to account for such phenomena. For this reason, of course, the tradition of the critical sociology of culture has relied upon a multiplicity of disciplinary resources: varieties of cultural Marxism, interpretive sociology and cultural history, ethnography, and the methods of the humanities generally. This implies, in relation to the second question, that the weakness of cultural studies in Canada cannot be remedied primarily from within the existing tradition of political economy. Though there are and will continue to be important forms of the political economy of culture and communications which draw more or less directly upon economic concepts, it is also clear that these forms of research can scarcely exhaust the issues of cultural analysis. Most importantly, both the limits and full significance of this research can be realized only within the framework of a more comprehensive cultural theory. Otherwise the political economy of culture risks enclosure within a specific specialist mode of inquiry, i.e. an economic interpretation of cultural reality, which is a necessary, but not sufficient foundation for a sociology of culture, the identification of possible emancipatory practices, and a strategy for encouraging anticipatory cultural movements.<sup>48</sup>

Rioux and Crean's critical sociology is exemplary of what this might and should entail and reflects a series of specific decisions about the most appropriate strategy for using "cultural Marxism" as a resource for cultural research in Canada. The result is intimately linked to both their metatheoretical point of departure concerning the nature of a critical social science and to Rioux's reflections upon the experience of cultural movements in Quebec. Such considerations have led them away from a concern with static models of cultural production of the type most closely associated with Althusserian Marxism or the formal models of causal determination characteristic of vulgar Marxism or conventional empirical sociology. As a consequence, their approach has many affinities with that of English cultural Marxists such as Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson. But this should not obscure important differences deriving from a perception of the very different class formations, a context of dependent development, and very different historical traditions.

This is not to say that the development of a critical cultural sociology in Canada has developed beyond an elementary stage, or even that Rioux and Crean have set out a systematic programme for this purpose. What can be argued, however, is that unlike the tradition of Canadian political economy, they have pointed the way to a *strategy* for appropriating European models consistent with the autonomous Canadian tradition of research. Many specific issues remain open (i.e. how to engage in a critical appropriation of the work of the Birmingham School) and it would require a separate essay to consider the limits and absences characteristic of Rioux's approach to the sociology of culture generally.

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### *(3) Social Psychological Presuppositions: Mediating Objects or Potential Subjects?*

Canadian political economy has not been concerned with social psychological issues at such.<sup>49</sup> Yet it must be asked: what is its underlying conception of the historical subjects, the agents of change? Is this neglect a product of disciplinary specialization or does it reflect the assumption that such matters are essentially secondary, epiphenomenal and thus not a priority of research? In any case, since such issues cannot be completely ignored, political economy has tended to work with a notion of human motivation based on a relatively simple conception of economic interest which is taken to be most naturally expressed in class-based collective action. Converted into a procedure for historical research, however, this assumption has proved fruitful to the extent that it has served to unveil the class bases and dependent context of Canadian development masked by previous generations of historiographers and social scientists. On the other hand, the limitations of such a crude materialist social psychology become immediately apparent in any effort to theoretically conceptualize the range of ways in which people live and act: the origins of dynamics of social movements, various aspects of religious and cultural phenomena, and the prospects for any fundamental transformation of the capitalist mode of production -to name only a few issues. If this is so, how can political economy propose to move from its findings about Canadian economic development to a theory and strategy of change directed toward the future?

The neglect and superficial treatment of social psychological issues closely parallels the problems of cultural analysis within the tradition of political economy generally. Both pertain to the strategic question of the movement between objective structures and the actions of subjects. Though the early Marx provided some brilliant insights into these issues, they came to be methodologically severed from the specialized form of economic analysis which was the concern of his attempt to isolate the laws of motion of an autonomous process of production. The reincorporation of cultural and social psychological questions into a conception of society for which the logic of capital is all-determining, however, necessarily requires a focus on how symbolic and individual realities are functionally adapted to the imperatives of cultural and social reproduction. The more recent move away from a mechanistic, reductionistic account of this process toward a structural model granting a degree of autonomy to superstructural phenomena does not change the essential objectives of such forms of inquiry. And though these types of research have an obvious social scientific legitimacy, it is important to note that the sociological contributions have been much richer, historically and ethnographically differentiated, and methodologically rigorous than those stemming more directly from neo-Marxist models.<sup>50</sup> Yet outside the area of family and feminist research, such social psychological issues have been of peripheral interest to the new Canadian political economy. The reason may be, in part, that the further a form of analysis is from influencing actual processes of change, the less concerned it is with the introduction of the mediating categories useful for, and

demanded by, the subjects transforming their lived experience.

Again, however, the critical sociology of Rioux and Crean provides some important suggestions regarding social psychological questions, though this remains an inadequately developed aspect of their exposition.<sup>51</sup> The central concept here is a conception of alienation and domination against which individual subjects have struggled historically as part of a general process of emancipation. But unlike most neo-Marxists, they refuse to reduce alienation to an economic category and limit social psychological research to problems of structural determination.<sup>52</sup> By viewing alienation in relation to a more general theory of domination, it is possible for a critical sociology to develop a critique of industrial society generally, not exclusively its capitalist forms. And by situating the problematic of social psychology in relation to the development of emancipatory practices, rather than limiting it to explaining the determination of individual behaviour by macro-structures, it seeks to escape the conservative implications of any static model of social reproduction, whether of Althusserian or Parsonian inspiration, which seeks to reduce social psychological inquiry to the perfunctory status of describing the transmission belts from macro- to micro-, from structure to subject. Marx, of course, countered such static implications with a conception of the revolutionary reversal of alienation which abstractly evoked the possibility of transformation through the action of a creative, collective subject. With the decline of the revolutionary mythos in this century, however, Marxian social psychology reverted to a formal determinism and increasingly lost interest in the question of the sources of the cultural innovation which are to bring forth a new world and a new human subject. Not surprisingly, such questions were left primarily to "bourgeois" cultural movements inspired by the aesthetics of surrealism or existentialist philosophy and personalist theology. More recently, similar concerns have been expressed by various countercultural critiques of contemporary social character and efforts to reconceptualize the problem of human needs.<sup>53</sup> Practically, however, the task of conceptualizing the political basis of incremental revolutionary change has fallen to the inheritors of the anarchist and council communist traditions, the theorists of "autogestion."

