Canadian Journal of
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
THEORY

HOMAGE TO D.A.F. DE SADE

a fin que ... les traces de ma tombe disparaissent de dessus la surface de la terre comme je me flatte que ma mémoire s'effacera de l'esprit des hommes ...

Testament of Sade

You have not disappeared.
The letters of your name are still a scar that will not heal,
the tattoo of disgrace on certain faces.

Comet whose body is substance, whose tail glitters in dialectics,
you rush through the nineteenth century holding a grenade of truth,
exploding as you come to our own time.

A mask that smiles beneath a veil of pink
made of the eyelids of the executed,
truth broken into a thousand flames of fire.
What do they mean, those giant fragments,
that herd of icebergs sailing from your pen and from the high seas heading toward the nameless coasts?
those delicate surgical instruments made for cutting away the chancre of God?
those howls interrupting your kingly elephant thoughts?
the frightful striking of out-of-order clocks?
all of that rusty armament of torture?

The learned man and the poet,
the scholar, the writer, the lover,
the maniac and the man who dreams the destruction of our perverse reality,
they fight like dogs over the bones of your work.
You who stood against all of them,
you are today a name, a leader, a banner.

Bending over life like Saturn over his sons
you scan with your steady look of love
the whitened ridges left by semen, blood, lava.
These bodies, face to face like blazing stars,
are made of the same substance as the suns.
We call this love or death; liberty or doom.
Is it catastrophe? Is it the grave of man?
Where is the borderline between spasm and earthquake,
eruption and coitus?

Prisoner in your castle of crystal of rock
you pass through dungeons, chambers and galleries,
enormous courts whose vines twist on sunny pillars,
seductive graveyards where the still black poplars dance.
Walls, things, bodies, reflecting you.
All is mirror!
Your image persecutes you.

Man is inhabited by silence and by space.
How can this hunger be met and satisfied?
How can you still the silence? How can the void be peopled?
How can my image ever be escaped?

Only in my likeness can I transcend myself
the other's existence affirmed by his blood alone.
Justine is alive only through Juliette,
the victims breed their executioners.
This body which today we sacrifice,
is it not the god who tomorrow will sacrifice?

Imagination is desire's spur,
territory is endless, infinite as boredom.
its opposite and twin.
Pleasure or death, vomit or flooding in,
autumn, resembling the going down of day,
sex or volcano,
a gust of wind, summer that sets the fields on fire,
eye-teeth or stars,
the stony hair of dread,
red foam of desire, slaughter on the high seas,
and the blue rocks of delirium,
forms, images, gurgles, and the rage for life,
eternities in flashes,
excesses: your measure of a man.
Now dare:
freedom is willingness toward necessity.
Be the arrow, the bow, the chord and the cry.
Dream is explosive. It bursts. Become again sun.

In your diamond castle, your image destroys itself, remakes itself, tireless.

Octavio Paz

The Prisoner (Hommage to D.A.F. DeSade)
From Early Poems 1935-1955 A New Directions Book.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. V, No. 3 (Fall, 1981).

THE DARK SIDE OF ENLIGHTENMENT

David Cook

"... and the den nam'd
Horror held a man
Chain'd hand and foot, round his neck an iron band,
hid from the light, as in a cleft rock:
And the man was confin'd for writing a prophetic: in
the tower nam'd Darkness was a man ..."

William Blake,
The French Revolution

The turning back into the past in an effort to get to the root, or if one prefers the geneaology of the problems of the twentieth century has proceeded recently along the lines of placing explosives under the conventional reading of the tradition. This activity has been particularly intense in the re-readings of the works of the Marquis de Sade, or rather in the progressive transformations of what Sade is understood to be. The question raised by Simone de Beauvoir in 1955 of "Must we burn Sade?"[1] has yielded to the more authoritarian injunction that we must read Sade.

These injunctions often direct the reader to see Sade in the guise of an early Freud on the one hand, or with the persona of the insane asylum on the other hand. In doing so Sade is lifted out of his time becoming in each case what he is not. As a result his thought suffers from being both more and less than it is. Sade should be returned to the discourse of the Enlightenment. A return that will be argued here depicts what William Blake so clearly understood that the dawn of a new world required the release of the incarcerated imagination. With an irony that penetrates to the core of eighteenth century society Sade's imprisonment in the tower of liberty of the Bastille symbolizes the unfreedom of the dominant political and religious myths. Through the locking up of the imagination prisons had appropriated the title of reason while being founded in unreason. The forceable acceptance of this logic destroyed both the body and the mind. It created monsters of the imagination that Goya transcribed to canvas. Sade true to his world of victim/victimizer is one of these creations.

The contrast between the claims made here for Sade's importance to the life of the imagination and his work is complete. There is almost universal agreement that Sade's writings are boring and repetitive and that the philosophy expressed is second rate. The obvious uneasiness of these views resting together has called for explantation, for example in the recent biography of Sade by Ronald

Hayman[2], or in the works of Roland Barthes.[3] The biographical stance of Hayman although providing many interesting clues to the enigma reduces Sade to the frailties of everyday life.[4] One must turn to Sade's work itself, and in the beginning to the manner in which Sade theorizes.[5] For this task Barthes' critique is a useful starting point.

Barthes attempts to rescue Sade in his examination of the 'Text'; that is through the works themselves. Through what Barthes calls the pleasure of the text one witnesses "the amicable return of the author"[6] as the reader becomes engaged in the discursive unity of the theatrical world found in the writings. The stress placed on the theatrical is important in understanding Sade for however much his work misses as great literature it still must be read from the perspective of a deliberate presentation. It is not guided by description of reality, but by the creation of images. Hence Sade's threat to the world he lived in, or to the world which continued to repress his works following his death is located, as Barthes correctly suggests, not in the shocking examples of his characters' actions. Indeed if taken alone these actions are in a sense in bad taste and boring. Sade's danger lies rather in his exceeding the ideology or myths that sustain the social order. The re-presentation of the bourgeois world through the mask that unmasks.

A reading of Sade must, to use Freiderich Durrenmatt's phrase, render his text dangerous.[7] Barthe's own reading locates this in the "paradoxical (pure of any doxa) discourse"[8]; in effect the creation of a new language. One is struck, though, not with the creation of a new language, for Sade did not invent, for example, either the word or the concept of sadism. Sade is caught more within the language of his time from which he did not escape. Here alone is a significant source of the boredom and repetition. However Sade was capable of a contra-position to the prevailing 'doxa' through the use of language's double, the imagination.

If one turns to the examination of the structure of Sade's writings one is struck immediately by the similarities in this structure to other writings in which political critiques and utopias have been presented. Though Barthes does not take his reader in this direction Sade's use of the negative utopia is strikingly traditional while achieving a revolutionary impact. It is clear that even in a more straightforward political tract such as *Yet another effort, Frenchmen, if you would become Republicans*[9] that Sade has a work such as Thomas More's *Utopia* not far from his mind. Once turning to the more literary works the comparison in structure to Plato's *Republic*, is an example though clearly not to the level of thought, is even more pronounced. The Sadian castles such as Silling in *The 120 Days of Sodom* must be read as a variant of the Platonic cities of *The Republic*. Sade's exploration of virtue and vice is through the founding in the imagination a society which bears a similar relation to the exercise of founding cities in Plato's dialogue. The fact that Sade presents only half of the dialogue focusing on the negative city of crime has led commentators to assume that Sade is to be interpreted literally. Yet Sade, like Plato, gives ample warning in each of his major works that they require interpretation. One is struck with the fact that Sade explicitly structures the novels as works of 'education'. Again referring to

The 120 Days Sade gave as its sub-title "l'Ecole du libertinage". Education, in distinction to science, requires the story teller whose lessons or parables must be of the super natural.

Recognition of this manner of theorizing immediately removes the objection of so many readers that Sade was not realistic. The cataloguing of sexual acts in *The 120 Days* is not science anymore than the encyclopedia of the philosophies was for Sade a compendium of truth. In fact Sade is quite explicit in proceeding via way of the primacy of the conceptual over the factual. The order of the Silling castle is to have the story teller first recount in speech an activity which once established in theory is enacted. Variations on themes are improvised and one is always mindful of the surroundings, a fascination that Barthes satisfies with a picture of the theatre of debauchery.[10] Yet the basic demand to set forth action first in speech is honoured. This sets the progress of Sade's writing not, as is frequently remarked in literary criticism in terms of development of characters or plots, neither of which exist in any complete sense, but rather in the gradual escalation of the demands of the story teller. This ends in absurd demands not unlike some of the absurd endings of Platonic speech. The rule of the philosophers is no more to be taken literally than the rule of the libertines. The exaggeration in each case serves to establish the limits of the concept and is integral to the manner of theorizing. Thus the degeneracy into mass slaughter and necrophilia is not something to "leave aside (as) removed from the 'normal inclinations of his heroes'"[11] as Maurice Blanchot one of Sade's first moden critics suggests.

Thus there is a sense that Barthes' claim that Sade was founding a new language through the opening of a discursive site should be honoured. Yet it is also clear that in reading Sade one must not repeat the hermenetical incarceration of the work in its own universe which appears to be Barthes' ending point. Sade has been locked up enough. Barthes states that "it might almost be said that imagination is the Sadean word for language."[12] There is a difference between language and imagination. It is this difference which leads to the placement of Sade within the ideological imagination of the Enlightenment. This returns Sade's work to the tradition while recognizing the paradoxical side of his speech. It is in this sense one can argue that Sade's work contributes to the darker side of the Enlightenment. One may also advance the position that Sade's failure to radicalize the Enlightenment indicates the domination of the subject is not only one of physical imprisonment but also of the imaginative universe. The ultimate sterility of Sade is the sterility of the dominated imagination.

Sade's link to the Enlightenment can be seen in his attempts to turn inside out part of the ideology that he encountered. In doing so Sade's universe represents not so much a renunciation of the prevailing views as he understood them, but a re-stating of the world that was coming apart. This activity, as many commentators have suggested, ends in Sade's political conservatism despite his support of the French Revolution. He remained an aristocrat almost in spite of himself.

Consider the cental concept of the Enlightenment, reason itself. Under this broad concept it is apparant that there existed considerable diversity amongst

the views expressed by those who Peter Gay has defined as the central figures of the Enlightenment. Gay quite rightly rejects the characterization of the period as the Age of Reason owing to this diversity. In the case of Sade the emphasis on finding an ordering principle, in effect to bring reason to bear on activity, is common to virtually all his writings. The reader finds injunctions given by the libertines to bring order to the pursuit of pleasure such as is illustrated by the passage below which forms the opening pages of *Juliette*.

> 'One moment', Delbène panted, wholly ablaze, 'one moment my dears, we had best introduce a little method into our pleasure's madness: they're not relished unless organized!'[13]

The role of this debased form of reason is central enough to lead commentators such as Jacques Lacan to see Sade as the logical completion of Kant and, in particular, Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* rather than in the guise as a precursor of Freud.[14] This is to suggest that Sade was searching for a form of the categorical imperative that would be able to order experience independent of the content of the experience. In short whatever the action as pleasure, as opposed to the Kantian action as duty, Sade called for a 'reasonable' rule. The maxim turns out to be something like 'all orifices should be filled'; a maxim aside from its vulgarity, that as best falls short of reason degenerating into a form of mechanistic rationality. In works such as *Juliette* this mechanistic approach leads to the instrumentality of the machine which carries out the pleasures with the subjects only as appendages.[15] This debasement of a type of 'pure reason' illustrates the core of unreasonableness in reason which leads to the elimination of the subject.

As with many concepts in Sade's world reason must be seen as the nexus of reason-unreason where the alteration between the two is always on-going. This process is not dialectical nor progressive. It resides at the centre of society as seen and as created by Sade. It is the basis of his critique of the Enlightenment's own monolithic use of reason.

Sade then proceeds to challenge both Christianity and the ideal of freedom under contract theory on a similar basis. Each myth is exposed in terms of its unreasonableness through the imaginative overturning or turning inside out of the myth. Another form, albeit if in a form of parody, of the dramatic upsetting of Kant by Hegel under the sign of domination rather than freedom. Though Sade's work did not form part of the tradition the rejection of the claim to freedom made by Kant was, as is well known, central to the theoretical work of Hegel and for that matter Marx. Moreover many other post-Kantian writers retained the centrality of freedom in face of the pratical evidence to the contrary. Sade is again, in this sense, more radical for his undertaking of the restructuring of society was from the perspective of enslavement through a republic of crime. In a similar manner to reason's relation to unreason Sade proceeds to illuminate

freedom through unfreedom. In the logic of this unfreedom Sade finds the root of the liberal theory of society.[16]

The power of Sade's approach to social contract theory resides in part in his marked eclectic approach. Sade's originality, as we have seen, was not in terms of the development of the positive political myth. He accepts as a starting point the various forms of the myth that he encounters in the works of Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Thus one is dealing with an almost unadulterated form of liberal ideology profound precisely for its unoriginality. To this, if one takes a simplistic approach, Sade adds Machiavelli, the most frequently quoted theorist in *Juliette.* Here one has a re-enactment on a rather small stage of the tension expressed in moral terms between good and evil faced with the necessary expediency of the political world.

Sade's intent in examining contract theories of society was to show that his precursors' attempts at justification of the social order have correctly set forth the condition of man in the 'pre-societal state', the state of nature, only to deny precisely what they have postulated in moving to political society. In enumerable instances in Sade's work the state of nature is painted in the familiar terms of the state of war as Coeur de Fer's description in *Justine* suggests.

> But the result, you will object, will be a state of perpetual war. So be it, is this not the state of Nature? Is it not the only state that truly becomes us? Men were all born alone, envious, cruel and despotic, desiring to possess everything and surrender nothing, and perpetually struggling to maintain either their ambitions or their rights...[17]

The similarity of this description to that of Hobbes' picture of English society in part one of the *Leviathan* is striking. So also is the conclusion that Sade draws from the description which occupies a central place in his work. Human nature in the state of nature is manifested in desires and more specifically in the pursuit of pleasures.

> If egoism is the first law of Nature, it is surely above all in the lustful pleasures that this celestial mother desires it to be our sole motive.[18]

Sade takes Hobbes seriously and in doing so places the most powerful of the bourgeois philosophers at the core of his own philosophy. Desire when linked with power is the sovereign principle of the leviathan and of the Sadian castles. Sade's critique focuses on the logic of this relation which serves to upset any notion that the social contract arises out of a sense of free and equal men acting in

a reasonable manner. According to Sade the initial differences amongst ment of "brute strength" immediately created an inequality. This inequality structured the first social relations which were ones of exploitation, or to use Sade's words; "In the beginning, then, was theft."[19] Because theft had its origin in the natural differences between men it was seen as being in accord with nature, and according to the familiar argument if nature had not intended man to steal she would have provided "man a fair share in the things of this world...and would thus have prevented anybody from enriching himself to the detriment of his neighbor."[20] Sade then goes on to postulate that the formation of society was to institutionalize the origins of inequality.

> When the first laws were promulgated, when the weak individual agreed to surrender part of his independence to ensure the rest of it, the maintenance of his goods was incontestably the first thing he desired, and...The powerful individual assented to these laws which he knew very well he would never obey...two classes: those who yield up a quarter of the loaf in order to be able, undisturbed, to eat and digest what was left, and those who, eagerly taking the portion proffered to them and seeing that they'd get the rest of the bread whenever they pleased..."[21]

This argument is, of course, not original for it is found in a more compelling version in Rousseau's *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality.* Similarily Rousseau's protest in the last pages of *Emile* that: "In vain do we seek freedom under the power of the laws. The laws "Where is there any law? Where is there any respect for law? Under the name of law you have everywhere seen the rule of self-interest and human passion"[22] could easily have been from the hand of Sade. But Rousseau is hardly confused with Sade; witness two works on education: the *Emile* and Sade's *Juliette* which prepare their students for two very different worlds. Sade could not have written Rousseau's famous phrase that "God makes all things good, man meddles with them and they become evil."[23] For in the phrase Rousseau at least holds out the possibility of laws that will exist to minimize the damage. The social contract nor Nature herself, for Sade, ever reaches towards the virtuous or the moral.

In an argument, again reminiscent of the argument in *Leviathan,* Sade claims that government's "unique morality" must be to it continuance. Surrounded by a nature that is not benign but rather at war "the means to its preservation cannot be imagined as *moral means* (emphasis Sade's), for the republic will preserve itself only by war, and nothing is less moral than war." Faced with this political fact Sade again concludes with a rhetorical question which denies the moral basis of the social contract. "I ask how one will be able to demonstrate that in a state rendered immoral by its obligations, it is essential that the individual be

moral?"[24]

As a consequence in the Sadian critique law is always the institution which proscribes the relation of the desires to the desired, and not the agent of a moral sentiment. Hence it always represents the order of domination or coercion. Michel Foucault has expressed a similar view in claiming that "humanity installs each of its violences in system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination".[25]

Again the presentation made by Sade is not original for the controlling of the passions or desires by law is pretty standard. To use Rousseau's *Emile* as a reference, the task of society can be see, in one guise, as "decreasing the difference between our desires and our powers in establishing a perfect equilibrium between the power and the will."[26] Rousseau elects to use power linked to will as the means whereas power is much more closely aligned in Sade's writings with the desires. Rousseau then continues in the *Emile* to identify the source of this problem in the imaginaton which "enlarges the bounds of possibility...and therefore stimulates and feeds desires..." The conclusion Rousseau draws follows logically in the controlling of the imagination; a conclusion that sets him diametrically opposed to Sade. To reference again the *Emile*.

> The world of reality has it bounds, the world of the imagination is boundless, as we cannot enlarge the one, let us restrict the other; for all the sufferings which really make us miserable arise from the difference between the real and the imaginary.[27]

Rousseau's thought cannot be exhausted by the simple reduction of his thought to a formula for the restriction of the imagination. Yet Rousseau's ascription of a menacing role for the imagination closes off an entry into liberal ideology which could explode it facade. Rousseau is nevertheless far more penetrating in the conceptualization of the imagaination than the reductionism which runs through the tradition from Hobbes, Locke to writers as diverse as Burke. Here the imagination is viewed primarily in terms of an uncreative empiricism.

Sade's reaction to the falsity of the tradition is to portray the society created under its auspices in a series of negative moments. Moments which have at their core the radical suppression of the individual. The progressive loss of the subject becomes both the plot structure of Sade's books as well as the reality for Sade of the world. This reality becomes apparent through the establishment of the imaginative societies where the logic implicit in the social contract is made explicit. The playing out of the Sadian critique required the Sadian castles. That is Sade's claim that conventional society called everything by it opposite necessitated the construction of negative utopias. In a manner similar to George Orwell's in *1984* Sade systematically identifies opposites in a parody of the

philosophical claim of the unity of identity and difference. The relations in society are expressed through the concept of the negative but not as dialectical relations. There is no reconcilation as in Hegel. There is merely the negative.

As an illustration, Sade consciously reverses the claim to freedom in the etablishment of the setting of the *120 Days*.

> I am alone here, I am at the world's end, withheld from every gaze, here no one can reach me, there is no creature that can come nigh where I am, no limits, hence no barriers; I am free.[28]

While Sade's work must be read with a view to his irony and black humour there is a seriousness to the theoretical constructions. The castle begins without the order of God[29]or without laws; that is without the repressive structure of society. This situation allows Sade to re-enact the founding of society through the establishment of codes and statutes as they 'truly' are. If one takes either the code of laws governing Silling[30] or other examples such as the Statutes of the Sodality of the Friends of Crime[31] Sade explicitly forbids political discourse; the sign again of his removal of the false mask governing society. This frees Sade to work out the logic of desires which is encrusted in the political ideology of the social contract.

Everyone who has had any contact with Sade knows that the desires are played out through the sexual domain. The originality and force of this claim has undoubtedly been responsible for the interest in Sade. There is a sense being argues here that this claim deliberately passes over Sade.

In examining what Sade says it is clear that the context of 'desires' is linked to the sense of 'wanting' or 'lack'; to the concept of negation. If there is a Sadian ontology it is structured as Pierre Klossowki remarks on non-being and negation rather than strictly on the sexual. In an important passage in *The 120 Days* the libertines inform the reader of the dynamic of the desires which always places the consumation of desire outside itself and outside of the subject.

> How can you be happy if you are able constantly to satisfy yourself? It is not in desires' consumation happiness consists, but in the desire itself, in the hurdling the obstacles placed before what one wishes. Well what is the perspective here? One needs but wish and one has. I swear to you', he continued,' that since my arrival here my fuck has not once flowed because of the objects I find about me in this castle. Every time, I have discharged over what is not here, what is absent from this place and so it is.[32]

The sense of estrangement carried within the postulate of infinite desires has been borne out in the incipient nihilism of a society structured on the state of nature as the state of war. The point of desires is never to be fulfilled in the dynamics of repression and domination.

However, the point of Sade's attack was much more explicitly the ideology of Christianity than the realm of exploitation which Marx was to lay bare as the basis of the desire-desired relation.[33] Sade as always was most backward at the time he was most forward. The concepts of privation and lack in Christian dogma were the evidence of the nothingness of evil in contrast to the fulness of the Lord. The ascription of evil to a form of non-being is central to Christian metaphysics. Etienne Gilson in his *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine* expressed this in the following manner: "Evil is the privation of a good which the subject should possess, a failure to be what it should be and hence a pure nothingness."[34] As all individuals were sinners, in the logic of unreason, all individuals were in essence nothing. The Christian myth then established the dynamic of emptying yourself to recognize one's 'true' relation to the Lord. Then one was ready to receive the fulness of the Lord. This for Sade was analogous to the origin of repression in contract theories. The state of nature was the state of the fall which was everyday life.

The unfolding of this myth symbolized the movement of the desiring-desired relation for Sade. Again as the reader knows the primary activity of the libertines was to void one's bowels, and, to use Sade's phrase, "to shed one's fuck". The receptacles of this operation are the inhabitants of the castle all of whom are empty shells awaiting to be filled or to fill in their turns; preferably as in *Juliette* to be filled on the altar or by the pope. The progressive elimination of those shells through torture or mutilation is a natural course in the logic of the castle because there is 'nothing' there. This follows the logic of Christianity which ascribes non-being to man and which sanctifies such things as the inquisition as a means of conversion. Ultimately the sujbects are all eliminated because in a sense they never existed; they were all found wanting.

Both Sade's critique of contract theory and his attack on Christianity end in the unremitting violence characteristic of his depiction of nature. The dictum to the individual is likewise an unrepentant hedonism based on the calculus of pleasure and pain, of the sensible, which social myths rationalize. The overall prevailing social relation becomes the master-slave. It forms an invariant substructure to society replacing the heavenly version, the Lord-sinner relation, and denying the false claims to equality of contract theory. Injected with violence the master-slave takes on the appearance of reciprocity in the circular Sadian staircase of the tortured-torturer leading quite appropriately to the bowels of the earth rather than to heaven.

Simone de Beauvoir in commenting on the master-slave relation suggests "that, quite unlike the conflict described by Hegel the process involves no risk for the subject. (ie. the master). His primacy is not at stake, regardless of what happens to him, he will accept no master. If he is defeated, he retires to solitude which ends in death, but he remains soverign."[35] Beauvoir is correct in that there is no risk in the sense that the masters have always been masters and for Sade it is

an illusion to suggest otherwise. Where the subjects are not real, that is as creations of the imagination, there is no ground for advancement in the dialectic, hence death has no meaning. The closest Sade comes to an existential consideration is in the *Dialogue between a Priest and a Dying Man* which ends with the conversion of the priest to the world of the libertine. This denial of the existential in favour of the Sadian polemic against the church, however justified, severely limits Sade's challenge to the Hegelian dialectic. On the other hand the logic of the sovereignty of desire founds society on reciprocal nothingness, on relations of denial and annihilation. The masters are endemic to the system. They cannot escape, or realize themselves expect through the logic of destruction, or the logic of the imagination.

Thus both the course of the desires and the ideological trappings of the Christian and political worlds that force Sade's attention towards the realm outside; towards that which does not exist. In a sense the libertines must choose destruction while being inhabitants of the castle just as the social world for Sade has chosen destruction. The unsatisfactory nature of these choices is apparent even while they are being lived out. Salvation, if one can use this word in any sense with Sade, is through the denial of the negation in the conceptualizing of what is outside which in one sense does not exist, on the other hand, which has more reality or being than the empty shells in the castle. To again refer to the *120 Days* and more specifically to the code governing life in the castle the "object is to inflame the imagination."[36] This constant refrain is Sade extends to the centre of Sade's own most intense pleasures.

> ...lo, there is your ass, Juliette, there before my eyes, and beauteous it is to my contemplation; but my imagination, a more inspired architect than Nature, a more cunning artisan than she creates other asses more beautiful still; and the pleasure I derive from this illusion, is it not preferable to the one which reality is about to have me enjoy?[37]

Sade's own entrappment in the world of the flesh, in the most visible form of non-being in the dogmatic scale of Christian metaphysics, is itself a limitation all too explainable in terms of his psychic problems. Yet the denial of the body is central in the master-slave relation. There is a perfect logic for Sade in the entrappment of the body, of the individual subject, in the working out of the theories governing the political realm. The negation of this negation through the imagination is itself ephemeral, for Sade cannot escape the circularity of the master-slave relation that has been constructed. Sade's politics as a consequence become as ideological as the Christianity he exposed.

