THE WORKING CLASS AS ZOMBIE: SIMULATION AND RESISTANCE IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Chris Doran

Baudrillard's obsession with simulation has prompted many of his admirers to see TV as a privileged site for contemporary analysis.[1] Yet Baudrillard himself has extended his analysis beyond the conventional mass media and now includes sociological theory itself as simulational. In particular, he has singled out the works of Marx and Foucault for detailed criticism concerning their own simulation of 'reality principles'.[2]

Although initially sympathetic to Marx, Baudrillard's later work sought to undermine Marxism's unquestioned linguistic assumptions and to show its oppressive rather than its emancipatory nature. Despite being in general agreement with Foucault's historical analysis, Baudrillard believes that it stopped just short of the "current revolution of the system";[3] when contemporary power, as well as theories of such power, became simulational. For Baudrillard, Foucault did not realize that contemporary power is a dead power, one that has lost its embodied referents and which is now resurrected as a mere sign system. As a result, Baudrillard accused Foucault of collusion in the simulation of the 'real'; because despite Foucault's apparent relativism, he still wanted to cling to a 'reality principle'.

Although Baudrillard's insights are suggestive, they remain at the level of theoretical critique and are in need of empirical documentation. I hope to make a start on this problem by examining an issue which links up Baudrillard's critique of both Marx and Foucault, namely the relationship between the working class and state power since the rise of the state-produced human sciences[4] in the early nineteenth century. Specifi-

cally, I want to analyse working class resistance to the imposition and current operation of these state reality principles.

In the first part of this paper, I will briefly illustrate the death of working class embodied experience and its subsequent resurrection as a simulation model. I will demonstrate that throughout the nineteenth century, the state imposed reality principles of science on workers' bodies. Equally important, these same workers resisted by making reference to a self-evident truth given by their common experience; what Baudrillard calls 'parole'.[5] Nevertheless they were seduced. These sciences gave them healthy bodies, yet killed their experiential knowledge.

With the emergence of the welfare state, the working class were then resurrected as the state-created simulation model of 'Labor'. As a consequence, Labor's resistance to the state was now made part of the simulation model itself.[6] As Kroker and Levin suggest,

> all the social movements which bet on liberation, emancipation, the resurrection of the subject of history, of the group, of speech as a raising of consciousness, indeed of a seizure of the unconscious of subjects and of the masses are acting fully in accordance with the political logic of the system.[7]

The central problem now appears and is the explicit focus of Part 2. If this discursive power now works by means of its ability to produce simulated versions of 'resistance' as well as 'reality', how then does one actually resist? At first glance, Baudrillard's analysis appears to be of little help. In fact, he seems to have just the opposite problem. Although he accuses Foucault of fabricating simulated models of power, we might ask the same question of him. Is he also colluding in the creation of a simulation model? Will his apparently relativistic theory become an exercise in power because it promises a new 'truth' about contemporary society? Granted, his state-produced sociological theory would be based on a very different 'reality principle', that power is always simulational and operates by creating the 'real'; yet it is already suggesting itself as a new model for contemporary sociological theorising, a kind of hyper-relativism in which all privileged versions are constantly being deconstructed. In opposition to this viewpoint however, I will argue that Baudrillard, at one level, is doing quite the opposite. My claim is that Baudrillard constantly practises a form of resistance to this spread of simulation. Although he himself says there is nothing outside of simulation, he constantly resists such a statement. Like the working class in the nineteenth century, he does this by invoking a notion of truth as given by experience. However, this alternative interpretation of Baudrillard is not directly apparent in his content. Instead, it is hidden in his frame.

Hitherto, most sociological theory has tended to ignore questions about the frame of analysis. This is a terrible neglect. By using analogies from molecular biology and mathematics, I will show not only the profitability of any analysis of 'frame', but I will also show that Baudril-

lard's own analysis operates as a contemporary virus. Consequently, much of the paper will be concerned with bringing this viral resistance to the surface by juxtaposing the content of his analysis against its frame. To do this, I will utilise an earlier form of viral resistance within more conventional sociology, namely the ethnomethodological critique of structural functional sociology.[8]

Finally, this analysis will prove helpful in my own formulation of a contemporary means of resistance. I will conclude by suggesting that contemporary resistance might speak at the level of the simulation model itself. It might use an encoded form of parole; the talk of zombies, those who know they are dead but nevertheless insist on speaking the truth of their own experience. An interesting and unexpected paradox thus emerges. My analysis concludes by suggesting that contemporary sociological theory need no longer be thoroughly dominated by relativism. The notion of parole, suitably framed, may be capable of acting both as a form of resistance and as one practical solution to the problem of relativism within sociology.

The Death of Experience

I will begin by selectively illustrating the transformation of the working class over the last century and a half into coded, discursive units, and the simultaneous death of their embodied experience. Today, only officially-created, scientific versions of their reality are acceptable. Nevertheless, if the central problematic is that the working class have had certain scientific interpretations imposed upon them, any theoretical analysis must be especially careful not to repeat the same error itself. Thus one initial problem is the type of methodology to be employed.

Parole: A New Methodology

Despite the originality of Baudrillard's thought, there are several problems which prevent any straightforward application of his insights to this analysis. First, his insistence that we treat Marxism as a code fails to address a more important point for the working class. It was not Marxism that was imposed on their bodies but rather another theoretical discourse, one put into place by the state. Consequently Baudrillard's analysis is only a partial one. It fails to address how such theoretical codes, such reality principles, were imposed *in practice*.

One way to understand the emergence of the working class as a simulation model is, to return to early nineteenth-century Britain and to document their codification by state officials like the factory inspectorate. Foucault is useful here not only because he alerts us to the powers

of surveillance and discipline that the state started to impose, but also because he locates the body as a privileged site on which this power operates. Nevertheless, Foucault has certain limitations.