*(4) Strategies of Change: Working-Class Mobilization or "Autogestion" Movements?*

Strategies for initiating and guiding change follow directly from social psychological presuppositions, i.e. an understanding of the conditions under which individuals come to form or reform groups to transform the institutional and cultural foundations of their existence. Again, this is not a question which Canadian political economy has addressed directly, though it has been touched upon by some of the writings on social movements. Yet the disturbing question cannot be avoided: is there a danger that an analysis of economic development has been linked with a strategy of radical change without having adequately examined the relationship between the two? May it be that the new political economy has been characterized by a split between theory and practice because

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the questions posed by historical research have only an oblique relation to the range of answers needed to construct a theory of advanced capitalism in Canada and linking it to an emancipatory politics?<sup>54</sup>

Though Drache has charged that one of the chronic features of the Canadian political economy tradition has been a tendency to make economic interpretation an end in itself, it is evident that more recently this latent positivism and academicism has not been carried over into the public political stance of those associated with this form of research. The new political economy has been generally linked with a leftist politics which ranges from the left-wing of the NDP, the more radical socialist-nationalist stance once associated with the Waffle group within the NDP, to the various radical socialist positions which converge at a certain point with the more or less "revolutionary" sectarian groups. Despite all of these overt political differences, however, the continuity between these approaches is derived from a shared reliance on political economy as a research method and a linked tendency to hypostatize the concepts of "class" and "labour" inherited from historical materialism. This is manifest in the assumption that the most fundamental category of political change is the response of the working-class to its exploitation and an objective deprivation of needs which can only be fulfilled through economic growth and gaining control of the state apparatus as a means of socializing the mode of production. In practice, however, a significant split is evident between the political strategy of those who lean increasingly toward a production-centred model of capital-logic and those who have been concerned with demonstrating the strategic importance of dependency theory.

The most internally consistent position is held by those who have attempted to subordinate dependency theory within the more general framework of the contradictory development of the production process and class conflict on inter-regional and international levels. Though this position can be reconciled with a tactical support for left-nationalist politics, the question of national or regional autonomy is interpreted in essentially instrumental terms. By definition, the logic of capitalism requires that the possibility of fundamental transformation is grounded in the process of working-class mobilization and is thus irreconcilable with the various reformist, populist and popular movements expressing largely middle-class or petit bourgeois forms of dissent. As a consequence, there is a certain formal reconciliation of research and practice because the former is concerned with analyzing the changes in the production process from the point of view of isolating the objective bases of contradiction and the strategic points for initiating support of progressive political activities.

The political strategies linked to forms of dependency theory, on the other hand, are characterized by a number of unresolved internal tensions. This is expressed in the anomaly that the new political economy has been most informative about the political consequences of the contemporary crisis in such deviant areas as urban politics, ecology movements, women's issues, Quebec and Canadian nationalism—none of which can be adequately treated exclusively within the theoretical framework of class conflict and economic infrastructures.

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Paradoxically, there is a large and theoretically unexplicated discrepancy between the model of the political economy of change which informs historical research and what are in fact identified in advanced capitalism as the actual sources of innovation and contestation. In much of the Quebec socialist-independentist literature this anomaly is reflected in the curious reference to "les classes ouvrières et populaires" or even "le mouvement ouvrier et populaire."<sup>55</sup> However useful this reconciliation may be for tactical purposes, it is difficult to comprehend the nature of the theory of social class which underlies such an approach. It is difficult to escape the impression that this may involve a form of theoretical wishful-thinking whereby political economy tries to remain open to these new sources of change by grafting them onto the classic model of the "interest" of the working-class. Most of this type of analysis in Quebec represents a rather uncritical effort to transpose a Gramscian conception of counter-hegemonic mobilization to the contemporary Canadian situation. Drache has proposed a similar analysis, but has made no attempt to conceal the fundamental difficulties:

A nationalist struggle implies the need for alliances and such alliances are the essence of any political struggle. It is irresponsible for the Left to cherish the illusion that there is a 'pure' manifestation of class conflict between the workers and the bourgeoisie. No class, it must be remembered, is a monolithic bloc without contradictory and opposing factions. Much more useful is Gramsci's notion of the 'process of popular mobilization' that is 'characterized inevitably by the foundation of "blocs"'. If Gramsci is right, the Left must begin to rethink its traditional ideas about what a working class politics means in the Canadian context. As a beginning it needs to develop a new approach which enables it to analyse nationalist issues in relationship to the specific class interests of both the working class in and outside the NDP and other embattled elements at this time in Canada's history.<sup>56</sup>

Though these suggestions are well taken as guidelines for certain types of empirical research and as a rejoinder to any proletarian puritanism, they still remain rooted in political economic categories and cannot formulate any objective reasons why such a left-nationalist popular coalition could or should develop. Whereas it was plausible for Gramsci to speak of "the working class" as an active, organized agent of change, what does that mean today? The precarious links within organized labour? And if labour itself is not unified, how is it to be linked to non-working class demands? What about all the latent "class" interests which find no active expression at all because the affected individuals have no basis for organizational self-defense? And if the activities of all these groups are

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to be reduced to their diverse class interests (presumably excluding those groups which do not seem capable of acting upon them), how are these cleavages within the "working class" to be reconciled with those of "other embattled elements"? This, apparently, would be one of the important functions of a movement against dependency, but is this possibility really linked to economic conditions directly? The desire for national autonomy, like that for workers' control, cannot be understood as a demand that follows from any materialistic social psychology of interest: those in greatest need tend to be least aware. In other words, such aspirations imply a fundamental cultural transformation, a utopian dimension of group activity, and a process of collective learning whose "necessity" cannot be derived from the facts of economic development. If the evolutionary logic of capitalist development is abandoned — and here neo-Marxist political economy is perfectly consistent—the "revisionist" consequences cannot be halted halfway through the process of rethinking working class politics.

One of the most provocative consequences of Rioux and Crean's "autogestion" strategy is that it breaks decisively with the assumption that the crisis of advanced capitalism can be resolved exclusively within the framework of economic categories.<sup>57</sup> From this perspective, the more fundamental contexts of domination are the forms of culture, production, and consumption generated by enslavement to an industrial process guided by its internal priorities rather than those of the members of society. Accordingly, any socialist strategy grounded in the appeal of simple enrichment is inherently incapable of significant movement toward the transcendence of alienation and inequality, even assuming that it can compete with the productivity of capitalism in the first place.<sup>58</sup> An "autogestion" approach, in contrast, is not in the first instance justified by any claim to greater productive efficiency; instead, it is legitimated as a means for allowing cultures and communities to redefine the priorities of human association in relation to other values than those imposed by the demands of the productive apparatus itself. This implies a recognition of the multiple sources of alienation and domination and consequently a pluralization of the potential forms of collective organization which might become vehicles for emancipatory practices and a basis for the spontaneous articulation of previously repressed human needs and concerns.