But if one steps back from the practical, literal reading of Sade it is clear that the body's liberaton is linked to the frantic attempt Sade makes to escape from the subjection of his imagination under the theological and political theories of

his time. The imagination is entrapped in the same way Sade was in the tower of liberty of the Bastille. There was a price to pay for Sade and his work in the prolonged stays in prison. His imagination, as for example evidenced in the creation of the castle of Silling, ultimately did not go beyond the asylum of Charenton where he spent his last days. Sade's prodigious effort to find reason, to find the intelligible order related to the sensible, never allowed him to listen to the unreason of his situation. Hence, in part, the repetitious and boring aspect of the Sadean corpus.

History also found it easier to ignore Sade in the development of the Enlightenment. Even Marx's reaction to Hegel in a sense passes him by. Recently the recognition of the darker side of the tradition has become more prominent. The uncovering of the imaginative universe has occurred through the works not only of Sade but of the poets and playwrights. Here literature and art join in the search for the replacement of the executed king or dead God. In a way this is a call to my mind for the return of theory as vision which the progress of the Enlightenment has forgotten.

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Notes

1. Simone de Beauvoir, "Must we Burn Sade?" reprinted in *The Marquis de Sade: The 120 Days of Sodom*, Grove Press, New York, 1967.
2. Ronald Hayman, *De Sade: A Critical Biography*, T.Y. Crowell, N.Y. 1978.
3. Roland Barthes, *Sade, Fourier, Loyola*, Hill and Wang, N.Y.
4. For example Sade's esoteric reading of letters to him to find a clue to his release date. See Hayman, *op. cit.*, p. 122.
5. There are some critics such as Peter Gay in his study of the Enlightenment dismisses Sade in a sentence and as a consequence would find little to approve of in this resurrection.
6. Barthes, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
7. Durrenmatt's own fascination with crime is not unlike Sade's in that justice for each is found outside society's laws.
8. Barthes, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
9. All selections from Sade have been taken from the Grove Press edition of his works unless otherwise noted. See "Yet another effort, Frenchmen, if you would become republicans" in *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, p. 323.
10. Barthes, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
11. Maurice Blanchot, "Sade", reprinted in *The Marquis de Sade: Three Complete Novels, Grove Press, N.Y., 1966, p. 56.*
12. Barthes, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
13. *Juliette*, p. 6. See also *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, p. 240.
14. Jacques Lacan, "Kant avec Sade" in *Ecrits II*, Editions de Seuil, Paris, 1971. See as well Simone de Beauvoir's comment on the similarity in the sources of Kant's morality and Sade's in the puritan tradition, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
15. *Juliette*, p. 947.
16. Simone de Beauvoir has pointed out Sade's view of the social contract as a myth which in reality is a bouregeois hoax. *op. cit.*, p.47.

17. *Justine*, p. 40.
18. *Justine*, p. 152.
19. *Juliette*, p. 114.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.* p. 115.
22. J.J. Rousseau, *Emile* Everyman Library, Dent, p. 437.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
24. *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, p. 315.
25. Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 1981, p. 151.
26. *Emile*, p. 44.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
28. *120 Days*, p. 412.
29. Pierre Klossowski in his study of Sade entitled "Nature as a Destructive Principle" reprinted in *The Marquis de Sade: 120 Days of Sodom* correctly sees the role given to nature by Sade but incorrectly assumes an identity between nature and God in Sade's work. See p. 71.
30. *120 Days*, p. 241.
31. *Juliette*, p. 418.
32. *120 Days*, p. 362.
33. The importance of Christianity in Sade is recognized in Albert Camus' study of Sade found in his *The Rebel*, Vintage Books, N.Y., 1956.
34. Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, Random House, N.Y., 1960.
35. Beauvoir, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
36. *120 Days*, p. 246.
37. *Juliette*, p. 522.

DANCE AROUND THE ABYSS

Wilhelm Dilthey is one of the great figures of turn-of-the-century social philosophy, not only in relation to the development of German thought, but in the wider process of uncovering and making explicit the polarities of the modern mind. The thinkers of the late nineteenth century were inheritors of a dual legacy passed on to them by the writers of the two preceding generations. From the romantics they received the idealistic insight into the meaningful character of historical dynamics whereas from the positivists and the empiricists they absorbed the injunction to observe particulars carefully and to relate them to one another according to the canons of inductive method. The fundamental division between finalism and modernism was replicated across the agenda of modern thought. The romantic viewpoint tended to be holistic *and* to encourage the search for methods of sympathetic understanding which would be specific to the human studies. In contrast, the positivistic standpoint gravitated towards individualism and the project of fashioning the human studies in accord with the methods of the natural sciences. Just as Kant's antinomies had generated efforts at synthesis at the beginning of the nineteenth century, at the end of *that* century the gap between competing syntheses prompted new attempts at unification. The movement back to Kant signalled the severity of the crisis, but it was the vitalistic tendency that made the most original contribution to the project of reconciliation. Dilthey was a key figure in life-philosophy, which, as Bergson insisted, was an effort on the theoretical plane to mediate between modernism and finalism. Dilthey's major importance for contemporary reflection was his application of the vitalist paradigm to the problems of the nature of historicity, the proper study of historical objects, and the foundations of liberal politics.

Kornberg demonstrates ably and precisely that the labels "historicism" and "relativism" fail to characterize adequately the complexity and import of Dilthey's thought. Dilthey's struggle was to reconcile on the plane of historical science the positivistic and ideological patterns of explanations, and on the plane of politics the tension between individual freedom and group purpose. Dilthey strove to avoid staring too long into Nietzsche's abyss, drawing the conclusions of a thorough going positivism that destroyed traditional intellectual and practical unities. But in his dance around the edge of the void he took most of the positions that still characterize debate in the human studies today. The failure of his politics and, by implication, of his theory should cause some thought about the limitations of contemporary discourse, but they should not obscure the magnificence of a restless mind searching for a formula adequate to unite a divided world. Dilthey ultimately failed to unify the divisions of Western culture because his master principle that life is the matrix in which reason appears and, so, can never be exhausted by reason, leads to the explosion of diversity and not to harmonious order. Today we inherit Dilthey's legacy and live a step closer to the edge of the abyss than he did.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. V, No. 3 (Fall, 1981).

HISTORICISM AND LIBERALISM: WILHELM DILTHEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Jacques Kornberg

Until recently, most interpreters argued that the key preoccupation of German Historicism was reconstructing individual epochs and national cultures. Historicism in this view, emphasized history's ideographic character, against those who would assimilate history to the practices of the natural sciences. This image covered Historicism's political stance as well, for it was considered Germany's version of the revolt against the Enlightenment. Historicists, it was said, legitimized existing historical structures, denied universally valid values, and insisted that each age be measured by its own standards. Recently this thesis has been questioned, and scholars have pointed to the Enlightenment background of Historicism.[1]

Similarly, for a long time Wilhelm Dilthey was included in the Historicist school and considered an unreserved historical relativist. Recently scholars have argued that this view is untenable. Dilthey can be termed a Historicist, but only if our understanding of the school is revised. His adherence to Historicism did not exclude belief in historical progress. Though the concept of empathetic understanding (*Verstehen*) - history's tool for reconstructing the unique and particular - was key to Dilthey's thought, he did not reject universal history. Dilthey endeavoured to blend universalism with an appreciation for the unique and particular. He elaborated history's special methodology, but also claimed that history sought universal laws just as the natural sciences did.[2]

Dilthey's *Introduction to the Human Sciences (Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften)* began with a celebration of the achievements of the German Historical School. However, he defined the school broadly, naming as its adherents: Winckelmann, Herder, Niebuhr, Jacob Grimm, Savigny, Bockh, Guizot and Tocqueville. Later on Ernst Troeltsch was to criticize Dilthey for imprecision; Troeltsch limited the school to those who found the key to history in the spontaneous creations of the national spirit and drew counter-revolutionary implications from this, defending prescriptive rights and organic social theories. But Dilthey was establishing another sort of pedigree, appropriating the title of the Historical School to other purposes. Herder shared in the Enlightenment's view of progress and natural rights; Tocqueville combined a deep regard both for historic continuities and for intelligent adaptation to the modern age. Dilthey's conception of the school had little to do with the "Historicism" posited by later interpreters.[3]

Dilthey's *Einleitung*, his answer to John Stuart Mill's logic of the Moral Sciences, was to be a synthesis of what he called the Historical School and the Abstract School of Mill, Buckle and Comte. Both were one-sided: By positing a fixed and constant model of human nature - economic man, utilitarian man,

rational man - the Abstract School took mere abstractions for reality. These models were heuristic devices, useful in pointing to certain constants in human behaviour, but they hardly encompassed the whole of human action. Man was a historical and social being; there was an aspect of him that eluded the fixed and constant. Dilthey criticized Comte and Buckle's preoccupation with historical law, objecting to the flat and uniform utilitarian image of man advanced by positivism. In Buckle's account of Western history, the particular was wholly absorbed in the universal. Nineteenth century man inevitably peeped out either in Antique or Medieval dress, as science and skepticism battled superstition.[4]

But the Historical School was equally guilty of one-sidedness. If abstractions missed the richness and diversity of history, those steeped in the singular missed the recurrent in history. Dilthey fully appreciated the Historical School's intuitive grasp of the uniqueness of historical epochs and peoples: "...its loving absorption in the individuality of the historical process..." But the preoccupation with singularity led to a neglect of the constants in human nature. Dilthey wished to move to a position that would combine both generalizations about human nature and a grasp of the indelibly unique and singular.[5]

In his writings on *Verstehen* Dilthey made much of its subjective side. Understanding a poem entailed comprehending the total psychic *Gestalt* from which it had emerged; this involved "...inner kinship and sympathy..."[6] Hence the culture of Antiquity could only be correctly understood by the Renaissance. *Verstehen* reached perfection when a historic personality touched others across the span of time, as with Ranke's portrait of Luther, Goethe's of Winckelmann, Thucydides' of Pericles. However, in certain realms *Verstehen* was far more universal and objective: "...concepts, judgements, larger thought structures", were among the expressions of *Leben* most easy to grasp, for they conformed to universal logic norms. In all historic periods, men could grasp them.[7]

Accordingly, while discontinuities might reign in other areas, the realm of intellect was marked by "...uninterrupted development..."[8] The "...homogeneity of thought..." ensured continuity, a cumulative flow in the experience of the generations of men. Problems and truths could be passed on from one generation to the next. Furthermore, mankind's intellectual acquisitions steadily encompassed wider and wider circles of humanity. As a result, "...a consciousness of solidarity and of progress..." accompanied mankind's intellectual labours.[9]

In this paper I shall not try to disentangle the elements of essentialism and historicism in Dilthey's conception of human nature, but rather describe and analyse the view of progress he formulated in the second book of the *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, his historical account of the rise and fall of metaphysics.[10] For him history had realized individual autonomy and freedom. However Dilthey's view of progress raises key questions about his relationship to German idealism. He rejected idealism and adopted empiricism, yet he posited no abstract individualism as did John Stuart Mill. Dilthey's key methodological unit was the social individual, bound up in teleological systems. Humans were levered into historical collectivities, transcending the individual. For Hegel, *Geist* - a metaphysical substance - stood for the unity and identity of Reason in all mankind. With *Geist* as a common substratum inhabiting all men's

minds, the conceptual acquisitions of Western culture could be inherited, developed and passed on among various peoples. In Dilthey's empiricist theory the history of the intellect unfolded in what he called the culture systems of religion, philosophy and science. Though men shared no underlying metaphysical being they were bound together in teleological systems, coordinating their activity in the quest for universally valid knowledge.

Moreover men were linked together in *Verbande*, "will-unities" or "ethical communities", carrying ethical ideals experienced by particular wills as objective and abiding. Dilthey's philosophy of history was a powerful anti-metaphysical critique, but there and in other writings he circled back to appropriate a great deal of the heritage of idealistic metaphysics. I shall explore the reasons for this at the paper's conclusion.

II

Dilthey's philosophy of history was emancipatory, a history of *Geist* in its "...march of conquest..." through the world.[11] Past history - to the dawn of the modern age - belonged to humanity's childhood, a period when religious and metaphysical "fictions" hindered the realisation of individual autonomy and freedom.[12] As men sought sure foundations for thought and action, they came to realize that religious dogmas, monolithic metaphysical formulas - all enemies of individual freedom - were merely projections or exteriorizations emanating from their minds. The notion of exteriorization recalls Hegel's concept of humanity's self-alienation.

With Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, valid knowledge of external reality was grounded in a theory of cognitions. For the naive - though in its time historically progressive - 'objectivism' of Greek thought, the structure of thought coincided with the real structure of the cosmos.[13] "Objectivism" or "dogmatism" meant that in the Greek view of knowledge, external reality was the key determinant, not the knowing subject. Insight into true Being emerged when the intellect came into contact with an independently existing reality. Men then gave themselves over to the objects of their contemplation. This view was shadowed by the primitive residues of Greek nature worship, which highlighted man's dependence upon the forces of nature. Accordingly, the Greek formula, "Like knows like" presupposed that the structure of knowledge depended upon the real structure of the cosmos. Plato's theory of Ideas reflected these mythic sensibilities. Knowledge was gained when men gave themselves over to the Ideas, realities existing independently of the mundane world. Experience stimulated memory of that other world, known before birth though forgotten at the moment of birth. Similarly Plato saw the ground of ethics in man's "...contemplation of the Idea of the Beautiful and the Good". Guided by these Ideas, men were prompted to ethical action. Ethical awareness did not emanate from man's autonomous conscience, but from contact with an ontological realm

outside man.[14]

Self-awareness, in the culture of Antiquity, never attained the free and autonomous human subject. Exteriorisations, the product of men's minds, held humanity in a relationship of dependence. Only in the second phase of its development, with the rise of Christianity, did Western culture come to realise man's full powers. Dilthey read the history of Christianity from the perspective of his liberal Protestantism. He had criticised Comte and Buckle for seeing religion as merely a "...resisting medium..." to be overcome by science, for he insisted that the religious idea as it developed through time, was the dynamic element in human progress.[15] Embedded in Christianity was the principle of the sovereignty of ethical will, which would, in the progress of time, come to full self-awareness. If Hegel saw history as a long travail in which reason overcomes its self-alienation, Dilthey posited a similar process, for ethical will.

The heart of Christianity was, "...the inner experience of the will's transcendence over the order of nature..." In Dilthey's phenomenological analysis of ethical life, man's experience of the imperfections of being involved an awareness of a higher ethical standard, possessing reality independent of the self. Moreover, ethical experience carried with it an awareness of its *sui generis* character. The symbolic expression of this ethical experience was the notion of a Providence directing the whole of creation to the ultimate victory of the Good. In his conception of religion Dilthey always circled back to ethics.[16]

Dilthey's philosophy of history can only be understood in the light of his theory of the "metaphysical consciousness," which he considered the universal basis of religious experience. Tracing the rise and decline of metaphysics to the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance and Reformation, Dilthey pointed to the underlying experiential core in metaphysics forming the substratum of mankind's ethical and religious systems. This core: "...the metaphysical...as personal experience..." reflected, "...the experience of devotion, of the free renunciation of our egoism...", as men broke through the realm of "...pleasure, impulse and gratification..." The higher religious systems were objectifications, externalizations of this immediate experience of the will transcending the natural order. The Christian notion of a personal God was a projection of this experience. Accordingly, the notion of the creation *ex nihilo* reflected the inner experience of the will's transcendence over nature, in the will's ability to sacrifice the self.[17]

The history of Christianity was that of its long journey to a full awareness of the "metaphysical consciousness", and, hence the sovereignty of the will. In this sense Carlo Antonio was right in insisting that, "Progress for Dilthey was an ever-increasing Christian freedom."[18] But early Christianity, still enmeshed in Greek metaphysics, would continue to attribute to God what belonged to man. Just as Feuerbach did, Dilthey asserted that man had depleted himself, while projecting his own perfections onto God. The idea of God as the fount of perfections absent in man, hindered man from understanding his own potentialities.

Christianity began its work of emancipation by tapping a source of experience and knowledge alien to Antiquity. Dilthey considered St. Augustine a key figure

in the transition to "inner experience," for his philosophic starting point was "...the religious-ethical process of belief...", and he placed the "whole man" at the centre of his analysis. From the vantage point of inner experience he analysed the will, the rhythms of spiritual life, and the experience of time. Experiences such as freedom, conscience and guilt, the felt contrast between perfection and imperfection and the transitory and the eternal, and a longing after the ultimate, could not be mastered by knowledge or referred to demonstrable objective realities.[19] Christianity initiated a historic process disengaging the inner life from its dependence upon an external objective order, defined by rational metaphysics.

But early Christianity, in the grip of Greco-Roman culture, was still far from its liberating end-point. Though now oriented to inner experience, Christians still went on to exteriorize these experiences: the gripping encounter with a Divine Will standing above nature and the cosmos, became the notion of the creation *ex nihilo*; the experience of flesh and spirit in opposition, became the theory of the incarnation. Even worse, these notions took on dogmatic authority: The kingdom of God , the creation *ex nihilo*, the incarnation, all became literal truth. Competing with other creeds, wishing to recast its beliefs into certitudes, Roman Catholicism transformed inner experience into "...a conceptual order belonging to external reality..."[20]

As a consequence, power still lay in external reality, not in man. Christians believed that the intellect acquired knowledge because men participated in the *Logos*, the Ideas emanating from the Divine. Religious experience objectified became Catholic dogma, an authoritative system flowing from God's will. The Church was God's chosen instrument of Grace, while ordination was a special grace endowing the clergy with power emanating from the Divine. Usurping the Divine charisma, the Roman Church devised "...a mechanism for ethical life, and hierarchical cant..."[21]

Enmeshed in the metaphysics of Antiquity, Christianity ascribed all efficacy to God, and withdrew it from men. Though Christianity had to acknowledge man's free will and responsibility, human freedom was subordinated to an all-powerful God, omniscient and the source of all Good. Hence, God as creative, sustaining, providential Will, directed and sustained all finite wills, providing them with efficacy, driving them to their goal. With a kind of "alchemist's art," medieval theology laboured to reconcile human and divine freedom, granting human will and efficacy a small bit of breathing space by concluding that God created and sustained human will but bestowed it with the power to move independently in the direction imposed, foreseen and willed by Him. Though Christianity had sacrificed the notion of, "...man's free will and responsibility and consequently his autonomy, to the church's tendency to see all good in mankind flowing from God through the agency of the Church...", the consciousness of man's freedom was slowly struggling to the surface.[22]

As *Geist* continued its historic "...march of conquest...", seeking "...sure foundations for thought and action...", it came to grasp more deeply and profoundly the meaning of human freedom, for the effort to reconcile metaphysics with the experiential truth of Christianity ended by undermining

both metaphysics and the Church's authority. Metaphysics continually collided with the personalist and voluntarist side of Christianity, until the persistent attempt to reconcile the irreconciliable gave way to a recognition of their fundamental antagonism. The more completely Medieval thought embraced its historic task, endeavouring to synthesize rational theology with the certainties of the religious *Erlebnis*, the more sharply the antagonisms emerged: like those legendary heroes, "...the more they struggled, the more tightly they became entangled in their bonds."[23]

Christian thought became ensnared in antinomies. Inner experience had proclaimed the primacy of will in God; metaphysics emphasized reason. But if the world came into being as a result of God's creative will, how could this be reconciled with reason which was eternal and unchanging? If the world was rational, then it could not be different than it was, and necessity ruled its creation; but this limited the sovereignty of the Divine will. Moreover, if will ruled the acts of the Divine, this implied that God could change, suffer, lack for something, and this contradicted His perfection. Antinomies abounded: If the Divine Reason was eternal, unchanging, why did God intervene in history, confronting man in finite time? Scholasticism tried to reconcile the irreconciliable by carving out a realm where faith alone applied, or by challenging the generally accepted conclusions of reason. Aquinas placed the creation *ex nihilo* in the realm of faith. Albertus Magnus argued on rational grounds, that the eternity of the world was inconceivable. But these expedients did not calm uneasy spirits.[24]

Medieval metaphysics came to fruition with the Franciscans Duns Scotus and William of Occam, both of whom shattered the fragile synthesis of the scholastics. Both were uncompromising, driving ideas to their ultimate consequences, boldly plumbing the sources of antimonies, unafraid of shaking the foundations of Medieval theology. Disengaging will and reason instead of trying to reconcile them, Duns Scotus set the stage for the first solid analysis of the will's freedom in the history of the West. Bifurcating will and reason unreservedly, he was able to do justice to the will. The will was not pulled along conceptual paths determined by thought, it was *sui genesis* - it had its own nature, its end lay in itself. When Scotus insisted that ethical law was founded in God's fiat rather than in His reason, he was not regressing to an anti-intellectual fideism. By stressing the living deed and person of God, he was furthering the urge toward freedom, germinating in Christianity.[25]

The urge toward freedom was more fully realized in William of Occam, whom Dilthey considered the "...most powerful philosophic personality..." since Augustine. Occam went to the heart of the difference between will and reason as opposed modes of knowledge, and anchored the self-knowledge of the will in immediate experience. As Dilthey believed, immediate experience involved a subjective awareness by those enduring guilt, overcoming impulse and need, of the power of their ethical will. As such, this awareness came only to those who actually made freedom a reality in their lives. Occam heralded the modern principle of "independence of will" and demonstrated it in his own life struggles.[26]

The principle of the will's sovereignty, embedded in Christianity, had momentous political consequences Recognition of the will's freedom meant acknowledging that man, as an ethical agent, was "...an end in himself of boundless value..." and that the end and aim of the ethical process lay in man, not in ethical, political or religious communities transcendent to him.[27] In Dilthey's formula: "The self-sufficient basis and sole aim of the ethical process rests in the person."[28] Rational metaphysics, on the other hand, the heir of Greek 'objectivism', absorbed human will into its conceptual structures, making it part of a larger whole. Metaphysics set the fulcrum of the ethical process in universal entities that overran the single individual, in the Platonic State or later, the mystical body of the Church.

Since reason was universal, identical in all men, binding them in a common essence, embracing reason had led to asserting the reality of universals over the individual, and to insisting that the whole dignity of the individual lay in his participation in real universals. This point was reached by non-Christian philosophers, who wholly absorbed the individual in the universal. Accordingly, the twelfth century Arab Aristotelian Ibn. Roschd (Averroës) even denied personal immortality. Separate intelligences were mere emanations of God's reason, which alone possessed immortality. Averroës' theories were to find their counterpart in Hegel's "panlogism," absorbing the individual into a metaphysical unity - the Idea - realizing itself in superpersonal historic entities.[29]

The conception of the state developed by Socrates, Plato and Artistotle, had been in keeping with the monolithic spirit of metaphysics. The state was considered an ethical unity meant to realise the Idea of the Good, and the polity was to be shaped into a unified will directed to the Good. In this abstract "...metaphysical poem" the State took on the aspect of a psyche, its parts unified to serve a higher end. Plato posited three castes, each with its assigned functions, constituting a unified polity. The wise rule, the strong support them, and the masses, sunk in appetite, obey. In a state whose goal was the Good, power was to be accorded to those with wisdom and virtue. In this abstract polity, the statesman was like the Demiurge, imposing form on recalcitrant matter - the banal appetites and interests of individuals, considered by Plato a lower order of being. Dilthey judged the Platonic state an adumbration of the Hegelian bureaucratic state. In both cases individual will and interests were subordinated to a guiding Reason, represented by a ruling strata transcending these interests (in the Hegelian state, the bureaucracy) and attuned to the good of the whole.[30]

Accordingly, Occam's position had wide-ranging political implications: "...personality endowed with ethical will and its free power now confronted all authority..." His nominalist position, that knowledge of universals would have to give way to knowledge of concrete persons, nullified the "...empty abstractions..." underlying Medieval social theory. The Medieval "...economy of salvation..." assumed that individuals were embedded in all-inclusive substantial unities. Humanity was one such substantial unity, and Adam's sin and Christ's salvation penetrated all men. Metaphysics gave philosophic content to the Pauline notion of the Holy Spirit as a sort of soul, constituting the real unity of that mystical body, the church. Later, the notion of the mystical body became

politicized, reappearing in the conception of the state as an organism. For John of Salisbury the state was a "...*corpus morale et politicum*..." whose parts were intermeshed like the organs of a human body. By insisting that universals were mere signs, not substantial realities, Occam undercut the ontological basis of medieval social theory.[31]

Dilthey's critique, both of the Greeks and of Medieval social thought, was an extension of his war against Hegel's philosophy of history, with its metaphysical political constructs. More than that, Dilthey was arguing against all theories that made a unified ethical will the nucleus of their polity, whether Comte, the Catholic church or the Romantic theoreticians of the *Volksgeist*. "Inner experience" sanctioned the claims of freedom; "...the subjective content of the inward life..." had an autonomous character. Man did not absorb this content from society, but from a realm of inner experience independent of society.[32] Dilthey drew a straight line from Occam to Luther, then to the Puritans, and to Kant and Fichte, Humboldt and Schleiermacher.[33] The conception of political freedom developed by Kant, Fichte, Humboldt and Schleiermacher grew out of the notion of "moral individualism" rooted in Christianity.