Although his work traces this rise of the human sciences as techniques of state power imposed on the population, he fails to acknowledge not only that 'class' was a meaningful concept at this time but that the working class vehemently opposed these state impositions. And when they were resisting this new discourse of power it was quite explicitly because these new frameworks damaged their bodies.

> Q. You say that you first went to work at the factory at the age of 12 years; are you certain your legs were perfectly straight when you began your work?
> A. Yes, I am.
> Q. Then you are sure that the present appearance of your legs is owing to the work at the factory?
> A. Yes, I first felt myself getting weak at the knees.
> Q. Was that from standing too much?
> A. Yes, we could not sit down but for a few minutes.[9]

This interchange is highly unusual. It comes from the 1832 Sadler committee investigating factory workers' health. For almost the first and last time in state history, the working class were allowed to speak directly of their own concerns. No attempts were made by state officials to formulate or reinterpret what was 'really' intended. Within months however, a 'scientific' royal commission was introduced to discover the same information. It would ask specific questions requiring specific answers. This second commission marks the beginning of the state's codification of working-class experience.

Hopefully, the analytic lesson is clear. We must discover working class experience unmediated by state science. As analysts we must forego theoretical interpretation, and instead give credence and prominence to actors' own meanings. Baudrillard talks of parole as being akin to the 'spoken word', my aim is to encode such language and make it available for analysis. This results in a rather novel methodology; an analysis of how working people actually interpreted their world at this time. They interpreted these new codes as oppressive, and they vigorously resisted them[10] by making reference to a world of health that had immediate practical relevance for them, one which needed no interpretation. Their world was self-evidently obvious, because they shared a common cultural and linguistic background, a symbolic order. They had no problem understanding their world, it was changing it, which was the difficulty.

Seducing Working-Class Bodies

Elsewhere, I have described how the symbolic world within which the working class understood their own bodies, became subjugated. As a

result, by the end of the nineteenth century they started accepting a state-produced 'official' version of their health.[11] Here is an outline of that transformation.

Despite our usual belief that the welfare state was a creation from the ashes of World War 2, its origins can in fact be traced back to the 1830s. The original blueprint of this coded state as a combination of traditional state interests in property and wealth, plus a newly found concern for the subsistence of the masses, was all set out in Jeremy Bentham's last work, his *Constitutional Code of 1832*. He proposed a science of state power in which the state would be all-powerful and discursive. Crucially, this state was to be created by lowly state officials who would not only enforce the law, but also obtain 'scientific' information in order to continually produce the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number'. The gathering of this information is what results in the codification of the working class.

It is from the 1830s onwards that we get the explosion in state information. In Britain, the factory inspectorate, the poor law officers, the numerous statistical societies, as well as the frequent royal commissions, are all pre-occupied with obtaining information on the working class. At first, the working class vehemently resist this codifying state and its new techniques of codification. George Bull said the following at a public meeting of factory workers in 1832;

> If, instead of making us pay these men and for the printing of these books, they had appointed a Committee of old washer-women and promised them tea-drinking, and left them to decide whether children should work more than 10 hours a day, there would have been some credit due to them.[12]

In 1833 workers wanted their health protected, yet the state's introduction of the factory inspectorate was not welcomed. It was seen as a means for regulating only the worst excesses of the political economy framework then in place; while the inspectors themselves were dismissed as state spies.[13] In the decades after the 1830s, the state's new 'sciences of the body' are increasingly imposed upon the working class. Fervent state officials constantly force working people into understanding their bodies in ways that are conducive to state interests. For example, by the 1870s, workers were being encouraged to see themselves in terms of 'accident risks'. Their earlier demand for a non-specific, general health preservation was transformed. A state-scientific discourse about accident probabilities, created by the factory inspectorate, led to the *problematisation* of a much narrower concern, namely accident compensation. As a result, workers' earlier outright resistance has been transformed into ambivalence. The 1880 Employers' Liability act allows employers and workers to set up accident insurance schemes that will provide small but certain payments, in return for workers not sueing

their employers in courts. This, of course, leads to a definite improvement in workers' immediate material existence. As one parliamentarian said,

> Nobody would contend that workmen were not in a more advantageous position under a system from which they derived compensation in all cases of injury than they would be if no such system existed.[14]

And although many working people are starting to agree with this evaluation, others steadfastly refuse this re-interpretation.

> The workmen never cared for compensation itself; it might have been a necessity for their social circumstances, but no idea of compensation ever urged them forward to agitate for the obtaining of this Act; it was primarily, I may say, absolutely, with the desire to protect their lives and limbs so far as human precautions could do so.[15]

Yet the seduction of the certainty of payments was too strong. Eventually, nearly all the working class were seduced. Today, anybody who now might argue for a version of health outside the parameters of the welfare state, is not only dismissed, but is not even understood. Health today must only be *comprehended* within state-produced parameters.

Digitalized Bodies

Although Foucault proves very useful in analyzing this surveillance of working-class bodies, he does not realize the extent of the transformation which occurred in the World War 2 period and after. As Baudrillard points out, the age of the panopticon is dead. Instead we have the beginnings of simulation.

> Truth which is no longer the reflexive truth of the mirror, nor the perspective truth of the panoptic system and the gaze, but the manipulative truth of the test which probes and interrogates.[16]

The working class were placed in precisely this situation after World War 2. After the collapse of both the frameworks of political economy and parliamentary reform,[17] plus the ensueing Second World War, it was strongly argued that the state should play a central role in the post-war reconstruction. Thus the 'recombinant state' emerged.

Like a cell concerned with its own self-reproduction, the post-'45 state had the onerous task of its own self-reconstruction. In the molecular cell, proteins (the essential building blocks of the cell), are produced through their 'translation' from amino acids via the codifying action of DNA. In a similar fashion after World War 2 working people's experiential world

got 'translated' into the official discourse of Labor by the codifying action of state sciences.

