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WOMEN AND
THE CINEMA:

FELLINI'S
CITY OF
WOMEN

GABOR'S
ANGI VERA

and

WOMEN AND
VIOLENCE

ECONOMIC McCARTHYISM

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ECONOMIC McCARTHYISM

Business be Damned

Hannah Arendt has said that the return of morality to public life begins with the injunction for truth in politics. Following Arendt, it is time to say the simple truth that the Depression in Québec and Canada is the inevitable and predictable consequence of the continued subordination of Canadian society to the political economy of American capitalism; and that, for all of the speeches by federal political leadership to the contrary and for all of the little homilies about patience delivered by Canadian banks, it is a lie—a profound, vast, and uninterrupted lie—that the Depression cannot be resolved through immediate and decisive political action. It is true, of course, that the Depression cannot be overcome within the terms of the liberal state or as long as that active and strong alliance between federal and provincial political leaders, liberal and conservative, and the class of organized capitalists (that network of banks, multinational corporations and energy consortiums) is permitted to continue to dominate the Canadian polity, turning the whole of the country into an instrument, an "opportunity", for the maximization of corporate profits and political power.

This is not a Depression for organized sections of the business community. For them, it's just a classic opportunity to impose a disciplinary model upon the work force; to "roll-back" the gains in labour legislation and wages made by women and men in the work-force; to defeat politically the whole structure of public sector unionization; to render superfluous all the claims for entitlements made by the dispossessed in the social economy of Canada and Québec; and to "rationalize" at the level of ideology the fact that organized capitalism can no longer provide work for significant and growing elements of the labour force. Under the relentless pressure of American capitalism, justified by the ideology of monetarism and welcomed *from within* by the corporate business community in Canada the populations of Canada and Québec are being pushed back, and this rapidly, to conditions of primitive capitalism. Business has declared war against Society; and it is assisted in its struggle against the national interest by political leadership which has, for whatever reason, lost the will to resist. It's time to remember the often overlooked injunction of the philosopher, Elijah Jordan: *Business Be Damned.*[1] And, in remembering Jordan's insight that there is an irreconcilable hostility betwen the human interest and the business interest, then we should also remember that there remains only one institution capable of expressing the popular will and of organizing political resistance against economic colonialism; and that institution is the State. That political leadership is now

moribund and paralysed only means that a new generation of thinkers must now arise to defend the national interest against economic and cultural imperialism, from without and from within. As the French Socialists have said: the task now is to break the power of money.

A Displaced Crisis

It is no secret that the United States maintains economic hegemony over the continent and stays one small step ahead of a domestic catastrophe in its political economy by implementing a political strategy which has successfully displaced the worst effects of the present "crisis" of advanced capitalism into the other societies of North America: Mexico, Québec and Canada. The political control of the credit mechanism and the shearing off of interest-rates from their "naturalistic" setting in the actual play of the market, in short the creation of a cybernetic (politically directed) economy, are the policy instruments which have been utilized by the Reagan Administration to deflect the main force of the current convulsion in the historical development of capitalism into the "dependencies" of the Empire. Mexico, Québec and Canada are drained of cash as capital follows its natural flight to the centre of the international money market in New York; the first shocks of a recessionary economy (a recession which is managed and, in fact, created *from above*) are played out in their domestic economies; the labour force, social legislation, the sphere of public morality itself are made over in the image of the disciplinary society; massive unemployment, the permanent shut-downs of factories, the creation of a surplus class of workers with no hope for future employment: all of these are but the detritus of an economic war which is waged by the United States against its immediate geographical neighbours. What is a managed recession in the United States is an almost uncontrollable Depression in Québec and Canada.

The federal government, always at least one step behind in its analysis and response to the crisis, is now caught facing the wrong front. While the *real* crisis for Canadians lies in the catastrophic effects of forced deflationary policies (liquidity crises, unemployment and welfare—all the signs of the immobility of Depression), the federal government declares war, again and again, against inflation: that symptomatic sign of an economy which has reached the final moment of an expansionary cycle of development. But, faithful to the monetarist principles which have penetrated deeply into the consciousness of federal policy planners and which reveal how profoundly the federal government is implicated in the basic logic of capitalist development, the government proceeds to "manage" inflation with a series of social policies which, from the standpoint of a just public morality, are obscene. How else to describe the recommendation by federal planners that the unemployed can expect no relief for at least another year or the fact that the national government refuses to accept responsibility for rendering superfluous a whole generation of Canadian students who, trained in

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public institutions according to educational policies set in place by the federal government itself, now find that their advanced training in the social sciences and humanities has no occupational outlet. Those who now speak of a new "lost generation" of Canadians are not inaccurate: the generation of the 1970's, this best hope for a rethinking of Canadian life, has been abandoned by the Canadian Government; it is stranded in society with surplus-consciousness and a deficit of job prospects. In the absence of any public leadership which is willing to assume responsibility for society as a whole, and which would contest the practical and ideological subordination of Canadian society to the interests of business, everyone is left to deal, individually and in radical isolation, with a situation of intense economic pressure. It is not surprising that under the pressure of the Depression, human beings begin to break. The stasis, paralysis and decay of public life is matched in personal life by the return of the Spencerian ego as the model of the "survival" personality of the 1980's: competitive, isolationist, privative and fearful.

In the face of this situation of genuine national distress, of an economic emergency which spreads suffering in its wake, it is scandalous that the national government, instead of attempting to relieve the state of emergency by making of public institutions a shield between economy and society, does precisely the reverse. In active collaboration with the public morality of the "new right", federal political leaders speak now of the value of a "disciplinary society" and of the need to purge the Canadian economy of its "unproductive" members. Canadian society requires a radical rethinking of the dependent character of our culture and economy (a *philosophy of culture* which would insist that economy be guided by substantive social values and that primacy be given to the political over the economic, to the public interest over economic self-interest), but instead we are confronted with a national government which betrays the human interest, again and again, by turning its back on real human suffering and by adopting as the central values of Canadian economic policy the public morality of neo-conservatism: a public morality which is antithetical to the social interests of Canadians and which, in any case, is the precise ideological instrument through which the Power apparatus of the United States has brought Canada and Québec to a state of forced dependency. As one banker in New York said recently: perhaps now the Canadian Government realizes the "inevitability of economic interdependence."

Canada and Québec are confronted with a "managed crisis" (managed, that is, by the power apparatus of advanced capitalism) which, while it is played out in the theatre, in the language, of economy, is specifically *political* in its origins and resolution. That the political will of the national government has been broken by the Reagan Administration simply means that Canada and Québec are vulnerable now to a very real economic *coup d'état*, to a cruel and hyper-realistic play of power by the United States against its northern "dependencies". We witness now an almost catastrophic "deflation" of the political powers of the Canadian Government in the direction of the business community. The Canadian Government has always placed its political trust in continentalism and thus it is at least

consistent that when in the crunch the Reagan Administration demonstrates that the United States will always go for itself, that the Canadian State should be doomed by the sword of continentalism. The political intervention by the American new right in the form of an upward manipulation of interest-rates is the immediate, and most visible, cause of the current Depression in Canada. It is the revalorisation of the "power of money" under the auspices of the Reagan Administration which has blocked the federal government's intervention into the natural resource sector and which leads to a generalized economic crisis in Canada (measured by any index, whether in housing starts, unemployment, welfare payments, business bankruptcies). And it is the political impact of the ascending spiral of interest-rates, telegraphed all the more quickly into the Canadian economy by the hyper-monetarists who have infiltrated the "command positions" of the federal government, which represents a decisive political victory for American capitalism over Canadian society. Before the wave-like motion of ascending interest-rates, before, that is, the imperatives of the international money system, the Canadian government is powerless to plan. While the Canadian Minister of Finance may report to the IMF that the fiscal crisis is about to be solved (and his choice of the terms "light at the end of the tunnel" is reminiscent of that other famous prognosticar, Robert MacNamara, just at the beginning of the war in Vietnam), the bitter reality is better told by the financial writers for the *New York Times:*

> Mr. MacEachan has said repeatedly that Canada's economic problems are almost entirely attributable to high American interest rates, which draw funds out of Canada and into United States investments. The recent economic summit meeting in Versailles, France was a severe disappointment for Mr. Trudeau's Government in that it failed to obtain any promise that high American interest rates would soon decline.
> But the impression this stance created was of a helpless Canadian Government whose hands were tied by American economic policy. Last week,after having promised only a simple economic statement, Mr. MacEachan announced that he would introduce a new budget, an apparent effort to show that the Government was doing something more than watching the American economy evolve.[2]

A satellite country with a satellite government; and moreover, a government which seems to welcome the "disciplining" of Canadian society by the American new right. How else, after all, to explain the curious fact that even after the long-range plans of the federal government in the direction of an advanced liberal state have been subverted by the monetarist strategy (which would prefer that Canada keep to its traditional role as a simple dependency) that the federal government rushes to institute in Canadian society the disciplinary values of the

new right. The legacy of this government is surely that by its continued subordination of any authentic regional voice, through its undermining of Canadian cultural experience, and by its overt collaboration with organized business, it leaves a society which is ready to go, and this of all things, more conservative.

McCarthysim also operates at the level of economy, and always at the level of public morality.

A Philosophy of Canadian Culture

The continuing crisis of political leadership precludes the public sphere as a source of a new, and more critical, vision of Canadian society or as the basis for a radical rethinking of the political strategies by which this country might finally break free of the cycle of "not so-silent surrender" to foreign capital and to the play of a relentless power apparatus centered in the United States. And yet, in the absence of a coherent philosophy of Canadian culture—a critical vision of Canada which would link together economy, public morality, and politics—we are left defenceless before the relentless dominations and powers of advanced capitalism. The peculiar strength, the actual Power, of advanced capitalist institutions is that they operate most strategically through control of systems of mass communication, through the capturing and subordination of the "symbolizations" of a society, through, that is, taking control of and playing back against the society the definitions of truth, value and reality in the social order. To struggle against the economic crisis, to "break the power of money", we must first break the domination of the symbolic order, of Canadian cultural practices, by the ideological hegemony of the United States.

In *Marxism and Literature*, Raymond Wiliams has spoken of the existence of an "emergent cultural practice" as the first sign of real political resistance against the structures of domination of advanced capitalism. Noting that "since what the dominant has effectively seized is indeed the ruling definition of the social", Williams argues that the articulation of an emergent cultural practice is the first refusal of a further penetration by the dominant order into the sphere of "reserved" or "resigned" regions of "experience and practice and meaning".

The development in Canada of an "emergent cultural practice" would involve simultaneously the deployment of two critical strategies: first, the development of a coherent analysis concerning how the institutions of advanced capitalism maintain a monopolistic hold on the entire process by which cultural and social practices are "mediated" in this society; and second, the creation of a critical and comparative understanding of the most vital tendencies in the regional expressions of Canadian culture. A philosophy of Canadian culture must, at one and the same time, "return to the country" by striving to give a public voice to that rich and divergent tradition of cultural practices in Canada and Québec which have always been silenced by the hegemony of business "culture"; and it must "connect again" to the world by absorbing what is relevant of the theoretical

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critiques of the "symbolic hegemony" of advanced capitalism which have been produced by theorists working in Australia, France, Germany, Britain and, of course, in Latin America. A critical philosophy of Canadian culture would be situated, therefore, midpoint between theoretical criticism and populist practice; a gravitation-point between a cosmopolitan critique of the hegemonic cultural order of advanced capitalism and a regional appreciation of "emergent cultural practices". In this time of national economic emergency—a time when political leadership has abdicated the will to resist—everything depends on the creation of a theory and practice of Canadian culture. For it is only the development of a philosophy of Canadian culture which will finally provide the means of breaking beyond the logic of economic reality which has produced the Depression as its predictable outcome and which, therefore, will provide the practical basis for a retheorisation of the Canadian State. It is a certainty that no society can retain its economic sovereignty if its politics, social practices, and work experience are not infused with a critical cultural practice, with a "lived" philosophy of culture. Confronted with the hard times of economic McCarthyism, it must be our gamble, our wager, to make of the Canadian left the moving force of public life by transforming Canadian cultural experience into an indictment of the power of business.

Arthur Kroker

Notes

1. Elijah Jordan, *Business be Damned.* New York: H. Schuman, 1952.

2. *New York Times,* July, 1982.

ELEMENTS OF A RADICAL THEORY OF PUBLIC LIFE: FROM TÖNNIES TO HABERMAS AND BEYOND*

John Keane

Public opinion ... deserves to be as much respected as despised
<div align="right">Hegel</div>

Since the Bolshevik Revolution, all emancipatory political thinking has been concerned with the subject of public life. Initiated by Rosa Luxemburg's critique of the earliest phase of that revolution,[1] this tradition of autonomous political thinking is of considerable relevance to any deepened understanding of the growth of public spheres under late capitalist conditions. At least, this is the argument of the following essay, which can also be read as a tentative and by no means exhaustive survey of this tradition's achievements and failures.

It should be emphasised that the starting point of this survey is immanent. It seeks to avoid "mere moralizing" (as Hegel called it) by thinking with and against several important twentieth-century contributors to a theory of autonomous public life. The argument begins with Tönnies' path-breaking critique of public opinion. The narrative then broadens into an examination of Dewey's attempt to retrieve and radicalise the old liberal bourgeois principle of publicity. Dewey's defence of the principle of "free and systematic communication" is seen to be especially important, inasmuch as it foregrounds themes of vital importance to more recent critiques of late capitalism—especially to those of Jürgen Habermas.

During the past several decades, it is argued, Habermas has made the most interesting and ambitious contributions to a radical theory of public life. These contributions are analysed and evaluated in some detail. It is proposed that his recent preoccupation with a theory of universal pragmatics is less than fully consistent with itself. Weakened by several internal difficulties, and therefore unable to realise its guiding political intentions and implications, this theoretical project is marked by political retreats. Habermas' advocacy of new forms of public life, it is argued, is contradicted by the abstract-formal mode of reconstructive argumentation which has more and more come to guide his inquiries. The theoretical project of defending the principle of autonomous public life, the remaining third of the essay concludes, must accordingly move beyond the antinomies and formalisms of Habermas' otherwise important arguments. This project must seek to internalise a range of substantive theoretical and political questions, several of which are briefly analysed.

JOHN KEANE

I

Toward a Critique of Public Opinion

At the outset, it is important to appreciate the background historical context associated with the rise of theoretical defenses of public life. Evidently, the resurgence of a dissident tradition of public-political thinking during the twentieth century has not been without motivation. It must be seen as an effect of the general advance of bureaucratization since the late nineteenth century and, in particular, as a critical response to the dramatic expansion of corporatist relations between bureaucratically organised institutions of social and state power. As Hilferding and others first recognised,[2] this corporatist recasting of life was prompted by a number of decisive background developments. The most important of these included the cartelization of economic power within civil society; the emergence of organised capital and labour groupings; the formation of alliances between these "interest groups" and mass, bureaucratically structured political parties; and, finally, the tendency for bureaucratic states everywhere to claim new and expanded powers of organization, powers which were typically delegated to business, agricultural and labour organizations. These corporatist tendencies were considerably reinforced by the economic and political mobilizations of World War I, the heightened struggles between the extra-parliamentary left and right, and by the manifold attempts to "accredit" organised labour. Everywhere in the heartlands of the capitalist world, political stability was seen by the ruling groups to demand more bureaucratic and centralised structures of bargaining and control which defied the previous distinction between "private" power and "public" authority.

This call for bureaucratic centralisation necessarily accelerated the erosion of parliamentary influence and representative government. The locus of bargaining and policy-making from here began to shift to executive authority, to unofficial party or coalition caucuses, and to networks of state ministries. The formation of political consensus became more and more captive to processes of bargaining between key, bureaucratically-organised interests bent on the mobilisation of "public opinion". This bargaining and mobilisation process, it should be emphasised, did not result in the simple *repression* of public life. During this period of transition to 'late' capitalism, bureaucratic organisations increasingly struggled to mobilise and optimise "public opinion" for particular ends. The ruling corporate and state powers began to rely less upon old-fashioned, "public be damned" strategies; guided by techniques drawn from wartime propaganda and consumer advertising and through the assistance of "counsels on public relations",[3] public life was to be normalised and put in order. The accumulation of capital, it seemed, more and more presupposed the accumulation of bureaucratic state power, of which the administrative accumulation of "public opinion"

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was to be a crucial aspect. Public opinion was to be neither simply obeyed nor evaded. With a high degree of scientific-technical accuracy, it could be expanded and "directed", fashioned to suit given interests.

This early twentieth century disciplining of public life by the "forces of order" was mediated by intellectual campaigns against what was anachronistically and misleadingly termed the "classical" theory of democracy and public opinion.[4] A growing body of welfare- and post-liberal discourse[5] now openly questioned the empirical and ethical validity of earlier liberal defences of "the public", especially their presumption of the male, property-owning "omnicompetent citizen".[6] This questioning process typically sustained itself upon deep-seated beliefs in the fruitfulness of empirical-analytic inquiry. The motivational origins of "public opinion", it was said, could be uncovered and analysed. The effectiveness of public opinion management could in turn be measured. Pareto's insistence that public opinion must be seen as an instance of derivations—non-rational actions clothed in "idealistic" garb[7] and Wallas' conviction that "the empirical art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the deliberate exploitation of subconscious non-rational preferences"[8]—provide two illustrations of a more general tendency during this period to analyze the unconscious forces hidden behind the formation and manipulation of public life. Political men, it was claimed, skilfully exploit privately-motivated formulae and compulsive gestures in their efforts at "getting results" with crowds. Their emotional, erratic behaviour was in turn easily incited through the process of imitation and collective suggestion. Motives arising from maladjustments to the environment were said to be susceptible to transference; they could be displaced upon "public" objects and "rationalised" in terms of a more universal public interest.[9] These kinds of discourses on the motivational points of origin of political action commonly merged with efforts at measuring "public opinion".[10] Drawing implicitly on market consumer research,[11] the investigation of "public opinion" tacitly proposed an equivalence between the universes of consumption and politics. Publics, it was announced, could be probed and measured, even predicted. Proceeding from the assumptions that, first, individuals must necessarily hold opinions about all matters and, second, that these opinions could be statistically sampled, tabulated as "results" and mathematically reconstructed, "public opinion" was deemed to be synonymous with the automatic opinion of all and the considered opinion of none. It constituted the sum of empirically existing beliefs of individuals, whose formation within an ensemble of relations of power was accepted (in accordance with a nominalist epistemology) as quite unproblematic.

It is necessary to emphasise that these anti-democratic vindications of the measurement and manufacture of public opinion by no means went unchallenged. Tönnies' discussions of public opinion, best expressed perhaps in his path-breaking work, *Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung*,[12] constitute one of the earliest and most insightful contributions to this resistance. Tönnies' contributions to a critique of public opinion are complex, and can only be sketched here. It suffices here to note that they form part of his more general concern (shared with Weber) to clarify the meaning of aspects of modern bourgeois society through

the elaboration and inductive-empirical rendering of "pure", ideal-typical concepts. In contrast to Weber, however, Tönnies places the category of public opinion (*öffentlichen Meinung*) at the centre of his project. According to his schema, the modern civilising process—the triumph of *gesellschaftliche* formations over those marked by patterns of *Gemeinschaft*—distinctively transforms the predominant types of collective will.[13] Modes of life structured by rationally-calculated contracts, state legislation and public opinion come to predominate. Contracts take the place of familial concord (*Eintracht*); legislation (*Gesetzgebung*) replaces the rustic folkways and mores of custom (*Sitte*); and, advancing beyond Weber, Tönnies emphasises that public opinion displaces religious faith. The latter have been, the former are becoming the decisive elements in modern social and political life[14]. In Tönnies' view, modern forms of collective will are increasingly structured by convention or calculation (especially at the site of economic production and exchange), by state legislation which seeks to regulate action by way of the establishment of rational-legal order and finally, by public opinion, which orients itself primarily to the political-ethical aspects of life in the associational type of society.[15]

Tönnies is convinced that the rise of public opinion is co-terminous with the disenchantment of modern bourgeois civilisation: "In recent centuries, the Christian religion has lost what public opinion has gained."[16] Formerly detested and forcefully proscribed as detrimental to peace and respectability, public opinion more and more places this age under the spell of atheistic criticism and "divisive and disintegrating purposive thought."[17] Public life and public opinion come to be seen as the principal powers in the political cosmos, lighting the paths of governments as a guiding star. The "public" comes to be loved for the enemies it makes: unproductive tyrants who choke public opinion; malefactors who avoid the detection of judges; the cowardly who criticise the general incapacity only in defence of their own. The past is confidently berated by the bearers of public opinion as an age of unreasonable darkness. To speak through Tönnies' categories, the form of modern collective will of which public opinion is a crucial aspect, ceases to be an "essential will" (*Wesenwille*), one defined by its traditional emotive or absolutist qualities. The modern collective will instead becomes identical with an "arbitrary will" (*Kürwille*), with forms of thoughtful action structured by the calculation of means of attaining ends reached through deliberation.[18] In accordance with this tendency, the bearers of public opinion manifest their social and political power by way of their approval or disapproval of political events, by demanding that the state adopt certain practices and abolish certain abuses, by insisting upon administrative reforms and legislative measures, in brief, by exercising critical judgments, after the manner of a calculating judge, for the sake of an allegedly common interest.[19]

It should be noted in passing that Tönnies here opposes the tendency of his contemporaries to speak of public opinion as the sum total of vaguely articulated opinions on any matter. "Public opinion" is not synonymous with the *volonté de tous* (to recall Rousseau's categories). It does not consist in the mere sum of actually existing opinions of individuals; it is not the automatic opinion of all and

the considered opinion of none.[20] For Tönnies, on the contrary, public opinion must be viewed as properly directed both to the scrutiny of existing relations of power and the formation of correct and good actions. The growth of public opinion under modern conditions presupposes "reasonable and deliberate" subjects who act in accordance with their considered opinions. It presupposes that these competent subjects can both define the boundaries and relations between individual, "private" opinions and the general opinion of a politically conscious public. Public opinion is "a common will which exercises critical judgment for the sake of a common interest and thereby affects 'private' forms of conduct and action in either a restraining or furthering manner."[21]

With reference to contemporary bourgeois societies, Tönnies again and again remarks upon the growing and already-tremendous influence of the belief in public opinion so conceived. This belief has become a question of habit, no longer a controversial matter. Tönnies advances the thesis that the belief that "public opinion" is "strong and forceful" has become a crucial, taken for granted aspect of public opinion itself.[22] Through the course of the civilising process, the power of public opinion begins to resemble that of the various religious creeds which it has supplanted. "Public opinion" can be compared to a sacred and dominating faith, jealous of its own sovereignty and sure of its own self-vindicating truth. By contrast with its more tenuous status in earlier phases of modernity, "public opinion" becomes (to invoke Tönnies' physics-derived term) more "solid": to believe in the tenets of public opinion is established as a reasonable conviction, indeed a universal obligation. "Public opinion" undergoes something like a deification, assuming the phantasmic appearance of a living body over and above those who are its agents. It is increasingly represented "as a thinking being, and it is frequently either adored or maligned as if it were a Supernatural, quasi-mystical being."[23]

It is precisely this deification of public opinion which provokes a measure of trepidation in Tönnies' analyses. The triumphant emergence of public opinion as a crucial aspect of modernity's collective will is a fundamentally ambiguous development. The persuasive strength of this "public opinion", it is observed, is inversely proportional to its authenticity. Tönnies observes Hegel's warning (issued in the *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*) that public opinion deserves at once to be respected and despised. Of fundamental concern to Tönnies is the growing tendency of organised, private interests to transfigure public opinion. He pointedly emphasises that, in the history of the modern bourgeois world, public opinion has most often been the opinion of the dominant, urban, propertied and "educated" classes; "the public" typically excluded the plebian classes. It is nevertheless insisted that the novelty of the contemporary situation consists in its more subtle and transparent formation of (pseudo-) public opinion through administrative means. Nowadays, organised powers become intent on promoting both a favourable opinion toward their particular operations and goals, and a more generalised public opinion which is in accordance with their own perceived interests. Urged on by the imperative to struggle against, or collude with perceived opponents who are also bent on opinion-

making, all organised interests must strive to transform a possible "public" disfavour into a favourable regard. Public opinion is worked on, manufactured: "Public opinion is belaboured, with the frequent result that *the* public opinion is *made* thereby."[24] The influence of the organised press (then the leading medium of formal communication) is especially crucial.[25] The press more and more represents itself as the organised expression, indeed, as the "reflection" of a public which is in reality an agglomeration of power-seeking, private interests. This commanding, opinion-shaping role of the media flows equally from its formal aspects (e.g., oligopolistic patterns of ownership and control; the layout of "news"), its selective (or "biased") content (editorials, disguised advertising, intentional or unintentional falsification of events) and its systematic links of dependency with other social power groupings. The symbiotic relationship between organised capital and the press is seen by Tönnies to be particularly decisive, inasmuch as advertising, which is the main business of newspaper is simultaneously a crucial tool in the organisational strategies of commercial and industrial capital.[26] Tönnies therefore concludes that the logic of the production, exchange and consumption of "judgments and opinion" tends to assume that form common to all commodities: "In this form of communication, judgments and opinion are wrapped up like grocers' goods and offered for consumption in their objective reality. It is prepared and offered to our generation in the most perfect manner by the newspapers, which make possible the quickest production, multiplication, and distribution of facts and thoughts, just as the hotel kitchen provides food and drink in every conceivable form and quantity."[27]

It was Tönnies'hope that the subordination crystallised within this planned commodification of public opinion would soon come to an end: "public opinion does not yet risk accepting 'socialism', but it does no longer dare reject it."[28] The expansion of mass education and reforms of the media, he hoped, would foster the "public" acceptance of the need to democratise the formation of its own opinions. Of course, Tönnies' anticipation of a "public ennobling of humanity"[29] was not to be realised. Everywhere in the organised capitalist world, there emerged during his time a deep skepticism within higher circles about the competence of autonomous, politically active publics. This skepticism resembled the earlier conservative turn against Enlightenment. Democratic, public life was denounced as a false, fluctuating and transitory illusion. Far from being the vital and necessary principle of states, it was reckoned to lead them along false paths, to expose them to continual disturbances. This denunciation at the same time served to justify the bureaucratic management of public opinion. In view of the imminent threats it posed to the stability of the present order, the authority-usurping and perhaps non-rational "public" was increasingly advised not to proceed beyond the point of a passive conformity. The depoliticisation of all spheres of life was viewed as an indispensable condition of the restoration of "democratic" order. Public business was from here on to be guided more safely and efficiently by expert administrators checked only occasionally by a public said to be incapable of leading an autonomous existence. The abandonment of the unworkable fiction of the "omnicompetent citizen" was deemed imperative.[30]

Weber's famous defence of a plebiscitarian leader-democracy anticipates and summarises these developments. Under conditions of mass democracy, he concluded, "public opinion is communal conduct, born of irrational 'sentiments'. Normally it is staged or directed by party leaders and the press." As a consequence of the expanded role of the state and the necessities of bureaucratic command, general depoliticisation had become imperative: "In a democracy the people choose a leader whom they trust. Then the chosen man says, 'Now shut your mouths and obey me. The people and the parties are no longer free to interfere in the leader's business.' "[31]

<div style="text-align:center">II</div>

Public Life Defended: Dewey on "free and systematic communication"

Such arguments for depoliticisation were by no means uncontested. In addition to Tönnies, several other critics sought to expose the authoritarian potential of the administrative production of public life. So to speak, these critics tried to rescue and radicalise the old bourgeois principle of public life, to turn it against aging bourgeois society itself. These attempts—from Rosa Luxemburg's critique of Lenin and Trotsky, to John Dewey's concern over the "eclipse" of public life—form something like a background tradition against which more recent theoretical defences of autonomous public life can best be understood. Here, the influential case of John Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems* (1927) can be briefly analysed. Building on the criticisms of Tönnies, this work broaches the theme of the "eclipse" of public life through the insistence that the "common sense" political philosophy of the times functions to vindicate the power of ruling officials. According to Dewey, this common sense draws upon false allusions to an already bewildered, no longer existing "public". The bourgeois publics which reflected parliamentary-representative forms of state have passed away. Whatever their former veracity, the old principles of civic life (such as those embodied in the early American self-governing communities) have become worn out. They serve merely as a litany monotonously recited by those who administer: "the Public seems to be lost; it is certainly bewildered. The government, officials and their activities, are plainly with us ... Politics ... tends to become just another 'business': the especial concern of bosses and the managers of the machine."[32] The symptoms of this eclipse of public life are manifold, yet by no means related in an evidently simple way. Dewey mentions the declining participation in formal political events; the proliferation of opinion-making by way of hired "publicity agents"; privileged access of big business to the state and the media; the growth of centralised, machine-like political parties; the unprecedented increase in the number, variety and cheapness of amusements

<div style="text-align:center">17</div>

which serve as powerful diversions from political concern; the growing "authority" and role of scientific-technical expertise in state planning; and so on.[33] He insists that this "eclipse" of public life has no parallel in earlier phases of modern life. This is because the formalisation and centralisation of political activity is expressive of the universal hold of bureaucratisation upon everyday life. Mass production tends no longer to be confined to the factory.[34] Nowadays, many correctly sense that "they are caught in the sweep of forces too vast to understand or master. Thought is brought to a standstill and action paralyzed."[35]

These claims about the unprecedented enervation of public life should not be interpreted as laments for a golden past. In opposition to the positivistic new liberal and post-liberal discourses on publicity, Dewey defends a radicalised version of the old bourgeois theory of a critical, power-scrutinising public. Dewey speaks carefully: "the public" is not yet. To form themselves into a more genuine public, marginalised political forces or "publics" (unfortunately unspecified by Dewey) must agitate and organise to break existing forms of institutionalised power.[36] The panacea for an ailing democracy is more democratic public life. This would be possible only insofar as these forces or "publics" established themselves as a self-directing, heterogeneous public, guided its day-to-day functioning, and shared its effects. This recovery of public life would have as its necessary pre-requisite a radical expansion of "free and systematic communication."[37] This proposal is striking, inasmuch as it foreshadows a central theme within later critiques of late capitalism. Dewey is certain: the possibility of public life would depend upon a radical expansion of those conditions which promoted discussion, debate and the formation of genuine agreement between transacting citizens. Only through "communication and enlightenment" (the radical opposite of force[38]) could the "naturalising", apolitical tendencies of the present be eroded. Dewey supports this proposal through the invocation of a rudimentary philosophical anthropology. He distinguishes mere spontaneous, interconnected behaviour, the universalisation of which the present promotes, however incompletely, from genuine action.[39] The latter is equivalent to forms of activity "saturated and regulated by mutual interest in shared meanings". The capacity for action is peculiar to the species. This faculty is defined by our ability to produce signs, through which enduring collective experience can be transmitted, considered, and wilfully ruptured and reconstructed. In accordance with this ontology, Dewey defends the possibility of a liberation of action through the defence of autonomous public life. So conceived, public life would presuppose "face-to-face relationships" and the developed capacity of citizens to individuate themselves through the "give and take" of argumentation. It would sustain itself upon the promotion of a "critical sense and methods of discriminating judgment" and, conversely, the shattering of "emotional habituations and intellectual habitudes."[40] "Public opinion", for the first time, would thereby become synonymous with those critical judgements formed and entertained by those who actively constituted the public. There could be no democratic public life without full "publicity" in respect of all maters which concerned it. This is Dewey's maxim: Whatever obstructs and restricts communication also limits and distorts

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the formation of a democratic and many-sided public.

Through this thesis, Dewey effects a radical inversion of the conventional (Weberian) meaning of the concept of the political. No longer equivalent to the struggle for power over others or the legitimate territorial organisation of the means of violence, politics must in future become synonymous, Dewey suggests, with those processes through which a public organises itself. This self-government could be implemented through the public's own officials. These officials would be constituted to perform their functions of caring for those who have "empowered" them.[41] "The state" would thereby become identical with an ensemble of public institutions continually searched for, scrutinised, criticised. By virtue of the open-endedness of political life so defined, "*the* just state" would be a figment of the anti-political imagination. With respect to questions concerning both form and content, there is no single state which can be said to be best, save that which itself maximises autonomous public life—and therefore its continual self-transformation. The formation of states would of necessity be an experimental process, open to the contingencies of historical creation.

III

Habermas: From undisturbed freedom to publicity

Dewey's defence of the possiblity of free and systematic communication need not at this point be analyzed further. Reinforced by the brief remarks on Tönnies, the sketch of Dewey's theory of self-government serves merely to foreground the contours of recent developments in the critical theory of public life. During the past several decades, the single most decisive contribution to this development, within the German-speaking world at least, has undoubtedly been that of Jürgen Habermas. Concerned to develop insights into a range of problems pertaining to communicative competence and systematically distorted communication, Habermas' theoretical project can properly be seen as guided by concerns which have directly political implications. These concerns, which remarkably parallel those of Tönnies and Dewey, are by no means marginal within either his earlier or later writings. Habermas has consistently and provocatively emphasised that late capitalist societies are profoundly threatened by bureaucratic, anti-political tendencies. From even before the time of his classic account (in *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* [1962]) of the "refeudalisation" of the liberal capitalist public sphere, through to his more recent writings on communication, Habermas has remained preoccupied with problems of public life. Highly critical of the advance of bureaucratic organisation in all spheres of activity, he has consistently written on behalf of the possibility of a "post-modern" order, in which life would properly be organised around the principle of the maximum feasible sharing of

responsibility and face-to-face involvement, participation and democratic control. Following Tönnies and Dewey, Habermas emphasises that public life under late capitalist conditions becomes the object of bureaucratic administration. He too recognises that the persuasive strength of public opinion is often enough inversely proportional to its authenticity, that authentic public opinion is therefore not the mere sum of actually existing opinions of individuals and groups. Habermas also denies that we are "by nature" apathetic, "private" and apolitical beings. Current levels of disinterest in questions of power and politics, the widespread inability (or unwillingness) to actively deliberate, criticise and effect decisions through common involvements within autonomous public spheres— all these well-known features of daily life under late capitalist conditions are seen by him to be a temporary and highly contingent consequence of a bureaucratic, disciplinary and highly unequal society. Like Tönnies and Dewey before him, he therefore remains convinced of the need to argue on behalf of the counter-bureaucratic goal of "public, unrestricted discussion, free from domination."[42]

Unfortunately almost all English-speaking interpreters of Habermas' *oeuvre* have so far failed to adequately acknowledge this point.[43] Preoccupied with *other*, less political themes, they forget that Habermas' defence of forms of non-bureaucratic rationality is already displayed within his earliest works of the 1950's. These writings are evidently structured by the distinction between the sphere of necessity and the realms in which the goal of undisturbed freedom (*Muβe*) can be realised. The later Habermas was to retain this distinction between the spheres of necessity and freedom, amending it with the more explicitly political themes so prominent in the above-cited works of Tönnies, Dewey and others during the 1920's. While the distinction between the toil and unfreedom of work and an autonomous realm of freedom was to be preserved, the latter realm would be specified through considerably different arguments. This shift of perspective is evident in numerous works from the time of *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*. The textual evidence suggests that this 'political' turn in Habermas' work developed under the immediate influence of both Jaspers' theory of "limitless communication" and, especially, the works of his student, Hannah Arendt.[44] Through the distinction between two types of progress founded on the work-communication dualism, Habermas launched a radical critique of late capitalist societies. This critique no longer focuses upon the problem of "undisturbed freedom" and the need for "cultural creativity". It is argued that the general advance of bureaucratic-administrative organisation is systematically obliterating all authentic forms of communicative action. Habermas indicts late capitalist bureaucratisation processes for their radical monopolisation of the *whole* of social and political life, for their crushing of free and systematic communication *outside* or *beyond* the realm of social labour. Recalling Aristotle, he insists that purposive-rational, bureaucratic activity can only ever be appropriate in a *limited* domain—that of work. Political life, by contrast, must develop outside of the boundaries and imperatives of bureaucracy and its hierarchic, centralised relations of command and obedience. The democratic

opposition to late capitalist social formations must reassert the classical goal of citisenship, pursue the vision of speakers and actors as competent *zôon politikon*. Within the realm of the political, or so Habermas urges, classless, "postmodern" societies would strive to abolish the categories of "above" and "below". In principle, all relations of power embedded within the realm of communication would at all times become the possible object of discursive scrutiny by any or all speaking actors.

This thesis remarkably parallels that of Dewey in particular. Yet the novelty and decisive political importance of Habermas' theory of communication consists in its development of what remains as merely a hint in Dewey's philosophical anthropology. It attempts to philosophically ground, and thereby substantiate the vision of democratic, public life. During the last decade or so,[45] this grounding has been attempted through the so-called theory of universal pragmatics, whose arguments seek to elaborate the universal rules in accordance with which all communicative action is produced and reproduced. In view of the trajectory of these arguments, it is somewhat surprising to hear frequent remarks (in private, at least) that the theory of universal pragmatics is of little political relevance. Such impatient and disillusioned allegations have to be handled with the greatest of care. Indeed, only partial sympathy is extended to these allegations in the reading of Habermas proposed here. Thinking with and against Habermas, the remainder of this essay accepts some of the force of these allegations without, however, rejecting *in toto* the significance of his contributions to a radical theory of public life. His valuable advocacy of alternative forms of public life, it is proposed, is contradicted by the mode of reconstructive and abstract-formal argumentation which sustains his project, especially in its most recent phase. As a consequence of this contradiction, or so it shall be argued, this ambitious and brilliant project cannot follow up on its own aims and political implications.

Habermas' persistent ambivalence about the political status and implications of the theory of universal pragmatics can be seen as a key symptom of this contradiction. Especially in his more recent writings, for instance, he humbly warns against treating the preliminary results of this theory as an "ideal" to be practically realised. The claims of universal pragmatics, Habermas believes, must be argued for *theoretically* and at the "level" of inquiries which are at the outset not committed to any particular political project. The theory of universal pragmatics is intended as an abstract-formal, universalist account of "human" competences. It is not a theory with immediately political intentions, and certainly does not depict actual or possible forms of life. Habermas does not always consistently observe these caveats, however, and it is precisely this ambivalence within his inquiries—his simultaneous denial and acknowledgment of their substantive political implications—which serves as the starting point of the following immanent criticism of his writings on language and communication. Commonly enough, for example, the theory of universal pragmatics is said to be concerned only with highly restricted, "clear case" forms of communication— with "consensual" forms of speaking and acting—the analysis of whose logic, it is further claimed, can nevertheless be cumulatively extended to cover other *deriva-*

tive forms of action, including, presumably, public-political action itself. Else-where, for instance in a reply to Apel,[46] Habermas' abstract-formal references to "the species" and its dependence on language are developed into the conclusion that we are fated to rely on the "non-deceptive use of language", whose rules can be reconstructed by way of a theory of universal pragmatics. Such talk of a species competence which *can* be exercised by every adult speaker of a natural language understandably heightens the suspicion that Habermas' concerns are imman-ently political. This suspicion is again reinforced, finally, by his flexible, some-times careless deployment of concepts associated with the theory of communica-tion into his political recommendations, and vice versa. The concepts of "discursive will formation", "communication freed from domination" and "pub-lic, unrestricted discussion" are just three of several of these migratory concepts; freely travelling to and fro across the boundaries of his "theoretical" and "politi-cal" writings, such concepts arouse the expectation that Habermas' theoretical project is guided by explicitly political concerns—concerns which are neverthe-less firmly denied. Once more, or so I argue below, the theory of universal pragmatics is evidently marked by a self-paralyzing contradiction. Unable to realise the political promise of its own claims, the theory stimulates the need for its own transcendence—in the direction of a radical theory of public life.

IV.

Toward a General Theory of Communication

A critical re-reading of the theory of universal pragmatics and its associated claims—concerning the ideal speech situation, communicative competence, the problem of ideology, and so on—must form the point of departure in this strategy of transcendence. Concerned to rescue the theory of universal pragmat-ics from lapsing into depoliticised and overly formalistic claims, this re-reading so to speak feeds upon the expectations which the theory's claims have them-selves generated. These political inferences are strongly evidenced in the theory's concern to analyze the "universal validity basis of speech"[47] and, thereby, the general capacities necessary for the *competent* performance of public speech acts. In view of this goal, Habermas might be seen as the Kant of the theory of speech and action. His universal pragmatics aim at an elucidation of the funda-mental dialogue—constitutive universals which underpin or "preconstruct" each and every speech act. Habermas denies that the logic of our speaking and acting is mysterious, merely conventional or simply arbitrary. The theory of universal pragmatics instead attempts a summary of the unavoidable and universal pre-suppositions which all adult speakers—irrespective of their natural language or dialect or particular historical context—must master competently if they are to

engage in intelligible communication at all.[48]

In attempting this summary, Habermas acknowledges the crucial importance of the stress placed upon the "performative" aspects of speech by the "ordinary language philosophy" tradition from the time of Wittgenstein. He nevertheless insists that the well-known descriptivism which plagued Wittgenstein's analysis of language games must be transcended. The analysis of the "pragmatic" dimensions of communicative action must no doubt encompass the dynamics of particular speech acts within particular contexts—but only by reconstructing the general, unavoidable and therefore *universal* principles which structure *all* speech acts.[49]

Further to this claim, Habermas makes a crucial assumption. Communication, he argues, is a matter of performing speech acts in accordance with binding systems of rules which, even if only implicitly or intuitively, we *already and always* follow. Such rules or presuppositions are at the same time assumed to generate and describe that intersubjectivity which makes possible mutuality of understanding between competent speakers. These "anonymous" presuppositions, to use Searle's expression, are "constitutive rules" in the strict sense that they do not merely regulate but also create or preconstruct all forms of communicative action.[50]

In respect of this assumption, and drawing upon the work of Apel, Habermas insists that all unbroken or "undisturbed" communicative activity, regardless of its superficially heterogeneous character, presupposes a cluster of interrelated rules or claims.[51] These so-called validity claims (*Geltungsansprüche*) together form a kind of background consensus (*Hintergrundkonsensus*) upon which all ordinary communication depends. This deep-rooted rule-structured consensus establishes the conditions of communicative action among the species; it constitutes a "species competence."[52] All participants within "language games" always and already, that is, *involuntarily* presume that their communicative actions are self-consciously in accord with this consensus and its general rules, whose existence can in turn be vindicated or made plausible through discursive argumentation. In brief, communication already presupposes (among the interlocutors concerned) a tacit agreement about what it means to communicate. Conversely, communicative action already presupposes some measure of awareness of the possibility of the breakdown of communication because of speaking actors' failure to fulfil the so-called validity claims.

Habermas asserts that four such primordial claims can be identified: first, that speakers' utterances can be understood by others; second, that the knowledge or propositions which speakers are attempting to communicate are "true"; third, that speakers are in mutual agreement concerning the normative rules which they establish and within whose boundaries they speak and act; and, finally, that speakers are "authentic", that is, sincere in speaking and therefore trustworthy.[53] These claims to, respectively, intelligibility, truth, rightness and veracity can here be analyzed more fully. In the first place, communication can only be sustained or remain undisturbed if speakers make both their relations with others (as expressed in such performative utterances as promising and announcing) and

the meaning of the propositional content of their utterance *intelligible*. This comprehensibility clause is partly fulfilled (as Chomsky's theory of linguistic competence has stressed) when speakers utter sentences that are grammatically well-formed. However, agreement through communication is also and always conditional upon the deployment of inter-subjectively valid or meaningful symbols, i.e., upon a shared, reciprocally-recognised awareness of the "significance" of chains of signifiers. Only if these two aspects of the intelligibility claim are satisfied does it become possible, in Habermas' view, for speaking actors to recognise the meaning of symbols from their own standpoint and that of others at the same time. In the absence of this "interlacing of perspectives"[54], speaking actors could only ever assume the position of mute animals, drowned within an unintelligible ensemble of private meanings and utterances.

In addition to this presumption of comprehensibility, communicating actors raise additional validity claims. The second of these operates within the "referential" dimension of speech (Frege[55]), in accordance with which contexts are objectified and spoken about as "the" world. Inasmuch as speech acts purport to say something about something or someone else (i.e., about the totality of existing affairs, or what Habermas sometimes calls "the external world"), all unbroken communication presupposes that speaking subjects mutually recognise the propositional truth of their exchanged speech acts. Certainly, Habermas opposes Austin's suggestion that all four validity claims concern propositional truth.[56] He nevertheless maintains that all standard speech actions always contain a "constative" or propositional component. All continuous communication presumes that interlocutors share and agree upon their knowledge through the deployment of propositional sentences which truthfully represent a really existing state of affairs.

Thirdly, undisturbed communication presumes that there already exists a genuine and mutually-recognised accord between speakers. All uninterrupted communication presupposes that parties *can* and *do* recognise the appropriateness or rightness (*Richtigkeit*) of the normative rules to which their speech acts contribute, and in accordance with which those acts (of recommending, promising, prohibiting, etc.) are structured as acceptable or "legitimate". The ensemble of speech acts which make up communicative activity cannot therefore be understood as the achievement of isolated, purposive-rational actors. All "successfully" executed communicative action already and always infers that participants' actions are in conformity with certain normative expectations. Such action supposes that hearers accept and enter into the "offers" proposed by speakers, into what Habermas calls the "social world" of normatively-regulated, interpersonal relations.

Fourth, and finally, communicating actors always infer that their exchanged speech acts satisfy a condition of mutual trust. In addition to presumptions about the intelligibility, validity and legitimacy of utterances, all uninterrupted interaction presumes that speakers are authentic and sincere in expressing themselves (i.e. in divulging what Habermas calls their "particular inner world") and are therefore worthy of the trust accorded to them by their hearers. Communication

can only continue undisturbed if, and only if, speakers suppose that they already act in accordance with a "sincerity rule".[57] All communicating actors infer, in short, that the truthfulness or veracity (*Wahrhaftigkeit*) of their utterances need not, indeed must not, be called into question.

One point should be noted immediately about this validity claims schema, a point which is of considerable relevance to a radical theory of public life. The theory of validity claims launches perhaps the most novel insight in Habermas' recent writings: within all undisturbed communicative action, it is said, the above cluster of interdependent validity claims serves as an immanent standard against which the "authenticity" of communciation can be evaluated. These claims counterfactually *anticipate* what, under late capitalist conditions, has not yet come to pass: free, systematic communication. "In communicative action", it is insisted, "participants presuppose that they know what mutual recognition of reciprocally raised validity claims means."[58] By way of this thesis, Habermas acknowledges Gadamer's thesis (drawn in turn from Heidegger) that a "deep common accord" (*tiefes Einverständnis*) is presupposed within all communicative interaction.[59] This fundamental insight is turned back on Gadamer's philosophic conservatism. For this deep-seated common understanding (in accordance with which speaking actors engage each other) cannot be described, as Gadamer wants to claim, in terms of an enduring, customary tradition which exercises a largely unquestionable power over its bearers. The "supporting consensus" which sustains all communicative action, rather, has a profoundly political or *public* character. Communicative action already and always presupposes the emancipatory, political goal of subjects' living together and reaching agreement through reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, common accord and mutual trust. Although they rarely in fact achieve this under late capitalist conditions, all communicating speakers and actors necessarily and unavoidably proceed *as if* their speech and action were competent and situated within a genuinely public arena. To invoke Habermas' expression, all unbroken or undisturbed communication both *presupposes* and *prefigures* an "ideal speech situation", wherein "communication is not only not hindered by external, contingent influences, but also not hindered by forces which result from the structure of communication itself."[60]

V.

On Communicative Competence

Through the ideal speech situation thesis, Habermas strengthens his case for the "recovery" of the classic Aristotelean category of politics (as public speaking and acting) against late capitalist bureaucratisation. At least, the political *impli-*

cations of the theory of universal pragmatics become rather more explicit. For Habermas urges that the principle of the "ideal speech situation"—the conviction that social relations could be organised "according to the principle that the validity of every norm of political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free from domination"[61]—is implicit within all communicative action. Whomever enters into a communicative relationship implies a mutual obligation to make their utterances intelligible, to provide good grounds for their assertions, as well as mutual obligations to justify their values in a trustworthy way. This means that the capacity to freely and competently engage in rule-structured communication is continually present, as it were, behind the backs of all those who speak and act within a communicative setting. Contrary to Gouldner and others [62] this communicative competence cannot thereby be spoken of as a "norm"; strictly speaking, communicative competence is always and already supposed and anticipated even before attempts are made to reconstruct and defend it by way of a *theory* of communicative competence.

Communicative competence therefore has (in Freud's sense) an *illusory* status. It is an ever-present, "wishful" anticipation within all communciative action. To engage the speech and action of others unwittingly implies the *will* to engage in consensual speech and action emancipated from all forms of domination. "Our first sentence," Habermas says in one of his earliest and most daring formulations, "expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus."[63] This intention cannot be analyzed as either a moralising, regulative principle (Kant) nor as an extant empirical reality (an *existing* concept, in Hegel's sense). It must be understood, rather, as an "operationally effective fiction"[64] which communicating participants must reciprocally and unavoidably impute to one another. All communicative action supposes, in short, that this illusory "fiction" should be given its due, that it has (here Habermas adopts the language of Lask[65]) a certain worthiness to be recognised or acknowledged (*Anerkennungswürdigkeit*).

As a consequence of its positing of the ideal speech principle, Habermas' universal pragmatics may be taken to *imply* or infer a radically political vision: that of communicative competence, of *Mündigkeit*, of individuated and autonomous citizens learning to deliberate, speak and act for themselves in autonomous public spheres. This inferred vision is particularly evident in both his earliest writings on communication and his more recent writings on ego development.[66] So envisaged, communicative competence would be conditional upon the fulfilment of three necessary conditions.

In the first place, the attempt to foster communicative competence would depend upon the development of symmetrical, reciprocal relations between speaking actors. This reciprocity would facilitate "an unlimited interchangeability of dialogue roles",[67] such that no one speaker (or group of speakers) could rightly monopolise the powers and means of assertation, disputation and persuasion. Under conditions of authentic public life, the speech and action of individuals and groups could not legitimately be sacrificed before abstractly defined or allegedly imperative opinions and norms ("the national interest", the "dicta-

torship of the proletariat" etc).[68] Genuinely *intersubjective* communication would be conditional upon the reciprocal self-representation of individual speaking subjects who acknowledged each other. In respect of this mutuality, Habermas insists that communicative competence ought not be confused with Chomsky's notion of "linguistic competence". For Chomsky, such competence consists in individuals' creative mastery of an abstract network of linguistic rules, with the aid of which they can correctly produce chains of utterances.[69] Habermas rightly objects: Chomsky misleadingly assumes that this system of "generative" linguistic rules is somehow innate. Individuals' production and reproduction of these rules is wrongly assumed to be a process which unfolds monologically, that is , according to an "informational model of communication".[70] It is as if each sender and receiver of utterances is already and always an entity for itself, a solitary entity already outfitted with certain pre-established language rules, in terms of whose universal applicability and meaning communication with other individuals becomes possible. Habermas is adamant that this formulation thoroughly depreciates the "pragmatic" and intersubjective dimensions of competent speaking and acting. Public, communicative competence is, and would always be, conditional upon subjects' "practical" mastery of dialogue-constitutive rules, their performance of speech acts within a language-structured context of intersubjectivity. This capacity for intersubjectivity is already anticipated under conditions of undisturbed communication: "Utterances are never simply sentences. Even if they do not expressly make pragmatic relations their subject, they are integrated from the beginning into a form of intersubjectivity of mutual understanding owing to their illocutionary force [i.e. to the fact of their 'doing something in saying something' in relation to others]."[71]

The non-identity or autonomy of individuals and groups would constitute a second necessary condition of democratic, public life. Conceived as the development of genuinely intersubjective "communities" of speaking actors, democratic public life would not be incompatible with processes of individuation. According to Habermas, individuation could only be developed in and through genuinely democratic processes of public life. Such individuation is by no means "ontologically given", as Chomsky and others assume. While beginning in the early phases of psycho-sexual development, individuation could only ever be *accomplished politically*, through the development of a subtle interplay of "nearness and distance" between public, speaking actors. Autonomous public life would be marked by the same paradox analyzed in Hegel's famous model of the quarrelling lovers: Individuals, Habermas implies, would assert themselves against non-identical others by way of the recognition of themselves in others.[72] Individuation would therefore presuppose a growing capacity of subjects to distinguish (and insist upon the difference between) their inner, "private" and "outer", public worlds.[73] In the course of their public activities, subjects would unavoidably express themselves and their inviolable "distance" from others, at the same time as they depended upon and interacted with others, with whom they would always and already be conjoined in a subtle, language-mediated relationship of "nearness". This dialectic of identity and non-identity would also operate at the

level of relations between different collectivities. A democratic, public society can only be envisaged as pluralistic, as maximising individuation and group diversity within a community setting. Habermas' implied model of democratic, public life therefore recognises no fantastic futures, in which existence would become free, easy and ridden of division. Future public life, he infers, would openly recognise, indeed encourage, a plurality of groups and political divisions.[74] Under "post-modern" conditions, the real antagonist of democratic, public life would not be the presence of particularities—competing claims, political quarrels and disputes—but, rather, the denial of their legitimacy.

The implication that reciprocity and individuation are two necessary conditions of public life infers a third: the unfettering of critical discussion. Liberated from any form of official evaluation from above, discussion under conditions of genuine public life would be unrestricted. No dogmatically fixed or majority opinion could permanently avoid being made the object of public debate and criticism. Political 'space' would be created, wherein the hitherto "minority" position of a fraction of the public could become, through sustained, unrestricted and compelling argument, acceptable to broader sections of the political community. Obviously, such unfettering of communication would depend upon the equalisation of speakers' access to the available means of communication. (It would no doubt also depend upon a radical reconstruction of the currently available means of communication, although Habermas does not directly discuss this problem.) Only thereby could participants "horizontally" initiate discussion about their needs, invoke hypotheses which shattered the ruling truth claims, and perpetuate such communication through further questions, answers, demands, recommendations, promises, etc. This would imply, in (the likely) cases of breakdowns of agreement, citizens' capacity to temporarily suspend action, so as to "move over" into "discourse" (as Habermas calls it[75]), that is, into deliberation freed from the constraints of organisation and action. Through such discourse oriented to reaching agreement, public discussants could fully exploit the "double structure" of speech acts by communicating about states of affairs as well as about their communication as such.[76] Relying upon discursive argumentation, subjects' hitherto repressed or heteronomously-constructed needs and principles could be mutually redefined and acted upon. The validity of social and political principles would cease to be dependent upon the already established "authority" of groups or persons holding these principles. Imposed norms would be distinguished from norms which were in principle capable of discursive justification; at this level of communicative competence, norms could be "normed".[77] Only under such conditions of uncensored discussion would it be justified to equate existing political agreements and compromises with genuine agreements and compromises reached without violence. Authentic public life would be structured by the principle of "rational speech". In accordance with this principle, or so Habermas implies, the truth of judgments and observations about "facts" would be synonymous with a public consensus reached, guaranteed, yet always contestable through unlimited and permanently renewable communication. This formulation contradicts Arendt's classical thesis that truth-telling is

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anti-political and that public-political life is therefore properly the sphere of opinionated agreement and consent.[77a] Nietzsche's observation that truth must always be equivalent to the solidification of old metaphors is also emphatically rejected. Pitted against mere opinion and old metaphors, the so-called consensus theory of truth insists that the validity of utterances (and their claims to propositional truth, normative appropriateness and veracity) cannot be decided without reference *both* to the competency of those who decide and to the conditions under which agreements are reached. The truth of any politically-negotiated consensus, in short, could not be decided without reference to the (non-) fulfilment of the validity claims upon which all communication is grounded. Conversely, "public opinion" could only be considered authentic if it had been achieved (and was capable of further renewal) under the three above-mentioned conditions of autonomous public life—conditions which maximised critical and unforced argumentation between individuated, equal and communicatively competent citizens.