III

Appropriating the heritage of modern individualism, Dilthey then insisted that human nature was deeply embedded in society and history. In the *Ethik,* he placed the theoreticians of inner experience side by side with those who believed ethical rules originated in man's social life. In this view men were embedded in, "...*Verbände* of an ethically productive character...", hence "...inwardly shaped by a collective spirit." As a result the ethical process did not unfold in the "...isolated individual..." but through the mediation of the "...social ethical religious whole..." The great historic instances of this view were the Platonic state, the Roman republic, Augustine's City of God, the Catholic church and the Hegelian bureaucratic state. The Catholic formula could stand for them all: "*extra ecclesian nulla salus*" - there was no salvation outside the church. Dilthey insisted both approaches were legitimate; he wished to effect a new synthesis incorporating these two perspectives.[34]

Men fight most vociferously against those akin to them in outlook, for their similarities and differences are subtly, threateningly intermingled. If Dilthey spent much of his time disowning Hegel, he was also close to him in some ways and accepted a basic premise of Historical Idealism, that ideas were carried by the ethical collectivities engendered by history. As criticism of Hegel Dilthey had insisted: "When the solitary soul struggles with its destiny, what it endures in the depth of its conscience is for its sake alone, not for the sake of the world - process nor for any social organism."[35] But if Dilthey created space for the single individual in the historical process, he also left room for what he called society's external organisations. These were teleological systems, "...transcending the individual"... they too were the carriers of progress, the guarantors of historic

continuity. Dilthey called them *Verbände* - great "will-unities" exercising power over individuals and sub-ordinating them to a common will. *Verbände* included the family, the community, church and state, corporate bodies and institutions. *Verbände* were ethical communities, with a collective will voicing ethical commands emanating from group life.[36]

The modern secular philosophy of history, as Dilthey believed, grew out of Christianity, which had first assumed a providential scheme unfolding in history in necessary stages. The Christian view of history assumed that mankind was a metaphysical unity inheriting original sin through Adam and redeemed through participation in the mystical body of the church. The modern philosophy of history had simply substituted the Idealistic collective *Geist* for the old religious universals. Both overrode the reality and efficacy of the autonomous individual. Just as God's will, directing history, provided most of the efficacy for human will, pulling men along as it were by invisible threads, so freedom for Hegel meant being in harmony with *Geist*.[37]

However, metaphysical universals in Christianity and Hegelian theory expressed a partial truth. Wills were bound together in *Verbände*; these incorporated universally valid aims. History was the play of these "...powerful will-unities..."; progress entailed the individual's "...sacrifical devotion..." to them. As Dilthey insisted: "*Verbände* link the generations in a framework that outlasts them. As a result, the growing acquisitions of humanity, laboriously accumulated in the culture systems, are gathered in stable forms, preserved, as though under a protective covering. Human association is one of the most powerful agencies of historical progress."[38]

Verbände had a life of their own. Men go their way following petty ambition, selfish interest, filling their niche on earth, and serve in the process, these great teleological systems. In a telling image Dilthey insisted that the blind Faust in his last days, could just as well stand for the hero in history as the masterly Faust, who shaped nature and society with the "...eye and hand of a sovereign..." History used men to achieve its purposes. "Even when it comes to the deeds of its heroes, history renders them ineffectual if they are of no use to its teleological systems." Men were instruments of larger forces, operating often beyond their understanding or control. In this sense, Dilthey argued, Hegel's concept of the 'cunning of reason' was correct.[39]

IV

Dilthey endeavoured to steer a course between individualism and a recognition of human nature's embeddedness in society and history. His synthesis was characteristic of late nineteenth century German liberalism; Emile Durkheim, in France, was engaged in a similar enterprise. Elaborating his synthesis, Dilthey sought a middle course between organic and mechanistic analogies in defining the relationship between the individual and the group. Men were conscious of themselves as a part of living wholes operative in them,

extending to their inmost being; they were also conscious of themselves as separate personalities with intrinsic value and individual purposes. Men were not merely means to a group end, neither was the group a mere means for the individual ends of its members. Combining elements of community and individuality in varying degrees, *Verbände* provided space for some free activity and also limited this activity, at one and the same time.[40]

Dilthey's position implied no uncritical or submissive attitude toward institutions, for he warned of the tendency of *Verbände* to subjugate culture to their ends. The interaction between what he called culture systems - the free creations of science, art, philosophy and religion - and *Verbände,* was a great theme of history. Creativity in the culture systems was the outcome of freely coordinated activity, while in the *Verbände* human action was regulated by the collective New ideas produced in the culture systems could later alter *Verbände,* while the latter could hold back the free unfolding of the creative spirit or grant it a wide and efficacious sphere of activity.[41]

Man was neither to be subordinated to superpersonal entities, nor disengaged from them. As Troeltsch was to put it later on: individuals do not make up the whole, but they identify themselves with it. Men remained normatively bound to *Verbände.* For Dilthey Christian individualism sanctioned no "...antisocial-subjectivity...". However, he was arguing that *Verbände* be characterised by freedom rather than coercion, conscientious personal judgement rather than subordination. Again, Troeltsch put this position succinctly: The German idea of freedom involved "...autonomous dutiful devotion and cooperation, along with watchfulness and responsibility...a union of initiative with devotion, pride with discipline, creative force with a sacrificial sense for the whole."[42]

Georg Iggers has argued that by emphasizing the Christian origins of the idea of freedom, hence conceiving of it as largely spiritual and non-political, German liberals were able to harmonise the claims of freedom with those of community.[43] Hock's study of Gustav Droysen suggests this may have been true of some liberals, for whom freedom had emerged from the Christian tradition. For Droysen the nub of freedom lay in the "...free decision of conscience." Droysen's aim was the freely-willed union between individual personality and *Verbände,* termed by him "ethical unities" (*"sittliche Gemeinsamkeiten"*). These unities were the overriding source of ethical norms. Individual self-determination involved freely recognising the ethical power these unities exercised over personality. In Droysen's vision of freedom, the emphasis lay on the expanded sense of personal responsiblity unleashed by the act of free decision. Personal responsiblity was realised in free devotion to superpersonal entities.[44] For Dilthey on the other hand, both the individual and *Verbände* had equal status as carriers of ethical values and the acquisitions of culture systems. Dilthey's notion of moral autonomy implied a greater degree of separation and critical distance between individuals and *Verbände.*

With his view of *Verbände* as key units of history, Dilthey believed that German history had nurtured a special kind of state and that liberal reform was bound to this historic ethical collectivity. The revival, after 1848, of the heritage of the Prussian Reform Movement and the war of liberation, shaped Dilthey's

lifelong political orientation. In a series of essays on the Prussian Reform Movement published in 1872, Dilthey adopted the themes of the Stein renaissance of the 1850's. He insisted that Stein had been Germany's greatest statesman, comparable, in standing, to Richelieu in France.[45] The institutions envisaged by Stein - municipal self-government, Provincial Estates and an Assembly of Imperial Estates - would initiate a creative partnership between Prussia's citizenry and the bureaucratic monarchy. Stein drew from German traditions of self government and owed nothing to foreign models. His aim was: "The participation of the nation in the administration of public affairs." Such participation was to nurture a sharpened sense for the good of the whole. Political consciousness not channelled into, "...free discussion and participation in the state...", ended up in a sterile political negativism. Denying citizens participation in public affairs stunted the vitality of the polity's collective spirit (*Gemeingeist*) and encouraged privatism, the reign of self-interest and a negative and critical attitude to the state. Participation in public affairs fostered patriotism and public spirit, creating that "civic sense" upon which "the feeling for the state" (*Staat sinn*) rested.[46] As Dilthey had insisted in 1862, disagreeing with Fichte's conception of the state: "...in the free forms fashioned by the historical and national spirit, there lies a far more effective power than in anything dictatorially engendered and controlled by the state."[47] In 1872, one year after the founding of the Second *Reich*, Dilthey was calling on his countrymen to renew the traditions of the German Reform Movement, reminding Germans that the work of Stein had not yet been completed.[48]

Dilthey accepted the conservative institutional structure of the Second *Reich*, with its monarchical constitution, its alliance of throne and alter secured by an established church with a mixed consistorial-synodal system, its state controlled universities with appointment and promotions in the hands of state officials. More exactly, Dilthey's position was midway between the left and right wings of German liberalism. His was a statist liberalism that stressed individual autonomy, fought against narrowly utilitarian and bureaucratic ideals of education and against uncritical submission to officialdom.[49]

In the German liberal tradition, the state was represented by the crown and bureaucracy whose role was to transcend particular interests. Parliament belonged to the sphere of civil society. As an entity above civil society, the monarchy was the visible embodiment of the state's ethical content. Though most liberals, including Dilthey, held this view, this shared premise could harbour significant variations. Dilthey's view was very far from Treitschke's, for whom the eighteenth century bureaucratic state was the earthly realisation of Plato's rule of the wise.[50] In a letter to Treitschke in 1870, Dilthey commented on his friend's view of the history of the Netherlands, scolding him for his adulation of the House of Orange who, according to Treitschke, had wisely marshalled society for the state's defence. Dilthey countered that unchecked preoccupation with the defence of the state threatened to make society an "armed fortress". The "...apostles of peace, trade and science..." were equally essential to the polity. At odds with Treitschke, Dilthey appealed to values threatened by an exaggerated concept of the state. It was not the House of Orange, he insisted, that had made

the culture of the Low Countries such an important link in the chain of European history, spawning Arminianism and fostering freedom and progress.[51]

Dilthey's synthesis of the individual and the superpersonal was based upon his conviction that Germany could avoid the pitfalls of both atomized individualism and despotism. Yet increasingly his political position was shadowed by contradiction, disillusionment and despair. Typically, during the Second Empire, he fought against the Kaiser's attempt in 1890 to promote narrow chauvinism and anti-socialist propaganda in the curriculum of the German Humanistic gymnasium. He approved that part of the *Kulturkampf* legislation abolishing church supervision of schools and requiring of priests successful completion of state examinations, but opposed the "police excesses" that gave the state sole power to expel and appoint clerics, considering these measures violations of the church's relative autonomy. He joined in the agitation against the Zedlitz bill of 1891 that would have restored church supervision over the *Volksschule* to counter the growing strength of atheism, materialism and socialism. In the 1890's the government and conservative political circles tried by intimidation and pressure to quiet both the "red professors", proponents of a paternalist state socialism, and liberal academic critics of government policies. In response, Dilthey's essays of 1900 on Frederick's alliance with the German Enlightenment, pointedly criticised the overbearing Frederickian repression in educational and religious affairs. In that same period, Dilthey was involved in representation and petitions to the government protesting its attempt to dismiss Leo Arons, a Dozent in physics who was a member of the Social Democratic Party. Dilthey joined those who argued that membership in the SPD was not tantamount to advocating revolution. Dilthey's letters of the 1890's are full of complaints about the heavy hand of personal government seen in the Kaiser's personal intervention in cultural affairs and in theological appointments, and in disciplinary action by the High Consistory against clerics who questioned fundamentalist beliefs.[52]

By 1880 when Bismarck broke with the National Liberals and the Empire moved to the right, Dilthey's political observations showed an increasing note of despair. He was, however, hostile to the newly-formed left of centre Liberal Union (*Liberale Vereinigung*) for their attitude of principled opposition to the government. As he believed, liberals ought to go more than half-way in their efforts to restore their alliance with the state. With the accession of William II in 1888 Dilthey was at first heartened by his liberal attitude to the workers, hoping it would end the rift between them and the state. When William abandoned these plans, and turned hostile to trade union rights, Dilthey's disappointment was intense. During the 1880's and 1890's Dilthey's letters to his friend Yorck von Wartenburg were a litany of complaints about bureaucratic repressiveness, coupled with the expressed conviction that only a progressive bureaucracy in the spirit of Stein could end the malaise in which the German polity had fallen.[53] With the Puttkamer purges of 1881, the Prussian bureaucracy had, however, lost its progressive elements. In Germany the project of wedding the values of individual autonomy to the historic form of the German monarchical state was defeated by history. It was a defeat that Dilthey's theoretical synthesis made him

reluctant to face.

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Notes

I am indebted to Dr. Helmut Johach of the Erlangen-Nürenberg University for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

1. For an early influential statement of this view, see Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action,* Glencoe, Illinois, 1949, 479-80. For a contemporary version, see Georg Iggers, *The German Conception of History,* Middletown, Connecticut 1968, 3-11. The new school of social historians in Germany sees historicism as ruling class ideology. Karl-Georg Faber has discussed these views in *History and Theory* XVI (1977), 51-66. For a summary of contemporary notions about historicism and an alternative viewpoint, see: Thomas Nipperdey, "Historismus and Historismuskritik heute," Eberhard Jackel and Ernst Weymar eds., *Die Funktion der Geschichte in Unsèrer Zeit,* Stuttgart, 1975, 82-95. The earlier view was encouraged by Meinecke's influential study, for he judged Historicism characteristically German. Historicism rapidly found congenial disciples in other countries; Meinecke ignores this. Nipperdey 88. For Enlightenment influences on Historicism, see Helen Liebel, "The Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism in German Thought," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 4 (1971), 359-85, Georg Iggers" Comments on Helen Liebel's 'Rise of German Historicism,' " and Helen Liebel, "Reply to Georg Iggers," *Eighteenth-Century,* 5 (1972), 587-603.

2. For H. Stuart Hughes, Dilthey's belief in history's autonomy led to skepticism and relativism. H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society* New York, 1958, 192-200. For a similar view, see Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge,* London, 1952, 107-08. For Iggers, Dilthey never succeeded in overcoming the historical relativism engendered by Historicism's individualizing approach, Iggers, 124-44. For a similar view, see Hans-Joachim Lieber, "Geschichte und Gesellschaft in Denken Dilthey's "*Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozial-Psychologie* 17 (1965), 734-41. Among the more recent interpretations, Ermath concludes that,"Dilthey chose a median position between an extreme essentialism and an extreme historicism." Michael Ermath, *Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason,* Chicago, 1978, 285. For Dilthey's view of progress, see Helmut Johach, *Handelnder Mensch und Objektiver Geist* Meisenheim am Glan, 1974, 80.

3. Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften,* Vol. I: *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften,* Stuttgart, 1959, xvi. Ernst Troeltsch, *Gesammelte Schriften,* Vol. III: *Der Historismus und seine Probleme,* Tubingen, 1922, 280-82. For Dilthey's liberal historicist predecessors, see Heinrich Heffter, *Die Deutsche Selbstverwaltung in 19 Jahrhundert,* Stuttgart, 1950, 359-64.

4. *Einleitung,* 49, 91. *Gesammelte Schriften* Vol. V: *Die Geistige Welt* "Uber das Studium der Geschichte der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und den Staat,", Stuttgart, 1961, 52-53.

5. *Einleitung,* xvi, 91-92.

6. *Die Geistige Welt* "Uber vergleichende Psychologie," 278.

7. *Gesammelte Schriften* Vol. VII: *Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften,* Stuttgart, 1961, 205-07.

8. *Einleitung,* 128.

9. *Die Geistige Welt* "Das Wesen der Philosophie," 375-376.

10. The historical treatises of the 1890's, on the Reformation and seventeenth century rationalism, are continuations of the historical section of the *Einleitung.* See Johach, 80, 89.

11. *Einleitung*, 249.
12. *Ibid.*, 296.
13. *Ibid.*, 177-79.
14. *Ibid.*, 189-93.
15. "Uber das Studium," 52-53.
16. *Einleitung*, 309-10, 325.
17. *Ibid.*, 384-86.
18. Carlo Antoni, *From History to Sociology*, Detroit, 1959, 34.
19. *Einleitung*, 251, 260.
20. *Ibid.*, 258. For a key discussion of the interplay between religious experience and philosophic concepts, see "Das Wesen der Philosophie," 386-88.
21. *Ibid.*, 258.
22. *Ibid.*, 280, 284.
23. *Ibid.*, 249, 330.
24. *Ibid.*, 317-27.
25. *Ibid.*, 321-23
26. *Ibid.*, 323-24.
27. *Ibid.*, 217.
28. *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. X: *System der Ethik*, Stuttgart, 1958, 21.
29. *Einleitung*, 318-20.
30. *Ibid.*, 226-227. To liberals like Dilthey, Hegel was an apologist of the policies of the 1820's, when Prussia reverted to the traditions of the *Beamtenstaat*, adopted the repressive Carlsbad decrees, and veered away from constitutionalism. For a nineteenth century liberal critique of Hegel's support of reaction, see Wolfgang Harich, *Rudolph Haym und sein Herderbuch*, Berlin, 1955, 39-40.
31. *Ibid.*, 323-24, 346.
32. *System der Ethik*, 20-21.
33. *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol., XI: *Vom Aufgang des Geschichtlichen Bewusstseins*. "Friedrich Christoph Schlosser," Stuttgart, 1960, 131. Dilthey claimed Luther was directly influenced by Occam. *Einleitung*, 324. For the continuities running from Occam to Kant and Fichte, see *Einleitung*, 273.
34. *Ethik*, 24.
35. *Einleitung*, 100.
36. *Ibid.*, 53-54, 65. *Verbände* has no English equivalent. 'Association' is too loose and contractual; 'social organism' is too cohesive and monolithic. I have translated "Zweckzusammenhang" as "teleological system." By this Dilthey meant that *Verbände* were informed by ethical ideals experienced by particular wills as objective and universally valid.
37. *Ibid.*, 99-100.
38. *Ibid.* 53, 65-66, 100.
39. *Ibid.*, 53, 127.

40. *Ibid.*, 74. "Uber das Studium," 40, 63. Makkreel has emphasized that the interplay between the individual and society was a central theme for Dilthey. Rudolf Makkreel; *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Sciences*, Princeton, 1975, 63. See also Ermath, 287. "History is neither the play of purely individual activity nor the work of supra-individual forces and institutions but the reciprocal relation of both."

41. In his study of eighteenth century Prussia's Civil Code, Dilthey had delineated the complex relationship between the Prussian state and the Enlightenment. The state fluctuated between its recognition of the values of liberty, toleration, reason and science and fear of the destructive consequences of "free reflexion." The newly founded Berlin Academy was allowed to publish scientific and political works, but this right was hedged in by substantial restrictions. Similarly religious heresy was not punishable as such, unless it's expression was judged detrimental to the general welfare as defined by the state. Moreover the cultural narrowness bred by the absolutist state reduced Christianity to an insipid utilitarianism. Pastors exhibited a spirit of "...courtly obsequiousness..." Piety meant being a loyal subject. For this reason Dilthey endorsed the achievements of the Prussian Reform Movement. With Stein's reforms in self government and Humboldt's in education, Prussia had moved toward modern constitutionalism, wedding the free citizen to the state. *Gesammelte Schriften*. Vol. XII: *Zur Preussischen Geschichte* "Das Allgemeine Landrecht," Stuttgart, 1960, 196. *Gesammelte Schriften*. Vol. III: *Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Geistez* "Friedrich der Grosse und die Deutsche Aufklarung," Stuttgart, 1962, 147.

42. *Gesammelte Schriften* Vol. XIV: *Leben Schleiermachers. Zweiter Band: Schleirmachers System als Philosophie und Theologie*. Zwei Halbande, Berlin, 1967, 367. This reference is to Book I. Ernst Troeltsch, "Die Deutsche Idee von der Freiheit," *Die Neue Rundschau* I (1916), 66.

43. Georg Iggers, *The German Conception of History*, Middletown, Conncecticut, 1968, 104.

44. Wolfgang Hock, *Liberales Denken im Zeitalter der Paulskirche*, Munster, 1957, 57-59.

45. *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. XVI: *Zur Getstesgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* "Deutsche Gerschichte von Ludwig Hausser," Gottingen, 1972, 163. For the 1872 essays on the Prussian Reform Movement, see *Zur Preussischen Geschichte* "Die Reorganisatoren des Preussichen Staats (1807-1813)," 37-130. For the Stein renaissance, see Heffter, 360.

46. *Zur Preussichen Geschichte* "Der Freiherr vom Stein," 47-49.

47. *Zur Geistesgeschichte des 19. Jubrbunderts* "Fichte als Ethiker und Politiker," 403.

48. "Der Freiherr vom Stein," 40.

49. Fritz Ringer has marked off this position on the German liberal spectrum, and termed it "mandarin liberalism." See *The Decline of te German Mandarins*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, 116 ff. *1969, 116 ff.*

50. *Hock, 67.*

51. *Clara Misch ed., Der Junge Dilthey: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebuchern 1852-1870*, Stuttgart, 1960, 290-91. Treitschke's "Die Republik der vereinigten Niederlande," appeared in his *Historische und Politische Aufsaetze*, Leipzig, 1870, Vol. II.

52. For an excellent account of these issues, see Gordon Craig, *Germany 1866-1945*, New York, 1978, Chapt. VI, "Religion, Education and the Arts". On the *Kulturkampf*, 72-78. On purges in the bureaucracy, 159. For a magisterial study in which the notion of a supine Wilhelminian policy is corrected, see Ernst Rudolf Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789*. Vol. IV: *Struktur und Krisen des Kaiserreiches*. Stuttgart, 1969, 894, 916, 952 (on Dilthey's role in the Arons affair). For Dilthey's responses, see *Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, 1877-1897*, Halle, 1923, 16, 134-35, 142, 228-29. *Zur Preussische Geschichte* "Das Allgemeine Landrecht," 196. *Über die Möglichkeit einer Allgemeingültigen Padagogischen Wissenschaft* "Schulreform." Weinheim, 1963, 83-86.

53. *Briefwechsel*, 4, 18, 228, 238. Zockler notes that Dilthey distanced himself from active politics from the late 1870s on. Christopher Zockler, *Dilthey und die Hermeneutik*, Stuttgart, 1975, 193.

WAYS OF SEEING

Over the past year, the editors of the *Journal* assisted in the development of an international conference, titled and this mindful of John Berger's thought, of "Ways of Seeing". The conference was sponsored by *The Association for Canadian Studies* and involved representatives from fourteen countries, ranging from Japan and the United States to Italy and Ireland. Held in conjunction with the annual meetings of the Learned Societies at Dalhousie University, the various sessions focussed on a critical examination of the cultural and historical imaginations. Reflecting, in good part, the importance that we attach to the recovery of a critical perspective in and on North American thought, the conference engendered a series of statements on the crisis of civilization. It was as if from the traditional solitudes of poetry, political theory, historical research and the visual arts, there emerged over two days a free commonwealth of ideas, indeed the beginnings of the renewal and regeneration of creative discourse. While it is impossible to reproduce here the intellectual vitality and generosity of debate which typified the conference, we are bringing to our readers two papers which, among others, represented significant reinterpretations of North American inquiry.

In his essay, "Lament and Utopia", Michael Weinstein compares George Grant's reflections upon the will to power in technological society and Leopoldo Zea's critique of the dialectics of imperialism. The traditions of Canadian and Mexican thought are thus linked as polarities of a common discourse. While Canada is envisaged as a society as a society given over to the historical remembrance of things past and Mexico viewed as a nation of utopian imagery, both intellectual traditions are presented as unifying around the critique of American empire. The essay sketches out the possibility of the existence in the New World of a silent, but profound, union of minds among the most anguished of thinkers. The discourse of North America may, in the end, involve an original and terrifying vision of the rebirth of Babylon.

Eli Mandel, one of Canada's most distinguished literary critics, examines anew the tension between Northrop Frye's estimation of the discursive basis of criticism and oppositional viewpoints which seek to break forever with the "cultural freudianism" at work in Frye's thought. In his paper, "Strange Loops", Mandel reflects upon the relation between the artistic and literary imagination and the sense of place, of region, which informs the most critical of perspectives. Mandel argues that in the writings of Robert Kroetsch, Michael Ondaatje and others there is a voice expressed, a language of discourse found, which is simultaneously particular and universal, local and cosmopolitan. In direct terms, Mandel opens up a violent meeting of two cosmologies of criticism, two contending epistemes on the meaning of the language of discourse. In the end is the language of discourse — the language of the poet who mediates reason and unreason — to be the visual language of Escher or Blake? Escher is the master of the paradox of strange loops, but Blake is the witness of the fall into modern consciousness.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. V, No. 3 (Fall, 1981).

STRANGE LOOPS: NORTHROP FRYE AND CULTURAL FREUDIANISM

Eli Mandel

This paper does not attempt a history of recent Canadian literary criticism. Nor does it have anything important to say about Canadian writing in itself. Instead, it is concerned with how it is that literature and criticism, in this country, can be described as ways of seeing Canadian culture. This is a problem in perception. In order to address this question, I concern myself with two matters and I begin by describing or delineating these: one is the matter of cultural and critical theory; the other I call "strange loops."[1] The first is simply the question of whether (or by what means) literary and cultural history and theory are at all possible; the second, a puzzle about the language of literature and the paradoxes it involves. Strange loops are linguistic paradoxes that structure theories of poetry and literature and criticism. Theories of culture pose problems by means of somewhat different structures: themes, images, forms, for example.