The gaze of the factory inspector or the poor law officer was replaced by the omnipresence of the 'form', a device totally embedded within this new framework of coded state power. The questions it asks presuppose the framework, and reproduce that framework in their answers. As Baudrilard says,

> Digitality is with us...the most concrete form you see it in, is that of the test, of the question/answer, of the stimulus/response.[18]

Modern workers' compensation forms are one example of this language of scientific state discourse. They ask questions to get supposedly objective answers. Yet the questions asked presuppose only the relevant information which the state wants.[19] Throughout, health is downplayed, accidents are prioritised, and diseases are made marginal; all by the construction of the form itself. The worker's response is merely to fit him or herself within this pre-determined code. The questions are digitalized. Yes/No responses are all that is required. Workers' health has become codified into state interests.

Baudrillard is aware of the similarities between this type of endeavour and our present day understanding of molecular biology:

> what biochemistry hypostatizes is the ideal of a social order regulated by a kind of genetic code or micromolecular calculus of PPBS (Planning Programming Budgetting [*sic*] System) that irradiates the social body with its operational circuits.[20]

The welfare state like the molecular cell, grows by recombination. Rather than using the genetic code as a means of growth, it uses the grid of 'objective' state science. Working class bodies have to be continually encoded into scientific discourse. Vast amounts of contemporary statistics and social scientific reports are premised on this digitalising process. As a consequence, everyone must speak the official language which is created from this process.[21]

Sociological Viruses

As Benjamin has noticed, with the rise of modernity reproduction has taken the place of production:

> reproduction absorbs the process of production, changing its finalities and altering the status of product and producer...the fact that anything might be simply produced, as such, in two copies, is already a revolution.[22]

In addition, I have suggested that the modern welfare state can also be understood as a recombinant one. So how then do we resist a system that is based on these principles of reproduction and recombination? As Baudrillard has suggested, resistance based on working-class subjective action is now the property of the Marxist code which insists on transforming working-class speech into the discourse of labor power.[23] Yet spontaneous working class resistance is either ignored or transformed into coded discourse.[24] Thus there appears little choice. Contemporary resistance must be put forward discursively, i.e., as disembodied. But how is this to be done?

The answer lies in understanding the behaviour of viruses in contemporary biology and by showing parallels in both modern mathematics and sociology. Hofstadter makes a direct comparison between viruses and Godel's theorem within mathematics.

> The analogue of Godel's theorem is seen to be a peculiar fact, probably little useful to molecular biologists (to whom it is likely quite obvious). It is always possible to design a strand of DNA which, if injected into a cell, would upon being transcribed, cause such proteins to be manufactured as would destroy the cell (or the DNA) and thus result in the non-reproduction of that DNA... an invading species of virus enters a cell by some surreptitious means, and then carefully ensures the manufacture of proteins which will have the effect of destroying the virus itself.[25]

He continues by describing exactly how this is done,

> What actually happens when viral DNA enters a cell? The virus 'hopes', to speak anthropomorphically, that its DNA will get exactly the same treatment as the DNA of the host cell. This would mean getting transcribed and translated, thus allowing it to direct the synthesis of its own special proteins, alien to the host cell, which will then begin to do their thing...In a way this resembles the story of the Trojan Horse.[26]

Godel's genius was to introduce self-reference into mathematics; to make it self-reflective and introspective. The unsettling consequence was that Godel introduced incompleteness as a fundamental attribute of mathematics. Ethnomethodology (EM) achieved a similar result within structural-functional sociology by using the same methods. It introduced the uncertainty of relativism as fundamental to the sociological enterprize. Both Godel and EM operated as viruses within their respective disciplines.

As a result, sociological theory has remained at this meta-sociological level ever since. In the English-speaking world relativism has become an orthodoxy, while Baudrillard has developed similar insights into his theory of simulation. Nevertheless, despite Baudrillard's apparent relativism, his theory tacitly re-introduces a notion of truth into sociological theory, but at yet another meta-sociological level. In other words, it too

is viral. But before I can demonstrate this viral nature of Baudrillard's own work, we must first become comfortable with the more general features of contemporary viruses.

Viral Strategies

The godelian/ethnomethodological virus involves introducing a self-referential paradox into the disciplines of mathematics and sociology. In both cases, a variation on the famous Cretan paradox is utilized. As is well known, the Epimenides paradox entails the Cretan, Epimenides, making the famous self-referential statement "all Cretans are liars." This utterance can be interpreted on two levels. At the content level, it refers to the general category of people—Cretans; but at the level of frame, it refers to Epimenides himself, because he is a Cretan. As a result of this self-reference, a recursive loop is generated in which the truth or falsity of the statement cannot be determined. Consequently, one can now understand this sentence at a higher logical level; not as a simple statement about the veracity of Cretans, but as a formal paradox—a sentence whose truth value constantly oscillates.[27]

In order to reproduce this paradox within modern science, a method for creating interpretations at the level of both frame and content had to be introduced. In mathematics, 'godel numbering' fulfilled this task.

> numbers are made to stand for symbols, and sequences of symbols... and this coding trick enables statements of number theory to be understood on two different levels: as statements of number theory and also as statements about statements of number theory.[28]

Within sociology, the use of ethnomethodology accomplished a similar encoding task. At one level EM described the social order produced by ordinary members in society. But at another level, it gave meta-descriptions of that social order; that is, it could also produce analyses of sociological descriptions of the social order.[29] This was possible because

> the interpretive procedures by which the positivistic sociologist produces and sustains a sense of social reality are effectively no different from those employed by ordinary members of society to achieve the same.[30]

Having identified the main elements of the viral strategy, let me now show how the paradox is constructed. Both of them follow a three part sequence. First, Godel introduced his numbering system for expressing conventional arithmetic notation. He showed that it was possible to assign a unique number to each arithmetical sign and symbol. For example,

Constant sign	Godel number	meaning[31]
V	2	or
=	5	equals
0	6	zero
s	7	the immediate successor of
(	8	punctuation mark
)	9	punctuation mark

EM also constructed a system for translating the world of everyday life into social theory. EM told us how the social world was continually created by the tacit and unnoticed interpretive techniques used by ordinary people in their everyday lives. In other words, it described the framework of the social world, rather than its content. For EM, the problem of producing correct versions of social reality was unanswerable.