There is, of course, an obvious objection to the advocacy of a proliferation of emancipatory demands and projects: how are these to become cumulative, how can they be politically aggregated in a way that guarantees a rational determination of societal priorities, inhibits co-optation and fragmentation, and guides a strategy oriented toward the transformation of the mode of production? The logical persuasiveness of the classic conception of the mission of the counter-hegemonic proletariat and its vanguard leadership was that all of these problems were "objectively" resolved. And the persistence of adherence to this solution, despite a century of well-documented failure, attests to both its intrinsic coherency and the absence of any conceptually tidy alternative, aside from abandoning the project of qualitative transformation altogether. The response of the theory of "autogestion," however, does suggest a new point of departure:

abandonment of the myths of abundance and transience, a generalization of politics in an experimental society, and a subordination of economic relations to social ones.

(5) *Economic Necessity or the "Imaginaire Sociale"?*

Finally, it might be asked, what is the vision of cultural transformation which inspires the new Canadian political economy? In moments of romantic anticipation, which aspects of contemporary culture are taken to be expressive of such possibilities? Are its categories inherently linked to the unfolding of the logic of industrialization, or does it contain any conceptual basis for distinguishing between growth and happiness, affluence and the good society?<sup>59</sup> Or are such questions largely irrelevant given the essential realism of political economy which implies that the outcome of history will be a simple product of objective forces, rendering our scribbles null and void?

If it rejects or ignores such questions, political economy is forced to join with some uncomfortable company. From the perspective of liberal pragmatism, for instance, which takes for granted a given form of capitalism as "reality", any effort to defy the reality principles which underlie the immutable logic of rationalization is doomed to Darwinian elimination. More sympathetically, a conservatism such as that of George Grant seeks to preserve cultural differences against the onslaught of technology, but sees no escape from the iron cage of rationalization given the functional imperatives of any movement seeking national autonomy.<sup>60</sup> Finally, from the position of a neo-Marxist conception of social reproduction widely accepted by Canadian political economists, it could be argued that the possibility for any fundamental change must be located in the evolution of the structural conditions of the economy which are, in the last instance, the determinants of possible transformations.

How might Rioux and Crean respond to each of these types of criticism? In order to comprehend the logic underlying their position, it is instructive to try to draw out the form of response which might follow from an understanding of the utopian dimension of their conception of critical sociology. First, their defense against liberal pragmatism would be the most straightforward. From the perspective of a dynamic conception of social reality, the actual can only be comprehended in relation to implicitly possible future conditions of society. On this point they could even cite students of contemporary modal logic who acknowledge that "possible worlds are a hidden and implicit aspect of all model-building and all theorizing. A theory that covers the actual world and only the actual world, is not a theory but a description."<sup>61</sup> This is admitted by macro-sociological theories of development and evolution, but for the most part these remain within the framework of a linear conception of rationalization and progress. As previously suggested, the position of Rioux and Crean is counter-evolutionary in that it argues for the possibility — at this stage of historical development — of smaller nations choosing novel strategies of development.<sup>62</sup>

To the second type of objection, that of Grant's conception of the



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incompatibility of technology and community, Rioux and Crean could reply that the possibility of cultural mutation (especially for a new conception of nature), including the development of a "société autogestionnaire," provides the potential conditions for transcending technological domination. This argument overlaps, of course, with that directed against liberal pragmatism and its similar hypostatization of technological determination.

The response to the third position, that of a neo-Marxist political economy, serves to summarize the previous agenda of questions. By hypostatizing a particular method, political economy runs the risk of a formalistic conception of practice because the identitarian logic underlying its conception of society denies the multidimensional and open-ended structure of social reality. On the one hand, this can even reach back into the realm of the economic, resulting in the conclusion that there is a single model which can adequately encompass the economic process.

On the other hand, and more pertinent to the questions under examination, it cannot adequately pose the problem of the formation of a new form of politics and culture, except by reducing them to the logic of the economic process. In culture this culminates in the temptation to see the system of cultural reproduction as essentially imaginary, precluding engagement with the latent truth contents of bourgeois traditions.<sup>63</sup> In the case of politics it implies the reduction of differences of interest to the domination of capital, thus obfuscating the enduring political dimensions of any possible political order.

With respect to the issue of socialist politics, Rioux and Crean cite Pierre Rosanvallon's charge that Marx was ultimately a continuator of Adam Smith and thus remained a prisoner of liberal ideology and its abstract utopia of transparent, atomized individuals.<sup>64</sup> The result was a confusion of the disappearance of the bourgeois state with that of politics as such, and a failure to grasp the importance of preserving the autonomy of civil society and its political dimensions as opposed to the state. Only by recognizing these dilemmas does "autogestion" become a priority and with it the potential transcendence of the polarization between Marx and Bakunin.

On the other hand, with respect to the cultural question Rioux and Crean are unrepentantly utopian and ally themselves more strongly with the creators than with the analysts of culture: "il faut mieux vivre vos rêves que de rêver votre vie."<sup>65</sup> This follows from the thesis that the potential for qualitative change must be already rooted in existing institutions and culture, rather than something which can be assumed to arise automatically in the course of the "revolution" or be "scientifically" constructed and imposed after the destruction of bourgeois institutions.

Another way to illustrate the implications of this utopian dimension of transition is to cite a similar formulation by Zygmunt Bauman. As he argues, the futile search for an analysis which demonstrates the "necessity" of socialism not only distracts from understanding the nature of change, but expresses and reproduces the very alienation to be overcome by superficially linking happiness, economic gain, and revolt. The rationale for this search to "prove" the

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"inevitability" of socialism, hence its latent positivism, stems from the assumption that this is a requirement for motivating participation in the "daring adventure of emancipation":

But can it really? It seems unlikely that the kind of emancipation and freedom the modern socialist thinkers dream of can be won with arms forged in the smith of alienation. It is, on the contrary, the relinquishment of the power internalized urge to employ such arms which is the preliminary and paramount condition for this emancipation. If the advent of socialism involves the creation of a new culture, the cultural image under which the transition takes place is not an irrelevant issue; in fact, it may well be the decisive factor...The proponents of the socialism of 'inevitability' will smile contemptuously at the memory of hopes that 'the strengthening of the state will bring nearer its demise', or that rampant terror will enhance human liberties; but they fail to see the ominous logical affinity between such hopes and their own. The idea that people will free themselves while acting as convinced agents of inevitability can only deepen and reinforce the mental grip of unfreedom...If socialism is to be seen, as it claims, as a further inquiry into yet unexplored regions of human freedom, it can be brought about only in a free and unconstrained dialogue between all the actors of the historical process.<sup>66</sup>