I am reminded of two comments that might illustrate this distinction, one by Saul Bellow, the other by Groucho Marx. When Bellow won the Nobel Prize, he was asked whether he thought of himself as a Jewish writer like Malamud or Roth. "When anyone asks me about Jewish writers, they frequently mention Malamud and Roth along with Bellow" he replied. "I think at once of Hart, Shaffner and Marx, tailors not writers." This is a comment about cultural criticism. Groucho Marx once said he would refuse to join any club that would have him for a member. This is a strange loop. Both remarks should remind us of difficulties in the kind of question this paper addresses and in the problem proposed. I begin by listing, for convenience, three puzzles in the notion of cultural criticism or in the concept of "Canadian culture" and the means by which it might be *seen* through literature; the first has to do with the difficulty of generalizing to a class or social or public notion the particular perceptions of a poem or novel. You could put this as a difference between politics and fantasy, collectivist or particularist interests, objective or subjective approches to writing. A second, as a kind of variation on this first, concerns the difference between an elitist approach to culture and mass culture or popular approaches. The literary and critical definitions of a literate audience, no doubt, stand in some sort of tension with the concerns of proletarian or at least mass or popular audiences. Third, a contradiction exists - profoundly, I think, - between the notion of writing as truth and writing as duplicity. Assuming that, as Roland Barthes remarks, the God of literature is the only god who lies, how would literary assertions relate to social reality or cultural identification?

Two theories of culture, to begin with, exist in opposition to one another. One, elitist, privileged (in language and metaphysical status), non-historical in relation to truth and society; the other, popular, particularist in language, and

experiential in form; one, more than likely, high literary criticism, formal in structure, continous in form; the other, low or vulgar in approach, phenomenological in structure, discontinous in form. We will have occasion to look at these differences in more detail as we go along. But this is obviously not the time or place in which to rehearse detailed puzzles of theory or even the history of attitudes about the purpose of literature as we have understood them in the country (though I will touch on some of these matters). I mention now, in passing, the problems the subject raises, the biases put before us (some now call this "habit").[2] What I propose to do is attempt to show how some questions I have put have been resolved or intensified in (first of all) our major literary critical approaches and then in the relevant work of some of our best writers. And in the process I want to put into opposition two kinds of critical and creative approaches: one, thematic, the other, structural; one about theory, the other, strange loops. I hope as well to deal with such intriguing questions that arise as those about history and structure, place and language, tradition and individual talent, and especially, beginnings and endings in writing: naming the world or bringing the house down.

II

A remark in my preface to *Another Time* attracted considerable attention, as these things go. "Modern criticism in Canada," I said then, "has become a strikingly effective social instrument. It serves as a vehicle of political comment and social awareness. It seeks a central role in the development of national consciousness. It aspires to the attainment of cultural coherence."[3] There seemed to me then some reservations to be added; I was at the time thinking very largely of the thematic criticism of Northrop Frye as extended and developed by Margaret Atwood in *Survival* and D.G. Jones in *Butterfly on Rock*. By then, in fact, we had important work from Dennis Lee, Warren Tallman, and Robert Kroetsch. Miriam Waddington had published valuable essays critical of the metaphoric mode of Frygian thought, and Frank Davey's ground-breaking *From There to Here* had appeared. The alternative approaches were taking shape even as the main-stream of serious academic criticism from Desmond Pacey to Malcolm Ross continued to develop and a large series of critical monographs on Canadian writers appeared. Still, no one, I think, is likely to dispute the view that the most cogent and powerful means of describing Canadian culture through its literary expression has been, historically, the so-called thematic criticism of Frye. Indeed, despite some sustained objections, the method, if anything, was elaborated and extended through a series of major critical studies - I think especially of John Moss's work and (to a lesser degree) of Margot Northey's generic study with its revealing title, *The Haunted Wilderness* and, of course, a host of essays in important critical journals. Yet, despite the range and acuity of critical objections to and assessments of Frye's method (for example, Malcolm Ross's, George Woodcock's, Frank Davey's, Russell Brown's) two major pecularities of it seem

to have eluded them.

It is surely no longer necessary to rehearse the central argument of thematic criticism though some of its implications take on special importance in this special context. Two in particular. First, the nature and character of its central metaphor, and second, its view of cultural Freudianism. Both, indeed, are vehicles of its social and cultural perceptions, its ways of seeing.

The central and familiar argument of thematic criticism is that the formative response in Canadian writing is to a dominant physical fact - the land as wilderness or north as symbol. Frye speaks of this as the riddle of the unconscious and believes that because of its concern with a symbolic mystery - unexplored, unchartered aspects of mind and universe, much of Canadian writing takes shape in images of terror and nightmare - a haunted, gothic mental space. The Canadian aspect of this encounter with the wilderness is the development of what Frye calls a "garrison mentality"[4]

The importance of this argument is that it connects with an historical interpretation of Canada as a northern nation or a Laurentian Empire. Unlike America, which develops by transformation at the frontier, Canada closes itself into the conservative town. America is revolutionary, active, dynamic. We are conservative, passive, religious. In another context, I put this in Charles Olson's terms in his essay on Melville, *Call Me Ishmael.* "I take SPACE to be the central fact to man born in America. . .large and without mercy. . .Plus a harshness we still perpetuate. . .The fulcrum of America is the Plains, half sea, half land, a high sun as metal and obdurate as the iron horizon. . .Some men ride on such space, others have to fasten themselves like a stake to survive. As I see it Poe dug in and Melville mounted. They are the alternatives."[5]

This is one of the implications of Frye's criticism and from the gothic it seems to me, a version of ourselves, distinct, clear, individual and peculiar emerges. Of this more, later.

The central metaphor needs some account. It becomes clear in the opposition to Frye's position (which begins, by implication at least as early as in John Sutherland's *Other Canadians* (1947), designed as a reply to A.J.M. Smith's*Book of Canadian Poetry* (1946) that itself occasioned Frye's review in the *Canadian Forum,* "Canada and Its Poetry," the first major statement of thematic criticism of our literature.). Sutherland's is essentially the same in substance, if not politically, as Frank Davey's critique in 1974 *(From There to Here).* In Sutherland's view, Smith's anthology fails because, choosing to support British intellectuals, like P.K. Page, Patrick Anderson, Neufville Shaw, James Wreford, it perpetuates our British colonialism, as a version of what Sutherland called the Canadian "Butler mentality." Against Smith, he argued a Marxist position: genuine Canadain writing, he said, is not upper middle class, aristocratic, or genteel, but lower class, vulgar, proletarian. Inside every Canadian there's a Brooklyn Bum-self struggling to get out and let loose his barbaric yawp. Our *real* tradition is American and proletarian, not British and intellectual.[6]

This you recognize as familiar and important. It says we are not a garrison people but a frontier people. It points to a perennial tension in Canadian life between English and American influences on our life *and* culture, tensions

expressed as between those who believe the lines of influence run North and South and those who believe they run East and West, between those who hold the Laurentian thesis of Innis and Creighten or those who, like Underhill, are continentalists, those who say Canada exists *because* of its geography and those who say it exists *despite* its geography.

At this point a peculiar, potent metaphor enters the discussion from the literary point of view. Frye's position is uncompromisingly British, not American so far as writing is concerned. There are two fallacies about poetry, the imaginative process, to be got rid of, one he calls North American, the other American though they come to the same thing. One he calls "Tarzanism," the other "the Ferdinand the Bull theory of poetry." Both views are that poetry begins with experience, "first-hand contact with life:" smelling the flowers like Ferdinand or out of pure primitive machismo, like Tarzan or Irving Layton.

Both are wrong. Frye calls them aboriginal views of poetry, but poetry, he says is not aboriginal or primitive. Its origin consists of going back to origins. But the origins of poetry are poetry. Literature begins with literature. It imitates other poetry. It is traditional not aboriginal. It is literary not experiential.

This is the point at which Frank Daveky objects and the point at which the two opposing views of *culture* with which I began, now emerge. It provides a key metaphor in Frye's perception. I turn, to elucidate the point, to Paul Bove's *Destructive Poetics* and particularly to his essay on "Literary History and Literary Interpretation." There Bové argues that criticism such as Frye's (Harold Bloom's, for example) "nostalgically (reifies) an aesthetically ordered. . .humanistic *tradition* as an alternative to the radical flux, disorder, alienation and death which characterizes the Post-modern world."[7] His argument is clearest in his direct engagement with Bloom. I quote his summary of Bloom's startling and highly influential thesis about the birth of the poet, the meaning of tradition, the family romance and the meaning of "the anxiety of influence."

> The argument of [Bloom's] *The Anxiety of Influence* is that all strong poets "try to overcome the priority of nature and time and necessarily fail." The independently existing "external" world claims priority over the poetic mind and restricts its freedom and comfort. "For every poet begins (however 'unconsciously') by rebelling more strongly against the consciousness of death's necessity than all other men and women do. Of course, according to Bloom, the acute anxiety of the poet emerges from the fear of two deaths: the physical death of the human being threatens the absolute freedom and priority of the 'cogito,' and the inhibiting temporal struggle with the poet's precursors promises 'poetic' death. Thus the poet's quest is for temporal priority over his fathers as well as for hierarchical priority or authority over nature. The poet's desire is to be not only his own father and to displace his 'real' father, *but to be the parent of those who gave birth to him in what Bloom, echoing Freud, calls the 'Primal scene of Instruction,'* the moment of 'Election-Love' when the poet is called and answers".[8] (I confess to a strong personal attraction to Bloom's theory of influence and to the marvellously paradoxical way it is put).

Now the cryptic and sometimes vexing meaning of Frye's comment "Poetry imitates poetry" becomes clear. That is a definition of *tradition* in poetry with all

the attendent and necessary metaphors implied. To use Bové's language again; two tropes (or figures of speech-metaphors) structure Bloom's thesis and reflect his concerns, and prejudices: "first, the genetic metaphor and its variants - the myth of the Fall, the idea of origins, the language of loss and nostalgia and the ultimate death of poetry; [beginning and end come together, we notice.] Second, the rhetoric of dualism and its transformations - the Cartesian isolation of the self, the quest to escape nature and time, the Gnostic desire for godhead, and the melancholy insistence on the priorty of mind over matter."[9] The primal figure of Frye's thematic criticism is a metaphor about what has been called the burden of the past or the anxiety of influence. In Sartre's words it is heraldic and mythic, a naming or identifying metaphor. It is too a metaphor that denies time in its circular form of literary history which identifies beginning and end. The poet of Frye's scheme seeks the timeless, the world of structure not process, order not disorder, culture not phenomenal experience. These are the implications of his work that critics like Frank Davey view with distaste. Critics who see his work as bookish, about literature, not about experience, elitist not democratic, concerned with structure and art as opposed to process and experience. There is, however, a further aspect of the metaphor of art and genetics, or the romance of the family, to be noted.

One of the most attractive features of thematic criticism - at least to literary nationalists - is that it lends force to a wide-spread view that literature serves as a means of national identification and accordingly as a force for national unity. One form of this view implies an analogy between an individual or person and a body of literature (a metaphor we have just been looking at in Frye's trope of genetics or origins).[10] Literature then is to the nation what personality is to the person. It defines us by giving us further metaphors of "who we are." Another form of the same view sees literature as defining or arising out of place, therefore providing us with a picture, so to speak, of "where we are." A subtler elaboration of these first two views postulates a social and causal relationship: literature is a product of society and accordingly a portrait not of its external features but of its very nature and mode of operation and existence, its processes, so to speak. The first is a kind of cultural Freudianism, the second, a literary geography, the third, a literary sociology, more often than not Marxist. That no one has yet made sense of the so-called causal relations between literature and society seems not to have occurred as an objection, no more in the sociology than in cultural Freudianism. Taken together, the three views constitute, as many argue they do, a psychological, geographical, and sociological portrait of Canada and hence an image of its character and nature, invaluable for the intricately particularized sense of the felt life of the country, not only its general features but its very texture.

So it is with the Freudian form of thematic criticism. Its many implications provide it with a convincing metaphoric position. It develops, in Atwood's *Survival*, through feminist shamanistic visions of the wilderness; and throughout, with the notions of the mythic sense of tradition as the formative force in writing. To take some of the more striking examples, Robert Kroetsch uses punning distinctions of horse-house to play with erotic metaphors of space

in fiction of the Canadian west and Earle Birney uses the metaphor as a means of psychoanalyzing all of us as perennial adolescents. How much of the Freudian approach, if any, is to be found in John Moss's *Sex and Violence in the Canadian Novel,* I don't know but I've heard there is a study of Canadian writing modelled on Leslie Fiedler's wonderful *Love and Death in the American Novel.*

It is Frye himself who points to a number of objections which can be urged against the view that literature serves as a means of national identification and startlingly points to the development that, in literature and criticism, weighs most heavily against the structure his own work created: that development is regionalism. Now, though at a glance this sounds very like a plea for provincial interests by a local politican, it, in fact, means something quite different from political decentralism. In criticism, it refers to the so-called destructive poetics which seeks to demystify tradition, history, traditional forms and structures. It involves the substitution of process, discontinuity, the poetry of flux and phenomenon, and the substitution of self-reflexive forms of strange loops or paradoxes of self for the timeless structures of the work of art outside of time, the artifices of eternity, in Yeats' phrase. To show how this substitution occurs and its relation to modern thought is the purpose of the remainder of this paper.

III

It is true, as one might expect in Canada, that the initial impetus toward a regional art and criticism looks very much as if it begins for political reasons. In his Preface to *The Bush Garden, Essays on the Canadian Imagination,* collected in 1971, it seems as if Frye has radically shifted from his nationalism of the forties and his internationalism of the mid-sixties when in *The Modern Century* he announced that Canada has come to nationhood just at the time when in a post-national world the significance of the nation had vanished. "Unity and identity," he remarked in his Preface, "are quite different things, and in Canada they are perhaps more different than anywhere else. Identity is local and regional, rooted in imagination and in works of culture; unity is national in reference, international in reference, and rooted in political feeling." "There are," Frye concedes, "of course, containing imaginative forms which are common to the whole country, even if not peculiar to Canada." The narrative, Frye argues; the documentary says Dorothy Livesay; the long poem, claims Michael Ondaatje. But the distinction Frye makes is of major import. Culture aligns itself with local and regional interests; "the rooted imaginative factors common to the country as a whole are negative influences," says Frye.[12]

Frye is addressing himself to the present lack of will [in Canada] to resist its own disintegration, in part by arguing for the authority of cultural disparity and the political danger of cultural nationalism or uniformity. Oddly, his argument co-incides with the modernist urge to articulate particularisms of various kinds and to deconstruct attempts at uniformity centralism, and orthodoxy, ". . .New Canadian writing of the sixties and seventies," Frank Davey announced in the

Introduction to his *From There to Here* "has taken process, discontinuity, and organic shape as its values rather than the humanistic ideal of the well-wrought urn. The writer's goal in such work has been no longer to retreat from the experiential world but to embody - and thus make intelligible to his reader - its rapidly increasing variety, fragmentation, non-linearity, and unpredictability."[13]

Both "regionalism" and "modernism" (or "post-modernism" as it is more often known), I well know are contentious terms, not fully understood nor clearly distinguished. So, for rather obvious reasons, I intend to be schematic and to draw my boundaries here crudely. I am going to argue first that regionalism is one aspect of modern culture in Canada and two, that it can be thought of primarily in linguistic terms, as language, and as a version of discontinuity or process in poetry. The sense in which we can distinguish various regions I leave to the examples I choose to illustrate my point. I refer to three writers in particular, and a fourth to reinforce my point. The writers are Robert Kroetsch, Rudy Wiebe, and Jack Hodgins, the fourth is Clark Blaise. They provide a spectrum of regionalist possibilities and modernist concerns in writing.

I begin with Robert Kroetsch for the simple reason that he is one of those writers specially valuable for critics uneasy about their terms who tends to define as fine a series of approaches to a definition of modernism as any critic could speak, is self-referring. He is also a cultural critic of the first order surveying the very material that is our subject. He introduced the notion in Canadian criticism of uninventing structures or destructive criticism. He focussed the attention of cultural critics on the distinction between region *as place* and region *as voice* (or language). The local pride, he argued, locates itself in its stories about itself, the oral tradition. His essay on "The Contemporary Canadian Long Poem" provides as fine a series of approaches to a definition of modernism as any critic could wish for. In typical bawdy fashion that those familiar with his work have come to expect the essay on the long poem is entitled "For Play and Entrance." There are more than 24 sections and you'll be relieved to hear I choose only to list those which seem to me most resonant with values we need to discuss. Thus, toward a definition of modernism, or what makes a poem a long poem:

1) Not how to end, but how to begin
2) The poem of the failure of system is the long poem
3) Our interest in the discrete, the occasion
4) A skepticism about history, the temptations of the documentary —archeology, not history
5) The failure of language
6) "It implies a form of literature that feeds on its own impossibil ity"
7) Place as space or absence
8) in *search* of instead of *in vision*
9) the conflict of the poem with its own design
   the double or the strange loop
   the presence of absence
10) the gap between language and narrative[14]

What long poems? Phyllis Webb, *Naked Poems*; Margaret Atwood, *The Journals of Susanna Moodie*; Ondaatje, *The Collected Works of Billy the Kid*; bp Nichol, *The Martyrology*; Don Mackay, *The Long Sault*; Fred Wah, *Pictograms from the Interior of B.C.*; Daphne Marlatt, *Steveston*; George Bowering, *Allophanes*; Roy Kiyooka, *The Fountain bleau Dream Machine*; Al Purdy, *In Search of Owen Roblin*; Eli Mandel, *Out of Place*; Robert Kroetsch, *Field Notes*. (For sheer interest, compare this list with Frye's comparable one of 1959 or 1956.)[15]

If modernist is, then, deconstruction, demystification, failure, beginning, a poem of language, in what way can we say this is regional? We note particularism, for one thing, but especially how the regional poem is a self-referring structure. Kroetsch's *Field Notes* is a continuing poem, one long poem linked to another in an endless sequence. Each is a book—a book of a book, image of itself, as in *The Ledger*: an account book of debits and credits, two columns balanced in the terror. The order of this poetry is what we now call structural: a binary system resolving the opposition or tension of a duality. Some odd results appear. A structural system is said to be ahistorical, that is, outside of time. But the self-referring strange loops appear to have unusual historical effects. A popular treatment of the subject, *Goedel, Escher, Bach* which deals with such loops in art, music, and mathematics, points out that Goedel's theorem in modern mathematics is called the dismal theorem because it proves the impossibility of mathematics. It, in fact, is a strange loop. Paradoxically, *nothing* then proved of enormous consequence. Part of Kroetsch's concern is then to discern structures (tradition, for example), part to destroy them, so that we may see what is *really* there. Nothing at all? What we made up? He may very well be the one Canadian writer who created a literary tradition by destroying it.

The most impressive tour de force in his work is that passage in *Seed Catalogue* which runs through the metaphor of growth on the prairies. How do you grow a prairie town, he asks. The answer: by discerning absence. Its presence is its absence. The emptiness of the prairie, of its past, of its history, of its culture. It grows of nothing. Nothing becomes something.[16] The world as language appears in *The Sad Phoenecian*, a structural love poem. The Phoenecian is a sailor, a trader, who brings alphabets to every port, and who as sailor has a girl in every port. The poem is an alphabet poem of Phoenecian runes run off in a binary opposition of the "and/but" that tells his story. It is this creation ex nihilo (so to speak) that gives us the antiphonal story: love and death, truth and lies.[17] Each story in other words (and there are always other words) tells another story—of the double place of self and other, body and spirit, man and woman. The word is the place: particular, local, occasional, in the poem of failure in search of, not in vision. Design in conflict with itself.

Rudy Wiebe is less paradoxical but no less committed to the notion of fiction as the means of defining the region, through the structures of language which it is, and no less committed to modernism as the vehicle of his fiction. His terms are those of the Christian anarchist, not the nihilist. In a statement about his writing, "Passage by Land," a powerful and quite extraordinary analogy (Kroetsch quotes from it in the *Seed Catalogue)* provides a poetics for

regionalism:

> To touch this land with words requires an architectural structure; to break into the space of the reader's mind with the space of this western landscape and the people in it you must build a structure of fiction like an engineer builds a bridge or a skyscraper over and into space. A poem, a lyric will not do. You must lay great black steel lines of fiction, break up that space with huge design and, like the fiction of the Russian steppes, build giant artifact. No song can do that; it must be giant fiction.[18]

Wiebe's giant fictions, *The Temptations of Big Bear, Scorched Wood People,* rewrite the history of the west, driving new structures across it to alter it as inexorably as the railroad, in fact. And a short fiction, like *Where is the Voice Coming From,* presents a theory turning into fact, an idea becoming a form, a concept becoming an experience with the stunning conclusion: having heard the Voice of Almighty Voice, fugitive, defiant renegade, the Cree, the narrator tells us "I do not, of course, understand the Cree myself." The theory proves "itself inadequate to explain what . . . happened." "For," says the narrator, "if I ever could, I can no longer pretend to objective, omnipotent disinterestedness. I am no longer *spectator* of what *has* happened or what *may* happen: I am become an *element* in what is happening at this very moment."[19]

The stance is modernist and regional. Both Wiebe and Kroetsch are prairie writers, writers of the west, but their place is as much language as geography, the giant black steel lines of Wiebe, the strange loops of Kroetsch. A third writer, Jack Hodgins, gives us a third perspective on this question, both in place and language. He is from Vancouver Island and his stories and fictions create that strange world—or *his* strange world. In Hodgins' *The Invention of the World*—if its astounding proliferation of events and experience can be cast in the form of summary—there are two major stories, both pilgrimages, one the obverse of the other. A magical story of a god-man, Donal Keneally, who lures an Irish village to Vancouver Island to his colony, The House of Revelations. The other is the story of Maggy Kyle, now the owner of the colony after the magic man's death—he tunnels himself into the earth in a black fury—how she runs it as a trailer park and returns Keneally's ashes to Ireland where he was born. The story is framed not only by Keneally's life and death, but by two marriages, Maggie's son's and her own. There are three dreams or wishes operating in the book: Keneally's wish to be god which proves evil; Maggie's to be at home in the world—both contained in the narrator's wish to know all. More than anything, the novel is marked by exuberance and humour. As Goeff Hancock puts it in his essay on "Magic Realism or, the Future of Fiction:"

> Language is telescoped and compressed. Literary works are Chinese—boxed inside the literary work. Characters split off into doubles. Various fictional layers are confused with reality, and the relationship of one reader with the main characters constantly shifts. Hyperbole and humour is given a fast spin and takes off. Unreliable narrators stalk the pages. And things *happen.*[20]

The book is constantly threatening to turn into a book, a self-referring form. Hancock rightly calls this "magic realism" a mode in which extraordinary feats and mysterious characters exist in ordinary places and the magic occurs from the sparks generated between the possibilities of language and the limitations of physical nature. "Changes are . . . happening to the language of fiction." It is not accidental that Hodgins says "Gabriel Garcia Marquez is closer to me than any Canadian writer because the same water washes on the shore of my home as on his." Regional cultures spring out of literary connections not geographical ones. The magic of *A Hundred Years of Solitude* changes Vancouver Island through Hodgins' stories.

Language writes us, the modernists say. If that is so, we are being articulated by a new dream of possibilities, voices we have only begun to hear. I close with Clark Blaise for two reasons: his career is the epitome of what to say about a pluralistic modernistic relativistic culture; his article on writing a summary of my theme.