> The basic theoretical question was no longer to be the obstinately unanswerable one of why 'in principle' social order is as it is (or claimed to be). Rather it was to become that of how 'for practical purposes' are particular manifestations of social order achieved.[32]

The ethnomethodological solution was to study how ordinary people produced versions of their reality, which if not correct in any scientific sense, were correct for their practical purposes. As a result, descriptions of how social order was created could then be represented within social theory. For example, a famous experiment by Garfinkel showed how the social order of 'normal' femaleness was an extraordinarily complex social construction. Agnes, a dubiously sexed person, was able, by utilising a myriad of artful practices, to produce himself/herself as 'normally female', although in many other 'biological' facets, s/he might have been considered a male.[33] The second part of this viral analysis is to show that, like Godel, EM can be used to refer to sociology itself. That is, it can introspect and reflect upon itself. Mehan and Wood have given a good overview of the thrust of this type of ethnomethodological research. It consisted of analyses of how sociologists themselves constructed 'objective' social science by using the very same common sense interpretive techniques as ordinary people did. Prior to this, sociological description had always prided itself on being scientific, that

> sociology...is capable of producing descriptions and explanations of social phenomena which correspond with actual events in the world.[34]

135

Nevertheless, the insertion of EM into sociology produced the opposite conclusion. For example, in an analysis of how sociologists conduct their research, Cicourel showed that the very process of producing objective data constantly requires common sense interpretation.

> The interviewer and the respondent must engage in interpretive work in deciding if a response is appropriate. Yet this interpretive work is neither part of the sociologists' theory nor of their method.[35]

Thus, sociology could not give objective statements about the world because sociologists were always interpreting the world in two different ways. In content, they interpreted it as sociologists; but in method, they interpreted it as ordinary 'members' of society. The conclusion which thus emerged was that traditional sociological knowledge could not retain its scientific validity because of this pervasive presence of members' interpretive practices.

The third step of the analysis is to reflect upon analyses of sociology that ethnomethodologists themselves performed. Mehan and Wood were writing within a framework which proclaimed itself as sociological, that is, they saw themselves as sociologists. Thus, we might expect when reading their own analysis to accept their findings as valid. But the actual content of their analysis said that sociology could not be true because the methods used to get 'objective' data were merely the same common sense methods used by ordinary people. A crucial problem thus emerged. By being sociologists, Mehan and Wood should have expressed a truth, but the truth they expressed was that sociology was flawed.

The higher level interpretation that then hits us, is that their own analysis must also be flawed. The analogy with the Cretan paradox now becomes obvious. Because they as analysts can also be interpreted on two levels, as ethnomethodological sociologists and as culturally competent members of the social world, they too were tacitly using common sense, interpretive methods to construct their own critique of sociology. Thus no type of sociology whatsoever, could produce objective statements about the world because tacit common sense interpretations could never be banished. EM, in a very prosaic and mundane manner, had convincingly demonstrated the relativism that lurked in the shadows of conventional sociology. In other words like mathematics, sociology was incomplete.[36]

Resistance as Virus

By using a similar viral strategy an opposite conclusion can be produced from Baudrillard's work, namely that relativism is not all pervasive. In order to demonstrate my proposed solution a modified Godelian

construction, called in mathematics an 'explicit Henkin sentence', will be used.[37]

The Godelian theorem/virus was, as we have already seen, a suicidal one because, "strings of the Godel type... assert their unproducibility within specific formal systems."[38] As a result, Godel's theorem destroyed earlier hopes of completely formalizing mathematics.[39] The Henkin sentence is also a virus but it is one that can reproduce itself in the host system. As Hofstadter explains,

> this phage [Henkin virus -CD] asserts its own producibility in a specific cell, and the sentence asserts its own producibility in a specific formal system. They can be constructed exactly along the lines of Godel sentences, the only difference being the omission of a negation.[40]

The equivalent of the Godelian sentence was "all Cretans are liars." Its equivalent in ethnomethodological terms would be "sociological knowledge is not scientifically correct." This type of sentence introduces relativism into sociology when it is realized that sociologists constantly use members' interpretive practices. With the 'omission of the negation' this sentence becomes "sociological knowledge is scientifically correct." And it is to the detailed construction of such a Henkin sentence-virus that I will now turn. To produce this Henkin sentence, one copies the godelian construction but one starts from a meta-sociological position. One begins with the acknowledgement of relativism as an accepted and common feature of today's world, that social analysis today has accepted the veracity of meta-sociological analyses. As already indicated, the rise of relativism stems quite straightforwardly from the ethnomethodological-Godelian critique of sociology. In this sense, all relativists might be regarded as meta-sociologists. They understand that their accounts are always less than objectively true. They now stand at a higher logical level, able to treat sociology itself as an object of inquiry, with Baudrillard himself as an archetypal meta-sociologist. My own methodology has also demonstrated its awareness of this relativist critique of the social sciences. For example, I have applied the ethnomethodological device of taking ordinary people's talk seriously, as well as accepting the provisionary and interpretive nature of my own analysis.[41]

Despite their claims to relativism, relativists can indeed be shown to proclaim a truth value, but that this is done tacitly, in terms of their method. They tacitly proclaim a truth based on the grounds of their own cultural experience or, as Baudrillard might say, the Symbolic order. In order to construct this Henkin paradox, it is once again necessary to place frame against content. We have already seen how EM acted as a coding device for analyzing the frame of sociological theory. Now my parole-methodology will be used as a coding device for analysing the frame of Baudrillard's theory. My historical analysis of the working-class, symbolic world has its counterpart in the first step of the godelian

137

analysis, the ability to code the framework of number theory into numbers, or the ethnomethodological ability to code members' knowledge into a sociological system. In my historical analysis I discovered that relativism was a totally different problem in the early nineteenth century than it is today. I examined ordinary working-class experience, its members' parole, and came up with some surprising results. Then the working class saw social scientific knowledge quite straightforwardly as relativistic, and incapable of telling them the truth of their own experience. They also saw it as oppressive and as a means by which state power was imposed on them. Hence they resisted it vehemently. In its place, they appealed to a self-evident truth which had no difficulty expressing itself as such, despite its background in their common symbolic experience.