### The Mutual Challenge

In drawing upon the critical sociology of culture sketched in Rioux and Crean's *Deux pays pour vivre* as a resource for challenging aspects of the new Canadian political economy, the objective has not been to distract from its major contributions to Canadian scholarship and its ongoing importance for understanding Canadian society. But this strategy has served to point to increasing signs of the limits of this tradition: its internal divisions, its unarticulated assumptions, and its need for new directions. Undoubtedly, many of the questions posed have slighted existing responses and demanded a clarification of problems which lie, strictly speaking, outside the bounds of political economy as such. To the extent that this has been the case, political economy can only benefit from setting the record straight and establishing more clearly its own relation to other traditions and disciplines. On the other hand, many of the weaknesses, limitations, and ambiguities of critical sociology and critical theory have been glossed over, along with the divergent formulations

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within that tradition. Above all, no attempt has been made to consider why such forms of inquiry have largely failed to concern themselves with Canada at all and what their implications for various types of empirical research might be. But again, critical sociology can only gain from further interrogation from within and without. What is regrettable (and symptomatic of the depth of the cultural crisis in Canada) is how seldom the question of the complementarity and tension between these two traditions has been raised; both have been impoverished as a consequence.

Theoretical division, the decline of the university as a source of cultural innovation, and all the other difficulties of constructing an alternative tradition of critical discourse take on a new urgency in a strategic context completely unforeseen by 19th-century revolutionary theorists: the rise of electronically and mass-mediated culture as the primary mode of communication. Writing in the twilight of what was believed to be a revolutionary mass waiting for the spark of mobilization, Walter Benjamin could still express one of the last hopes of the revolutionary tradition: that the electronic media and the mechanical reproduction of culture offered a break-through for agitational propaganda. But as McLuhan has showed us against his intentions, the advent of a wired civilization has largely served to secure the veil of cultural domination even tighter. In attempting to respond to this situation more than three decades ago, Harold Innis and Theodor Adorno ended up as strange bedfellows in invoking, unbeknownst to one another, the priority of preserving the philosophical imagination. For this reason Innis charged that the conservatism of education institutions resides primarily in their tendency to "avoid the major philosophical problems of Western civilization." Moreover, the electronic media, rather than ushering in a new age of public awareness and the popularization of knowledge, have exacerbated the loss of theoretical capacity grounded ultimately in the interaction between oral and written discourse:

The tendency toward conservatism has been accentuated by the mechanization of communication in print, radio, and film. They have tended to emphasize the factual and the concrete. Abstract ideas are less susceptible to treatment by mechanical devices...Large ideas can only be conceived after intensive study over a long period and through the direct and powerful device of the spoken word in small groups.<sup>67</sup>

Because the traditions of scholarship are also a product of the specific conditions of North American civilization, even radical research has not been exempt from the process of formal rationalization against which it has so valiantly protested.<sup>68</sup> However much the cultural industry may engender awareness of unmet needs, desires and aspirations, these cannot be channeled directly into a process of collective transformation by the austere empirical

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findings of an angry economic science or the anachronistic folklore of a revolutionary proletariat. Those who would and could transform the world under the conditions of advanced capitalism come from too many different walks of life, have suffered from too many different forms of domination, and have too great an awareness of the contradictory features of any project of qualitative change to be subsumable within a totalizing movement. Whereas a decade ago it could still be proclaimed that "if you are not part of the solution, you are part of the problem," that has now been implicitly transformed into its opposite: "if you think you are part of the solution, you are probably a part of the problem." If one side of this response is cynicism and retreat, the other is an insatiable hunger for concepts which can articulate the new framework of questions within which talk of solutions might once again seem something more than sectarian chatter. In this context, therefore, nothing could be more radical than to plead for the cultivation of a new form of critical thinking not only as the basis for a new vision of the future, but as a source of resistance to the temptations of power, the rewards of accommodative thinking, and the seductions of repressive de-sublimation. In this long winter of cultural hibernation in Canada and Quebec, hope for survival requires a quiet confidence which can be nurtured only through the passions aroused by abstract ideas, written texts, and the spoken word in small groups. So Rioux and Crean conclude not with "le grand refus" of Marcuse, but with "un grand défi":

Ne serait-il pas temps pour qu'au Canada, cessant pour une fois d'imiter l'empire, le peuple reprenne goût à la politique qui ne consiste pas seulement à vouloir s'emparer du pouvoir mais à débattre en long et en large des finalités de la cité?<sup>69</sup>

Yet this vindication of theoretical imagination should not be taken to imply that political practice and empirical research have simply lagged behind theory, as if they could have kept pace or that theory is somehow better off as a consequence. Such an interpretation would be false not only because it sees political failure as the work of individuals, or glosses over the difficulties of building up an empirical research tradition, or forgets the realities of isolation, fragmentation and dependence in Canadian scholarship; it also ignores the potential of theoretical reflection for irresponsibility and poetic promiscuity, beholden only to a narcissistic conception of wisdom. The divorce and mutual distrust between critical theory and political economy should be taken, therefore, as mirroring the objective breach between theory and practice, hence a sign of domination and a call for mutual learning. Otherwise both run the risk of falling prey to the tyranny of epistemological divide and rule, by allowing talismanic labels of "materialism" and "idealism" to magically name the source of all our conceptual ills and thereby deprive us of the critical imagination required for recovery. To the extent there *is* hope for theoretical reconciliation or qualitative

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change, "the task is to subsume the descriptive into the critical, making the turn to the concrete the dominant moment of social theory."<sup>70</sup>