VI.

Systematically distorted communication

From the time of his earliest formulations of the theory of universal pragmatics, Habermas was of course acutely aware that numerous mechanisms serve to repress and conceal these conditions of public, communicative competence. He never assumed that Socratic forms of communication are everywhere and instantly possible. Late capitalist patterns of communication, he recognised, are also the site of the exercise of pseudo-compromise and violence; precisely because of this, they cannot be described as (genuine) communication at all. Indeed, no previous society has lived in conformity with the principle of "rational speech,"[78] The history of all hitherto existing societies—including those in the modern world which have had universal-democratic pretensions—has been a history of systematically deformed communication, and struggles to overcome that repression. Every known social formation has been marked by attempts to distort the universal capacity to speak and act politically, to check its conflict potential through skewed distributions of state and social power, property and communicative ability.

Habermas' advocacy of free, systematic communication finds itself in opposition to these authoritarian tendencies. In relation to the past, the theory of universal pragmatics implies the need for dissipating the nature-like grip of authoritarian traditions over the present. Their dogmatic truth claims must be criticised, their important insights preserved.[79] With direct reference to the conditions of late capitalism, the theory of universal pragmatics also commits itself to the distinction between an imposed, "actually achieved consensus" and a

genuine or "rational consensus" without deception.[80] Thereby it concedes the substance of Tönnies' thesis that public opinion must frequently be doubted, that this opinion's persuasive strength is often inversely proportional to its authenticity. This fundamental distinction between a rational and actual consensus is plausible, Habermas argues, because the promise of unfettered speech and action immanent within all communiciation itself serves as a "measure" of the degree to which every actually-achieved consensus is false. To illustrate this thesis, Habermas invokes the metaphor of the trial. The ideal of communicative competence is said to serve as a "court of evaluation" (*Bewertungsinstanz*), within which any existing consensus can be brought to trial, and interrogated concerning its alleged claims to be a warranted consensus. Genuine opinion is not necessarily equivalent to the sum of actually existing opinions; it is not identical with the automatic opinion of all and the considered opinion of none. Actually existing agreements between speaking actors have no ultimate finality, as has been claimed in recent theoretical discussions of power and interest.[81]

Granted this distinction between two forms of consensus, Habermas infers that false or inauthentic agreements can be induced by at least two interrelated processes: speakers' "internalisation" of authoritarian power relations (through the familial supervision of their psycho-sexual development, for example) and the uneven distribution of dialogue possibilities between nations, classes, regions, social groups and individuals.

Under such conditions of induced misunderstanding and deception, Habermas insists there can be no presumption in favour of a rational consensus on the prevailing distribution of power. Any falsely induced consensus finds its limits or "otherness" in the always implied logic of free and systematic communication. Free and systematic communication therefore names its foe: systematically deformed communication. Habermas explicitly invokes and defends Walter Benjamin's sarcastic warning: "Pessimism all along the line. Absolutely . . . but above all, mistrust, mistrust and again mistrust in all mutual understanding reached between classes, nations, individuals. And unlimited trust only in I.G. Farben and the peaceful perfection of the *Luftwaffe*."[82]

Guided by this warning, Habermas is led to speak of distorted communication as the mutilation or the dumbfounding of potentially free, speaking and acting subjects. Such destruction of the capacity for public, communicative competence may assume either of two generically interrelated forms. In cases of psychotic character deformation, the destruction of communciatve action results from faults internal to the organisation of speech acts themselves.[83] These psychotic deformations (analysed by Freud, upon whom Habermas explicitly draws) are seen to have originated within the young child's experience of suffering, and its attempted repulsion through unconsciously motivated forgetting. Typically, deformed communication of this first type displays a distinct dissonance between actors' utterances and their actions and accompanying gestures. The relatively coherent structure of undisturbed communication disintegrates; utterances, actions and bodily gestures become estranged from each other. Added to this, physically deformed communications can be described in terms of their evident

contravention of patterns of speech which are mutually recognised as binding or conventional. The absence of grammatical sense or the utilisation of opposite words (and, therefore, the peculiar mingling of conventionally incompatible meanings) might be taken as instances of this contravention. Finally, psychotically deformed communication displays a certain compulsive repetitiousness and rigidity. The chronically 'reflective' action of undisturbed communication degenerates into recurrent, stereotyped behaviour, whose emotiveness is often unexpectedly catalyzed by "external" stimuli. The daily life of psychotic actors is held captive by certain archaic "palaeosymbols", by the private "inner foreign territory" (Freud) of compulsive fantasies and emotion-charged images. Accordingly, psychotics cannot easily dissociate their private fixations upon archaic symbols from their publicly-expressed utterances, actions and bodily gestures.

Psychotically deformed communication should be analytically distinguished, in Habermas' view, from a second form of distorted communication—that of "pseudocommunication". In contradistinction to psychotic communication, pathological disturbances or blockages within patterns of pseudocommunication assume a transparent form. These disturbances are not recognised by speaking actors to be destructive of their subjectivity as such. Communication is invisibly marked with "unrecognised dependencies". Labouring under the illusion that they have reached genuine agreement through communicatively competent negotiations, interlocutors' mutual misunderstanding and self-misunderstanding perpetuate themselves without interruption. The validity claims of speech are naively assumed, even though they remain in fact unfulfilled. Under such conditions of voluntary servitude, "participants do not recognise any communication disturbances. Pseudocommunication produces a system of reciprocal misunderstandings, which are not recognised as such, due to the pretence of pseudo–consensus".[84]

VII.

Political Action as Therapy?

The boundaries of this typology of distorted communication are obviously incomplete. The silent pseudo-consensus induced by the systematic deployment of force or terror, for instance, remains unanalyzed.[85] This stimulating typology nevertheless provokes a series of questions concerning its political-strategic implications. Which forms of political life and tactics, we are prompted to ask, are most appropriate to fostering the awareness that an immanent and genuine consensus are not identical? Which political strategies and organisations are most conducive to the defence of autonomous public life?

In anticipating Habermas' responses to such questions, it is clear that he firmly rejects all justifications of the legitimacy and efficacy of vanguardist strategies.

This refusal—uncompromisingly directed at Lukács and, implicitly, a long and respected tradition of Western political thought from the time of Plato[86]—directly draws upon Aristotle's theory of moral-practical knowledge and prudent political action. Authentic political action, in Habermas' view, must always be guided by a certain foresight and clarity of its potentials and possible consequences. Such knowledge of "what is to be done" nevertheless cannot be "possessed" or "applied" in the manner of artful, technical knowledge. To be politically competent is not identical with knowing what, at all times and under all circumstances is good for all. Political action cannot totalise history, tie all problems together and happily orient itself to a future which is already written in the present and in which all problems will be neatly solved. Political action cannot flatter itself on its capacity to grasp the whole directly, for it is risky action in the process of self-invention. "Attempts at emancipation," Habermas stresses, can, under certain circumstances be rendered plausible as *practical* [in the Aristotelean sense of practical-political] necessities, taking into consideration the conflicts generated by the system (which have to be explained theoretically) and the avoidable repressions and suffering. But such attempts are also tests; they test the limits within which 'human nature' can be changed and above all, the limits of the historically variable structure of motivation, limits about which we possess no theoretical knowledge and, in my view, cannot in principle possess. If in testing 'practical hypotheses' of this kind, we, the subjects involved, are ourselves included in the design of the experiment, then no barrier between experimenter and subjects can be erected. Instead, all the participants must have the opportunity to know what they are doing—thus, they must form a common will discursively."[87] According to this compelling view, autonomous public life is conditional upon speaking actors' *self-involvement* in particular political acts. Becoming "political" can only be a developmental process, a discretionary capacity exercised through discussion, risk-taking and action within particular power situations. Accordingly, any movement which seeks to defend public life through reliance upon purposive-rational, bureaucratic means contradicts itself. This self-contradiction, Habermas claims, is evident in Lukács' classic formulation of the Party as the mediator of theory and praxis. Not only does this formulation artificially tailor theoretical discourse to the alleged imperatives of organisational-strategic action ("pure theory" is seen as proof of "opportunism"). The process of enlightenment of the oppressed (viz., the proletariat, whom Lukács insists must not suffer "a terrible internal ideological crisis"[88]) is also to be subordinated to the cunning designs of the Party leadership. Habermas flatly rejects such formulae. The immunity of the political educators from political education by others cannot, without certain authoritarian-bureaucratic consequences, be posited as either given, necessary or desirable. In the struggle against distorted and pseudo-communication, he intimates, all decisions of consequence must be made to depend on the practical discussion of the participants concerned. In his earlier discussions of the theory of communication, at least, this thesis was elaborated with reference to certain methodological insights of psychoanalysis. It is true that Habermas' very first interest in Freud concentrated upon the implica-

tions of Mitscherlich's theses on the contemporary decline of patriarchal bour-
geois authority.[89] Later, Habermas came to follow Alfred Lorenzer: the psycho-
analytic therapy situation was interpreted as a mode of analysis of distorted
communication and, by implication, an exemplar of the strategy through which a
revitalised, "post-modern" public sphere might be achieved politically.[90] Psy-
choanalytic therapy was understood as a critical and emancipatory mode of
explanatory understanding, structured by the regulative principle of the ideal
speech situation. To invoke Habermas' terms, it is a form of "scenic understand-
ing", a "depth hermeneutic" (*Tiefenhermeneutik*) which aims to break the
power of the past over the present through future-oriented memory.[91] Analo-
gous to the theory-mediated political struggle for genuine intersubjectivity,
psychoanalytic therapy seeks to criticise (and thereby promote patients' libera-
tion from) distorted communication; psychoanalysis seeks to realise this goal
through the systematic reliance upon self-reflection "materialised" or grounded
in discussion. Psycho-analysis is a form of language analysis oriented to the
restriction of "uncon-sciously motivated action" and the expansion of domains of
intersubjectivity within which subjects' self-interrogation and cross-examination
can proceed freely and systematically. The history and controversial substantive
details of psychoanalysis are of minor interest in this context. Of crucial impor-
tance, according to the earlier Habermas, is that the relationship between analyst
and patients is in principle directly analogous to that association between public
interlocutors which obtains in the political struggle for public life. The analyst,
like the political actor, seeks to understand others' "distorted" reactions as
meaningful (and perhaps even as resting on good reasons). At the same time,
both the activist and the analyst are concerned to provoke a corresponding
reorganisation in others' self-interpreted speech acts. Habermas extended the
analogy further. In the enlightenment process, both the critical theory of com-
munication and psychoanalytic theory serve as advocates of the possibility of
genuine, non-deceptive communication. Each seeks to critically interrogate its
addresses, to induce their self-reflection on the validity of the theory's own claims
and on their own captivity within relations of domination and power. Both
theoretical discourses seek in other words to initiate processes of critical reflec-
tion, to catalyze subjects' *self-liberation* through free and systematic communi-
cation.

Two immediate objections can be raised against this invocation of psychoana-
lysis as an exemplar of the critique of distorted communication. Both objections,
which Habermas now acknowledges, but to whose implications he has not
satisfactorily responded, derive from the strong suspicion that his analogy
between the psycho-analytic therapy situation and radical political activity was
from the outset highly misleading. In the first place, Habermas' own critique of
Freud's scientism already pointed out that the Freudian therapy situation is
premised upon the professional "authority" and "expertise" of the analyst.[92]
Granted, the Freudian schema insists that patients' initial deference to this
authority is "voluntarily" willed. Moreover, the process of validation of the
claims of psychoanalysis seems consistent with Habermas' proposed consensus

theory of truth: in the final analysis, the "objects" of analysis are the authorities and, accordingly, must themselves confirm (or deny) the hypotheses of the analyst, perhaps even supplementing them with their self-understandings.[93] Finally, the psychoanalyst must refrain from making proposals for patients' prospective actions. These must be decided by patients themselves.[94] Despite these caveats, the enacted therapeutic dialogue is in another respect singularly monologic. At the outset, as Habermas has subsequently admitted,[95] the relationship of the partners in therapeutic discourse is by no means egalitarian. Nor are their positions interchangeable. Psychoanalytic discourse inserts the patient in a position of fundamental disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the analyst. The patient is presumed to be as yet incapable of entering a genuinely communicative relationship. Such capability is at best only *achieved* through a successful therapeutic process. The analyst accordingly *confers* enlightenment; patients can only seek enlightenment about themselves. The validity claims of the psychoanalyst must not be disputed by the analysands. These claims form, at the outset at least, the irrevocable and unquestionable terms of argumentation within which interactions proceed. The analyst is therefore the privileged bearer of true insight, of genuine natural-scientific hypotheses which can be validated as knowledge of acknowledged "laws". At most, this knowledge can be denied by patients—but only through a change of analysts or the severance of consultations altogether. This point has severe implications for Habermas' prudent, non-vanguardist proposal for political enlightenment. Their insistence that the political process which exposes and undoes systematic distortions of communication can be likened to the psychoanalytic dialogue unwittingly harbours a dogmatic "elitism". Habermas' version of psychotherapy as an exemplar of prudent public-political action concealed another difficulty. This problem was long ago raised by Geigel, Gadamer and others. In their not unwarranted view, Habermas' psychoanalytically-informed political proposals seriously underestimated the measures typically pursued by the wealthy, powerful and prestigious in late capitalist societies to stifle, co-opt or violently repress political dialogue.[96] The adaptation of the therapy model to the political task of communicatively dissolving false consensus thereby clung to the reformist illusion that the demonstrative force of argument alone would engage and convince commanders of existing bureaucratic institutions. This presumption, it was argued, stemmed directly from the misleading comparison of therapy and politics. This comparison was deceiving precisely because, under therapeutic conditions, patients' sense of malaise and desire for cure serve as the raison d'être of their engagement with the analyst. In political struggle, by contrast, no such prior orientation to reaching an understanding can be presumed. At best, communicative action *within* and *between* oppressed groups is possible. The relationship of those who rule and those who struggle for emancipation from professional-bureaucratic domination is one of *confrontation*. Resistance, compromise, and dissembling on the part of the ruling groups (as Machiavelli expressed so clearly at the onset of bourgeois modernity) is the norm. Again, Habermas was forced to imperil his own argument in acknowledging this crucial insight.[97] The singular objection

remained: the problem of distorted communication and its dissolution through theory-guided, democratic, political struggle cannot adequately be analysed through the model of psychoanalysis.

VIII.

The Problem of Ideology

It can be argued that this internal limit upon Habermas' early attempts to secure psychoanalysis as a model for political struggle was compounded by an additional difficulty. This second limitation derived from Habermas' rather brief and later abandoned attempt to explicate a theory of the mechanisms of "pseudo-communication". Drawing heavily upon the Marxian theory of ideology, this theory of pseudo-communication aimed to expose and criticise—without authoritarian consequences—those processes which veil or conceal the possibility of communicative competence and, conversely, the servile dependency of some speaking actors upon others. Ideologically-distorted communication, Habermas proposed, functions to conceal institutionalised relations of domination and violence. Under the hegemony of pseudo-compromises and "mutually accepted" beliefs (say, in the benevolence of patriarchy or the efficacy of professional expertise), this domination tends to become insulated against interrogation by both the individual subject and the community at large. Meta-communication about the routinised or normalised communication of daily life is thereby blocked. The formation of authentic agreements and mutual agreements and mutual obligations—whose possibility is hypothetically posited within all unbroken communicative action—is adjourned, even deemed unnecessary. This is the sense in which the ideological distortion of communication is highly paradoxical.[98] On the other hand, the ideologies which prevent free and systematic communication "make a fiction of the reciprocal imputation of accountability." Speaking actors' presumption that their communication is in accord with its validity claims (of intelligibility, truth, rightness and veracity) is violated. On the other hand, it is precisely these ideological impediments to genuine communication which serve to repress questions about the non-fulfilment of the presupposed validity claims. Actually existing communication appears to its authors and participants as unproblematic or legitimate. Ideologies thereby "reinforce the belief in legitimacy which sustains the fiction [of the fulfilment of validity claims] and prevents its being exposed."[99] This paradox is highly evident, Habermas argued, in the classical bourgeois ideologies of formal law, the commodified exchange of equivalents, and the public sphere.[100] These ideologies represented the emerging modern world system as an achievement of "free and equal" subjects, and as therefore emancipated from relations of domination in personalised form. Typically criticising the past in the name of their own

scientific and universally valid claims,[101] bourgeois ideologies radically weakened the "objective" authoritative power of systems of myth, metaphysics and customary ritual. The subjectivism of these ideologies in turn greatly strengthened the capacity of the bourgeoisie to induce voluntary servitude among the exploited. Representing their own particular interests as universal or *pro bono publico*, the bourgeoisie sought to rule without appearing to rule.[102]

By presenting the problem of pseudo-communication in this way, Habermas' synthesis of the theories of communication and ideology seemed at first sight to be highly credible. The novelty and suggestiveness of this attempted synthesis also provided support for the view (of Adorno and others) that the theory and phenomenon of ideology belong to the movement of history.[103] Whether this synthesis was plausible, however, remained much less certain. This uncertainty was generated by a pressing question which remains largely unanswered in Habermas' more recent work, namely: Can the critical theory of universal pragmatics and the Marxian concept of ideology be effectively synthesised? This question is provoked by the presence of a number of ambiguities and confusions within Habermas' account of ideological communication.

Suggestive of deeper difficulties within his attempt to sketch a theory of pseudo-communication, these weaknesses included: first, the often timid and highly oblique references to the category of ideology (as in the theses on the "glassy background ideology which idolises and fetishises science"[104]); secondly, the occasional "overburdening" of the concept with anachronistic meanings (as in the discussion of the "ideologies" of traditional social formations, or in the more general claim that the evolution of "the dialectic of forces and relations of production takes place through ideologies"[105]); and, thirdly, the virtual abandonment of the concept of ideology within more recent formulations of the theory of universal pragmatics. These ambiguities and weaknesses, it can be argued, are neither fortuitous nor uninteresting, nor without political implications. They are in fact suggestive of two crucial, and hitherto unresolved antinomies between the theories of universal pragmatics and the classical Marxian project of ideology-criticism. From the outset, it can be argued, these two antinomies strongly hindered Habermas' further elaboration of the problem of pseudo-communication and its subversion—a problem which nevertheless remains of great importance to a critical theory of public life. For, and more obviously, there exists an unambiguous contradiction between the epistemological status of the Marxian critique of communication and Habermas' above-mentioned rejection of vanguardism. This antinomy was spotted by Habermas himself in an early essay, where it was warned that, on account of its scientistic premises, the Marxian critique of ideology would require reconstruction if its utility for critical social analysis was to be preserved.[106] This point was again repeated in his criticism of Marx's identification of his critique of liberal capitalism as a natural-scientific project: "Marx never explicitly discussed the precise meaning of a science of humanity elaborated as a critique of ideology and distinct from the instrumentalist meaning of natural science."[107] Habermas' later discussion of the problem of pseudo-communication repressed this conclusion. It

overlooked the point that the Marxian advocacy of a revolution of the existing material conditions of production, which it knows to be the "real foundation" upon which rises corresponding ideological forms, is logically tied to its self-misunderstanding as a form of natural science. Against its own resolve, thereby, the project of criticising pseudo-communication formed something like a tacit alliance with scientism—a scientism, it should be added, which has constantly bedevilled Marxian critiques of ideology from the time of their first formulation through to more recent amendments, such as those of Althusser.[108]

This self-contradiction within the theory of pseudo-communication was rein-forced by a second difficulty. This difficulty derived form the fact that the classical Marxian dénouement of the riddles of ideology presupposed the existence of a domain of "material" activity purged of symbolic representation. Notwithstand-ing its own scientism, the Althusserian project correctly called attention to this metaphysical presupposition within the early Marxian critique of ideology.[109] The scope of Althusser's insight can indeed be extended. For it is clear that the tradition of ideology-criticism from the time of Bacon has constantly suffered under the weight of its own illusory belief in the existence of a positive reality freed from the symbolic. Within this tradition, ideology has been understood as a form of misrepresentation of a subterranean reality of material life processes. These processes are explained as the pre-communicative point of origin of ideology, a point of origin which is also the point of truth that contradicts the false "nothingness" of ideology. Marx himself never satisfactorily broke with this reasoning, which is also evident in Bacon's conviction that "words" and "discourse" obstruct understanding and throw the species into confusion, through the *Idéologues'* concern to lay bare the origins of all consciousness, to Geiger's more recent positivistic denunciation of the ideological as pure mysti-cism which is readily refuted by techniques of empirical verification.[110]

Consistently, Marx's search for the origin of representations ends by embrac-ing the myth of an origin external to symbolic communication. His appropria-tion of the Roman myth of Cacus is illustrative of this unflagging enthusiasm for identifying the "material foundations" of ideology through the model of the *camera obscura*.[111] According to this model, the bourgeoisie's false, inverted representation of itself as the source of all wealth can be likened to the trickery of Cacus, who seeks to conceal his cattle-rustling efforts by herding his prey into his den backwards, so that it appears they have already departed. In the early works, Marx and Engels similarly propose a rebellion against the rule of the symbolic. The "actual existing world" is contrasted with that which "humanity" says, imagines or conceives, with "the phrases of this world." Building upon this distinction, the materialist conception of history "scientifically" accounts for the latter through recourse to the logic of the former. The formation and pseudo-independence of the symbolic is unveiled and explained with reference to the beyond, behind and beneath: material practice itself. The illusions of the epoch are said to be sublimations of the "material life-process", in accordance with whose divisions of labour and class struggles the species produces its own means of need satisfaction and social and political relations.[112] Ideologies therefore have

no history—in the precise sense that the logic of their birth, rise to dominance and decay is always and everywhere "burdened" by the primordial determinations of the division of labour. Inverted representations of reality can therefore be traced to the inversions and self-contradictoriness of the actual life-process of "real, active humanity." Conversely, the dissolution of the hold of the ruling phrases over the lips and minds of the dominated can only be achieved through revolution. Liberation is a "practical", and not a mental-discursive act.

Through its dependence upon this Marxian theory of ideology, Habermas' theory of pseudo-communication unwittingly burdened itself with the metaphysical presumption that ideology is the "mask" of a subterranean reality, a reality which can be purged of all treacherous symbolic density. On at least one occasion (viz., in his early comments on Gadamer), Habermas in fact explicitly embraced this presumption.[113] Granted, this critique of Gadamer's "idealism of linguisticality" correctly conceived of linguistic communication as a kind of "metainstitution". Communication was seen as an infrastructure upon which *all* economic, political and cultural institutions are dependent. "Social action," Habermas insisted, "is constituted only in ordinary language communication." Curiously, this formulation was at once undermined by a fairly conventional Marxian account of language as a limited circle of the movement of ideas, a "superstructure" divorced from the everyday realities of production. According to Habermas, particular modes of linguistic communication not only harbour deceptions (*Täuschungen*). Language itself oftentimes deceives. "(L)anguage is *also* ideological", by virtue of its capacity to mask or veil certain constraints of reality (*Realitätszwängen*) which operate from "behind the back" of language. These constraints (such as a change in the mode of production) also effect "from below" revolutions in the symbolically transmitted and intersubjectively shared patterns of meaning within any social formation.[115]

Habermas' embrace of this revamped base-superstructure formulation prompts a singular objection: the Marxian account of the "concealment" function of ideology does not sufficiently acknowledge that cultures—including the forces of production in both their objective and subjective aspects—are historically variable, more or less meaningful orders of subjects and objects structured through definite symbolic schema. The "material life-process" is by no means coterminous with the pragmatics of production, for neither escapes symbolic mediation. Conventional Marxian accounts of ideology are in this respect unacceptable, for actors' symbolically-mediated experience of themselves in relation to other subjects and objects cannot be understood (to invoke the words of Schmidt) as a mere translation of the "objective logic of the human-work situation."[116] It must be denied that signs are necessarily cognate to the terms of the deed, that both have a common origin in material utility. A reconstructed critique of ideology—which Habermas' work promised, but has so far never achieved—must not only fully reject the scientistic premises of Marxism. It must also note that situated or "formed" subjects' production and transformation of symbolically-mediated communicative relations cannot be conceived as either a level or dimension of any social formation. This communication is co-extensive

with symbolically-mediated activity as such. Every experience of the world of nature or society is articulated through the production, reproduction and trans-formation of signs. There is no specifically communicative relationship—not even the labour process itself—which is constituted from an Archimedean point "outside" or "below" this symbolic-discursive realm.

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Notes

1. Rosa Luxemburg, *The Russian Revolution* (Ann Arbor, 1961 [1918]), esp. chs. 4-6. Other important defences of democratic public life during this period include: Antonio Gramsci's analysis of council communism and, later, the modern Prince as proclaimer and organiser of a "national popular collective will" cf. *Selections from Political Writings: 1910-20* [New York, 1977], pp 34-35; *Prison Notebooks* [New York, 1971], pp. 132-33,158); Karl Korsch, *Was ist Sozialisierung?* (Hanover, 1919); John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (London, 1927); C. Wright Mills' discussion of the formation of "primary publics" in opposition to the mass communications industry (see especially *Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*, ed. I.L. Horowitz [London, 1963], part 4, ch. 10); and, more recently, Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (London, 1957); Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago, 1958); S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston, 1960) and Carole Pateman, *The Problem of Political Obligation* (Chichester, 1979).

2. Rudolph Hilferding, *Finance Capital*, Ed. Tom Bottomore (London, Boston and Henley, 1981), part 5. More recently, see Charles S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe* (Princton, 1975). Cf. Robert Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* (New York, 1967) and *Businessmen and Reform, A Study of the Progressive Movement* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916* (New York, 1963). For the case of Britain, see Keith Middlemas, *The Politics of Industrial Society* (London, 1979), part one.

3. E.L. Bernay's *Public Relations* (New York, 1952), p. 79; cf. his earliest study, *Crystallising Public Opinion* (Chicago, 1923).

4. This intellectual assault of course began much earlier. Amidst the political and social struggles of the mid-nineteenth century, for example, the question of "public opinion" became a favoured subject of political leaders, newspaper writers and intellectuals. In retrospect, this concern with "the public" served as the precedent to its bureaucratic re-ordering. Some early treatises which point in this direction include: William A. Mackinnon, *On the Rise, Progress and Present State of Public Opinion in Great Britain and Other Parts of the World* (London, 1828); Joseph Mosely, *Political Elements, or, The Progress of Modern Legislation* (London, 1852); David Urquhart, *Public Opinion and its Organs* (London, 1855); Franz von Holtzendorff, *Wesen und Wert Offentlichen Meinung* (Berlin, 1880).

5. Michael Freeden, *The New Liberalism* (Oxford, 1978).

6. This concept was invoked by Walter Lippmann in his *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922 [1965]), p. 173. Compare also the more recent interpretations of the emergence and limitations of the theory of "equilibrium democracy" in C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal*

Democracy (Oxford, 1977), ch. 4, and Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (London, 1969), ch. 2. As Carole Pateman has convincingly indicated (*Participation and Democratic Theory* [Cambridge,1970], chs. 1 and 6), this theoretical critique of the "omnicompetent citizen" sustained itself on fictions about a homogeneous "classical" tradition of democratic thinking.

7. Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* (New York, 1965).

8. Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics* (London, 3rd edition 1921), pp. 118ff; on the analysis of the unconscious dimensions of public opinion during this period, cf. Francis G. Wilson, *A Theory of Public Opinion* (Chicago, 1962), part 2.

9. Cf. Harold Lasswell, "The Measurement of Public Opinion", *The American Political Science Review*, XXV (1931), pp. 311-326. See also his *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (New York, 1927) and Friedrich Schönemann, *Die Kunst der Massenbeeinflussung in den Vereingten Staaten* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1924).

10. See, for example, the somewhat later, and classic study of Stuart A. Rice (*Quantitative Methods in Politics* [New York, 1928], p. 57), which insists that the concept of "attitudes" must be preferred to that of "public opinion", since the latter concept connotes too much of a "rational and conscious element in the actual motivation."

11. See the pioneering works of C.F. Higham, *Looking Forward: Mass Education Through Publicity* (1920) and *Advertising: Its Use and Abuse* (1925). On the theoretical links between market research and public opinion measurement, see Friedrich Pollock, "Empirical Research into Public Opinion", in Paul Connerton (ed.), *Critical Sociology* (Harmondsworth, 1976), pp. 225-236.

12. Published in the same year as Walter Lippmann's famous *Public Opinion* (*op.cit.*), Tönnies' *Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung* (Berlin, 1922) was for many years, at least prior to the rise of Nazism, considered the classic European treatise on public opinion. Unfortunately, it remains relatively unknown in the English-speaking world. Tönnies had also planned a companion volume to the *Kritik* wherein he would deal with the genealogy of the concept of public opinion. Regrettably, only fragments were published. See, for example, "Macht und Wert der öffentlichen Meinung", *Die Dioskuren, Jahrbuch für Geisteswissenachaften*, 2, (1923), pp. 72-99 (partly translated as "The Power and Value of Public Opinion", in Ferdinand Tönnies, *On Sociology: Pure, Applied and Empirical* ed. W.J. Cahman and Rudolf Heberle [Chicago and London, 1971], pp. 251-265); the early discussion of public opinion and the role of the press in *Community and Society* (London, 1972) and his early critique of Wilhelm Bauer's *Die Öffentliche Meinung und Ire Geschichtlichen Grundalges* «*1914*] in "Zur Theorie der Öffentlichen Meinung", Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 40 (1916), pp. 2001-2030.

13. *Kritik, op. cit.*, p. 219; cf. *Community and Society, op. cit.*, p. 231-2.

14. *Kritik, op. cit.*, p. 80.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 570; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 228-257 and *Community and Society, op. cit.*, pp. 220-222.

17. *Kritik, op. cit.*, pp. 207, 71.

18. Cf., *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78: "Public opinion is the common way of thought, the corporate spirit of any group or association, insofar as these opinions are built upon thought and knowledge rather than on unproven imaginings, beliefs or authority."

19. "The Power and Value of Public Opinion", *op. cit.*, pp. 253-4.

20. Walter Lippmann's definition of public opinion is an early expression of this tendency opposed by Tönnies: "Those features of the world outside which have to do with the behaviour of other human beings, in so far as that behaviour crosses ours, is dependent upon us, or is interesting to us, we call roughly public affairs. The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationships, are their public opinions" (*Public Opinion, op. cit.*, p. 18). Such formulations were marked by a deeply ironic, self-fulfilling prophecy. For their assumption that all must hold an opinion, reinforced by the structurally-secured incapacity of individuals to form an opinion through genuine public argumentation, resulted in the widespread acceptance of stereotypic analyses and instant, on-the-spot, opinion formation—a development, it can be argued, which only accelerated the growing suspicion of "the public" as the arbiter of legitimate social and political authority!

21. "The Divisions of Sociology", in *On Sociology, op. cit.* p. 137; cf. *Kritik, op. cit.*, pp. vi-viii. Relying upon this more precise meaning, one heavily indebted to the phase of Enlightenment, Tönnies was highly critical of Lippmann's all-encompasing, positivistic concept of public opinion as mere popular sentiment and feeling; cf. Tönnies' review of *Public Opinion* in "Amerikanische Soziologie", *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 26, 2 (1927), pp. 1-10.

22. "The Power and Value of Public Opinion", *op. cit.*, p. 251.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 252; cf. *ibid.*, p. 257: "'Public opinion' is considered to be like a strong fortress which must at all times be guarded and defended."

24. *Ibid.*, p. 262. Others agreed with Tönnies' assessment. See, for example, the passing remark in R.M. MacIver's classic, *The Modern State* (London, 1926), p. 19. "So many agencies are enlisted in the task of persuasion, and so few are concerned with the mere business of exploring the truth. The great endeavour is not to elicit public opinion but to make it, to control it, to use it."

25. "The Power and Value of Public Opinion", *op. cit.*, p. 254.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 255-256.

27. *Community and Society, op. cit.*, p. 221.

28. *Kritik, op. cit.*, p. 572; cf. "The Power and Value of Public Opinion," *op. cit.*, p. 264: "the more the masses move upward and the more they participate in the advance of education and political consciousness, the more will they make their voices count in the formation of public opinion."

29. *Kritik, op. cit.*, pp. 572-3; cf. "Historicism, Rationalism, and the Industrial System," in *On Sociology, op. cit.*, pp. 266-287.

30. Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion, op. cit.*, pp. 251. This highly influential kind of argument was repeated in Lippmann's subsequent works. *The Phantom Public* (New York, 1925) insisted that the democratic public had no political functions save that of mandating those capable of

deciding. According to *The Public Philosophy* (New York, 1955), the slow decay of free western democratic governments is a consequence of uninformed publics overriding the judgments of informed, responsible officials.

31. The latter point is emphasised in Weber's discusssion with Ludendorff, as recalled by Marianne Weber in *Max Weber: A Biography*, ed. Harry Zohn (New York 1975), p. 653; the first point appears in *FMW, op. cit.*, p. 221.

32. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems, op. cit.*, pp. 116-117, 138.

33. *Ibid.*, ch 4.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 116, 126.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 129.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-3; cf. p. 152: "Combined activity happens among human beings; but when nothing else happens it passes as inevitably into some other mode of interconnected activity as does the interplay of iron and the oxygen of water. . . . Only when there exists *signs* or *symbols* of activities and of their outcome can the flux be viewed as from without, be arrested for consideration and esteem, and be regulated.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 154, 163, 167, 218.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

42. *TRS*, p. 118.

43. Cf. the striking absence of discussion of Habermas' *political* concepts in Thomas McCarthy's otherwise excellent exegetical study of his writings (*The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, op. cit.*) and Garbis Kortian's account of their "meta-theoretical" dimensions (*Metacritique: The Philosophical Argument of Jürgen Habermas*, [Cambridge, 1980.])

44. Habermas acknowledges the importance of Jasper's "philosophy of communication" in "Die Gestalten der Wahrheit", in *PPP*, pp. 99-109 and in "Uber das Verhältnis von Politik und Moral" in H. Kuhn and F. Wiedmann (eds.), *Das Problem der Ordnung* (Munich, 1960), p. 111; his dependence upon Hannah Arendt (and especially her major work, *The Human Condition, op. cit.*) is made explicit in "On the German-Jewish Heritage", *Telos*, 44 (Summer, 1980), pp. 127-131.

45. The concern with a general theory of language and communication was suggested in his 1965 Frankfurt inaugural lecture (*KHI*, p. 314), pursued systematically in "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence" (first delivered as lectures during a visit to England in the late 1960's) and greatly extended in many works during the past decade. See especially: "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen" in *TGOS*, pp. 101-141; "Summation and Response", *Continuum*, 8, 1 (Spring-Summer 1970); the unpublished Gauss lectures delivered at Princton University in the

spring of 1971, *Towards a Communication Theory of Society*; "Wahrheitstheorien" in Helmut Fahrenbach (ed.) *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift für Walter Schulz* (Pfullingen, 1973), pp. 211-265; *LC*, part 3; "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics: A Working Paper", *Theory and Society*, 3 (1976), pp. 155-167, which is developed more fully in "Was heisst Universal-pragmatik?", in K.O. Apel (ed.), *Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1976), pp. 174-273, and translated as "What is Universal Pragmatics?", in *CES*, pp. 1-68. For further commentary on the theory of pragmatic universals, see my earlier "Communication, ideology and the problem of 'voluntary servitude'", *Media, Culture and Society*, 4 (1982), pp. 123-32; Thomas A. McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), ch. 4; Anthony Giddens, "Habermas's Critique of Hermeneutics" in *Studies in Social and Political Theory* (London, 1977), pp. 135-164; John B. Thompson, "Universal Pragmatics", in John B. Thompson and David Held (eds.), *Habermas: Critical Debates* (London and Basingstoke, 1982), pp. 116-133.

46. "Discussion", in Theodore F. Geraets, *Rationality Today* (Ottawa, 1979), p. 346.

47. *CES*, p. 5.

48. "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics", *op. cit.*, pp. 155-6; *CES*, p. 26.

49. Cf. *CES*, pp. 7-8 and p. 208, note 1: "Hitherto the term 'pragmatics' has been employed to refer to the analysis of particular contexts of language use and not to the reconstruction of universal features of using language (or of employing sentences in utterances)."

50. John R. Searle, *Speech Acts* (London, 1978), pp. 33ff. Habermas acknowledges the fundamental importance of Austin and Searle's theories of speech acts to the arguments of his universal pragmatics (*CES*, pp. 25 ff). The most important of this post-Wittgenstein literature includes: J.L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words* (Oxford, 1962); "Performance-Constative", in C.E. Caton (ed.), *Philosophy and Ordinary Language* (Urbana, Illinois, 1963), pp. 22-33; cf. John R. Searle, *op. cit.*, and "What is a Speech Act?" in M. Black (ed.), *Philosophy in America* (Ithaca, 1965), pp. 221-239; "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts", *Philosophical Review*, 77 (1968), pp. 405-424, and *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts* (Cambridge, 1979).

51. Cf. Karl Otto Apel, "Sprechakttheorie und transzendentale Sprachpragmatik - zur Frage ethischer Normen", in K-O. Apel (ed.), *Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie* (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 10-173.

52. *CES*, p. 14 This thesis has old roots: the proposition that speech is that medium of communication which already presupposes a tacit agreement concerning what it means to communicate already appears in Socrates; cf. Plato, *Phaedrus and The Seventh and Eighth Letters* (Harmondsworth, 1973), pp. 19-103.

53. *CES*, pp. 1-5; "Wahrheitstheorien", pp. 220-1; "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics", pp. 157-9; and "Zwei Bemerkungen zum praktischen Diskurs" in *ZHRM* p. 339.

54. "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", p. 141.

55. G. Frege, "On Sense and Reference", in P. Geach and Max Black (eds.), *Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 56-78.

56. J.L. Austin, "Performative Utterances", *op. cit.*, p. 251.

57. John R. Searle, *Speech Acts, op. cit.*, p. 251.

58. *CES*, p. 4; cf. *TGOS*, p. 120, *LC*, p. 110, and "Einige Bemerkungen Zum Problem der Bergründung von Werturteilen", in *Verhandlungen des 9. Deutschen Kongress für Philosophie* (Meisenheim, 1972), pp. 89ff.

59. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem" in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. David E. Linge (Berkley, 1977), pp. 7-8: "We all know that to say 'thou' to someone presupposes a deep common accord. Something enduring is already present when this word is spoken. When we try to reach agreement on a matter on which we have different opinions, this deeper factor always comes into play, even if we are seldom aware of it."

60. "Summation and Response", p. 131.

61. *KHI*, p. 284; cf. *CES*, pp. 63-65, 88, "Wahrheitstheorien", p. 265, note 46, and "Summation and Response", p. 131: "We name a speaking situation ideal where the communication is not only not hindered by external, contingent influences, but also not hindered by forces which result from the structure of the communication itself. Only then does the peculiarly unforced compulsion of a better argument dominate . . ."

62. A.W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity", *American Sociological Review*, (1960), pp. 161-178.

63. *KHI*, p. 314; cf. "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", p. 115.

64. "Wahrheitstheorien", p. 258; cf. *CES*, p. 88.

65. Emil Lask, "Zum System der Logik", *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol.3 (Tübingen, 1924), p. 92; *CES*, pp. 4-5.

66. For example, in "Summation and Response", p. 126, Habermas explicitly invokes the claim of G.H. Mead (*Mind, Self, Society* [Chicago, 1934], p. 327): "Universal discourse is the formal idea of communication. If communication can be carried through and made perfect, then there would exist the kind of democracry . . . in which each individual could carry just the response in himself [sic] that he knows he calls out in the community." See also *CES* pp. 78ff.

67. "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", p. 143; cf. "Summation and Response", p. 131.

68. This insistence reinforces one of Habermas' objections to the Parsonian conception of cultural "values" as somehow *given* universalistic norms which outline the desirable orientations for a social system considered as a totality. In Habermas' view (*ZL*, pp. 176-77), this formulation *a priori* excludes the possibility of the *political* formation of value orientations through "a universal and public discussion by the members of the society based on available information about the given conditions of reproduction of the system. Thereupon, a relative agreement could be effected on a value system which included the objective value orientations previously hidden from the knowledge and will of the citizenry. Through such communication, formerly acknowledged cultural values could not function only as standards; cultural values would themselves be drawn into the discussion."

69. N. Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

70. "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", p. 131.

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71. This argument underpins Habermas' criticism of the model of linguistic behaviourism (developed out of the semiotics of Charles Morris), whose account of communication as symbolically-mediated, stimulus-response behaviour equally misses the importance of the intersubjective negotiations of meaning as a *developed* competence of speaking and acting subjects. See *ZL*, pp. 150ff; *CES*, pp. 6-7, 20, 27-9; cf. "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", pp. 140 and 138, where Habermas stresses that any structure of intersubjectivity "is generated by neither the monologicaly mastered system of linguistic rules nor by the language-external conditions of its performance. On the contrary, in order to participate in normal discourse, the speaker must have—in addition to his linguistic competence—basic qualifications of speech and of symbolic interaction (role-behaviour) at his disposal, which we may call communicative competence."

72. Cf. *KHI*, pp. 138, 157; *CES*, p. 90 and "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", pp. 122-123, 143 and 141: "Every being, who says I to himself [sic], asserts himself toward the Other as absolutely different. And yet at the same time he recognizes himself in the latter as another I and is conscious of the reciprocity of this relationship; every being is potentially his own Other."

73. "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", p. 122.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

75. *LC*, pp. 107-108; *TP*, pp. 18-19.

76. *CES*, pp. 41-3, 53. This ability to distinguish and "uncouple" the so-called propositional and illocutionary dimensions of speech acts is said to be unique to the species (*Ibid.*, p. 41, where Habermas draws upon the analysis of I. Dornbach, *Primatenkommunikation* [Frankfurt, 1975]). Presumably, this capacity could only be realised fully under conditions of authentic public life. Then, and only then, could speaking actors openly and freely communicate about both "the facts" and the dynamics of their relations with each other.

77. *CES*, p. 86; *LC*, pp. 111-117.

77a. Hannah Arendt, "Truth and Politics", in Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman (eds.), *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, third series (Oxford, 1967), pp. 104-133.

78. Cf. "Wahrheitstheorien", p. 259; "Summation and Response", p. 132; "A Reply to My Critics" in John B. Thompson and David Held (eds.) *Habermas: Critical Debates* (London and Basingstoke, 1982), p. 221; *TGOS*, pp. 140-1.

79. Cf. the appraisal of the work of Gershom Scholem, ("Die verkleidete Tora: Rede zum 80. *Geburgstag von Gershom Scholem", Merkur*, 32, 1 [January, 1978], pp. 100-101), where Habermas insists that criticism's power to "intervene in tradition and explode the continuity of that which is passed down" warrants a distinction between (a) authoritarian tradition, i.e., the seemingly unchallengable renewal of "truths" of fathers by their sons; and (b) the creative appropriation of tradition, according to which the "authority" of the past can be critically scrutinized and transcended. See also *LC*, p. 70; "Consciousness-Raising", *passim*, and "Summation and Response", p. 128.

80. "Summation and Response", p. 127; cf. "Wahrheitstheorien", p. 258. Habermas' distinction between these two forms of consensus might be favourably compared with Steven Lukes' concern to generate a radical conception of power and interest (*Power: A Radical View* [London and Basingstoke, 1977] pp. 24-25, 32-35, 46-50). Lukes speaks of the problem of latent

conflicts of interest which arise from contradictions between the interests of those exercising power, and the "real interests" of those excluded or shaped by this power. It is suggested (through rather empiricist and insufficiently developed arguments) that the category of real interests must be connected with an empirically-grounded theory (based on adduced "evidence") of the preconditions for autonomous political action. Habermas' theory of validity claims deepens this thesis, but through less positivistic arguments.

81. *CES*, p. 14; *TP*, p. 17. The positivistic claim that an actually existing agreement must always be final is defended in the well-known work of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz on "non-decisionmaking" *(Power and Poverty, Theory and Practice* [New York, 1970], p. 49). In the absence of observable (overt or covert) political conflict, it is claimed, "the presumption must be that there is a consensus on the prevailing allocation of values, in which case non-decisionmaking is impossible."

82. "Consciousness-Raising", p. 59 (the quotation is from Walter Benjamin's 1929 essay *Der Sürrealismus*, translated in *Reflections* [New York and London, 1978] p. 191). Compare also the explicitly political, and uncharacteristically metaphoric rendition of this same point in "Summation and Response", p. 127: "Reason in the sense of the principle of rational discourse is the rock on which hitherto factual authorities are smashed rather than the rock on which they are founded."

83. "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", pp. 117ff.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 117; cf. "Summation and Response", pp. 125-6 and *CES*, p. 210, note 2.

85. Cf. H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1973), chs. 11-13.

86. *TP*, pp. 32-37. Habermas' rejection parallels Maurice Merleau-Ponty's dismissal of a "politics of reason" in favour of a "politics of understanding", *(Adventures of the Dialectic* [Evanston, 1973], pp. 3-7).

87. *TP*, pp. 36-37 (translation altered). Somewhat uncharacteristically, Habermas here adds that under certain political conditions (the opposition to war? the subjection of a woman to a wife-beating husband?) such strictures on the need for cautious prudence are simply scurrilous or ridiculous. This point will be pursued further in section XIII.

88. G. Lukács, "Toward a Methodology of the Problem of Organisation", in *History and Class Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), p. 304 (original emphasis).

89. *KK*, pp. 112-117.

90. This conception of the analysis of processes of drive dynamics as linguistic analysis draws explicitly upon Alfred Lorenzer, *Kritik des psychoanalytischen Symbolbegriffs* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970) and *Sprachzerstörung und Rekonstruktion* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970). Compare also K.-O. Apel's interpretation of pschoanalysis as a critical emancipatory inquiry which dialectically mediates communicative understanding with the quasi-naturalistic objectification and explanation of action, in "Analytic Philosophy and the 'Geisteswissenschaften', *Foundations of Language*, suppl. series, vol. 5 (Dordrecht, 1967), pp. 25ff, 55ff, and in "The A Priori of Communication and the Foundation of the Humanities" in Fred Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy (eds.) *Understanding and Social Inquiry* (Notre Dame, 1977), pp. 310-312. Habermas' appropriation of psychoanalysis (and his corresponding attempt to differentiate *two* forms of interpretation and communication) is evident in "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", pp. 116-130; *KHI*, chs. 10-12; *KK,* pp. 264ff; *TP*, pp. 22ff.

91. *KHI*, p. 218; *CES*, 68, 70; *KK*, 264-30.

92. *KHI*, ch. 11. Habermas' criticism of Freud's "self-misunderstanding" of the epistemological status of the psychoanalytic project parallels that of Michael Foucault (*Madness and Civiliza- tion: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* [New York, 1973]). According to Foucault, Freudian psychoanalysis counters contemporary positivistic accounts of madness by engaging "unreason" at the level of its language. Freud established the possibility of a *dialogue* with unreason (p. 198). On the other hand, this dialogue is premised upon the interrogating authority of the analyst. Freud "did deliver the patient from the existence of the asylum within which his 'liberators' had alienated him; but he did not deliver him from what was essential in this existence; he regrouped its powers, extended them to the maximum by uniting them in the doctor's hands" (278).

93. *TP*, pp. 24, 29.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

96. H.J. Geigel, "Reflexion und Emanzipation", in *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik* (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 278ff; cf. the reply to Habermas by H.G. Gadamer in *ibid.*, pp. 307ff, and A. Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society* (New York, 1971).

97. *TP*, pp. 16, 29ff.

98. *TGOS*, p. 120. Compare the attempt by Claus Mueller (*The Politics of Communication* [New York, 1973]) to deploy the theory of ideologically distorted communication.

99. *TGOS*, p. 120; cf. "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence", p. 117, and "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power", *Social Research*, 44 1 (Spring, 1977), p. 21-22.

100. See *TRS*, esp. pp. 98-100, 111-112; *LC*, pp. 22-3; *SO*, 65-6, 110-111. Habermas' concern with these ideologies is unfortunately ignored in Paul Ricoeur's discussion of Gadamer and Haber- mas in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge, 1981), essay two.

101. *LC*, p. 22; *TRS*, p. 99.

102. *LC*, p. 22; *TRS*, pp. 98-99. Of course, Habermas acknowledges that bourgeois-ideological forms of communication also displayed an "evident contradiction between idea and reality" (*LC*, p. 23). They were thus plagued by internal contradictions, and therefore condemned to successive internal erosions and immanent criticisms. Bourgeois ideologies typically repressed, invited and provoked their opposite: criticisms of ideology addressed to the exploited victims of the new bourgeois order. "Ideologies are coeveal with the critique of ideology. In this sense, there can be no prebourgeois 'ideologies'" (*TRS*, p. 99). In respect of the "utopian" or "illusory" qualities (which also functioned as a substitute gratification among the dominated, as Marx stressed with reference to Christianity in his polemic against Feuerbach), bourgeois ideologies were indeed false, even though they were not simply "false consciousness"(Engels). As the young Habermas noted with reference to the growth of public argumentation in the seven- teenth and eighteenth centuries, ideologies "are not exclusively defined by their being the pure and simple falseness of a necessary social consciousness ... (They) also display a moment whose truth consists in a utopian impulse which points beyond the present by bringing its justification into question" (*SO*, p. 111); cf. *ibid.*, p. 278. In this earlier formulation, Habermas is closer to

Theodor Adorno, according to whom ideology is an objective and necessarily illusory form of consciousness, marked by the "coalescence of the true and false" ("Beitrag zur Ideologienlehre", *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 6 (1953-4), p. 366.

103. Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, *Aspects of Sociology* (London, 1974), p. 183.

104. *KK*, p. 79; cf., *TRS*, p. 111 and Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man, op. cit.*: The "absorption of ideology by reality does not, however, mean the end of ideology."

105. *CES*, p. 169; cf. *LC*, p. 19.

106. *TP*, pp. 237, 242. Habermas here pointed to a few subsequent (and, in his view, less than satisfactory) attempts to reconstruct historical materialism as a critique of ideology: Ernst Bloch's concern with the critical utopian moments of ideological consciousness; Benjamin's theory of the allegorical; and Adorno's defence of the critical potential of modern art through the categories of negative-dialectical thought. Habermas' own project can be placed within this failed tradition.

107. *KHI*, p. 45.

108. Scientistic Marxism enjoyed a powerful reputation throughout the whole of the Second and Third Internationals, as has been shown by Russell Jacoby, "Towards a Critique of Automatic Marxism: The Politics of Philosophy from Lukács to the Frankfurt School", *Telos*, 10 (Winter, 1971), pp. 119-146. This scientism culminates in contemporary Soviet Marxism. Against those "ideologists" who dare to speak and act rebelliously, this Marxism confidently asserts the unquestionable dualism between science and ideology; it therefore also insists upon its role as the privileged bearer of scientific insight into both the laws of nature and history. Another recent instance of this scientism is to be found in the Althusserian account of those universal and indispensable processes through which ideology functions "to shape men, to transform them and enable them to respond to the exigencies of existence" (Louis Althusser, *For Marx* [London, 1969], p. 235, [translation altered]). It is claimed that scientific knowledge of social formations consists in an autonomous discourse which both speaks "in ideology" and tries to break with ideology (*Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* [London, 1971], p. 162). This kind of formulation, as critics of Althusser have pointed out, obscures the logic of the mediations between scientific discourse and its ideologial "referent". Scientific inquiry, it is said, must proceed from the most abstract concepts (which are seen to be related to "formal abstract objects") to the most concrete concepts (which are supposedly related to "real-concrete singular objects"). It is as if these categories are detached, spontaneous thoughts, independent of actual social and political relations of power, and attributable only to some ill-conceived movement of pure scientific reason. According to this potentially bureaucratic formulation, the dualism between science and ideology cannot be questioned. The "object" of thought is represented as virtually internal to thought. In addition, knowledge itself is dehistoricised. It is to be preserved (for eternity?) as valid against a ubiquitous ideology which tends—by virtue of the allegedly indusputable claims of science itself—to become synonmous with "false consciousness" (as has been pointed out by Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory, op. cit.*, p. 181). The maxim that "there is no practice except by and in an ideology" (*Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, op. cit.*, p. 159) is not extended to "science" itself.

109. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, op. cit.*, p. 151: "Ideology... is for Marx an imaginary assemblage (*bricolage*), a pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the 'day's residues' from the only full and positive reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material individuals producing their existence. It is on this basis that ideology has no history in *The German Ideology*, since its history is outside it, where the only existing history is, the history of concrete individuals, etc."

110. Cf. Francis Bacon, "Novum Organum", in *Works*, James Spedding et. al. eds. (London, 1883), pp. 54ff; Theodore Geiger, *Ideologie und Wahrheit* (Stuttgart and Wien, 1953), and, concerning Bacon and de Tracy, Hans Barth, *Truth and Ideology* (Berkley, 1976), chs. 1 and 2.

111. *Theories of Surplus Value*, III, (Moscow, 1971), p. 536. Commenting on this myth (appropriated from Luther's own rendition), Marx notes; "an excellent picture, it fits the capitalist in general, who pretends that what he has taken from others and brought into his den emanates from him, and by causing it to go backwards he gives it the semblance of having come from his den." Compare Marx's note attached to *The German Ideology, op. cit.*, p. 472: "ideologists turn everything upside down".

112. Cf., *The German Ideology, op. cit.*, pp. 413-414.

113. "A Review of Gadamer's *Truth and Method*", in Fred A. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy (eds.) *Understanding and Social Inquiry, op.cit.*, pp. 335-363; cf. Gadamer's pointed response in *Truth and Method, op. cit.*, p. 360; cf., *TP*, p. 158, where work as purposive-rational action is seen as always endowed with meaning or significance by virtue of its embeddedness within a framework of communcatively-generated rules.

114. "A Review of Gadamer's *Truth and Method, op. cit.*, p. 360; cf., *TP*, p. 158, where work as purposive-rational action is seen as always endowed with meaning or significance by virtue of its embeddedness within a framework of communcatively-generated rules.