Blaise is defined by more boundaries, borders, countries, and regions than virtually any other Canadian writer; perhaps in this he *is* typical. Born in Canada, he lived as a boy in Florida, studied in American universities, married a Bengali writer, taught in Montreal, travelled to India to live there twice, returned to Montreal, joined the faculty at York in Toronto, left for the States where he now teaches at Skidmore. His first book had the brilliantly appropriate title, *A North American Education.*

His article on fiction is entitled *To Begin, To Begin.* In it, he enunciates three rules or lessons for the writer and with these I conclude because they sum up what I have to say about modernism in art (not how to end, but how to begin) and its implied view of Canada and its culture: not the ending but the beginning. Not apocalypse but genesis. Not bringing the house down but raising the curtain, starting. Bob Kroetsch says, "It is the paradox of Columbus' perceptual moment that it cannot end. The moment of the discovery of America continues . . . We demand . . . new geographies. And the search that was once the test of sailor and horse and canoe is now the test of the poet."[21]

Clark Blaise says:

> Lesson one: as in poetry, a good first sentence of prose implies its opposite (a strange loop.)
> Lesson two: art wishes to begin, even more than end.
> Lesson three: art wishes to begin—again.[22]

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Notes

1. The term is taken from David Hofstader, *Goedel, Escher, Bach* (Basic Books, 1979) and the implications that are further worked out in Patrick Hughes and George Brecht, *Vicious Circles and Infinity* (Penguin, 1978).
2. Some of the above distinctions are developed in Paul Bové, *Destructive Criticism*, Columbia Press, 1980.
3. Eli Mandel, *Another Time*, Press Porcépic, 1977.
4. Northrop Frye, "Canada and Its Poetry," and "Conclusion to a *Literary History of Canada*," *The Bush Garden*, Anansi, 1971, pp. 129-143 and pp. 213-251.
5. Charles Olson, *Call Me Ishmael*, Grove Press, Inc., 1947, pp. 11-12.
6. John Sutherland, "Introduction to *Other Canadians*," *Controversies, Essays, and Poetry*, ed. Miriam Waddington, McLelland and Stewart, NCL, 1972, pp. 55-62.
7. Bové.
8. *Ibid*, p. 9.
9. *Ibid*, p. 8.
10. See "Introduction", *Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, Vol. I.
11. Margaret Atwood, *Survival* (Anansi, 1971); R. Kroetsch, "Fear of Women: an Erotics of Space", *Canadian Forum*, vol. 58, no. 685, pp. 22-27; Earle Birney, "Canada: Case History: 1973", *Collected Poems*, (McLelland and Stewart, 1975), p. 175.
12. Frye, *The Bush Garden*, pp. i-x.
13. Frank Davey, *From There to Here*, Press Porcépic, 1974.
14. Robert Kroetsch, "For Play and Entrance: The Contemporary Canadian Long Poem," *Dandelion*, Vol. VIII, No. 1, pp. 61-85.
15. Compare Frye, The Bush Garden, p. 126 pp. 163-179.
16. Robert Kroetsch, "Seed Catalogue", *Field Notes*, General Publishing, 1981, pp.53-55.
17. *Ibid*, pp. 77-79.
18. Rudy Wiebe, "Where is the Voice Coming From?", *the narrative voice*, ed. John Metcalf, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Ltd., 1972, pp. 249-256.
19. *Ibid*.
20. Geoffrey Hancock, "Magic Realism, or, the Future of Fiction", *Canadian Fiction Magazine*, No. 24/25, Spring, Summer, 1977, pp. 4-6.
21. Robert Kroetsch, "Preface", *Dreaming Backwards. The Selected Poetry* of Eli Mandel, 1954-1981, General Publishing, 1981.
22. Clark Blaise, "To Begin, To Begin", *the narrative voice*, ed. John Metcalf, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Ltd., 1972, pp. 22-26.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. V, No. 3 (Fall, 1981).

LAMENT AND UTOPIA: RESPONSES TO AMERICAN EMPIRE IN GEORGE GRANT AND LEOPOLDO ZEA

Michael A. Weinstein

Two great nations, Canada and Mexico, border the United States, which is the most powerful empire in the contemporary world and, indeed, the greatest organized concentration of power in human history. When, in the nineteenth century, the United States expanded westward spurred by the myth of Manifest Destiny, Canada nearly experienced and Mexico felt most intensely the impact of military confrontation with their dynamic neighbor. Today a conflict of arms between the United States and either of its neighbors is unthinkable because of the overwhelming might of the United States. The sheer military supremacy of the United States over the nations which border it is the primary geopolitical fact which determines the character of Canadian and Mexican marginality to the American empire. In addition to its coercive superiority, the United States exerts economic domination over its neighbors through the trade and investment of its corporations, and a growing cultural hegemony secured through the influence of its communications media. In his *Lament for a Nation* George Grant grasped the comprehensiveness of Canadian dependency on the United States by linking the 1962-63 defense crisis over Canadian acceptance of nuclear missiles to the emergence of Canada as a "branch-plant" society controlled by corporations based in the United States. In North America military, political, economic, and cultural power is centered in the United States, a fact which makes Canada and Mexico not only geographically but socially peripheral to their imperial neighbor.

Canadian and Mexican marginality to the United States is so obvious a fact that it may seem gratuitous and perhaps indelicate, especially for someone from the United States to insist upon it. But, as Alfred North Whitehead often noted, one of philosophy's purposes is to bring to conscious expression the pervasive features of reality. In the sphere of social reality the pervasive features are often just those which it is uncomfortable for many people to acknowledge because conscious recognition of them may heighten the sense of insecurity and intensify inferiority feelings, or may bring to light a guilty conscience. Those who live in the United States and have appropriated for themselves the name "Americans" usually have at best a subliminal awareness of Canadian and Mexican marginality. Americans generally do not conceive of the United States as an empire, but instead as the greatest nation in the world. They are told by their communications media that Canada and Mexico are "neighbors," not dependencies, and relations with the two are reported as if they were among equals. The great achievement of peaceful borders and open doors between good

neighbors (though, of course, minor quarrels sometimes cloud any friendship) is the dominant mythology about North America in the United States. Every attempt is made to conceal the fact of supreme American power, recognition of which might foster feelings of guilt and raise the question of responsibility for the effects of power. The fact of American empire is acknowledged far more keenly in Mexico and Canada than it is in the United States, but even in the dependencies of the empire there is a tendency to dull awareness of marginality in order to decrease wounded pride and anxiety.

Two of the most profound philosophers in the contemporary world, the Canadian George Grant and the Mexican Leopoldo Zea, have based much of their thinking on the marginality of their respective nations to the American empire. In great part their vocation as philosophers has been to understand the organizing principles of society in the United States, which they believe to be the principles of modern social life. Far from attempting to mute the fact of American supremacy of power, Grant and Zea have stressed that fact in their interpretations of contemporary world history. Both of them express a deep ambivalence towards the United States which gives their thought a nondogmatic character and nurtures their creativity. For Grant, Canada shares the fate of the United States, which is the spearhead of the global triumph of technique over substantive norms, whereas for Zea Mexico is at the forefront of the worldwide movement to universalize the values of the modern Occident, the leader of which is the United States. Acute awareness of marginality leads neither Zea nor Grant to bitter anti-Americanism or to *ressentiment,* but to clarification of the situations of their respective nations in current world history. The historical possibilities of Canada are defined by Grant and those of Mexico by Zea in dialectical opposition to the dynamic, expansionist, and instrumentalist system of the United States. The protagonist in their historical dramas is the United States, to which Mexican and Canadian histories are at best weaker alternatives and at worst mere compensatory adaptations. The fact of Mexican and Canadian marginality is underscored by recognition that no philosopher in the United States has defined a life's work in the context of Canadian, Mexican, or even of North American history. Mexican and Canadian thinkers, in contrast, cannot but have the United States in mind.

The ability to ignore one's contingency and accidentality is, according to the Mexican philosopher Emilio Uranga, a prerogative of the strong.[1] Those who are able to enforce their definitions of the situation create the situation and may exclude themselves from it by turning the weaker parties into constants and variables in a series of living experiments. The strong tend to absolutize their perspectives and when they philosophize to do so in the language of universality. The more powerful they are in relation to the weak, the more the strong are likely to overlook the qualitative differences between themselves and the weak, and to judge the weak as merely weak, as inferior, and not as different and as having a uniquely distinctive center of life. The weak have no such luxury when they philosophize. They are conscious that they are limited by the strong and, therefore, that their perspecitives are relative to those of the strong. The weak, then, philosophize far more in the language of particularity than in that of

universality. Their thought clings to concrete history, which is a field revealing the specific limitations of some individual complexes of social fact by others. The weak, indeed, reach out for a universality which is won through the encounter with particular fact and which is in opposition to an actuality marked by diversity.

The importance in the thought of Grant and Zea of the particular history of North America and of its possible universal significance places their work in the context of the historical currents of philosophy which emerged at the turn of the twentieth century during the reconsideration of Hegelianism. This is not to say that Grant and Zea are strict historicists. Grant recurs to the tradition of natural law for a critical standard by which to judge modernity, whereas Zea appeals to the Christian humanist tradition of Spanish Enlightenment for his vision of a universal community. Yet both Grant and Zea are dedicated to living and thinking, in the terms of José Ortega y Gasset, at the "height of the times", which for them means to be self-conscious about the relations of their thought to their historical circumstances. Zea's thought has been nourished most by Ortega's perspectivism and Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, both of which were deeply influenced by German historicism. Grant's doctoral dissertation was written about the British theologian John Wood Oman who wrote that "the real fulfilment of religion" is, "in freedom and independent thinking, to find our true relation to the past and to society and to the whole task of the Kingdom of God."[2] Grant and Zea have walked down Oman's "weary road," seeking universal significance through their specific historical circumstances, especially the circumstance of the dependency of their nations on the American empire.

Empire and Technology

The hallmark which distinguishes the thought of Grant and Zea from other anti-imperialist thinking is the insistence of both of them that the United States is the supreme exemplar of modernity and, therefore, of the progressivist historical tendency in the contemporary world. The ambivalence of Grant and Zea towards the United States is encapsulated in their commitment to appreciate fully the significance of modernity, which means for them to assimilate the meaning of American society, and in their simultaneous rejection of central elements of that meaning. In his earliest book, *Philosophy in the Mass Age,* Grant argued that the philosophy of the United States is more modern than its major progressivist competitor, Marxism, because "pragmatism is much more completely a history-making philosophy than Marxism."[3] According to Grant, whereas in "Marx's philosophy man's power to make the world is limited by a final necessary outcome," in "pragmatism man is entirely open to make the world as he chooses and there is no final certainty."[4] In Grant's vision of the public situation the essence of modernity is the deliverance of nature to a human will which is unhindered by any normative limitations and which tends,

therefore, to seek control, including control over human nature, for its own sake. North American history reveals most clearly that modernity is a social process which eliminates any submission to fixed ends in favor of the "will to will," which was identified by Martin Heidegger. It is just the unleashing of the "will to will" which so disturbs Grant when he observes the dynamism of North American society. At the root of the modern identification of time with history is the hidden and bitter truth that "if history is the final court of appeal, force is the final argument."[5]

Zea's belief that the society of the United States is the spearhead of modernity is based on his judgment that it incorporates more than any other society the principles of "rationalism." According to Zea, rationalism is "the supreme expression of modernity."[6] Applying the distinction of Ferdinand Toennies between community and society, Zea argues in a parallel fashion to Grant that rationalism "disengages the casual relation of means-end from the common life, making of the common life a more or less adequate means to the ends pursued by each individual in particular."[7] Rationalist principles and practices subordinate "collective entities, forms of common living founded in a whole of interests transcending individuals, to another form of common living which resides in the concrete interests of individuals."[8] Whereas in a community individuals are "knit together and live together in virtue of an end which transcends them," in a society "each individual looks for, in the common life, the elements that will allow his own betterment and that will guarantee that his efforts towards the social good will redound, in the end, to his own good."[9] Rationalism, then, though it releases individual energies and is the ground for technological achievement and material advance, destroys communities based on substantive norms and initiates a reign of selfishness in society.

The similarities of and differences between the thought of Grand and Zea can be grasped by focusing on their fundamental critiques of modernity and of its most advanced exemplar, the United States. Both the pragmatism described by Grant and the rationalism delineated by Zea destroy the bases of premodern communities by sweeping away belief in and commitment to substantive norms which imit the range of permisible activities of human beings towards one another. The dynamism of the United States is, then, for both thinkers a result of the liberation of American life from traditional restraints. Grant and Zea part company, however, when they discuss the dialectical opposite of community. For Grant modernity means the substitution of a new collectivism, humanism, for the traditionalism and communalism which has been superceded. The collective entity "man" is the subject of a "history," the meaning of which is control over nature for its own sake. In one of his most brilliant and profound images Grant connects the American space program with the will to mastery as an "end in itself": "To conquer space it may be necessary to transcend jordinary humanity, and produce creatures half flesh and half metal."[10] There is a sense of the demonic possibilities of modernity in Grant's thought which leads to the insight that the cruel irony of a pure humanism is the negation of a flesh and blood humanity and its substitution by an artificial species designed to exert its power over space and the things within it. For Zea, in contrast, modernity involves at

its root the destruction of all collective entities and their replacement with masses of detached individuals. The counterpart of Grant's demonism of the will in Zea's thought is greed or egoism. The essence of the American empire is not untrammeled conquest of nautre but unrestrained greed. The rationalist society achieves, for Zea, only such unity as is necessary for the most powerful of its components to satisfy their interests. The ideals of the American polity - "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" - are universal, but the practice of the American empire is to deny to other peoples the opportunity to achieve these ideals because it aims to appropriate the benefits of the industrial age for itself.

The differences between Grant's and Zea's critiques of the American empire may be related to the diverse circumstances in which they philosophize. Arthur Kroker has observed that Canada is "the most modern of modern nations," the one to which Albert Camus's "utterance on the absurd is most appropriate."[11] Canadian nationality is defined, by Kroker, as a tension "between destiny and exile, between nationalism and cosmopolitansim, between a form of identity rooted in a powerful and brooding sense of the Canadian homeland and an identity based on a flight beyond the homeland, in exile."[12] For Grant's generation exile prevailed over destiny and the greatest fruit of his vocation has been a "lament" for the absorption of Canada into the American technological complex. The most brilliant Canadians must choose, at a sacrifice, to remain "other" to the American empire. Most of them do not so choose and are welcomed into the empire, as the stunning successes of John Kenneth Galbraith, David Easton, and Marshall McLuhan demonstrate. In Kroker's sense of the modern situation, which is epitomized by the Camusian individual whose "exile is without remedy," Canada, not the United States, is the most modern place of all. Those who live in the United States are blinded by the power of their nation to the universal implications of their social patterns, which is why, perhaps, they need a Galbraith to teach them about the "technostructure," an Easton to translate political life into cybernetic language for them, and a McLuhan to explain television to them. The Canadian contribution to the social thought of the American empire has been great: Canadian liberals are the perfect exponents of the technological cosmopolis. Grant stands out against the cosmopolitan alternative, which he understands to mean service to the American empire. Yet he understands that Canada's fate is to be an auxiliary of American projects. Grant is aware that English Canadians share a Protestant culture with Americans and that both peoples are implicated in "the position where technological progress becomes itself the sole context within which all that is other to it must attempt to be present."[13] In order to gain an independence from the American empire Grant must wrench himself out of a social world which is his own - the world of the dynamic Great Lakes - and appeal to possibilities which have been superceded not only by history but by the form of "time as history." No wonder that Grant's vision penetrates to the demonism of the modern: Canadians are caught up, willingly or not, as integral participants in the adventures of the American empire.

In contrast to Grant, Zea speaks as an outsider, as one who has not been welcomed as a participant in American adventures, but whose nation has been

used, so far as possible, as "prime matter," a "resource," an "instrument" by the United States. Whereas Grant must choose to marginalize himself with regard to the American empire Zea has no choice but to be marginalized. For Zea, modern history has been made by the "Occident," which includes France, England, and the United States. The successive leaders of the Occident have imposed their own values on the rest of the world declaring the ways of the others to be infrahuman. Those marginalized by the Occident have sought to imitate the dominant powers, not only as the expression of an inferiority complex, but because of the great material benefits brought by technology and the intrinsic appeal of democratic ideals. The failure of the Occident to share its material bounty and its political good with the rst of the world is, for Zea, the great historical fact of modernity. His experience is not that of being caught up in the technological whirlwind, but that of being excluded from full participation in modern life, of being a means to alien ends. Zea looks forward to the transcendence of greed and to the realization of a universal community based on the irreducible dignity of each person. He is of a people which is not at the cutting edge of modernity, but which is in a rapid process of modernization. He believes that the United States has failed to serve its ideals and that the torch of progress has passed to the oppressed peoples of the Third World who will promote a richer vision of universality in which community will be grounded in the shared condition of "solitude, suffering, and the need to resolve the urgent problems which assail all men, just by virtue of the simple fact that they are men."[14] Wheareas Grant gains his leverage to critique the American empire from an appeal to the past, Zea transcends the rationalism of modernity with a utopian vision of a planetary community united by existential awareness. For Zea, humanism is not necessarily demonic, because its meaning may be ministration to the finitude of each person, not the unrestrained will to control. Zea claims the right of the Third World to try to do better with technology and democracy than the American and Soviet empires have done. His hope, from the kind of viewpoint Grant takes, is that of one who has not yet become modernized enough to understand how technique creates its own totalization of the world.

Despite the differences in their interpretations of the essence of modernity and the basic principles of the American empire, Grant and Zea are in perfect agreement on what the society of the United States has become. According to Grant, the "doctrine of progress is not, as Marx believed, the perfectibility of man, but an open-ended progression in which men will be endlessly free to make the world as they want it."[15] "The very signature of modern man" is "to deny reality to any conception of good that imposes limits on human freedom."[16] Yet unleashing the "will to will" involves, in Grant's view, a deep and tragic irony. As a technological order of life is developed and as the impulse to mastery effectively turns on human nature itself, "the vaunted freedom of the individual to choose becomes either the necessity of finding one's role in the public engineering or the necessity of retreating into the privacy of pleasure."[17] Similarly to Grant, Zea observes that "in order to file down the rough edges of common living, assigning to each individual a place inside of which his action will encounter the least friction, individuals are transformed into tiny pieces of a colossal wheelworks of

a great machine which grows ever more powerful and the aim of which transcends the wishes of those who compose it."[18] Zea remarks that liberty, defined as "the capacity to act in another manner than that which has been programmed" is continually diminishing in the United States, and that unpredictability, improvisation, and useless and gratuitous expenditure, all of which are the sources of creative activity, are disappearing from American life.[19] Reflecting on the American quest for security Zea queries: "Security for whom? Little by little this who or someone is being lost."[20] Zea's vision of the contemporary Occident culminates in the striking thesis that "Occidental man has ended by dehumanizing himself, by transforming himself into the instrument of his instrument."[21] Puritanism, according to Zea, had made the Western individual the instrument of God's design on earth. But that individual has become purely an instrument of development, progress, and opulence.[22] Only the resistance of the oppressed to becoming adjuncts of the instrumental complex promises a vindication of humanity. Though Grant might not agree that Zea's hope is founded, he is at one with Zea on the description of society in the United States.

From their positions on the margins of the American empire, Grant, the self-conscious and voluntary other, and Zea, the excluded outsider, find the essence of that empire to be the drive towards a technological society. For both of them the horror of the contemporary age is to be dragooned into a social process in which human beings become means of their means who are unable to orient their action to achieve a genuine good. The urge to mastery which Grant finds at the heart of American society and the greed which Zea discovers there are, in principle, subject to no substantive limitation. Both thinkers were moved to their most profound and impassioned criticism of the American empire by the Vietnam War, Grant because of his noble shame at "being party to that outrage" and Zea because it provided him with the final confirmation that the United States could not be expected to move towards universalizing its values. Having concluded that the United States is a dangerous power whose citizens are so involved in reproducing and expanding their own social mechanism that they are incapable of caring for its consequences, neither Grant nor Zea suggests how the blind imperial beast might be tamed. Indeed, it is not their place to do so, but their failure to speak to the question of how empire might be limited shows how deep the effects of marginalization go. Since Hiroshima there has been a brooding sense throughout the world that the United States holds itself above substantive norms of public morality. In the thought of Grant and Zea that sense becomes articulate but has no practical issue.

Beyond the Imperial Fact

The critiques made by Grant and Zea of the American empire and their identification of the United States with modernity itself impel them to look beyond modern life for their own normative commitments. Grant recurs to the premodern civilization of the West, the productive and uneasy synthesis of

Athens and Jerusalem, to ground his critical standard, whereas Zea looks forward to an ideal society based on universal awareness of human suffering and finitude, though he often attempts to root that vision in the past by appealing to the Christian humanism of the Siglo de Oro and to the antipositivist philosophies which appeared in Latin America at the turn of the twentieth century. Grant's conservative vision, unlike the reactionary thought of the nineteenth century, grows out of a deep acquaintance with and assimilation of the liberal form of life, and a consequent reflection upon it. Philip Hanson remarks that as Grant thought through "the liberal trust in human history as the progressive reincarnation of reason" he could no longer "celebrate the new age" produced by this trust.[23] Grant, says Hanson, "became a spectator, waiting and listening to the speeches, rituals and strivings of a society dominated by technique."[24] Hanson aptly concludes that "only charity in its highest form can sustain a spectator in our technoligical age."[25] Grant's conservatism is informed by what the political philosopher Francisco Moreno calls "passionate humbleness."[26] The appeal to Greco-Christian natural law made by Grant is tinged with tragic irony: "For myself, as probably for most others, remembering only occasionally can pass over into thinking and loving what is good. It is for the great thinkers and the saints to do more."[27] In a manner analogous to Grant's conservatism Zea's progressivism has none of the easy optimism of nineteenth-century positivism. As Raymond Rocco points out, in Zea's view "all history *presumes* the principle of life, which, for Zea, means the life of each person."[28] Rocco notes that "the concepts of commitment, responsibility freedom," which Zea gains from his encounter with existentialism, have in his thought as "their common reference the dignity, the integrity and welfare of 'the person.'"[29] Zea, then, is not an exponent of unlimited progress, but a proponent, just as Grant is, of normative limitation progress, on dynamic action. That despite his affirmation of personalism Zea cannot avoid the nihilistic consequences of historicism is a critique suggested by Rocco. But the tension in Zea's thought does not detract from his clear intention to place normative restrictions on the acquisitive desires which are set free by a rationalistic and technological society.

Sustaining the complexity, self-criticism, and irony which characterize the attempts of Grant and Zea to push beyond modernity are the serious engagements of these thinkers with the features of human life which have been most clearly expressed in contemporary existentialism. Grant, like Camus, enters the discourse of existentialism through raising the question of the meaning of finite human life. In the most existentialist of his writings, the brief essay "A Platitude," he observes that though "the true account of the human situation" may indeed be "an unlimited freedom to make the world as we want in a universe indifferent to what purposes we choose," such an account implies that "we do not have a system of meaning."[30] For Grant, the great issue of contemporary civilization is how a system of meaning might be recovered. He suggests no program for renewal, because he believes the modern project to be all-encompassing, but appeals in the fashion of Heidegger to "listening for the intimations of deprival," cultivating a sense of what has been lost in

technological society.[31] For Grant, "any intimations of authentic deprival are precious, because they are the ways through which intimations of good, unthinkable in public terms, may yet appear to us."[32] In his essay "In Defense of North America" Grant articulated the paradox of North American life that "the very substance of our existing which has made us the leaders in technique stands as a barrier to any thinking which might be able to comprehend technique from beyond its own dynamism."[33] In "A Platitude" he suggests that "we do not know how unlimited are the potentialities of our drive to create ourselves and the world as we want it."[34] There are, perhaps, contradictions internal to technological society, for example, "the divided state which characterises individuals in modernity: the plush patina of hectic subjectivity lived out in the iron maiden of an objectified world inhabited by increasingly objectifiable beings."[35] Grant's opening to possible contradictions within modern life is less an offering of hope than a counsel to dispose oneself to listen, not to despair but to be alive to what may grow in the interstices of a world formed by technique and by its impulse to mastery.

Similarly to Grant Zea believes that the problem of meaning is central to contemporary life and thought. Zea shares Grant's preoccupation with the implications of a civilization for whose members history is the only horizon and observes that for contemporary human beings the problem of meaning is more profound than it was for those who lived in previous times. "The man of our times," says Zea, has "taken account of the historicity of essences and has been able to do so because he has remained without transcendental references to support himself."[36] All that is left to the contemporary individual, according to Zea, is "History and along with it immanentism: that is, not being able to find support in anything other than himself."[37] Just as Grant achieved insight into "time as history" from his encounters with the works of M.B. Foster, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Leo Strauss, so Zea draws his inspiration from "the Historicism of Dilthey, Scheler and Ortega."[38] In particular Ortega's theme that the human condition is one of "shipwrecked being" resonates in Zea's work and unites it with Grant's informing vision that "our present is like being lost in the wilderness, when every pine and rock and bay appears to us as both known and unknown, and therefore as uncertain pointers on the way back to human habitation."[39] Zea, however, finds in historicism not only deprival but promise. Historicism, for Zea, has made possible the recognition by Latin American thinkers that they belong to an authentic philosophical tradition by teaching them that all thought is an original and intelligible response to particular and concrete circumstances. By universalizing the circumstantiality of thought historicism allows Latin Americans to understand their intellectual history not as an inferior copy of successive European ideas but as an engagement with their social and cultural marginality. There is a sense in which Zea finds immanentism to be a challenge and opportunity. For Zea, contemporary thought has delivered human beings over to life, their radical reality: "What is important to the contemporary man is to live, without being preoccupied about whether this life is a dream or a reality."[40]

The marginality of Grant's and Zea's thought to the spirit of the American

empire is most evident in their proclivities to take history seriously. Grant's "listening for the intimations of deprival" and Zea's looking forward to a universal community add the dimensions of past and future respectively to the blind concern with the present of the American empire. As Zea points out, "the North Americans, one can say, have acted with views to a present already achieved which must be conserved, whereas the Ibero-Americans have acted with views to a future which ought to be realized."[41] Grant separates the primal Canadian project, now eclipsed, from Zea's North America and actualizes the sense of deprival in a lament: "The impossibility of conservatism in our era is the impossibility of Canada. As Canadians we attempted a ridiculous task in trying to build a conservative nation in the age of progress, on a continent we share with the most dynamic nation on earth."[42] The present in which the American empire lives is not that of Whitehead's "drop of experience" which, as it perishes, still catches a piece of eternity, but the "specious present" of process, the treadmill which can only be named by the contradictory phrase—continuous change. American dynamism is at its core restlessness, not so much the will to will or greed, but in times of prosperity the will to get ahead and in times of decline the will to cope. Americans, as the protagonists of empire, have had the luxury not only of ignoring languages other than their own, but of ignoring the dimensions of time which are not actual, the symbolic past of spoliated possibility and the symbolic future of unrealized potentiality. The realization of time as history, then, may be a gift-curse of the marginal whereas the creation of time as history may be a by-product of technological empire.