The second step in this Henkin construction is to pose the problem of self-reference. That is, my methodology applied to Baudrillard's work itself. Baudrillard's theory is about how codes of meaning are imposed. Yet he says little about how they were imposed, whether they were resisted, or how they were resisted. With my methodology, I show how state officials have imposed relativistic codes of meaning since the early nineteenth century. Thus, when we introspect on Baudrillard's writings, it might appear at first, as if Baudrillard is following in this long tradition. He is a state official, a university lecturer and thus, in some sense, a modern counterpart of the state officials of the nineteenth century. He can be interpreted as imposing his relativistic knowledge on others, via a claim to social scientific truth, albeit at this meta-sociological level of truth as relativism.

Nonetheless, the insertion of my parole-methodology into Baudrillard's theory will show that in his practice, he does the opposite of what he says in his content. When we examine his actual textual practices, he too resists relativistic state-produced knowledge; in this case, his very own theory. He does this by tacitly appealing to experiential validity. At first, such an appeal might appear worthless, seeming to hold little or no truth value. Yet these types of appeal are a well-accepted but unnoticed feature of the sociological relativists' position. Let me explain.

Although ethnomethodologists examined members' knowledge, they only saw it in terms of the limits that it put on objective, sociological knowledge. Because it could not guarantee objective scientific truth they concluded that it introduced relativism. They did not examine the other interpretation hidden within their own analysis; namely that this members' knowledge, which they themselves shared, was not disputable. That is, they treated it as their bedrock, as self-evident.

This knowledge had a truth value derived only from its common shared experience. There was never any need to prove its truthfulness, because everybody took it for granted. It was true "for all practical purposes." In effect, the acceptance of such self-evident knowledge ensured one's membership within this sociological community. But, although these

ethnomethodologists saw this members' knowledge as inferior to objective scientific knowledge, they never disputed its 'for all practical purposes' veracity. In fact, because it was such an assumed part of their background knowledge, all they thought possible was that it might be explicated and brought to the surface. Also for the 'practical purposes' of doing sociological research, these ethnomethodologists completely accepted the veracity of this members' knowledge, and by incorporating it into their scientific research, made it scientifically valid. At this juncture, I argue, they ceased being relativists because they were now tacitly insisting on the truth of their common, shared experience.

It is this other hidden interpretation of ethnomethodology; its truth as experience and for "all practical purposes," that I want to prioritize. This fact allows me to reverse the polarity of ethnomethodology's godelian equivalent, and to construct the content of the Henkin virus. My claim now becomes 'sociological knowledge may be correct' rather than fallible, because relativistic sociologists themselves tacitly accept the truth of their own cultural competence. Truth, for the practical purposes of doing sociological research, can now be guaranteed not by scientific objectivity but by one's membership in a common culture. In a sense, this is similar to the early assertion by feminists that they could speak a 'truth' given by their common experience. Yet because their common experience typically involves power relations, their theorizing always involves an awareness of such relations. Unfortunately the ethnomethodologists accepted, as culturally given, the stability of the social order and saw no power relations at work. Thus the sociology they produced had no concern with power. My work, as might be expected, has more similarities with this feminist research. The major difference with my analysis is that its reliance on parole is made at a different logical level, as I hope will become apparent later.

This appeal to the truth of cultural experience is present throughout Baudrillard's writings and reflects his own personal involvement in acts of resistance, such as the events of May 1968 in France. In his earlier works, the truth value given to the symbolic realm was obvious:[42]

> Utopia wants speech against power and against the reality principle which is only the phantasm of the system and its indefinite reproduction. It wants only the spoken word, and it wants to lose itself in it.[43]

While in another text, he writes,

> only that which assumes its meaning through continual reciprocal exchange eludes exchange value, in the gift and the counter-gift, in the ambivalence of an open relationship, and never in a final relation of value.[44]

Throughout, Baudrillard proffers the symbolic order against the world of the code, but he does not try to interpret it. His notion of the symbolic

comes not just from the writings of people like Levi-Strauss, but from his own experience in the symbolic order. For example, he says with regard to power, "each person knows deep down that any form of power is a personal challenge, a challenge to the death."[45] And in several other places, he utilises other aspects of parole, "something in all men profoundly rejoices in seeing a car burn."[46] These assertions are not scientifically established, rather they are 'true' because they appear self-evident to Baudrillard; "something in us disaccumulates unto death, undoes, destroys, liquidates and disconnects so that we can resist the pressure of the real, and live."[47] Thus like the working-class resistance of the last century, Baudrillard resists by using parole. But unlike the working class of the nineteenth century, Baudrillard's resistance is at a higher logical level. It is at the level of the code itself; it is scientific![48]

At this point, the analogy-in-reverse with structural functional sociology should be made explicit. Structural functionalists proclaimed 'objective truth' but in their tacit 'methods' they used relativistic, experientially-based, common sense techniques of interpretation. Baudrillard does the opposite. He proclaims a relativistic position for his own theory, but in his textual methods, he constantly appeals to a tacit, self-evident notion of truth, adequate for his 'practical purposes.' This tacit use of parole is constant throughout his work.