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### Notes

1. Wallace Clement and Daniel Drache, eds. *A Practical Guide to Canadian Political Economy*, Toronto: Lorimer, 1978. Cf. also Daniel Drache, ed. *Debates and Controversies*, Toronto: Lorimer, 1979.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
4. Marcel Rioux and Susan Crean, *Deux pays pour vivre Montréal*: Editions coopératives Albert Saint-Martin, 1980. The English version will be published by James Lorimer, Toronto.
5. The concept of "critical theory" is employed as a contrast term to neo-Marxism or Marxist political economy; with respect to substantive issues it will also be used synonymously with the term critical sociology. For a representative example of the contemporary applications of critical theory in this generic sense, cf. Norman Birnbaum, ed. *Beyond the Crisis* New York: Oxford, 1977. Sometimes the notion of "critical sociology" has been employed rather indiscriminately, blurring the important differences between critical theory and neo-Marist approaches as, for example, in J.W. Freiburg, ed. *Critical Sociology*, New York: Irvington, 1979.
6. A largely anecdotal and biographical recounting of Rioux's intellectual development can be found in Jules Duchastel, *Marcel Rioux: Entre l'utopie et la raison*, Montréal: Nouvelle Optique, 1981. Among Rioux's writings his *Essai de sociologie critique*, Montréal: Hurtubise HMH, 1978, is most pertinent as a general account of his conception of critical sociology.
7. Abraham Rotstein, *The Precarious Homestead*, Toronto: new press, 1973, pp. 121-2.
8. For a fascinating historical reconstruction of the Canadian version of the late 1960's generation, see Myrna Kostash, *Long Way from Home*, Toronto: Lorimer, 1980.
9. Susan Crean, *Who's Afraid of Canadian Culture?* Don Mills, Ont.: General Publ., 1976.
10. A general survey of this tradition is given by Denis Monière in *Le Développement des idéologies au Québec*, Montréal: Québec/Amérique, 1977; for insightful theoretical discussions focusing specifically on the national question, Nicole Laurin-Frenette's *Production de l'état et formes de la nation*, Montréal: Nouvelle Optique, 1978, should be consulted along with Robert Vandycke, "La question nationale: où en est la pensée marxiste?" *Recherches sociographiques*, vol. 21, no. 1-2, 1980, pp. 97-129.
11. There is not as yet any comparable theoretical treatment of the more recent developments of the national question in Canada, but Clement and Drache provide a helpful listing of pertinent materials in *A Practical Guide*, pp. 146-52.
12. George Grant, *Lament for a Nation*, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965, p. 20.

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13. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
14. Rotstein, pp. 69-81.
15. See Rioux, *Essai de sociologie critique* and Duchastel, *Marcel Rioux*.
16. Rioux and Crean, pp. 20-21.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
18. As evidence of this it should be noted that survey analysis has revealed that "Quebecers who support independence are not more bigoted or authoritarian. On the contrary, they tend to be more approving of minority language rights than English Canadians, and they tend to be more libertarian in their attitudes toward civil rights than other Quebecers," Michael D. Ornstein, et al. "Public Opinion and the Canadian Political Crisis," *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 15, no. 2, 1978, p. 203.
19. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, trans. H. Zohn, New York: Schocken, p. 256.
20. In this connection Rioux cites approvingly the work of Zygmunt Bauman, Jacques Attali and Marshall Sahlins.
21. For an elaborate defense of the view on the Quebec left which Rioux is opposing here, see Gilles Bourque, *L'Etat capitaliste et la question nationale*, Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1977.
22. Rioux and Crean, p. 58.
23. In the French version the discussion of the political economy of culture and communications is perfunctory and has largely an illustrative function. For more recent detailed discussions of these issues with reference to Canada, see Thomas L. McPhail, *Electronic Colonialism*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981, and Dallas W. Smythe, *Dependency Road*, Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1981. Smythe's study marks a new stage in the development of the political economy of Canadian communications and poses a number of theoretical issues which would require separate treatment to do justice.
24. Rioux and Crean, p. 43.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
27. For an often penetrating critique of the influence of Althusser on British cultural theory—which does not, however, provide an altogether suitable alternative—see Simon Clarke, et al. *One Dimensional Marxism*, London: Allison and Busby, 1980.
28. Rioux and Crean, p. 87. For this reason modern countercultural movements are viewed as expressing in part authentic utopian aspirations. This theme is developed in greater detail by a former student and a colleague of Rioux: Diane Moukhtar and Luc Racine, "Nouvelle culture, utopie et non-pourvoir," in N. Assimpoulos, et al. eds. *La Transformation du pouvoir au Québec*, Montréal: Ed. coopératives Albert Saint-Martin, 1980.

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29. In part this refers to the right of survival of a number of internally colonized peoples as celebrated, for instance, in Michèle Lalonde and Denis Monière in their recent *Cause Commune: manifeste pour une internationale des petites cultures*, Montréal: L'Hexagone, 1981. More generally, however, this plea converges with a rich tradition of decentralist social theory long cultivated by people such as George Woodcock, Ivan Illich, Paul Goodman, Murray Bookchin, and Jane Jacobs. In fact, Jacobs has recently provided a sober and independent defense of the Quebec autonomy movement: *The Question of Separatism*, New York: Vintage, 1981.
30. Though Rioux's use of the concept of "culture populaire" has affinities with the notion of "populism" used in reference to Western agrarian social movements, the two should not be confused. His concept retains reference to the process of marginalization, but generalizes the potential sources. To a great extent he follows Marcuse here.
31. Rioux and Crean, p. 90.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
33. This research is being conducted under the auspices of the "Institut Québécois de recherche sur la culture" headed by Fernand Dumont. In addition to the various related monograph series, mention should also be made of an associated new journal, *Questions de culture* (1981-).
34. More recently, Rioux has joined the fray against Trudeau in a satirical political tract titled *Pour rendre publiquement congé de quelques salauds*, Montréal: l'Hexagone, 1981. The specific political and cultural implications of Rioux's position is evident in his role as one of the founders of the "autogestion"-oriented journal *Possibles* (1976-).
35. William Appleman Williams, "Radicals and Regionalism," *Democracy*, vol. 1, no. 4, October 1981, pp. 90-2. Or as Frederic Jameson has recently admitted, following here the example of Tom Nairn on Britain rather than the case closer to home which he has often visited, the nationalist question stands as "Marxism's great historical failure": "it is increasingly clear in today's world (if it had ever been in doubt) that a Left which cannot grasp the immense Utopian appeal of nationalism (any more than it can grasp that of religion or fascism) can scarcely hope to 'reappropriate' such collective energies and must effectively doom itself to political impotence." *The Political Unconscious*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981, p. 298.
36. For one of the more perceptive and theoretically well-informed statements of these issues, see Nathan Keyfitz, "Sociology and the Canadian society," in T.N. Guinsburg and G.L. Reuber, eds. *Perspectives on the Social Sciences in Canada*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974, pp. 10-41. See also, Paul Lamy, "The Globalization of American Sociology: Excellence or Imperialism," in J. Paul Grayson, ed. *Class, State, Ideology and Change*, Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980, pp. 351-60.
37. Representatives of critical theory and sociology have been discussed in Canadian journals, most notably in the *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, and to a lesser extent in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*. The overall isolation of Canadian critical sociology is one of the reasons why Rioux and Crean's book deserves particular attention. The consequence of this situation has become especially evident in the textbook literature oriented toward "Marxist" approaches and "political economy." Such terms are used indiscriminately and little effort is made to introduce the important differentiations necessary for a selective and critical introduction. This problem relates, of course, to the difficulties in the technical literature. Symptomatically, none of these texts draw upon critical theory and sociology, a fact which points to the remarkable isolation of Canadian neo-Marxist sociology in particular. The only exception is directed by necessity to the American market: Ben Agger, *Western Marxism*, Santa Monica, Ca.: Goodyear,