How does an American, one who is concerned, as Grant is, to understand "what it is to live in the Great Lakes region of North America," join the discourse shaped by the independent contributions of Grant and Zea? Both of the great marginal philosophers demand that one be what Grant calls an "intellectual patriot" in order to engage them fully in discussion. The voice of the American must be a voice vindicating the present, not in the sense of justifying inequalities of power or of praising technological feats, but of cultivating a vivacious despair in what I can best call an open experience of the new world, an experience unencumbered by any symbolic projections of past or future. The American who dares to take time as history seriously should drink immanentism to the dregs and cultivate what William James in his best moments called "inward tolerance," an unflinching look at oneself and one's works. And what is that new world to which one should be open? It is a world in which mind has been collectivized and externalized in the mass media of communication and in which individual concern for the meaning of the totality no longer serves a public function but is inimical to scientific administration. It is the privilege of the American thinker to witness philosophy become anachronistic and the mind itself be drawn outside of itself. The plush patina of hectic subjectivity has become a sensory reaction to external images. The iron maiden of an objectified world has become a shock, a pill, a television screen. Can one tolerate one's own exteriorization from the outside? Can interiority be reclaimed? Those are questions raised by one who is in the empire and of it.

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Notes

* I wish to thank Purdue University for awarding me a Fellowship at its Humanities Center under which this paper was written. I also wish to thank the staff of the Newberry Library in Chicago, particularly Ms. Karen Skubish and Mr. Richard H. Brown, for facilitating my research and for providing me with carrel space and the privileges of the Library.

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Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. V, No. 3 (Fall, 1981).

NIHILISM, POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Tom Darby

It was the young Karl Marx who informed us in his doctoral dissertation that philosophy could never be the same after Hegel.[1] Since Marx's utterance, the reception of the words of Hegel, after largely being ignored for more than three quarters of a century, have come back to us and have been received with the enthusiasm that the term revival best captures.[2] This Hegel revival began in the first quarter of our century and shows no sign of abating, for the words of Hegel were written for us, the inhabitants of the "New World", as Hegel called it. it.

Among those who came after Hegel and who took his claims seriously was Nietzsche. And it was Nietzsche who passed down to us the lament that our age is one in which "all foundations are breaking up in mad unconscious ruin and resolving themselves into the ever flowing stream of becoming."[3] His statement typifies the pathos and concern of some who have become aware of what Hegel has left us, and adumbrates the playful yet deadly serious knell in Kojève's pronouncement that history has ended or Heidegger's poetic dirges about our life in this Eveningland. We, along with other post-Hegelians such as these, actually live in the "New World" that Hegel described. Nietzsche, because he was one of the first to take Hegel at his word, called his own "thoughts out of season" a philosophy for the future. For his declaration of our murder of God is but an afterthought on Hegel's recognition of his death, the subsequent embalming of his thoughts "forever" in the Hegelian system and the resurrection of his spirit through the elaboration of its principles in the form of planetary domination. But Nietzsche, while taking Hegel's claims seriously, announced that Hegel failed, and Nietzsche's agony is a testament to Hegel's failure. In one sense Nietzsche knew that Hegel was correct, that the "New World" Hegel described belongs to us, but he also knew that the citizen of this world is not a sage possessing wisdom, rather he is a Last-man or a Nihilist. Thus it was Nietzsche's contention that Hegel brought with him the most bleak of "ideologies". His melancholy is wrought of the condition in which "everything is permitted", resulting in our words and deeds, the stuff of politics, vanishing along with the self-devaluation of the highest values that have heretofore undergirded them. And even though Mann was correct in a curious way when he stated that the destiny of our times would resolve itself in political terms, we are left to search among the debris of our ever changing history for standards by which to judge our actions and speeches or merely to

revel in the *Zeitgeist* joyfully and unconsciously, consuming it as fast as it appears.

In order to understand in a specific way what Nietzsche means by Nihilism, one could go to his scattered texts. But in general, there are two types of nihilists, both differentiated by their levels of self-consciousness. In this sense one could say that one is passive, the other active. The passive nihilist, the most despicable type for Nietzsche, is none other than the Last-man. He does not know that he is a nihilist for his consciousness goes no further than the life of his body. He is an unconscious consumer, himself the end product of the calculating rationality, the culmination of the noble tradition of the West in the baseness of utilitarianism. He is a gourmand whose consumption does not discriminate beyond the taste buds of his palate, whether the object of consumption be the newly prepared yet dead values generated before him, or the equally inert products gathered from the earth below him. But the active nihilist knows who he is. His is not a life of the body, but of the psyche alone. He is a gourmet who not only can distinguish between values as well as among the fruits which we force the earth to yield, but knows that the former are just as man-made as the latter, and that one can command the will that creates both if only he can give up his revenge for the past and happily accept his role as commander.

But one does not have to go directly to Nietzsche, or to Heidegger to learn of this split of "humanity" into the separate selves of body and psyche. He can follow Kojève and look at Hegel "in close up", as it were, and thereby gain an understanding of why such post-Hegelians as Nietzsche and Heidegger see a need to grope for, or either wait for, a new beginning. But this beginning would be willed, neither from the void surrounding the darkness of the *Newzeit* nor through the ersatz illumination of the planet through technology. Rather a new beginning must take both the darkness of nihilism and the willing will of technology seriously, for this in itself is a beginning.

Politics, Power and Wisdom

"The state is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth." — *Hegel*

As already noted, Kojève bluntly states that with Hegel history or time stopped. Also he says that the 'bringing together' of time and eternity constitutes the goal of History which is, at the same time, the appearance of the State and of the 'System'. In this context we will examine the relationship of the State to the 'System', or the relationship of Power and Wisdom, and this, as it pertains to the problem of time.

First, it might be noted that while at the end of History there is the final State, the advent of the State is not its final goal, for the goal of history is Wisdom. This Wisdom is to be achieved by what Kojève has described as a

"double criterion".[4] Kojève reasons that the one who has Wisdom, or Absolute Knowledge, "must be a citizen of the Universal and Homogeneous State"[5] because the knowledge that he has, in order to be complete, must be circular. He concludes from this that "wisdom can be realized . . . only at the end of History".[6] Power, then, the State, must bring an end to History before Wisdom, the goal of History, can be reached. The key here is to know that the Wise-man is a citizen of this "Universal (*i.e.*, non-expandable) and homogeneous (*i.e.*, non-transformable) State",[7] for the State is the "basis for the circularity of the System (Wisdom) itself." Thus, "the citizen of this State, as active citizen, *realizes* the circularity that he reveals as contemplative Wise-man, through his System". Next Kojève discusses both aspects of this "double criterion", the State and the 'System', *i.e.*, (1) "If the current state of this actually corresponds to what for Hegel is the Perfect State and the end of History, and (2) if Hegel's knowledge is truly circular."[8] Now to talk about the *fact* of the actual existence of this state is to refute common sense, and Kojève dismisses this approach by saying that the important thing is whether or not this State is "impossible in principle". His conclusion here is that the possibility can neither be proved nor disproved, that since the State exists as a possibility and since a possibility can neither be proved nor disproved (can neither be truth nor error), then the State exists as an "ideal". This "ideal", which is neither true nor false, however, can be transformed into truth through negating action which brings the world into accord with the ideal. But the end of History brings forth the end of action, for here man is satisfied and action is no longer necessary or possible, for satisfaction depends on the elimination of desire, which takes place in the existence of a State which recognizes universally the particularity of individuals.[9] Again we are thrown back upon empirical verification or fact, but Kojève claims that if the 'System' can be proved to be circular then we can believe in the existence of the Universal and Homogeneous State despite the conflict of this belief with our common sense. Accordingly, if we see that Hegel's system actually is circular, we must conclude in spite of appearances, that History is completed, and consequently, that the State in which the System could be realized is the perfect State.[10] And from this we can conclude, as Kojève does, that if the *Phenomenology* can be proved to be circular then the "dual criterion" for the advent of Absolute Knowledge, *i.e.* the actual existence of the Wise-man as a citizen of this State, is satisfied.

Here we can appeal to two areas, first, the relationship of Napoleon to Hegel; and, second, the relationship among other symbols which emerge from this association.

Kojève reminds us that the Historical facts of the *Phenomenology* are important for our understanding of that book, and that the existence of Napoleon is one of these historical facts , but a fact taken as fact remains nothing more than an event in time without significance. Hence the

Phenomenology "explains" the meaning of facts to us; it, in effect, provides us with the essence of events which exist in history. So before the *Phenomenology* can be written, before the essence of the historical facts can be revealed to us, the facts themselves must exist. This is another way of saying that power must exist before wisdom, or that Napoleon, who represents complete power, in that he is the completely satisfied man, must precede Hegel, who represents complete knowledge, in his knowing Napoleon to be the completely satisfied man. Taken by itself, then, the existence of Napoleon, while being a satisfied existence, is a mere "fact", but, as we noted, taken together with Hegel, this combination, this "dyad" of Napoleon-Hegel, or power-wisdom, constitutes the satisfied and perfect man. As Kojève explains here, Napoleon cannot "say" this; thus, the saying is Hegel's role as part of this dyad. To repeat Kojève: "Hegel is somehow Napoleon's self-consciousness".[11]

Now what does this mean? How can one be another's self-consciousness? Since Hegel provides Napoleon's existence with an essence, we can say that in part this role has to do with 'meaning,' and in this case the "recollection of meaning", or memory. There are two forms of memory to reckon with here, both a "naive memory" and 'memory' as "understanding". The first has to do with the memory of "being in time" or real History, and the second has to do with "Being as Eternity" or Real Being, or the first with being as becoming, which has an existence but whose essence is 'relative' because it changes, and the second with being which has become, Being which has an existence which corresponds to its essence and is therefore, Absolute. The account of Napoleon, taken by itself, has to do with this naive memory or with Facts, this fact included, a fact without significance, existence without essence, but the existence of Napoleon taken together with the essence (which Hegel provides through his philosophical "recollection") renders the becoming of Being of which Napoleon is a part, integrated into Being which has become, through Hegel's explanation of it in the form of the *Phenomenology*. Speaking of these facts (of the becoming of Being) Kojève says: "The *Phenomenology* explains them or makes them understandable, by revealing their human meaning and their necessity. This is to say that it reconstructs ("deduces") the *real* historical evolution of humanity in its humanly *essential* traits."[12]

This understanding is the *Aufhebung* of History and in its revealing the essence of the becoming of Being speaks Being which has become, or Real Being (existence = essence). With this speaking we have 'Science', or the *Phenomenology* preserved in and elevated into the *Logic*. This speech is circular because, first, it is not relative, and, second, because it is not relative, it is complete. This is the case because the 'Science' is dependent upon the existence of the essence of man. Thus, the 'Science', in explaining the essence of the existence of man, is complete speech about being that has become. Man *qua* finite man, is all there *is*, and this is why Kojève says that the

Phenomenology radically denies transcendence or the Infinite. But "This is to say that the Infinite in question is Man's infinite". Man's Infinitude is realized as such through his becoming conscious that all there is and has been is Man, and that his knowledge of this is all that can be said; but at the same time, if man says all there is to be said then he speaks complete speech, or speaks Eternal Truth; and 'circular' Truth, Truth which points only to itself. To speak Eternal Truth is to know all, and to know all is to be God, and this God is both finite and infinite. He is the God incarnate in the existence of the dyad Napoleon-Hegel who reveals himself as conscious of himself in the form of the eternity of the System.

At this point we must further investigate the meaning of this conclusion, the seemingly absurd claim that the synthesis not only marks the completed goal, and therefore, the end of time or history, but also that the monad is God incarnate. In order to find an answer we should first ask who are these two consciousnesses? What principles do the existence of Hegel and the existence of Napoleon embody? The most obvious answer is that Napoleon is active; his actions bring about the objectification of the principle of freedom in the world, and that Hegel realizes the significance of Napoleon's action. Napoleon then embodies the notion of historical *praxis* and Hegel the notion of theory. This is to say that Hegel, through his being able to recollect (theorize) all the moments of history in relation to the advent of Napoleon, has closed the gap between theory and practice. Now since historical *praxis* is active, Napoleon, then, is the active principle, and theory (*theoria*), the passive principle, descriptive of a beholding (*Anschauung*)[13] which alters nothing, is embodied by Hegel. This is why it can be said that the synthesis of Napoleon-Hegel constitutes the obliteration of the tension between the active and passive, *praxis* and theory.

More can be drawn from Kojève's conclusion. To be active is to *do something* and to do something is to be conscious, or a something is an object for the doing — *something* must be the object of consciousness. But to do something, while it entails consciousness, is not necessarily self-conscious doing, for in order for this "doing something" to constitute self-consciousness it must be related back to the doer through self-reflection. In self-reflection nothing of the *real* is altered, but the consciousness of he who does the reflecting is altered, and this consciousness in reflecting itself into itself becomes self-consciousness. This is why Kojève has said that "somehow Hegel is Napoleon's self-consciousness".

When consciousness reflects itself into itself it finds an abyss and this abyss is a *Nichts*. Thus we can say that to talk of a synthesis of Napoleon-Hegel is at the same time to talk of an interplay between the something (*Ichts*) and the nothing (*Nichts*), and therefore, the merging of these two principles, the active and passive, practice and theory, constitutes a dialectic culminating in a

synthesis between the *Ichts* and the *Nichts*. The strange usage, *Ichts*, is employed by Kojève, Hegel in his exposition of Böhme in the *History of Philosophy*, and by Böhme himself.

This dialectic between *Ichts* and *Nichts* is necessary for the synthesis of these opposite principles and their elevation into the 'monad' descriptive of the Wise-man. This dialectic marks a radical step away from traditional ontology which merely seeks to describe the substance of given-Being and which in its description totally loses the subject of the ineffable nothing of given-Being. Here discourse revealed through the negating action of the externalizing ego is absorbed in the substance of Being (nothing), but also the subject of Being (something) must be described. And this is what Hegel means when he says in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that: "In my opinion, which can be justified only through the exposition of the system itself, everything depends on this, that one expresses or understands the true (*Wahre*) not only as substance, but rather just as much as subject."[14]

To describe something as the substance of the real is to say what the something *is not*, for the something is something other than the given-Being that has been transformed through negating action. Thus, to describe the something as the substance of the real is not a true description, but merely a linguistic extension of the consciously negating (mediating) action itself. But to say what something is not is a step in the direction of saying what is. It is a step toward describing the nothing, the opposite of the something. The something is the result of the action of the externalizing ego. The action of the ego posits the particular something (*für sich sein*) as a universal for others, and thereby elevates itself above its own particular existence for the sake of others. "I is this I, but equally a universal one."[15] This universalization of the particular ego is at the same time a sacrifice of the isolated and particular ego, a suicide of the ego, and a sharing of its meaning with others. It is the death of the particular and determinate something, but the recognition of the universality of the ego. This is to say that the particularized content of the ego is accepted as universal by others, by the community. This is another way of saying that only in a community can recognition take place. This universalizing of the particular is the Truth that the Wise-man describes. The description gives an account of how the particular *Word* is revealed as universal *Word*. What is described is the Truth of being (substance), but also the process of the revelation of being (subject), and in this way the account of the True is described.[16] The latter accounts for the progressive death of the ego which asserts itself through discourse, and is an explanation of how a description of the Truth is possible at all. Without this account we are left with either a philosophy of nature which merely describes substance, but which cannot give an account of its ability to describe it, or we are left with an anthropology (negating action) which only can describe what the substance of

its truth is not. In order to at once describe subject and substance, the true and the Truth, is to assert that the essence of the existence of one is the essence of the existence of the other. It is to say that each has its truth in its opposite. The subject (the ego) creates itself through its negating action and gives an account of itself through reflecting itself into itself. This account is a recollection of the significance of its previous actions (theory) and is the externalization of the nothing in the form of discourse. But in discourse *something* is revealed and this something is the progressive revelation of Nothing, the progressive death of the ego, which, in finally giving up its particularity in a bloody fight for recognition (revolution), brings about the community for which it has sacrificed itself.

This account of the nothing is of man in his negating action and is a revelation of death as his essence. The truth of man is death because his negativity, which allows him to transform given-Being, is also the revelation of his finitude as his essence. In transforming the given (nature or God) he progressively frees himself from it, sets himself apart from the boundless infinity of it, and in doing so, his essence is increasingly revealed as his freedom from the given, from infinity, and man comes to realize himself as a being other than he is, a being which is other than a part of infinite nature. He realizes himself as a mortal (historical) being. His mortality is the condition of his freedom, for if he does not reveal himself as mortal then he is not free from the infinity of the given. To be human is to oppose the given, it is to be free, but it is also to accept death as a condition of humanity. To accept death is the same thing as the sacrifice of the isolated particularity of the ego. It is to risk one's life in the fight. for recognition. Full recognition is accepting the particularity of a finite ego as a universal and infinite value. It is to accept man, a being who dies, as the incarnation of the Word. Kojève has even gone so far as to identify Napoleon as the epitome of this incarnation of the Word. He calls Napoleon "the *Logos* become flesh."[17] This is said because Napoleon exemplifies the man who embodies the ideals of freedom articulatd by the French Revolution, and that the final risk of life is undertaken by him on behalf of these principles. Napoleon, in risking his life, sacrifices his particular ego for these principles. The sacrifice of the particular ego is a sacrifice to have the particular ego recognized as universal not by some transcendent God but by *other men*; it is to have the value of finite man recognized as infinite. This is to say that Napoleon is the epitome of man as free and hence *mortal*, man as characterized by Death (bloody revolution). And it is through Napoleon, the embodiment of man as Death, that man also finds life. But this life, life through death, is not a life in the Beyond, rather life on earth, life in the Universal and Homogeneous State.

For Hegel death is the way to life. The death (crucifixion) of anthropomorphic man constitutes the birth (resurrection) of pro-theomorphic 'man'. Anthropology becomes mythology, a divinization

(apotheosis) of man-in-the-world, the externalization of time and the temporalizing of eternity.

Kojève does not dwell on the manner in which this metastasis takes place. But what he does say about it reveals a difficult problem concerning the final synthesis (the *Aufhebung*) of the opposites. Kojève puts it this way:

> Napoleon is turned toward the external world (social and natural): he understands it because he acts successfully. But he does not understand himself (he does not know that he is God). Hegel is turned toward Napoleon but Napoleon is a man, he is the 'perfect' Man by his total integration of history: to understand this is to understand man, to be understood oneself. By understanding (= justifying) Napoleon, Hegel achieves, therefore, his consciousness of *self*. Thus he became a Sage, a 'completed' philosopher. If Napoleon is revealed God (*der erscheinede Gott*) it is Hegel who reveals him. Absolute Spirit = plenitude of *Bewusstsein* and of *Selbstbewusstein*, that is of the real (natural) world that implies the universal and homogenous state, realized by Napoleon and revealed by Hegel.[18]

Briefly, Hegel has recognized Napoleon but the problem is that Napoleon has not recognized Hegel. Thus, the dyad remains a dyad rather than becoming a single "We," a monad. And, for the metastasis to be complete, Napoleon (who implies the State) would have to recognize Hegel (who implies Wisdom or Hegelian Science).

What is lacking is a recognition that Hegelian 'Science' comprises the Truth, and this recognition which is absent on the microlevel of Napoleon is also absent on the macrolevel of the Universal and Homogeneous State which he implies. Logically we can say that becoming Being, human history, which is accounted for in the *Phenomenology* has not yet recognized Hegelian science as Truth, and if this is the case, then the *Aufhebung* which unites the *Phenomenology* (time) with the *Logic* (eternity) also is not yet complete, or becoming Being is not yet Being having become. Thus, the *Phenomenology* remains but a linear account of becoming Being. But, if the 'circularity' of the 'System' can be proved, and if the existence of the Universal and Homogenous State, on which the qualification of circularity must rest does not need to be empirically verified, but can be considered as an 'ideal' (which is neither false nor true), then the system can not be wrong. On the other hand, the world, or the world's opinions, concerning Hegelian science *can* be wrong, and must, through action (force), be brought in line with the "ideal", thus, the

'system' itself becomes political propaganda for the obliteration of adverse opinion, an arbiter through which Science is recognized as Truth, and an element of social control for the realization and the maintenance of a State (power) fully integrated into the System (wisdom). Until this time, until full recognition by the State of the Truth of the System, those in the State can not know the significance of the fact that they are, for without full recognition of the 'Science', there is no "recollection of meaning," no *Aufhebung*, thus, those who are unwilling to recognize become the *they* who cannot see beyond the *fact* that they are those 'unenlightened' ones. Here is a *they* opposed to a "We" who supposedly can 'remember' the significance of this "fact," because the "We" possesses absolute, circular knowledge, through the recognition of the truth of the 'System'.

From Speculative Magic to Technology

"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."
Arthur C. Clark

To reiterate the argument: Kojève says that Napoleon, because he epitomizes human Freedom, is therefore "the total integration" of all the moments of the *logos* of History. Because of this, Napoleon is perfect, the "perfect man". To understand Napoleon is to understand Man in general, therefore, if a man understands Man in general then he has complete self-knowledge. This is what Kojève claims that Hegel has done: "By understanding (= justifying) Napoleon, Hegel achieves, therefore, his consciousness of Self." Hegel reveals Napoleon as the revealed God. "Thus Absolute Spirit, plenitude of *Bewusstsein* and of all *Selbstbewusstein*, that is of the real (Natural world) that *implies* the Universal and Homogeneous State, realized by Napoleon and revealed by Hegel."[19] Here we have a consciousness belonging to one man and a self-consciousness belonging to another, a dyad that "somehow" becomes a monad despite the fact that Kojève points out "Hegel does not like dualisms". It is obvious that in order for the metastasis of this dyad into a single monad to take place, and hence produce the actual *principle* which will allow for 'Science', the final tension between the consciousness of Napoleon and the self-consciousness of Hegel must be erased. We have already discussed the possibility of equal recognition as a solution to this difficulty, but this solves only part of the problem. Recognition of Napoleon by Hegel, as noted before, has to do with the recognition of the Science of Hegel (theory) by the world Napoleon's action has founded in *principle*. This is the final step that makes the *Aufhebung*, which became possible in principle, a concrete reality, for only with this scenario do we have Reality equalling Concept. Thus there is an immediate step which allows for this "*somehow*" to take place in principle. At first, this

step may seem quite elementary, for it is simply this: in order for one to be self-conscious he must possess a Self and all Selves have physical bodies. Now it is argued that the self-consciousness of Hegel, which also implies that Hegel has a Self and a body, "*somehow*" merges with the consciousness of Napoleon. Well, first, what happens to this self-consciousness when it becomes part of the monad? And what becomes of the Self and the body that gives it up? Part of the answer is that the Self and body dies, for philosophy (the realizing) is equivalent to the act of death, at least in the Socratic sense. First, perhaps we need to remind the reader that as Kojève says, Hegelian "Science is the eternity which reveals itself to itself."[20] Hegelian Science then is pure self-consciousness, and this self-consciousness, as Kojève has said, is eternity. Men do not exist in eternity, they have Selves and bodies and bodies and Selves exist in time. But how can one say that this self-consciousness derived from the metastasis of the two separate men exists in eternity? Kojève has an answer:

> The result of the action (realization) of the wise-man is, on the other hand perfect. It does not change and it cannot be gone beyond or exceeded: briefly it has no future properly so called. Consequently, this action is not an historical event properly speaking, it is not a true moment in time. And to say so is to say that it is no longer a human reality. Once again, the empirical existence of science in the world is not man but Book (the *Phenomenology of Spirit*) . . . Certainly this existence is empirical and as such it has duration: The Book endures, itself; it deteriorates, it is reprinted, etc. But the tenth edition in no way differs from the first edition: one can modify nothing in it, one can add nothing to it. All the while changing, the book remains therefore identical to itself.[21]

Here is part of the answer to the problem. This self-consciousness that reveals itself to itself through the metastasis of Hegel and "somehow" becoming Napoleon's self-consciousness does not take place in the world of bodies, Selves and time, but in the eternity of the *Phenomenology*. But where does this Science exist and where does the metastasis take place before the last (empirical) step of recognition? The answer to this question is to be found in the *Phenomenology*. "Spirit, which, when thus developed, knows itself to be Spirit, is Science. Science is its realization, and the kingdom it sets up for itself in its own native element."[22] In whatever this native element might be, we may be assured this is where the metastasis occurs, for Hegel is emphatic. "A self

having knowledge purely of itself in the absolute antithesis of itself, this pure ether as such, is the very soil where science flourishes, is knowledge in universal form."[23] Cannot one safely say that the metastasis of the dyad Napoleon-Hegel into a monad that reveals itself to itself through realizing the essence of itself in its complete opposite is the same as "A self having knowledge purely of itself in the absolute antithesis of itself?" If we have established this, then what is this "native element" that Hegel calls "the pure ether as such"? What does this mean . . . is Hegel speaking of *aithér*, that imaginary substance, thought by the ancients to fill the space beyond the moon, the spaces occupied by the stars?