115. "A Review of Gadamer's *Truth and Method*", *op. cit.*, pp. 360-1.

116. Alfred Schmidt, *The Concept of Nature in Marx* (London, 1973), p. 30. See also: Adam Schaff, *Marxism and the Human Individual* (New York, 1970), p. 75; Marshall Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason, op. cit.*, esp. ch. 3.

MASSAGE IN THE MASS AGE:
REMEMBERING THE McLUHAN MATRIX*

John Fekete

In the 1920s, I.A. Richards' experiments with the practical criticism of poetry ended in the cul-de-sac of his students' stock responses to the texts. Marshall McLuhan relates the story of Richards' subsequent visit to the University of Wisconsin. While canoeing, Richards fell into the icy waters of Lake Mendota and, when rescued, was unconscious but nonetheless clinging to the thwart of the canoe. *The Cardinal,* the student paper at Wisconsin, ran a feature cartoon on the incident with the caption: "Saved by a stock response" (34, pp.19-20).

In his later work, McLuhan himself became increasingly interested in the stock responses that assist people to negotiate various demanding situations in everyday life. He developed, correspondingly, a conservative amnesia about the reifications of daily existence that distorted his focus on the liberating or humanistic features of the cultural environment. I have been sharply critical of this amnesia (see 10), and find no reason now to retract the basic criticisms. At the same time, in order to appropriate and appraise McLuhan's contribution, it does not seem enough to rehearse those criticisms, unless we can simultaneously account, in a complementary vein, for the fact that McLuhan's writings continue to intrigue. How is it that his work may still serve us well as an alibi for discussing a configuration of matters deeply important for us? To what extent can it be regarded as a new model for a strategically-oriented humanist scholarship, characterized by a concern with paradigm shifts, civilization-level reflection, a futuristic edge and experimental pedagogy? The observations below are designed to sketch such a complementary framework for a continuing discussion.

Many modern accounts have converged to suggest that a momentous human revolution is under way, with a significance that may parallel or exceed that of the industrial and political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The extent to which this revolution may pivot on new modalities of information, knowledge, and intelligence, the extent to which it implies overt rearrangements of our social, economic, political and cultural institutions, and the extent to which it entails subliminal alterations in our cognitive, emotive, and esthetic responses have become large, open and pressing questions of our times, not least because of the immense conflicts that may be implicated in any of these changes. In the immediate, the nature and impact of our newly-emerging electric or electronic technologies and the way in which their social incorporation may proceed point to possible consequences for the structure and quality of human interactions at least as profound as the consequences attached to the invention of writing or print.

Marshall McLuhan tried to absorb and respond to this prospect of the human life-world on the point of evolution, and to articulate an orientation to the pressures that this imposing complex of problems and opportunities exercises

on the enduring concerns in the purview of the humanities. As an explorer of new landscapes, he has left behind a challenging intellectual and institutional legacy. He can be described as a maverick humanist; his institutional fate is particularly interesting and instructive for framing his intellectual project.

It appears paradoxical that McLuhan should have become the world's most widely known and acclaimed literary scholar while remaining relatively uncherished or resisted in the academic milieu where he spent most of his working life. A year after his death, his Centre for Culture and Technology is being dismantled at the University of Toronto, and his work has attracted relatively little active interest in recent years in the academic humanities. By contrast, it is worth recalling how very popular McLuhan became during the 1960s in important non-university sectors including teaching, the arts, engineering, architecture, business, and media-related fields. In the French language, *le mcluhanisme* became a common noun, signifying mixed-media cultural forms. In Canada, McLuhan advised the federal government; in the U.S., he collected substantial fees for talking to executives of Bell Telephone, IBM, Container Corporation of America, and General Motors. It has been observed that McLuhan's sense of the corporate "may even have made the executive suite as attractive a base of operations for him as the throne room had been for the early humanists" (38,p.93).

Newspapers routinely referred to him as "communications prophet" or "media guru," and Toronto newspaper coverage alone of McLuhan was 1223 column inches in 1964 (36,pp.31-33). His face appeared on the covers of *Newsweek*, and *Saturday Review*, and material by and about him reached vast and varied audiences through new mass circulation organs like *Look, Vogue, Family Circle, Fortune, Life, Esquire, Playboy, National Review, New Yorker, New York Times Magazine, National Catholic Reporter,* and *Popular Photography*, as well as radio, television, a record, and films. McLuhan also took advantage of the rise of the mass paperback, and published over a dozen books, of which *Understanding Media* sold well over 100,000 copies. It is fair to suppose that in capturing and articulating the structure of feeling of the 1960s, McLuhan touched a contemporary nerve.

McLuhan's reception in university circles during this period and since has been much less enthusiastic, and it is possible to identify at least four major clusters of difficulties in the way of a favourable and enduring incorporation of his concerns, polarized around his deviations from the specialist academy from high culture, from the spirit of critical values and from the realm of the privileged, isolated text.

1. An information environment of electronic data-processing through the mass media and with the aid of computers suggests a major shift in the place and function of formal education. It favours the recognition and formulation of patterns that will make stored information available to research and make sense of the proliferation of signs at large, and it requires the strategic skills of coordinating and interrelating data to complement specialised knowledge and memory. A premium is placed on comprehensive understanding of the processes

of learning and knowledge formation. To an extent, the humanist advocacy of interdisciplinary liberal education is confirmed on these grounds but it is not hard to see how such an emphasis runs counter to the institutional and professional attachment to specialized scholarship.

In the nearly feudal division of functions and disciplines in the conservative university structure of the 1950s, McLuhan offended the dominant norms with his vigorous pursuit of an interdisciplinary investigation cutting across the humanities and social sciences, beginning in 1953 with the journal *Explorations*, founded on a Ford Foundation grant. These norms, of course, have since loosened, partly through McLuhan's own efforts, in the context of a general attack on the feudal forms of education pressed by such agencies as Ivan Illich and advocates of deschooling as well as by a broadly militant student movement. Interdisciplinary formations today are stronger, somewhat more capable of looking after their needs, and correspondingly somewhat less strident, if even more strategically important.

Within the classification, definition, and co-ordination of data, the electronic techniques pose a further great challenge for all scholars, but especially for the special concerns of the humanities: the challenge to know the limits of what are and are not technical problems and to support the valorization of those human functions — from the phatic to the valuative and consensually cognitive — for which technology cannot substitute because these human functions are essential to the interpretive and communicative dimensions in the formation of human community and in the intersubjective legitimation of social and cultural goals (39,pp.5-7). The information revolution, thus, with all its perceivable pressures and unforeseen fallout, places the humanities with the full force of all their traditional concerns in a strategic position.

McLuhan's recognition of the educational function of the new media, however, ran into the resistance of scholars to the primitive contents of the available mass media. His polemical attacks on the monopoly of the book as teaching-aid (28, p.1), and on the extent to which traditional education coerces students to be passive consumers of uniformly-packaged learning (26,p.144), were polemically rejected by academics in a defensive posture. As McLuhan moved further from the institutional norms for the production and distribution of information by playing to a mass audience in new pedagogical forms, his serious underestimation of universities, and of the critical exploration of cultural and intellectual values which is the mandated function of the universities, simply further strained his relations with the structure of institutional norms. In the end, the academic humanities have yet to engage with his provocative formulation of a "classroom without walls" and its central recognition that, in the electronic information milieu, most learning occurs outside the classroom.

2. As proportion and propriety are closely linked, so a reflection on the volume of information outside the classroom and the formal arts led McLuhan, through the *Explorations* period and thereafter, to reject the high-culture provincialism that "everything connected with industry, commerce, sport, and popular entertainment is merely vulgar" (18,p.96). He came to define culture as a communication

network with which all objects and activities have some kind of relation so that "there are no non-cultural areas" in society (19,p.191). By shifting attention to form, he attended to the formal continuity of cultural articulation in a multiplicity of fields. When McLuhan linked profane culture to canonical culture, and proposed that the new media were "serious culture" (21,p.7) or that advertising used symbolist techniques to create communal participation in the totemistic institutions of national brand commodities such as Coca Cola (20,p.555), he was taken to be heretical with respect to the canonical humanities professions.

Now we can recognize such arguments as belonging to a large culturalist complex concerned with reducing the distance between the arts and the other forms of life. Northrop Frye's argument for the formal continuity of narrative across different discourses, the universalism implicit in the attention to the rhetorical stances and conventions that both organize discipline-specific writing and cut across disciplines, the structural or semiotic generalization of signs throughout the social domain in networks of conventional formations, and the post-structuralist development of the productive notions of trace and genealogy all parallel or confirm McLuhan's approach and create around it a politically democratic intellectual and institutional cluster which was unavailable in the 1950s and 1960s, which is more or less realistically synchronized with the widely variable retrieval and reception conditions in the contemporary information environment, and into which McLuhan can be fruitfully resituated. What the traditional humanities and the humanist social sciences still need to introduce into such a pan-semiological configuration in order to assist the active appropriation of practical powers of decision and agency is: (a) a revalorization of the value definitions and symbolic exploration that the open forms of the arts serve to provide; (b) a thematization of the ways in which the closed forms of mythologies (in Barthes's sense) of mass culture may be opened in individual reception: (c) a reconnection of the semiological field with the body politic in the fullness of the world; and (d) an emancipatory anatomy of the forms of domination at play in the semioticized social universe.

3. In contrast to the deeply rooted defensive posture of the traditional humanities with their received critical stance or wasteland mentality with respect to the social order or disorder of the times, McLuhan, as early as 1948 in his "Introduction" to Hugh Kenner's *Paradox in Chesterton,* announced programmatically the need to face "the problem of creating a practical moral and social order...and this necessarily means an action which co-operates in multiple ways with the numerous hopeful features of the contemporary world" (17,p.xvii). Whereas the early McLuhan had attacked "the technological bias of the age" (16, p.171), later he came to describe the electric media as hopeful features that we should maximize (33, p. 133), and to claim that they resolved the traditional humanist problems — for example, healed "the print-made split between head and heart" (26, p.170).

Such a technologically-effected resolution of problems like the dissociation of sensibility that preoccupied T.S. Eliot is a paradoxical reversal of the customary

superordination of the world of humane values to the world of the machine and it was bound to evoke nervous reservations from the academic humanities, with justice in so far as any distinction in McLuhan's writing between technical potentials and the contexts of human response is elusive. But it is noteworthy that elements of all of McLuhan's humanist traditions collaborated in this reversal. The search for order among his Catholic influences such as G.K. Chesterton, Hilaire Belloc, and Wyndham Lewis took an openly technical turn in Teilhard de Chardin. In the sociological tradition of Lewis Mumford, until the late retractions, electric technology served as the motive force of the renewal of civilization. In the visual arts, from Futurism and Dadaism to Cubism and Constructivism, as in Mallarmé's description of the newspaper as a new form of communal landscape (32, pp.5-21), McLuhan found, to adapt a phrase of art historian Siegfried Giedion, that mechanization took command of the imagination. The English traditions of praise for the miracles of the machine go back to Tennyson's "Locksley Hall," Carlyle's description of locomotives as "our poems", and Shelley's description of the scope of technical power in *Prometheus Unbound.*

Perhaps most importantly, the Anglo-American tradition of critical theory, of which McLuhan could be described as a culminating figure (10, p.135), in its strivings for totality and order, from I.A. Richards and T.S. Eliot through the New Critics and Northrop Frye, developed an increasingly technical orientation. There is a plausible leap from a technical art form to other technical communicative forms, in this case, electric media, to serve as the agencies of a salvation that the secularized eschatology in this tradition has since Matthew Arnold customarily anticipated from art within its unresolved art-religion interface (10, p.11).

McLuhan's strongly urged confidence in the option presented by an incipient electric culture tended, in the utopian mood of public reception of the 1960s, to make less visible or compelling in their own terms his critiques of centuries of mechanization, which link him with a variety of European traditions of alienation critique, and also tended to overshadow the countervailing humanist scruples in his methodological assertion that culture need not be accepted as a fate (26, p.76), his warning that "we must now work very hard to retain" the achieved values of the Gutenberg mechanical culture (26, p.135), or his repeated comments on the status of his own work as consisting of probes, not fixed formulas. The field of attention acquired from both a humanities and a social science tradition as well as the visual arts, the set of problems and resources received from a literary tradition, and the moral orientation supported by a Catholic religious tradition combine in McLuhan with an anthropology of man as "the tool-making animal, whether in speech or in writing or in radio" (26, p.4), to create an original synthesis which, taken as a whole, but read through the emphases of the moment, was bound to be almost impossible for literary humanists to accept.

4. McLuhan's "worldly turn," as it might be called, reversed the systematic isolation of the literary humanities from social currents. He thus confronted a

two-centuries-old critical strategy adopted under the hostile pressures of industrial, commercial, and political development. McLuhan argued relentlessly that the age of electro-magnetic information processing was tendentially capable of satisfying without exception all of the concerns that humanists had demarcated for two centuries as their basic demands more or less in critical opposition to the system of the world. In effect McLuhan declared that the culture-society, or cultivation-calculation, antagonism of Romantic origin was terminated (10, p.8), and he used an apparatus developed in literature and critical theory for the analysis of communicative and social relations.

In as much as his arguments about a comprehensive information environment left no place for privileged isolation of the humanities and their objects of study, McLuhan was simply taking note of professional and cultural realties that the humanist were unready to accept as were, in their turn, the political economists. The general principle here is the ending of privileged, self-determined, stable spheres of separated human activity. Nevertheless, the skeptical response from the humanities involved a proper concern that McLuhan's impatience with mediations may erode the ever more necessary humanistic opposition to the imperialism of instrumental reason. In the event, it passed unnoticed that McLuhan was, among other things, offering to recapture for humane reflection some territory in the realm of scientific processes and social relations which had been abandoned and which was being rapidly claimed by the positivist social sciences that were vigorously on the rise after the 1939-1945 war. Evidently the humanities did not need to feel disarmed; they could consider that they were being placed, as McLuhan hoped, in the control tower of society to navigate its course, having thus acquired greater responsibility, i.e. greater capacity to respond to a greater range of questions.

McLuhan's interdisciplinary worldliness was, in fact, except for his few academic and many public supporters, unwelcomed in all quarters. If his excursions into the social sciences were predictably considered from given social scientific disciplinary standpoints to lack density, it was equally predictable that his turn to the consideration of historical, technological, and other environmental elements would cause alarm in the circles of the literary institution, especially as it seemed to threaten the hermetic closure of the textual object around which the strategic moves of the literary humanities had only in the preceding decade or two developed a professional institutional base (see 10,11).

Today, at a different strategic stage of institutional development, texts are routinely opened to intertextual configurations within the expanded formalization that results from the structuralist and post-structuralist consolidation of the language paradigm (see 11). New attention to the contexts (social practices, collective interpretive norms and assumptions, or conditions of production and reproduction) that impinge intrinsically on texts is being given persuasive direction and support, moreover, from such divergent critical quarters as Michel Foucault, Stanley Fish, and Raymond Williams (see 13,12,41). It seems much more likely that McLuhan may be able to appear less eccentric or deviant in such a configuration and find the proper hearing that can earn for his concerns a place

of importance in a broadly ecumenical paradigm.

In fact, McLuhan's work remains one of the best alibis in the humanities for exploring the nexus that bears his mark: interpretation-communication-community. It links him to pragmatist traditions as much as to hermeneutic traditions. The context of reception belongs to both, and McLuhan's enduring sense of a mass audience that he believed was too numbed by the habitual patterns of the cultural environment to be aware of the changes occurring around it gave him the broad theme of manipulation in order to take account of it. From the Richards-Eliot tradition McLuhan had inherited, in any case, an interest in the manipulation of impulses to serve in the formation of a wider equilibrium. Manipulation and massage, then, are pivots from which some of the stimulating elements in McLuhan's work may be reviewed—elements that may still be usefully touched on in contemporary discussions.

The major opening image of McLuhan's 1967 text, *The Medium is the Massage* (29, pp.4-5), highlights a life-sized hand cupping an ear attached to the barely visible side of a head. A lock of hair, a patch of forehead, and a dim suggestion of a cavity to house the eye add fragments to the picture. The sole caption inquires: "...the massage?" The most partial semiology will display here the central problematic of McLuhan's interrogations: an acoustic tactile field dominated by the hand, i.e. the universe of manipulation.

The controlling focus of the image is a receptive gesture of amplified attention. In mapping the field of attention, more broadly than Harold Innis's inquiry into why we attend to the things to which we attend (15, p.xvii), McLuhan expands a problem in the psychology and sociology of perception toward the articulation of an ecology of sense, taking from the organic and social sensorium such aspects of sense as sensation, sensuality, sensuousness, sensibility, apprehension, affect, percept, concept, rationality. As their ratios change, McLuhan says, people change (29, p.41).

The gesture of amplified auditory attention, especially as the ear is said to favour no particular point of view, rests on a posture of total sensory receptivity adjusted to the anticipation of an acoustic or oral message—which means, for McLuhan, not only spoken or verbal but total (22, item 1; 26, p.3). In fact, the verbal caption, ". . . the massage?", even as it echoes the earlier cybernetic formula—the medium is the message—that McLuhan introduced in 1959 (23; see also 24,25), exceeds that formula. Its *double entendre* provides a dual hermeneutic specification of message within the communicative paradigm, historically drawing attention to the mass age with its mass culture, and behaviorally, to the sensory massage. The pun, and the echo, in their verbal synergies, of course further exceed these propositions.

The punch that comes from the media environment then makes good on the anticipations; its gift saturates the receptive horizons of expectation. According to McLuhan:

> All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in
> their personal, political, economic, aesthetic, psychological,

> moral, ethical, and social consequences that they leave no part
> of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered. The medium is the
> massage. Any understanding of social and cultural change is
> impossible without a knowledge of the way media work as
> environments (29, p.26).

In massage, everything and everyone is completely worked over, altered, manipulated. We are here in a world of mass mediatization, forced socialization, universal imposition of models. We are past a world where contents are significant, or even where forms dispose of relative self-determination. It is noteworthy that we seem to have here a regulative paradigm, not a productive paradigm. The media are the processes that effect changes "of scale or pace or pattern" in human affairs (27, pp.23-24).

What appears here as a general theory of objectivation has at its centre a theory of communication. In this sense, media are not vehicles or means of distribution of formed contents, or co-efficients of ideology; in their very operations they are *ipso facto* effectors of ideology and social relations (3,p.169). It follows that they compel involvement and participation—the terms through which McLuhan characterizes the electric age (in contrast to the specialist detachment of the earlier print-dominated period). In as much as the human image is that of a receiver, this is evidently the world of universal consumption, consumption of signs, consumption of media. Correspondingly, the media themselves take on, in their very operations, the form of domination, the form of the unilateral gift, the massage.

On Jean Baudrillard's account, if one agrees to understand communication, not as simple transmission-reception of a message, but as the reciprocal space of a *responsibility* (not psychological or moral, but personal, mutual correlation in exchange), then media, as McLuhan accurately presents them, "fabricate noncommunication," preventing response, and "making all processes of exchange impossible (except in the various forms of response *simulation,* themselves interpreted in the transmission process, thus leaving the unilateral nature of the communication intact)." A system of social control and power is thus coded in the abstract social relations so established (3, pp.169-170). In the light of his tribal optimism, McLuhan's proposition of media massage is clearly not a critical proposition, but it is equally clearly endowed with considerable analytic value.

If, on McLuhan's reading, media processes do not serve primarily to convey information but to reprocess and transform the factors of communication, then we are taken past the theatre of representation and the contentions and abstentions of signs. Signs are separated from transcendental signifieds, as Jacques Derrida would prefer, de-auratized, as Walter Benjamin would say, that is, stripped of intrinsic finality and implicated in a general manipulation, a political epistemology, a tactical disposition, a coded program. It is at this point that McLuhan finds a provisional terminus of sorts, to replace the transcendental ends that are lost to the media massage, by way of recourse to nature, especially

the sensorium: "All media are extensions of some human faculty—psychic or physical" (29, P.26), and extensions alter our ratios of sense perceptions and thus the way we think and act (29, p.41)

It would be important to study the extent to which this phantasm of nature, which draws body, technology, and social form into a simulation model of the penetration of the nervous system by cultural process, can bear fruit under investigation into the connections between organism and social organisation. It is possible to criticise (10, pp.168-170) the ideological character of the subject-object identity which is postulated here by McLuhan and which, from genetics to socio-biology, philosophy, literary theory, or physics is part of a complex contemporary strategic configuration. What is worth noting here is that the sensorium serves, on McLuhan's account, to provide the variables of the code carried and imposed by the media. It is then the sensory bias of the method of information processing favoured by a particular medium that regulates the process of signification and exchange. In consequence, the socio-cultural system has no further foundational or teleological myths or referential values and McLuhan, accordingly, places at the peak of his value hierarchy an interplay of senses as opposed to any exaggeration of one over the other. Indeed, he defines "touch," the sense of manipulation, as the general interplay of senses rather than a separate sense (26, p.65).

McLuhan's prophetic stance is accordingly assumed, just like Teilhard de Chardin's cosmic optimism (26, p.32), to the extent that he finds in the era of electro-magnetic technology an era of tactile communication. If McLuhan is right that a period of fragmentation, distance, and detached sequential reflection, what he calls a visual period, is receding, then it is intriguing to consider that just at the point where touch is being denied its separate sensory value as a factor in physical manipulation, and, correspondingly, its value in classical political-economic terms, it should be recategorized as a general sensory interplay characteristic of generalized manipulation and plasticity (2, p. 100). McLuhan's argument merits serious attention within a constellation of similar arguments to the effect that the movement of information increasingly exceeds in significance the movement of physical materials. In his description, the result is that the communicative universe becomes a field of interface, of being in touch, of tactile and, one would have to say, tactical simulation, one might even hope tactful simulation, in a mosaic arrangement where message turns into massage.

McLuhan thus brings organic and organizational elements into active relationship in a way that leaves neither term stable or, rather, institutes both through the structure of their relationships. It is of particular interest that, as a result, he moves to reinstitute as the key to his ecology of sense, with a new historical edge, the category of *sensus communis* (26, p.106). In his discussion of the sensorium, McLuhan combines a medieval usage of this category, as a faculty of the individual mind that serves as the common root or the processor of the information of the outer senses, with the category of common sense as the sense that founds community. This latter usage refers to the common world, predisposition, most general frame of reference or way of seeing of an epoch or a

culture, which has served through the centuries of the commercial-industrial period, in Vico, Shaftesbury, the Scottish moralists, or the German pietists (see 14, pp. 19-29), as a defense against privation, usually as an ideal norm to the extent that a broad public sphere, or *a fortiori*, a substantial community, were not given in empirical reality. Kant had demarcated a space for this problem in his discussion of aesthetic judgement, and any attempt to maintain the subjectivity of taste while avoiding the traps of ideosyncratic subjectivism must come to terms somehow with an effectively shared dimension. In our own information environment, as even higher cognitive functions come under questioning as to their ineluctable subjectivity, a historical concretization of the given *sensus communis* seems indispensable for any hermeneutic theory that raises the question of reception.

It is in this connection that Marshall McLuhan, like Walter Benjamin (see 4,35), calls attention to the conditions of reception in mass culture through his interpretation of forms and media and their functions. McLuhan's historical specification is to find in electro-magnetic processes the shapes of a new electronic community, made interdependent by the instantaneous and thus simultaneous processing of information in a global network, and correspondingly reshaped at the level of the individual psyche with a discontinous and inclusive mode of awareness as opposed to the sequential and segmented modes of consciousness in earlier cultures dominated by fragmenting technologies. Like Freud or Marcuse, McLuhan reads history with pointed reference to psychic organization.

It may be of interest in other contexts that sometimes McLuhan describes this global electronic village community in the terms of an ultra-conservative ritualized ethos (31, p.70), sometimes, more rarely, in the terms of an ultra-libertarian pluralistic eros (26, p.31), and sometimes in the terms of a millenial religious apocalypse (31, p.72). Partly, there are ideological variants at play here, partly a strategy of ambivalence that builds into the text enough contradictions to reduce the vulnerability to refutation or irony that attend a single point of view. What matters more for the moment is McLuhan's central insistence on the question of a new rationality, both public and private, a *sensus communis* at play at the levels of both sensory organism and technical organisation:

> Our extended senses, tools, technologies, through the ages, have been closed systems incapable of interplay or collective awareness. Now, in the electric age, the very instantaneous nature of co-existence among our technological instruments has created a crisis quite new in human history. Our extended faculties and senses now constitute a single field of experience which demands that they become collectively conscious. Our technologies, like our private senses, now demand an interplay and ratio that makes rational co-existence possible (26, p.5)

McLuhan's central contribution then is to contemporary rationality debates or, more precisely, to the discussions over what ratios might regulate the tactics of social organization in a tactile communicative ecology. His target is a conscious rationality, co-ordinating individual culture and liberty with collective culture and mythology in the light of day (26, p.269). The issue here is one of proportions, or rather, of disproportioning and reproportioning, in as much as he rejects, as he claims electronic culture rejects, the proportions of the closure effected by visual rationality.

For techniques of insight into the forces shaping human perception, McLuhan turns, like Walter Benjamin (see 4, pp.157-202), to the patterns and methods of awareness of symbolist and modern art and poetry, to the contours of the process itself in distinction from the products. In the esthetic developed from Ruskin and the French symbolists, he finds clues to a procedure of multi-leveled insights. It is characteristic of McLuhan's convictions and habits that he seeks to find in popular culture the basic components of a hieratic intelligence and is prepared to withstand the almost inevitable scorn of "serious people". In a discussion of the Gothic grotesque, he notes that the vogue of the Gothic romance was considered trite and ridiculous by "serious people" (26, p.266) in Blake's time, yet could later and now be seen as the quest for a unified mode of perception which held the key to the way out of the "single vision and Newton's sleep" that Blake fought all his life.

Ruskin's description, which won Rimbaud's and Proust's attention, presents the grotesque as a way of breaking open the closed system of perception embedded in the "regime of Renaissance perspective and single vision or realism" (26, p.266):

> A fine grotesque is the expression, in a moment, by a series of symbols thrown together in bold and fearless connection, of truths which it would have taken a long time to express in any verbal way, and of which the connection is left for the beholder to work out for himself; the gaps, left or overleaped by the haste of the imagination, forming the grotesque character (37, p.91).

McLuhan finds here a source of Rimbaud's technique of vision in his *Illuminations,* and draws a line to Joyce as well, in as much as Joyce accepted the grotesque "as a mode of broken or syncopated manipulation to permit *inclusive* or simultaneous perception of a diversified field" (26, p.267). The world of manipulation again closes on itself but this time as a resource of artistic articulation. Simultaneity here may be read as analogical ratios rather than as the coordination of absolute presence (see 30, p.240; 8, p.85).

We might draw further lines between Rimbaud's "painted slides" and Benjamin's dialectical images, linking a French poet and a German cultural

theorist, or among Keats's, Benjamin's and the Frankfurt School's commitment to fragments as anchors of a sublime defence against the pressures of single vision and homogenised rationality. The point is that McLuhan is here working deeply within a cultural configuration that also includes the structuralist attention to gaps and fissures in texts and the Brechtian theatre of multiple-visioned estrangement. His effort, not unique in history but significant in our time, is to retrieve discontinuity from the multi-cultural archives as a viable resource of illumination, as a technique of "collocation, a parataxis of components representing insight by carefully established ratios, but without a point of view or lineal connection or sequential order" (26, p.267). McLuhan's own pedagogic art employs such juxtapositions in a mythic configuration, in both Barthes' sense of myth as having no "regular ratio between the volume of the signified and that of the signifier" (1, p.120) and McLuhan's own sense of myth as a "mode of simultaneous awareness of a complex group of causes and effects" (29, p.114).

In the same vein, McLuhan insists that under the conditions of simultaneous information movement and human interdependence, neither truth nor practicality are well served by the fixed or specialist point of view, closure, or perspective, but require, as the only viable method, the method of the open "field" and the suspended judgement, the discovery of the 20th century in art and physics alike (26, p.278). On McLuhan's account, the suspended judgment deconstructs the visual distance or detachment implicit in the narcissism of the point of view and therefore re-involves one in the process through the open "field" method, having surpassed the limitations of one's assumptions by criticizing them. We must remember here that the category of participation, for McLuhan, is modelled on Keats's "negative capability", and therefore signifies an active processing of uncertainty without closure. As Raymond Williams recently noted in a different context (40, pp.334-338), a suspended judgement may be a necessary prelude to the eventual exercise of an authentic judgement restored to its circumstances and thus deprived of a privileged standpoint of superiority. In other words, McLuhan's argument may properly open the doors to a full range of normative considerations, in the sense of orientations for an open-ended, pluri-dimensional life-style, and thus to a most urgent problem of how to redeem value discussion from the grip of a Philistine moralism.

In Joycean stream of consciousness, or in other contemporary techniques, McLuhan sees a transformation of an impersonal process to one that centrally involves active reception as Joyce expressed it in *Finnegan's Wake:* "My consumers are they not my producers?" And through these new realms of indeterminacy or undecidability, McLuhan calls for an expansion of our norms of rationality, so that visual sequence may no longer monopolize the rational norm and that much of what modern discussion regards as irrational or non-logical may be seen as features of "the ordinary transactions between the self and the world, or between subject and object" (26, p.278). Tactile rationality would thus be a larger rationality in which visual closure, among others, would be suspended. When Derrida writes of deferring linguistic closure as long as possible, it is clear

that the poststructuralist investigation of the trace structure of language and McLuhan's study of the strategic methods of inclusive awareness have important points of contact within the single web of the modern information environment. It is all the more important for us to read them together in that one stresses the digital and the other the analog.

If McLuhan's turn to implicating the domain of aesthetics in a worldly complex of actual material processes was directed against the hermetic closure of texts as autonomous determinate entities in a way that incurred the automatic resistance of the New Critical institution, it differs as well from the Derridean construction, not only to the extent that this latter represents a textual closure within the language paradigm, as Foucault argued (13, p.602), but also to the extent that it proposes a limitless play of grammatological traces. The McLuhan emphasis in cognitive practice on a moment of analogical fusion of discontinuous fragments following the moment of analytic fission (32, pp.164-166) runs counter to the Derridean emphasis on fission, on the unrestricted digital play of abstract functions whose concrete, transcendental closure or fusion, it is said, should be deferred as long as possible (6, p.46). The New Critical, the symbolist, and the Catholic traditions converge in McLuhan's orientation toward a quality of intelligibility in things, by analogy, in the exterior as in the interior landscape. But the methodological action in both McLuhan and Derrida is to dereify closed, fixed forms, in effect by way of fresh relations.

Still, in a theoretical climate stamped by the Derridean argument, there are likely to be new barriers to a reception of McLuhan, where more properly there might be interchange and mutual revision. Emphases on disperson and inclusion pull in different directions, although the common deep interest in the interval, the gap, the space of discontinuity and difference draws together. Perhaps if we concede that the world is still given to us in the form of actual pluri-dimensionally circumscribed conflicts and options, neither as ultimately harmonious *présence,* nor as ultimately indifferent *différance,* we may agree that the appropriative interest in the bias of communication, in an opening to the material rationalities inscribed in operative processes, is complementary to and as deserving of attention as the critical interest in deconstruction, in an opening to "the play of the world and the innocence of becoming" (6, p.427).

There is another fundamental connection between McLuhan and Derrida. The binary opposition between two technical forms, speech and writing, is equally the structural underpinning of both grand cultural theories. In the *Grammatology* (8), published in 1967, Derrida takes up again and again, without reference to McLuhan, the same themes that McLuhan develops throughout the 1960s: logocentrism, phonocentrism, the eye, the ear, technics, the impact of the phonetic alphabet, abstraction, writing, linearity as "the repression of pluri-dimensional symbolic thought" (8, p.86), simultaneity, synaesthesia, etc. In Derrida, as in McLuhan, a discussion of writing, speech, and other basic communicative technologies that initially draws on or parallels Hegel's reflections expands beyond the received categories to the point where the divergent natures of written and oral forms of thought and social organisation

are elucidated, and then to the point where *writing*, for Derrida, and *oral* form for McLuhan, come to articulate not only primary categories, compared to which all others represent an ontological impoverishment, but also a historical finality, the shape of things to come, the coming to prominence and dominance of the primary category.

McLuhan's anticipation of the historical expansion of oral form in an electric age is now familiar. By contrast, in 1972, in the passage in *Marges de la philosophie* where Derrida finally acknowledges the existence of his theoretical alter-ego and comments on him directly, he affirms his own anticipation of the historical expansion of a general writing:

> As writing, communication, if we retain that word, is not the means of transference of meaning, the exchange of intentions and meanings [*vouloir dire*], discourse and the "communication of consciousness." We are witnessing not an end of writing that would restore, in accord with McLuhan's ideological representation, a transparency or an immediacy to social relations: but rather the increasingly powerful historical expansion of a general writing, of which the system of speech, consciousness, meaning, presence, truth, etc., would be only an effect, and should be analysed as such. It is the exposure [*mise en cause*] of this effect that I have called elsewhere logocentrism (9, pp. 194-195; 7, p. 392).

How close together or far apart a general oral form and a general writing may be as announcements of a new information environment remains to be seen. It is not necessary here to adjudicate between McLuhan's and Derrida's terminologies analyses and conclusions in order to anticipate that new illuminations may ensue from the scholarly effort that awaits us of bringing their texts into dialogue. They move evidently on congenial grounds of inquiry, and in an ecumenical spirit one may accept that the questions that are asked bind as much as the fragments of answers may separate. It may be possible to join in the hope that ours may be a time when such basic matters as speech, writing, reading, seeing, listening and touching are brought to much deeper understanding.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that the technique of the "etc." in Derrida's list of the effects of a general writing is similar to the technique inscribed in the lengthy lists of parallelisms that carry the burden of signification attached to McLuhan's basic media signifiers (e.g. 31, p. 60). There is the suggestion here of a place for exaggeration, hyperbole, in the rhetorical apparatus of modern scholarship. The function of such hyperbole would be to attract attention and to draw it forcefully to the *pattern*, that is, the ensemble of relations among the details enumerated. With respect to McLuhan's usage, especially with regard to

statements expressing what has become known as a technological determinism—
for example, in the statement about media massage that I connected with the text
under examination—it is possible to differ from those who compare McLuhan's
formulations unfavourably with the cautious qualifications of academic
convention. The effect or function of such exaggeration can be regarded as
paralogical and meant to take account of the communication situation. It is
addressed to an audience presumed to be asleep or hypnotized by cultural
imprinting and hence in need of excessive address to loosen the imprinting. It is
also enunciated from an epistemological position that is prepared to subvert its
own status, call attention to its hypothetical character and propose itself as a
probe rather than a theorem. Finally, like McLuhan's juxtapositions generally, it
invites engagement with its rationality, simultaneously reproportioning its
proportions and the proportions of the world, more than it invites outright
acceptance or the outright rejection which has frequently been its destiny of
academic reception.

McLuhan, in fact, seems to use a complex rhetorical arsenal to resist the
reduction of his text to a single point of view, including the indeterminate energy
of Nietzschean aphoristic fragments; analogy, humour, and other semioclastic
techniques (see 34); and undecidable probes developed in contradictory
directions—even on matters as basic as whether in the electric age we are likely to
"live in a single constricted space resonant with tribal drums" or "live
pluralistically in many worlds and cultures simultaneously" (26, p. 31). One
might say, ultimately, on the Barthesian or Derridean argument that every model
is its own norm, and in recognition of the variability of reception, that McLuhan's
model, relying on communicative and social organisation as its referent or alibi,
is full of informative surprises for those who are capable of receiving it that way.
For others, it may take a more predictable shape. On this account, McLuhan's
inconsistencies, evasions, undecidabilities work *for* him as much as against him,
and one might see him, in basic respects, as finally a tactile theorist, that is a
textural rather than a structural analyst, with cultural texture as his object, and,
by way of a kind of pedagogic art, texture also as his product.

This is, to be sure, a generally friendly humanist reading of McLuhan, but close
to the agnositic spirit of the Russian harlequin in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*
who holds that Kurtz, for all his shortcomings, enlarges the mind. The culture-
technology nexus, the rationality problem, and the structure-form-content matrix
remain open and strategically urgent questions to whose elucidation McLuhan
has made memorable contributions. There is a broad constellation of cultural
inquiry into which McLuhan can be profitably and honourably welcomed if we
are less dazzled by his points of excess and more open to his points of access.
McLuhan, like Marlow, was an untypical narrator of the crisis situation of his
culture, a culture embarked on a great adventure and poised for great changes
through an expansion of intelligence automation, and major rearrangements of
life. As was said of Marlow, so too the meaning of McLuhan's writing can be said
to lie, ultimately, "not inside, like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which
brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze ..."

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DESIRE AND HISTORY IN ROLAND BARTHES

Pamela McCallum

In the final pages of *Mythologies* Roland Barthes describes the contradictory position which the critic of culture—the mythologist—inhabits. The critical thrust of his project lies in displacing the effect of normalization or naturalization which myth produces so that the sign can be grasped anew within the historical processes that gave it form. Yet it is precisely because the critic relentlessly analyzes his own culture that he is unable to live in its plenitude. If the critic analyzes the mythology of 'good French wine', as Barthes does, he can no longer innocently enjoy it. The act of reinventing history precludes to him *both* the comfortable existence within the collective myths of his community *and* the luxury of a utopian vision of the future. "For him," Barthes writes:

> tomorrow's positivity is entirely hidden by today's negativity. All the values of his undertaking appear to him as acts of destruction: the latter accurately cover the former, nothing protrudes. This subjective grasp of history in which the potent seed of the future is *nothing but* the most profound apocalypse of the present has been expressed by Saint-Just in a strange saying: *"What constitutes the Republic is the total destruction of what is opposed to it."* This must not, I think, be understood in the trivial sense of: 'One has to clear the way before reconstructing.' The copula has an exhaustive meaning: there is for some men a subjective dark night of history where the future becomes an essence, the essential destruction of the past.[1]

The praxis of the mythologist, then, does not allow him to integrate himself with the plenitude (the meaning) of his cultural context. Quite the opposite: critical perception renders the mythologist unable to grasp the sign systems of his culture except through their discontinuous, *analyzed* forms.

We can go still further. Desire is felt not as a positive longing for a plenitude, but rather as a negative lack yearning towards a further negativity. Such a formulation—drawn here from Barthes' consideration of popular culture—has significant implications for the analysis of literary texts. Traditional literary criticism has grouped itself around two broad claims. On the one side, various critics—Frye, Ransom, Leavis and some of the Frankfurt School—insist that literature's radical cutting edge lies in its concretization of a utopian wholeness, a vision of unity not to be grasped in the disembodied forms of lived experience in advanced capitalist societies. On the other side, post-structuralist critics and their

precursors, Brecht or Benjamin, argue that literature's critical praxis lies precisely in the extent to which it fractures wholeness, thereby reorienting perception and calling into question perceived versions of "reality". Within these two positions the question of desire is central. The former stance would seem to posit a longing for wholeness in desire, a yearning which cannot be fulfilled within the contemporary socio-cultural context; the latter appears to insist on a radical reorientation of desire itself. This paper will argue that in *The Pleasure of the Text* and *Sade/Fourier/Loyola* Barthes is deeply concerned with the reconceptualization of both desire and its actualization. Barthes' focus, however, veers towards a consideration of desire which isolates itself from the crucial question of the context of its concretization. Taken together *Sade/Fourier/Loyola* and *The Pleasure of the Text* form a meditation on desire, but one which curiously disevers itself from history.

I

The relationship Barthes draws between text and critic is most clearly articulated in his famous commentary on "rereading" in *S/Z*. There he commends rereading as:

> an operation contrary to the commercial and ideological habits
> of our society, which would have us "throw away" the story
> once it had been consumed ("devoured"), so that we can then
> move on to another story, buy another book, and which is
> tolerated only in certain marginal categories of readers (child-
> ren, old people, and professors), rereading is here suggested at
> the outset, for it alone saves the text from repetition (those
> who fail to reread are obliged to read the same story every-
> where).[2]

Like the mythologist, the critic here strives to release the narrative from the characteristics it shares with other narratives, to make it aware of its "critical difference." The text, trapped within the repetitive conventions of its narrative structure cannot know itself without the critic's intervention. The critic, because he is not satisfied with one "reading", because he insists on "rereading" and desires to grasp difference as well as similarity, can liberate the text into its own identity.

Yet is it precisely here that we should examine the concept of "identity". Barthes does not intend to signify the text's uniqueness; rather, in Barbara Johnson's words, it is "the text's way of differing from itself. . . . Far from constituting the text's unique identity, it is that which subverts the very idea of

identity, infinitely deferring the possibility of adding up the sum of a text's part or meanings and reaching a totalized, integrated whole."[3] The rereader's desire, then, is to emancipate the text from the bounds of structure, from its own plenitude, into the infinite interplay of its own possibilities. Politically, then, the rereader, and we should note that the rereader is still the critic, although a perverse critic, sees his task as one which denies any utilitarian status to the text. Just as Barthes' analysis in *S/Z* emancipates Balzac's *novella* from the domination of the classic realist narrative, so rereading liberates the text from being appropriated, consumed or devoured. And, it is exactly here, *in its insistence not to be used*, that rereading recaptures the text's critical dimension.

In designating the utopian by the text's fragments, by its refusal of a codified identity, Barthes takes issue with the dominant tendency of describing the text's utopian vision. Whether utopianism is located in Frye's master narratives or in the Frankfurt School's aesthetic dimension, it is generally ascribed to the text's ability to concretize wholeness, unity, harmony in the face of the atomized lived experience of advanced capitalist societies. Barthes discerns the text's utopian dimension not in the vision of otherness, but in the existence of otherness, that is in the refusal to participate in the act of appropriation.

This direction in Barthes' thought is most fully formulated in *Pleasure of the Text* where he opposes the erotic interplay between text and reader to the demands of any system based on the authoritarianism of the reality principle. Reading in *Pleasure of the Text* is an engagement which denies appropriation. "What I enjoy in a narrative," he writes, "is not directly its content or even its structure but rather the abrasions I impose upon the fine surface: I read on, I skip, I look up, I dip in again."[4] The interaction between reader and text takes the form of undirected playfulness which produces either pleasure, in the classic narratives, or bliss—Barthes' famous sexual metaphor of *jouissance*—in the modernist narratives.

Such a formulation radically reorients the relationship between reader and critic. The critic, who attempts to insert his interpretative stance into the text, demanding at points that it *mean* this or *mean* that, imposes an authoritarian censure on the unstructured interplay between reader and text. To follow through Barthes' Freudian metaphor: if all readings have their basis in neurosis, then the critic stands as a censuring father figure demanding that the reader abandon the pleasure principle and submit to criticism's version of the reality principle. Hence the peculiar subversiveness which the modernist texts hold for Barthes; they are the texts whose fractured narratives refuse any interpretation, slipping again and again out of the critic's grasp to insist on their radical eroticism.

According to Barthes, the text transforms itself from the frigidity of "prattle" when neurosis forms in it, that is, when desire of something perceived to be external is born out of its lack. The text of bliss, then, must maintain the moment of desire, the neurosis around which its madness forms: "So we arrive at this paradox: the texts, like those by Bataille—or by others—which are written against neurosis, from the center of madness, contain within themselves, *if they*

want to be read, that bit of neurosis necessary to the seduction of their readers: these terrible texts are *all the same* flirtatious texts."[5] Indeed, the scandal of the literary text lies in the seductiveness. Saint-Just, speaking as the republic's lawgiver, notices that Racine subverts the careful codification of legalisms; when you read *Phaedre*, he writes, you believe Phaedre to be innocent and the law guilty.[6] It is not merely that the text presents a narrative of rebellion against unjust laws, but that it seduces the reader into a position he would not *consciously* hold. Or, to take up again Barthes' psychoanalytic terminology, it seduces the reader into allowing neurosis free play.

Thus when Barthes categorizes the readings of pleasure, he sees in the text the imagined image of the reader's own neurosis:

> We can imagine a typology of the pleasures of reading—or of the readers of pleasure; it would not be sociological, for pleasure is not an attribute of either product or production; it could only be psychoanalytic, linking the reading neurosis to the hallucinated form of the text. The fetishist would be matched with the divided-up text, the singling out of quotations, formulae, turns of phrase, with the pleasure of the word. The obsessive would experience the voluptuous release of the letter, of secondary, disconnected languages, of metalanguages (this class would include all the logophiles, linguists, semioticians, philologists: all those for whom language *returns*). A paranoiac would consume or produce complicated texts, stories developed like arguments, constructions posited like games, like secret constraints. As for the hysteric (so contrary to the obsessive), he would be the one who takes the text *for ready money*, who joins in the bottomless, truthless comedy of language, who is no longer the subject of any critical scrutiny and *throws himself* across the text (which is quite different from projecting himself into it).[7]

If Barthes' list seems to privilege here the hysteric, we must remember not only the anti-authoritarianism of interplay between text and reader, but also the abrogation of censure in Barthes' critical community. Indeed, when he invokes community, he does so as a 'Society of the Friends of the Text', thereby laying bare the mastercode of *The Pleasure of the Text* in his invocation of Loyola and Sade. For there can be no doubt that *The Pleasure of the Text* is, in effect, the hallucinated theory of that earlier text, *Sade/Fourier/Loyola*. Barthes writes there of the necessity to release the text from its status as an object for analysis, as something to be appropriated to a particular critical system:

> Nothing is more depressing than to imagine the Text as an
> intellectual object (for reflection, analysis, comparison, mirror-
> ing, etc). The text is an object of pleasure. The bliss of the text
> is often only stylistic: there are expressive felicities, and
> neither Sade nor Fourier lacks them. However, at times the
> pleasure of the Text is achieved more deeply (and then is when
> we can truly say there is a Text): whenever the "literary" Text
> (the Book) transmigrates into our life, whenever another writ-
> ing (the Other's writing) succeeds in writing fragments of our
> own daily lives, in short, whenever a *co-existence* occurs.[8]

The fascination with these three authors is not the desire to live through the
programs set out in the texts, but rather the exact impossibility of any such
transfer from words to action. Sade, Fourier and Loyola create worlds which
belong exclusively to the realm of words, which can exist only in language.
Indeed, it is as "Logothetes, founder of languages"[9] that Barthes links these three,
so apparently diverse, writers.

To go further still: the language they create denies the utilitarian or functional
characteristics of discursive texts. It is not a language of communication, but, on
the contrary, one which attemps to give form to Saint-Just's "subjective dark
night", one which tries to speak a void or to say what cannot be said:

> Thus, if Sade, Fourier, and Loyola are founders of a language,
> and only that, it is precisely in order to say nothing, to observe a
> vacancy (if they wanted to say *something* linguistic language,
> the language of communication and philosophy, would suffice:
> they could be *summarized*, which is not the case with any one
> of them).[10]

So Barthes will argue elsewhere that Sade defies visual representation: "Just as
there is no portrait of Sade (except an imaginary one), no image of Sade's world is
possible. By an imperious decision of Sade the writer, this world has been
entrusted solely and totally to the power of the word."[11]

The abrogation of any communicative function in writing places language in a
contradictory postion. On the one hand, in order to create the world of the word,
it must pile up the catalogues, the lists, the calculations and divisions, sets and
subsets which Barthes lays bare as the comon point among the writings of Sade,
Fourier and Loyola. Thus, it overcomes its own vacuity by a kind of surfeit of
language. On the other hand, language must always circle around the unspeak-
able, acknowledging its own negativity, while it attempts to abolish it.[12]

The Sadian world, according to Barthes' interpretation, is above all a world of

language: "Speech," he writes, "is wholly bound together with the overt mark of the libertine, which is in Sade's vocabulary the *imagination*: it might be almost said that imagination is the Sadian word for *language*."[13] To be sure, (and this is to the dismay of some readers of Sade, those readers who wish to consume or devour the novels) libertines discourse as much as they act: hence the charge that Sade is boring, turgid, unreadable. Language denies desire's actualization within the text, that is, denies a vicarious eroticism, infinitely deferring actualization:

> Its [language's] task, at which it is brilliantly successful, is to contaminate reciprocally the erotic and the rhetoric, speech and crime, to introduce suddenly into the conventions of social language the subversions of the erotic scene, at the same time as the price of the scene is deducted from the treasury of language.[14]

If the libertine is controlled by anything, if he submits to anything, then it is to language. For there can be no doubt that this *homme souverain* bows his head before the powers of language. Again and again the four masters of Silling Castle challenge the rules and regulations only to be convinced that one must obey what is *written down* in the statutes. And, as Barthes points out, even libertine practice is subordinate to speech: "practice follows speech, and is absolutely determined by it: what is done has been said."[15] Indeed the statutes themselves insist that the libertines may only reinvent an act after it has been recounted in story. Barthes sees then in Sade's work a new world of language for Silling Castle is in his words, "the sanctuary not of debauchery, but of the story."[16]

Such an interpretation, I will argue, conflates what are two separate narratives in *The 120 Days of Sodom* into one narrative structure, or, put from the other side, it privileges Duclos' narrative and pushes that of the ominscient narrator to the periphery. Barthes' reading of *The 120 Days* rests on an emphasis of the power of words, that is, the control and talent of the storyteller whose words give form to desire, or allow desire to be actualized. Duclos' narrative creates the "catalogue" of the passions, allowing, by permitting itself to be fractured, to be interrupted, the concrete enactment of its words. It is precisely within the catalogues of the passions that the surfeit of words takes form. And, even Duclos has to be instructed to increase the plenitude of her discourse. The first night of the storytelling Curval interrupts her, not to demand enactment, but to ask for more words:

> "Duclos," the Président interrupted at this point, "we have, I believe, advised you that your narrations must be decorated with the most numerous and searching details; the precise way and extent to which we may judge how the passion you des-

cribe relates to human manners and man's character is deter-
mined by your willingness to disguise no circumstance; and,
what is more, the least circumstance is apt to have an immense
influence upon the procuring of that kind of sensory irritation
we expect from your stories."

"Yes, my Lord," Duclos replied, "I have been advised to omit
no detail and to enter into the most minute particulars when-
ever they serve to shed light upon the human personality, or
upon the species of passion; have I neglected something in
connection with this one?"

"You have," said the Président; "I have not the faintest
notion of your second monk's prick, nor any idea of its dis-
charge. In addition, did he frig your cunt, pray tell, and did he
have you dandle his device? You see what I mean by neglected
details."[17]

Yet while Duclos is told to produce "the most numerous and searching details",
the omniscient narrator of *The 120 Days* refuses to give details, pleads a lack of
knowledge and consistently denies the narrative plenitude: Here is the presenta-
tion of the first dinner at Silling Castle:

Spying one of his neighbors stiffen, Durcet, though they were
still at table, promptly unbuttoned his breeches and presented
his ass. The neighbor drove his weapon home; the operation
once concluded, they fell to drinking again as if nothing had
happened. The Duc soon imitated his old friend's little infamy
and wagered that, enormous as Invictus' prick might be, he
could calmly down three bottles of wine while lying embug-
gered upon it. What effortlessness, what ease, what detach-
ment in libertinage! He won what he had staked, and as they
were not drunk on an empty stomach, as those three bottles fell
upon at least fifteen others, the Duc's head began gently to
swim. The first object upon which his eye alighted was his
wife, weeping over the abuse she had sustained from Hercule,
and this sight so inspired the Duc he lost not an instant doing
to her things too excessive for us to describe as yet. The reader
will notice how hampered we are in these beginnings, and how
stumbling are our efforts to give a coherent account of these
matters; we trust he will forgive us for leaving the curtain
drawn over a considerable number of little details. We promise
it will be raised later on.[18]

The narrator's promise, as we might expect, is never fulfilled. Later on we are told "Aline displayed I've no idea what, for I have never been able to discover what went on in those infernal closets"; and "I've no idea what happened next"; still later; "I have little definite information upon what the libertine took it into his head to do in the midst of those seven persons but his absence was prolonged."[19] Thus, the omniscient narrator of *The 120 Days* is unable to provide the details, the surfeit of words which make up Duclos' narration. In effect, omniscient is hardly an appropriate designation for this narrator who is anything but "all-knowing". Rather, in distinction to Duclos', his narrative is an absence of words, a register of the impossibility of speaking, or the *interdit*, "what cannot be said."

But it is exactly here in the *entredit*, what is between statements, between the plenitude of Duclos' narration and the vacuity of the narrator's, that Sade actualizes desire within his words.[20] The narrator had, in language very close to *The Pleasure of the Text*, invited his reader to skip, look up, dip in again:

> Many of the extravagances you are about to see illustrated will doubtless displease you, yes, I am well aware of it, but there are amongst them a few which will warm you to the point of costing you some fuck, and that, reader, is all we ask of you; if we have not said everything, analyzed everything, tax us not with partiality, for you cannot expect us to have guessed what suits you best. Rather, it is up to you to take what you please and leave the rest alone, another reader will do the same, and little by little, everyone will find himself satisfied.[21]

The eroticism of the reading lies in the edges of the two narratives rubbing against one another, the alteration of surfeit/surpression. It is not in the plenitude of Duclos' narration (or Juliette's or Justine's) but in the *entredit* between the two that desire concretizes its fitful existence.

Yet here we encounter a further problem for to live between the lines is not to live at all, and the ultimate effect of *The 120 Days* is, like the deaths of most of its characters, not the plenitude of erotic playfulness, but an immense vacuity. The privileged position which Barthes gives to Duclos' narrative foregrounds the plenitude of the word and displaces its absence. To grasp the significance of the juxtaposition of plenitude and absence we would have to turn instead to those critics which situate *The 120 Days* within history.

II

While Barthes had discovered in the catalogues of passions, the lists, the piling

up of details, the division and subdivision of Duclos' narration, a celebration of the plenitude of words, of the power of discourse, Horkheimer and Adorno interpret this surfeit of language as a pivotal contradiction in the project of the Enlightenment. From their perspective Sade represents not the surfeit of desire endlessly seeking its actualization, but, on the contrary, the relentless subordination of desire to systematization and rationalization:

> The architectonic structure of the Kantian system, like the gymnastic pyramids of Sade's orgies and the schematized principles of the early bourgeois freemasonry—which has its cynical mirror-image in the strict regimentation of the libertine society of *Les 120 Journées*—reveals a organization of life as a whole which is deprived of any substantial goal. These arrangements amount not so much to pleasure as to its regimented pursuit—organization—just as in other demythologized epochs (Imperial Rome and the Renaissance, as well as the Baroque) the schema of an activity was more important than its content.[22]

Here Barthes' reading is reversed. Far from constituting a privileging of the world of discourse, the rules and regulations of Silling Castle represent quite the opposite: regimentation and organization exist for their own sake, requiring that desire relinquish its emancipatory projection and subordinate itself to a rigid schematization. The analysis in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* resembles Foucault's suggestion that Sade's world represents the Enlightenment's imprisonment of subversively "mad" passions within a controlled environment.[23] Silling is here neither the refuge of debauchery, nor of the story, but a minature asylum.