The third and final step in our imitation of the godelian strategy is to intensify the self-reference again and to understand the position of my own analysis. Like Baudrillard, I too am aware of the recent developments in sociological theorizing and the world of relativism that we now inhabit. I understand full well that my analysis is an interpretation, one of many possible ones; that it is meta-sociological. Yet when I reflect upon my own tacit, textual practices in the way that I investigated Baudrillard's and those of the working class in the nineteenth century I also have to acknowledge that my analysis, in terms of its textual methods, used similar working-class strategies and truths. I too accepted the veracity of the self-evident understanding of the nineteenth-century working class and did not seek to discover 'what they really meant'.

I too have tried to resist the colonizing power of the social sciences, by appealing, without interpretation, to the assertions of working-class experience. But then perhaps that should not be too surprising. Like the ethnomethodologists who came to the realization that they themselves incorporated dual interpretive capacities, as sociologists and as competent members of society,[49] I too must acknowledge my dual membership that is based on both my sociological training and my cultural background.

Like the ethnomethodological critique of sociology but only in reverse, the end result is that, at the level of content, I claim that my paper is a relativistic one, yet I am forced to acknowledge that, in my method, I have tacitly expressed the veracity of working-class parole, based on my own shared cultural background. Like the Epimenides paradox, it forces us to

move to a higher level of interpretation. At this level, my paper, via the textual methods utilized, tacitly says that it is not relativistic because it is based on my shared cultural belief in the veracity of experience and distrust of state science. Like the nineteenth.century opponents to the codifying state who resisted via appeals to the self-evident truth of their own bodies, I too have made a similar claim, albeit from within the framework of state science, rather than from outside. The conclusion reached is outrageously naive, yet the methods used to produce it reflect conventional and well-accepted procedures within recent sociological theory.

Finally, we have finished the construction of our explicit Henkin sentence. I have tried to show in a formal way a means of resisting the simulation effects of much of contemporary social scientific theorizing. As I also suggested, the results are not what might have been imagined. One form of resistance to the simulation effects of modern sociology is to insist on the truth (for all practical purposes) of experience, by exploiting the analyst's dual membership both within the sociological community and as a 'member' of a cultural community. Here truth is guaranteed, not by rigorous scientific methods, but by the analyst's membership in a community.

As a youngster growing up and loathing the prospects of working at Vauxhall Motors like my father, it was not difficult for me to choose the alternative of further education. Yet it is here where one realizes that the contemporary simulated versions of Labor are at odds with one's own experience;[50] they are mere sign systems.

> labour is no longer a force. It has become a sign among signs...
> all that is asked of you is not that you produce, nor that you make
> an effort to surpass yourself...but that you be socialised.[51]

Throughout my academic socialization it was clear that the theoretical discourses of sociology, even the sympathetic ones like Marxism, did not describe my experience. Yet the paradigms of structural functionalism and Marxism provided the dominant ways of understanding social experience.

Nevertheless, it is obvious to me and many others that, today, power is becoming lodged in the different forms of media. UB 40 in a cryptic note on the importance of reggae music in their early experience suggested that the reggae they loved was "reggae before it was discovered by cops, sociologists, and TV producers."[52] More recently, John Lydon has made a similar Baudrillardian point, succinctly and rather bluntly claiming that, "The written word is a lie."[53] Nevertheless in the realm of the academy, such voices have largely been ignored.

We members of the *simulated* working class know our quandary. It is of no use to call for the articulation of working-class experience; that possibility was colonized some time ago. In the process, working-class embodied experience was destroyed, codified, and resurrected as a

simulation model. Consequently, any contemporary resistance must, I suggest, fully accept this death, and instead produce itself in terms of this resurrected experience.[54] We must resist at the level of the simulation model itself, that is, of scientific discourse.

> You cannot defend against the code with political economy or 'revolution'...All dissent must be of a higher logical type than that to which it is opposed. [It is] thus necessary to play a game of at least equal complexity in order to be in opposition to third-order simulation.[55]

The game played in this paper was to produce an analysis which, at the level of framework, i.e., the simulation model, was seductive. One way to get out of the quandary of relativism was by moving to a higher logical level, the meta-meta-sociological! Simultaneously, this claim acted as a means of resistance to contemporary simulation. I argued for a truth value which pointed beyond relativism, namely the veracity given through common cultural experience. While such a position was implicit in the sociological relativists' position, I have drawn a higher-level interpretation out of that tacit dimension of relativistic social science. I suggested that at the level of frame, relativism could be avoided by appealing to an experiential truth based on common cultural experience.

But at the level of content, I found that the culture I belong to has been consistently antagonistic to such scientific discourse. Most social science merely dismisses working-class culture as being "anti-intellectual," but another interpretation is hidden within that dismissive stance; that historically this anti-intellectualism constituted a way of resisting the destruction of working-class experience by the onslaught of this science of state power. Yet with the generalization of this simulation model after 1945 and the rise of a new generation totally immersed in this simulation experience, the necessity of resistance at a higher logical level emerges; resistance to the simulation framework of state science itself.

Coded biological organisms can be resisted by the action of viruses which are understood as being neither dead or alive. Coded society can be resisted by the action of zombies who are also understood as being neither dead or alive. That is, at the level of frame, I insisted that we understand ourselves as coded, that we must operate within the simulation model itself, that we must formulate ourselves within the disembodied discourse of contemporary science. But at the level of content, I suggested that we must heed our particular cultural backgrounds. And in my case, as I have documented, this demonstrated itself as antagonistic to much of state science, a discourse seen not only as seductive but as oppressive. This paradox of frame versus content, which I have set up, is not unintentional.

Division of Social Science
University of New Brunswick

SIMULATION AS RESISTANCE

Notes

1. For examples of this emphasis on TV, see K-H Chen, "Masses and the Media: Baudrillard's Implosive Postmodernism," *Theory, Culture and Society* (Vol.4,No.1 1987), 71-86; and A. Kroker and D. Cook, *The Postmodern Scene* (Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1986), 267-279.

2. See J. Baudrillard, *Simulations* (New York: Semiotext[e], 1983) for a more explicit analysis of these 'reality principles'.