In order to answer this question yet another problem must be solved. If the metastasis of these two self-consciousnesses takes place in the Book, and, if the Book is "eternity," and if this necessarily circumvents the problem of the original empirical existence of the two egos that comprise the dyad, then to whom does this self-consciousness belong? It cannot belong to Napoleon nor can it belong to Hegel, both were in time, both are dead, and besides, since it is in the Book it is "eternity". At this stage, the stage of its occurring in "*principle*", the answer would have to be that the self-consciousness belongs to no one, for what else other than Science can "exist in its own native element"? This is to say that the self-consciousness belongs to the 'System of Science'. "Science on its side requires the individual self-consciousness to have risen into this high ether, in order to be able to live with science, and in science, and really feel alive there."[24] From this one can conclude that the self-consciousness belongs to the 'System of Science' and the 'System of Science' also exists in this ether.

We have been told by Kojève that if the 'System' could be proved to be circular, then it is in "*principle*" true. I am contending that the metastasis that "*somehow*" comes about to establish the principle of Science is the same thing as saying that the 'System' is in this way established in "*principle*". Now principles do not have empirical existence, just as angels existing in the ether do not have empirical existence; principles belong to no one, as the self-consciousness in the ether of the 'System of Science' belongs to no one. This is the case until the second and final step, that of recognition, establishes the principle in actuality; until the Science, through its being recognized by the actual world, descends from the ether of the Concept and becomes manifest through its being recognized by the actual world as Truth. At this point, Kojève does tell us to whom this self-consciousness *will* belong. It will belong to the community of believers whose existence will harbour the essence of this Science.[25] Here we have the "New World" of 'Hegelian Science' with its community of believers.

In order for Science to become actual, Kojève like Hegel, must admit of real History as the arbiter of the Concept. The *Aufhebung* of which he speaks

merely occurs in the ether of the system, not in the reality of the world. Kojève knows that according to the *Phenomenology*, the period that harbours the birth pangs of a new era is one of total *Zerrissenheit*, and that this total dismemberment exists until the new age is established concretely. Also, Hegel has told us, and Kojève has told us after him, that the most extreme form of *Zerrissenheit* is equivalent to Death or I = I. He must know that this extreme stage is a "necessary" pre-requisite to the birth of a new (if even final) era. Between the advent of the phenomenon of the Historical Jesus and that of the Christ, there was this most extreme form of *Zerrissenheit*, and figuratively this is equivalent to Christ's descent into Hell. And Hegel's philosophic "action" which allegedly resulted in his self-consciousness becoming Napoleon's, amounts to death. Indeed, philosophy has been called the study of death.[26] Kojève calls Hegel the Sage, perfect and satisfied, or he calls him a God. Since Kojève considers Hegel a God, he must admit that his divinity has only been established in principle, that is in the ether of the System, for as Kojève says, the system only has been proved in "principle", and the final means through which it will become actual will be purely political. If, as Kojève contends, Hegel is truly the figure who "reveals" Napoleon as the "revealed" God (*der erscheinende Gott*), if in other words, Hegel is the new Historical Christ (God the Son) who reveals (justifies) Napoleon (God the Father) through explaining that the essence of his action (Freedom) redeems the suffering of man, and if he contends that this is established only in principle (or in the ether of the 'System'), until political action makes the principle manifest, then what is one to conclude? Since, as Kojève has pointed out, Hegel is dead, and the Science is "eternity" because its Spirit will forever live in the form of the Book, one can say that the result of the political action that establishes the Universal and Homogeneous State would be the resurrection of Hegel in the form of the spiritual community of the "New World". But since this political action has not yet occurred, and Hegel's spirit has not yet been resurrected, and we are in that non-time between his crucifixion and resurrection, then one must ask of Hegel's whereabouts. If Kojève is correct about Hegel's identity, and if Kojève's Hegelian dialectics are accurate, then, at least in the figurative sense, the answer must be that Hegel, after his descent into Hell, has ascended into the ether of the 'System'.

Despite the fact that Hegel is in the ether of the system of science, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* he speaks of the necessity of the descent. This pertains to the phenomenon of *Zerrissenheit*.

> Death, as we may call this unreality, is the most terrible thing and to keep and hold fast to what is dead demands the greatest force of all . . . But the life of mind (Spirit) is not one that shuns death . . . it endures death and in death

> maintains its being. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder (Zerrissenheit).[27]

Thus this descent into Death, or into the total destruction of the soul, is a pre-requisite to Science.[28] For "mind (Spirit) is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it. This dwelling beside it is the *magic power* that *converts* the negative into being."[29] This power about which Hegel speaks is the thinking subject, or consciousness, which through its subjection to *Zerrissenheit* or Death, discovers its own "determinations" or necessity. In other words, the essence of the soul discovers itself in the being of the soul, and in this "cancels abstract immediacy" found in Being, and "by so doing becomes the true substance, becomes being or immediacy that does not have mediation (reflection, consciousness) outside it, but is this mediation itself."[30]

This is the conversion from immediate Being, found only in the total finitude of Death, to the life of consciousness. In this conversion, the *eternity* of the unconscious is mediated by the *time* of consciousness. The result is first the completion of the circle, a tying together of the threads woven by an archeology of being and a teleology of thinking, resulting in self-consciousness. Second, the tying together of the broken pieces of the dismembered soul with the threads of self-consciousness, and third, a turning about of the soul toward the sunlight of Science.

It is apparent that there is a parallel between the nature of this conversion and the metastasis of the two empirical egos of Napoleon and Hegel. In fact, both take place in the ether of the system, but, too, as Hegel has said "actual history" must make the metastasis or conversion concrete. Since Hegel claims to have already performed it in the ether, the Science remains, as Kojève has pointed out, merely a possibility. But since thought cannot overstep its own determinations, the metastasis already had to have taken place in concrete reality, and Kojève says, that, in *principle* it has. If we grant this, then we must conclude that the System is true, for the ideas in the substance that is the ether of the system are "*in principle*" identical to the actual reality of which the system speaks. Too, the new Science is eternal in the Book read by the Spiritual Community of the "New World." But since the Universal and Homogeneous State talked about by Kojève is not immanent except in principle, then how will it become actual in practice? The answer is that the Book in which the principles are contained will be the tool for its realization. First, the solution is political. As already noted, the Book can be used as propaganda. Next, one must not forget that Kojève is a Marxist and no good Marxist forgets his master's famous words: "Until now the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." But with these words that could come from the mouth of any left-Hegelian, one must remember Hegel's own words: "Philosophy escapes from

the weary strife of passions that agitate the surface of society into the calm region of contemplation."

The above are the kind of statements upon which left and right Hegelianisms are made, for left-Hegelianism locates the essence of man in the labour of his body, while right-Hegelianism locates it in his reasoning mind. The whole point of the Science of Hegel, however, is to abolish this tension of the body and the psyche, being and thinking. Kojève is aware of this, for otherwise he could not have told us all that he has. Nevertheless, if the conversion and the metastasis that does take place in the ether of the system is used for furthering the principles of the Universal and Homogeneous State, then this self-consciousness which belongs to no one in particular, will belong to every one universally, for everyone in this homogenous and actual world will be a Hegelian. But strangely enough, to attempt to operate in this substance that is the ether of the system in such a way as to influence the reality of the phenomenal world is tantamount to magic. But is magic beyond the reach of men? If we take him at his word, Hegel must not have thought so when he told his students at Jena:

> Every single (person) is a blind link in the chain of absolute necessity, on which the world develops. Every single (person) can extend his dominion over a greater length of this chain only if he recognizes the direction in which the great necessity will go and learns from this cognition to utter the *magic word* which conjures up its shape. This cognition which can both embrace in itself the whole energy of the suffering and the antithesis which has ruled the world in all the forms of its development (*Ausbildung*) for a couple of thousand years, and can raise itself above it all, this cognition only philosophy (Science) can give.[31]

But one can utter this "*magic word*" only if he has the "*magic power*" which Hegel later elaborated in the *Phenomenology*. The procedure discussed in connection with the conversion is an explanation of this *magic power*, that will establish 'Science,' and raise us, through our "cognition," above the suffering and antithesis of humanness. Traditionally only those possessive of divinity or perhaps alchemy are said to perform magic, but while in our post-modern age divinity may account for few followers, such acts have many open adherents.

The best way to get at the heart of the meaning of the symbol of magic and the magic word (*Zauberwort*) is to consider what would entail performing the

act of magic and the uttering of magic words. Magic for man, just as everything else he attempts to do or utter, must be an act or a speech. Man can act or speak because, and only because, he is in the world; for man, this being who is in the world, this being in Being, also has time in him. This man, this Being who has time in him, lives among other beings, and because of this, and only because of this, speech and action are possible. But to act or to speak is to cast one's self from one's being into Being, or into the world, and this casting of one's self into Being is in the form of acts and speeches. It is to cast Time into Being. But we men, while we possess the common quality of action and speech due to our common Being, do not possess the same being. Thus, our acts and our speeches are as unique as the uniqueness of the being from which they originate. Man cannot know in what his acts will result, nor can he know exactly the meaning that will be taken from his speeches. But if one's actions could be performed and his words uttered from the standpoint of eternal Being rather than from the standpoint of his being in Time, then the intention of his acts would correspond with their end, and his utterances, in the form of the facticity of his words, would coincide with the meaning he has intended for them. Is would equal ought, fact would equal meaning. But in order to do this, one would have to 'act' and 'speak' not from the standpoint of Time, but from the standpoint of Eternity. Put another way, only if there were no time, or if somehow time were stopped, could 'man' perform such 'acts' and utter such 'speeches.' Moreover, if one, from the standpoint of Eternity, could utter the word that would stop time, then, while time would stop in the form of speech, time would continue in the form of action. But if one could at once perform the act that magically would stop time together with uttering the magic word that would stop time, then, indeed time would stop. This, however, would be a reverse of the Creation, for in the Beginning was the word or deed that created the World, Being, and from Being, man, as the animal who speaks and acts, became possible.

If the 'System' is the final *speaking* of the significance of the final *act*, and both the act and the significance are to be continued in the "ether of the System," or in Eternity itself, then to speak the 'System' is the equivalent of attempting to speak from the standpoint of Eternity, or from the standpoint of pure Being, identical to itself, or to attempt to speak from the standpoint of God. But this works both ways, and it does so because man, or Time, is also in the 'System' (the 'System' = the identity of identity and non-identity).

Voegelin, in his article, "Hegel: a Study in Sorcery."[32] has claimed that Hegel attempts to perform magic, but here he does not go through the necessary steps that would allow one to see exactly in what sense the symbol Magic is to be taken in relation to the *man* Hegel. I am reluctant to call Hegel a sorcerer, despite the association of his thoughts with the thoughts of Böhme and other mystics. My reason is as follows: To be a sorcerer is to perform

magic, and Hegel, among many who have attempted it, has not performed it. However that the *hypothetical* results of his 'System' are tantamount to magic, I have no doubt.

But the results are *hypothetical* in the same way that the system is perfect and final, if indeed it can be proved to be circular. However one cannot say that Hegel is a sorcerer because Hegel did not *do* anything. He merely described the world as it had come to be. Jacques Ellul has talked of magic and has said that while the attitude is identical with other forms of technology, the only difference between primitive magic and modern technology is that one works and the other does not.[33] And it was Heidegger in his "Der Staz Von Grund" who talked of technology as a calling forth of everything both human and non-human to give its reasons, and through the calling forth turning the world into "standing reserve" to be at the disposal of our creative wills.[34] His idea of technology is circular just as is Hegel's system. Both are a merging of the heretofore separate realms of thought and action whereby not only does the "logos become flesh", thereby phenomenolizing thought in the world, or coupling logos with techné. But this is not techné as mere production, although the first part of Heidegger's definition does pertain, but better techné comes to be a "discovery" or a "making present."[35] Also, it is circular in another way: Whatever is willed becomes mere reserve for a further expansion of the system.[36] The coupling of techné and logos is the phenomenal manifestation of the system, a homeostasis of wholes and parts, yet a whole that is more than its parts. It is the uniting of unity and disunity, the unity of eternity and time, the identity of identity and non-identity. It is a homeostasis of desire and need. This system, as Ellul notes, expands not arithmetically but geometrically. The process is self-generating, "technique engenders itself".[37] It is the expansion of the principles of the modern state into world history, the topic that closes the *Philosophy of Right*. This merging of reason with history is what brings about the "New World", the name that Hegel gave to the new dawn in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[38]

Thus, the entrée to the description of Hegel's "new world" is the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. One follows its moments diachronically, for the moments are those of a teleology that progressively reveals reason as spirit erupting into time. Because of the teleological character of the *Phenomenology*, the past and present are explained in terms of the future. But when the explanation is finished, Hegel, in the language of *is* rather than ought *describes* the present and the future in terms of the past. As he tells us in the *Philosophy of Right*, the past is "the event grown old". The advent of Napoleon and Hegel's explanation of his action has brought the straight arrow of *telos* back upon itself, making synchronic (complete) speech possible. Thus the resolution of the dual character of the *Phenomenology*, the diachronic and synchronic elements, the appearance of wholes and the

explanation of parts, allows Hegel to talk about the area of the system that is political science. But to talk of the present and the future in terms of the past is to speak not from the standpoint of teleology but from that of *techné*. It is to describe principles involved in the making present of an already actualized end. Techné resembles *telos* in that both produce an end, but *telos* differs in that the knowledge of the purpose only can be seen with the previous knowledge of the principles that explain (justify) the end produced. Telos implies *epistémé* but techné implies artifice.[39] Its description is bound up with the use to which the product can be put, the "logic of the product". In itself techné does not imply self-consciousness or intentionality but neither does teleology as such imply this. This is why no matter what the citizens of the state do, and whether or not they know the reasons for their "actions", they serve the state, and also why the state whose institutions are made actual by Napoleon's actions becomes revealed only through Hegel in his explanation of his revelation of Napoleon as the *logos* of history. For Christian philosophy the *logos* equals the second person of the Trinity and its functions are identified with the creative activity of Christ. It is Hegel who reveals that Napoleon is the *logos* become flesh. But flesh becomes spirit, the third trinitarian principle, through this revelation, and the state is the spiritual manifestation of the *logos* (the system) on earth. Like all else on earth, it is either natural or artificial, but the Hegelian state is both natural and artificial, it is the oneness of *physis* and the separateness of *nomos*. It is of *logos* and *techné*. It is the self-elaboration and self-control of the principles of the system. It is cybernetized Hegelianism.[40] It belongs to the completion of time as history concretized in that part of the system that is the state. Hegel talks not of Prussia, rather of a planet united under the principles of the monad Napoleon/Hegel. This final society emerged in principle because the final word (*logos*) had appeared in time as history. This is why philosophy had to come to its end. "The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk". But the dusk is the eclipse of light illuminating the West. The planet in principle has been infused with western *techné* - *logos*, harnessing the earth herself in principle, yet unleashing man from the light of the world.[41]

Nietzsche reacted overtly to this inescapable conclusion, the only conclusion that can be reached if man has thought the principles of his historical existence to their end. Nietzsche informs us that this is why modern men are *epigoni*, or at least think themselves as such.[42] And his despair for the "historical sickness" easily can be understood. That which is most characteristic of modernity is technology and if one thinks technologically he thinks time as history. Because time is history the creation of the "future" is out of nothing and from nothing. This is bound up with forgetfulness because reflection requires self-consciousness and self-consciousness implies not only a future but a past from which to forge one. Without reflection one has no past

and the "future" into which he flings himself is but a void of new possibilities. Thus man is left only with his will, for the seat of the will is the moment of choice and the moment of choice is always the present. Hegel teaches us that liberalism and the ideologies of which it is a parent are produced of this will become *techné*. Herein is embodied the principle of freedom in the fullness of time as history. But Nietzsche taught us that these products amount to secularized versions of Christianity and while the tombs of the dead God are but old churches, the monument to the new god is the everchanging landscape of the technological empire whose post-historical citizens are precisely those Last-men and nihilists alluded to by Nietzsche.

The "New World": Described

"only a god can save us". — *Heidegger*

Kojève himself has speculated on what life in this new world is like. In a long and queer footnote often remembered as one of Kojève's more outrageous pronouncements and rarely taken seriously, he deals with two possibilities. The first is the reanimalization of man, the second is what he calls the "Japanization" of man. Here I will quote a large portion of the note for it is too astounding to ignore:

> If one accepts 'the disappearance of Man at the end of History,' if one asserts that 'Man remains alive as animal,' with the specification that 'what disappears is indefinitely: arts, love, play, etc.' If man becomes an animal again, his arts, his lovers, and his play must also become purely 'natural' again. Hence it would have to be admitted that after the end of History, men would construct their edifices and works of art as birds build their nests and spiders spin their webs, would perform musical concerts after the fashion of frogs and cicadas, would play like young animals, and would indulge in love like adult beasts.[43]

Kojève then says that this new 'man', will be "content" rather than happy. This is understandable, for happiness is something fraught with contradition, and contentment is a 'pure' state which, because it is restricted to itself, does not engender the presence of its opposite.[44a] Happiness is a stage-along-the-way of fulfilled anticipations, it belongs to historical man, contentment is the complete fulfillment of anticipation, the obliteration of anticipation, it truly belongs to post-historical 'man'. It is the same as satisfaction.

Kojève also says that this 'man will play' or that the "constructing" and the "works that man undertakes will be 'natural again'". Is not this the same as saying that work (since there is no more work to be done) will become play? And is this not understandable since the gods are often seen at play? The only difference here is that after the primeval age the gods usually played on Olympus or in some other aethereal realm, but the abode of "natural man" is the earth, and the earth in this case, which has become the Universal and Homogeneous State which has usurped the profane realm of working man, has become an intermundane yet aethereal Olympus, the sacred realm of playing gods.[44b]

There is more to this interesting note:

> The definitive annihilation of Man properly so-called also means the definitive disappearance of human Discourse (Logos) in the strict sense. Animals of the species Homo Sapiens would react by conditioned reflexes to vocal signals or sign 'language', and thus their so-called 'discourses' would be like what is supposed to be the 'language' of bees. What would disappear, then, is not only Philosophy or the search for the discursive Wisdom, but also that Wisdom itself. For in these post-historical animals, there would no longer be any '(discursive) understanding of the World and of self.'[45]

The disappearance of discourse and of wisdom? This is understandable since these reanimalized 'men' "communicate" in signals or signs. It is not surprising that to communicate in Signs is to lose "understanding of the world and Sèlf" because to communicate in signs is to equate signifier with his object, thus understanding is lost because there is *no difference* between World and Self. The Self is one with the *Fact* of his existence in the world; as the world is natural, so is man.

But how does this square with the playing post-historical 'men' which we have identified with gods? How can this new 'man' be a god if he can not think much less have Wisdom? Since man as we have known him has been eliminated through his wanting for nothing, the middle term, man, between a sacred god and a profane world has been eliminated. Thus, we have this misty world of the sacred intermixed with the profane where gods roam the earth in the form of sacred animals.

Kojève ends this portion of his speculation with a discussion concerning the means by which the pre-revolutionary (revolution of Robespierrian Bonapartism) world has been "eliminated", or if you will, ways in which the

Universal and Homogeneous State has been elaborated. After talking about this elimination in the U.S.S.R., China, and Western Europe, he concludes by saying that "the American way of life" prefigures the 'eternal present' future of all Humanity, and "that Man's return to animality appeared no longer a possibility that was yet to come, but as a certainty that was already present."[46]

The remainder of this long note is even more intruiging because, as Kojève tells, visits to Japan between 1948-1958 have led him to abandon the above thesis concerning the reanimalization of man, because on these visits he found an entirely different society which "had for almost three centuries experienced life at the 'end of History.'" Here he claims to have found a class of nobles "who ceased to risk their lives (even in dual) and yet did not for that begin to work . . ." and comments that this existence is "anything but animal." He contends that this society is devoid of the institutions of morals or politics "in the European or Historical sense,"[47] but that the society upheld "disciplines" which nevertheless negated the natural or animal. These "disciplines" are, according to Kojève, created by *Snobbery*. He concludes by reasoning that "no animal can be a snob" and therefore that "every 'Japanized' post-historical period would be specifically human."[48] This is indeed astonishing. What is this queer term "Snobbery" which had led Kojève to abandon his previous thesis? He does not tell us much about it here except that the discipline which it engenders generates values which are both *formalized*, and, at the same time, "empty of all 'human' content in the historical sense,"[49] and because of this man can commit a "perfectly 'gratuitious' suicide."[50]

By formalized values we can take him to mean values given a definite form or shape in terms of prescribed customs, ceremonies, or laws, and that their being "empty of human content" has to do with their being absent of any practical (human) content such as in our saying "How do you do?" This is why, when practising them one can commit a "perfectly gratuitous suicide," that is a suicide from which the victim expects no payment, and a suicide committed simply because doing so is the right, or decent, or proper thing to do according to the prescribed values or customs to which "Snobbery" leads. The word "gratuitous" is our key here for it comes from the Latin root *gratus*, from which our English word grace is derived. Grace, among other things, is a privilege, and he who can commit this "gratuitous suicide" is one who is privileged. This is why he is a snob. Now to be a snob is to think oneself better than someone else, to be richer, more knowledgeable, more powerful, or more virtuous than someone else. It is to be aristocratic. The analysis of Kojève's footnote on "Snobbery" is supported by a further elaboration of the term made by him in an interview with Gilles Laponze in 1968. In the context of a discussion on the post-historical world and Japanese culture Kojève exclaims that:

> By nature snobbery is the prerogative of a *small minority*. Now, what we learn from Japan is that it is possible to democratize snobbery. Japan is eighty million snobs. After the Japanese people, English high society is a bunch of drunken sailors.[51]

Here I will suggest that Kojève's "snobbery" has to do with the Greek term *aidòs* which pertained to a practice of the *aristoi*.[52] *Aidòs*, in terms, of a practice, has to do with (1) "A moral feeling, reverence, awe, respect for the feeling or opinion of others . . .". (2) It, therefore, has to do with "shame, self-respect, a sense of honour, sobriety, moderation". (3) It also refers to "a regard for friends." (4) "The term is personified as reverence." Briefly, Snell, in his *Discovery of Mind*, says that *aidòs* "originates as the reaction which the holy excites in man" and that its secularized form is close to "the refined climate of the court or polite society." He adds that "a deep conservatism is the keynote for a call to *aidòs*."[53] E.R. Dodds in his *The Greeks and the Irrational* puts his emphasis on another element, respect for public opinion. He says that *aidòs* is characteristic of a culture where "anything which exposes man to the contempt or ridicule of his fellows, which causes him to "lose face," is felt unbearable."[54] Those who have commented on this term agree that the experience which gives rise to *aidòs* is basically religious. It is an "ancient feeling" which goes back to what Dodds has identified as a "shame-culture" as opposed to a "guilt-culture."[55] These culture types are derived from the anthropologist Ruth Benedict, and her particular usage has reference, strangely enough, to modern Japan as opposed to the West.

In a post-historical world, of Japanized snobs, guilt no longer operates as a social control, here guilt does not exist, for sin does not exist. Sin cannot exist because action does not exist, for with the absence of action, we have the absence of possibility, which eliminates the element of temptation, which makes sin, and, therefore guilt impossible. This is why "formalized values," as opposed to guilt, a product of the conscience, become the "disciplines" of a "Japanized" world. Also, in a shame culture acts (both irrational and rational) can be projected to an external force which can be seen as the "causes". Consequently, there is no need for the actor to be expunged of wrongdoing, thereby making catharsis an unnecessary and impossible prerequisite for cleansing the conscience. A clear conscience would not be a value here, but the enjoyment of public esteem would be, and public esteem would be acquired in the practice of the "formalized values." In the history of the West, guilt and the need for catharsis arose with a separation of body, as that which acts, and the psyche, as that from which the act originates, and thus, in this case, it is impossible to project blame on an external force. This marks the emergence of guilt as a social control, whereby the notion of divine temptation is

transformed into a punishment and God becomes the embodiment of divine justice. But with the absence of action, hence, possibility, temptation and guilt, then *aidòs* becomes a sociological force as an agent for order and maintenance.

As said before, to be a snob is to conceive of oneself as better than others, because of one's superior wealth, knowledge, power or virtue. Could this not be why Kojève says that under the influence of this snobbery the subject still opposes the object and hence remains human, but that this opposition is not an attempt to transform the given, but rather to "oppose himself as a pure 'form' to himself and to others taken as a 'sort'."[56] Is it possible that Kojève means here that the snob is a snob because he thinks himself to have superior knowledge (Wisdom), because he can "speak in adequate fashion of all that is given to him,"[57] and that he opposes himself in that he competes among other snobs for the arete that is won by *aidòs*?[58] But, who are these "others" to whom he is opposed, these others taken as a "content"? Are they not those who have not yet become snobs? Could these others not be a "they" as opposed to a "we" who think themselves to be superior which makes them snobs? It seems possible that these "others" are those untransformed animalized creatures who have not become the planetary *aristoi* of the 'Japanized' state.