Such an interpretation begins to situate Sade within history, but it does not allow us to grasp his work as a praxis project which at one and the same time inscribes the discourse of emancipation into a process of enthrallment. Jean-Paul Sartre suggests that Sade lived "the decline of a feudal system": his project, to re-establish the residual rights of the warrior in violence, is deflected onto the terrain of the emergent bourgeoisie. First, he founds his system on the subjectivity of the ego; *homme souverain* represents the force of the superior individual. Second, he adopts as the enabling premise of this system the concept that Nature represents, and therefore justifies, a world of violence. But, as Sartre points out, it is exactly here that Sade comes up against the dominant idea of the period: "in the eyes of everyone living in 1789, aristocrat or bourgeois, Nature is good."[24] Far from merely actualizing desire, Sade's system results from the necessity to formulate his own thought, using what Sartre calls "the concept-tools of his period":

> It is in these terms that he erects a monstrous work which it
> would be wrong to classify too quickly as one of the last vestiges
> of aristocratic thought, but which appears rather as the claim
> of the solitary man, grasped opportunely and transformed by
> the universalist ideology of the revolutionaries.[25]

Understood as lived experience within history, Sade's thought is anything but the free play of desire to create new worlds of words. To be sure, Barthes' analysis in *Sade/Fourier/Loyola* lays bare the importance of systematization in its fascination with the elaborate and bizarre system-building which Barthes discovers in each of the three figures. Yet Barthes sees the intricacy of each system as a kind of tribute or monument to the play of desire within discourse. Such an emphasis allows desire untrammelled actualization, disevered from the pressures of history. If Barthes had ended *Mythologies* with an approving reference to the laconic discourse of Saint-Just, he might well have remembered that writer's insistence on the pressuring weight of history: however freely desire may appear to spin out its narratives in *The Pleasure of the Text* or *Sade/Fourier/Loyola* it never emancipates itself from *la force des choses*. Barthes foregrounds the liberating project of *historie* as story, as narrative, as discourse, but forgets that it can only inscribe itself within that other *histoire*: history.

Notes

1. R. Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers, St. Albans: Paladin, 1976, pp. 157-8.

2. R. Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. R. Miller, New York: Hill and Wang, pp. 15-16.

3. See B. Johnson, "The Critical Difference," *Diacritics*, 8, no. 2, June 1978, pp. 2-9.

4. R. Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text*, trans. R. Miller, New York: Hill and Wang, 1975, pp. 11-12.

5. *Ibid.* p. 6.

6. See Saint-Just, *Théorie Politique*, ed. A. Liénard, Paris: Seuil, 1976, p. 170.

7. *The Pleasure of the Text*, p. 63.

8. R. Barthes, *Sade/Fourier/Loyola*, trans. R. Miller, New York: Hill and Wang, 1976, p. 7.

9. *Ibid.* p. 3.

10. *Ibid.* p. 6.

11. R. Barthes, "Pasolini's *Salò*: Sade to the Letter," in *Pier Paolo Pasolini*, ed. P. Willemen, London: BFI, 1977, p. 65.

12. Cf. Jean Genet's description of his project in that text of eroticism, *The Thief's Journal*, trans. Bernard Frechtman, New York: Grove Press, 1974, p. 94: "This book, *The Thief's Journal*, Pursuit of the Impossible Nothingness." See also Barthes' comments on the banishment of the peasant, Augustin, not from erotic play but from discourse in *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, *Sade/Fourier/Loyola*, pp. 159-60.

13. *Sade/Fourier/Loyola*, p. 31.

14. *Ibid.* p. 33.

15. *Ibid.* p. 35.

16. *Ibid.* p. 37.

17. D.-A. de Sade, *The 120 Days of Sodom*, trans. A. Wainhouse and R. Seaver, New York: Grove Press, 1980, p. 271.

18. *Ibid.* p. 265.

19. See, respectively, pp. 514, 524 and 534.

20. For an analysis in a different context of *entredit/interdit* in Sade, see Jane Gallop, *Intersections*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981, pp. 52-55.

21. *The 120 Days of Sodom*, 253.

22. M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightment*, trans. John Cumming, New York: Seabury, 1977, p. 88. Barthes does comment on the "mechanization" of sexuality in Sade, *Sade/Fourier/Loyola*, pp. 152-53, but he does not develop the theme of rationalization.

23. See M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, trans. R. Howard, New York: Vintage, 1973, pp. 282-85.

24. J.-P. Sartre, *Search for a Method*, trans. H. Barnes, New York: Vintage, 1968, p. 114.

25. *Ibid.* p. 115.

AUGUSTINE AS THE FOUNDER
OF MODERN EXPERIENCE:
THE LEGACY OF CHARLES NORRIS COCHRANE

Arthur Kroker

To this conception of will, as an autonomous determination of the total self,
Augustine adheres tenaciously at all stages of his career.
>   Charles Norris Cochrane. *Christianity and Classical Culture.*

Will and power are, in the will to power, not merely linked together; but rather
the will, as the will to will, is itself the will to power in the sense of the
empowering to power.
>   Martin Heidegger. "The Word of Nietzsche"

Remembering Augustine

In his critical text, *To Freedom Condemned,* Jean-Paul Sartre remarked that
the "continuous flight which constitutes the being of a person comes to a sudden
halt when the Other emerges, for the Other sees it and changes it thereby into an
object, an in-itself."[1] Now, the present meditation is in the way of a report on
how my "continuous flight", an effort at thinking through at a fundamental level
the sources of the radical crisis of twentieth-century experience, has been
brought to a sudden halt by the "Other" of Charles Norris Cochrane.

A forgotten, and certainly unassimilated, thinker, whether in his native Canada
or in more international discourse, Charles Norris Cochrane represents in his
writings I am now convinced, an explosive intervention in the understanding of
modern culture. Before reading Cochrane, it was possible to hold to the almost
lethargic belief that the crisis of modern culture could be traced, most im-

mediately, to the "bad infinity" present at the beginning of the rationalist calculus of the Enlightenment; and that, for better or for worse, the intellectual horizon of the modern age was contained within the trajectory of Kant, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche. After Cochrane, there remains only the impossible knowledge that the discourse of the modern century began, not in the seventeenth century, but in the fourth century after Christ; and this in remembrance of the real meaning of Augustine's *Confessions*. Cochrane was the one thinker in the modern century, with the exception of Hannah Arendt, to make Augustine dangerous again: dangerous, that is, as the metaphysician and theoretician of power who set in motion the physics (trinitarianism), the logic (the epistemology of modern psychology) and the ethics (the functionality of the *Saeculum*) of western experience. In Cochrane's reading of Augustine, one can almost hear that fateful rumbling of ground which announces that, after all, the great "founders" of the western tradition may have been, in the end, either in the case of Plato, Homer or Lucretius precursors or antagonists of the Augustinian discourse or, in the case of Kant, this most modern of thinkers, merely secularizations of a structure of western consciousness the essential movements of which were put in place by Augustine. Yes, Cochrane presents us with the challenge of rereading the Augustinian discourse, not simply within the terms of Christian metaphysics, but as a great dividing-line, perhaps *the* fundamental scission, between classicism and the modernist discourse.

Three Subversions

This essay, then, is an attempt to escape the gaze of the Other—to take up the challenge posed by Cochrane—not by evading his radical rethinking of the "tradition" of western knowledge, but rather by following through a strategy of thought which consists of three fundamental subversions. The first two subversions are intended to be *with* Cochrane: to show precisely the implications of his thought for a rethinking of, at first, the Canadian discourse and then, by way of extension, of the dominant discourse of the history of western consciousness. Consequently, I shall argue at once that Cochrane has never been integrated into Canadian thought, not really because of benign neglect (although the forgetfulness of a "radical amnesia" may have its place) but because there has been until now no obvious fit between the received interpretation of Canadian discourse and Cochrane's writings. To absorb Cochrane's thought into the tradition of Canadian inquiry would be to subvert a good part of Canadian intellectuality: to demonstrate, for example, a very different use of the "historical imagination" in the role of a critical account of the philosophy of civilization; and to show that there exists in the methodology and practice of Canadian thought a coherent, indigenous and dynamic "philosophy of culture" which, in its depth of vision, is without parallel in modern cultural theory.

AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

Again, and this still *with* Cochrane, I will put forward as a theoretical conclusion that Cochrane's philosophy of culture is subversive of and radically discontinuous with the main interpretations of the history of western knowledge. If Cochrane is correct in his philosophical and historical reflections on the genealogy of the crisis of western culture, then there is at the heart of the western *vitia* (in its physics, epistemology and aesthetics) the radical impossibility of a civilization which, in the absence of a "creative principle" of integration, oscillates between the polarities of the sensate and the ideal. In responding to the "depth categories" of the crisis of western culture, Cochrane sought to think through the history of classical and modern experience *outside of and against Platonic discourse*. The provocative interpretation which is announced by Cochrane is the same as that which was earlier hinted at by Nietzsche: Christian metaphysics, precisely because of the radical nihilism of its will to truth, also saves us from the failure of Reason to secure a "permanent and enduring" basis for society against the constant revolt of mutable and contingent experience.

In a word, Augustine is the truth-sayer of the failure of Platonic discourse (yes, of philosophy) to secure an adequate political order against the tragic dénouement of poetic consciousness. Now, while Cochrane ultimately sought shelter in the discourse of Augustinian realism, I shall argue *against* this *pax rationalis* that while Augustine may, indeed, be the precursor of and cartographer of modernism, the discourse to which he condemns us is that of a total domination: a domination founded in the will to will and in the colonization of sensual experience. Thus, against Cochrane I would offer one final subversion: the overcoming of the fundamental principles of Augustinian discourse (the will to power, the will to truth, and the nihilism of the *trinitarian* solution to divided consciousness) is the beginning, again and again, of a modernism which is based on the "opening of the eye of the flesh".[2]

To Breach the Silence

A terrible silence has surrounded the work of Charles Norris Cochrane, denying him recognition as Canada's most important philosophical historian and as a principal contributor to a more international debate on the geneology of the crisis of western society. The exclusion of Cochrane's thought is all the more ironic given the recommendations to read Cochrane made by two of Canada's most distinguished thinkers. Thus Harold Innis said of Cochrane's magisterial study, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, that it represented the "first major contribution by a Canadian to the history of intellectual thought."[3] And this was followed, from the perspective of philosophical discourse as opposed to political economy, by George Grant's saying of the same work that it was the "most important book ever written by a Canadian."[4] In a philosophical obituary written at the time of Cochrane's death in 1945, A.S.P. Woodhouse wrote of the

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tragic sense of his life; of his search for a principle of "historical realism" which would resolve the radical crisis of western culture; and that, even within the community of "professed scholars", Cochrane was noteworthy, above all, for his single-minded dedication to the life of scholarship.[5]

It is unfortunate that the injunction to read Cochrane has not been followed. For, taken as a whole, his writings are the record of a thinker who has adopted, lived through and overcome most of the major positions which it is possible to hold in the twentieth-century on the question of what represents an adequate philosophy of life now that the modern age verges, once again, on *stasis*. To read Cochrane is to be educated anew in the now-forgotten insight that the crisis of modern society has its origins in the classical genealogy of European civilization and that, at the deepest level, the tempest of twentieth-century experience (where fascism is on the move again as the norm of political life) is yet a further outbreak of a single, crisis-moment in the metaphysics of western experience.

The rethinking of the crisis of the modern age against its classical background in the metaphysics of the "Graeco-Roman mind" is the context for all of Cochrane's writings. *Thucydides and the Science of History* (1929)[6] is an attempt to recover the classical foundations for the politics (democratic) and epistemology (critical empiricism) of "pragmatic naturalism" against the iron cage of Platonic rationalism. *Christianity and Classical Culture* (1940), which centres on the apogee of Roman civilization in Augustus and Vergil and the dynamism of Christian metaphysics in Augustine and Theodosius, is a decisive commentary on the radical "break" in world-hypotheses (in politics, metaphysics, ethics and epistemology) which marked the threshhold between the *naturalism* of classical discourse and the rationalism of Christian metaphysics.[7] "The Latin Spirit in Literature" (a short, but summational, article written in 1942 for the *University of Toronto Quarterly*) complements, I would contend, Weber's analysis of the "Protestant ethic" as a profound and incisive synthesis of Roman civilization (this precursor of the imperialism of the United States) as the enduring source of the "will to live" and the "will to accumulation" so characteristic of the "empirical personality" of modern political empires.[8] "The Mind of Edward Gibbon" (delivered as a lecture series at Yale University in 1944 and, then, republished in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*) is a fundamental, and devastating, critique of the proponents of Enlightenment "Reason" (ranging across the works of Hume, Locke and Gibbon) and an almost explosive reappropriation of the significance of Christian metaphysics as the truth-sayer of the failure of classical reason.[9] And, finally, even Cochrane's doppelganger, *David Thompson: The Explorer*,[10] (written in 1925 and often discounted as a major publication) is almost a philosophical autobiography of Cochrane's own trajectory as a "cartographer" of intellectual traditions and as a thinker who lived always with the sense of the tragic dimensions of human experience.

It was Cochrane's great contribution to recognize, and this parallel to Nietzsche, that Christian metaphysics, not in spite of but *because* of the terror of its nihilism, also contained a singular truth: it solved a problem which classical reason could not resolve within the horizon of its presuppositions.[11] And thus

Cochrane recognized in the thought of Augustine, in this epicentre of Christian metaphysics, the limit and the threshold of that very same phenomenology of mind, epistemology of modern psychology and "direct deliverance" of personality and history, that, for all of our protests, is still all that stands between the abyss in classical discourse and the modern century. It was Cochrane's singular insight to see the real implication of Augustine's *Confessions*; to sense that to the same extent that Augustine might rightly be described as the "first citizen of the modern world"[12] then we, the inheritors of modern experience, cannot liberate ourselves from the "radical anxiety" of the present age until we have thought against, overturned, or at least inverted, the Augustinian discourse. Curiously, this essay returns through Cochrane to the impossible task of beginning the modern age by inverting Augustine. And, to anticipate just a bit, it is my thesis that Augustine was a peculiar type of Columbus of modern experience; he was the cartographer of "directly apprehended experience", of the direct deliverance of will, nature and consciousness, this emblematic sign of the eruption of the modern discourse from the *stasis* of classical reason, who has falsified the maps to the *civitas terrena*. If, finally, the embodiment of the will to power in fleshly being was the modern possibility; then it was Augustine's strategy, not so much to act in forgetfulness of being but in repression of the corporeal self, by providing a method for the incarceration of that unholy triad, imagination, desire and contingent will. In making the body a prison-house of the "soul" (embodied consciousness) Augustine was also the first, and most eloquent, of the modern structuralists.

Now, while Cochrane ultimately took refuge in the *pax rationalis*[13] (and in the *pax corporis*) of Augustinian discourse he also once let slip that, in that brief hiatus between the dethronement of classical reason and the imposition of the Christian will to truth there were at least two philosophical song-birds who, knowing for whatever reason the Garden of Eden had finally materialized, gave voice to the freedom of embodied being. Plotinus uttered the first words of *modern* being when he spoke of the ecstatic illumination of the One; and Porphyry took to the practice of *ascesis* as a way of cultivating the dynamic harmony of will, imagination and flesh. Before the carceral (the *Saeculum*) of Augustine and after the rationalism (the Word) of Plato, Plotinus and Porphyry were the first explorers of the new continent of modern being.[14] And so Cochrane went to his death with his gaze always averted from the human possibility, and the human terror which might issue from a direct encounter with unmediated being. From the beginning of his thought to its end, he preserved his sanctity, and yes sanity ("unless we are madmen living in a madhouse"[15]) by delivering up the "inner self" to the normalizing discourse (always horizontal, tedious, and unforgiving) of critical realism: to *pragmatic naturalism* at first (*Thucydides and the Science of History*) and then to Christian realism (*Christianity and Classic Culture*).[16] Cochrane never deviated from Augustine's injunction, delivered in the *Confessions*, to avoid having "the shadow of the fleshly self fall between the mind and its first principle to which it should cleave."[17] But now, after his death and in tribute to the wisdom of his profound scholarship, this

essay will allow the dark shadow of the critical imagination to fall between the texts of Cochrane's writings and its modern reception. It would be in bad faith to say that what this will permit is a simple "breaching of the silence" which has incarcerated Cochrane's thought and kept us, as North American thinkers, from an inversion of Augustinian discourse and, indeed, from a full critique of classical reason, as well as of the culture of the Old World.[18] To know Cochrane's thought is to discover a series of highly original insights into the nature of classical and modern experience, but it is also to recognize the limits and possibilities of Canadian thought. For it is also our thesis that the insights of Cochrane concerning the fateful movement from classical discourse to Christian metaphysics could only have originated in a tradition of thought which has transformed a tragic understanding of human experience (and the search for a realistic solution to the divided consciousness of the twentieth-century) into a searing critique of the foundations of western civilization. If it is accurate to claim that Cochrane is a precursor of Canadian thought, with the vast expansion and intensification of the region of Canadian thought contained in that claim, then it must also be said that his limitations, his radical failure, also is part of the Canadian legacy. Simply put, the silence which is breached in recovering Cochrane is our own: it is also the Canadian mind which is wagered in this encounter with the ancient historian.[19]

The Precursor of Canadian Thought

Cochrane's thought is an important precursor of the Canadian discourse because it puts into play four tendencies which are the very fibres, the interior of typography, of the Canadian mind. Or, to be quite specific, Cochrane's intervention, represents less the totality of the Canadian imagination than one side of the Canadian mind: his unnoticed contribution was, perhaps, to provide the most intensive and eloquent expression possible of that "permanent inclination" in Canadian thought which is expressed by a tragic sense of political experience, by a continuous recovery of the historical imagination (by a search for a "creative principle" which would mediate "bicameral consciousness"), and, ultimately, by a classical accounting of the genealogy of western civilization. If it is true to claim, for example, that the tradition of political economy (which was brought to its beginning, and conclusion, by the *naturalism* of Harold Innis) represents an "indigenous" tendency in Canadian thought, then it must also be said that the other side of the Canadian discourse is represented by an equally native tradition of *cultural* studies of modern civilization.[20] It is within the latter tradition that Cochrane stands; an exponent of a theory of civilization who insisted that if the fatal deficiency in western knowledge is to be overcome then we must be prepared to *rethink* the foundations of ancient and contemporary culture. And, of course, keeping in mind what Cochrane always liked to note about Virgil, really about the birth of naturalism in the political economy of *Romanitas*, that "naturalism tends to devour its own gods",[21] then we cannot

keep hidden for long the incipient critique of political economy that is contained in a vision of human experience which stretches from a tragic perspective on creative politics to a radical criticism of both extremities, both polarities, of the western mind—idealism (animal faith) and naturalism (the detritus of scepticism). Thus, what Cochrane has to say in "The Latin Spirit in Literature" about the sure and certain disintegration of naturalism (the root metaphor of political economy) into bewilderment applies with as much force as ever to any attempt to monopolize knowledge around the nexus of ideology and, might it be said, power. Harold Innis, who was an intellectual friend of Cochrane's and, I believe, with Eric Havelock, one of the few Canadian thinkers who attempted, after Cochrane's death, to call attention to his intellectual contributions was, in the domain of a tragic understanding of political experience, a student of Cochrane's. It was not incidental that Innis recurred to the tragic motif of *Christianity and Classical Culture* for a way, finally, of expressing the essence, this bitter futility, of the "marginal man". Between Cochrane and Innis, between the ancient historian and the political economist, there was a self-reflexive understanding of the impossibility of philosophy without a commitment to "thinking in blood" and the undesirability of a political economy without a philosophical foundation. Might it be that the foundations of a new Canadian discourse will someday emerge on the basis of a critical renewal of the friendship of Cochrane and Innis: not in the flesh for the finality of death has intervened but in the passing into theoretical discourse of that tiny, but elemental, spark that once exploded between Cochrane and Innis and, for a trembling moment, began to illuminate the dark night of the Canadian imagination.

If, indeed, Cochrane's thought stands in an ambivalent relationship to the tradition, new and old, of political economy (representing its best hope for internal regeneration and its greatest fear of "being undermined"), then it is even more apparent that the recovery of his legacy constitutes a complete and unforgiving indictment of what now passes for political philosophy in Canada. Between critical philosophy and political economy there stands a comfortable and wide region of common interest; both are perspectives, tragic and historical accounts, of the nature of "dependent being". But between critical philosophy and dominant traditions of political philosophy in Canada, there is only the silence, or is it a suppression without words of critical philosophy, of irreconcilable difference. Cochrane, together with the other founders of the tradition of critical philosophy in Canada—and I have in mind Eric Havelock's *Preface to Plato* and George Brett's comprehensive, and little understood, *History of Psychology*,[22] were unique in developing a systematic critique of rationalist discourse. For Cochrane and Havelock, the legacy of Platonic rationalism was the installation, or perhaps the more insightful term would be liberation, of a totalitarian impulse in western knowledge. If, indeed, there is a single original insight, a compelling theoretical impulse, in the legacy of Cochrane, Havelock and Brett, it is this anti-rationalist impulse: their critique of the "submersion" of philosophy in rationalism begins to take root (in psychology, communications theory, literary analysis, history and philosophy); it flowers, it spreads out, it begins to sing of a new morning; and

then it is silenced. No fissures are permitted to appear; it is as if that maddening, wonderful group of thinkers in the fateful fourth century had been strained through the "conversion experience" again.

I have lived my life, in fact, not only under the sign of radical amnesia: that is bearable; I understand the psychological dynamics of the colonised mind. But I have also lived under something else that is quite unbearable; under, that is, the imposed statement that there is *no immanent tradition* of Canadian theory, no indigenous tradition of Canadian critical philosophy. This is the repression which wounds, and which I cannot forgive; it implies that the highly original insights of thinkers such as Cochrane, Fackenheim, Watson, Brett, and Havelock bear no immediate relation to my existence: it means that my being is denied the possibility of being wagered on the success or failure of the philosophical project represented by the anti-Platonic tradition. I have grown up, a "man of flesh and bone", a corporeal self weighed down by circumstance; but I am condemned to be a coward, a being not just without a history but without the possibility of losing everything on the wager of the "riddle of the Sphinx" if I cannot reconnect to a native tradition of Canadian thought which always "took philosophy as an experiment". If it is possible that a critical philosophy can be founded on the gesture of going over to the side of the losers; to the side, that is, of the silenced voices in Canadian intellectual history, then I suppose that qualifies this meditation as the beginning, over and over, of a loving recovery of the risk of philosophy. What I find most unbearable is not the simple silencing of the past. It is this elemental fact. Now and for some time, the discourse of Canadian political philosophy has been dominated (as Goya might imagine, with dread, this nameless domination comes in the nature of starlings rooting en masse) by Straussianism; by that very tradition of hyper-rationalism, and thus of antiphilosophy, which was the antithesis and object of scorn of the very best of the now suppressed Canadian thinkers. Can there be a more bitter mockery of the intellectual life of Charles Cochrane, or of Canada's single, most insightful contribution to world philosophy, than this, that the incarceration of intellectual history has been accompanied by the investiture of Canadian thought with an official discourse of Canadian thought has it that we are "neo-Kantians",[23] if not the exponents of a static rationalism; we are even told, and this not uninsightfully as a reflection on the product of the suppressed mind, that Canadian inquiry hovers within the closed horizon of "the faces of reason". The reality, of course, is the exact opposite of the "faces of reason": Canadian thought is replete with insights because it forms a sustained, and not unquixotic, assault on the *primacy* of reason. For better or for worse, the thought of Charles Cochrane, for example, was not a vacant defence of the sovereignty of rationality, of truth, but an effort at "vindicating human experience". It was a wild gamble with a tragic and vitalistic account of human experience: a gamble that was intended to discover, at last, the "creative principle" which would provide an internal integration, a direct mediation, of personality, history and consciousness. What we witness now—neo-Kantianism (the nameless relationalism of analytical philosophy) and neo-Platonism (a normalized Plato and thus incarceratd within the rationalist heaven

of Straussian discourse)—are not the original movements of Canadian thought. They are more akin to a kind of weary fall-out from the failure of the precursors of Canadian discourse to resolve, or perhaps even to bring the threshold of speech that "Columbus's egg" of modern experience: the body as the limit and horizon of the new world; the flesh as the unmediated centre of "continuously experienced consciousness". After the limits of transgression in Cochrane's thought had been reached in his refusal to think *through and beyond* the transparent centre of Christian metaphysics to its inversion in the dark region of corporeal being, after this first of the great refusals, well, Canadian metaphysics lost—and this of all things—its *will*. This was a generation of Canadian thinkers who went to the grave, and how else can this be said, with broken hearts.

The Black Watch

Charles Cochrane was particularly adept and, in the tradition of Stephen Pepper's *World Hypotheses*,[24] even brilliant as a sometimes playful, always ironic, phenomenologist of the human mind. In accounts of seminal thinkers in the western tradition, ranging from his satirical deconstruction of Gibbon's *The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire* (the chief value of which, Cochrane wrote, was not as history but as literature. "It was a splendid example of how the eighteenth-century mind looked at its past")[25] to his profound reflections on Virgil's *Aeneid* (the geneology of the "latin spirit" in the formation of "empirical will"),[26] Cochrane drew out the fundamental presuppositions, the "discursive assumptions", by which the members of the family of world-hypotheses gained their singularity and yet announced their limitations. In ways more deeply rooted than he may have suspected, Cochrane was a "constitutive" Canadian thinker. Not really as a simple matter of content; after all, Canadian discourse has always moved with flexibility between the New World and the old continent, between history and technology. As a matter of direct content, the greater part of Cochrane's writings are to be inscribed within that *arc-en-ciel* which moves from the first whispers of classical reason to the disintegration of Christian metaphysics. But, goodness knows, the intensity of the encounter with Cochrane's *oeuvre* may have something to do with the elliptical character of his thought; his reflections always circle back and transform the object of meditation. Thus, as in the instantaneous transformation of perspective predicated by catastrophe theory, history shifts into dialectics, Virgil's *Aeneid* becomes a precursor of the founding impulses of American empire, and metaphysics runs into civilization. Even as a matter of content, it is as if the region of ancient history is but a topography in reverse image of modern

experience. And, of course, it is; for Cochrane is working out a strategy of thought which moves, and plays, and fails, at the level of metaphysics. What is at stake in his thought are a relatively few laws of motion of the theoretical movements of the western mind. He was, after all, whether as a pragmatic naturalist or, later, as a Christian realist, always a metaphysician of western civilization.

Over and beyond content Cochrane was an emblematic Canadian thinker because of the form, the "presuppositions", of his thought. The enduring impulses which mediated his discourse were shadowed, however inchoately, by the discursive premises of the Canadian ethos, or more specifically, of *Canadian being*.

I prefer to think of Cochrane, or to "name" him, as a member of the Black Watch of philosophical history: a member, that is, of that broader tradition of thinkers in Canada and elsewhere who developed a self-reflexive critique of modern civilization and who were haunted, all the more, by the conviction that western society contained an internal principle of *stasis*, an unresolvable contradiction, which would release again and again the barbarism always present in the western mind. As Christopher Dawson, the Irish Christian realist, put it in his essay *The Judgement of the Nations*: "...this artificial reality has collapsed like a house of cards, the demons which haunted the brains of those outcasts (a "few prophetic voices", Nietzsche and Dostoevsky), have invaded the world of man and become its master. The old landmarks of good and evil and truth and falsehod have been swept away and civilization is driving before the storm like a dismantled and helpless ship."[27] Or, as Eric Havelock remarked in *Prometheus*: "The bitter dialectic of the Prometheus seems to pursue us still. As the intellectual powers of man realize themselves in technology . . . there seems to be raised up against them the force of a reckless dominating will."[28] To Dawson's lament over the "depersonalization of evil" and to Havelock's forebodings concerning the certain doom which was integral to the "collective consciousness of the human species", Cochrane contributed a tragic understanding of the classical foundations in western culture and metaphysics, of the turning of nemesis in the European mind. It was Cochrane's distinctive contribution to advance beyond moral lament and promethean consciousness (Cochrane was to say in *Christianity and Classical Culture* that promethean consciousness is the problem of "original sin"; the turning point, not of science and technology, but of Christian metaphysics and the embodied will[29]) to a systematic and patient reflection on the precise historical and philosophical formations which embodied—in the Greek enlightenment, in the twilight moments of the *Pax Augusta* and in the "outbreak" of enlightenment in the eighteenth-century—the "internal principle of discord" which opened time and again the "wound" in western knowledge. That Cochrane was able to surpass the intellectual limitations of Christian realism and to deepen and intensify a convergent analysis such as that of Havelock's was due, in good part, to the "four qualities" which he put into play, and for the sake of which Canadian discourse is wagered on the success or failure of his vindication of human experience.

AUGUSTINE AND MODERNISM

Four Wagers

What is most compelling about the writings of Charles Cochrane, whether it be his studies of Thucydides, Virgil, Augustine, Gibbon (or his much discounted, but seminal, meditation on the Canadian explorer, David Thompson) is that they disclose the mind—the direct deliverance of being into words—of a thinker for whom the act of thought is a way of preparing for death. Indeed, much more than is typical in the community of historians or professional philosophers, there is no sense of estrangement in Cochrane's writings; no silence of repressed thought between the word and the meditation. What is at work in the texts is, in fact, not an evasion of life but a troubled, restless and tragic record of a thinker who gambled his existence on philosophical history; who, as Sartre said about himself in *Words* and I would now direct this to Cochrane, wrote, in desperation and in despair, to save himself. And just as Sartre noted that writing had condemned him not to die an unknown, so too, Cochrane's "wager" is too urgent and too demanding to allow him, even in memory, to slip away from us into the oblivion of death. For Cochrane has opened up a passageway to a radical rethinking of the western tradition—to a philosophical reflection on tragedy as the essence of human experience, to a coming struggle with and through Augustine, to a reinterpretation of the genealogy of divided consciousness. Cochrane has condemned us to be "passengers without a ticket" (Sartre again) between idealism and naturalism; to be, after his unmasking of Platonic rationalism and his abandonment of classical *scientia* (long before John Dewey, Cochrane adopted, meditated upon and abandoned an "experimental" social science with its commitment to a liberal image of "creative politics"), thinkers who have nowhere to go except, finally, through and beyond Augustine.

And, if truth be told, everything in Cochrane's life, every word, every tormented but sometimes also boring turn of thought, is but a lengthy prelude, a preparation, for his interpretation of Augustine. All of Cochrane's thought hovers around, and falls back from, his final meditation on Augustine: a meditation which, while it occurs within that profound text, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, really takes place, receives its *embodiment* as it were, in one single, but decisive chapter of that book—"Nostra Philosophia".[30] It is, of course, towards the horizon of the outrageous, tumultuous, brilliant (and, I think, quite mistaken) formulations of that chapter; towards, that is, a radical reflection upon (and inversion) of the "trinitarian formula" (seen now, both as the epistemological structure of modern psychology and as the metaphysical structure of modern power); towards this nightmare and utopia that this meditation tends. If Cochrane had written nothing else but that single chapter (that single, emblematic and, yes, mystical, outpouring of a life of thought), with its quite impossible and quite transparent and, it must be said, so troubling account of Augustine, then his would have been a full and worthwhile philosophical life. For he would still have taken us by surprise; he still would have created a small shadow of anxiety between the mind and the fleshly self; he still would have come up to us from

behind, from the forgotten depths of Christian metaphysics, and cut away the pretensions of the modern *episteme*, touching a raw nerve-ending, a deep evasion, in western consciousness. And he would have done this by simply uttering a few words (like the undermining of a modern Tertullian), by whispering, even whimsically, that the *esse, nosse, posse,* the consciousness, will and nature, of the trinitarian formula, the philosophical and historical reasons *for* Augustine, had not gone away. And he might not even had to say that we were merely marking time, marked men really, until we have returned to the Christian tradition and wrestled, not with the devil this time, but with the Saint. Surely we cannot be blamed for being angry with Cochrane; for lamenting that dark day when the *absence* of his writings first demanded a reply. Cochrane has condemned us to history; and the history to which he forces a return, this happy and critical dissipation of amnesia (and which critical philosopher has not begged for a recovery of the past, for ontology), is like the break-up of a long and tedious winter. But who can appreciate the spring-time for all of the corpses coming to the surface? To read Cochrane is to be implicated in the history of western metaphysics. There is no escape now: so, as a prelude to Cochrane's prelude it would be best to establish, quickly and with clarity, the thematics which led him, in the end, to the "will to truth" of Augustine and which, I believed, doomed his thought to circle forever within the Augustinian discourse.

1. The Quest for a "Creative Principle"

That there is no tiny space of discord between Cochrane's meditation upon existence and his inscription of being in writing should not be surprising. Cochrane devoted his life to discovering a solution to a fundamental metaphysical problem: a problem which he did not simply think about at a distance but which he lived through, in blood, as the gamble of mortality. It was Cochrane's contention that the central problem of western knowledge (and, successively, of ethics, history, ontology and politics) lay in the continuous failure of the European mind, and nowhere was this more evident than in classical reason, to discover, outside of the presuppositions of idealism and naturalism, an adequate accounting concerning how, *within* the domain of human experience, a principle might be discovered which would ensure *identity through change*.[31] And it was his conviction that in the absence of a general theory of human experience which furnished a "creative principle" as a directly apprehended way of mediating order and process (the contingent and the immutable) that western knowledge, and thus its social formations, were doomed to a successive, predictable and relentless series of disintegrations. As Cochrane had it, Christian metaphysics was not *imposed* on classical reason, but arose in response to the internal failure, the "erosion from within", of classical discourse.[32] Consequently, the "truth" of Christian discourse was to be referred to the constitutive "failure" of the western mind, and originally of the "Graeco-Roman mind" to vindicate human ex-

perience: to resolve, that is, the "tension" between will and intelligence, between *virtù* and *fortuna*. In his viewpoint, it was the absence of a creative principle for the integration of human personality and human history which, in the end, led the "Greek mind" to a tragic sense of futility in the face of a world seemingly governed by the principle of *nemesis*; and which condemned the Roman mind (this precursor of the "acquisitive and empirical" personality) to "bewilderment" in the presence of the "bad infinity" of naturalism; and which, in the modern age, has reappeared under the sign of instrumentalism as enlightenment critique.[33]

This impossible demand on history for a creative principle, for a new vitalism, which would successfully integrate the process of human experience and solve, at least symbolically, the inevitability of death (Cochrane's *social* projection for death was the fear of *stasis*) represents the fundamental category, the gravitation-point, around which the whole of Cochrane's thought turns. It sometimes can be said, particularly so in the case of serious philosophies of life which "think with blood", that their conceptual structure, their modes of intellectual expressions, their often contradictory interventions and reversals, their attempts at taking up the "risk of philosophy", are radiated with a single, overriding root metaphor. If this is so, then the "root metaphor" of Cochrane's thought is the attempt to solve "the riddle of the Sphinx", to reconcile the Homeric myth of necessity and chance, to answer the "weeping of Euripides" through the creation of a vitalistic account of human experience. The search for a "creative principle" (which Cochrane ultimately finds, in the "will to truth"— "*personality* in God) is, thus, the presupposition which structures his earliest critique of the *arché*—the "physics, ethics and logic" of Platonic discourse (*Thucydides and the Science of History*), which grounds his most mature account of the "radical deficiencies" of enlightenment reason ("The Mind of Edward Gibbon") and which informs his summational critique of the psychology, politics, history and epistemology of the classical mind (*Christianity and Classical Culture*).[34]

If Cochrane's rethinking of the western tradition from the viewpoint of its radical scission of being and becoming was a simple *apologia* for Christian metaphysics against the claims of classical discourse or, for that matter, akin to Christopher Dawson's profound, but static, circling back to Christian theology under the guise of the defence of civilization, then his thought would pose no challenge. If, indeed, we could be certain that this turn to vitalism, to the search for a new unifying principle which would vindicate human experience by linking the development of "personality" (the Augustinian solution to the "multiple soul") to the mysterious plenitude of existence, was all along only another way of taking up again the "weary journey from Athens to Jerusalem", then we might safely say of Cochrane what Augustine said of the Stoics: "Only their ashes remain". But it is, fortunately so, the *danger* of his thought that, while it never succeeded in its explicit project of developing a new *vitalism* which would preempt the "revolt of human experience", his discourse does stand as a "*theatricum historicum*" (Foucault) in which are rehearsed, and then played out, the three fundamental "movements" of western thought: poetic imagination, philo-

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sophy (both as Platonic reason *and* as positive science) and theology. It was, perhaps, Cochrane's unique contribution to recognize in the emblematic figures of Homer (myth), Plato (*scientia*) and Augustine (*sapientia*) not only powerful syntheses of divergent, but coeval, tendencies in western consciousness, but to think through as well the *significance* of what was most apparent, that these were representative perspectives, the play of *aesthetics, intellectuality* and *faith*, the fates of which were entangled and, who knows, prophesied in the gamble of the others.[35] It may be, of course, that Cochrane's concern, and hope, with the possibility of the "trinitarian formula" ("Nostra Philosophia: The Discovery of Personality") as the long-sought creative principle was but a product of a Christian faith which finally permitted him the peace of the *crede ut intellegas*. But, might it not also be, that the trinitarian formula was less a historically specific product of the Christian metaphysic than an impossible, and transparent, reconciliation of the warring discourses of Homer, Plato and Augustine. In a passage which approaches ecstatic illumination, but which also carries with it the sounds of desperation, Cochrane, thinking that he is, at last, at rest within the interiority of Augustine's closure of human experience, writes: "Christian insight finds expression in two modes: As truth it may be described as reason irradiated by love; as morality, love irradiated by reason."[36] Now, while this passage is a wonderful expression of the creation of the "value-truth" which marks the threshold of power/knowledge in the disciplinary impulses of western society, still there can be heard in this passage another voice which is absent and silenced: this timid voice which can just be detected in the carceral of "value-truth" utters no words; it is not, after all, philosophy which makes the first protest. The sound which we hear deep in the "inner self" of the repressed consciousness of Augustine is, I believe, that of the weeping of Euripides: it is the return of poetic consciousness, of myth, which is, once again, the beginning of the modern, or is it ancient, age. The danger of Cochrane is that his quest for the creative principle, while always aimed at silencing myth *and* reason, clarifies the fundamental categories of the triadic being of western society. Cochrane thought with and against Platonic discourse (*Thucydides and the Science of History* was an intentional recovery of the classical science of fifth-century Greece against the "general hypothesis" of Herodotus and against Platonic philosophy) because of his conviction that Platonic reason was inadequate to the task, posed in mythic consciousness, of discovering a "creative and moving principle" which would reconcile human effort and *fortunà*. And Cochrane fled to theology as a second strategic line of retreat (after the débacle of classical reason) from the "ineluctability" of *nemesis* in human experience. Thus, the curiosity: an ancient historian who not only meditates upon but lives through the root metaphors, the fundamental categories of thought and the immanent limitations of the three constitutive structures of western consciousness. While Cochrane's "radical deficiency" lay in his unwillingness to relativize Augustinian discourse; that is, to think through the significance of the "discovery" of that explosive bonding of power and nihilism in theology; nonetheless Cochrane has succeeded in recessing the historical origins of the "radical scission" to the elemental play in the

classical mind among poetry, philosophy and theology and, moreover, in presenting a broad trajectory of the genealogy of western consciousness.

2. *The Tragic Sense of Political Experience*

Cochrane's search for a creative principle which would provide a more adequate ground for the reconciliation of order and process was made the more urgent by his tragic sense of political life. He was a "philosopher of the deed", one who transposed the essential impulses of the tragic imagination into a general theory of the classical sources of the tragic imagination, into a general theory of the classical sources of European culture and, moreover, into a radical rethinking of Christian metaphysics as a necessary response to the internal deficiencies of the naturalistic *vitia* of the classical world. From its genesis in *Thucydides and the Science of History* to its most mature statement in "The Mind of Edward Gibbon" (an eloquent criticism of the formalism of instrumental reason), Cochrane's intellectual project was suffused with an existentialist sensibility: with a self-conscious and deliberate attempt at formulating in the idiom of historical scholarship the pessimistic and, indeed, fatalistic impulses of the "inner man". Whether in his studies of Virgil, Lucretius, Thucydides, Theodosius or Augustine, the historical imagination was for Cochrane an outlet for a wealth of psychological insights into the meaning of suffering in human existence. It might be said, in fact, that he elaborated, and this in the language of historical realism, a profound psychological analysis of the always futile human effort, this vain *hubris*, struggling against the pull of the flesh towards death. This was a philosopher of life who arraigned the main currents of European cultural history as a way of illuminating the more universal, and thus intimate, plight of reconciling the brief moment of life with the coming night of death. But then, the peculiar tragedy of Cochrane's historical sensibility is that he was broken, in the end or (if a Christian) in the beginning, by the radical impossibility of living without hope of an easy escape within the terms of the intense and inevitable vision of human suffering revealed by the poetic consciousness of the pre-Socratic Greeks. Cochrane was a philosopher of the deed because his writing responded, at its deepest threshold, to the aesthetics of poetic consciousness; but the great internal tension of his thought, and I suspect the deep evasion of his life, was that he sought to make his peace with the tragedy of finality by denouncing as a "radical error" the *hubris* of promethean consciousness (this is the *arché* of *Thucydides and the Science of History*) and, later, by accepting the Christian dogma of original sin (the "essential moment" of *Christianity and Classical Culture*) as a justification for Augustine's sublimation of divided consciousness into the "will to truth". The peace made by Cochrane with existence consisted perhaps only of the expedient of substituting guilt over the *hubris* of the Homeric hero for the unmediated and unrelieved image of nemesis offered by the Greek poets. Need it be said that, while guilt offers the promise of a final

peace through the mechanism of the "confession", or shall we say "evacuation", of the self, poetic consciousness promises only that the self is condemned to the liberty of experiencing fully the vicissitudes of contingent and mutable experience. The horizon of Cochrane's historical realism was represented by the fateful figure of Augustine; it was not accidental that Cochrane's thought, while it may have begun with and never escaped from its reflection on Herodotus, concluded with a meditation on *The Confessions of St. Augustine*. Perhaps Cochrane's major contribution may have been to instruct us now of the main avenues of evasion open—the prospects for an internal peace—which were disclosed by the European mind as it struggled to draw away from the tragic sensibility of the Greek classical historians.

Thus, in much the same way that Cochrane once said of classical historiography that it represented an attempt to "escape from the conclusions of Herodotus",[37] Cochrane's historical inquiry might be viewed as an enduring and progressively refined effort at discovering a new *arché*, or starting-point (a "new physics, ethics and logic") which would respond finally to the fatalism, to the internal principle of *stasis*, in human experience disclosed by aesthetic consciousness. In an eloquent passage in *Christianity and Classical Culture*, Cochrane presented a vivid description of the nemesis inherent in the very play of human experience. The universe which presents itself in Herodotus is one of "motion . . . perpetual and incessant."[38] Translated into a principle of human behaviour, the "psyche" is so constituted that "now and then, here and there (like fire), it succeeds in overcoming the resistance of those elements which make for depression, and, when it does, it exhibits the phenomenon of accumulation and acquisition on a more than ordinary scale."[39] But, Cochrane notes, there is in this universe no evidence of organic growth; and this because the "principle of expansion operates at the same time as a principle of limitation."[40] Thus, and this is fundamental for Cochrane, "the process to which mankind is subject is self-defeating; it is like the opposition of a pendulum."[41] In this tragic dénouement, the role of the mind is that of a "passive spectator": "self-consciousness resolves itself into a consciousness of impotence in the grip of material necessity."[42] Or, in a succeeding passage, Cochrane meditates upon the words of Herodotus which were voiced by a Persian noble at the Theban dinner-party given on the eve of Plataea:

> That which is destined to come to pass as a consequence of
> divine activity, it is impossible to man to avert. Many of us are
> aware of this truth, yet we follow because we cannot do other-
> wise. Of all the sorrows which afflict mankind, the bitterest is
> this, that one should have consciousness of much, but control
> over nothing.[43]

The elemental and noble gesture of Cochrane's thought was his effort, always

scholarly and nuanced, to fashion a response to the "bitterness" which flows from the recognition of marginal and mutable existence. Cochrane's thought hovered around bitterness of the soul, not in the modern sense of *ressentiment*, but in the more classical meaning of bitterness as an acknowledgement that there was a work in the very interiority of human experience a principle of limitation, of arrest, which outside of and beyond human agency moved to drag back the most inspiring of political experiments and of philosophical projects to nemesis and *stasis*. What Vico has described as the inevitable cycle of *ricorso*,[44] Cochrane recurred to, and this often, as the classical image of "walking the wheel".

If it is accurate to claim that the tragic imagination represents the limit and the gamble of Cochrane's thought, then we should expect to find a lingering, but pervasive, sense of arrested human possibility in each of his writings. And this is, of course, precisely what occurs; but with the important change that his tragic sensibility develops from a rude, almost innate, way of meeting existence to a complex and internally coherent philosophy of European civilization. Here was a thinker who transformed the sensibility of bitterness of the soul into an over-arching, and quite original, account of the failure of creative politics, of classical reason and, in the end, perhaps even of Christian metaphysics to solve the enigma of History. Thus, in his earliest published writings, *David Thompson: The Explorer*, Cochrane presented in the most agonic of terms the "story" of Thompson, this explorer of the Canadian West, whose naturalism was typified by an "imaginative sympathy" for the landscape and its inhabitants and whose intellectual outlook was that of an historian "who had the mind of a scientist and the soul of a poet."[45] And, of course, the story of Thompson was that of a Greek tragedy: a cartographer who could find no publisher willing to take on the risk of his work; a father who is forced after retirement to return to surveying to pay off his son's debts; a Christian who lends money to the Church and, even in the face of destitution, deeds it his property; an early patriot (whose "love of country . . . sprang from an immediate knowledge of the land itself") whose warnings against the expansionary land claims of the "litigous" Americans went unheeded. Cochrane's Thompson was not that dissimilar to the Homeric hero who struggles courageously against adversity, seems to attain a measure of success; and then, at the very moment when relief from the vicissitudes of human existence has been gained, the achievement is swept away by the flux of human experience driven by a "mysterious inner force" of inertia, of equivalence.

In his otherwise astute philosophical obituary, Woodhouse has dismissed Cochrane's work on Thompson as an earlier historical study of little academic interest. Perhaps within the conventional terms of classical scholarship it is; but I think that in the depiction of the tragic fate of Thompson the naturalist there are anticipated all of the major themes that will come to dominate Cochrane's study of the nemesis that awaits classical reason. The essential moments of Thompson's tragedy ("the man who looks at the stars"[46]) are not that different from the "yawning chasm" in human experience which awaits each of the major figures Cochrane will later study: Thucydides (the first modern political scientist"[47] whose empiricism could not explain the suffering of the Athenian plague or the

necessity of defending democratic ideals in the *Funeral Oration*); Lucretius (whose desire for "salvation through enlightenment" was destined to dissolve into "resigned melancholy");[48] Virgil (whose intention of "salvation through will" could not halt the "intellectual and moral bewilderment" of the late Roman empire); Augustine (whose "historical realism" was developed in response to the radical deficiency of the classical order's desire to attain "permanence and universality" by means of "political action"); or even Gibbon (whose defence of the "universal instrument" of reason was fated to return the modern century to the *ricorso* of classical reason). Irrespective of the subject-matter Cochrane's thought was never freed of the terrible insight that in the face of a mutable and contingent domain of human experience, the self is confronted, in the end, only with futility, despair and the certainty of the decay of the flesh. And, of course, it was futile to look to political action for salvation because the principle of decay was within, not without; awaiting only an "external shock" to release the *demiurge* again.

3. *The Method of Historical Realism: From Naturalism to Vitalism*

While Cochrane's quest for a more adequate creative principle took place within the horizon of a tragic discourse on human experience, it was expressed through his always insightful recourse to the historical imagination. In keeping with the very gamble of life which was at stake in his classical scholarship, Cochrane's deployment of the historical imagination changed radically as his analysis of the sources of the tragic deficiencies of classical culture broadened into a general critique of the metaphysics of the Graeco-Roman mind. What was constant in his thought, from the beginning in *Thucydides and the Science of History* to the ending in "The Mind of Edward Gibbon", was the use of the "sympathetic imagination" as the axial principle of historical inquiry. For Cochrane, the historical imagination in its standard of presentation should "live up to the most exacting standards of logic and artistry." And, in its standard of interpretation, the "historical and synoptic method", assisted by the "rich resources of language and literature", should seek with the aid of the sympathetic imagination, "disciplined and controlled by the comparative study of people and cultures, to enter into and recover what it can of past experience, so far as this is possible within the narrow limits of human understanding; and this experience it will seek to 'represent' in such a way as to convey something, at least, of its meaning to contemporaries."[49] Cochrane's injunction on behalf of the "sympathetic imagination" as the basis of historical investigation, delivered as it was at the end of his life, does not differ significantly from his original use of the historical imagination to "represent" the tragic sense of Thompson's naturalism; or, for that matter, to present, with a vivid sense of concretization, the discourses of Thucydides, Plato, Theodosius, Julian, Lucretius and Virgil. As a matter of intellectual inclination, Cochrane always erred on the side of generosity to the

perspectives of his opponents in the classical tradition; and it is no small measure of his fealty to the principle of the "sympathetic imagination" that his bitterness of the soul was interlaced with brilliant gestures of sardonic wit.

If, however, the use of the sympathetic imagination represents one continuity in Cochrane's historical method, there was also another, perhaps more essential, thematic unity. Cochrane was, above all, a historical realist: a thinker who sought to discover in the immediate data of human experience an immanent principle of integration which, more than the "anaemic intellectualism of rationalism", would provide for the dynamic unification of the sensate and ideal in human existence. It was Cochrane's lifelong conviction (one which deepened as his sense of the tragic dimensions of the triadic being of western consciousness) that the "mysterious inner force" of human experience should not be met either through "apotheosis or escape.[50] Understanding the vitalistic dimensions of human experience as a force *both* for creation and disintegration, Cochrane devoted his historical scholarship to the recovery of a "realistic" principle which would redeem the civilizing process." Now, as a historical realist, Cochrane was the precursor of an important tradition in Canadian letters: a tradition which includes the "psychological realism" of George Brett, the "cultural realism" of Eric Havelock, the "existential realism" of Emil Fackenheim, and the "critical realism" of John Watson. What distinguishes Cochrane's experiment in historical realism is, however, that he adopted all of the major positions which it was possible to take in the realist tradition of the twentieth century. After all, the paradigmatic figures in Cochrane's thought are Thucydides and Augustine, both of whom were realists, but, of course, of a fundamentally different order. Thucydides was a *pragmatic naturalist*; and in allying himself with his naturalistic political science, Cochrane sought salvation in a political realism. The attraction of Augustine lay, I believe, in the elemental fact that he was also a realist, but (in the Pauline tradition) a Christian realist of the "inner man"; a realist who sought to constitute "from within" the psychology of individual personality, a solution to the quest for "permanence and universality" which had eluded the best efforts of "creative politics." Cochrane's historical realism thus oscillates between the polarities of Thucydides and Augustine: between the pragmatic naturalism of *Thucydides and the Science of History* and the vitalistic discourse (or Christian realism) of *Christianity and Classical Culture*. In his phase of Thucydidean realism, Cochrane was a "scientific historian": one who sought to discover in the naturalistic *vitia*; that is, in the discourse of "utilitarian ethics", "democratic politics" and an "empirical political science" canons of interpretation and practice for the "dynamic integration" of being and becoming.[51] In his commitment to Augustinian realism, Cochrane considered himself to be a "philosophical historian": one who wished to disclose (and successively so, at the levels of epistemology, ontology and aesthetics) the deep reasons for the "internal" collapse of classical reason. As an Augustinean realist, Cochrane shifted the basis of the search for a "creative principle" from the sensate level of human experience ("creative politics") to the "remaking" of inner experience. While the classical science of Thucydides provided a basis of critique of Platonic rationalism

(Cochrane said, in fact, that Thucydides and Plato were the polarities of Greek thought) and of mythic consciousness (*contra* Herodotus), Christian realism was the final gamble: an attempt to still the "revolt of human experience" by making the Word flesh.

It was almost inevitable that Cochrane's deployment of historical realism would shift from a naturalistic to a vitalistic basis. The striking feature of his study of Thucydides, aside from its brilliant linking of Hippocrates' *Ancient Medicine* with Thucydides' invention of a method of empirical political science modelled on the medical strategy of "semiology, prognosis and therapeutics"[52] (the historian as a "physician" to a sick society), was that it was a *decisive failure.* Cochrane may have begun *Thycydides* as a "scientific historian", but he ended with the complete abandonment of "creative politics" as a way of warding off the "external shocks" which threatened at every moment to release the stasis within the body politic. While Cochrane managed to complete *Thucydides* with a diminishing but dogged loyalty to the canons of a naturalistic political science (even in the last paragraph he insists that the problem of suffering is a matter of "philosophy not empirical political science"), the central thrust of the study is to shatter the best hopes of "political action" as a means of "saving the civilizing process." It is not a little ironic that Thucydides' declensions in favour of democratic politics are presented in the form of the famous *Funeral Oration,* nor that the background to Cochrane's paean to democratic politics is the seeming madness released by the Athenian plague.

The study of Thucydides had the effect of destroying the foundation of pragmatic naturalism: after Thucydides, Cochrane never sought solace again in the "scientific spirit" (indeed, he was to resituate classical science and Platonic reason as two sides of the philosophical impulse) nor did he seek to exclude (on the basis of the exclusionary canons of interpretation of narrow empiricism) the problem of human suffering from his thought. Cochrane turned to philosophical history to find an answer to the radical failure of classical science to respond adequately to the impossibility of a "stable and enduring" form of political action; more, to that original sense of suffering ahead: the weeping of Euripides as the sure and certain sign of the coming revolt of human experience against all incarcerations. And, might I say, Cochrane's desire for the recovery of Christian metaphysics was confirmed by his historical observation that Augustine was the objective necessity, the inevitable product, as it were, of that fateful breakdown of the classical mind.