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1979.

38. The theme of the relationship between political economy and critical theory has been articulated most explicitly within the Frankfurt School tradition. For a detailed account of the emergence of this problem in the early Frankfurt School, see Giacomo Marramao, "Political Economy and Critical Theory," *Telos*, no. 24, Summer 1975, pp. 56-80. More general historical accounts are available in David Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory*, Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980, and the introduction to Paul Connerton, ed. *Critical Sociology*, Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1976. The general topic has also been treated in a rather different, but illuminating way by Alvin Gouldner in his *The Two Marxisms*, New York: Seabury, 1980.
39. The principle underlying all the models of new-Marxist political economy is to explain the continuing failure of revolutionary transformation. Different regulative concepts are taken to be decisive. As Stanley Aronowitz has suggested, three basic theories have been used to account for the apparent failure of capitalism to collapse: the realization crisis emphasized in Lenin's theory of imperialism, dependency theory which explains the integration of the Third World into the world capitalist system, and the model of capital-logic:

The third position, capital-logic, tries to overcome the apparent failure of the third world revolution in a different way. A theory of late capitalism as a specific historical stage, it incorporates the theory of imperialism into an entirely new paradigm: it is the logic of accumulation itself, literally at its origins in the labor process, that the whole development of capitalism, including the problem of the proletariat as historical agency or subject, may be understood. Unlike Lenin and dependency theory, which subsume the labor process into the process of circulation of capital, capital-logic remains oriented to production relations, both with respect to its value from and its technical character. "The End of Political Economy," *Social Text*, no. 2, Summer, 1979, p. 8.

The central issue in the more recent Canadian discussions has been how to combine the indigenous version of dependency theory with variants of the production-centred capital-logic approach which goes far beyond cruder notions of class conflict. For one of the few occasions where this debate has become more explicit, see Ray Schmidt, "Canadian Political Economy: A Critique," *Studies in Political Economy*, no. 6, Autumn 1981, pp. 65-92.

40. Karl Korsch, *Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung und andere Schriften* ed. Erich Gerlach, Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1974, p. 167.
41. Leo Panitch, "Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy," *Studies in Political Economy*, no. 6, Autumn 1981, p. 28.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Among the important contributors to the debate on the foundations of the human sciences one would have to include Jürgen Habermas, Gerard Radnitzky, Richard Bernstein, Anthony Giddens, Roy Bhaskar, Joachim Israel, Jon Elster, and Johann Galtung, to name only a few. See also the magistral survey by Paul Ricoeur, *Main Trends in Philosophy*, New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1979.
44. A potential exception here is the question of the relationship between the theorizing of Innis and Marx. Ian Parker's efforts at reconciliation have been heatedly attacked by David McNally in "Staple Theory as Commodity Fetishism: Marx, Innis and Canadian Political Economy," *Studies*



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in *Political Economy*, no. 6, Autumn 1981, pp. 35-63. It is clear this debate should be continued as it goes to the heart of the relationship between staples theory and other forms of analysis, especially neo-Marxist capital-logic. At this point the staples version of dependency theory is on the defensive and highly vulnerable because it has not elaborated its metatheoretical assumptions and has failed to develop a comprehensive critique of neo-Marxist theory. Also, important issues of political strategy are at stake here.

45. Some of these themes have been touched upon in Robin Neill, *A New Theory of Value: The Canadian Economics of H.A. Innis*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972. Those who have begun to pose such questions are largely outside of or on the margins of political economy as is evident in a recent Innis symposium: William H. Melody, et al., eds. *Culture, Communication and Dependency*, Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1981.

46. As Rioux has described this relationship:

Les divergences entre les marxistes économistes et les marxistes culturels—pour employer une expression commode—semblent à la fois moindres, à certains égards, et plus graves à d'autres points de vue...c'est au sujet du passage d'un type de société à l'autre que les deux groupes peuvent s'opposer mais il semble que leurs points de vue et leurs démarches peuvent être complémentaires et devraient l'être. *Essai de sociologie critique*, p. 164.

Aronowitz expresses this in a somewhat less conciliatory manner:

...the counter-logic of the erotic, play, and the constituting subject may not be reduced either to the mode of production of material life or the mode of social reproduction (family, school, or religion in their capacity as ideological apparatuses of the state). Political economy ends when theory seeks to specify the conditions of transcendence. Marxism as critique consists in showing the *science* of political economy is descriptive of the commodity fetish. The apogee of critical science resides in specifying the non-subsumable. "The End of Political Economy," p. 51.

47. The limitations of the existing tradition of cultural analysis are evident in the items cited by Clement and Drache (pp. 146-52) on culture and nationalism. There is no sign of the range of theoretical issues of the type surveyed, for example, by Jorge Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology*, London: Hutchinson, 1979. An important exception here is John Fekete's *The Critical Twilight: Explorations in the Ideology of Anglo-American Literary Theory from Eliot to McLuhan*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977. That such a transformation is underway, however, is evident in recent work on the history of working class culture, the Concordia radio drama project, and some research underway at Trent University, the communications departments at Simon Fraser and McGill, and the sociology and social and political thought programmes at York. See also, Liora Salter, ed. *Communication Studies in Canada/Etudes Canadiennes en Communication*, Toronto: Butterworths, 1981.