3. J. Baudrillard, "Forgetting Foucault," *Humanities in Society* (Vol.3,No.1 1980), 87-111.

4. Foucault's notion of the human sciences encompasses not just the social sciences but also those clinical and applied sciences which routinely impinge on the human body. Our common term "health sciences" comes close to Foucault's intention here.

5. For Baudrillard's most extensive discussion of parole, the spoken word, see chapter 5 of *Mirror of Production* (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975).

6. Even academic Marxism, whose discursive formulations include theoretically "correct" methods of resistance, can also be seen as a state-produced imposer of reality.

7. A. Kroker and C. Levin, "Baudrillard's Challenge," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*(Vol.8,Nos.1-2, 1984), 15.

8. Ethnomethodology showed how social order was created, and thus acted as a 'form' to a 'content' which was structural functionalism. I aim to demonstrate how coded power was imposed, and thus my paper will act as a 'form' for a 'content' which is Baudrillard's theory. The viral nature of this work depends on combining form and content in a self-referential fashion.

9. *Report from the Select Committee on the 'Bill to regulate the Labour of Children in the Mills and Factories of the United Kingdom'* (Vol.XV, 1831-2), 28.

10. Here Foucault's methodology shows its weaknesses. He has little empirical analysis of the working class, and pays only scant attention to how these codes were vigorously and strenuously resisted. For examples, see M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Peregrine books, 1977) part 4.2.

11. C. Doran, *Calculated risks: An Alternative History of Workers' Compensation*, (Unpublished dissertation: University of Calgary, 1986).

12. Quoted in S. Finer, *The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick*, (London: Methuen and Co.Ltd., 1952), 57-8.

13. For example, see B. Hutchins and A. Harrison, *A History of Factory Legislation*(London: Cass and Co. Ltd., 1966), 56.

14. *Hansard* (Vol. 19: 1893), 751.

15. Quoted in P. Bartip and S. Burman, *The Wounded Soldiers of Industry*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 164.

16. J. Baudrillard, *Simulations* (New York: Semiotext[e], 1983), 52.

17. For the most insightful analysis of the death of both the frameworks of liberal democracy and of classical economics, see K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

143

CHRIS DORAN

18. Baudrillard, *Simulations,* 115.

19. See C. Doran, "Workers Compensation Today: Political, Medical and Health Issues" in *Sociology of Health Care in Canada,* ed. B. Bolaria and H. Dickinson (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovitch, 1988), 460-472.

20. J. Baudrillard, "The Structural Law of Value and the Order of Simulacra" in *The Structural Allegory,* ed. J. Fekete, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 66-67.

21. The scientific representatives of the working class, their union spokespersons, are as adept at using this language as anybody else. For example, the following, concerning workers' compensation, comes from the Ontario Federation of Labor, *The Workmen's Compensation System in Ontario: A Critical Overview* (n.d) "where permanent disability results from the injury, the pensionable loss suffered by the employee shall be calculated from the nature and degree of the injury, the loss of real earnings, and a fully indexed pension shall be established to be paid bi-weekly during the lifetime of the employee of a sum equivalent to the periodically assessed calculation of loss." (p.21). Any trace of the experiential language used to resist the state in the 1830s has now disappeared. The scientific representatives of the working class have been seduced into understanding the world quite differently. They resist, but only from within the parameters of coded discourse.

22. Quoted in J. Baudrillard, *Simulations,* 99.

23. The unfortunate position which modern Marxism finds itself in, is that it too is caught up in this mediation of working people's experience. As Baudrillard has shown in the *Mirror of Production,* Marx insists that the working class are alienated only because they have lost control over their labor power. "And in this Marxism assists the cunning of capital. It convinces men that they are alienated by the sale of their labor power, thus censoring the much more radical hypothesis that they might be alienated as labor power" (p.31). As with their subjugation under the imposition of official discourse by the modern welfare state, workers are subjugated to a similar imposition from Marxist thought: "dialecticized under the sign of revolution by Marxism, it is always the case of an imposition of meaning" (ibid., p.155).

24. Thus modern forms of resistance, such as graffiti in New York city, have typically been ignored as irrelevant, whilst other forms like the punk phenomenon have been transformed into discursive analyses. For example, D. Hebdidge, *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (London: Methuen, 1979).

25. D. Hofstadter, *Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid,* (New York: Vintage, 1979), 536-7.

26. Ibid., p.538.

27. Although the introduction of the Epimenides sentence results in a formal paradox, the consequences for mathematics and sociology are slightly different. As Hofstadter says, "Whereas the Epimenides statement creates a paradox since it is neither true nor false, the Godel sentence G is unprovable...but true" (p.18).

28. Ibid., p.18.

29. For examples of such analyses, see J.M. Atkinson, *Discovering Suicide* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978); P. Filmer, et al, *New Directions in Sociological Theory* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1973); J.D. Douglas, *The Social Meanings of Suicide* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

30. Filmer et al, *New Directions in Sociological Theory,* 36.

31. Adapted from E. Nagel and J. Newman, *Godel's Proof* (New York: New York University Press, 1958), 70.

32. J.M. Atkinson and P. Drew, *Order in Court* (London: MacMillan, 1979), 21.

33. See H. Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967) for details.

34. Atkinson and Drew, *Order in Court*, 18.

35. Quoted in H. Mehan and H. Wood, *The Reality of Ethnomethodology* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), 51.

36. For more detailed analyses of the early ethnomethodological critique of sociology, see P. Filmer et al, *New Directions in Sociological Theory,* Part 1. For an example of the hostile reaction it received at the time, see E. Gellner, "Ethnomethodology: the Re-enchantment Industry or the California Way of Subjectivity", *Philosophy of the Social Sciences,* (Vol.5, 1975), 431-50. Since then, the ethnomethodological virus has mainly taken one of two routes. Firstly, its viral attack on social scientific knowledge has been downplayed. EM is now seen merely as a sub-discipline within sociology concerned with the micro-organization of everyday life. In other words, EM's self-referential character is largely forgotten. For a recent overview of the tenuous position which contemporary ethnomethodology holds within present-day sociology, see W. Sharrock and B. Anderson, *The Ethnomethodologists,* (London and New York: Tavistock, 1986) chapter 7. Their exposition tries to distance EM from its earlier critique of sociology and claims that the theoretical aims of each faction are, in fact, dissimilar.