4. The Refusal of Classical Reason

The whole of Cochrane's thought gravitated towards an elegant and comprehensive critique of the divided consciousness which he took to be the metaphysical centre of the secular mind. It was his insight, at first historical and then metaphysically expressed, that the modern century has not escaped the cata-

strophe which eroded the Graeco-Roman mind *from within*. Cochrane was, in the end, an opponent of all rationalism, not simply on the grounds of providing a defence of Christian metaphysics, but really because the radical severance of reason from experience (the "disembodied logos") was fated to terminate in "static and immobile" conceptions of social reality. And, of course, in the face of a contingent and mutable process of human experience (a social reality which exploded from within, subverting all attempts at the final closure of experience), rationalism could only be maintained through the imposition of a totalitarian politics. Cochrane may not have been the first to realize the totalitarian impulse which is implicit within Western reason, but he was the philosopher who carried through to its limit the historical thesis that reason, "instrumental" reason, could only persevere if the heterogeneity of human experience was finally silenced, incarcerated within the "iron cage" of rationalism. For Cochrane, as long as western metaphysics was thought within the terms of Platonic discourse, it was condemned to oscillate between materialism and idealism, between the naturalization of the will and the transcendentalism of disembodied knowledge. This, at least, was the thesis of his remarkable essay, "The Latin Spirit in Literature", just as surely as it was the coping-stone of *Christianity and Classical Culture*. It is important that Cochrane never forgot that Augustine, before he was a Christian, was a confirmed Platonist; and that Christian metaphysics (the "embodied logos") was also the reverse image of Platonic ideas. Under the rubric "the word was made flesh", Platonic Reason migrated into the body and blood of a corporeal being that was about to be "delivered up" to incarceration within the metaphysics of a Christian, but really *modern* power. In a word, Augustine "embodied" rationalism; and he thus provided a solution to the instability of "creative politics" which had eluded the classical mind. The "iron cage" of rationalism expressed, after all, a more general commitment by the classical mind to seek a *political* solution to the quest for "permanence and universality". Political action was presented as the "creative principle" (whether in Athens or in Rome) which would integrate the "warring tendencies" of the sensate and the ideal, making "the world safe for the civilizing process." Now, just as Cochrane had earlier in his study of Thucydides concluded that the canons of a positive polity could not arrest, let alone explain, the "uninterrupted" revolt of human experience, so too his study of the politics of the Roman empire led him to the insight that the secular mind possessed no "creative principle" to prevent the disintegration of organized society into the extreme of naturalism (the "empirical will") or of idealism ("salvation through enlightenment"). The catastrophe that awaited classical culture (this emblematic foundation of secular civilization) may have been precipitated by "unanticipated external shocks" but its origins were to be traced to a "fundamental failure of the Graeco-Roman mind."[53]

It was Cochrane's intention in "The Latin Spirit in Literature" and in *Christianity and Classical Culture* to explore the deep sources of the radical deficiency in the politics and reason of classical culture. What, he inquired, caused the "Latin spirit" to a restless oscillation between the "resigned melancholy" of Virgil and the "melancholy resignation" of Lucretius: the exemplars of the tragic and

instrumentalist tendencies in the classical discourse? What, that is, destined the Roman mind, this *genus* of the empirical will to fall short of the political ideal of "permanance and universality"; to fall into a "moral and intellectual bewilderment" from which there was to be no hope of recovery except for a "radical remaking" of personality and the "practical conduct of life"? And what, in the end, arrested the Greek imagination within a vision of a universe dominated by *stasis*, for which the only recourse was futility and despair? It was Cochrane's historical thesis that the referents of the "Graeco-Roman mind" (reason and will) stand as "permanent inclinations"[54] in modern culture; and that, therefore, the "sure and certain doom which awaited classical culture" is also a sign of the coming disaster in the modern age.

> The work of Virgil, like that of Lucretius, is in a large sense, didactic; otherwise, the difference between them is as wide as the difference between Greece and Rome. The one preaches a gospel of salvation through knowledge; the other of salvation through will. The one holds up an ideal of repose and refined sensual enjoyment; the other one of restless effort and activity. Lucretius urges upon men a recognition of the fact that they are limited as the dust; that the pursuit of their aspirations is as vain and futile as are the impulses of religion, pride, and ambition which ceaselessly urge them on. The purpose of Virgil is to vindicate those obscure forces within the self by which mankind is impelled to material achievement and inhibited from destroying the work of his own hands. . . . It is this difference which makes the distinction between the melancholic resignation of Lucretius and the resigned melancholy of Virgil; the one the creed of a man who accepts the intellectual assurance of futility; the other of one who, despite all obstacles, labours to discover and formulate reasonable grounds for his hope. It is this difference that makes the distinction between the epic of civilized materialism and that of material civilization.[55]

Just as Cochrane had discovered in the inexplicable suffering of the Athenian plague (*Thucydides and the Science of History*) the limits of Greek politics and, moreover, of classical reason; so too, he finds in Virgil's description of the "empirical personality" as the foundation of Roman empire the threshold of instrumental activity as a basis of "material civilization". As Cochrane noted, the strength and weakness of Rome as the "foundation of western civilization" depended on the "psychology of rugged individualism—the spirit of individual and collective self-assertion"[56] which destined the Romans to represent, if not "the origin, at least . . . the essence of the acquisitive and conservative spirit in

modern civilization."[57] For Cochrane, the peculiar strength of the Latin spirit (this emblematic expression of naturalism) was that the Romans, viewing themselves "as custodians rather than creators" allowed nothing to stand in the way of the development of the "empirical personality" with its basis in will. Consequently, the Roman identity, rooted in *natura naturans*, oscillated only between the polarities of *amor sui* (individual self-assertion which found expression in *dominium*) and collective egoism ("public authority and the discipline of the city").[58] Thus, while to the Greeks:

> life was an art, for the Romans it was a business. While, therefore, the rich Hellenic genius exhausted itself in the effort of speculation, and in the cultivation of the various forms of artistic expression, the Romans ... devoted themselves to the acquisition and conservation of material power, and this aim they pursued with narrow concentration and undeviating consistency for as long as they deserved their name. The Greeks shrank in terror from excess; the Romans found nothing excessive which was possible, and their measure of the possible was based on a 'will to live', cherished by them to a degree almost unique among the peoples of antiquity.[59]

Or, stated otherwise, long before the Protestant Reformation and that fateful linking of the will to salvation and the capitalist ethic, another bridging of the pragmatic will and private property had taken place. The "Latin spirit" parallels the major themes of Weber's "The Protestant Ethic", with, however, the major exception that empirical personality of the Roman *imperium* put into practice a discourse which linked together a theory of family right *(patria potestas)*, an understanding of personality as property *(dominium)*, a "civic bond" founded on the urge to practical activity, and the will to exclude everything which did not contribute to the "will to work, the will to fight, boldness of innovation and ... disciplined obedience."[60]

It was Cochrane's great insight to "diagnose" the Latin spirit correctly, taking Virgil as the principle spokesman of that which was most faithful to the naturalism of the Roman mind. In "The Latin Spirit in Literature", Cochrane said of the empirical personality that its adoption made of the Romans a "type of a practical people whose objectives are realizable because they are clear, and clear because they are limited to what the eye may see and the hand may grasp. It is no accident that the spear was for them the symbol of ownership..."[61] Yet, for all of this devotion to the expansion of the pragmatic will, it remained "the fate of naturalism to devour its own gods."[62] And while naturalism devours its own gods, "it never succeeds in replacing them with others more impregnable to the assaults of time and circumstance." The Latin spirit, the coping-stone of the empirical personality, gave way to "spiritual bewilderment"; that is, to a search

for an answer to the question: "what is to be the intellectual content of life, now that we have built the city, and it is no longer necessary to extend the frontiers?"[63] Or, as Hegel would say later, what could possibly be the content of a civilization founded on "bad infinity"? For Cochrane, it was the peculiar fate of Virgil to be a "splendid failure", understood only by the Christians who "recoiled from him in terror, for the very simple reason that they regarded him as a man who had something to say." It was Virgil's fate to provide a warning, but only after *stasis* had begun, that "the state and empire of Rome depended fundamentally on *will*; virtue is not knowledge, it is character; and its fruits are seen in activity rather than in repose or contemplation."[64] As Cochrane remarks, Virgil "gives authentic expression not merely to the Latin temperament, but in considerable degree to that of western civilization as a whole. It him alone you see them all."[65]

It was Cochrane's radical insight that Christian metaphysics represents an active synthesis of the Latin experience. The Latin fathers put the "coping-stone" to the developing theory of personality; Augustine's transcendental will was the reverse image of the empirical will of Virgil and Sallust; and the "doctrines of sin, grace, and redemption . . . achieved that philosophy of progress for which the classical world had waited in vain for two thousand years; and which, even through its perversions, has been one of the chief sources of inspiration to the mind of modern man."[66] Virgil is envisaged as bringing to a conclusion the futile quest in classical culture for a creative principle which would have its basis in naturalism or idealism. The modern age does not begin with Plato or with Virgil, but with Augustine's radical reformulation of the philosophy of progress. It was the distinctive contribution of Augustine to rethink the void between naturalism and transcendentalism (between the empirical will and the tragic sensibility); and in the reformulation of the "trinitarian principle" to develop a new principle of integration of human action which would shift the discourse of progress to a "radical remaking of character." As Cochrane says, "Latin Christianity culminated in Augustine, who may justly be described as, at once, the last of all the Romans and the first citizen of the world."[67]

"The Will to Will": Cochrane's Augustine

As a philosopher of the modern public situation, Cochrane devoted himself to the exploration of the fundamental categories of western metaphysics: that is, to the investigation of the "inner logic" in western consciousness of the relationship among being, will and truth. Thus, for Cochrane, the phenomenology of the Latin spirit or, for that matter, the historical wager of Thucydides were not episodic or discontinuous historical "events", locked up within a certain phase of historicity, but, rather, gained their significance as reflections of the way in which the dynamics of western metaphysics worked itself out, and this so vividly and

concretely in historical experience. The bicameral consciousness, or we might say the radical division between will and knowledge (philosophy and history), which was at the root of the Latin spirit is the very same reflection of warring being which has coloured the history of western metaphysics (Nietzsche's truth and will, Heidegger's world and earth, Grant's technology and *sapientia*, Lee's "savage fields"). To say this is to link Cochrane's exploration of the Graeco-Roman mind (the "permanent inclinations" towards transcendence and submersion) to its actual extension as a fundamental reflection on the genealogy of the radical crisis, the catastrophe, of twentieth-century human experience. Within the discourse of philosophical history, Cochrane stands in that tradition of metaphysical reflection which has sought to understand the inner workings of the nihilism in the western mind. Cochrane was, first and last, a metaphysician for whom the medium of philosophical history was a way of presenting the concrete expressions in western history of the fundamental categories of being.

To say this is to note only that which was most original and, in fact, radical about his thought. Cochrane approached the domain of Christian metaphysics as a constitutive response to the failure of the secular mind, at least in its Virgilian and Platonic representations, to solve the riddle of being-in-the-world: to provide, that is, an internal and directly experienced principle of integration between "order and motion", or, more accurately, between contemplation and instrumental activity. It was Cochrane's thesis that Christian metaphysics was not an aberration in the western tradition; not a long, grey twilight which separates the celebration of reason in Latin classical culture from its re-emergence in the Enlightenment, but a necessary, and vital, response in western thought to the flight of being from the vicissitudes of existence. For Cochrane, Christian metaphysics was the truth-sayer of the *vide* at the centre of western consciousness; and the theological discourse of the early Catholic thinkers, (Athanasius, but, most of all, Augustine) the first intimations of the birth of modernism. As Cochrane remarked of Augustine: "Not satisfied like the Hebrew to weep by the waters of Babylon, nor yet, like the Greek, merely to envisage the pattern of a city laid up in heaven, but true to the native genius of the children of Romulus, he traced the outlines of an ecclesiastical polity which . . . had its foundations solidly embedded in the living rock of empirical fact. Leaving it to others to pursue millenialist dreams of a New Jerusalem, he erected the last but not the least impressive or significant monument to the spirit of Ancient Rome."[68] In the face of the failure of political action to achieve "permanence and universality" in the "civilizing process", Augustine developed a synthesis of "the whole vision of antiquity (Hebrew, Greek and Latin)" which was delivered up in terms of a theory of the radical remaking of the "human personality" and of the creation of "historical experience" (the *Saeculum*). Augustine was a crucial mediator of the "inner logic" of western metaphysics to the extent that his writings install a new metaphysics of power (what Nietzsche describes as the "will to will"), an epistemology of modern psychology (the "closing of the eye of the flesh"), and the creation of the "will to truth" (the linkage between power and knowledge of which now only Heidegger, Nietzsche and Foucault have taken

as the nucleus of the modern regime of power).[69] The Augustinian discourse was, in its essentials, a reflection of a permanent desire in the western mind to silence the struggle of being and becoming (which first found expression in the tragic sensibility of mythic consciousness) through the strategy of *embodying* the Concept (what Cochrane refers to as the values of "truth, beauty and goodness") in the living fact of the flesh, in the normalization of psychological experience.

The high-point of Cochrane's intellectual achievements was represented, and this most certainly, by the publication of *Christianity and Classical Culture*. It was in this work that he explored, in rich historical detail and with genuine philosophical insight, precisely how the Augustinian discourse constituted both a "solution" to the catastrophe which awaited classical culture (the *Pax Augusta* was finally capable only of "renovation" and "regeneration" of western civilization). In analyzing the historicity of the troubled relationship between the discourse of classical reason and politics (Virgil and Augustus) and Christian metaphysics (Theodosius and Augustine), Cochrane brought to a new threshhold of understanding the way in which the western tradition, both as metaphysics and as political action, has deployed itself. Before Cochrane, the genealogy of western culture has to do with the history of Reason: a Reason which is sometimes transcendent, at other times submerged in the naturalism of empirical will. After Cochrane, the archeology of European, and now North American, culture cannot avoid the truth contained in the fact that Augustine, this founder of Christian metaphysics, was not ultimately the bitter opponent of classical reason, but its redeemer. It was the fate of Augustine to represent a "synthesis of the whole vision of antiquity" precisely because he understood the nihilism which is at the heart of western consciousness. That there is only a reversal of terms between Plato and Augustine, and not a radical diremption, might only mean that Augustine was the first of the modern rationalists: the thinker who understood that Reason could be maintained only as a member of the holy trinity of nature, will and knowledge; as a *term* within that triadic structure of modern consciousness. That Augustine followed Latin Christianity in widening and deepening "the spiritual foundations of a material life which it refused either to repudiate or deny"[70] also meant he was the first of the modern metaphysicians, or, perhaps more accurately, sociologists, of power: the first thinker, that is, to transform the empirical will into the transcendental will and, consequently, to establish the possibility of the will to power. As a synthesis ultimately of Plato and Virgil, Augustine was the culmination of the classical mind's futile search for a new principle of fusion, a "will to truth" which would finally overcome the radical division of the sensate and the ideal. Now, to accomplish this philosophical equivalent of nuclear fission (in which Christian metaphysics preserved the nihilistic moment in the western mind), Augustine made of the body, its deep psychology and its sensual appearance, a radical experiment in a "totalizing" political philosophy. It is often thought that in his famous words "look into yourself" or in his equally celebrated invention of modern psychology in the creation of a "continuous and cumulative experience" that Augustine was somehow freeing the region of the body, and most certainly of the unconscious, for the

development of a modern experience which would no longer be incarcerated within the monotonous terrain of a transcendental reason. It is not as often thought that in his search for the "inner man", Augustine was presenting only a chilling sentence on the human possibility: an intimation of a fascist power which would work its wonders through the explosive combination of guilt and the will to truth. Was not the "confession" of Augustine ultimately of the will to itself; that is, the assent of the fleshly will to abandon its claim to radical autonomy in favour of the peace which would come with that new "union of hearts"—the development of the "will to will"? Nietzsche might have been thinking of Augustine when he remarked that the will to power is "the inner-most essence of Being"; and further, when he notes (with Heidegger) that psychology is not the essence of the "will to will", but is "the morphology and doctrine of the will to power."[71] This is simply to say, of course, that the whole of European culture, the metaphysics of modern experience, was decisively trans-formed by the Augustine's synthesis. And who can say, with any certainty, that Augustine's formulation of a nameless power based on the will to will or, moreover, his colonization of the "inner man" through the incarnation of a metaphysical "truth" have somehow disappeared, now that the profile of reli-gious discourse has receded from view?

In the writing of *Christianity and Classical Culture*, Cochrane presented the exact terms of Augustine's revision of Christian metaphysics with the easy assurance of a thinker who was confident that modernism had not escaped the Augustinian legacy. And, of course, while it may have been Cochrane's weakness that he took refuge in the carceral of the "trinitarian formula" (and this as a way of evading, not philosophy, but the tragic aesthetics of poetic consciousness), nonetheless his description of Augustinian metaphysics, delivered up as the "loving" act of a thinker who had finally come home, offers us an invaluable insight into the phenomenology of the modern mind. The overriding import-ance of *Christianity and Classical Culture* may be that it makes visible the metaphysics of modernism which, taking place in the fourth century in that decisive threshhold between the opening of the wound in western consciousness (the radical antagonism of the "Graeco-Roman mind") and the coming mille-nium of a Christian peace, was forced to declare openly its strategies, its "inner logic". In Augustine, the inner logic of western metaphysics, the specific strate-gies by which the corporeal self would be invested by the "will to truth", was forced finally to the surface. For a brief moment, the dominations and powers of western experience were forced, in fact, to confess themselves; to declare their justifications and to say, quite honestly, how they intended finally to silence the weeping of Euripides by turning the corporeal self against itself. Curiously the act of rereading Augustine is nothing less than an exploration of modernism before it goes underground. And what makes Cochrane such a brilliant guide is that his thought, always tragic and ever in flight from existence, cleaves to Augustine as its "first principle". Cochrane tells us what exactly constitutes, at a theoretical level, the decisive intervention by Augustine into western metaphysics.

ARTHUR KROKER

Nostra Philosophia

It was Cochrane's claim, as elaborated in the third and decisive section ("Regeneration") of *Christianity and Classical Culture,* that Augustine's originality consisted of assembling into a single discourse three important innovations in Christian metaphysics. Augustine's break with discursive reason (with the whole dualistic *logique* of dialectics) imposed a new beginning-point on human experience. While the Augustinian discourse had the immediate effect of transforming the corporeal self into a vehicle (the body as a prison-house of the flesh or as a "temple of God") for the inscription of truth, it also established the foundations (in epistemology, aesthetics and ethics) of a modernist conception of *personality* and *history.* [72] Augustine was, indeed, the first of the modern structuralists because he broke completely with the classical conception of reason and with the classical economy of power. Before Augustine, reason and power were rooted in the representationalism of nature. After Augustine, the representationalism of classical reason and power had disappeared; it was replaced by a thoroughly *relational* theory of personality and history. It was, perhaps, the sheer radicalness of the break in western experience which was contained in the thought of Augustine that lends *Christianity and Classical Culture* such elegance and persuasiveness. Cochrane realized that whether in *The Confessions* or in the *City of God* (or, indeed, in his numerous doctrinal challenges to heresy) Augustine articulated the main impulses of the *vitia* of the Catholic world. In a word, Augustine was the first theoretician to explore the *physics,* the *logic* and the *ethics* of modern experience. Long before Foucault and Baudrillard alerted us to the character of modern power as a "dead power", a "nameless" power which no one owns (but which operates as an "eternal inner simulacrum")[73] that is, long before Foucault broke forever with a representational discourse which was founded on the originary of "nature"; long before this, Cochrane, looking for shelter from the storm, had stumbled upon an earlier expression of a dead power, of a power which is purely mediational and, thus, relational in its symbolic effects. The significance of Cochrane's recovery of Augustine against classical reason is that, almost innocently, he provides an intimate account of that fundamental break between the modern and classical *epistemes* which was precipitated by Augustine and from which we are only now beginning to awaken.

1. Physics: The Discourse of the Trinitarian Formula

Augustine's first intervention into the closed and comforting discourse of western metaphysics consisted of a radical refusal of the classical conception of a dialectical reason. As Cochrane said, it was ". . . the function of fourth-century Christianity . . . to heal the wounds inflicted by man on himself in classical

times."[74] Classical discourse, beginning as it did with the *arché* of nature, constituted itself within the horizon of a closed *logos* which oscillated backwards and forwards between the antinomies of the naturalistic table of discourse. With all of the flourishes of bad burlesque, the classical economy of reason found itself trapped between the polarities of scepticism (Platonic *logos*) and dogmatism (empirical will). The problem for classical reason, faced with the alternatives of transcendence and submersion, was to discover an adequate "myth" (Homer) or "hypothesis" (Plato) which would serve as a "fuse" to complete the "circuit of intelligibility" across the void at the centre of discursive reason.[75] Much like the modern effort of Enlightenment (Cochrane claimed in "The Mind of Edward Gibbon" that its attempted rehabilitation of discursive reason was nothing but an imitation of the "radical deficiency" of the table of classical discourse), classicism began by "envisaging the subject as in some sense 'opposed' to the 'object' world" and, then, seeking a reconciliation of the two by presenting, mythically or hypothetically, some intelligible relationship between the two. Two escapes were possible: "upwards by way of transcendence or downwards into positivism."[76] At stake were the reconciliation of the "classical *logos* of power" (which opposed its subjective character, "art and industry" to an objective side (fate and fortune); and the fusion of the classical *logos* of reason (which opposed an ultimate principle of being—"water (Thales), air (Anaximenes), fire (Heraclitus) or some element undefined (Anaximander) or as the limit or form (Pythagoras)—to a differentiated principle of becoming (Heraclitus' dialectical materialism, the "idealism" of the Pythagorean school.[77] As Cochrane notes, the result of the closed table of classical discourse was to condemn thought to the "assertion of the claims of the positive sciences" (Hippocrates' *Ancient Medicine*) or to an endless drift into "subjectivism and sophistry" (Plotinus and Porphyry). And, of course, from Augustine's standpoint, the radical error of Plato was his discovery and then displacement of the third *arché* (Order) into the Form of the Good, the One, which was to supervene over the atomism of sensate experience. The "blunder" of Plato was to overlook "the possibility that if the conclusions thus reached were so disheartening, the reason for this might not lie in some radical misapprehension of the problem as originally proposed."[78] In not providing a means by which *logos* might be made immanent, Platonic discourse, viewing matter as the "all-but-nothing" immobilized reality, "reducing it purely to terms of structure, so that time was represented as a 'moving image of eternity' and process, as such, was identified with 'irrationality' and 'evil'."[79] The result was the picture of the 'multiple soul', a composite of discrete elements confronting one another in a struggle to be concluded only by the final release of mind from its prison-house in matter and by its return to its source of being, the 'life' of pure form. The fuse between the One and the Many (the Universal Soul as the "hypostatized" connective, or fuse, between the sensate and the intellectual) would be by way of dialectic: the instrument by which the radical dualisms at the heart of discursive reason would be resolved in favour of the overcoming of the "illusory world of sense."[80]

Now, long before Kant's renunciation of the possiblity of knowledge of the

Ding-an-sich (and his subsequent turn to a *regulatory* theory concerning the analytical presuppositions of the categories of thought) Augustine broke with the Platonic logos, with rationalism, by opposing to the *nature* of discursive reason the *supersensible* principle of triadic being. Classical discourse had sought the principle for the unification of human experience in an *external* mediation: in idealism (transcendentalism) or in materialism (submersion in the finite). Augustinian metaphysics took as its realm of action the field of human exper·ience itself; with, of course, the important exception that it invented "personal-ity" (what Cochrane describes as the "triune character of selfhood")[81] as the embodiment of the Word. Augustine's subversion of classical discourse con-sisted, above all, of fusing epistemology and psychology in the special sense that he put the body itself into play as a living *theatricum* for the struggle of the finite and the indeterminate. It surely was an early sign of the beginning of the specious cruelty (the "guilt" over fleshly being) of the modern century when Augustine, in his declarations on the "direct deliverance" of consciousness, said, in effect, that now corporeal being would be the new epicentre for a metaphysics of ordered process. For what, after all, was sin but mortality? And, as Cochrane liked to be reminded by Augustine, the Christian analogue of promethean consciousness was that first transgression of "original sin."[82] Augustinian metaphysics saw the fleshly self both as a danger and a possiblity: a danger because the "raw touch of experience" was only a sign on the way to death; and a possibility because the radical remaking of corporeal being promised, and this finally, the inner silence of the "unmoved mover". Augustine opened up the continent of human exper-ience only to, and this so promptly, incarcerate the corporeal self within the "triune character of selfhood". Yes, Cochrane is correct in noting that Augustine invented the modern conception of "personality"; but the "personality" which was created, viewed always as a sociological manifestation of the "unmoved mover" (an early structure of "dead power" of modern times) was also a prison-house of the actual data of human experience.

We are confronted with a contradiction in Augustine. This was the thinker who simultaneously broke with the static dualisms of classical discourse by recovering human experience as its own ground and, yet, who spoke to being, will and consciousness only to silence them under the sign of a *relational* will to truth. Augustine's physics involved a fourfold strategy for the colonization of human experience. First, Augustine transformed the, previously supersensible principle of triadic being (Father, Son and Holy Ghost) into the axial principles of a new theory of personality. The Holy Trinity was embodied under the sign of a new trinitarian formula of human personality: being/will/consciousness. At a fundamental metaphysical level, the fleshly self was transformed into a mirror image, or perhaps better described as a colonization in parallel form, of trinitar-ian Christianity. Augustine said that the "problem of life was one of conscious-ness" and by this he meant that the closed table of naturalistic discourse could only be subverted by means of a new "phenomenology of human experience": one which generated no hiatus between the sensate and the ideal. The embodi-ment of logos (the "Word made flesh") meant that consciousness was to be

transformed into a matter of "direct deliverance" and that the sensate and the ideal would be unified by will. An *"intima scientia"*[84] would be created which would take being, will and intelligence as directly experienced aspects of human experience. "From this point of view we may see ourselves as possessing the *inseparabilis distinctio* and *distinctio cuniuncto* of a quasi-trinity: being, nature and consciousness."[85]

More fundamentally, the trinity of nature, will and intelligence (itself a mirror image of the original trinity) parallels that other way of taking the trinitarian formula; *corpus* (the body), *anima* (the vision) and *voluntas (intentio animi)*.[86] It is, in the end, desire *(amor, libido)* which unites the body and intelligence. For Augustine, the body was not an epiphenomenon nor a real principle of existence. It is but a "ticket of recognition."[87] For, after all, the "flesh is the nag on which we make the journey to Jerusalem."[88] Now, however, in the struggle among the body, desire, and consciousness, Augustine argues that everything is to be referred for adjudication (and unification) to an "internal principle of being". The three-in-oneness of the modern personality is founded on an original absence, a void: "the soul is that by which I vivify my flesh."[89]

The presentation of a triadic structure of human experience (of which one manifestation was the *theatricum* of personality) depends on two other strategic interventions: the desubstantialisation of nature and the final affirmation of the self as a substantial and transcendental unity.[90] Augustinian physics undertook the ultimate gamble of delivering up the "inner man" to the surveillance of an *"intima scientia"*. It was Augustine's claim that he was finally able to break with classical discourse when he realized that spirituality was substantial and that nature was experienced only as a lack, an absence. Long before Kant, Augustine undertook that fateful movement of thought in which the gravitational-point shifts from the contents of human experience to the analytical presuppositions which regulate the play of the various elements of social existence. The embodiment of the "unmoved mover" as the internal mediation of human experience (a "meditation" which is always known as an absence) meant that the Augustinian discourse would move to decentre the empirical will (contingent and mutable being), concentrating instead on the conceptual norms which regulate, and incarcerate, the different dimensions of human experience. Thus, a great reversal in the *order* of thought appears: the *Ding-an-sich* of human experience (the ontological domain of the thing-in-itself) is desubstantialized and what remains as immanent are the normative relations ("truth, beauty and goodness") which signify the internal pacification of human experience. All of this is to indicate, of course, that the Augustinian discourse is nihilistic: it substantializes an absence (the creative principle of the "unmoved mover") and it condemns as nothingness the whole region of corporeal being. Augustinian metaphysics can seek to "close the eye of the flesh" under the comforting ideology that empirical experience is a void, a dark absence. And it is not even with bad conscience, but with the consciousness of a mind which has committed itself to the metaphysics of nihilism, that Augustine can speak of the need for a "hatred of the corporeal self" and of a "love of the self which clings to

its first principle in God."[91]

Thus, as a matter of physics there are two great ruptures of thought in Augustine: the embodiment of trinitarianism as the *coeur* of the modern personality; and the substitution of the substantialization of the Concept for the nothingness of human experience. In Augustine's discourse, a complete metaphysics founded on the principles of a new epistemology of modern power is imposed on human experience. Before Augustine, there may have been a "warring subject" which oscillated between the ideal and the sensate; but, after Augustine, there is only the silence of a corporeal self which, having been evacuated of its claims to be the centering-point of contingent and mutable experience, now falls into silence. For all of the speech in Augustine concerning the nature of sin, the turbulence of the body, the iniquity of desire, what is most peculiar (and this is apparent in Augustine's adoption of an increasingly militant form of analysis) is that the actual body falls into silence. We are confronted not only with the splitting of reason and imagination but also with the severance of empirical and transcendental will and with the radical disjunction of nature and analytics.

2. Logic: Crede ut Intellegas

Augustine's second intervention into western metaphysics was represented by the creation of a discourse which, in overcoming that real space in the classical domain between will and truth, brought together, and this for the first time, authority and reason. Cochrane reminds us that in reconceiving "substance as spiritual", Augustine was able to perceive that "so far from being ultimate, 'form' and 'matter' alike were merely figments of the human mind."[92] Now, Augustine's revolt against reason was fundamental (not because, as for Tertullian, it implied a radical severance of faith and reason, a faith by 'instinct', under the sign of the *credo quia absurdam*) in two senses. First, the Augustinian discourse represented a sharp denial of "science as architectonic" in human existence, and thus of the correlative belief that while reason is capable of transcending to the objective domain, faith remains a matter of "private intuition."[93] The essence of trinitarianism, both as a theory of "dynamic personality" and as an epistemological discourse, was to assert memory, intelligence and will (*corpus/anima/voluntas*) as relative and directly experienced aspects of the single process of human experience. Against the radical scepticism of, for example, Pyrrho, Augustine claimed that "reason itself presents the credentials by virtue of which it presumes to operate."[94] In his "phenomenology of the human mind", Augustine asks: "What must I accept as the fundamental elements of consciousness, the recognition of which is imposed upon me as an inescapable necessity of my existence as a rational animal"?[95] And to this, he replies that to "the awareness of selfhood as a triad of being, intelligence and purpose" there is to be ascribed

"infallible knowledge; because it is the knowledge by the experient of him-self."[96] It is the "direct deliverance of consciousness, independent of all media-tion through sense and imagination" which brings reason into a direct and substantial mediation (Cochrane describes this as the "substantial unity" of the triune character of selfhood) with memory ("the sense of being or personal identity") and will ("the uncoerced motion of the self"). As Augustine said in that famous expression: "If I am mistaken, this very fact proves that I am."[97] This *vitalistic* theory of knowledge (vitalism in the sense of the "direct deliverance" of consciousness) is the precise point of division between the epistemological rupture at the heart of classical reason and the reconciliation of consciousness, life and will initiated by Augustine. The categories of triadic being represent a resolution to the classical scission of the material and the ideal; the trinitarian principle represents the preconditions "which are imposed upon the intelli-gence" as the starting-point of its operations. Thus, for Augustine, faith and reason are not antithetical principles, but "complementary." From the rejection of the claim "that discursive reason can authenticate the presumptions which determine the nature and scope of its activity otherwise than in terms of their 'working and power',"[98] everything follows. As Augustine noted: the *crede ut intellegas* ("believe in order to understand") was, above all, a response to the incapacity of the classical mind to resolve the radical divisions at the heart of naturalism. The lesson of Cassiciacum was, in the end, that "if faith precedes understanding, understanding in turn becomes the gift of faith."[99] Between philosophy and theology, that is, there is a silent assent: reason never escapes from faith, and faith as the ultimate acknowledgement of science to verify the presumptions by which "it presumes to operate" remains always as the truth-sayer of consciousness.

It is then only a very short passage from Augustine's deflation of reason into its ground in faith to his second, and this very political, conclusion that reason and authority were to be coeval principles. It was a momentous, and terrible, development in modern metaphysics when, in his meditation upon the trinitar-ian principle, Augustine discovered the necessary connection between the will and reason: the fateful connection which produced the will to truth. "Such is the constitution of human nature that, when we undertake to learn anything, author-ity must precede reason. But the authority is accepted only as a means to understanding. 'Believe . . . in order that you may understand.'."[100] The *crede ut intellegas*, this invention of the will to truth, is surely the beginning-point for a full politicization of western consciousness; for, that is, a working of power within the interstices of will and consciousness. Augustine had already claimed that memory was the centre of personal identity (thus the *Saeculum* will substi-tute for fleshly being), and now memory will be made to correspond to the *regulae sapientiae* ("the true service of which is purely as an instrument for correct thinking"[101]). Thus, the Augustinian *episteme* fully penetrates the pri-vate sphere of "inner consciousness." A substitution of the order of knowledge occurs: "the knowledge in question . . . is that of the spiritual man. The man who sees the universe, not through the 'eye of the flesh' but in light of a principle whereby he is enabled to judge everything without himself being judged by any

man."[102] Curiously, Augustine brings us to the very edge of a modern and critical theory of experience (memory, will and intelligence as directly experienced aspects of human action) but then he reverses the process of discovery, playing the modern constitution of experience back upon itself as a way of responding to the "error" of classical discourse, but also of prohibiting the direct encounter with mortality which is the essence of the human condition. Augustine's politicization of truth provides, I believe, the exact grammatical rules of usage by which reason is to be permanently severed from the imagination. Under the sign of the *crede ut intellegas*, consciousness is universalized; and this in the precise sense that rules of correspondence (whether functional norms of truth, beauty and good-ness or relations of similitude, likeness, etc.) are established between the will (this "uncoerced motion" of the mind) and the authority of the *regulae sapien-tiae*. The trinitarian principle allows the will to invest knowledge; and, inversely, it necessitates that the *regulae sapientiae* will be internalized as permanent defences against the appearance of egotism (empirical will) and, why not say it, against the ultimate freedom of the corporeal self to accept its human fate as an ironic gesture of life against death. It was against the human condition of the empirical will, against death, that Augustine erected that first social contract represented by the triadic principle of being.

3. *Ethics: Theatricum Saeculum*

In the Augustinian discourse, the will to truth is grounded in the principle that the realm of sensuous experience is mediated by the "value-truth" of the *ordo conditionis nostrae*: the fundamental categories of epistemology and normative evaluation which are, ultimately, a matter of direct deliverance.[103] While, at one of its polarities, the *ordo conditionis nostrae* generates the radically new concep-tion of a human "personality" ("the primitive and original values of selfhood"), at the other polarity, it produces a second, great discursive unity, that of "history" (the *Saeculum*).[104] It was, indeed, an awesome and definite line of division between the discourse of classical naturalism and modern experience when Augustine, refusing to "close the wheel" of a mythologically informed history, *invented* human history as the actual site in which there would take place the "subduing of the flesh" and the regeneration of personality. In the pursuit of a *pax rationalis* (the synthetic unity of knowledge and activity), the function of the Augustinian discourse was to link the ontological (or, more accurately, theologi-cal) unity of human personality, conceived as a "centering" of the trinitarian principles of being/will/intelligence, with the "ethical" unity of historical action, rethought as a discursive manifestation of the divine economy. With the integra-tion of personality and history, a new social unity was created: one which was capable of serving simultaneously as the apparatus of *society* and as a regulator of individual conscience. As Cochrane stated: "History in terms of the embodied

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logos means history in terms of personality. As such, it makes possible a fulfillment of the great *desideratum* of classicism, viz. an adequate philosophic basis for humanism."[105] For Augustine, the radical error of classicism was that in the absence of a "substantial" principle of unity, its image of an adequate basis for social unity oscillated between the extremes of "thinking with blood" (barbarism) or of civilization (classical *ataraxia, apatheia*). Christian metaphysics addressed the defect of the classical economy of power (this restless movement between barbarism and civilization) by delivering up a *substantial* ground for human experience. Cochrane argued: "Properly speaking, (Christian) history is the record of a struggle, not for the realization of material or ideal values but for the materialization, embodiment, the registration in consciousness of real values, the values of truth, beauty and goodness which are . . . thrust upon it as the very condition of its life and being."[106]

Now, without doubt, Cochrane intended his remarkable analysis of the phenomenology of the Augustinian discourse to serve as a last, eloquent *apologia* for Christian metaphysics. And it might even be said that what drew Cochrane to Augustine was precisely Augustine's creation and thematic unification of the discursive ensembles of the "dynamic personality" and the *Saeculum*. After all, Cochrane claimed that the criticism of classical truth was also a "criticism of classical ethics."[107] And there are, in fact, few more ecstatic passages in Cochrane's writings than his description of the almost vitalistic origins of *substantiality* in Augustinian ethics. Of Augustine's defence of "value-truth" as the essence of "creative personality" and of "creative history", Cochrane says: "It is substantial rather than formal truth, and it is substantial rather than formal ethics." And why? Because in Christian metaphysics, "truth may be described as reason irradiated by love; as morality, love irradiated by reason." In sum, the Augustinian discourse makes the linking of personality and history (consciousness and will) dependent on the *incarnation of the word*; and to this extent it closes together the problem of historical necessity (the "divine economy") and the maintenance of an adequate personality (the "redemption of the flesh"). Cochrane was ultimately seduced by the Augustinian vision that in the "discipline" which was provided by "the subjugation of the flesh", there was to be found an actual working-out (in conscience and in history) of a substantial synthesis of human experience. Or, as Cochrane would claim, the regulative values of "truth, beauty and goodness" are "essentially substantial . . . and inherent in the very constitution of the universe."[109] Thus, to the degree that the values which are "metaphysically and physically real" are at the same time "historically real", to that same extent the logos (the *intima scientia*) is embodied in the consciousness of the flesh.

It is, perhaps, the simple fact that Cochrane, himself in search of an adequate philosophy of life, took the trouble to read Augustine seriously and to rethink the implications of the *Saeculum* which makes his recovery of Augustine of such fundamental consequence. For, outside of Cochrane's *apologia* for Christian metaphysics, there is present in his analysis of Augustinian ethics a theoretical account of the actual birth of personality and history as the main discursive sites

of western politics and metaphysics. Long before Sartre's declaration of the "age of ideology", Augustine described the genealogy of the total ideology which was imposed by Christian metaphysics on western experience and, in addition, justified the thematic unity which would be struck between personality (an "identity" which comes after, and not before, the "subduing of the flesh") and history (the first economy of ideology). And it is essential to the understanding of the nihilism which is at the heart of western experience that Augustinian ethics, based as it is on a complete severance of the *civitas terrena* and the *civitas dei*, justifies itself, not through a litany of prohibitions, but through the discourse of love. It is "love irradiated by reason" and "reason irradiated by love" which are the ethical principles guiding the struggle against the corporeal self. Cochrane found, and this finally, a real serenity in the ethic of love/reason; he might have noted, though, that the curious feature of the modernist discourse released in the vision of Augustine was that it would justify the "subjugation of the flesh" in the name of the "defence of life" and that it demanded "hatred for the self" in favour of the ethic of love. Augustinian ethics, which surely as Cochrane claims, finds its fullest expression in the concept of the *Saeculum*, truly embodies in the flesh the metaphysics of the trinitarian principle and the epistemology of modern psychology contained in the notion of the will to truth. With Augustine's "registration in consciousness"[117] of the *analyticus* of being/will/intelligence and with his ethical defence of the "will to truth" as a historical *and* moral necessity, the modern age is suddenly upon us; and all this in the fourth century after Christ. Yes, it is in Augustine's discourse on the will that there is the beginning of the arc of a dead power which will be illuminated in the nineteenth century by Nietzsche's nightmarish vision of the "will to will" and in the present century by Michel Foucault's image of a "relational" will: the transparent, meditational and contentless will at the centre of the disciplinary society.

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Notes

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, *To Freedom Condemned,* New York: Philosophical Library, 1960, p. 20.

2. It was Augustine's project to close "the eye of the flesh" and thus to substitute an "inner power" for the workings of sensuous experience.

3. A.S.P. Woodhouse, "Charles Norris Cochrane," *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Canada,* 1946, p. 87.

4. L. Schmidt, *George Grant in Process,* Toronto: Anansi, 1978.

5. Woodhouse, "Charles Norris Cochrane," p. 87.

6. Charles Norris Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1929.

7. Charles Norris Cochrane, "The Latin Spirit in Literature," *University of Toronto Quarterly,* Vol. 2, No. 3, 1932-33, pp. 315-338.

8. Charles Norris Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940.

9. Charles Norris Cochrane, "The Mind of Edward Gibbon I," *University of Toronto Quarterly,* Vol. 12, No. 1, 1942-43, pp. 1-17; and "The Mind of Edward Gibbon II", *University of Toronto Quarterly,* Vol. 12, No. 2, 1942-43, pp. 146-166.

10. Charles Norris Cochrane, *David Thompson: The Explorer,* Toronto: MacMillan, 1924.

11. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture,* p. 468.

12. Cochrane, "The Latin Spirit in Literature," p. 338.

13. This, at least, was Cochrane's position in *Christianity and Classical Culture.*

14. Cochrane described Plotinus and Porphyry as mediational moments in philosophical discourse; a trembling mid-point between the birth of Christian metaphysics and the death of the disembodied *logos* of Plato. Plotinus followed a programme of *ascesis* (the 'evacuation' of the soul of all elements of complexity) and Porphyry had recourse to *theurgy,* (an early example of psychoanalysis.) *Christianity and Classical Culture,* pp. 429-430.

15. And, of course, all of Cochrane's thought stands as a response to precisely this possibility.

16. Cochrane never suspected though that in Augustinian realism there is, above all, the first stirrings of the birth of nihilism. Augustine stands on the dark side of Nietzsche as much as Foucault is the future of Nietzsche's 'will to will.'

17. *The Confessions of St. Augustine,* translated by E.B. Pusey, London: Collins Books, 1961. See, for example, chapter 8.

18. It is my thesis, after Heidegger, that Augustine's discourse on the "flame of the will" installed a transparent, contentless and mediational 'power' ' a dead power ' at the epicentre of western experience. I have discussed twentieth-century manifestations of this relational theory of power in "Modern Power in Reverse Image: Michel Foucault and Talcott Parsons," forthcoming.

19. After Thucydides, Cochrane said that the study of "radical evsor" was also a way of "taking possession forever" of another world—hypothesis.

20. Cultural studies in English Canada centre on an examination of the *form* (the deep structures) of modern society. See, for example, the analysis of cultural forms in Northrop Frye, Marshall McLuhan, E. Carpenter, etc.

21. Cochrane, "The Latin Spirit in Literature," p. 334.

22. Eric Havelock, *Preface to Plato,* Oxford: Blackwell, 1963. George S. Brett, *History of Psychology,* London: Library of Philosophy, 1921.

23. Thus, Leslie Armour has titled his recent, excellent study of Canadian philosophy, *The Faces of Reason.* The gamble of Canadian thought is, however, an interrogation of the privileged position of reason (Emil Fackenheim, George Brett, George Grant, etc.)

24. Stephen B. Pepper, *World-Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence,* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1942.

25. Cochrane, The Mind of Edward Gibbon I."

26. Cochrane, "The Latin Spirit in Literature."

27. Christopher Dawson, *The Judgement of the Nations,* London: Sheed, 1943, p. 5.

28. Eric Havelock, *Prometheus,* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968, p. 16.

29. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture,* p. 241.

30. Ibid., pp. 399-455.

31. Cochrane's search for a solution to the problem of *identity through change* is the common feature which grounds his historical realism and his turn to Augustinian vitalism.

32. And why? Because dialectics oscillates between pragmatic naturalism and hyper-rationalism, neither of which exhausts the heterogeneity of human experience.

33. See specifically Cochrane's critique of Lockean epistemology in "The Mind of Edward Gibbon."

34. Cochrane understood, in fact, that Augustine's doctrine of the trinity (a doctrine which located in the mirror of the trinity an indeterminate recession towards that which never was, but which could only be known in its absence,) was also a significant act of metaphysical closure. In the mirror of the trinity a reversal of the order of experience occurs: a reversal in which the region of non-being nihilates facticity. It was the arc of a dead power represented by the movement of the will to will between two signs that were reverse images of one another. This leads directly to the writings of Nietzsche, de Sade and Camus.

35. Cochrane's tragic sensibility paralleled the cultural pessimism of Herodotus; the third term which he always sought escape was mythic consciousness.

36. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture,* p. 445.

37. The search for a mode of scientific history which in establishing the foundation of creative politics rendered possible an escape from the poetic consciousness of Herodotus was a theme of *Thucydides and the Science of History.*

38. *Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture,* p. 468.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. For an excellent description of the working out of *ricorso* in language and myth, see Northrop Frye, *The Great Code: The Bible and Literature,* New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1981.

45. Cochrane, *David Thompson: The Explorer,* p. 170.

46. Ibid., p. 169.

47. For an account of how Thucydides applied the principles and methods of Hippocratic medicine to the interpretation of political history, see *Thucydides and the Science of History,* pp. 14-34.

48. Cochrane, "The Latin Spirit in Literature," p. 331.

49. Cochrane, "The Mind of Edward Gibbon," p. 166. This article represents Cochrane's most mature account of the historical imagination and, indeed, is the moment at which his thought is its most metaphysical.

50. For a full account of the early Christian attitude to the 'apotheosis' of promethean consciousness, see *Christianity and Classical Culture*, pp. 359-398.

51. *Thucydides and the Science of History* represents a synthesis of an empirically informed history (Thucydides) and a theory of creative politics based on the model of the Athenian polis.

52. Ibid., pp. 26-34.

53. It was Cochrane's thesis, of course, that the genealogy of this failure of the Graeco-Roman mind begins and ends with the metaphysical impossibility of naturalism, with, that is, the impossibility of maintaining a creative politics on the basis of a rationally divided experience. Augustine's contribution was to repudiate a dialectical conception of power in favour of a relational one!

54. For a brilliant account of the psychological differences which established the Greeks and Romans as mirror images of one another see "The Latin Spirit in Literature."

55. Cochrane, "The Latin Spirit in Literture," p. 330.

56. Ibid., pp. 321-322.

57. Ibid., p. 322.

58. "It was not John Locke but Cicero who (in a little-noticed passage) first asserted that the state exists to protect property." Cochrane, "The Latin Spirit in Literature," p. 323.

59. Ibid., p. 322.

60. Ibid., p. 331.

61. Ibid., p. 325.

62. Ibid., p. 334.

63. Ibid., p. 337.

64. Ibid., p. 333.

65. Ibid., p. 335.

66. Ibid., pp. 337-338.

67. Ibid., p. 338.

68. Ibid.

69. After Jean Baudrillard's description of power as dead "in-itself" moving between signifier and signified as symbolic effects of one another, I take Augustine to be the first theoretician who radicalized the infinite possibilities which would be opened to the disciplinary method if the void of the 'flame of the will' were to overcome the facticity of the flesh. I understand Nietzsche's will to power, Heidegger's critical accout of the will which moves restlessly to impose value, and Foucault's nightmarish vision of the 'eye of power' as the first awakening of thought to the transparent and mediational quality of modern power. See, in particular, F. Nietzsche, *The Will To Power*, New York: Random House, 1968, M. Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, New York: Harper and Row, 1973: and Michel Foucault, *Folie et déraision, Histoire de la Folie à l'âge classique*, translated as *Madness and Civilisation*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1965.

70. Cochrane, "The Latin Spirit in Literature," p. 338.

71. Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p. 79.

72. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, "Nostra Philosophia: The Discovery of

Personality," pp. 399-455 and "Divine Necessity and Human History," pp. 456-516.

73. Jean Baudrillard, "Forgetting Foucault," *Humanities in Society*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter, 1980, p. 108.

74. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, p. 360.

75. Ibid., p. 431.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., p. 422.

78. Ibid., pp. 424-425.

79. Ibid., p. 425.

80. Ibid., p. 428.

81. Ibid., p. 403.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., p. 403.

84. Ibid., p. 407.

85. Ibid., p. 439.

86. Ibid., pp. 433-434.

87. Ibid., p. 438.

88. Ibid., p. 446.

89. Ibid., p. 444.

90. The "desubstantialisation of nature" is accomplished by transforming the world of factual experience (yes, sensuous experience,) into a "privation," an "absence," a "lack." Augustine's revolutionary conception of the will as the vital force of the modern personality was shadowed by that other sign: "to nill." Thus, what is instituted by Augustine is simultaneously the sovereignty of the void as the centre of western experience and an order of transgressions. The theory of human action which is revealed by trinitarianism is nothing less than what we later witness as "institutionalization" (Talcott Parsons) or "normalization" (Michel Foucault).

91. But the God to which the self is referred is in Augustine's terms immutable, indivisible, omnipotent and sexless: yes, at the beginning and always a dead God.

92. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, p. 396.

93. Ibid., p. 415.

94. Ibid., p. 403.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid., p. 404.

98. Ibid., p. 412.

99. Ibid., p. 400.

100. Ibid., p. 402.

101. Ibid., p. 414.

102. Ibid., p. 415.

103. Ibid., pp. 471-516.

104. Or, as Cochrane says: "History in terms of embodied *logos* means history in terms of personality." *Christianity and Classical Culture*, p. 480.

105. Ibid

106. Ibid., p. 513.

107. Ibid., p. 506.

108. Ibid., p. 506.

109. Ibid., p. 513.

ON UNDERSTANDING ROUSSEAU'S
PRAISE OF ROBINSON CRUSOE

Mary L. Bellhouse

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was deeply impressed by Defoe's 1719 story of Robinson Crusoe—indeed, he was charmed, captivated and, at the same time, troubled by the novel. Rousseau's correspondence of the early 1760s contains the intriguing revelation that during this period he considered writing his own version of *Robinson Crusoe*. Not only does an admirer explicitly recommend this idea, but, in addition, Rousseau's publisher, Marc-Michel Rey, asks him, in August 1763 and again in January 1764, whether he should send along a copy of *Crusoe* so that Rousseau may commence work on it. But Rousseau was deterred from the project mainly by the difficulties he suffered following the condemnation by French and Swiss authorities of the *Social Contract* (1762) and *Emile* (1762). In March 1764, Rousseau informs Rey that he will abandon the Robinson project because he no longer has the courage or strength for such work.[1]

Although Rousseau never wrote his own full-length version of *Crusoe*, his writings are replete with Crusoe references. Best known is the influential and extraordinary praise given to *Robinson Crusoe* in *Emile* where the tutor lauds Defoe's novel as "the most felicitous treatise on natural education" ever written.[2] Rousseau was apparently the first to indicate the broad philosophic value of *Crusoe* and his remarks in *Emile* prompted a number of new translations and imitations of Defoe's novel. Robinson is also mentioned in the *Social Contract* and an implicit link is drawn to *Crusoe* in *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1761): St. Preux, who earlier spent several months on a desert island, likens Julie's secret garden to Juan Fernandez, the very island where Crusoe's prototype, Alexander Selkirk, was marooned.[3] Finally, there are the powerful statements of self-identification with Crusoe which Rousseau makes in each of his major autobiographies, *The Confessions,* the *Dialogues,* and *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker.*

Careful study of these references suggests that Rousseau did begin to refashion Defoe's novel to suit his own purposes. The Robinson Crusoe so admired by Rousseau is, in many ways, *not* the character to be found in Defoe's novel. Rather, Rousseau seems to create two new Crusoes, one for Emile and another for himself as portrayed in his personal writings. Furthermore, each figure represents not simply a modification of Defoe's character, but a new type.

It was most likely the inaccurate and incomplete translation of *Robinson Crusoe* by Saint-Hyacinthe and Van Effen that Rousseau read, yet the failings of this translation cannot alone account for Rousseau's treatment of the story. It seems that Rousseau read the book, for the first time at least, when he was only about fifteen—long before he began serious writing. There is a passage in his

Confessions which suggests that Rousseau read a copy of *Robinson Crusoe* from a lending library in Geneva sometime between 1725 and 1728. Though Rousseau mentions no specific titles from this library, he declares that he avidly read all of its contents and that some of the books forcefully affected his imagination:

> What it [my imagination] did was to nourish itself on
> situations that had interested me in my reading, recalling
> them, varying them, combining them, and giving me so great a
> part in them, that I became one of the characters I imagined,
> and saw myself always in the pleasantest situations of my own
> choosing. So, in the end, the fictions I succeeded in building up
> made me forget my real condition, which so dissatisfied me.
> My love for imaginary objects and my facility in lending myself
> to them ended by disillusioning me with everything around
> me, and determined that love of solitude which I have retained
> ever since that time.[4]

Along with the ideas of self-identification and solitude contained in this passage, the enormous popularity of *Crusoe* at the time supports this dating of Rousseau's reading. Yet since Rousseau's alterations are neither haphazard nor casual they do not seem to be the result of a fallible memory. On the contrary one strongly suspects that Rousseau reread *Crusoe* as he was writing about it.

My thesis is that Rousseau recreates *Crusoe* in one way in *Emile* and in another in his personal writings. (My interest here is with Rousseau's interpretation of the Crusoe tale, not the Defoe novel itself.) For scrutiny of Rousseau's treatment of Crusoe sheds light on his criticism of nascent capitalism and its relation to modern culture. It also suggests that Rousseau considered the recasting of popular literature as a significant moral strategy, one which might serve as a complement to the Platonic censorship defended in the *Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre* (1758). Finally, study of Rousseau's handling of *Crusoe* helps to clarify his attitudes toward nature: neglect of *Emile* has often meant forgetting that the *"père du romanticisme"* held a practical as well as an amorous attitude toward nature.

The Solitary Walker as Crusoe

The image of Crusoe recurs throughout Rousseau's personal writings. For example, in the *Confessions* Rousseau describes how, when quarantined at Genoa, he chose to be confined alone in the *lazaretto* and felt "like another Robinson Crusoe" in making arrangements for his stay.[5] Rousseau further

signifies this identification near the end of the *Confessions* when he describes his life on the then rustic Swiss island of Saint Pierre. In the second *Dialogue* Rousseau expresses his affection for this novel in a discussion of his love of solitude; further on, he speaks of how he saw himself "more alone in the middle of Paris than Robinson was on his island."[6]

Although Crusoe is not mentioned by name in the *Reveries*, Rousseau invokes his image even more strongly in his last work when referring to his own solitude and, especially, when speaking of a desert island. Throughout the *Reveries* Rousseau explains that he is accustomed to nourish his heart with its own substance and to seek all its pasturage within himself. Reaffirming that he will no longer find happiness among men and recalling the famous personal reform from which he dates his "lively taste for solitude," Rousseau claims that he could have done all his studies equally well on a desert island. Describing the island of Saint Pierre even more lyrically than in the *Confessions*, he declares that he would like to spend the rest of his days on this "fertile and solitary island," "singularly situated for the happiness of a man who loves to limit himself" (*se circonscrire*). Further on, Rousseau explains his love of botany and reveals that, while botanizing, he compared himself "to those great travellers who discover a desert island."[7]

What does *le promeneur solitaire* admire in Crusoe and what in the novel is altered to achieve this self-identification? Several features of Defoe's story and the Rousseau autobiographies reward comparison, including the type of narration, the spiritual value accorded solitude, attitudes toward nature and ideas expressed on the need to work versus the enjoyment of leisure. A fundamental similarity between Defoe's novel and the Genevan's autobiographies is the subjective and individualist spiritual pattern evident in both. Defoe and Rousseau were both raised under Calvinist discipline and the spiritual pattern in *Crusoe* and the autobiographies is derived in part from the Calvinist insistence on moral self-examination as the duty of the individual. Broadly speaking, the introspective and egocentric qualities of Crusoe and Rousseau relate to a larger cultural pattern resulting in part from Protestantism's displacement of the Church as mediator between the individual and God. A related similarity between Defoe's novel and the Rousseau autobiographies is their form. The autobiographical memoir is perhaps rivaled only by the dialogue as the literary form best suited to provide the reader with intimate knowledge of the inner moral being of the narrator. (Rousseau combines these two forms in his second major autobiography, *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques: Dialogues*.) While *Robinson Crusoe* is generally regarded as the first instance in the history of fiction in which a hero's daily mental and moral life is fully exposed to the reader, Rousseau's *Confessions*, in its unprecedented achievement of moral and sentimental self-exposure, stands as one of the decisive cultural events of the modern epoch.