48. Aronowitz expresses this crucial point as follows:

Even if capital-logic is an adequate explanation of the *origin* of the ubiquity of cultural domination in general and mass culture in particular, it cannot account for their autonomy. For having been produced as the aspect of capital's new conditions of reproduction, mass culture reproduces itself on the basis of its own logic, whose economic dimension, while not insignificant, cannot encapsulate its influence, which exceeds its intended

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function. Mass culture, as the penultimate substitute for community, conceals that fundamental social impulse, but its spurious gratifications reveal it as well...If the counter-logic is not theorized as utopia, the proletarian public sphere, popular culture that is rooted in everyday resistance, and the possibilities for transcending capital itself are theoretically foreclosed. "End of Political Economy," p. 50

49. A social psychologist, Peter Archibald, in *Social Psychology as Political Economy*, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978, has made a useful contribution to drawing out this dimension of political economy. His account suffers, however, from a superficial rejection of the possibilities of social phenomenology and symbolic interactionism to contribute to these matters. The most serious consequence of this social psychological blindspot is in the area of the theory of social movements. Though the re-introduction of class analysis has corrected important deficiencies of much conventional historical research, it has not led to any serious reconsideration of the deficiencies of classic Marxist analysis and culminates in the most superficial of generalities as, for example, in Gary B. Rush, "Political Economy and Social Movements: Notes Towards Theory and Analysis," in John Allan Fry, ed. *Economy, Class and Social Reality*, Scarborough: Butterworth, 1979, pp. 435-59. This is also evident in R.J. Brym and R.J. Sacouman, eds. *Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada*, Toronto: Hogtown Press, 1979, though the historical richness of the materials compensates in part. The tendency for many political economists to simply denounce populist and nationalist movements as petit bourgeois and reformist betrays a dogmatic tendency which blinds analysis to the dynamic elements of contemporary politics. For a characteristic example of this kind of reductionism, see James Overton, "Towards a Critical Analysis of Neo-Nationalism in Newfoundland," in Brym and Sacouman, pp. 219-49. And no one on the left in Canada or elsewhere has dared to provide an adequate rejoinder to Mancur Olson Jr. in his *Logic of Collective Action*, New York: Schocken, 1965. His analysis of the discrepancy between the individual and collective rationality and how it undermines the utopian thrust of social movements remains an indispensable point of departure for any strategy of radical change. The theory of "autogestion" seems to provide an implicit response derived from the failure of traditional forms of party organization and mobilization.
50. This holds primarily for the theory of the subject as outlined in various sections of Louis Althusser, *Positions*, Paris: Editions Sociales, 1976. Empirical applications have assumed the form of an essentially reductive form of historical discourse analysis based on linguistic models. See here Régine Robin, et al. *Histoire et linguistique*, Paris: Armand Colin, 1973. A less static strategy of analysis, which attempts to reconcile semiology, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and the theory of the subject, has animated recent British discussions as, for example, in Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, *Language and Materialism*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. But as for a dynamic social psychology suitable for purposes of historical and ethnographic research, Bourdieu's "theory of practice" and key concept of "habitus" appear more fruitful. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Outlines of a Theory of Practice*, trans. R. Nice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, and *Le Sens pratique*, Paris: Minuit, 1980.
51. For a valuable complementary study which draws upon Gregory Bateson's communication theory for a social psychology of domination and dependency, see Tony Wilden, *The Imaginary Canadian*, Vancouver: Pulp Press, 1980. Though the militancy of his use of the language of colonialism may make many readers wince, Wilden's often startling revelations about Canadian identity and history point to a form of cultural suppression of possibilities which is difficult to deny. A more nuanced vocabulary for expressing this form of "advanced" cultural domination remains to be elaborated.
52. It is not possible here to consider in more detail Rioux's use of the concept of alienation, but see his *Essai de sociologie critique*, pp. 85-95. What is called for, of course, is a broader critical social psychology whose outlines are now emerging. For earlier analyses of the crisis of academic social

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- psychology, see Joachim Israel, "Stipulations and Constructions in the Social Sciences," in J. Israel and H. Tajfel, eds. *The Context of Social Psychology*, London and New York: Academic Press, 1972, pp. 123-211 and Nigel Armistead, ed. *Reconstructing Social Psychology*, Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin 1974. Regrettably, the promise of ethnomethodology and phenomenology to this project has still not been realized in the form anticipated in Peter Dreitzel, ed. *Recent Sociology No. 2*, New York: Macmillan, 1970. But under the heading of "socialization" theory, this topic continues to inspire research in West Germany, cf. Dieter Guelen, *Das vergesellschaftete Subjekt*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977. See also Philip Wexler, "Toward a Critical Social Psychology," *Psychology and Social Theory*, no. 1, Spring/Summer, 1981, pp. 52-68.
53. For a provocative example of the former, see James Ogilvy, *Many Dimensional Man*, New York: Harper Colophon, 1979, and of the latter, William Leiss, *The Limits to Satisfaction*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976.
54. A good example of this, because theoretically well-informed, is James Sacouman's assumption that a Maritimes-rooted political economy has a greater chance of developing an effective political strategy because of the previous weakness of "third road" populist and social democratic efforts. What is hard to follow is why a region previously resistant to protest should as a consequence be ripe for working-class mobilization in response to "concrete, theoretically informed research that is effectively communicated and organized," "The 'Peripheral' Maritimes and Canada-Wide Marxist Political Economy," *Studies in Political Economy*, no. 6, Autumn 1981, p. 146. Signs of historical working-class resistance and state coercion should not be mistaken for an emergent counter-hegemonic movement; nor is it clear why the pattern will not follow the populist and social democratic path found elsewhere in Canada. This is not meant to discourage such political economic research, but to sober its political "pretensions" and call for other forms of inquiry as well.
55. This type of "wishy-washy" class analysis is characteristic of both the "Comité des Cent" and the "Regroupement pour le socialisme" as defined by Marc Ferland and Yves Vaillancourt, *Socialisme et indépendance au Québec: pistes sur le mouvement ouvrier et populaire*, Montréal: Ed. Socialisme et Indépendance/Ed. coopérative Albert St-Martin, 1981. Such "class analysis" is then coupled with an astounding naiveté (if not deceit) about the elementary constraints of economic scarcity and the existing system of power and production. In the name of such "un vaste mouvement populaire pluri-classiste" all of the public and para-public unions are told by their "maître penseurs" that they have an obligation to maintain their already excessive wage gains (relative to the private sector), even if it (as seems possible) bankrupts the province, worsens the situation for the impotent groups, makes the envisioned coalition impossible, destroys the PQ, and restores with even greater power the rule of the Quebec Liberal Party. See, for example, the reasoning of Jean-Marc Pottle and Thierry Hentsch, "Le malaise du syndicalisme québécois," *Le Devoir*, 18 janvier 1982, p. 11. Where criticism of the PQ is most just, however, is in pointing out that it has attempted to adjust to the fiscal crisis by following the lines of least resistance (budget cuts in the areas where there is the least capacity for a defensive response), rather than spreading the burden equitably throughout society. Remarkably, the PQ's leftist critics seem unable to grasp that a new strategy of industrial development requires capital which must come either from internal savings and investment or more borrowing. Given the fiscal crisis, therefore, the PQ is powerless to carry out its programme and part of the socialist left has tried to make the absurd claim that it has an alternative other than a "Cuban-style" revolution that would last about as long as it takes to shut off an oil line. For a sober assessment of the crisis of public finances and a call for a freeze on public sector wages, see Pierre Fortin, "Les finances publiques: un coup de barre radical s'impose," *Le Devoir*, 14 janvier 1982, p. 19.
56. Daniel Drache, "Ten Good Years: The Beginnings of Hinterland Resistance," in Drache, ed. *Debates and Controversies*, p. 56.