    The other route taken led away from relativistic critiques of social science, and, instead, pursued them in the realm of natural science. In this growing field, now dubbed the "Social Studies of Science" the relativistic, rather than objective nature of natural science is constantly investigated. However, S. Woolgar in his recent edition, *Knowledge and Reflexivity,* (London: Sage Publications, 1988) once again directly confronts the problem of relativism within social science, specifically the self-reference problem within the Social Studies of Science programme. Here again the consequences of such analysis seem to have promoted heated debate. Latour's chapter within the volume is but one example of the controversy which this issue generates. See also my "Jumping Frames: Reflexivity and Recursion in the Sociology of Science", *Social Studies of Science,* (Vol.19, 1989), 515-31, for a discussion of a related controversy within this field.

37. Hofstadter demonstrates the relevance of such sentences to my work, by showing how they operate as mathematical viruses. He explains that implicit and explicit Henkin sentences have isomorphisms in the world of molecular biology. These are the 'tobacco mosaic virus' and the 'T-even phage' (or virus), respectively. However, it is the 'T-even phage' which is the more successful virus. That is, "when a T4 phage invades an E. coli cell, after a brief span of about twenty-four or twenty-five minutes, the cell has been completely subverted and breaks open. Out pop about two hundred exact copies of the original virus—'bicentuplets'—ready to go attack more bacterial cells, the original cell having been largely consumed in the process...The essential fact is that it is a battle between a host which is trying to reject all invading DNA, and a phage which is trying to infiltrate its DNA into some host cell which will transcribe it into mRNA (after which its reproduction is guaranteed). Any phage DNA which succeeds in getting itself repro-duced this way can be thought of as having this high-level interpretation: 'I can be reproduced in Cells of Type X'." (pp.540-1). The beauty of the explicit Henkin sentences is that they are similar to the T-even phages; they can reproduce themselves in the host cell. "Explicit Henkin sentences direct the construction of their own proofs—they are analogous to more complex viruses which direct their host cells in putting more copies of themselves together" (Ibid., p.543). My intention, by using the explicit Henkin

construction, is to also produce a virus which can be reproduced within the host system.

38. Ibid., p.536. Also, see chapter 16 for a fuller discussion of the analogies between Godel's mathematics and molecular biology.

39. This hope was especially prominent in the first third of this century and was characterised by Russell and Whitehead's magnus opus 'Principia Mathematica' which, as Hofstadter says. "purported to derive all mathematics from logic and...without contradictions" (p.23).

40. Ibid., p.541.

41. In other words, by situating my own work within the wider framework of relativistic social science, I have shown that I share the same assumptions about the relativistic nature of the social world, as do other meta-sociologists; such as those in the ethnomethodological, social constructionist, and post-structuralist schools of thinking.

42. Although he also realized that this symbolic world was always in danger of being codified. "Against the spoken word, political economy, throughout its history, supports discourse in which everything that is exchanged is put under the instance of the code"(*Mirror of Production*, 137).

43. Ibid., p.167.

44. J. Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1981), 212.

45. J. Baudrillard, *Forgetting Foucault*, 106.

46. J. Baudrillard, *Mirror of Production*, 141.

47. J. Baudrillard, *Forgetting Foucault*, 101.

48. This appeal to the symbolic as an ineffable truth counterposed to the codification of the world is only part of Baudrillard's tactical and textual practice. Throughout his texts he tries to resist his own theory, by destroying it at the same time as creating it. As he says, "In truth, there is nothing left to ground ourselves on. All that is left is theoretical violence"(*The Structural Law of Value*, 59). His most prominent methodological strategy, his refusal to interpet 'symbolic exchange' seems to have had its desired effect because several would-be imposers of his theory have criticized him on exactly these grounds. For instance, D. Kellner, "Baudrillard, Semiurgy and Death", *Theory, Culture and Society*, (Vol.4 No.1, 1987), complains, "Baudrillard never defines the concept of 'symbolic exchange' which simply stands as a positive antithesis to productive activity" (p.140).

49. R. Turner, ed., in *Ethnomethodology* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1974) suggests the impossibility, for sociologists, of avoiding this reliance on common-sense knowledge. "The sociologist inevitably trades on his members' knowledge in recognizing the activities that participants to interaction are engaged in; for example, it is by virtue of my status as a competent member that I can recurrently locate in my transcripts instances of 'the same' activity" (pp.204-5).

50. For example, J. Goldthorpe and D. Lockwood's 1969 study of the *Affluent Worker*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), was an analysis of the town I grew up in, the workplace where my father worked (and where I also worked, albeit very briefly). Yet its inability to document that experiential world despite its widespread acceptance within the sociological literature, not only reinforces my claim that the simulated world produced by these authors is at odds with the experienced world, but that it is their version of that world which gets imposed as 'reality'.

51. J. Baudrillard, *Selected Writings*, edited by M. Poster, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 130-1.

52. UB 40, *Labour of Love*, (Dep Int Records, 1984).

53. Public Image Limited, "Rise" on *Album*, (Electra/Asylum Records, 1986).

54. For example, in 1976, 'popular culture' was recognised by an emerging generation as merely a simulation model of its own lived experience. By necessity, the subsequent resistance had to employ the framework of the simulation model itself in order to be heard. But at the level of content it insisted upon the authenticity of its lived experience. I suggest that contemporary resistance to the recombinant state must adopt a similar strategy.

55. J. Baudrillard, *The Structural Law of Value*, 57