The rise of individualism, increasingly significant in Western Europe from the late sixteenth century onwards, contributed to both the success of the novel form, with its frequent early guise as autobiographical memoir, and the heightened

value placed on sincerity. The autobiographical form allows the individual to reveal his or her own self—"that private and uniquely interesting individuality."[8] In the case of *Robinson Crusoe* the narrator's experiences are "uniquely interesting": his responses and personality are not particularly strange or unknown to us. As Coleridge perceived, Robinson is "the universal representative, the person for whom every reader could substitute himself ... nothing is done, thought, suffered, or desired, but what every man can imagine himself doing, thinking, feeling, or wishing for."[9] Rousseau justifies his own autobiographical impulse by claiming he is both unique and representative: he argues that he is the only one in his generation who retains *true* human nature. Like Crusoe, Rousseau engages in moral self-examination. But the Genevan seems more concerned to expose his own shameful acts and, at the same time, to excuse his actions based on the avowed innocence of his intentions. In Rousseau the French and English conceptions of sincerity, drawn into a fascinating though too sweeping distinction by Lionel Trilling, are seen combined for the first time. Trilling's distinction also separates Crusoe from Rousseau:

> In French literature sincerity consists in telling the truth about oneself to oneself and to others; by truth is meant a recognition of such of one's own traits or actions as are morally or socially discreditable and, in conventional course, concealed. English sincerity does not demand this confrontation of what is base or shameful in oneself. The English ask of the sincere man that he communicate without deceiving or misleading. Beyond this what is required is only a single-minded commitment to whatever dutiful enterprise he may have in hand. Not to know oneself in the French fashion and make public what one knows, but to be oneself, in action, in deeds; what Matthew Arnold called 'tasks'—this is what the English sincerity consists in.[10]

While Crusoe's commitment to his tasks is often construed as exemplary, Rousseau's admission of wrong-doing is meant as an even more profound moral lesson.

The Protestant introspective habit undergoes secularization in both Defoe's fiction and Rousseau's autobiographies, though the form of secularization varies. Among recent critics, Ian Watt especially stresses the secularization of Defoe's outlook, while scholars such as George Starr and J. Paul Hunter dispute this reading, emphasizing instead Crusoe's spiritual reflections and the importance of Defoe's religious background.[11] Rousseau, for his part, remains remarkably silent concerning the religious side of the tale: he draws no attention to the fact that Crusoe turns to God and in his isolation experiences a conversion. Moreover,

in contrast to works such as Augustine's *Confessions*, both Defoe and Rousseau primarily address the reader, not God, in their narratives. Rousseau's autobiographies are almost devoid of orthodox turning to God, though his *Confessions* retains a moral intent: namely, to spur the reader to engage in his or her *own* moral self-examination and improvement.

In its attention to detail and chronological ordering, *Robinson Crusoe* is more like Rousseau's *Confessions* than his *Reveries*.[12] The *Reveries* is more stylized, concentrating on fewer moods and events. Yet, as its full title suggests, the *Reveries* is mainly about solitude (and thus invites comparison with *Crusoe*). For both Defoe and Rousseau, solitude has important spiritual value, though the two authors differ on the nature of that value. Crusoe comes to value his solitude because it leads him to read the Bible, turn to God and be thankful to Providence. At first he deplores his island existence and though he later takes some enjoyment in it his presence there is always involuntary: he always wants to escape his solitude and the island itself.

The main benefit Rousseau derives from solitude is not religious. Rather, in solitude Rousseau can experience the almost perfect happiness of reverie, a happiness that does not derive from virtue nor depend at all on God—either contemplation of God, God's grace, or future rewards granted by God in an afterlife. Rousseau offers a description of his reverie on the island of Saint Pierre:

> When the evening approached, I descended from the summits of the island, and I went gladly to sit down on the border of the lake, on the shore, in some hidden nook: there, the sound of the waves and the agitation of the water, fixing my senses and driving every other agitation from my soul, plunged it into a delicious reverie, where the night often surprised me without my having perceived it. The flux and reflux of this water, its continual sound, swelling at intervals, struck ceaselessly my ears and eyes, responding to the internal movements which the reverie extinguished in me, and sufficed to make me feel my existence with pleasure, without taking the trouble to think. From time to time was born some weak and brief reflection on the instability of earthly things, of which the brief reflection on the instability of earthly things, of which the surface of the water offered me the image; but soon these light impressions effaced themselves in the uniformity of continuous movement which rocked me, and which, without any active help from my soul, did not fail to attach me to such an extent that when summoned by the hour and the signal agreed upon, I could not tear away without an effort.[13]

With the rhythms and breaks of this prose—"musical and yet analytical"[14]— Rousseau recreates the atmosphere of reverie. The sight of the water moving

back and forth and the continual sound of the waves fix his senses and plunge his soul into reverie. The object of the reverie is simultaneously the water and the self (*le moi*). There is a progression from the use of the senses of sight and sound to their effacement by, or absorption in, the sense of tactilely uniform, continuous, gentle movement. The water grows increasingly indistinct and limitless as the night falls. The self spreads outward and seems to merge with the totality of existence. The exterior movement of the water harmonizes with and replaces the agitation within Rousseau's soul. His mind is at rest, he does not think. With his faculties in this passive state, Rousseau is better able to feel his existence.

At the heart of this experience, and the real source of happiness, is the feeling Rousseau terms "the sentiment of existence":

> What is the nature of one's enjoyment in such a situation? Nothing external to oneself, nothing except oneself and one's own existence; so long as this state lasts, one suffices to oneself, like God. The sentiment of existence, stripped of all other affection, is in itself a precious sentiment of contentment and of peace, which suffices alone to render this existence dear and sweet to whoever knows how to remove from himself all the sensual and terrestial impressions which come unceasingly to distract us, and to trouble the sweetness here below.[15]

To feel that one exists—that one is alive—brings happiness.

Throughout his writings, Rousseau stresses the value of spiritual self-sufficiency of various types, but the particular happiness of the sentiment of existence—despite its apparent simplicity—is, in his view, a rare experience. Rousseau suggests that this sentiment is available only to "natural man" living in solitude—himself as *le promeneur solitaire* and the primitive described in his *Second Discourse*.[16] Rousseau discounts the happiness of reverie as a political good because reverie requires "a delicious idleness" (*farniente*). While the solitary walker is "devoted to idleness" (*oisiveté*) and the primitive of the *Second Discourse* "breathes only repose and freedom...wants only to live and remain idle," most humans must work.[17] Contrasting the primitive with social man, Rousseau comments that the latter is "always active, agitates himself, torments himself incessantly in order to seek still more laborious occupations."[18] At the same time, Rousseau makes the judgment that, under present conditions, it is better that most men not abandon work for reverie:

> But the greater part of men, agitated by continual passions, know little of this state, and having tasted it only imperfectly for a few instants, do not retain anything but an obscure and

confused idea, which does not permit them to feel the charm. It would not even be good in the present state of affairs, that avid of these sweet ecstasies, they should be disgusted with the active life, of which their needs, always being reborn, prescribe to them the duty.[19]

For Rousseau, the good citizen must work; the only blameless idler is one living apart from society. Reverie is left out of his prescriptions for remodeling society.

Despite Rousseau's autobiographical identification with Robinson, Crusoe experiences nothing like reverie and the sentiment of existence. On the contrary, Robinson is more like Rousseau's social man—continually laboring. Likewise, the two differ in the way they experience time. Rousseau tosses away his watch and feels the sentiment of existence as an "eternal present," without past or future. Crusoe, thinking so much about time and yearning to keep it accurately, is more like Rousseau's social man, a creature anxious about time, full of regrets about the past and hopes for the future.[20]

Rousseau and Robinson's attitudes also differ in writing and reflection. Often absorbed, Robinson is diligent in keeping his journal, the ultimate bookkeeper who dreads running out of ink. On the other hand, Rousseau stresses that reverie can only occur when the mind is devoid of intellectual activity. He claims that reflection was painful for him and that one of his greatest joys on the island of Saint Pierre was to leave his books packed and do without a writing desk. Poor Robinson, in contrast, expends "infinite labor" to make himself a table so that he may write with more pleasure.

Reverie also requires an absence of painful ideas: "It is necessary that the heart should be at peace and that no passion should come to trouble the calm."[21] Rousseau elaborates in the fifth Promenade:

> But if there is a state where the soul finds a position sufficiently solid to repose thereon, and to gather together all its being, without having need for recalling the past, no—to climb on into the future; where time counts for nothing, where the present lasts forever, without marking its duration in any way, and without any trace of succession, without any other sentiment of privation, neither of enjoyment, of pleasure nor pain, of desire nor of fear, than this alone of our existence, and which this feeling alone can fill entirely: so long as this state lasts, he who finds it may be called happy, not with an imperfect happiness, poor and relative, such as that which one finds in the pleasures of life, but with a sufficing happiness, perfect and full, which does not leave in the soul any void which it feels the need of filling.[22]

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In these claims about the sentiment of existence during reverie, Rousseau denies Hobbes' assertion that humans are *always* dominated by feelings of privation or enjoyment, pleasure or pain, desire or fear. Hobbes gives the following definition of happiness or, as he calls it, "felicity" in the *Leviathan*:

> *Continuall successe* in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquility of mind, while we live here; because Life it selfe is but Motion, and can never be without Desire nor without Feare, no more than without Sense.[23]

For Hobbes, perfect happiness is impossible because humans can never attain a state of contentment where nothing more would be desired. Hobbes also claims that one of the most important characteristics of human beings is fear of (violent) death. This is the primary fear and "the passion to be reckoned upon" for getting human beings to leave the state of nature and join civil society.

In his experience of full contentment from the sentiment of existence and in his lack of fear of death, Rousseau's self-portrait as *le promeneur solitaire* repudiates Hobbes claims about human nature. On the other hand, Defoe's Crusoe closely approximates Hobbesian man. Crusoe's felicity consists in "continual prospering"; he is continually *restless*; deeply motivated by fear of death, he labors enormously to assure his defense against other men. Rousseau's omission of these Hobbesian aspects of Crusoe is an expression of his personal view of the Defoe character.

Related to these differences and equally significant is the divergence in the attitudes of Robinson and Rousseau toward nature. Reverie may be possible even in the Bastille, but the ideal environment is a lush and solitary island. The perfect setting, in other words, would be an island like that of Crusoe, as Rousseau explicitly suggests when describing his experience on the island of Saint Pierre in the *Confessions*.[24] But, while proximity to nature encourages reverie, one must possess enough sensitivity to appreciate nature's beauty. Not for instruction, but to amuse himself, Rousseau takes up botany on the island of Saint Pierre where his room is filled with flowers and seeds instead of papers and books. The expansive character of Rousseau's inclinations leads him to immerse himself in nature and identity with 'the whole of nature.' Yet, in his view, most men are unable to experience the same sweet sensations as he did because of their habit of seeking ingredients for medicines in nature: "No one will go seeking garlands for shepherdesses among herbs for enemas."[25] The philosopher (Theophrastus in the ancient world; Rousseau in the modern one) botanizes for a different reason: simply to enjoy the act of observation itself. In more general terms, Rousseau

attacks the tendency to reduce everything to material interest.

Crusoe's attitude toward nature is not at all aesthetic but, instead, entirely utilitarian:

> Defoe's "nature" appeals not for adoration but for exploitation
> ...Crusoe observes nature...with the calculating gaze of a
> colonial capitalist; wherever he looks he see acres that cry out
> for improvement, and as he settles down to the task he glows,
> not with noble savagery, but with purposive possession.[26]

Thus, Crusoe uses his art and labor to domesticate and reorder his island. Crops are grown, goats and fowl tamed, enclosures built, trees felled: the island is mastered, not lauded for its beauty. Crusoe wants to impose man-made order to urbanize his countryside; Rousseau seeks to accommodate himself to the natural harmony of his idyll.

Robinson Crusoe and Emile

After complaining that he hates books because they "only teach one to talk about what one does not know," Emile's tutor announces that Emile will read *Robinson Crusoe*. Emile is to read this novel at about fourteen; it will be his first reading and, for a long time, his entire library. Emile is even "to think he is Robinson himself, to see himself dressed in skins, wearing a large cap, carrying a large saber and all the rest of the character's grotesque equipment."[27]

Why should Emile study and even impersonate Robinson Crusoe? One lesson Emile is to learn from the novel is a kind of pyschological independence. Emile is raised to be a "natural man" and "natural man is entirely for himself. He is numerical unity, the absolute whole which is relative only to itself or its kind."[28] Rousseau thinks, in contrast, that most humans are *slaves* to the opinions of others and even the good citizen is only a fractional unity whose value is determined by his relation to the social body. Emile, a natural man destined to live in a corrupt society, is to learn to resist the yoke—the poison—of opinion. Commenting on the value of *Robinson Crusoe*, Emile's tutor advises:

> the surest means of raising oneself above prejudices and
> ordering one's judgments about the true relations of things is
> to put oneself in the place of an isolated man and to judge
> everything as this man himself ought to judge it with respect to
> his own utility.[29]

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Emile is to learn to escape the influence of *amour-propre*, of vanity. He is to be continually concerned with the utility or use-value of objects, not their exchange-value. Moreover from studying Robinson he is to learn to be practical, ingenious, and to have foresight.

The story of Robinson will also help Emile to gain a kind of economic independence. Unlike the solitary walker, Emile will live in society and so must work. Emile's tutor instructs:

> Outside of society isolated man, owing nothing to anyone, has a right to live as he pleases. But in society, where he necessarily lives at the expense of others, he owes them the price of his keep in work....To work is therefore an indispensable duty for social man.[30]

To avoid snobbery and to gain economic security, Emile will follow Crusoe in choosing manual labor as his occupation. With Crusoe as a model, Emile will become "laborious, temperate, patient, firm, and full of courage."[31]

Emile is also to imitate Crusoe in learning to do a variety of complex tasks from beginning to end. Part of what made the novel so fascinating to eighteenth-century readers, and has ensured its popularity since, is the way Crusoe—when making his bread, his candles, his pottery, his cheese and all his possessions—escapes the division of labor, a dominant characteristic of production by Defoe's day.[32] Emile's tutor associates the division of labor with the introduction of luxury and directs the reader of *Emile* to study the *Second Discourse* to understand the consequences of division of labor. There we read that as long as humans

> applied themselves only to tasks that a single person could do and to arts that did not require the cooperation of several hands, they lived free, healthy, good, and happy insofar as they could be according to their nature, and they continued to enjoy among themselves the sweetness of independent intercourse. But from the moment one man needed the help of another, as soon as they observed that it was useful for a single person to have provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, labor became necessary; and vast forests were changed into smiling fields which had to be watered with the sweat of men, and in which slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow with the crops.[33]

Rousseau's analysis thus prefigures that of Marx and contrasts sharply with the oft-celebrated pinmakers of Adam Smith.[34]

Emile's tutor criticizes those occupations that require humans to act like "automatons" or like a "machine." He claims that the most general and indispensable arts ought to be the most esteemed; he judges agriculture the noblest, ironworking second in rank, and woodworking third. He exclaims, "what important reflections on this point our Emile will draw from Robinson Crusoe!" and counsels Emile to learn a variety of manual trades and to specialize in carpentry.[35]

In Book Three of *Emile*—where *Crusoe* is lauded—the tutor comments at length on the economic and social changes occurring in eighteenth-century France. While it is correct to speak generally of *Emile* as an "anti-bourgeois" work, it is useful to distinguish between the different strata of the bourgeoisie of that period. Rousseau's position opposed that of the more capitalistically oriented *marchands-fabricants* and many of Rousseau's ideas—"his hatred of luxury, his attack on finance, his concern with morality, his fear of economic development, his criticisms of despotic government and aristocracy"— supported the values of the old craftsmen as well as the rentiers in the larger cities of France.[36] As Lionel Gossman points out,

> the differences within the bourgeoisie between the more capitalistically minded maîtres-marchands or marchands-fabricants and their traditionally oriented brethren with their emphasis on the immediate relation of supply and demand, of producer and client, found an early expression in the conflict within the Enlightenment between Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the main army of the philosophies.[37]

It is paradoxical that Rousseau employs *Robinson Crusoe* in his attack on commercialism and nascent capitalism since Robinson in some ways epitomizes capitalism and his story has become a significant myth supporting capitalist culture. Rousseau is able to use the story for his own purposes in part because Emile reads an abridged version of the novel, "disencumbered of all its rigmarole, beginning with Robinson's shipwreck near his island and ending with the arrival of the ship which comes to take him from it."[38]

With this abridgement, Crusoe's treatment of Xury and much of the information on Crusoe's acceptance and willingness to profit from slavery and the slave trade is excised. Apparently left in is Crusoe's relationship with Friday, but perhaps Emile's tutor would stress the educability, if not natural goodness, of Friday rather than his slave-like status.[39] A more important aim of this abridgement is to buttress Rousseau's argument on the need to limit desires. In Rousseau's perspective, curtailing desire is crucial both to psychological and economic independence; it is thus a key lesson for Emile to learn. Rousseau is decisively influenced by Plato in his formulation of this issue and when he says of

Emile "all our delicate relishes do not please him,"[40] he repudiates arguments in favor of luxury made by his near contemporaries like Mandeville and Montesquieu as well as Glaucon's call for relish in Book Two of Plato's *Republic*. Socrates' best regime is born out of the reform of that second city—the feverish city of luxury and imperialist war—and the reform is based on educating the soul to limit desires. So too, Emile's soul must be educated.[41]

Near the beginning of Book Three of *Emile*, Rousseau asserts that human weakness comes from the inequality between our strength and our desires. He continues, "it is our passions that make us weak, because to satisfy them we would need more strength than nature gives us. Therefore, diminish desires, and you will increase strength."[42] Rousseau sees the period just prior to puberty as unique because it is then that strength outweighs desire.[43] Emile at this age will be "self-sufficient," not tormented by imaginary needs, and unaffected by opinion.

But how can Crusoe provide an object lesson for Emile when "Defoe rejoices in worldly comfort"[44] and Robinson is always after more material comforts? While Crusoe himself is anxious to overcome the Lockean 'spoilage' and 'labor' limitations on accumulation of private property, he cannot so long as he is alone on his island. So it is during the period when money is useless to Crusoe and when there is no one else to labor for him that Emile will study the fellow. Crusoe comes to recognize that on his island:

> I had nothing to covet; for I had all that I was capable of enjoying....I had no Competitor...I might have rais'd Ship Loadings of Corn; but I had no use for it; so I let as little grow as I thought enough for my Occasion. I had Tortoise and Turtles enough; but now and then one, was as much as I could put to any use. I had Timber enough to have built a Fleet of Ships....But all I could make use of was, All that was valuable. I had enough to eat, and to supply my Wants, and, what was all the rest to me? If I kill'd more Flesh than I could eat, the Dog must eat it, or the Vermin. If I sow'd more Corn than I could eat, it must be spoil'd. The Trees that I cut down, were lying to rot on the Ground. I could make no more use of them than for Fewel; and that I had no Occasion for, but to dress my Food. In a Word, The Nature and Experience of Things dictated to me upon just Reflection, That all the good Things of this World, are no farther good to us, than they are for our Use; and that whatever we may heap up indeed to give others, we enjoy just as much as we can use, and no more. The most covetous griping Miser in the World would have been cur'd of the Vice of Covetousness, if he had been in my Case; for I possess'd infinitely more than I knew what to do with.[45]

Yet Robinson's moderation is not a quality of his soul, only of his circumstances.

He relates that he "had no room for Desire, except it was of Things which I had not, and they were but Trifles, though indeed of Use to me."[46] He still wants more, though his desire is temporarily circumscribed by utility. Emile will not witness the utter relentlessness and true heights of Crusoe's ambition for wealth, but instead he will focus on Crusoe's patient island labors as farmer, shepherd and carpenter. Emile will be attentive to Crusoe's speeches about the uselessness of money on the island, and not read that Crusoe's greatest thrill—his heart flutters, he grows pale, sick and almost dies on the spot with joy—is when he learns he is rich in pounds sterling![47]

Emile's soul is educated to moderation; he is taught to prefer the simple and condemn luxury. He will not be idle like the solitary walker but, since his desires will remain limited, neither will be labor endlessly like most humans. Likewise Emile's concept of time is neither the eternal present of reverie nor the anxious concern with past and future experienced by Crusoe and most humans in society. Instead, Emile "enjoys time without being its slave....the calm of passions, which makes the passage of time always uniform, takes the place for him of an instrument for measuring it at need."[48]

Finally, there is an important relation between Crusoe and Emile in their attitudes towards science and its practical applications. The Ancients, broadly speaking, counseled both human moderation and accommodation with nature. The modern tradition, running from Francis Bacon through Marx and dominating our world, calls instead for a new science to be developed to *conquer* nature. With the power of science, an abundance of goods will be produced to meet all human desires. Politics becomes a problem of distribution, not educating to moderation. To the Moderns, then, science undermined Socrates' argument on the need to limit desires.

Crusoe accepts this modern outlook: he is willing to use all the technology he can muster to exploit his island as well as control others. But Rousseau, while respectful toward science of the first rank, is deeply suspicious of its use and consequences in modern society. He wants Emile to use science to become independent, not dependent.

Like Crusoe, Emile will learn by experience and avoid an overly deferential attitude toward scientific authority: "forced to learn by himself, he uses his reason and not another's; for to give nothing to opinion, one must give nothing to authority, and most of our errors come to us far less from ourselves than from others."[49] The tutor adds that his object is not to give Emile science but "to teach him to acquire science when needed, to make him estimate it for exactly what it is worth."[50]

Rousseau illustrates a further lesson—unknown to Crusoe—with the remarkable tale of how Emile exploits his new knowledge of magnets to ridicule a showman at a local fair, only to be humiliated in turn by the more canny performer. Rousseau uses the magnet anecdote to teach that knowledge of nature and science must not be used to dominate others, nor as a source of pride or vainglory. Just as a deferential attitude toward scientific authority carries dangers, so too, does the use of technological authority to gain dominion over others.

Conclusion

Studying Rousseau's praise of Robinson Crusoe provides a critical perspective on modern culture and economy. Rousseau—both a political theorist and the author of the best-selling novel of his day—recognizes the mythic power of Defoe's tale. Rousseau creates two somewhat different images of Crusoe, one for himself and one for Emile, and thereby reveals a division in his own thought between a more passive side that delights in nature's beauty and a more active, social and political side. (A related dichotomy continues in the next century, represented on one side by Thoreau and on the other by Marx.) Rousseau's apparent attempt to transform the economic individualism of Defoe's hero is brilliant but, in the long run, a failure: Emile's moderate, anti-capitalist Crusoe has not displaced Defoe's character as culture hero. On the contrary, the modern imagination remains drawn to Crusoe as the relentless developer who reorders nature with an eye to profit, not beauty.

Rousseau never brings together his two Crusoes, but he provides a prophetic hint of their fate in the Seventh Promenade. There Rousseau describes how he interrupted a mountain hike to investigate an odd clicking noise: he crawls through the brush only to discover a stocking factory hidden in what he took to be remote wilderness. Rousseau remarks, "But, after all, who would ever have expected to find a mill in a ravine? In the whole world, only Switzerland presents this mixture of wild nature and human industry."[51] This vision prefigures the image of the machine in the wilderness that will come to dominate North America in the next century. Rousseau, not deluded by a static view of history, shares none of the buoyant optimism that overtakes nineteenth-century America—when some held that gazing upon the *mechanized* landscape would induce an ideal state of mind.[52] The arguments on moderation and science in *Emile* have not prevailed. Little wilderness remains. The loss, from a Rousseau-like perspective, is to be measured perhaps not so much in the fewer haunts for reverie—which, after all, Rousseau claimed could be accomplished even in prison—but instead in the diminished quality of the soul of Everyman.

Rousseau's economic plan appears radical and simple: he argues against the division of labor and applauds farming.[53] This vision has been generally discounted as undeveloped and unrealistic. One critic, for example, speaks of "the petit-bourgeois nature of Rousseau's solution" and censures Rousseau for failing to describe the material basis of the new society of the *Social Contract*. In this perspective, Rousseau's "plan for the political regeneration of man involves a regressive movement of his economic and material being, which *in fact* seems as impossible as a return to the pre-social, pre-moral state of nature."[54] Similarly, compared with a rigorous Marxist analysis of *Crusoe*, Rousseau's treatment may seem to further obscure the significance of the labor of others in Defoe's story.[55] But this is not because Rousseau supports antagonistic social and economic

relations; rather, the differences arise because Rousseau emphasises a positive model of Crusoe and thus largely removes these relations from Defoe's tale instead of directly attacking them. Neither Marxists, who have drawn inspiration from Rousseau's attack on inequality, nor liberals, who have applauded his call for individual producers, have heeded Rousseau's basic teaching that society cannot attain both material wealth and liberty. Rousseau's call for moderation of wants and economic self-sufficiency in the name of liberty and happiness merits re-examination.

Perhaps partly because of its reinforcement of dominant economic values, Defoe's *Crusoe* has been shunted to the children's library. Originally written for an adult audience, *Robinson Crusoe* is one of a number of classics, including *Gulliver's Travels* and *Moby Dick*, now widely read by children as well as adults. Rousseau not only recognizes *Crusoe's* potential appeal to young readers, he is attentive to the social power of literature and the ability of fictional heroes to inspire identification and imitation in youthful readers. Echoing Plato's *Republic*, Rousseau argues in the *Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre* that the good society requires censorship. He explores an alternative strategy for an already corrupt world by writing not only political treatises like the *Social Contract* but also popular fiction designed to have broad and beneficial moral influence (*La Nouvelle Héloïse*), as well as recasting popular literature such as *Crusoe* to encourage more desirable social values.

Defoe's *Crusoe* has remained remarkably popular. Even if Rousseau had written his full-length version of *Robinson Crusoe*, one suspects that it would not have displaced Defoe's as a popular myth. The heart of the explanation lies beyond the merits or failings of Rousseau's prose; it is to be found instead in the enormity of the task Rousseau attempted: to turn his audience away from Hobbesian acquisitive values and the lure of power held out by that modern-day ring of Gyges, science and technology.

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Notes

1. *Correspondance complète de Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. R.A. Leigh, Geneva: Institut et Musée Voltaire, and Oxfordshire: Voltaire Foundation, 1965-, Vol. 15, letters 2544, 2556; Vol. 16, letter 2782; Vol. 17, letter 2897; Vol. 19, letters 3114, 3187.

2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Oeuvre Complètes*, eds. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, Paris Pléiade, 1959-, IV, 454. This edition hereafter cited as *O.C.* On the influence of the *Emile* praise of *Crusoe*, see Joseph texte, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Cosmopolitan Spirit in Literature*,

trans. J.W. Matthews, New York: Macmillan, 1899, pp. 127-128 and William-Edward Mann, *Robinson Crusoé en France*, Paris: A. Davy, 1916.

3. *Du Contract Social, O.C.*, III, 354; *La Nouvelle Héloïse, O.C.*, II, 413, 471.

4. Rousseau, *The Confessions*, trans. J.M. Cohen, Baltimore: Penguin, 1954, pp. 47-48; *O.C.* I, 39-41. Cf. Georges Pire, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau et Robinson Crusoé," *Revue de Littérature Comparée*, XXX (1956), 493-95.

5. *Confessions, O.C.*, I, 296.

6. *Deuxième Dialogue, O.C.*, I, 812, 826.

7. *Rêveries, O.C.*, I, 1015, 1048, 1040, 1071.

8. Lionel Trilling, *Sincerity and Authenticity*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 25.

9. Quoted in Ian Watt, *The Rise of the Novel*, Berkeley: University of California, 1957, p. 78.

10. Trilling, *Sincerity and Authenticity*, pp. 57ff.

11. Watt depicts Robinson Crusoe as *homo economicus* in *"Robinson Crusoe as a Myth,"* in Daniel Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe*, ed. Michael Shinagel, New York: W.W. Norton, 1975, pp. 311-32; and in *The Rise of the Novel*, pp. 60-92. On the spiritual side of the tale, see esp. Starr, *Defoe and Spiritual Autobiography*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 74-125; Hunter, *The Reluctant Pilgrim*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966; and William H. Halewood, "Religion and Invention in *Robinson Crusoe*," *Essays in Criticism*, XIV (October 1964), 339-51.

12. Crusoe's arithmetic is often flawed when he reports dates, and strict factual accuracy is not a primary aim of Rousseau's *Confessions*.

13. *The Reveries of a Solitary*, trans. John Gould Fletcher, New York: Burt Franklin, 1971; reprint of 1927 ed., pp. 110-11; *O.C.*, I, 1045. I have made a few improvements in the quotations from the Fletcher translation.

14. Marcel Raymond, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La Quête de Soi et La Rêverie*, Paris: José Corti, 1962, pp. 146-47.

15. *Rêveries*, Fletcher trans., pp. 113-14; *O.C.*, I, 1047.

16. *Discours sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité, O.C.*, III, 144.

17. *Rêveries*, Fletcher trans., p. 106; *O.C.*, I, 1042. *The First and Second Discourses*, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, p. 179; *O.C.*, III, 192.

18. *Second Discourse*, Masters trans., p. 179; *O.C.*, III, 192.

19. *Rêveries*, Fletcher trans., p. 114; *O.C.*, I, 1047.

20. *Rêveries, O.C.*, I, 1014. Cf. E.P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,"

Past and Present, No. 38 (December 1967), pp. 56-97.

21. *Rêveries*, Fletcher trans., p. 114; *O.C.*, I, 1047.

22. *Rêveries*, Fletcher trans., p. 113; *O.C.*, I, 1046.

23. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C.B. Macpherson, Baltimore: Penguin, 1968, pp. 129-30. (Admittedly, Rousseau's happiness is not "perpetual.") See also the beginning of chap. 11 of *Leviathan*.

24. *Rêveries, O.C.,* I. 1047-1048; *Confessions, O.C.,* I, 644. Cf. Rousseau's letter to M. de Malesherbes of Jan. 4, 1762; *Confessions, O.C.,* I, 171-73; and *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, Part IV, Letter XI.

25. *Rêveries*, Fletcher trans., p. 141; *O.C.*, I, 1064.

26. Watt, *"Robinson Crusoe* as a Myth," p. 316.

27. *Emile or On Education*, trans. Allan Bloom, New York: Basic Books, 1979, pp. 184-85; *O.C.*, IV, 454-55.

28. *Emile*, Bloom trans., pp. 39-40; *O.C.*, IV, 249.

29. *Emile*, Bloom trans., p. 185; *O.C.*, IV, 455.

30. *Emile*, Bloom trans., p. 195; *O.C.*, IV, 470.

31. *Emile*, Bloom trans., p. 208; *O.C.*, IV, 487.

32. Watt, *The Rise of the Novel*, pp 71-73; *"Robinson Crusoe* as a Myth", pp. 317-319.

33. *Second Discourse*, Masters ed., pp. 151-52; O.C., III, 171.

34. While Smith himself applauds the division of labor in Book I of *The Wealth of Nations*, he castigates it in Book V.

35. *Emile*, Bloom trans., pp. 201, 188; *O.C.*, IV, 477, 460, 478.

36. Lionel Gossman, *French Society and Culture: Background for 18th Century Literature*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972, pp. 28-29

37. Ibid., p. 26. Cf. the economic autarchy of Clarens in *Nouvelle Héloïse* where utility counts for all, money is rarely employed and instead there is an advanced system of barter.

38. *Emile*, Bloom trans., p. 185; *O.C.*, IV, 455.

39. This announced abridgement of *Crusoe* would probably be extended to remove the sections on cannibalism. If left, the cannibalism at least would be interpreted differently by Emile's tutor than by Montaigne in 'Of Custom,' an essay condemned in Book Four of *Emile* for the way it cites bizarre practices—including cannibalism—to disprove the existence of 'inner conscience' as a universal moral faculty.

40. *Emile*, Bloom trans., p. 191; *O.C.*, IV, 465.

41. Indeed, the problem of expansion of needs is more severe for Rousseau than Plato since the Genevan accepts the historicity of human needs, a view later adopted by Marx. See *Second Discourse*, Masters ed., p. 147.

42. *Emile*, *O.C.*, IV, 426.

43. Like Plato, Rousseau views sexual desire as one of the most important and yet difficult passions to control. Since the tutor seeks to postpone the development of Emile's puberty, Crusoe's peculiar asexuality is convenient.

44. Gordon Vichert, "The Theory of Conspicuous Consumption in the 18th Century," in *The Varied Pattern: Studies in the Eighteenth Century*, eds. Peter Hughes and David Williams, Toronto: A.M. Hakkert, 1971, p. 260.

45. *Robinson Crusoe*, Norton ed., pp. 101-02.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., p. 221.

48. *Emile*, Bloom trans., p. 187; *O.C.*, IV, 459.

49. *Emile*, Bloom trans., p. 207; *O.C.*, IV, 486.

50. *Emile*, Bloom trans., p. 207; *O.C.*, IV, 487.

51. *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, trans. Charles E. Butterworth New York: New York University Press, 1979, pp. 101; *O.C.*, I, 1071-72.

52. Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, see esp. chap. IV.

53. See Henri Grange, "Rousseau et la division du travail," *Revue des Sciences Humaines* (April-June 1957), pp. 143-55.

54. Lionel Gossman, "Rousseau's Idealism," *Romanic Review*, LII, 3 (October 1961), pp. 173-82.

55. See Stephen Hymer, "Robinson Crusoe and the Secret of Primitive Accumulation," *Monthly Review*, XXIII, 4 (September 1971), pp. 11-36.

Fellini's Art of Affirmation:
The Nights of Cabiria, City of Women,
and Some Aesthetic Implications

Frank Burke

Frederico Fellini has, over the past thirty years, established himself as one of the most important directors in the brief history of cinema. More than that, his work has earned him comparison with Shakespeare, Dante, Blake, Joyce—and other great visionaries in the Western literary tradition. Yet, in spite of his enormous reputation, his work has incited a good deal of hostility. Certain intellectuals distrust him because they can't take ready abstractions to or from his films. Others abhor him because he fails to provide political dogma and programmes of reform. He's accused of being self-indulgent and irrational by the former, of being an irresponsible bourgeois romantic by the latter. For those interested in a political reduction of the cultural imagination, anything that resists reduction—like Fellini's non-prescriptive vision—will be denounced. On the other hand, any intellectual with an adventuring mind may, conceivably, be persuaded. There *is* a method to Fellini's imagination. There is, in fact, a rigorous consistency to his films. The "chaos" that many claim to find in his work is really complexity—and the richness and density that complexity demands. This essay will attempt to examine certain processes in his work to demonstrate that his vision is anything but self-indulgent, that he has something profound to say about what it means to be human, that he is—in short—worthy of his reputation.

Fellini's work seems initially to divide into two categories: films of failed potential, films of realized potential. In the first group, characters never get beyond a very limited capacity to grow or create. They end up as either comic failures (*Variety Lights, The White Sheik,* "The Matrimonial Agency,"[1] *The Orchestra Rehearsal*) or tragic failures (*I Vitelloni, La Strada, Il Bidone, Amarcord,*[1] *Fellini's Casanova*). In the second, characters develop the capacity for wholeness, heightened awareness, self-transformation (*The Nights of Cabiria, 8½, Juliet of the Spirits, Fellini: A Director's Notebook, Fellini-Satyricon, The Clowns, Fellini's Roma, City of Women*). There is also, however, a third category: films of "annulment-and-redemption," in which characters who are unable to relate, virtually self-destruct—cancelling out their own flawed ways and everything that gets in the way of wholeness. Their self-destruction reinstates the possibility of growth, enlightenment, and so on. *La Dolce Vita* is truly apocalyptic in this respect, witnessing the moral collapse of an entire society (the main character toasts "the annulment of everything" near the film's end), then concluding with the extremely positive, restorative, image of a young angelic girl smiling at the camera eye and at us. "The Temptations of Dr. Antonio" and "Toby Dammit" do away with single characters rather than entire cultures, but the effect is the same: everything negative is negated, opening the

way for something more positive.

Though some of Fellini's non-redemptive films (*La Strada* and *Amarcord*, for example) have been highly and justifiably acclaimed, his imagination is most unique and explosive in the movies of affirmation. Works such as *8½, Juliet of the Spirits, Satyricon,* and *City of Women* set him apart most clearly from other directors. These movies are also, I believe, where his greatest significance as an artist lies. He has, with greater persistence than any of his contemporaries, used the art of film to explore and advance the frontiers of spiritual possibility. He hasn't done so in any orthodox way: he's hardly advocating Catholicism or Christian doctrine. Rather he's used film in the same way Blake used poetry to forge a unique religious vision of experience. For this reason, I've chosen to focus on the two movies which "bookend" Fellini's affirmative view.* *The Nights of Cabiria,* made in 1956, was the first film in which a Fellini character was able to transcend failure. (*Cabiria* was preceded by *Variety Lights, The White Sheik, I Vitelloni,* "Matrimonial Agency," *La Strada,* and *Il Bidone.*) It ushered in a sixteen-year span—through *Fellini's Roma* (1972)—during which all Fellini's films focussed on redemptive possibility. *City of Women,* his most recent work (1981), marks a return to affirmation after *Amarcord* (1974), *Casanova* (1977), and *Orchestra Rehearsal* (1979). *Cabiria* introduces a number of fundamental processes that recur in all Fellini's positive movies. Moreover, it reveals the profundity and discipline of Fellini's imagination as he fashions his tales of individuation. Finally, it provides an excellent context in which to approach *City of Women.* The two films, in turn, lay the groundwork for some brief concluding remarks about the relationship of Fellini's "art of affirmation" to spiritual development.

I

The Nights of Cabiria

A brief plot summary might be useful for those who have not seen the film—or have not seen it recently.

> *Cabiria, a thirtyish prostitute, is out for a walk with her pre-*
> *sumed lover, Giorgio. He pushes her into the Tiber, steals her*
> *purse, and runs off. Cabiria is rescued and revived, and returns*
> *home. At night, after burning Giorgio's belongings, she joins*
> *Wanda and her other prostitute friends at their workplace: the*

The Nights of Cabiria is not available in 16mm in Canada; *City of Women* is available from Criterion Films, Toronto.

"Passeggiata Archeologica." *She gets in a fight with a huge whore, Matilde, then demands that some friends drive her to the Via Veneto—where she looks hopelessly out of place among the high-priced hookers. As she loiters in the street, Alberto Lazzari, a famous movie actor, bursts out of a night-club, embroiled in an argument with his mistress, Jesse. Jesse storms off, and Lazzari invites Cabiria to keep him company. They visit a nightclub then go to Lazzari's villa. When Jesse shows up, Cabiria is forced to spend the night sleeping in the bathroom. At dawn she awakens and leaves.*

Cabiria and friends attend the "Divine Love" pilgrimage, where Cabiria passionately asks the Madonna to help her change her life. Following the services, Cabiria agonizes over the fact that she and her friends haven't been changed. She vows to sell everything and go away.

At the Lux theatre, Cabiria submits to hypnosis and to an imagined courtship with a rich young man, Oscar. After the performance, she's approached by a man who claims his name is Oscar and who insinuates himself into her company. In succeeding scenes, he appears to be generous and under-standing, and Cabiria is satisfied to accept unquestioningly his gifts and companionship.

Out for a walk near her home, Cabiria meets Brother Gio-vanni, who offers her spiritual counsel and incentive. She decides to give up both prostitution and her undemanding, basically selfish relationship with Oscar. When she tells Oscar she can't see him any more, he offers marriage and she accepts—viewing it, as Brother Giovanni would, in spiritual terms. She sells her home and most of her belongings, and after a tearful farewell to Wanda, boards a bus to join Oscar.

As she and Oscar dine, then walk through the woods, he appears increasingly sinister. At the edge of a cliff Cabiria realizes he intends to kill her and steal her money. She responds with a fury and terror that neutralize Oscar. When she drops her purse at his feet, he grabs it and runs off, leaving her to sob herself to exhaustion and sleep.

A short time later Cabiria awakens, retrieves a "bridal bou-quet" she had gathered earlier, arises, and walks backs through the woods. When she reaches the road, she is surrounded by numerous boys and girls playing musical instruments, riding motorcycles, or walking arm in arm. Devastated by her cliffside experience, she seems initially untouched by their joy. But as they continue to weave and play around her, she gradually softens and responds. A young dark-haired girl bids her 'Buona sera," and her face becomes luminous with renewed

life. She nods her acceptance—not only of the girl's benedic-
tion but of all she has undergone. She begins to glance all about
her with the pleasure of total engagement. For a brief moment,
she glances at the camera eye and us, and her sense of whole-
ness magically becomes ours.

Cabiria's story is a struggle for enlightenment and self-transformation. Through her numerous adventures and dark nights of the soul she develops powers of consciousness which enable her to enjoy full spiritual harmony.

At the outset, Cabiria is little more than a body: imaged in long shot, capable only of physical activity. (Her job as prostitute suggests this, though it also establishes her as a giver and a lover.) Her initial "death and rebirth" marks the beginning of individuality and intelligence. When she comes to, her face is revealed clearly for the first time, a passerby identifies her as "Cabiria," and she begins to question the motives and whereabouts of Giorgio. This leads shortly to the crucial question: "What if I'd died?"—which signals the birth of self-consciousness.

Cabiria's self-consciousness is initially mere body-awareness: sensitivity to herself as a distinct, mortal piece of matter seemingly separate from everything else. (Perspective or "point of view" is the perceptual equivalent.) In the scene immediately following her birth of awareness, the opening words—"Notice the difference between me and all of you"—capture precisely Cabiria's sense of separation. Her accompanying defensiveness and alienation manifest themselves when she immediately gets in a fight with Matilde.

The symptoms of emerging self-consciousness are not all negative. Cabiria's developing intelligence, in responding to her alienation, creates a sense of something missing—and the need for change. This leads not only to the temporary abandonment of the *Passeggiata*, but to the awakening of idealization, wonder, and rudimentary love through Cabiria's encounter with the romantic movie star, Alberto Lazzari.

Lazzari, whose name suggests a profound form of transcendence—death and rebirth—introduces Cabiria to four modes of getting beyond herself: role-playing, projection, vision, and make-believe. Each of these is, obviously, associated with Lazzari's profession in movies.

Role-playing. Not only is Lazzari himself a player of roles (always undergoing change), but he casts Cabiria in a role: "understudy" to his temporarily estranged girl friend, Jesse. Cabiria adapts quickly and admirably, becoming a suitable and refreshing companion for Lazzari.

Projection. When Cabiria is transported by Lazzari's appearance, it's clear she's projecting onto him her dreams of romantic fulfillment—then worshipping him as the illusory object of her dreams. Narcissistic as this may be, it still marks the beginning of Cabiria's capacity for something other than mere physical love or prostitution.

Vision. It's Lazzari's image that astounds Cabiria, and her eyes that reflect her

wonder. Moreover, consistent with his work in movies, Lazzari lives in a highly visual world. Within this context, Cabiria learns to relate to the given—and particularly Lazzari—as image rather than matter. She settles for his photograph instead of his body when Jesse reappears, and she ends her evening watching their reconciliation through the bathroom keyhole. In fact, she turns the Jesse-Lazzari relation into a film, as is made clear through an iris shot of the lovers as the scene concludes.

Make-believe. Like the movies he stars in, Lazzari traffics not just in images but in fantasy. Though he's surrounded by visual objects, he's also ruled by things unseen, whose presence is wholly mental. He refers to people absent (his maid) or who no longer exist (Beethoven), and his entire evening with Cabiria is predicated on the fact that Jesse is *not* there. Cabiria responds to his influence by concerning herself with things absent. She gravitates, in short, closer to the realm of the non-existent and the merely possible.

This becomes quite clear the following morning. Not only does she leave behind Lazzari's photo when she leaves the villa, but when she awakens in his bathroom, she gazes out the window and off into the distance—not back into the bedroom. For the first time, she looks beyond rather than at her world, reflecting a longing to penetrate the realm of the invisible.

Appropriately, the next phase of Cabiria's experience is religious. She and her friends take part in a pilgrimage which is given almost entirely to transcending the physical, given, world. Above all else, the pilgrimage is a "head trip." Words (incantations, prayers, hymns) become the dominant form of experience, continuing Cabiria's progress beyond the visible. The images that do appear tend to be evocative or mandalic rather than representative: mere outlines or hollow symmetrical forms which one looks through, as well as at. When they are representative, they refer to spiritual rather than physical reality (e.g., a picture of Madonna and Child to which Cabiria prays).

Within this environment, Cabiria becomes truly cerebral for the first time. When her companions return to self-indulgence (eating, drinking, etc.), she turns her back on them, states "I'm thinking," and contemplates the seeming failure of the pilgrimage to bring about transformation. More important, though it won't become clear until the following sequence, Cabiria acquires the most crucial of intellectual tools: symbolism. One of the principal incantatory phases at the shrine is "Viva Maria"—a phrase that is also electrified and elevated as a dominant visual sign. Under hypnosis at the Lux theatre, Cabiria will take the name "Maria" as a way of articulating her quest for renewal, innocence, purity—those values symbolized by the Virgin which Cabiria is struggling to identify with (or re-identify with) in her journey beyond prostitution.

At the Lux (whose name equates it with enlightenment), Cabiria goes all the way into her head and away from the world. Under hypnosis she closes her eyes and uses her imagination to create an ideal of self-transformation and love that she will ultimately realize. She enters wholeheartedly into the romantic tale of "Maria" and "Oscar" introduced by the conjuror—quickly adopting the role of Maria, inventing dialogue, and becoming the co-creator of the fiction. The

conjuror describes what's going on as "auto-suggestion" (i.e., "self-suggestion"), and the phrase is even more accurate than he intends. In becoming Maria, Cabiria "suggests" an ideal self: one who passionately pursues love as the all-consuming goal of life. Love here is not merely projection as it was with Lazzari. Having assimilated the notion of spiritual transcendence on display at the pilgrimage, Cabiria develops a sense of "divine love" that is both personal and transpersonal: the union of a loving self with a loving other.

Cabiria's development through the Lux sequence, though extraordinary, is incomplete. She has withdrawn from reality into fantasy. Since she tends to deal with notions of love and transcendence only within her mind, they remain self-centered. She has created a *symbol* of otherness, but she hasn't really assimilated the symbol into experience. The appearance of a "real" Oscar gives her the opportunity to apply her newfound capacity for symbolization and spiritualization to her day-to-day world.

Oscar initiates another major process of mental development. He introduces himself as a *"ragioniere"* (an "accountant" or, in terms of its root meaning, a "man of reason"), and through the early part of their relationship he teaches Cabiria how to "account for" experience with rational explanations. In short, he shows her how to relate to the outside world consciously, actively. Initially, he tends to be her surrogate intelligence, but she quickly makes his powers of reason her own.

As Cabiria becomes more attentive and analytical, she also begins to invest Oscar with tremendous significance. She begins to see him as the necessary agent of her transformation. At first she does so in largely physical terms—seeing him as a means of escaping the *Passeggiata*. But this alters drastically in the most contemplative scene of the film (and one which parallels the pilgrimage sequence): her encounter with Brother Giovanni. He's virtually born out of Cabiria's thoughts as she walks, lost in meditation, near her home. A voice of revelation from the realm of the spirit, he tells Cabiria she must be in the grace of God to be happy and that she should be married because "matrimony is a holy thing." From here on, Cabiria views Oscar in terms of "holiness," "grace," and salvation—and she views her relation to him in terms of profound spiritual union. No longer merely a person, he becomes a symbol—the real becomes imbued with religious value.

Most important, she nows sees transformation completely in terms of movement-beyond-self. She prepares to abandon the known and familiar—renouncing prostitution, selling her house, and leaving behind her maternal friend Wanda. True, she appears to be doing this all for Oscar, but—as becomes clear by the end—he's not an embodiment of the familiar. He's the absolute "other," the denial of all Cabiria is and has been.

As Cabiria moves beyond self-centeredness, she is not merely surrendering to what's outside and sacrificing her identity. She's *becoming* what's beyond her, through her capacity for imaginative identification. This is reflected in one of her final conversations with Oscar when she tells him that he and she have become *"uguali"*—a word that means not just equal but identical, the same.

In directing her energies outward, Cabiria becomes increasingly effective. She even begins to make Oscar respond to her initiative rather than vice versa. (She's the one who forces the marriage proposal.) She also makes more and more significant decisions on her own. In fact, Oscar is absent from five out of six consecutive scenes when Cabiria takes the necessary actions for changing her life. By this point she has assimilated everything he has to offer and she's reached the verge of self-transcendence. She's ready to jettison Oscar and to die and be reborn as a new kind of individual in a new spiritual climate.

This occurs in an unearthly landscape at the edge of a cliff, far above the water. Oscar reveals his true intent, and Cabiria is overwhelmed with disillusionment and moved to utter self-denial: "Kill me, throw me in. I don't want to live." This desire for death is Cabiria's renunciation of all she has been to this point. It's a willingness to encounter the complete unknown and, as such, it's the "death" that precedes enlightenment.

Cabiria, of course, does not die a physical death. She's saved from this by her own, fully developed, power of personality. Even in her extreme vulnerability she remains a dominant force—and her violent grief momentarily redeems Oscar. Not only can't he bring himself to kill her, he's turned from murderer into savior as he pulls Cabiria away from the brink and says "Can't you see, I don't want to hurt you." Furthermore, he doesn't actually rob her. He only takes the money she drops at his feet as an offering—money which is no longer of value to her.

Oscar's cynicism is so thoroughly destroyed that, in the end, he just negates himself. He escapes pathetically into the woods in tacit acknowledgement that he has no place in her world. Moreover, at the moment he "self-destructs," he can only do good: his final acts—taking the money and himself out of Cabiria's life—are prerequisites to her full enlightenment.

Though she's not killed by Oscar, Cabiria does undergo a kind of death once he's gone. She gradually lapses into unconsciousness and regresses to a point prior to birth. As she does, her sobs become those of a little girl, her final cry that of a baby. Then she lies dormant, "dead"—about to be reborn to a moral environment so highly evolved that Oscar and all he embodies are no longer possible.

When she comes to, picks up the bouquet she had earlier gathered with Oscar, and moves back through the woods, she has become a bride of life. Married to no one in particular, she is married to the world at large. Her act of self-affirmation, her willingness to keep on keeping on, generates the youngsters whose music and dance celebrate their life and hers. Though their appearance is miraculous, it's not arbitrary. They are her own transcendent powers released into the world, her "othered" self made manifest. They are her own capacity for resurrection and renewal acting upon her in a spiritual domain where all separation between self and world has vanished.

Union is not restricted to Cabiria and her adolescent companions. Just before the film ends, her gaze focusses briefly but firmly on the camera eye. As it does, she miraculously penetrates the eyes and souls of the viewers. At that moment,

the conventional relation between spectator and film is destroyed. Fellini and his camera eye—instead of being merely the media through which we see the film—become the media through which his film sees us. More than that, as the seer—seen relation becomes reciprocal and unitive, mediation is dissolved.

In piercing the veil of invisibility, Cabiria does not end up in the realm of illusion as she did at the Lux. She connects with powers (camera eye and us) that are indeed present though not seen by her. This becomes the final and fullest expression of her capacity to live in a universe of spirit—a universe defined by the paradoxical present-ness of absence, which can only be experienced through the genius of seeing what is there yet invisible.

II

City of Women

Despite the fact that *Nights of Cabiria* and *City of Women* are roughly twenty-five years apart—and the latter reflects Fellini's tremendous imaginative development in the interim—virtually all the major processes of *Cabiria* recur in *City of Women*: the growth from physical experience to spiritual vision; the movement from a real or given world to one of pure imagination—then to a new kind of reality filled with the freedom of imaginative possibility; the increasing willingness on the part of the main character to explore the unknown, the "not-I," in search of transformation; the use of the opposite sex as a symbolic embodiment of the unknown—hence as the principal agent of transformation; the quest for a unity beyond not only biological dualism but beyond the psychosexual dualism that emerges when sexuality evolves into a symbolic means of addressing experience.

Several of these processes are established in embryonic form in the very opening moments. When Snaporaz first appears, he's an unconscious body, mechanically bounced around by the movement of the train. He then acquires a face and identity, as he appears reflected in the glasses of the "Signora" sitting across from him. Next he opens his eyes, and his awakening is imaged as the ascent of vision from the Signor's boots up to her face. Awakening is quickly followed by the birth of attention and interest, as he dons his glasses—instruments of scrutiny and visual analysis. This in turn is followed by passion as his hand and the Signora's touch on a wine bottle that's about to topple onto the floor. Finally, when the Signora gets up and leaves, a sense of purpose and rudimentary abstraction is awakened. Snaporaz arises and pursues a figure who, no longer present, has become an ideal—a goal in his mind which he's seeking to fulfill.

Snaporaz is hardly a figure of moral discrimination at this point. He's pathetic

in his predatory male obsessiveness. Yet the emergence of identity, the awakening and focussing of consciousness, and the development of a sense of quest beyond the physically immediate all hint at a talent for spiritualization that will bring about much more authentic forms of growth as his story progresses.

In terms of the film-as-a-whole, we begin in the realm of the physical: Snaporaz's attraction to the Signora is entirely sexual. He chases her into the bathroom (the sanctuary of the body), gropes her, enjoys a (rather imperiously administered) french kiss, and makes a ludicrous attempt at intercourse. However, sexuality evolves to the level of ideology as soon as the Signora leads the unsuspecting Snaporaz to a feminist convention. Here sexuality defines itself in terms of role, identity, and ideology, rather than biological urge. "Fellatio" and "penetration" become symbols of "phallic narcissism" and "sociological oppression" in the intellectual jargon of the conventioneers. "Castration" and "masturbation" become ideological slogans of feminine self-determination, marriage becomes a political statement rather than a biologically-determined institution. (Enderbreit Small accumulates six husbands as "an example of feminism within the family circle.") Most important, biological and physical necessity are utterly denied as women claim "menopause doesn't exist, it's only an alibi for Male Society," "teaching [children is] more rewarding than having them," "I've no fear of aging or dying," and "all women are beautiful, they are only twenty years old." The culmination of this is the outright rejection of the male—an act which, for the feminists, symbolizes total liberation from the sexual process and its patriarchal consequences.