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57. For a broad, historical introduction to the topic of "autogestion" see Alain Guillermin and Yvon Bourdet, *Clefs pour l'autogestion*, Paris: Seghers, 1975; and for an influential general formulation see Pierre Rosanvallon, *l'Âge de l'autogestion*, Paris: Seuil, 1976.
58. This is one of the most fundamental contradictions of the recent Manifesto of the "Comité des Cent" in Quebec. Though its call for de-centralization, worker's participation, and a fully democratic form of party organization echoes the influence of "autogestion" discussions in the francophone milieu, it is coupled with a classic appeal based on the supposed economic benefits of independence and socialism. By not fully acknowledging the tensions between industrialization and alternative forms of work organization, this document promises too much and provides no guidelines for resolving the dilemma. Moreover, its call for opting out of the North American economy betrays the complete poverty of its conception of transition. Great silence surrounds the question of where the capital for development is to come from and how to persuade the "working and popular classes" to accept an interim decline in their standard of living through voluntary savings.
59. Such questions have not, for the most part, been posed by the new political economy, even if there are expressions on the periphery, as in Abraham Rotstein, ed. *Beyond Industrial Growth*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976. In lamenting the consequences of a staples economy, dependency theorists have tended to fall back on a celebration of industrialization without adequately posing the question of alternative forms of economic development. Neo-Marxist capital-logic approaches propose an alternative form of industrialization, but do not really examine its fundamental assumptions which are, to be sure, still rooted in the logic of a growth-oriented society. There is, however, a more sociologically-oriented form of political economy which can be reconciled with a critique industrialization as, for example, in Patricia Marchak, *In Whose Interests*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979.
60. Grant's formulation bears repeating:

...indigenous cultures are dying everywhere in the modern world. French-Canadian nationalism is a last-ditch stand. The French on this continent will at least disappear from history with more than the smirks and whimpers of their English-speaking compatriots—with their flags flying and, indeed, with some of their guns blazing. The reality of their cultures, and their desire not to be swamped, cannot save them from the inexorable facts in the continental case. Solutions vary to the problem of how an autonomous culture can be maintained in Quebec. But all the answers face the same dilemma: Those who want to maintain separateness also want the advantages of the age of progress. These two ends are not compatible, for the pursuit of one negates the pursuit of the other. Nationalism can only be asserted successfully by an identification with technological advance; but technological advance entails the disappearance of those indigenous differences that give substance to nationalism. *Lament for a Nation*, p. 76.

61. Jon Elster, *Logic and Society*, New York: Wiley, 1978, p. 7.
62. Such a view of change challenges both certain tendencies toward an unfolding, linear model of development in Marx and the even more evolutionistic conceptions characteristic of most sociological theories. As Anthony Giddens has recently argued, here supplementing Rioux and Crean's general position, a more adequate approach to contemporary social change would have to give more prominence to:

(1) Relations of autonomy and dependence among societies or regions of

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social systems...(2) The uneven development of different sectors or regions of social systems...(3) Critical phases of radical social change, in which the existing alignment of major institutions in a society becomes transformed, whether or not this involves processes of political revolution...and (4) A 'leapfrog' idea of change, according to which the 'advanced' in one set of circumstances may inhibit further change at a later date; while on the other hand that which is 'retarded' at one point in time may later become a propitious basis for rapid advancement. *Central Problems in Social Theory* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979, pp. 225-9.

Canada and Quebec provide interesting illustrations of each of these processes and Rioux and Crean's plea falls directly within the purview of the final point: "For leapfrog processes of change involve the awareness that some events in the past need not be repeated in the future: that *avoidable possible worlds* are the other face of future states of society to be striven for." *Ibid.*, p. 230.

63. This holds primarily for neo-Marxist, especially Althusserian, versions of political economy. Non-structuralist versions tend toward a more Gramscian conception without, however, the autonomous, counterhegemonic proletarian culture which he could take for granted. Staples and dependency theory has not really worked out a coherent alternative aside from a pragmatic recognition of the need to rehabilitate nationalism as a mobilizing force in a dependent economy.
  64. Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le Capitalisme utopique*, Paris: Seuil, 1979.
  65. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
  66. Zygmunt Bauman, *Socialism: The Active Utopia*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1976, pp. 139-40. Rioux and Crean's use of the concept "imaginaire sociale" actually derives from Cornelius Castoriadis, *L'Institution imaginaire de la société*, Paris: Seuil, 1975. Also in this context cf. Fred R. Dallmayr, *Twilight of Subjectivity*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
  67. Harold A. Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1964, pp. 204 and 211.
  68. In this respect the situation in Europe is only moderately better. As Habermas has noted in an interview, he considers himself as one of the "last of the Mohicans" in having had the opportunity to combine philosophy and social science. Symbolically enough, the chair in philosophy and sociology created for Horkheimer was abolished in 1971 with Habermas' departure from Frankfurt. When pressed to cite a concrete example of philosophers still able to combine social scientific standards and a "public, politically effective," role, he names Charles Taylor as a type found even in the Anglo-Saxon domain, "even Oxford." What Habermas fails to mention, however, is that Taylor is in intellectual and political exile, having failed to gain significant appreciation or influence at home in Canada. See Jürgen Habermas, *Kleine Politische Schriften* (I-IV), Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981, p. 487.
  69. Rioux and Crean, p. 116-7.
  70. Aronowitz, p. 52.
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