Confronted with sex as an ideological and intellectual reality, Snaporaz is forced to abandon his physical ambitions. By the end of the convention sequence he's actually blind to the sexual attributes of women. Momentarily saved by a beautiful young woman (Donatella), he pays no attention to her amply displayed cleavage. Moreover, as soon as he leaves the convention, he encounters sexual obsession as negative and threatening. An ursine creature, who offers him a ride on her motorcycle, attacks him in a greenhouse—much as he attacked the Signora in the toilet—and he discovers that turnabout is not much fun.

Although Fellini's feminists deny the biological, they don't really transcend it. By defining themselves solely in terms of sexual identity, they remain unwitting victims of their physical inheritance. Once we enter the environs of Dr. Zubercock, sex evolves from an idea tied to physical necessity to an ideal verging on pure imagination.

Unlike the feminists portrayed in the film Zubercock is not an analyst of the given, he's a maker. He's created his own environment (the women rely on a hotel), he's invented gadgets in honor of women, and he ends up being a major force in Snaporaz's transformation. For Zubercock, sex is always a matter of fantasy, divorced from reality. He can't relate to women, only to "monuments"— whether they be the statue of "Mama," the romantic poetry of D'Annunzio, or the celebration of his "10,000th conquest." He never makes love to his fiancée, and, in fact, he ends his visible career in the film renouncing "real" women once and for all. A creature devoted to imaginative wish-fulfillment, he allows

Snaporaz the space to begin seeing women not as real figures to be seduced but as means for achieving wholeness—i.e., "marriage" in the fullest sense. Not that Zubercock is, in the long run, an admirable figure. As his name suggests, he's absurd—merely an advanced manifestation of the kind of self-centeredness Snaporaz embodied at the film's beginning. For this reason he must be counterbalanced by the appearance of Elena—Snaporaz's wife—who demands that Snaporaz be accountable in terms of his relations to women. More than that, Zubercock must ultimately be eliminated so that Snaporaz can achieve a vision of women that is far more mature than anything Zubercock has to offer.

Accordingly, the "retirement" of Zubercock signals a movement beyond romantic idealization (which still has its ties to biological dualism) toward a kind of symbolization which is mythic or archetypal in its comprehensiveness. "The Feminine" replaces individual women and even the ideal of women—and comes to encompass all that's unknown—both outside and within. It becomes the source of mystery, awe, and fear—the "non-I" or non-ego with which Snaporaz (like Cabiria before him) must make contact in order to be transformed.

At this point, sexuality and real women disappear—a turning point marked when Elena, after an operatic attempt to arouse Snaporaz, falls asleep. She too "retires" as it were, freeing Snaporaz to enter the uterine chute of his imagination, where he re-encounters all the female images that have combined to create a mythic composite of the unknown deep within him. Though some may have been real women in his past, these figures are memories and symbols in the present. Moreover, they become increasingly de-humanized, non-realistic, as they move Snaporaz's mind further and further beyond the familiar. From the warm, tactile Rosina who hugs Snaporaz as a child, we move to the two uniformed motorcycle daredevils, then to the distant and mechanical lady in blue at the beach. Then Snaporaz recalls his childhood cinema heroines. These women are projected rather than physically present—hence completely inaccessible—but for this reason they are all the more susceptible to being fetishized and invested with enormous mythic significance. Accordingly, the cinema heroines become even less familiarly feminine than the preceding women—even more alien and bizarre—concluding with a musculine, static, Mae-West type figure.

When Snaporaz leaves the cinema behind and moves back to memories of actual women, he takes with him his fetishizing impulses and abandons all realistic sense of the female. Moreover, he associates the final images of the chute sequence with that most comprehensive and frightening of unknowns: death. (He has opened himself out more and more to experiences of departure and death during the Zubercock sequence, and his journey both up the stairs to the bedroom and down into the chute has been established as a "night journey" with profound implications.) First, he recalls the ass of a widow polishing a grave. Then, he recollects a whorehouse, in the midst of war-battered Rome, which is repeatedly rocked by nearby explosions. Here he encounters the "assophile's delight": a robotic prostitute whose most notable attribute is a gigantic rear end. Though the image of her enormous ass is party comic, it's also immensely

unsettling. The grotesqueness communicates a sense of mystery which is made all the more resonant by the funereal sounds of a tolling bell.

By this point, Snaporaz's perception of the feminine has moved far beyond mere sexual attraction. (The ass, in fact, is "neuter.") He has moved from a physical familiarity which breeds contempt (his assault on the Signora and her "superbuns") to a vision of complete otherness. Associated as it is with death, his image of the prostitute becomes a way of transcending self that will lead to the same kind of resurrection and renewal that Cabiria achieved.

Nevertheless, as its grotesqueness makes clear, Snaporaz's whorehouse vision has its limitations. It brings him to a point of absolute separation from the feminine and the mysterious, and it runs him the risk of getting lost in a private, distortive symbolism that would forever destroy his ability to relate to real women. He must find a way to bridge the gap between himself and the Other. He must develop a new kind of familiarity by seeing himself and the feminine as part of a larger, unitive process and, even more important, as part of each other. The only way he can do this is by coming to realize that the feminine is not something ineluctably "out there." It's something which is also latent within him, something he can create as well as encounter. Having spent most of the film relying on bodies, images, and ideals of women derived from outside, he undergoes a crucial change when he's trapped and questioned by a tribunal of women, then offered an opportunity to meet the "Ideal Woman." For one thing, he choses to meet the mysterious head on, rather than view it from the distance and security of memory as he did with the prostitute. He's willing to journey into a realm of terror and death—knowing that those who have preceded him have been brought back either on a stretcher or not at all. But most important, while he starts out thinking in terms of an existing, objectice "Ideal" ("If you existed, would you be my reward or punishment?"), he experiences a sudden flash of insight: "you must be somebody new, born out of me as I was born out of...". Though he doesn't finish the statement, it's obvious that he can now envision the feminine as something to-be-created, as a force born from him in much the same way that he is born of women. (Biological genesis now functions merely as a model for imaginative genesis.) Seeing himself as a potential creator, he can see himself sharing in the feminine power of fecundity. In a crucial sense, he and the feminine have become *"uguali."*

He not only hypothesizes about his power to give birth, he domonstrates it. He closes his eyes and announces that by the time he counts to 7, "She"—the Ideal—will appear. Summoned by his imagination, she does: an enormous ballooned image fashioned in the likeness of the young and beautiful Donatella.

As a representation of Donatella, this version of the feminine is far more accessible, realistic, and appealing than the dehumanized derriere. Moreover, it combines darkness and light and—in offering to remove Snaporaz entirely from his immediate surroundings—it combines the known (Donatella) with the unknown (a new world and life). As a result, it embodies totality rather than just alienating otherness. Yet it's still grotesque, it's still a denial of reality, and it's still a symbolic substitute for an open and direct relation to the world and to

women. It's mechanical, cumbersome, static, and illusionary—as symbols tend to be.

For all these reasons, the ideal must be destroyed. As part of Snaporaz's journey back from the symbolic to the actual, the de-humanized to the human, the real Donatella appears, in the guise of a terrorist. She strips away her own veil of distortion—her terrorist's mask—and, as a radiantly concrete image, shoots down the false dream, Snaporaz and all. As he and the balloon plummet toward earth, the inflated Donatella diminishes to human size and collapses against the netting to which Snaporaz clings. Suddenly, her image is replaced by vivid closeups of four blonde women—"real" people but apparent strangers to Snaporaz. Their startling appearance is associated with his impending death, and in terror he asks of them (and of death): "Who are you?"—a question which remains unanswered. At this moment, Snaporaz has completed his journey back from the grotesquely symbolic to the real. However, he discovers that the real is no longer familiar, comforting. He invests the images of the blonde women with all the mystery of the unknown—which his imagination has learned to envision. The real and the created, the known and the unknown, have also become *"uquali."*

In the very next shot we see him, awakened in the train compartment, confronted by his wife. All, up till now, has been his dream. He awakens to an experience of wholeness quite similar to Cabiria's in the final scene of her story. Initially put off by his dream and by an imperious Elena, he suddenly discovers that the glasses he broke in his dream are now broken in reality. The world he'd imagined/created begins to infuse the real world to which he's awakened. Even more miraculously, women from his dream—the Signora, Donatella, and one of Donatella's companions—enter the compartment. On the one hand, these females are all alien (they've changed roles from the dream, and all seem strangers to Snaporaz). On the other hand, having originated in his dream, they are, in a crucial sense, born out of him. Much as the youngsters at the end of *Nights of Cabiria* embody her own powers externalized, the three "dream women" in the compartment are Snaporaz's manifest femininity.

These apparitions confirm the two fundamental discoveries of Snaporaz's dream: the feminine that appears without is also a part of him, and reality viewed in the light of imagination has all the mystery of the unknown.

As the brief sequence progresses, Elena's distance and disdain disappear. She and the Signora share a knowing and complicit smile, forcing Snaporaz, amidst his astonishment, to do the same. Somehow—he knows not why—he and the women are all implicated in the same embracing, beneficent process. More than that, they are magically implicated in each other's very existence. Sexual dualism—whether biological, intellectual, or achetypal—has given way to spiritual androgyny and communion.

At home in his city of women, Snaporaz performs one final act: he chooses to return to his dream. No act of escape, it's a return to the death he was facing as he and his Ideal plummeted earthward. Armed with a faith beyond fantasy, he can face death now—or perhaps dream a new and deathless dream. He can enter the

dark tunnel and search out the small but insistent light Fellini provides at the end of the tunnel for the final six or seven seconds of the film. He can see the tunnel not as an end but as one more transition in a world that has become infinitely transitive. In a world without ideals, absolutes, "termini," death itself dissolves into the ongoingness of life.

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We have followed Fellini's lead in suppressing the fact, until the very end, that most of *City of Women* is Snaporaz's dream. His development prior to awakening is quite coherent without the dream being taken into account. However, viewed in the light of his dream, the film takes on new and much larger significance.

First of all, it means that from the very beginning, even in his pursuit of the Signora, Snaporaz is relating to a world of images (rudimentary spirit) rather than physical presences. His relation to the dream is the same as our relation to the film. Even he is an image or character in his dream, rather than a "real person." He's not "actually" abusing the Signora, he's imagining it—and he's envisioning how absurd and pathetic such behavior really is. There is, in short, a kind of creative distance to all that happens.

As a result, there is an element of accountability built into the nature of his experience. This becomes all the more pronounced once we realize that he, as dreamer, is responsible for all the women who appear. As a character, he may be tempted repeatedly toward wish-fulfillment, but as the imaginative source for his dream, he is continually creating situations in which wish-fulfillment is destroyed. The Signora's initial sexual compliance proves only a ruse in Snaporaz's dream strategy, leading him to the feminist convention where the Signora can denounce him for the fraud that he is. His self-indulgent delight in Zubercock's "greenhouse" of erotic images and sounds is abruptly halted by the appearance of the angry, demanding Elena. His roller-coaster ride through the sexual fantasies of his past gives way to the tribunal, where he is rightly accused of selfishness, confusion, and "maniacal assophilism." The appearance of the ballooned ideal of Donatella is followed swiftly by its destruction at the hands of Donatella-as-terrorist. In the final analysis, we are presented with a figure who dreams a rhythm of wish-fulfillment and rejection that moves him ever deeper into the realm of the feminine while, at the same time, killing off mere adolescent dependence on it. He dreams a process in which the feminine forces demand nothing less than self-transformation. Since his dream is himself projected, the women he envisions are his own powers struggling to make him new and integral.

Another crucial fact of the dream is that it offers a world of extraordinary unity. Inside and outside (Snaporaz-as-character and Snaporaz-as-dreaming-imagination) are not polarized; they are different aspects of the same process. The dream offers Snaporaz and us as a model of life in which everything conspires to the growth of the individual and the individual (albeit unwillingly) creates the very experience he undergoes.

Finally, the dream offers a highly refined model of "feminization." Structu-

rally, Snaporaz's dreaming imagination serves as the womb in which the character Snaporaz is nourished and developed. As a result, he gives birth to himself when he awakens. He is, from the beginning, both part of the feminine (as a character) and the feminine itself (as "mother" and dreaming imagination). Seen in this way, feminization is completely beyond biological determinism and duality. It's the capacity for spiritual parthenogenesis which each of us— regardless of our inherited sexuality—can attain through imaginative vision.

III

Fellini's Art of Affirmation

In telling their tales of individuation, *Nights of Cabiria* and *City of Women* also point to the function and value of the kinds of stories they tell. Artworks of affirmation, they tell us something of the nature of affirmative art—at least of the sort Fellini creates. This is especially true of *City of Women*, since Snaporaz's dream functions precisely as a movie might within his growth toward enlightenment.

One obvious conclusion we can draw from *Nights of Cabiria* and *City of Women* is that Fellini's art is one of spiritual process. His films work out the possibilities for human development in moral and spiritual terms. Because they are processes, they are resistant to generalization, to abstractions imposed from without. The narrative situation is always evolving, values are continuously being generated on the move. As a result, we must address ourselves to how and why things *change* rather than what they "mean" in any static sense. Only by determining the full significance of change will we begin to derive true meaning from the films. (Note how easily the image of the prostitute's ass can be misconstrued—and Fellini and Snaporaz accused of misogyny—if it is not seen as part of a process.)

Fellini's films can educate us in the possibilities of imaginative freedom: how unities are forged and how the new comes into being—in the realm of the spirit. Attuning us to the "logic" of creative experience, they can serve, in their highly specific way, as a "science" of creative change.

In terms of its relation to day-to-day life, such art is a symbolic, ideal, construct which acts as a medium or bridge between raw and creative experience. It serves precisely the same function that hypnosis and dream do for Cabiria and Snaporaz. It lifts one out of the realm of necessity, to be educated in imaginative freedom and to carry freedom and initiative back to the world of the necessary. Because it is merely a medium or bridge, the artwork cannot be an end in itself. It must as some point self-destruct. Snaporaz's vision of the balloon is a perfect case in point. For Snaporaz-as-character it's the one symbol he creates for himself in

the dream. And while it's crucial as the expression of a newfound power of creation—and as a new synthesis of the feminine—it must quickly be shot down so that he can get on with his return to the real.

Given the nature of its conclusion, *City of Women* may initially seem to contradict what's just been said. Snaporaz's return to reality is brief, and he ends the film seemingly back in dream—his world of art. However, I think Fellini's point is that he's not escaping reality. He's entering yet a new dimension in which the dream will be infused by the real. He's entering a phase of heightened, more resonant reality. Fellini himself has said: "This time he will dream because he is deciding to dream. It will be a vigilant dream, full of attention for the profound, a witnessing dream. He goes back consciously into the dream in order to have a more lucid contact with himself. Lucid and fascinated at the same time, passionate and yet with a sense of distance. Intentionally without intention..."[3]

Moving from the more general aspects of Fellini's art to the medium of movies, we can see the "film experience" as offering a unique and vital form of creative life. It engages us in a coming-into-being of which we are part. We dream the film; it's inside as well as without, a marriage of the subjective and objective. Its coherence becomes our own, and our fantasies become projected on and through it. As Fellini sees it, the cinema is to the spectator as woman is to man:

> I think the cinema is a woman by virtue of its ritualistic nature. This uterus which is the theatre, the fetal darkness, the apparitions—all create a projected relationship, we project ourselves onto it, we become involved in a series of vicarious transpositions, and we make the screen assume the character of what we expect of it, just as we do with women, upon whom we impose ourselves.[4]

Hardly a mere passive enterprise for Fellini, moviegoing is a means by which we co-create life as mythic, awe-inspiring, religious. (As we noted, Snaporaz's greatest leap beyond the merely representational took place through his memories of the cinema.) Movies offer us concrete images—an external world—but they do so in the mode of envisionment. They give us the real under the sign of imagination, mystery, magic. Unlike literature, which can foster escape into words and subjectivity—and a consequent distrust for the world outside—movies encourage reverence for and expanded perception of "thereness." As a result, literature and film create a useful counterpoint in the rhythm of enlightenment. The former takes us on the "trip in," as we deny the given and refine our capacity for invention. The latter takes us on the "trip out," where we re-encounter the given in the guise of the numinous—and as born, in part, out of us.

The ultimate goal of Fellini's art is the same goal sought and achieved by

Cabiria and Snaporaz: transcendence of gravity, of matter, of all that ties us to the earth and our animal natures. Once asked about his fears, Fellini remarked:

> The fear of falling, of growing too heavy. There is a vertical line in spirituality that goes from the beast to the angel, and on which we oscillate. Every day, every minute carries the danger of losing ground, of falling down again toward the beast.[5]

Fellini's art of affirmation is part of his struggle to overcome the dangers of "falling." It's also his way of showing that man can succeed in his journey beyond the beast. It's his attempt to dream himself and us anew, in a shared revolution of sensibility, that can bring us back from art to life, somewhat closer to the angels.

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Notes

1. The italicized titles refer to feature films, those in quotation marks refer to shorter films included in "film anthologies" with the work of other directors. "The Matrimonial Agency" is part of *Love in the City*, "The Temptations of Dr. Antonio" is part of *Boccaccio '70*, and "Toby Dammit" is part of *Spirits of the Dead*.

2. *Amarcord* is not as obviously tragic as, say, *La Strada*. It's a much more mellow film with a more pervasive comic spirit. Yet there's a sense of great sadness, emptiness, at the end. With young Titta's mother dead, things have fallen apart. His father has lost all direction. The once-mythic Gradisca (the stimulus to Titta's imagination) has married a Fascist. And Titta is drunk and lost in a world from which all his adolescent supports have suddenly and devastatingly disappeared.

3. Gideon Bachman, "Federico Fellini: 'The Cinema Seen as a Woman...' ", *Film Quarterly*, 34, No. 2 (Winter, 1980-81) p. 5.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

5. Gilbert Salachas, *Frederico Fellini: An Investigation Into His Films and Philosophy*, trans. Rosalie Siegel (New York: Crown Publishers), 1969, p. 114.

PRAXIS

Praxis #6: Art and Ideology (Part 2)

Michel Pecheux, **Language, Ideology and Discourse Analysis: An Overview**

Douglas Kellner, **Television, Mythology and Ritual**

Nicos Hadjinicolaou, **On the Ideology of Avant-Gardism**

Kenneth Coutts-Smith, **Postbourgeois Ideology and Visual Culture**

Marc Zimmerman, **Francois Perus and Latin American Modernism: The Interventions of Althusser**

Fred Lonidier, **"The Health and Safety Game"** *(Visual Feature)*

Forthcoming issues:

WOMAN OF CLAY: GABOR'S *ANGI VERA*

Anthony Thomson

Eastern European cinema has basked in several moments of critical acclaim in the West. This cyclical acceptance has generally followed the loosening and tightening of the artistic straight-jacket and the accompanying periodic production of films which are thematically 'universal' (for example some of the productions of the Czechoslovakian 'spring') or which articulate opposition to the political regimes. In this respect the recognition granted Wajda's *Man of Iron* by the moguls of American cinema is essentially a reflection of current political evaluations.

Although currently overshadowed by the significance of Solidarity and its celebrated celluloid memoir, the Hungarian director Pal Gabor has combined the theme of 'universal humanism' with a critique of institutionalized communism in a very interesting political film entitled *Angi Vera*. Both the subject itself and Gabor's handling of it have won considerable praise from many Western critics and socialists alike. This mutual acceptance can be explained through an articulation of the political posture which suffuses the film. Throughout, Gabor reveals his standpoint as much by what he condemns as by what he fails to criticize and thereby implicitly accepts. Ultimately, if I agree with much of the former, what I regard as the political short-comings of the film are crucial to its successful production and its appreciation in the West.

Two Triads

Chronologically, the film is linear in construction. Vera Angi—the surname is given first in Hungarian—works in a hospital as a nurses' aide, one anonymous worker among hundreds of others. She singles herself out during a staff meeting by standing up and delivering a criticism of the administration which, while hesitant and modest in style, is forthright in content. This individual step is the first in a progression which is the obverse of individualism. Seen as having leadership potential, Vera is drawn out of the hospital and into the Party and sent to receive education at a large cadre school. She appears to be honest, modest and principled—exactly the image the Party might be expected to have of itself. But throughout the course of the movie, both these images are dispelled.

Through a few other well-timed and contextually appropriate assertions, and a timely acquisition of a female mentor, Vera solidifies her status as a model student. This position—and Vera's practical future—is threatened by a brief affair with a teacher which is finally resolved climatically in a formal criticism/self-criticism session. In the end she is singled out for a favoured post.

This is the story, then, of the making of a political opportunist—one who places individual benefit ahead of principles and collective needs to the detriment of the interests they represent. Yet the film is considerably more subtle than this bald assertion suggests. As Gabor slowly reveals Vera's character, it proves to be complex and enigmatic. The outcome of her actions makes them appear consciously manipulative, yet in themselves they seem motiveless and not calculated. It is as though she has an instinct for doing what appears to be the right thing in the short run for very different long-term results of which she is, at most, only dimly aware. In this respect Vera is symbolic of more than just the seduction of a relatively honest innocent by a corrupt organization.

Angi Vera is also a conscious political statement, examining many of the troublesome dichotomies of socialism: the distinction between theory and practice, the chasm between the leaders and the mass, the antagonism between disciplined action and spontaneity, and, embracing all of these, the relationship between the intimate and the personal on the one hand and the public and the political on the other.

The film narrates Vera's experiences in the cadre school as they involve four central characters. Of these, two are men. One is a miner who, through substantial individual hardship and sacrifice, had made important practical contributions to the revolution. He finds the transition to the school, with its strict discipline and formal intellectual demands, very difficult. In response, he goes AWOL to visit his family. By following his 'proletarian instincts' in the insurrection he had won favour with the Party, but when his 'instincts' demanded personal intimacy, they were condemned. By implication Gabor goes further and suggests both the irrelevance of theory and the inherently repressive nature of institutions.

To explain his indiscretion the miner, who had been admonished publicly, offers only an officially acceptable portion of the truth—that study was difficult for him. At this juncture Vera distinguishes herself for a second time by offering to tutor him privately. In these extra lessons he memorizes stock phrases about the inevitable dissolution of capitalism while Vera stares disinterestedly out of the window. Gabor never declares that Marxist theory, in itself, is irrelevant; but nowhere does he suggest that theorizing has any value in social practice. While the miner is flattered by the individual attention he is receiving, and responds by developing an emotional attachment, Vera remains coldly distant, giving the impression that he is merely instrumental to her ends.

Istvan, the teacher, is in many respects the opposite of the proletarian miner. He is an intellectual with command over book-learning—theory in the narrowest sense—but with very little practical experience (a point made explicit by some of the women through sexual allusions). This judgment is undoubtedly correct, but in this scene Gabor represents gossip as a 'human' form of criticism in contrast to an organized and explicit forum which is 'inhuman'. Yet it is this absence of structure and context, as well as the motives behind personal gossip, which make the practice dishonest and destructive rather than open and constructive. For Gabor, people understand spontaneously and the intervention of organized politics, where it doesn't pervert this knowledge, obscures it.

Vera secretly conspires to rectify Istvan's practical short-coming, but also only in its narrowest sense. School-girlishly she flirts with him, asks questions after class (with no interest in their answers) and eventually seduces him. In contrast to her attachment to the working class miner, which is 'officially correct' but condescending, her attachment to Istvan is 'incorrect' and manipulative. During the final criticism and self-criticism session Vera confesses the affair publicly, thus perhaps undercutting potential exposure. Against the advice of his colleagues that he should deny the charge, Istvan acknowledges the affair and publicly declares his love for Vera—the personal sphere as the vessel of truth and integrity. His desire for Vera, who is more attractive in the conventional sense than his wife, is not seen as illegitimate, and there is no implication that the liaison was improper. The mysteries of love and attraction are far more significant for Gabor than notions of socially appropriate relations between students and teachers. The former is seen as quite 'natural' and therefore accepted unequivocally.

Presented with the necessity to choose between the personal and the political at this crucial juncture, Vera accepts pragmatic counsel and denies a reciprocal feeling declaring that she had been merely attracted to his authority. With this sanctioned explanation (hardly a self-criticism of any depth or sincerity) she again wins approval for herself but at the cost of the emotional ruin of her supposed lover.

Besides these two men who, with Vera, complete one triad, there are two important women in the film. Anna is a middle-aged party functionary and careerist who becomes Vera's mentor. Like Istvan, she is sexually repressed, but unlike him she has long given up any 'illusory emotions'. An editor of an important Party newspaper, Anna is Vera's ladder to success. When she eventually graduates at the top of her class, Vera is given a job at this paper. In the final scene, while the other graduates travel away from the school by train, these two women travel more prestigiously by automobile towards their respective futures.

Throughout the film Vera's moments of initiative are brief. With Anna, Vera is especially passive and any marginal activity involves other characters. While the Party boss has harsh personal criticisms of the other students, about Vera all that he can say is that she is "accommodating"—in his eyes a political virtue. From the facial close-up of the opening credit sequence to the final close-up gradually dissolving in blue, Vera remains virtually inert. When Anna denounces a former member of the Democratic Socialist Party as a counter-revolutionary, Vera signs it without comment. For Anna the personal has merged with the public and the Party determines her standards of personal integrity and morality, in effect demanding that she dissolve both in acceptance of Party infallability. Not only Moscow but Budapest also does not believe in tears!

The other woman is Maria, a lusty and outspoken character whose spirit and independence in the face of the domination of the Party bring her into frequent conflict with the authorities. Her relationship with Vera is complex, fittingly so because if Anna represents the renunciation of spontaneity Maria embodies its consummation. For her integrity is first an individual issue. She is not a success at

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the cadre school and is last seen by Vera, whisked away in the car with Anna, doggedly pedalling a bicycle against a strong wind. She has apparently not renounced the ultimate political goal but, in this use of a standard cinematic image, is unwilling to compromise her personal principles in the long and arduous journey. In place of Anna's suppression of the personal in favour of unquestioned service to the representatives of an idea, Maria's individualism determines her political standards. Gabor is sympathetic to Maria. Boisterous in the private realm, she survives publicly by a tactical withdrawal from public issues, by non-involvement. It is ironic when the claim to having made no political mistakes depends upon insularity and privatization.

Political Critique

Angi Vera raises some crucial political questions and it may be surprising that the film was successfully completed and released. This may be explained both by what the film was about and by what it is not about. Set in the late 1940s during the consolidation of the Hungarian Workers' Party, it is outwardly a critique of 'Stalinism', things having presumably changed for the better. Its use of history to comment on the present is oblique. As the car/bicycle sequence attempts to demonstrate, the explicit standpoint is 'within socialism'—Maria is cycling in the same direction as Vera and Anna. More importantly the alternative statement is not threatening to the present regime.

The film criticisms of the Stalinist Party are powerful. The cadre school looks like a concentration camp and the students like uniformed internees. In one dining hall scene Gabor focusses on rows of identical water pitchers dispensing bland liquid to all the inmates. Do the pitchers represent the content of the political education offered at the school (suggesting the need for reforms) or do they stand for the entire tradition of socialism seen as a fundamental denial of individualism? Only in the context of the whole film can this be answered. Eating and drinking are important themes: After uncovering the 'counter-revolutionary' Anna devours two rich cream cakes, asserting in between swallows that they are just desserts for doing the work of the Party, while Vera eats more sparingly, but eats nonetheless.

The only vaguely revolutionary aspect of the school's chief commissar is his red tie. Otherwise, looking nothing short of a Gestapo agent, he comes the closest to being an actual caricature. With this exception, Gabor goes to some length to show elements of 'humanity' in all the characters. Even Anna is given a moment of personal anguish when she recalls her own tragic love affair, to surround her callousness with some degree of pathos. And Vera experiences a brief moment of remorse after ruining Istvan, being rescued from self-imposed exposure to the winter elements by Maria who counsels endurance and fortitude. Like Hungary itself, she is forced by circumstances beyond her control to adjust to a foreign ideology and is only able to persevere, to roll with the punches.

The contrast between the mechanical submission demanded by the Party—a set of amoral absolutes which, according to Istvan is 'inhuman' in its severe judgments (he calls this statement the only 'truth' spoken during the criticism meeting)—and what Gabor sees as the abstract principles of spontaneous life are heightened by the use of colour and space. The film was made in the winter and external shots are bathed in cold blue. People are separated from each other by space and by layers of thick, grey clothing. By contrast, in an evocative early scene, the womens' shower room is bathed in warm yellows and amid the radiating heat the women banter in a manner both uninhibited and sensual. Physical proximity expresses a genuine comraderie whereas elsewhere the term "comrade" is suspect: it has been appropriated by the Party and emptied of all its former meaning. Anna uses the term unconsciously when addressing the old Social-Democrat she was about to denounce, a word which ironically revealed that a "comrade" was the last thing she might be. (Gabor has the victim condemned, pointedly, for opinions rather than actions).

The Party leaders are separated in space from the others, often standing on a stage and shot from the back of the room. In the opening scene the camera pans down the hospital corridor towards the staff meeting while the words come at first indistinctly, from a distance, as they do for the hospital staff, though in their case the distance is ideological rather than spatial. They sit in boredom and fear hoping not to be singled out of their private sphere and asked to contribute. The Party rhetoric about socialist democracy is sharply at odds with the passivity of the audience and with Vera's public criticism, which begins with practical problems in the hospital and ends by declaring ('condeming' would be too strong) the arrogant attitude of the officials. Later the chief hospital administrator admonishes Vera for this betrayal of her personal loyalty to himself and his senior staff. Had they not taken her in as a child and looked after her? This apparent disloyalty (to surrogate parents) is paralleled later by the disavowal of Istvan, yet these two events should not be seen automatically as identical. In the hospital Vera had made a public criticism of a public capacity. Legitimacy was on her side and it was the administrator who was attempting to use nepotism to deflect apparent truth. But the parallel is no accident, and the viewer is forced to ask at what point did Vera's 'conversion' occur? When did quantity change into quality? What was conscious and what unconscious?

Like history, Vera's actions can be reinterpreted. Her target, it seems, was only the most accessible. For all its pronouncements about democracy and socialism the Party is hardly less arrogant, and is perceived to be so by the staff. The practical issues she raised are implicitly antithetic to the abstractions being dished out from the stage. On these scores, however, Vera is silent. The result is personal advancement. She passes directly from the paternalism of the hospital to the paternalism of the Party, being assured that "we will take care of you."

The Personal and the Political

The essential 'inhumanity' of the Party is seen by Gabor to be its perversion of the appropriate relationship between the public and the private—the public invasion of the sacredness of the personal. In its campaign to suppress the spontaneous, becoming a "good communist" is defined as a complete renunciation of the personal, becoming instead a functionary of an all-powerful and correct Party. The impersonal regime demanded of the cadres amounts to a repudiation of life and dedication to an ideal apparently as other-wordly as any spiritualism, complete with a corrupt this-worldly priesthood. This religious image is explicit in the film. Following the opening credit shots and before moving to the meeting inside the hospital, the camera focusses momentarily on two nuns outside, a theme which is revived in the final scene when Vera and Anna motor towards their futures—two secular nuns who, by sacrificing their individualism for the Party, have taken the vows. An abstract 'higher end', orchestrated by some unseen deity, directs their destiny and demands a dedication no less severe than taking the veil.

The problems the party school should have been addressing are patently obvious: overt careerism, bureaucratic strangulation of initiative, rote learning, arrogance of leadership accompanied by its corollary, a compliant and unquestioning following (complete with the inevitable grumbling and gossip). Rather than redressing these fundamental abuses, however, in a perversion of purposes the school works to recreate them. The self-criticism session is an absolute parody of the intended purpose of such an exercise.

Dressed in a cloak of omniscience and separated from the cadres by elevation and a large red stripe on the white tablecloth, the 'revolutionaries' are demarcated in perpetuity from the underlings. Gabor, however, goes further than the obvious point that the people who, most charitably, need re-education, are those systematically mis-educating their successors, by implying that these cadres themselves are not in need of education. Granted that the main point is a critique of the abuse of authority: the absolute degeneration of a "workers' party" into a bureaucratic jungle strangled by the self-interested manipulations of a new mandarinate. The problem with the film is less that Gabor doesn't offer a genuine solution, an alternative for Eastern Europe—if such had been the case, *Realpolitik* would certainly have intervened—and more with the solution that is implied. His standpoint does not permit any distinction between the petty opportunisms all too characteristic of daily life and the principle of 'life' itself. Rather they are seen not only as natural but are celebrated as the 'spice of life'. Gabor pays lip service to the 1960s dictum that the personal is political by linking the political short-comings of his targets to negative personality characteristics. Yet even 'integrity' is no guarantee that wrong things will never be done for supposedly 'greater ends'. He demonstrates that political opportunism has its foundations in self-interest, but cannot, at the expense of his contrast between the spontaneity of life and the stultification of institutions, expose the link

between such opportunism and the petty practices of everyday life.

Inevitably the viewer is left with an individualistic rather than collective alternative to the bureaucratized Party. We have only monolithicity or an abstracted humanism, a celebration of the mysteries of life and the splendid isolation of individualism. It is not only the critique of Stalinism that gives the film some legitimacy in the eyes of the Party in Hungary, but also its individualistic philosophy. This is not to assert that liberalism is identical to the official ideology of the Party, but rather to claim that it is not threatening. Nor is it only the film's ambiguity, which leaves room for multiple interpretations, that makes it acceptable for western critics. There is, instead, a basic, ideological similarity. Maria may be the most admirable character, but any real opposition to the degenerate politics of the regimes in Eastern Europe demands more than the principled integrity of a few intellectuals, a dramatic refusal that stops only at a desire to retain clean hands, however abstractly logical the view that, 'if only everyone . . ." It is this solution, the film's dubious socialism and, ironically, its anti-intellectualism that are the sources of the film's acceptance by western intellectuals.

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REASON AND VIOLENCE:
MORE THAN A FALSE ANTITHESIS—
A MECHANISM OF PATRIARCHAL POWER

Geraldine Finn

The following two commentaries were presented as part of a day-long interdisciplinary feminist session on REASON AND VIOLENCE: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES held during the Learned Societies' Meetings at Ottawa University, June 9, 1982. The object of this session was to bring together feminists from across the various disciplines—psychology, sociology, politics, biology, history, etc.—to explore the connection between "reason" as traditionally interpreted and "violence" as traditionally practised. Designated speakers were asked to reflect upon what they had learned about "reason" in their efforts to theorize and/or combat that violence. The selection of speakers and topics was informed by my own conviction that reason is an instrument of violence, of specifically male violence, and not its antithesis as we are often told, and by my need to test this hypothesis against the 'evidence'. What follows is a summary of my introductory comments to the session which indicate how this thesis might be defended.

It is commonly assumed though seldom actually argued that reason and violence are antithetical or mutually exclusive. It is further assumed though, again, rarely argued that reason is good (right and desirable) and violence bad (wrong and undesirable).[1] Those who challenge this presumed antithesis usually do so by pointing out that not all violence deserves to be dismissed as irrational and that in some circumstances the most rational thing to do is to act (or more commonly, to react) violently. In such cases (for example, in cases of self-defense), it would be contrary to reason to refrain from violence.

This weakening of the antithesis affects only one of the terms of the presumed polarization, however, by conceding that violence is not always exclusive of reason. The *key presumption* of the antithesis, that reason *per se* is right and its right to rule is sovereign, remains unchallenged.

It is rarely argued that reason itself may be a source of violence—and when it is, it is always presumed that there has been an historical 'falling away' from a more primordial and pristine 'higher' reason (which would necessarily exclude violence) to a 'lesser' instrumental or technical rationality, for example, which is the real root of the violence perpetrated in reason's name.[2] I know of no critique which suggests that *reason itself* and not just its historical forms and deviations may be a source of violence. It seems that Reason, like Science and the Family, is sacrosanct; an *a priori* good thing which in itself can only benefit humanity—in spite of what would appear to be a wealth of evidence to the contrary. Any

violence associated with Reason, like the violence associated with Science and the Family (1 in 10 wives in Canada battered, 1 in 4 girls incestuously assaulted) is attributed, again *a priori* to particular and supposedly accidental features of an historical form of Reason, Science or the Family, and never to Reason, Science or the Family itself.

I maintain, by contrast, that Reason itself is constitutively and not accidentally violent,[3] and that it is neither good nor even neutral (i.e. that its value depends on its use), but like Science and the Family it is a constitutive part of a political ideology (a theory and a practice) and apparatus of violence which is used to keep subordinates in their place in a given social and economic order. I believe, furthermore, that this Reason is most fundamentally an instrument of specifically *male* power and violence, constructed in the image of men and rooted in a peculiarly male experience of powerlessness and alienation, and that it is, perhaps first and foremost, an instrument of their particular alienation of women.

These are large claims and I cannot pretend to defend them adequately in the space of these few pages. What I will do, however, is indicate the *general* direction of my arguments and some of the particular details by which it might be supported.

First, no one can really say what Reason is.[4] But whatever it is, (or is said to be) it is constituted in discourse and within that discourse has always been characterized as follows: as that by which we arrive at *Truth;* as that which always has its *Other* (what Reason is always contingent upon what it *is not*: it is not faith, for example, or emotion, or personal, or particular); as in some sense a function or faculty of the *mind.* These three characteristics of Reason, vague as they may be, are sufficient to render Reason both political and politically inaccessible (invisible, indefinable, intractactable) and are the root of Reason's enormous power and Reason's violence. This is because, whatever it is (whatever precise content or denotation is attributed to Reason at any given moment in history) Reason is always exclusive and authoritarian, polarizing and law-making. *It always has its Other* over which it is sovereign, which it is entitled to control or destroy as circumstances demand. This is why I believe Reason to be constitutively violent.

Within the discourse of Reason, Reason as the locus of Truth plays the part of God. It is both the Author and Arbiter of the objective order of the world and of our knowledge of it, on the assumption that there is a single correctness about the world and Reason proves our sole access to it. As the norm of knowledge (i.e. as God) Reason is law-making and law-preserving. But law, as we learned from Walter Benjamin,[5] is itself "an immediate manifestation of violence" in that violence is a necessary condition of its possibility. (How we 'define' violence will be considered later in this paper; the sense in which it is being used until then should be clear from the context.) For law is established and maintained only through force: the forced repression of dissent, the forced submission of dissenters. And indeed we have all been forced into 'acknowledging' the various (and often changing) 'truths of Reason': by failure, discipline, humiliation or expulsion in our pursuit of knowledge in academia; by threats of hell and damnation in

our pursuit of goodness in religions; by hospitalization, alienation or incarceration in our pursuit of social and psychological health in our 'private' family and social lives; by unemployment and homelessness in our pursuit of a living in our 'public' and 'productive' lives; by prison, death or exile in our pursuit of justice and self-determination in our 'political' lives—and so forth.

Again, if Reason is Truth then that which is not Reason (and there is always something which is not Reason, for Reason is essentially oppositional—it would be nothing were it not for that to which it is opposed) is False and a candidate for elimination or repression.[6] Since Reason itself has no real referent (or content) and is actually constituted as that which it is not, anything can be opposed to Reason depending on what it is politically expedient for the ruling-class spokesmen (sic.) of Reason (i.e. of Law) to discredit, control or repress at the time - nature, experience (both 'subjective' and 'objective'), faith, emotion, intuition, instinct—and even forms of Reason itself re-named and re-classified as 'rationalism', 'scientism', 'instrumentalism, 'objectivism', 'subjectivism' and so forth. For Reason, if it is Right is necessarily exclusive: of certain knowledges and certain subjectivities. It disqualifies most often knowledge acquired from particular practice and concrete everyday experience (i.e. *knowledge available to everyone*) at the same time as it diminishes those subjects who can only speak from these positions—historically women and those men who do physical labour—those who service a ruling-class who claim to 'know' and 'rule' by virtue of their superior Reason miraculously untarnished by the 'personal', 'material', 'practical' or 'emotional' constraints which disqualify those over whom they rule from both knowledge and the good life.[7]

Thus Reason serves the ideological (always political) purpose of *ruling-out* as ill-founded and irrational and therefore untrue the only knowledge available to members of certain social classes (the dominated). Since knowledge is power and truth a knowledge-effect i.e. an effect of power, the discourse of Reason effectively deprives members of these classes of social power and maintains and reproduces its concentration in the hands of a ruling and leisured élite.[8] Immediate truths which originate in and are verified by the actual practice of life are, along with those with access to them, ruled out of the court of Reason. They are in turn obfuscated, discredited and repressed (as subjective, particular, and unverifiable, for example) in the name of a transcendent Reason whose 'eternal' categories of thought are sanctified as sovereign.[9]

The identification of Reason with the Mind reinforces this polarization which I maintain is implicit in and necessary to the discourse of Reason, and reproduces it as a feature of reality itself. At its most primitive the dualism presumed by the discourse of Reason consists in the division of human beings into minds and bodies and the simultaneous association of Reason (Truth and Right) with the former.[10] It is man's (sic.) Mind or Reason we are told which distinguishes him from the rest of the natural world and entitles him to sovereignty over it.[11] Knowledge is a function of the Mind and knower and known belong to different orders of being. Man, the Mind, is the subject who knows; Nature, mere matter, the object known. The knower is active, the known passive. The knower is

universal, the known 'merely' particular. This fundamental dualism—part and parcel of the discourse of Reason—has generated a whole battery of dichotomies which are constitutive of male-stream thought at all levels—the political, economic, historical, scientific or whatever—the most common of these being the supposed oppositions between: mind and body, reason and emotion, culture and nature, universal and particular, abstract and concrete, sacred and profane, divine and mundane, absolute and relative, subject and object, order and disorder, real and apparent, self and other, light and dark, good and bad, true and false, and of course, male and female.

I maintain that this division of reality is peculiarly and not accidentally male. It serves peculiarly male needs for a certain kind of power, needs which women do not experience as a result of their more immediate and concrete relationship to the species by way of their reproductive activity. These dualisms express at the ideological level men's experienced alienation from species continuity, creativity and community at the basic material level of their relationship to reproduction— from which they are essentially excluded. Consequently, male thought emphasises difference, separation, opposition, polarity and conflict in its discourse about the world. For that is indeed how men experience their relationship to species continuity, creativity, community and control: they are alienated from it. At the same time male thought expresses men's desire for a unity, continuity and community they do not immediately experience in their everyday lives, in its persistent aspiration to 'oneness': to the universal, absolute, eternal and unassailable knowledge and subjectivity of a transcendent and impersonal Reason.[13]

The dualism of male-stream thought, of which the discourse of Reason is a powerful and telling example[14] serves men's interests by mediating ideologically[15] their experienced alienation from the species. But it does so at the expense of women's lives. For women are men's Other; we therefore belong to that pole of the system of dichotomies which requires control and domination by the other pole consisting of Reason and Men. This identification of women with the irrational and inhuman pole of the mind/matter dichotomy persists to this day and serves to disqualify female knowledge *a priori* whenever it fails to conform to the norms and practices of male-stream rationality.

Representing the world in dualistic terms allows the knower to treat not only nature but also people as objects and to take no kind of responsibility for the uses and direction of his knowledge—which is declared Rational, and therefore impersonal and objective.[16] It has enabled men, the knowers, to falsely abstract themselves from nature, as if they were not themselves historical, material, organic and social beings. This abstraction of men from the rest of nature, and from women, is the root at one and the same time of both their *power,* for they can be ruthless with others with whom they feel no identification, and their alienation, from the world, each other and themselves. It is also a measure of their freedom, and, for them, of their 'humanity'; for the more they control the more free they think they are. But the more free they are in this sense, the more alienated they are from their real material roots in nature and intersubjectivity. Within the discourse of Reason, freedom and alienation are far from being anti-

theses: they are two sides of the same coin—gains in freedom perceived as control over nature only increase the alienation they are presumed to remedy.[17]

Reason and violence are far from antithetical, therefore. On the contrary, Reason is constitutively violent, first because it is Right and therefore necessarily coercive, and secondly because it is most essentially part of a mechanism of power.

But what is this violence to which Reason is conventionally opposed? Just as there is "no universally agreed or uniquely correct sense of Reason"[18], so, it must be acknowledged, there is no universally agreed on or uniquely correct sense of violence. I follow Robert Paul Wolff's example[19] here in maintaining that what is perceived and conceived as violence varies according to expectations and to one's vital interests. When my peripheral interests are at stake anything in excess of moderate force from others, whether mental or physical, will be perceived as violent, while I am inclined to forget that other parties to the dispute may find their primary interests challenged and thus have a different view of what is and is not violent. (Compare the "violence" of a husband's response to a scratch on the fender of 'his' car, with the 'violence' of a wife's respose to a muddy footprint on the kitchen floor.) Basically, then, the concept of violence, like Reason" serves as a rhetorical device for proscribing those political uses of force which one considers inimical to one's central interests".[20]

The denunciation of physical force within the discourse of Reason, therefore, as irrational, immoral and illegitimate as a way of resolving conflict, enforcing decisions or achieving ends, serves an ideological function of ruling out the only instrument of power available to those social classes whose subordination it ensures and relies on. It is alway *those who hold power,* that is, those who have the ability (the social power) to enforce decisions, who insist on the correctness of 'rational methods' (husbands, fathers, university directors, department chairmen, property owners, teachers, doctors, etc.) for settling disputes and challenges to the *status quo;* who declare the use of physical force (though not the use of mental coercion, for that is a mechanism of *their* power and therefore serves their vital interests) to be violent and therefore irrational and inappropriate. (Except, of course, when it is named 'counter-violence' as is done in the cases of prisons and asylums—more 'rational' methods of social control.) This should not surprise us, for physical force is a means to power, ultimately that upon which all power, even the 'legitimate', is based; and argument is not. Physical force must therefore be suppressed if present power structures are to be preserved.[21] Argument, on the other hand, is to be encouraged for it poses no direct threat to the ruling order. It merely postpones change indefinitely, distracting opposition, while maintaining prevailing power relations.

The appeal to argument, 'rational methods' and Reason should be seen for what it is: an essentially *defensive* tactic i.e. a tactic of those who are defending their power. For they are not, in their turn, required to support their position or their stipulation against physical force with reasons. Their characterization of some forms of force as *physical,* and others as not; of physical force as *violent,* and others as not (e.g. the force of argument, the force of law); of violence as

exclusive of Reason; of Reason as right and therefore the only permissible means to social ends . . . All these are *a prioris* unsupported themselves by 'rational argument'—for they cannot be. Their legitimacy and authority, like all legitimacy and authority, is founded in *Rule* not Reason, *Force* not argument and *Power* not persuasion. Far from being the "precise opposite of power and violence" as Popper proclaims, Reason is its equivalent, and one of the most effective means of its exercise and mystification.

C.E.G.E.P. de l'outaouais

Notes

1. Popper in his 1947 address "Utopia and Violence" reprinted in *Conjectures and Refutations,* 1963, voices these assumptions about reason. "I am a rationalist" he says, "because I see in the attitude of reasonableness the only alternative to violence"..."I believe that we can avoid violence only in so far as we practice this attitude of reasonableness when dealing with one another . . . I choose rationalism because I hate violence". "Reason is for him the precise opposite of an instrument of power and violence; he sees it as a means by which these may be tamed". In "Reason and Revolution", in *Archiv. Europ. Social. XI,* 1970, he reaffirms this commitment claiming that "reason is the only alternative to violence so far discovered". For a discussion of Popper's views see Roy Edgley, "Reason and Violence" in Korner, *Practical Reason.*

2. I am thinking here, of course, of the Frankfurt School of thought.

3. I also believe that Science and the Family are constitutively and not accidentally violent. For a discussion of this claim with respect to Science see my "Women and the Ideology of Science", in *Our Generation,* Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring, 1982.

4. "There is no universally agreed or uniquely correct sense of reason", *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. Paul Edwards.

5. See "On Violence" in Walter Benjamin, *Reflections, Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings,* 1968, from which the subsequent quotation was taken.

6. Reason rarely eliminates that which it is not for it usually requires the emotion (the caring of women for example) or the physical strengths and skills of others)the labour of colonized people for example), which it denounces and alienates from itself, in order to be at all. (C.f. the Master—Slave relationship in Hegel and de Beauvoir's elaboration of it in *The Second Sex*).

7. Historically, Reason emerged as the norm and law of knowledge, truth and right around the time of Pythagoras when the separation of knowledge and philosophy from the techniques of production kept pace with the rise of slavery and an increasing contempt for manual work. "It was found extraordinarily fortunate that the secret constitution of things should reveal, not to those who manipulated them, not to those who worked with fire, but to those who drew patterns on the sand." Indeed, it becomes difficult to hold any other view of the origin of knowledge—that knowledge could be arrived at by interrogating nature directly, for example— "when all the implements and processes by which nature is made to obey man's will" (sic.) have become the province of slaves, subordinates and social inferiors, like women. See Benjamin Farrington, *Greek Science,* from which these quotations were taken.

8. This is Foucault's language. See his *Power/Knowledge,* for example, published recently by Pantheon Books. The ideas in this paragraph are explored more fully in my paper on "Women and the Ideology of Science" cited above.

9. Categories are like definitions. They oblige us to represent reality in predetermined ways and exclude us from knowledge and/or rationality (and power, of course) when we do not. They dictate unchanging patterns of both natural and cognitive events and processes and they fix the truth—and therefore power. For a further critique of categories and definitions see "Women and the Ideology of Science", op. cit..

10. It is a historical question, whether the discourse of Reason coincided with the emergence of dualistic thinking. As far as I can tell it did—in the history of 'Western' thought both appear along with Pythagorean idealism. But this point requires further consolidation.

11. Just as God, the Almighty Mind or Logos of the world gets his entitlement to rule over Man from His supposedly superior Rationality, uncontaminated as it is by any contact with the flesh or matter of any kind.

12. For a thorough and truly ovarian analysis of the thesis proposed here see Mary O'Brien's *The Politics of Reproduction,* Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.

13. It is, in fact, an aspiration of Godliness which the existentialists, in particular Sartre, have documented so well and transformed into a metaphysics.

14. It seems that all male thought is dualistic, including mythological thought. The extension of this analysis to so-called "pre-rational" or "pre-scientific" thought remains to be done. I am inclined to think that Reason replaced the Phallus as the talisman of men's difference and power, as a symbol and expression of their alienation, and as an instrument of their control over women, nature and progeny. But again, this hypothesis requires further consolidation.

15. I use the term "ideology" here very much in Althusser's sense of the term whereby ideology is an apparatus of power which alludes to reality in an illusory way. Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of "subjects" to the world and each other, but it can be decoded to reveal the truth it is mystifying and reifying and which is its condition of possibility.

16. I am paraphrasing Margaret Benston here, see her "Feminism and the Critique of Scienific Method" in *Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics,* ed. by Angela Miles and Geraldine Finn, forthcoming from Black Rose Books.

17. This point is dealt with more fully in my paper on "Women and the Ideology of Science" op. cit. where it is extended to include a critique of Humanism.

18. *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. Paul Edwards.

19. Robert Paul Wolff, "On Violence", *The Journal of Philosophy,* 66,1969.

20. Wolff, op. cit. p.613

21. Not only physical force of course. The power of emotion and feeling must also be discredited for the holders of power are human after all and powerful emotions as well as physical force are also capable of rocking the boat.

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REASON AND VIOLENCE:
THREE FIGURES OF THEIR RELATIONSHIPS

Louise Marcil-Lacoste

This interdisciplinary workshop on reason and violence is meant as an exploration of their connections from a feminist perspective. In my closing remarks, I shall focus on three possible figures of the relationships between reason and violence: the traditional antinomy, the neoclassical connection and the recent inversion. These figures were suggested to me by the papers presented during this workshop, along with the discussions following their presentation; in delineating their features, I shall also refer to some of my own research in women's studies, especially that devoted to the notion of reality of aggression.

My reflections will begin in a manner somewhat similar to Geraldine Finn's introductory remarks on the more than false antithesis between reason, as traditionally interpreted and violence as traditionally practiced. As Geraldine Finn has argued, the traditional interpretation of the relationships between reason and violence is pervaded by moral connotations and rests on an antithesis: reason is good and violence is false. My own reflections will address, however, a different and perhaps more epistemological issue than the moral antithesis.

I agree with Geraldine Finn's thesis that the typical qualification of reason and violence by means of moral connotations rests on a false antinomy. I also think that Geraldine Finn's argument—that we could not improve the theoretical and practical network of issues at stake here by the attempt to weaken the side of violence, while dismissing the side of reason as a mere historical accident of rationality is quite crucial. However, my concern here is different. Indeed, much in the line of today's repeated strictures against dualism, dichotomies, antinomies, etc, the attempt to check violence against women should not lead us to a rhetorical stance. The main problem I have in mind is the tendency to label indiscriminately any form of behavior concerning women that is morally unacceptable as violent behavior.

I take it to be one of the most interesting and promising result of today's discussion that the more we were specific on the issues of reason and violence, the better we could see, tell and prove the tricky and inadmissible nature of their relationships when discussing the question from a feminist perspective. My plea, therefore, will be in favor of specificity as a heuristic device, bearing in mind that the rejection of a (false) antithesis between reason and violence does not commit ourselves to the endorsement of their identity. As a matter of fact, it would seem that the only possible level of identification of reason and violence lies in the kind of broad statements on their "total" nature, which have the unfortunate effect of slipping from the absence of any recognized connection between reason and violence to the diffuse presence of a relationship everywhere. From a methodological point of view, this transition leads us back again, all too often, to the starting point, to nowhere.

In order to present a more specific approach and in order to avoid possible misunderstandings, let me add that in arguing against the identification between reason and violence, I am not intimating that violence against women is *not* manifold, systematic, connected in many ways with reason, and in *this* sense, that their relationship is everywhere. Nor I am suggesting that it could be possible to solve, or to check one particular form of violence against women, without addressing quite a variety of other forms of violence and of other factors. What I am saying is that in order to deal accurately with this overwhelmingly complex network of issues, we do not have to treat all forms of violence against women as if they were alike, and all forms of rationality as similar—including women's experience which Helen Levine forcibly described, today, as a genuine form of knowledge.

This plea in favor of specificity as a heuristic device can be illustrated by reference of today's discussions. For example, there are important connections between raping or beating and what Debra Lewis described as the "day-to-day" experience of violence, such as, for a woman to be afraid of walking alone on a street at night. However, one should also be wary of frequent trivialization of such demonstrations, the putting of, say, rape or battering on a par with, say, the social prohibition of a woman's disagreement with men; or of shock-treatments as a privileged resort for women with a lack of emotional support on behalf of male friends or husbands; or, again, the consumption of D.E.S. with male/female discrepancies in income, etc. The point is, indeed, that it is too easy to invoke the (perceived) less damaging forms of violence against women in order to trivialize them all. As well put by Pat Hughes today, it is too easy to explain away obvious cases of violence against women by focussing on less obvious ones. Again, and this point was well illustrated by Lesley Silver and Denise Stone, it is very easy to proceed to a "communalization" of violence against women.

It would seem, therefore, that our concern to avoid false dichotomies, erratic dualisms or ungrounded oppositions should not lead us to re-enact new forms of dualism. Geraldine Finn has remarked that it was part of the traditional interpretation of the relationship between reason and violence to provoke a higher indignation toward physical violence, in comparison with legal violence. Be that as it may—it would seem that, at least in the legal domain, the situation is not as clear-cut as it is claimed here; given the analysis of Pat Hughes and Sandra Léveillé, it would seem difficult to provoke indignation even in the case of physical violence against women—my concern is that we do not endorse a new dualism now, treating, for example, physical violence against women as if it has only physical effects.

In other words, our choice is not between all or nothing, univocity or elasticity. When reflecting upon the relationships between reason and violence, from a feminist perspective, the point is to be specific enough to become able to delineate the different figures of these relationships, thereby becoming equipped to diagnose the moment when any given figure gives rise to unacceptable effects for women. This, I think, is one of the reasons why the topic of today's discussion is so difficult: when considering the impediments of one form of connection

between reason and violence, one is inclined to resort to its opposite. Yet, this other form of connection implies other problems, a point which was well illustrated today by Pat Hughes's puzzling questions concerning the exact nature of a desirable change about the judicial notion of rape, with reference to the new phrasing of Bill C-53.

I now turn to the *first figure* of the relationships between reason and violence, *the traditional antinomies*.

Traditionally, reason has been represented as the result of a calm, cold, moderate pursuit, whereas violence has been linked with passion, excessive ardour, impetuousness or immoderate behavior. In this context, of course, reason and violence are opposite notions, in the sense that reason is held to contrast with passion to the point of being diametrically different from it. More to the point, violence is not a rational phenomenon, nor could it *be made so* by applying reason to the study of its manifestations.

Though traditional, this view of the antinomy between reason and violence is not obsolete. It remains, so to speak, in the very *absence* of certain kinds of questions about violence and, more specifically, about the use of violence against women. For example, one does not ask "why" such and such a male person did commit harm or inflict injury to such and such a woman, in the sense in which one would ask "why" did the same person endorse this or that political creed.

A striking example of the importance of what is *missing* in terms of questions raised about violence or procedures delineated against it has been given today by Harriet Simard's study of the manufacturing of D.E.S., now linked to a rare form of cancer in the reproductive system of D.E.S. daughters. Approved as a medication for pregnant women in 1947, D.E.S. had been introduced without tests and animal experiments; it was not banned until 1971, though independent scientists discovered its ineffectiveness in 1953, and it is still on the market under so many names that its withdrawal defies any legal attempt.

To the traditional account of the antinomy between reason and violence, therefore, I think that a feminist perspective does add a refusal to ignore certain questions and an ability to raise them forcibly. In other words, as erroneous as this view might appear, the traditional antinomy between reason and violence has not even produced the kind of beneficial effects it might have implied, for example, in condemnning and banishing—as the logic of this antinomy should imply—the kinds of irrational double-standard we find when considering violence against women.

Besides, it would seem that recent research in women's studies provide us with new insights and a few refutations concerning this traditional and not obsolete interpretation between reason and violence as antinomies. Indeed, such research tends to show that many of the traditional forms of violence against women are not at all the result of the so-called "uncontrollable urge" of men. Leaving aside the issue of the controllability of urges or passions—the kind of theoretical issue which was most discussed before women's studies—those studies show indeed that, be that as it may, it simply is not the case that a rape, for example, could be explained by reference to "passion". On the contrary, as Susan

Brownmiller has shown for the U.S., and as Lorenne Clark and Debra Lewis have shown for Canada, rape is usually an action that is planned in advance, perpetrated by a group of men rather than a solitary outburst, and that it is "motivated" by a "cold" contempt, as well as a "designed" desire to demonstrate men's masculinity by exercising power over (and against) a given woman.

Again, as it has been exemplified by the recent Canadian report of the Permanent Committee on Health and Welfare, the "wife beating pattern" does not merely consist of slaps in the face or the throwing of dishes: it is made up of strangulations, rapes and all too genuine and brutal beatings. This "pattern" truly is a pattern in the sense that it is not a rare phenomenon: up to 10 per cent of Canadian women are brutalized every year. Such brutality is not associated with clear cases of psychological pathologies; rather, it is linked with all too normal personalities.

In today's sessions, we have had a few more suggestions in this line. Thus, as argued by Barbara Roberts, deliberate and random direct *physical* violence against women benefit directly and indirectly from *structural* forms of violence, related to poverty, inequality, subordination, dependence, etc. In turn, those structural forms of violence themselves result from the systematic appropriation of female labour, etc. Again, as argued by Helen Levine, the external and internal forms of violence against women continue unchecked because of a "reason" which, in contemporary psychiatry, "helps" women to conform to oppressive life conditions, and fixes women's attention in the wrong direction, that of a "private" problem. In Lesley Silver's paper, we are shown that the very language used in the "helping" professions renders violence against women acceptable, thereby reinforcing the double-standard approach to the question of protection from violent assaults in the legal system. The urgent need would seem to be to protect men from other men rather than women from men. This last thesis has been reinforced today both by Sandra Léveillé's study of the withdrawal of sanctions against assailants in cases of sexual assault against women, and by Pat Hughes' comments on violence against women as a means a social control, a notion still to be found in the new writing of Bill C-53.

In other words what most of today's papers challenge is the traditional dichotomy between reason and violence, as traditionally understood, mainly on the basis of the following awareness: what is generally held to be "irrational", that is, violence, is at once too concrete, too frequent, too structural, too systematic, too easy to explain and too readily "helped" by the use of (ordinary and scientific) reason to be taken as a case of antinomy.

In considering this traditional view of the relationship between reason and violence, a feminist perspective is thus lead to require that we stop practicing a systematic blindness to, and/or a systematic neglect of a whole series of brutal facts. All in all, this whole series of brutal facts suggest rather that far from being a matter of antagonism, the relationship between reason and violence is rather a matter of justifying violence by the use of reason, including, let me insist, the justification of the most physical, obvious and brutal forms of violence against women.

It is, I think, in this line of justification of violence by reason that Rachel Vigier's analysis of the Rational Violence of Male-Stream Thought takes its full sense. She reminds us that the traditional dichotomy between reason and violence does not bear the touchstone of historical facts related to philosophy. Philosophers, she argues, upheld the very relationship between reason and violence to be essential to life: the mind sees the world as an hostile environment, the body as an affront to the purity of thought, and other beings as a violation of the Self. Consequently, they saw women as threats: their biological security about the continuity of the species (the fact that they give birth) would destroy men's possibility of becoming a potent force in the world, a mediating force between life and death.

My claim here therefore is that there are crucial questions, which are not commonly raised about violence, and more specifically about violence against women, because violence is presumed to be irrational in being the perfect antithesis to reason. This assumption is what a feminist perspective ought to challenge. In the light of recent research indeed the truth of the matter seems to be that violence is anything but irrational and that reason is anything but a rampart against violence. After all, even such a feminist thinker as Ashley Montagu has argued in the still-quoted *The Natural Superiority of Women* (1952), that misogyny was a reaction formation due to men's envy of women's biological superiority: women give birth, they have two X chromosomes, they endure stress better and deprivation, they are longer-lived, etc.

Considerations such as these lead us to the *second figure* of the relationship between reason and violence, *the neo-classical connection.*

For the purpose of clarification, let us recognize, that in matters of violence, something like Pascal's saying about the relationship between reason and what he called "le coeur" might be at stake. Pascal's famous statement was: *"Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas."* In other words, there is another way of looking at the relationship between reason and violence on the basis of which one would be inclined to say that, though different from logic, there is a certain rationality to be elicited from violent manifestations of males against women. There is, one would say, a certain "logic" to passions, ardour, aggressiveness, subconscious needs, and even perhaps a certain "chic" to what philosophers now call "la démesure", the going beyond or out of measure, perhaps what Helen Levine described, today, as the "clarity of madness".

In this context, reason is not to be identified with ordinary common sense, folk psychology, the search for balance and the proper middle, not even with the abstract and linear form of thinking which is dominant in most disciplines. Nor is violence to be presented as irrational, absurd or ridiculous. It could just be, so this interpretation would go, that the relationship between reason—a way to account for various phenomena—and violence—a way to find otherwise unavailable outlets—constitutes a fundamental feature of the human (or perhaps the male's) biogrammar.

In *The Descent of Woman* (1973), Elaine Morgan argued that the "Tarzan theory of evolution" takes it for granted that male hormones give them a greater

propensity for aggression. Again, as Mary Ann Warren argues in her encyclopedia on *The Nature of Woman* (1980), sociologists who look for ethology in order to find clues to laws of human interaction generally argue that aggressiveness, dominance and status keeping are inherent male traits. She cites Morris, Tiger, Storr, Lorenz (as interpreted by Fast), Maccoby and Jacklin, Goldberg, Johnston, Ellis, etc. She also quotes Ardrey, who insists on the rather telling "fact" that males compete among themselves for territory and for status, but not for females. She refers to Wilson's thesis on the male dominance over women as an example of hypertrophy, that is, the magnification of small innate differences by (so-called) economic and cultural progress.

There are, of course, debates. Some like Bardwick argue that aggressiveness is not a trait toward which males have an inherently greater disposition than women. Others argue that there is no necessary connection between aggression and power, while still others claim that though "natural", or hereditary, male aggression and violence need not be inevitable (Tiger, Fox) or morally justifiable (Holliday, Tiger, Fox).

What I think a feminist perspective does add to such debates, and I think today's session is a good illustration of this fact, is a healthy refusal to be caught up in the bird-and-egg problem about innateness *versus* environment in violent behavior. This might be done in many ways but this refusal basically implies the following conviction: whatever kind of reasons could be given to explain men's violence against women—reasons which in many ways cannot explain the double standard approach to protection we mentioned earlier in the first figure—the most important and urgent issue lies in the diagnosis on what seems susceptible of being acted upon, now. Perhaps, after all, the issue lies more on the side of reason, than on the side of violence, reason being in this figure a cultural phenomenon, and violence, a natural one. In any case the issue surely lies on the side of all the institutional parameters which explain the continuity of violence against women.

Thus, today, Barbara Roberts addressed the economic variable of vulnerability toward violence; Helen Levine questioned the actual institution of psychiatry, Harriet Simard, the institution of medicine and pharmaceutical networks; Lesley Silver; Pat Hughes and Sandra Léveillé, the legal system; Geraldine Finn and Rachel Vigier, the institution of philosophy, while tonight papers will deal with the media.

In other words, and this is my second thesis, too much research time has been spent on the "deep" (natural) explanation of the male urge to dominate, to aggress, to be violent—and too little research time has been spent on the way to design effective scenarios, or in Wilson's phrase, "cultural ritualizations" by which the aggression drive of males—supposing it to be both natural and inevitable—would be redirected *away* from women.

I take it to be one of the important conclusions of the present workshop to realize that the generally endorsed moral thesis according to which all human beings should be protected from one another should not go on as the cutting by half of the universality of the prescription; that is, it should not go on in *not*

explicitly and systematically trying to include women in the application field of the norm.

This, I suggest, is the paradox of "protection" which feminist studies begin to make clear and to which Debra Lewis' paper referred this morning (when she showed the connection between protection and privacy, when talking of women) and which Barbara Roberts' analysis shows to be as much of a myth as the myth of women dependence. The "myth of protection" (women need protection) is a myth to the extent that institutions attempt to protect men from other men, but not women from men. The paradox of protection is the following: when it is time to "protect" women from indulging into the side effects, the after-effects or the bulk of equality treatments, we *do* find a lot of well documented studies, all quite copious in careful warnings. When it is time to assess violence, we have a lot of studies showing not merely the general thesis that any criminal is more to be pitied than condemned, but also the more specific (and sexist) thesis that a male criminal (for example, a rapist) is more to be pitied than his victim (the raped woman) and is the person who needs protection if he goes to jail for his crime (from other male convicts).

This inverted compassion is what I mean by the paradox of protection. It shows that if we do not have to face the neglect or the blindness that pervades the first figure of the antinomy between reason and violence, we have to face a complete reversal of moral categories, while dealing with the second. Poor males, says this figure, how unfortunate you *must* be in order to *need* such violent outlets! And, let us add, on *this* scale, it certainly is not difficult to explain why all women are depicted as Amazons, nor is it difficult to understand why, as Debra Lewis remarked today, the increase in male violence is readily attributed to a never-empirically assessed rise of feminism. The only innovative attitude, as related by Pat Hughes' comments today, would seem to say that, poor rapist, he did not know that his victim did not consent.

Thus, to go back to my point, when it is time to protect women from real and brutal physical and other sorts of assaults from men, rather than protecting them from the pitfalls of feminism, we readily fall back into conservative metaphysics, or negative heuristics, that is, the paths which ought to be avoided in research.

The irony of this story lies in the fact that, with this neoclassical figure of the connection between reason and violence, women are (for once) allowed reason but when and only when, like Lucia die Lammermore, they are said to have lost it. Or, in Sandra Léveillé's terms, women are ascribed the capacity to make responsible choice, only when they are the victims of rape. Or, again, as the studies of Lesley Silver and Denise Stone suggest, instead of looking for equality of protection for both men and women, we are looking for equality of assaults by men and women. The everlasting interest arisen out of statistical dust on women's aggression against men is the neoclassical way to trivialize the issue of violence against women.

The *third figure* of the relationship between reason and violence which I wish to adumbrate here is related to the last point; I have called it *the recent inversion*.

There is, indeed, still another line of interpretation of the relationship

between reason and violence which differs both from the antinomy and the deep connection. This interpretation actually makes violence a condition for reason itself, or at least, a condition for the superiority of men's reason over women's reason. Thus, according to Anthony Storr, in *Human Aggression* (1968), aggression is a natural instinct for males which accounts for many things but, more specifically, for the "undoubted superiority of the male sex in intellectual and creative achievement." Aggressiveness, in males, is thereby an "intrinsically desirable phenomenon" becoming destructive "only" when its "expression is inhibited". Men, Storr continues, become mentally ill when they do not behave aggressively enough, and women become mentally ill when they behave too aggressively.

Storr's statements, let us add, remind us forcibly of Charles Darwin's own thesis in *The Descent of Man* (1871): "Man is more courageous, pugnacious and energetic than woman, and has a more inventive genius."

Of course, neither Darwin, nor Storr tell us to what extent the "courageous, pagnacious and energetic" nature of man will actually lead to a "more inventive genius", by means of physical, structural and brutal assaults against women. As Corinne Hutt has argued in *Males and Females* (1972) "evidence suggests a strong link between male aggressiveness and greater creativity, ambition and achievement."

At this point, indeed, it is tempting to imagine that a parity of aggressiveness might be the answer. As a matter of fact, while only Rachel Vigier's paper addressed "positively" the violence issue on behalf of women, the discussions of this afternoon's workshop gave this question dramatic prominence. For obvious reasons, the third figure of the relationship between reason and violence is the most difficult to assess and to counter adequately. Up to a certain point the first figure, the antinomy, can be refuted; the second figure, the connection, can be completed and better balanced. But the third figure, the inversion, leads to the most puzzling logical and moral dilemma. Indeed, if women choose not to react violently—except in self-defence—then, they apparently choose not to modify the basic structure of societal violence by means of "the rules of the game." On the other hand, if women choose to react violently, beyond the self-defence step, then they confirm the ideology of violence, of brutality, of assaults. They further document the underlying ideology of "women as threats" which has been the most powerful instrument of justification both of women's subjugation and of violence against women.

The logical contradiction of condemning violence in males while admitting it in women is not easy to dismiss, even if one is arguing on the basis of a strategy of retaliation, that is, if one argues that we should expand the notion of self-defence from the individual domain to the social network of institutions. Though the last thesis would seem the most arguable tenet in this context, especially if one distinguishes between different sorts of violence, of retaliation and of diagnosis, its talion morality cannot easily get rid of the objection that in acting this way, one re-enacts an aggression morality. In other words, violence is not to be condemned merely because or when it is perpetrated by a certain kind of agent

(male of female); violence is to be condemned because it is unacceptable behavior. The problem, therefore, is to introduce violence on behalf of women without promoting and consolidating violence as the basis of human relations as a value.

In my opinion, further research is badly needed on this question and I will restrict my comment to a re-enforced plea for specificity: let us try to identify forms of violence which are to be checked; let us identify the forms of retaliations which are necessary for checking violent behavior, and let us then try to identify which forms of retaliations should be promoted by women from a feminist perspective.

But if the issue of women's own violence is still obscure, the feminist perspective does add something quite crucial to the analysis of the third figure of the relationship between reason and violence as an inversion. I refer, indeed, to the explicitation of the curse which such a (male) blessing implies for women, when one faces the glorification of violence itself as a means of superior intellect.

To put the thing crudely, women have then the choice between being violated, in many cases, actually brutalized or—if male phylogenetic violence is redirected away from *them,* that is, *ideally* in creative intellectual achievements—women then have the choice of applauding men's intellectual superiority. Women will then avoid the curse of sociobiology, if only they endorse Aristotle's vision of their more than inferior intellect, or Freud's belief in their "naturally" subservient masochistic propensity.

In today's terms, women must then choose among palatable alternatives such as taking a D.E.S. pill or not to have a child, being "helped" to conform to oppressive conditions or to break-down in the clarity of madness, or else—in Sandra Léveillé's apt phrase—to condone violence against them.

The trick here, on the side of women, is to be performed by the operation of love, a topic to which both Debra Lewis and Denise Stone alluded today. As Wilson wrote, in *On Aggression* (1963), "love and hate are inseparable, because such personal bonds form only in species with highly developed instincts for intraspecific aggression." Again, since the nineteenth century, Havelock Ellis' claim (in his *Studies in the Psychology of Sex,)* has been often repeated: "women enjoy and desire experience of physical pain when inflicted by a male lover." In more contemporay terms, most (true) women enjoy being raped.

Today's workshop, I think, including tonight's session, is a powerful reminder that this two-fold glorification of aggression and superiority in males stands as a clear counter-example both for the first and the second figure of the relationships between reason and violence, a formidable case of sexist double standard while explaining the connection between reason and violence.

Helen Levine has insisted on the exclusion of the political context in order to define women's health and ill-health—compared with the legitimation of the political context as a factor of males' difficulties. Harriet Simard has insisted on the exclusion of the normal experimental procedures in the case of the introduction of the D.E.S. medication; Lesley Silver focussed on the professional language which induces an acceptation of male violence against women, while Rachel Vigier pleaded for a feminine account of aggressiveness, an aggressiveness which

would not be manifest against one another.

My final comment, therefore, will be a question. Could it be possible to designate a philosophy of human relationships which instead of assaults will talk of contacts, instead of aggression as a condition for creative thinking will talk of creative research as a condition for the elimination of violence.?

Back to the old and by now somewhat refreshing meaning of reason as a search for the proper middle, my question is: can we designate an identifiable proper middle between reason and violence, not a between "assaults" *versus* "aggravated assaults", but a between women's curse and men's blessing, a middle-point between neglect and brutality?

I shall leave it to you to answer but I am convinced that only a concern with the welfare of women could possibly provide us with the beginnings of a solution.

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REASON AND VIOLENCE

Papers Presented

Finn, Geraldine. Reason and Violence: Introductory Remarks

Hayden-Pirie, Marion. The Rise in Sado-Masochistic Imagery in Advertising

Huges, Pat. Legal Rationality and Violence to Women

Leveille, Sandra. Sexual Assault and the Judicial System

Levine, Helen. How Psychiatry, in the Name of Reason, Does Violence to Women

Lewis, Sandra. Misogyny, Violence and Social Control

Roberts, Barbara. Female Dependence and the Living Wage

Shannon, Kathleen and Pennyfeather, Joan. Speaking on *Not a Love Story* and *If You Love This Planet*

Silver, Lesley and Stone, Denise. Wife Assault: A Study in Power Relations

Simon, Harriett. Women, Medicine and Drugs

Vigier, Rachel. The Rational Violence of Male-Stream Thought

AMERICAN CAPITALISM'S NEW TESTAMENT

R.T. Naylor

George F. Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty*, Basic Books, New York, 1981.

The reign of conventional Keynesianism, as a philosophy of economic policy and a practical guide to redistributive justice, is over, at least in America. It was dethroned partly by the inexorable flow of events in the real world of business and politics, and partly by the increasingly feeble results of the applications of its doctrines. Lacking the dignity even to await the last rites, the schools contending for the succession already have an impressive record of public diatribe to their credit. The principal battle has been between the post-mortem neo-Keynesians, who continue to put their primary reliance on fiscal interventionism to stabilise the level of aggregate demand, and the "new" monetarists who assert the sufficiency of credit control via the money supply to influence demand conditions in desired directions. From time to time the two pretenders cease their own public quarrels to join forces against a third, much punier set of rivals—the handful of North-American followers of the Latin-American school of structuralists who are even more interventionist than the Keynesians but who target their policy prescriptions at the industry, and even at the enterprise level, with a view to creating the supply-side conditions for economic growth. Structuralism put its primary emphasis on assuring the growth of productive capacity through state intervention to break the institutionalized barriers to economic development imposed on peripheral economic regions via a division of labour determined by the metropoles. It therefore was never a serious contender, in America, with the two demand-side pretenders for the succession. The same is certainly not the case for the newest supply-oriented school of thought to throw down the gauntlet.

Collapse of the Keynesian Consensus

After the Second World War Keynesianism was institutionalized in Britain and in Canada. But in the U.S. its acceptance was belated, and its effective period of operation much shorter—a fact which explains the greater ease with which it was overthrown. During the brief period when it was accepted in the U.S., it worked for reasons that had little to do with its inherent logic.

Keynesianism was premised on the notion that government spending in

excess of tax receipts would, in the face of industrial excess capacity, eliminate unemployment and increase national income without generating appreciable inflation. That, in the U.S., for all practical purposes, came to mean the combination of, in Seymour Melman's expression, Pentagon Capitalism and the "key currency" status of the dollar. Pentagon Capitalism meant the emergence of a gargantuan system of corporate welfare in which leading sectors of American industry, particularly concentrated in the northeast, were guaranteed financial viability without reference to efficiency or managerial competence in anything beyond the cultivation of political and military connections. The "key currency" system meant that part of the cost of maintaining the flow of corporate largesse was passed on to America's chief trading partners abroad. As American "Keynesianism" worked, the U.S. government ran budget deficits, attributable in no small measure to the costs of military procurement at home, while the U.S. economy ran balance of payments deficits due to the export of fund for private investments and, increasingly throughout the 1960's, for military spending abroad. Since the U.S. dollar was *the* international medium of exchange, other countries absorbed the outflow of dollars from the U.S. into their foreign exchange reserves, and then re-lent them to the U.S. in the form of purchases of American government treasury bills. And since the issue of treasury bills financed much of the government deficit, the circle was complete. Easy fiscal policy (deficit spending) and easy money went hand-in-hand with rapid income growth; for the normally inflationary consequences could be diffused abroad as other countries absorbed the U.S. excess liquidity.

Confidence in the system eroded rapidly as the Vietnam War deepened and the pile-up of overseas claims on the U.S. treasury got proportionately greater. Financial shocks followed — the gold rush of 1968, Nixon's suspension of convertibility of the dollar into gold and the accompanying trade offensive in 1971, and the final collapse of international managed money in 1973. In the wake of the 1973 debacle the western world was haunted by the spectre of stagflation —declining productivity, rising unemployment, *and* rising prices. Within the U.S. the response among policy makers and academic economists was disciplined confusion. On the one hand *rigor mortis* Keynesians of the Chrysler school saw the solution in more-of-the-same-with-a-difference, in a perpetual government bail-out system for corporate incompetence despite the danger that, with the loss of the dollar's international status, the results would mean the institutionaliza-tion at home of the inflation formerly diffused abroad. On the other hand the new monetarists, with their star rising, and backed by Wall Street and Club of Rome advocates, preached economic conservatism and the paramount virtues of a stable dollar value of financial contracts even at the expense of zero or very slow real growth. In one fundamental sense, new monetarists and the Keynesians were Tweedledum and Tweedledee, both nagging at the level of aggregate demand but differing on how to control it, on how much to control it, and on the relative importance of unemployment and inflation as social ills. The more vociferous their public antagonisms, the clearer it became that the differences between them, including the question of the relative futility of their policy

prescriptions, were of degree rather than of kind. Hence when the supply siders came on the scene, they took the country by storm. While the old right had largely acquiesced in the philosophy of a government-corporate plutocracy, the new right stood for the moral rearmament of American capitalism around the altar of the free market mechanism. While the conservative Old Right fought to defend the entrenched powers of big industrial and financial interests, especially in the northeast, the radical New Right articulated the aspirations of the moral majority of small- and medium-size enterprises, particularly in the South and West.

Economics for the Moral Majority

The moral majority of enterprises inhabit a world that is radically different from that in which members of Pentagon Capitalism and other facets of the corporate welfare system dwell. Large firms have their financial viability guaranteed by the state, either by general demand-management policies, or, in the case of firms within the military-industrial complex, directly. In both cases firms can be relatively indifferent to cost, including the cost of credit, of labour, and of managerial incompetence; for additional costs can be passed on more or less at will to their customers, be they the state or the population at large. But moral majority firms have no such guaranteed annual incomes. They lack both the political key to entry into the military-industrial complex, and the market power to price on a simple cost-plus basis. Hence the reality of their plight when high and rising interest rates hamper their capacity to raise working capital or carry inventories, when a rising tax bite chomps off the surpluses necessary for self-financing of their capital requirements, and when unions or minimum wage laws prevent them from shifting the burden back down onto the shop floor.

Central to the supply-side creed are the reaffirmation of Say's Law and the entrepreneurial spirit. Say's Law states that the act of supplying commodities to the market simultaneously generates enough purchasing power in the form of payments for labour, resources, or services that went into the production process, to clear the resulting products off the market—ie, supply creates its own demand. If true, then this would obviate the need for government demand-management policies, and undercut the moral as well as the economic rationale of the welfare state. At the same time, exultations of the entrepreneurial role reaffirm the frontier spirit of American business, and provide the moral majority of firms with a much-needed shot in the political arm in the face of the entrenched power of the old corporate plutocracy. The resulting combination produced the mobilization of the moral majority behind the doctrine of supply-side economics and, in uneasy alliance with the Old Right, the capture of the levers of political power—and as well the imaginations of the American "middle class."

Supply-side doctrines are much more than economics. Supply-siders articulate

a philosophy that welds a protestation of faith in the entrepreneurial spirit with a reaffirmation of the traditional values of suburban America badly in need of a fillip to carry it out of the post-Vietnam doldrums. Supply-side economics then is the writ of America the beautiful at the enterprise level. It taps simultaneously the healthy current of traditional American political culture that distrusts big government and the bureaucratic decision-making process, and the unhealthy undercurrent of contemporary American political reflexes that yearns for the 1950s when good guys and bad guys had their roles well defined, and America walked tall on the world stage. Thus the supply siders, in conjunction with Ronald Reagan, assumed the position of moral and political leadership of Middle America left vacant by the respective demises, physical and metaphysical, of John Wayne and the Green Berets. What the supply side was lacking was a Good Book in which its gospel could be recorded in readily accessible form. Into that spiritual and epistemological void stepped George Gilder and his New Testament of the New Right, reiterating that

> faith in man, faith in the future, faith in the rising returns of giving, faith in the mutual benefits of trade, faith in the providence of God are all essential to successful capitalism.
> (p. 73)

Moral Foundations of the New Right

Gilder sets himself a task previous commentators on American business and economic life had demonstrably failed to do, namely "to capture the high adventure and redemptive morality of capitalism" (p. X), and thus to rescue it from the array of sins—ecological brigandage, sexism, racism, exploitation, and moral vacancy—imputed to it by the left (p. 7). Predictably he sees a socialist conspiracy everywhere, "in auditoria and parish parlours, among encounter groups of leftist intellectuals" (p. 3) and, presumably, behind the curtain in American boardrooms and, in the final sanctuary of America's most endangered species, under the beds of the nuclear family. To demonstrate the "moral value of capitalism" he feels it is essential to sell the notions that the American frontier is still open, that opportunities would still abound were it not for the heavy-handed interference of the state, and that the possibility of social ascent is open to all regardless of race, color, and for the most part, creed, though, fortunately for the future of the American nuclear family, not regardless of sex. Thus he defiantly flings the charges of the left back in their faces.

To the charge that capitalism entails the rapid depletion of non-renewable resources and engenders ecological chaos, Gilder replies that in fact the problem of resource depletion has been exaggerated and that, in any event, any problems

created by the current generation of capitalist enterprises become the new frontier in which the next generation can test their entrepreneurial skills. The problems of today are the challenges of tomorrow, the successful resolution of which both replenishes the spirit of entrepreneurial endeavour and, presumably, creates in turn yet another set of problems for the future (p.256). To Joseph Schumpeter's notion of creative destruction as the outcome of entrepreneurial activity, Gilder has added destructive creation, joining the two in a sort of social-psychological wheel of perpetual motion that continuously replenishes the moral fabric of American capitalism while providing the ecologists' dream of the ultimate non-nuclear solution to the energy crisis.

Sexism at the work place, the more rapid advance of men over women, the sexual hierarchy of authority, and unequal pay for equal work, is the next charge against capitalism on which Gilder sets his intellectual prowess to work. To him the economic manifestations of "sexism" are really the joint products of biology and the social requirements for the preservation of the nuclear family. Men are naturally more aggressive and career-oriented, and the future strength of American capitalism will require tapping these biological urges and harnessing them to the productive machine. Thus "the man's earnings, unlike the woman's, will determine not only his standard of living, but also his possibilities for marriage and children—whether he can be a sexual man. The man's work thus finds its deepest source in love." (p. 87) So much for sexism at the work place.

As to racism and poverty these are largely figments of the overactive imaginations of federal bureaucrats or, to the extent they are real, are due to the misinformed meddling of governments which, in their efforts to aid the "lower class", in fact destroy the initiative of its members and condemn them to the perpetual misery of a non-entrepreneurial role in life. Racism is long gone from American social life; and poverty, being a state of mind more than a social condition, would not exist if there were no federal standards by which to try to measure it nor federal bureaucrats to feed off it. However on one point Gilder is categorical. Poverty is not the same thing as income inequality, for inequality is essential to the functioning of the system. Gilder therefore disparages the "morbid egalitarianism of leveling down rather than summoning up" (p. 92) and the accompanying hatred of wealth and success. This is a tendency particularly pronounced at the United Nations where "voices rise with alternating zeal against the blight of want and against the Americans and Zionists, creators of wealth." (p. 96) As he sees it, in a message directed at once at the American poor and the underdeveloped world, "material progress is ineluctably elitist; it makes the rich richer and increases their numbers, exalting the few extraordinary *men* who can produce wealth over the democratic mass who consume it." (p. 259)

Finally, the ultimate charge against capitalism, and one which commentators prior to Gilder had been most remiss in failing to counter, lies in its supposed moral vacancy, a misconception which Gilder most energetically and imaginatively seeks to refute once and for all. Typically both antagonists and protagonists of capitalism have agreed on its fundamentally amoral character, on its exultation of hedonism and the principle of dog-eat-dog competition. To

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Gilder this is patently false. For capitalism starts not with avarice, but with the application to material life of the golden rule!

"Capitalism begins by giving", Gilder claims (p. 21), and finds is evidence in economic anthropology, particularly the potlatch ceremonies of the Indians of Pacific northwest coast of America. In this and similar primitive redistributive systems, gifts are made in the expectation of future returns. Thus the potlach, together with Say's Law of supply creating its own demand, constitute indisputable proof that "capitalism consists of providing first and getting later." As Marx *should* have put it, "redistribute, redistribute. That is Moses and the prophets!" But surely, one is inclined to interject, there is a vast difference between a primitive gift-exchange ceremony and the complex interactions of mature capitalism. Not so, says Gilder, "the gifts of advanced capitalism are called investments"! (p. 24) These are gifts which capitalists make to their society. Granted they are made in the expectation of return, but so too were the gifts made under the potlach ceremony. Even the Bible says the the giver will be given unto. But the actual level of returns to giving is never certain; for ultimately

> Capitalist production entails faith—in one's neighbours, in one's society, and in the compensatory logic of the cosmos. Search and you shall find, give and you will be given unto, supply creates its own demand. It is this cosmology, this sequential logic [sic!] that essentially distinguishes the free from the socialist economy. (p. 24)

Supply-Side Critique of Keynesianism in Practice

Building on the potlach, Say's Law, and the golden rule, Gilder moves on to a demonstration of how Keynesianism has reversed the sequential logic of capitalism, and at what cost. Keynesianism, in its problem analysis and policy prescription, exalts the demand side of the capitalist equation at the expense of the conditions for the growth of productive capacity that supply-siders stress as the key to prosperity and economic advance. Keynes, who evidently had never attended a potlach ceremony, reversed Say's Law and with it the golden rule. To Keynes, demand creates its own supply, thus putting a premium on individual avarice, creating the moral vacancy in capitalism which leftists attack, and implicitly putting a seal of social approval on the quest for a free school-lunch. Keynesianism is also charged with stifling initiative and innovation by focusing on the problem of stabilizing the demand for old products instead of creating the supply conditions for the emergence of new ones. By the same token it prevents the social rejuvenation of the capitalist class through the constant infusion of new talent and the consequent weeding out of dead wood that a fully functioning

market economy open to entrepreneurial initiative would permit. The key to the malaise, to the inverted morality, to the stress on taking instead of giving and on demanding instead of supplying, lies in the taxation and social security system of the modern state.

Gilder manages to conjure up a long list of charges against the modern welfare state. In terms of social effects, taxes lead to a loss of initiative and the will to self-improvement as the poor find their material needs taken care of by welfare and the rich divert their incomes into consumption and speculation and away from productive investment. Taxes, too, lead to a decline of public morality and a rise in underground economic activity beyond the range of the tax collector's grasp—drug-peddling, prostitution, theft, babysitting for unreported cash payments, and so forth. Taxes undermine the vitality of the arts, for they take away the surplus income of the formerly rich former patrons and force the arts to become dependencies of the state granting agencies. And most heinous of all the crimes of taxation against American social life, taxes destroy the nuclear family by effectively castrating the American male! For, "unlike the mother's role which is largely shaped by biology, the father's breadwinning duties must be defined and affirmed by culture." (p.122) Hence as taxes geld a large part of his income, forcing his wife into the work place, "the man unable to perform his role as breadwinner is being slowly unmanned." (p. 16)

The adverse social consequences of taxes are reinforced by the social security system they finance. The entire thrust of the welfare system is to take the risk, and the entrepreneurial initiative out of participation in the mainstream of American economic life, and breed precisely the social problems it is supposed to defend against. Hence "arson has for some years been among America's most popular crimes" and, rather than being caused by social tensions in the ghetto, as the white liberal manages to mislead himself and the public into thinking, "most of it is induced by fire insurance." (p. 108) Thieves arraigned in court cite as their defence, not need, but the existence of theft insurance. By the same token one could surmise, though Gilder does not do so explicitly, bank robbieries *caused* by deposit insurance and unemployment caused by unemployment insurance. And one might even be tempted to go further, arguing that disease is caused by medical insurance — though in this instance one would likely have the support of the American medical heretic, Dr. Mendelsohn, who has argued convincingly that universal medical insurance, by increasing the access doctors have to the general population, is dangerous to public health.

As to the macroeconomic effects of the tax and social security system, here three main charges are levied — and "proven" largely by Gilder's standard method of successive iteration and reiteration-cum-thesaurus. The first is that the social security system, apart from its general role in stifling initiative, permits the government to displace the private financial institutions in the intermediation of the flows of savings and investment, causing a decrease in the national (private) savings rate and a consequent capital crisis for industry. (How his contention here that the intermediation process is the heart and soul of the capitalist system squares with his earlier insistence that truly entrepreneurial

firms do not borrow from the outside capital market is a matter of some mystery.)

The second major charge is that the rates at which taxes in fact are levied make them actually self-defeating in terms of their revenue objectives. Here Gilder invokes the widely-famed and aptly-named Laffer Curve which resurrects, with the meticulous sense of public relations that only a Californian could muster, a trite old axiom of revenue tariff theory and applies it to the general income tax. The proposition holds that if tax rates get too high they stifle investment, causing output and income to fall, and therefore reducing aggregate tax receipts. Dwelling as they do in a world of ultimate faith, careful specification of secular causation has never numbered among the supply-siders' leading priorities.

The third charge which Gilder lays at the door of the tax and transfer system puts him on more solid ground. It is the contention that taxes—the cost of government services—get diffused throughout the economy and built into the cost of good and services, causing a net upward displacement of the overall inflation rate, rigidifying the structure of relative prices and costs, reducing the overall responsiveness of the economy to changes in scarcity prices, and creating a floor that hampers any subsequent tendency prices might have to fall again when firms become more efficient. This last point, stressing the adverse impact of taxes on the supply-side of the economy in exacerbating inflationary pressures goes to the heart of the on-going public dispute between the supply-siders of the New Right and the monetarists of the Old Right that is currently sowing confusion and consternation in Reaganite ranks.

Supply-Siders Versus Monetarists

Unlike both Keynesians and monetarists (to different degrees), supply-siders do not see inflation as a problem *per se*. Rather it is a symptom of a problem— the underlying malaise of productivity and the stifling of entrepreneurial initiative for which the final responsibility rests with the heavy hand of government. To a good supply-sider, inflation can actually accelerate the rate of capital formation by tilting the income stream in favour of the future, favouring the debtor over the creditor, and providing a propitious climate for exercising entrepreneurial initiative—the entrepreneur, unlike the *rentier* capitalist, has little or no difficulty protecting his future income stream from inflation. Inflation becomes a social problem only in the context of a leveling off of productivity growth, and in that case the reactivation of the growth process from the supply side, not hacking away at the level of demand, should be the government's policy priority. Faced with strong inflationary impulses, monetarists, old and new, demand austerity programs — raising of taxes to cut down government deficits and curtailing the growth of the money supply—to deflate aggregate demand. Supply-siders counter that tax increases are themselves inflationary, from the point of view of initiative and costs, and

contend that tax cuts to stimulate output and reduce costs is in the long run the only sound anti-inflationary strategy. Nor do supply-siders accept the prescription on monetary restraint, for its likely consequences are simply to squeeze the private sector, particularly small business, while leaving the government relatively impervious to its effects, thus diverting more resources to the public and away from the private sector. Indeed to Gilder and other supply siders the very notion of a monetary target is largely a chimera—the money supply adapts itself to a price level determined by costs, including taxes, either by changes in velocity or by the evolution of new institutional forms of payment.

Sense and Nonsense in the New Testament

It is clear enough from their critique of monetary policy and their perception of the consequences of the decline of the innovatory capacity of the American economy, that supply-siders, including George Gilder, have put their thumbs on real issues that have long eluded their demand-side foes. Contrary to the self-advertisement American supply-siders are prone to engage in, there does exist a long and impressive intellectual legacy to back up some of their claims. Latin-American structuralists have long argued convincingly that primary attention to supply-side conditions was essential to the development process, and their critique of demand-side austerity measures, aimed against the International Monetary Fund in particular, was at heart the same even if much more intelligently formulated and with careful reference to the international division of labour—as that which American supply-siders level at domestic monetarists. Furthermore the stress on the entrepreneurial process found in Gilder and other supply siders is largely copied from Joseph Schumpeter who, unlike his modern protegé, had enough basic economic sense to understand that the world had changed irreversibly since the days when Horatio Alger and Wyatt Earp extended the American frontier, each in their own mutually reinforcing ways. Indeed the very specification by the supply-siders of Say's Law —as a long-run tendency rather than a short-run identity—is so loose as to be acceptable to any Keynesian in terms of methodology, though not in terms of ideology. For it is there—at the level of ideology—that the supply-siders are truly different. Their ideological quirks are two-fold. One is the constant reiteration of ultimate faith in the free-market mechanism, dismissed by the structuralists, Schumpeterians, and Keynesians alike. The second is the social morality—or rather the "middle class" bigotry that they attempt to legitimize as a form of social science.

Gilder's *Wealth and Poverty* in the final analysis reflects the intellectual and social climate in which it was conceived and born. Discursive, meandering, unashamedly self-contradictory where that is expedient, often dull, but more often unconsciously funny, the book ends up being positively embarrassing to read, and not a little frightening. It is something that would have been laughed

out the door of any reputable publishing house in the 1960s and 1970s. Its emergence now—complete with the endorsement of political powerhouses from David Stockman (former Director of the Office of Management and Budget) to William Casey (Chairman of the Reagan Transition Team) to Representative Jack "ax the tax" Kemp—is a chilling sign of the times—of a deteriorating intellectual environment, of a rising Cold War cretinism in the guise of political discussion, and of a reassertion of the Archie Bunker streak in the North American soul.

The alternative explanation is that Gilder has out smarted us all, that in reality what he set out to create is the cleverest social satire since *Catch 22.* That if true would be no small relief.

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THE RADICAL INFATUATION WITH WESTERN MARXISM OR *LA BELLE DAME SANS MERCI?*

Rosaire Langlois

Russell Jacoby, *Dialectic of Defeat: Contours of Western Marxism*, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. X+202

One of the more striking characteristics of the re-orientation of social and political theory during the past fifteen years or so, has been the resurgence of interest in various types of Marxist theory.[1] Old theorists were rehabilitated—among them Lukács and Gramsci—and new thinkers were embraced—notably, Althusser and Habermas. The old faith took on new trappings. This second coming of Marxism bore little resemblance to the old-fashioned version. The very foundations of classical Marxism—for example, the stress on the role of the economy and technology on the organization of social life—were cast aside with a corresponding exaltation of the role of the autonomous human subject. Innocent bystanders could be forgiven for wondering whether the uniqueness and perhaps even the coherence of Marxism had not been compromised altogether. The latest work of Russell Jacoby, while not intended as an encyclopaedic survey of all the theorists and issues within the "Western Marxist" tradition, attempts a partial stocktaking and affords an opportunity for a tentative assessment of the approach.[2] Jacoby writes as both scholar and passionate partisan. Not all, however, will share his continued enthusiasm.

The Dialectic of Defeat is, at one level, a work of intellectual history. As such, it is a quite interesting and significant effort. At another level, it attempts a good deal more, though much less convincingly. As a critique of scientific or, in his term, "conformist" Marxism, as a venture in linking philosophical beliefs and their political implications, and as an attempt to decipher the roots of working class reformism in the West, the analysis is often stimulating but rarely convincing.

Jacoby contrasts the widespread concern of most Western Marxist theorists with the problem of democratic political strategies as opposed to the authoritarian and bureaucratic routes followed by Leninists and Stalinists. He documents how the roots of this difference can be traced, at least in part, to the different interpretations of Hegel that tended to prevail in Russia and Western Europe (p. 7). In Russia, Engels' scientific interpretation of Hegel was more widely adopted by modernizers who stressed the ideas of laws of development based on Hegel's *Science of Logic*. In Western Europe, meanwhile, the "historical" Hegel found a more favorable reception. The preferred text here was

The Phenomenology of Mind with its stress on subjectivity and consciousness (p. 38).

Jacoby demonstrates beyond any doubt that the attack on Engels' alleged deformation of Marxist theory began, not with Lukács as is quite commonly assumed, but rather with the Italian and French Hegelians of the 1890's. Already, Gentile, Croce and Rodolfo Mondolfo were alert to some important nuances separating Marx' and Engels' theoretical formulations. In passing Jacoby also attempts, successfully it would seem, to correct some recent misunderstandings with regard to the work of Rosa Luxemburg. Jacoby rejects attempts made to place her within the camp of orthodox Marxism, and reclaims her for "Western Marxism".

The book also contains interesting reflections with regards to the uncritical adoption by the Soviets of Western standards of technological and industrial progress. While Jacoby's *ex post facto* remarks can't help but strike a responsive chord in our own era of ecological crisis and "limits of growth", it is not altogether clear that the Bolsheviks should have been so clairvoyant at the time nor that they had a great deal of choice in the matter.[3]

One of the major themes of the work involves an attempt to establish a link between philosophical beliefs and political practice (p. 7). Although Jacoby quite explicitly denies any simple connection (p. 60), academic hedging aside, the main thrust of the argument is clear enough: there has been, he maintains, a strong tendency for the orthodox Marxists to resort to authoritarian and bureaucratic political strategies whereas Western Marxism has been permeated by a profoundly "democratic ethos". The psychodynamic core of orthodox Marxism, we are informed, rests on an "asceticism" and a "cold passion for science and authority" (p. 36). It is a thesis which, if seemingly obvious at first glance, is increasingly problematic on closer examination. Asceticism is often an historical concomitant of the industrialization process, including that of the Western nations, and its presence is not, in itself, a cause for surprise or concern. As for the connections between philosophy and politics, Jacoby mentions how Plekhanov, one of the ablest of the orthodox Marxist theorists, broke with Lenin, but neglects to mention that Karl Kautsky, the leading theorist of the Second International, another "scientific" Marxist—known for a time as "the Pope of Marxism"—did likewise.[4] No mention is made of Bukharin, who provides a somewhat similar case under Stalin.[5] While differing in political strategy, none of these men—perhaps the three major orthodox theorists—rejected their "scientific" Marxist approach. When one considers, in addition, that two of the most important Western Marxists—Lukács and Gramsci—as Jacoby admits, had changing or ambivalent attitudes towards Leninist political practice, the tenability of the thesis becomes less and less apparent.

Although Jacoby notes in passing that "economic and political conditions in Russia encouraged a Marxism that spoke to different imperatives than in Western Europe" (p. 7), he, regrettably, doesn't pursue this line of analysis at all. The distinguished American sociologist Lewis Coser produced a study, several years ago, which quite profitably examined the development of Marxian thought

in the early decades of this century from precisely this angle.[6] Coser showed, in quite some detail, how differing socio-economic conditions gave rise to the quite varied interpretations of Marxism. Jacoby's own study would have gained immeasurably by confronting the kinds of issues raised by Coser's analysis.

The discussion of "Class Unconsciousness", much the weakest chapter in the book, consists of little more than very brief presentations of various views on the question of why the Western working class has not taken up its revolutionary task. Arghiri Emmanuel's important development of the "labour aristocracy" theme is dismissed in a few words as "economic reductionism". Jacoby's qualified preference—though he refrains from any detailed discussion—would appear to favour "theories of mass culture, advertising, affluence and legitimacy". He would seem to be unaware of the limitations of these theories, all the while clinging—for unspecified reasons—to a faith in the future prospects of the Western working class (p. 126). A fine critical analysis of these very theories favoured by Jacoby has in fact been made by Allan Swingewood in a slim volume, *The Myth of Mass Culture*.[7] Swingewood not only details the profoundly conservative and unduly pessimistic nature of these approaches, but also discusses the subtle ways in which the "democratisation of culture" has been taking place, thereby providing a somewhat sounder basis on which to base one's hopes for the future.

A central concern of *The Dialectic of Defeat* is the inadequacy of orthodox Marxism with its "naked economic orientation" (a phrase of Bloch's cited approvingly p. 34) which has consequently "obliterated the human individual or subject" (p. 9). While other neo-Marxists have specified in more precise detail the nature of their objection to classical historical materialist theory—usually by stressing the "relations" as against the "forces" of production—the gist is the same.[8] Orthodox Marxism is, furthermore, in Jacoby's estimation, a distortion of Marx's original project. According to him, Marx's concept of "science" was not the same as what is meant by the term in French or in English (p. 21), and the aim of orthodox Marxists to construct a "real and positive science" (p. 35) is ludicrous, only serving self-discipline and restraining free, unstructured, thought.

In response to these contentions, it should be noted that it is far from being established that Marx's view of science was indeed so very different from our own after all,[9] and that, furthermore, quite apart from whatever Marx really thought about the matter, studies in anthropology and comparative sociology, principally in the last two decades, suggest, at the very least, that it would be premature to abandon the quest for a "real and positive science of society."[10] Progress in social science was very likely retarded by the tendency in the last century to almost systematically avoid a materialist research strategy: Harris has shown fairly conclusively that such a strategy has never been consistently applied.[11] Recently, however, major works by Cambridge anthropologist Jack Goody as well as research inspired by Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism* provide a plausible and quite sophisticated analysis of the ecological origins of the variations in economic, political and kinship systems, as well as the emergence of

literacy and its varied forms, in Africa, Europe and Asia.[12] This data with its emphasis on the primacy of the productive forces, in my view, is compatible with the evolutionary theories advanced by Joseph Needham—the noted biologist and historian—in a number of essays written in the 1930's and 1940's and recently republished. Needham's 1937 Spencer lecture—which has lost none of its relevance—is not only a brilliant essay in "grand theory" but also an original development of some aspects of the theory of scientific socialism.[13] This body of work may well provide the groundwork for a materialist and evolutionary theory of society which is both empirically grounded and conceptually coherent.[14] In spite of a number of fairly obvious affinities with classical Marxism, it is doubtful that this approach can be strictly classified as a Marxist one, and might more appropriately be considered a variant of "cultural materialism".[15]

The nature of this data does not, of course, permit any dogmatic conclusions, but it does raise the strongest doubts concerning the Western Marxist orientation on the issue of the role of the forces of production in social life. The theoretical implications of the data would appear to go directly counter to the central assumptions of Western Marxism. Why? The tendency, on the part of Western Marxists, to deny the primacy of the productive forces, is hardly surprising since any kind of materialist or environmentalist explanation of human action is in contradiction with the somewhat exaggerated views of human autonomy propounded by them.[16] As Wittfogel recently noted:

> ... man never achieves total freedom ... Marx stresses that man's freedom is based on dependence on nature and rational behaviour toward it ... If you believe that because the world is modernized you can ride nature like a horse, you are wrong. With progress this bond becomes only deeper, more complex but it does not disappear.[17]

These rather fundamental criticisms aside Jacoby's book is a provocative work containing much information that will be of aid to scholars. And while there does appear to be more problems with the Western Marxist tradition than Jacoby would seem to indicate or perhaps be aware of,[18] it would not do to be entirely dismissive of the tradition. Indeed many individual works will continue to provide a stimulus to reflection. There are grounds, however, as I have tried to indicate, for supposing that—after more than a decade during which radical intellectuals have been under the spell of Western Marxism—like the elusive lady in Keats' poem, the results have not lived up to the high expectations. The fetish for neo-Marxism has, furthermore, led to an altogether puzzling neglect of work which, in my view, was more important, more readily accessible, and even less ponderous, although surely no less radical. It is perhaps time that the infatuation with "la belle dame" ceased, and that we turned our gaze elsewhere.

Toronto

LA BELLE DAME SANS MERCI

Notes

1. Richard Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976, and Alvin Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, New York: Basic Books, 1970.

2. For a more comprehensive survey, the reader should turn to Perry Anderson's *Consideration on Western Marxism*, London: New Left Books, 1976. For some astute comments on this work, see the review by Heinz Lubasz in *The Times Higher Education Supplement* February 18, 1977. Any attempt to understand Western Marxism really should come to grips with the views advanced by Lewis S. Feuer, for example "Neo-Primitivism: the New Marxism of the Alienated Intellectuals" in his *Marx and the Intellectuals*, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1969, and also "University Marxism", *Problems of Communism* July-August 1978.

3. See E.H. Carr "The Legend of Bukharin", *Times Literary Supplement*, Sept. 20, 1974, and Alec Nove, *Was Stalin Really Necessary? London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964. Nove's outstanding essay gave rise to an almost predictable misunderstanding: that Nove was an apologist for Stalinism!*

4. *Karl Kautsky, The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964.

5. Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.

6. Lewis A. Coser, "Marxist Thought in the First Quarter of the 20th Century", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 78 #1, July 1972, pp. 173-201.

7. Alan Swingewood, *The Myth of Mass Culture*, London: Macmillan, 1977.

8. Jürgen Habermas, in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, London: Heinmann, 1979, rejects the notion of the primacy of the productive forces, p. 146. Even Neo-Marxists like Althusser, who stand in opposition to humanistic Marxism, also stress the dominance of the relations of production: see Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, *Mode of Production and Social Formation*, London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 52.

9. Lewis S. Feuer, "Marx and Engels as Sociobiologists", *Survey*, Vol. 23 #4, Autumn 1977-78.

10. On the question of social laws, see N. Lobkowicz, "Historical Laws", in Donald McQuarie, ed., *Marx, Sociology, Social Change, Capitalism*, London: Quartet Books 1978, and Hugh McLauchlan, "Popper, Marxism, and the Nature of Social Laws", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31 #1 March 1980 pp. 66-77.

11. Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory*, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1968, p. 5. Harris' contentious study is nonetheless a magisterial history of anthropological thought.

12. Jack Goody, *Production and Reproduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1976 and *The Domestication of the Savage Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1977. Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.

13. Joseph Needham, *Moulds of Understanding*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976, (edited by Gary Werskey). The editor of this edition of Needham's essays falls victim to the prevailing

voluntaristic mood of Western Marxism when he objects to Needham's reliance upon a "deterministic variety of evolutionary Marxism" (p. 23), precisely the approach that, in my view, should at least by reconsidered. Needham's thought is characterized by an uncommon blend of an orthodox Marxism as well as a strong Christian faith.

14. None of this literature has been discussed by neo-Marxist theorists in the last decade, not even by Jürgen Habermas who has attempted to develop the most comprehensive and systematic general theory. Habermas' unwarranted stress on the dominance of the relations of production was noted earlier. For a well-considered and rather devastating critique of other aspects of Habermas' project, see a series of articles by Tronn Overend, notably, "Social Realism and Social Idealism: Two Competing Orientations on the Relation between Theory, Praxis, and Objectivity", *Inquiry*, Vol. 21, 1978, pp. 271-311.

15. Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism*, New York: Random House, 1979. See especially Chapter 6, where he presents his criticisms of "dialectical materialism".

16. On the radical incompatibility of the scientific and humanist approaches, see Susan Stedman Jones, "Kantian Philosophy and Sociological Methodology", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 14 #1, February 1980, pp. 99-111.

17. "Conversation with Wittfogel", *Telos*, #43, Spring 1980 to p. 151.

18. Indeed more than it has been possible to even raise here: on some of these other issues, see Lewis Feuer, "The Preconceptions of Critical Theory", *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 16 #1, June 1974.

For an original contribution to the somewhat hackneyed debate on the young Marx, and one which is in conflict with the Western Marxist interpretation, see Heinz Lubasz "Poverty: Marx's Initial Problematic", *Political Studies*, Vol. XXIV #1, March 1976 pp. 24-42.

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