In the case of our two life forms presented by Kojève, at least in whatever realm they exist, we do not yet advance to a revelation of the concept and the Universal and Homogeneous State, for revelation takes place within history, and as Kojève has informed us, history has ended. The conflict then does not lead to the progress of self-consciousness which is a result of recollecting all previous moments in the form of the Concept, but rather, being devoid of both history and the Concept, the conflict leads to forgetfulness and silence.

Here then as regards the Japanized form of life, we can say that this is a revolt against culture or a revolt against speech as a form of vindicating honour and an embracing of the silent honour of death. This is a revolt against the West because it is the West that exemplifies the principle of self-preservation, and self-preservation is exemplified by the principle of work in the form of speech. The West is represented by the Russo-American way of life, and because of its exemplifying the principle of self-preservation at the expense of honour, it evolves into the reanimalized form of life. This reanimalized form of life, therefore, now has Life, as opposed to Death, as its principle, and one could say its major concern is with the elaboration of this principle. The elaboration of this principle can be called "collective housekeeping," which puts the life of the body above all else. Here we have baseness as a pure type and it is opposed to the pure type of nobility which, in embracing Death (honour) over self-preservation has as its major concern not "housekeeping," but "homemaking"[59] or nation-building. The first form is characterized by expanding internationalism, the other by centralized

ethnocentric nationalism. They are archetypical forms of opposition and this is why Kojève has said that the path of the future is "to Japanize the West or to Americanize Japan." Kojève does not speak of a synthesis between the two, but rather the "or" of this statement alludes to what one only could describe as a planetary 'dialectic': a bloody fight between East and West. But how can one speak of a dialectic without history? Here is one way. We will discuss the other shortly. The paradigmatic dialectics of Master and Slave require first that neither or both of the adversaries in the struggle be annihilated, for if one or both is killed then there is no one to recognize the other. When Kojève speaks of the impossibility of synthesis he is speaking of the impossibility of recognition, for to recognize is to synthesize the meaning of one's self from his relation to the other. This is the case because when he speaks of the impossibility of a synthesis he speaks of our specifically modern condition of existing in a world of competing ideologies whose political powers possess Atomic weapons, a world where ideological clashes seem irreconcilable through the usual diplomatic and military channels. Ours is a world where the latter produces either a 'zero sum game' where all lose, or a world where one completely obliterates his opponent by 'beating him to the bottom' technologically or by completely undermining him through propaganda so as to completely absorb him after his internal deterioration. Either of the three would surely mean the end of history, for the first is merely to blow ourselves into a state of perpetual 'forgetfulness', and the second and third would produce a non-expandable, non-transformable form of life that would erase succession in history from 'human' experience exchanging it for the total equivalence of perpetual duration.

Also, it is curious to note that *adiòs*, snobbery has to do with wonder or awe, and that wonder or awe is the feeling which Hegel names in his *Äesthetics* as engendering the first phase of art.[60] But, while awe here has to do with awe for the natural universe, awe in this instance has to do with awe for a cultural universe represented in the form of "formalized values". Again we return then in this post-historical world to the beginning. It, in this case, is not the world of Signs through which the animalized "other" communicates, but a stylized and formal world of the Noh Theatre, and the Japanese poets. *Adiòs* is the social glue for the world, as it was for the Homeric world of the Greek heroes, and poetic language, the language of Image, is its form of articulation. It is a remythologizing language where all points to itself as a series of mirrors. This language is the language of those privileged Snobs who have become "Japanized".

Strauss mentioned the reasonableness of the "change from the universal-homogeneous monarchy to the universal-homogeneous aristocracy", but unfortunately, does not elaborate on it.[61] Nevertheless, cannot we say that what Kojève has speculated on here adumbrates a distortion of aristocratic

conscience of the Nietzscheian Overman who, through a "Perfectly gratuitous suicide", of *amor fati*, strives to overcome the "last man". And although he intends to extend grace to himself for the sake of the eruption of the dawn of a New World created *ex-nihilo* from his own will, he does not know how to utter both the "yes" with the "no" and is like those from whom Zarathustra walks away at the end of the poem.

The symbol of Hell regarding the Hegel of Kojève is revealing when applied to some of the conclusions drawn from Kojève's sketches of what he takes to resemble post-historical 'man'. Summarizing the previous argument: the first form of life, re-animalized man, does not work, he plays. He does not engage in discourse, for discourse involves the use of symbols and symbols surpass themselves. Since there is no surpassing, and he does not communicate symbolically, then he communicates "naturally", or does so in signs, a medium of discourse that does not distinguish between subjects and objects. He wants for nothing, and is thus contented, which is not only a characteristic of animals but also of gods. This is the world returned to "natural man", a realm inhabited by the *soulless bodies* of sacred animals. The second form of life is what Kojève has called "Japanized-man". The language of this other-directed 'aristocracy' of "Snobs" is a language "devoid of any human content", and this language, because it has no human (practical) content, leads to a perfectly "stylized way of life". Here I equate the language of the 'Snob-culture' with the language of the chattering sycophant, the language of pure culture. And since a language without content is a language of pure form, or a language with no objective referent, I have said that this language is one of images. Remember that the two forms of life are archetypes of pure mastery (nobility) and pure slavery (baseness) in the unconscious psyche, and the unconsciousness knows no time. It too is eternal.

What if time could be brought to the eternity of the unconscious; what if this unconsciousness could be mediated with the time of consciousness? Would this not be tantamount to the arresting of the tension between the *Nichts* and the *Ichts*, or the meeting of the circle of the archeology of the soul that uncovers being, and the teleology of soul that uncovers Time. Would not this be the metastasis of Being and Time resulting in pure self-consciousness? The answer is yes, Hegelian science, in that it is eternal, is located in that element in which Science "feels at home", in the ether of the Concept, but the unconscious forms of life are located in the opposite realm — the abode of the 'underworld' of ourselves.

The symbols used by Homer in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey* to describe the inhabitants of Hades are identical to those that describe Kojève's two forms of life. The inhabitants are portrayed as images and shadows. But the inhabitants of our underworld are not only the souls without bodies of Homer's Hades, but too they are their opposite, the bodies without souls of Plato's cave.[62]

Hades is the bottom of the abyss of the soul. It is the I = I, Death or total *Zerrissenheit*, and it represents the infinite depth of an internal dialectic of a soul in the doldrums of its own non-time.

Thus in this bottomless pit of non-time dwell Kojève's archetypes, re-animalized "last-men" and Japanized nihilists. With the first, meaning pertains exclusively to the realm of the calculating rationality, the rationality of facts that aspires through technology to a homeostasis of desire and need. This control of both human and non-human nature, through the manoeuvering of accident from the human condition and the concomitant eradication of the fear of the future, through the obliteration of the future, aims at changing human nature itself through the elimination of the 'problem' of temporality, thereby allowing 'man' to enjoy a satisfied existence in a completely cybernetic system wherein his metabolism is one with Nature's. With the second, meaning does not pertain to manipulation and control of external phenomena, but rather pertains exclusively to the subject. Here meaning is drawn into the self, as with vampish characters of Munch paintings and Strindberg plays. There is no manoeuvering of accident from existence through the external manipulation of cause and effect. There is no progression of parts tied together through the relations that cause and effect establishes. There is no beginning and no end. Objective phenomena, however heterogeneous as to their difference in quality or in their order of appearance, is given coherence through experiencing them together. This simultaneous experience of the appearance of what externally would be mere accident becomes the equilibrium from which contradictory parts receive a unity. But the unity is not found through the succession of events that establishes coherence through the relation of qualities but rather it is a unity of duration. Thus we have not the succession of cause and effect, the stuff which leads to understanding and mastery of the natural world through changing the future while swallowing it up. Rather we have an arrest brought about by acute attentiveness to experience, thereby imploding anticipations and memory, future and past, into the present in such a way that change or difference is given a unity in an eternal present. As found in haiku verse, the theatre of the absurd, the pataphysical text or in truly terrorist politics, there is a unity in the simultaneous experience of contradiction, yet no synthesis or unity of the phenomena experienced.[63]

The apparent absurdity of Kojève's explanation of Hegel's legacy through this presentation of these archetypes cannot be understood apart from this. The prudential reasons adduced for Universal Homogeneity belong to the technological rationality of the last man. But the mere appearance of the active Nihilist, a type in total contradiction to the first, is an appearance of the 'logos' of absurdity itself. This is why the ironic Kojève is simultaneously grave and frivolous.

There is no arresting the tension between the two types except through technological supremacy of one type over the other or through an ersatz arrest offered by the 'understanding' of this a-logic. There is no synthesis, either it is a stand-off, a clash or a resignation to and reverie in the absurdity of the Spirit of the time. But this feasting on Spirit is not a reenactment of a symbolic eucharist, rather, for the post-modern soul-less body it is the reduction of this feast to a mere fact of consumption, and for our latter-day body-less souls, an animation of the consumed gods with their own dirempted spirit. With the latter, the symbolic *meaning* is relegated to the *image* of the intense and spontaneous frenzy of a bacchanalian festival, and for the former, is *signified* by animals consuming a corpse at the foot of Golgotha.

Conclusion

As we exist in this world we must participate in it in order to know anything about either our world or ourselves; we must be conscious, but this consciousness of ourselves and the ground upon which we walk comes and goes. When it does come, it does so because our experience as men in the world is differentiated from ourselves and the world in which we exist, and this experience of being a man finds its meaning through symbols that give significance to this experience. These symbols can take many forms, but whatever form they take, they establish for us this difference between ourselves and the world in which we exist, and in one form or another express the order of this difference we see before us. Our symbols order the world and us in relation to each other, or one could say that to be conscious of existence as man-in-the-world orders the existence of humaness. There are degrees of differentiation, and the degree to which one can differentiate and order this experience of existence determines the character of the symbols that give meaning to his existence.

Symbols have a specific character that set them apart from other modes of articulation. With symbols as opposed to signs and images, the subject is not identical to the object of experience. The symbol, while it can more accurately differentiate and order its objects, cannot express exactly the objects of experience. Thus man, the *animal symbolans*, is not identical with the earth as are the other creatures, who live, die and are reborn again in the eternal metabolism of Nature. Unlike the other animals, man dies. He dies simply because he knows that he will die, whereas the other animals know nothing of death, for death, until it occurs to man always *will* take place *tomorrow*, but for the animal there is no tomorrow, hence no knowledge of death. But man who knows of death, and knows that it will occur tomorrow, is unique, for not only is he different from the other creatures in that he knows death, each one of him is unique in that each knows that when death does come to him that it will be specifically his. Thus, his death is uniquely his, and while he is like other

men in that all men die, yet he is different from all others in this respect. But not only is each man's death uniquely his, it is the same for his life, for to know death is to know of a *future* in which death will occur, and to know of a future is to know of a *past* and a *present*. This is so because, if one knows of death he knows that it entails the disintegration of at least physical existence. To die is for the body to cease to exist, but to be able to know that the body *will* cease to exist is to know what the existing body is that will no longer be, and to know what this body is, is to know what it *was* before today. If one knows that he will always die *tomorrow*, he must know it *today*, for today is now, and this present along with the one who exists in it, is different from what it was and will be. Everyday we know that tomorrow we will die, for each day is different and difference itself is death.

If difference is Death, then the symbols with which we articulate this experience of death to ourselves, since they produce difference, are also Death, and this is why Death, since from it we gain our uniqueness and consciousness of our temporal dimension in which we were, are, and will cease to be, is the same as difference, or is the same as the Symbol. To symbolize is to be conscious of time, for the Symbol has the structure of time, and this is why the *animal symbolans* is not one with the earth that is an object of his experience.

Because man differentiates himself from the earth, and orders this difference in the form of symbols that articulates his being-in-the-world, man is never quite at home in the world. He knows for a fact that he exists, but when he tries to decipher the *meaning* of this *fact* in the form of symbols, he is left in ambiguity. The ambiguity arises out of difference between the symbol and its intended meaning, between the difference of his existence and his essence. If essence is expressed in the form of the symbol, and the symbol has the form of time, then one could say that his ambiguity is produced by the tension between Being and Time.

This tension between Being and Time is precisely what Hegel sought to abolish, for it, in its extreme form, is *Zerrissenheit*, or what popularly often is called alienation. If, however, one could abolish this tension, the abolition would mean the destruction, not only of the ambiguity that is the seat of the experience of *Zerrissenheit*, but also would abolish the symbols through which the experience of this tension is expressed. If one abolishes the Symbol, one abolishes time, for as said before, time is the form of the symbol because the symbol arises out of the consciousness of Death, and Death is the arbiter to Time. If the tension is abolished and along with it the Symbol, Time and Death, then 'man' would not die, for he would have no future in which to die, and because he would have no future and no Death, there would be no difference between him and the world in which he exists. He would be at home in the world. Animals are at home in the world for they do not die; they are

forever one with the world, and Gods also do not die. Since it has been said that the world was made by God and the theistic notion of God entails difference between God and the world, then God could be at home in the world only if he were one with the world. So, in order for God to be at home in the world, he would have to know Death, but Death is only in the world and is only known by men, thus God would have to become man. Consequently, in order for God to become man, he would have to do what man, properly so-called, does, experience Death; he would have to become an *animal symbolans*: he would have to participate in humanity in the form of an incarnation, whereas, in the opposite dialectic, man must participate in divinity in order to become God.

This double movement of the descent of the infinite and the ascent of the finite, while it may culminate in both man and God being at home in the world, would abolish man *qua* man and God *qua* God altogether. It would mean Death to man *qua* man (Death to Death) and it would mean Death to God in that through Death the eternity of God would become temporalized. God would be man and man God. In this state of total equivalence between Man, World and God all would be at home in nature whose time is the eternity of the cycle of birth, maturation and deterioration.

This tension that is the ground for the experience of the difference between Man, World and God, is the *Metaxy*.[64] It is this in-between *fact* of existence and the *meaning* of existence, between Life and Death, Being and Time that defines the nature of man as the creature who uses symbols to articulate the meaning of his existence to himself. If this tension were not part of his nature, then neither alienation, nor its most intense form, *Zerrissenheit*, would occur, but too, if one were to abolish alienation, he would have to abolish the animal who differentiates the order of his existence through symbols. One would have to eradicate the nature of humaness altogether. This is true for several reasons. First, to dwell in-between is to exist, in mythical term 'half-way between the animals and the Gods.' Animals are totally ignorant and gods are totally wise. Thus, to eradicate the in-between of properly human existence is for 'man' to cease to differentiate experience in symbols of incomplete knowledge which is philosophy and to condemn him to the complete ignorance of animality, or to elevate him to the place of total wisdom, the place reserved for gods.

But as Nietzsche put it in the *Use and Abuse of History*, God's "becoming transparent and intelligible inside Hegelian skulls", is the same as the murder we have symbolically committed. And God's supposed sojourn on Earth is the eclipse of the sky over us. It is through our thinking time as eternal that we have come to think of time as History. As far as man is concerned, it is to admit with Nietzsche that "a first nature was once a second and every conquering second nature becomes a first". And it is to ask as he does in

Zarathustra: "Who has enough courage for that, who deserves to be the masters of the earth?"

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Notes

1. Karl Marx, "The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature in General," in *Activity in the Philosophy of Karl Marx,* trans., Norman Livergood, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967, p. 63.
2. The revival goes as far back as the availability of the Lasson edition of the *Jenenser Logik*; 1922; Lukacs' *History and Class Consciousness,* 1923; Köner's *Von Kaut bis Hegel,* 1924, and Marx's *Paris Manuscripts,* 1932. It further was spurred by Kojève's lectures on Hegel delivered at Paris between 1933 and 1939, published in 1947 as *Introduction à la Lecture du Hegel.*
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Use and Abuse of History," trans., Adrian Collins, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957, p. 56.
4. Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,* trans. J.H. Nichols, New York: Basic Books, 1969, p. 95. Hereafter referred to as *Intro.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Loc. cit.*
7. *Loc. cit.*
8. *Intro,* p. 96.
9. Man appropriates nature because he desires, and his ultimate satisfaction (= complete recognition) depends on his ability to order nature to the extent that his desires are fully satisfied. Man attends to his desires through negating given-being and this is carried out first through naked violence on nature and then in the more subtle form of violence called technology. Now Kojève contends that technology is to be used as an end to accomplishing this complete satisfaction (= complete recognition), that technology is only a means to this end and is not an end in itself. See Geo. Grant, *Technology and Empire,* Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969, p. 100.
   This subject is discussed at length in the above source which outlines the debate between Kojève and Leo Strauss on this matter. Here Grant notes that Strauss contends that technology, rather than being a mere means to an end, is an end in itself. Grant sums up his contention in this manner: "it would appear to me that technological progress is now being preserved not first and foremost to free all men from work and disease, but for the investigation and conquest of the infinite spaces around us. The vastness of such a task suggests that modern society is committed to unlimited technological progress for its own sake." *Ibid.,* p. 101. Furthermore, Grant notes that "Hegel-Kojève" substitutes universal recognition, which depends on technology, for the classical doctrine of virtue, and that by lowering the goals of human attainment, an optimism concerning the satisfaction of desires in a Universal and Homogeneous State became manifest along with an unleashing of the passions through which this goal is to be attained. *Ibid.,* p. 105. The differences between the classical and modern notions of the relationship of man to nature are indeed striking. They are outlined in this source and at bottom Kojève's "assumption" rests on whether or not his essentially modern understanding of this relationship is correct and whether or not man negates nature as a means to fulfilling desires or as an end in itself. We will return to this subject.

10. *Intro,* p. 98.

11. *Ibid.,* p. 70.

12. *Ibid., p. 166.*

13. *The Anschauung* has to do with an intuition with a quality of directness and immediacy. See Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. M. Muller, New York: Doubleday, 1966. "... we shall separate from this all that belongs to sensation (*Emphfindung*) so that nothing remains but pure intuition (*reine Anschauung*) or the mere form of the phenomena . . .." pp. 22-3.

14. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind,* trans. J.B. Baillie, New York: Harper and Row, 1967, p. 80.

15. *Ibid.,* p. 530.

16. A. Kojève, "The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel," trans. J. Carpino, in *Interpretation,* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, pp. 144-156.

17. A. Kojève, "Marx, Hegel and Christianity," trans. J. Carpino, in *Interpretation,* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, p. 36. In a more specific sense this would mean that Napoleon has arisen from the Death of the Terror.

18. A. Kojève, *Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel* Paris: Gallimard, 1947, p. 153.

19. *Ibid.,* pp. 574-75.

20. *Ibid.,* p. 383.

21. *Ibid.,* p. 385.

22. *The Phenomenology of Mind,* p. 86.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.,* p. 87.

25. *Introduction à la Lecture du Hegel,* p. 385.

26. Plato, *Phaedo,* 80e, 81.

27. *The Phenomenology of Mind,* p. 93.

28. A separate work could be written on the phenomenon of the descent in not only Hegel's philosophy but in the history of philosophy. Regarding the relationship between this key notion in Hegel's thought and the western philosophical and religious tradition, one should note the great debt the *Phenomenology of Spirit* owes to Pauline thought. Not only is the descent equal to death, but this journey into the Hell of ourselves is at the same time the ordeal whereby the "deep things of God" are discovered (I Cor. 2:10). This facing death is a prerequisite to these "deep things of God" or Wisdom. Death, pure negativity or Ego = Ego, will be overcome with the attainment of Wisdom. The attainment through an ascent is the supersession of the "depth" (*Ph.* p. 808) or as Paul tells us in I Cor. 15:26 "The last enemy that shall be destroyed is Death." At this point one attains Wisdom, complete self-consciousness or Absolute knowledge. It is as Hegel says, "Spirit knowing itself in the shape of spirit..." (*Ph.* p. 798) or as Paul says, Wisdom is "comparing spiritual things with spiritual" (I Cor. 2:13).

29. *The Phenomenology of Mind,* p. 93.

30. *Loc. cit.*

31. Hegel, *System of Ethical Life,* trans. H.S. Harris, unpublished version, Appendix, p. 11.

32. Eric Voegelin, "Hegel: A Study on Sorcery," *Studium Generaite XXXIV,* Paris, 1971, pp. 367 391.

33. Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society,* trans. John Wilkinson, New York: Random House, 1964, pp. 24-25.

34. Also see Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology", in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1977, p. 17.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

36. George Grant, *English-Speaking Justice* Sackville: Mount Allison University Press, 1974.

37. *The Technological Society*, p. 87.

38. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 75.

39. "The Question Concerning Technology", Heidegger shows the separation of techné and epistémé to have taken place with Plato. "Aristotle . . . (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI, Chs. 3 and 4), distinguishes between epistémé and techné and indeed with respect to what and how they reveal . . . It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us . . . "

40. Heidegger, through a discussion of 'the four causes', ties together *telos*, *techné*, and *logos* *Logos* is related to the *causa efficiens*, that "which brings about the effect . . ." It means "to consider carefully . . . to bring forward into appearance". Also note that Heidegger says that the translation of *telos* as aim or purpose is too narrow. *Telos* also has to do with a "circumscribing" which "gives bounds to the thing. With the bounds the thing does not stop . . .", p. 8. As I relate cybernetics to planetary domination and Hegelianism, I am not referring just to such works as those of Deutsch which represent political systems to self-adjusting mechanisms. A better example is to be found in the so-called "new cybernetics" which attempts to move away from the cybernetics of Wiener. Whereas the "old" cybernetics is still tied to the image of the machine, that is physics, the "new" adheres to the image of organism, or biology. The main task of the "new cybernetics" is to overcome entropy through using "noise" as positive feedback. In Heideggarian terms "noise" too would become ready-reserve. E. Morin, the major spokesman for the "new" cybernetics has stated "Of course living things combat entropy by supplying themselves with energy and information from outside, from the environment, and by casting out into the environment as waste the deteriorated residual materials which they cannot assimilate. However, at the same time life is reorganized, as a result of entropy exercising its lethal, disorganizing effect within. Without entropy there can be no negentropy. Thus we do not have here a simple Minichaean opposition between two antagonistic principles, as is too often supposed. On the contrary, we have a complex relation, complementary, competitive and antagonistic at the same time. This essential quality of biological complexity was adumbrated in exemplary fashion by Heraclitus: 'Life from death and death from life.' Hegel too came very near the concept of negentropy with his 'magic force (Zauberkraft) causing the Negative to return to Being'." Strangely enough the section of the article from which the quote is taken is called "Life from death, death from life". See "Complexity" in *The International Journal of Social Science*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (1974), pp. 563-565. Heidegger, in his famous interview in *Der Spiegel* said that cybernetics was the "new philosophy", and here he also said "that only a god can save us".

41. For Heidegger Earth and World are opposed yet related terms. Whereas the World owes its existence to mortals, what they bring into appearance must be rooted in the Earth. We stand between the two in a curious way: "The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing reserve." "The Question Concerning Technology", p. 33.

42. *The Use and Abuse of History*, p. 49.

43. *Intro*, p. 159.

44a. For an analysis of this distinction see Stephen Strausser, "The experience of Happiness: A Phenomenological Typology" in *Readings in Existential Phenomenology*, ed. N. Lawrence and C. O'Connor, Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967, p. 286.

44b. Here 'Man' plays and in his play he does not alter the given for he is completely oriented in it, but what does he do mentally? He fantasizes. If play-thoughts produce theories they are of the type akin to what Alfred Jarry calls "Pataphysics". This completely non-serious 'theory' was named by André Breton in *Anthologie de l'humour noir.* See Ihab Hassan, the *Dismemberment of Orpheus*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 48-53. Here "fact is equivalent to dream, past to present, reason to madness, space to time, and self to other . . . Pataphysics is the science of nonsense", p. 51. Here play is completely frivolous, as opposed to Paideia. The latter is serious play, for only the Gods can engage in this enterprise. Plato, *Laws* (VII, 803).

45. *Intro*, p. 160.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

47. *Loc. cit.*

48. *Loc. cit.*

49. *Intro*, p. 162.

50. *Loc. cit.*

51. Lapouze, "Entretien avec Alexandre Kojève", p. 6.

52. Werner Jaeger links *aidôs* directly to the Homeric conception of aristocracy. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, Vol. I, trans. G. Highet, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 7. On *aidôs* in Plato see *Laws* 647d-e, 271d, 699b-d, 590a-d; *Seventh Letter*; 336d-337b; Protagoras, 322c; Republic, 560a-b. For *aidôs* in Aristotle 50c Ethics, Book IV.

53. Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of Mind*, trans. T. Rosenmeyer, New York: Harper and Row, 1969, p. 167.

54. E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, p. 18.

55. Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946, p. 222.

56. *Intro*, p. 162.

57. *Loc. cit.*

58. In the aforementioned interview of Kojève, examples are given of this type of *areté*. "Don't forget that snobbery goes a long way. One dies through snobbery as with Kamakazies". These are examples of *areté* as "mainly virtue" or what Kojève calls "gratuitous negativity".

59. I am inviting the reader to think about not only Engels' famous words about the "administration of things", the 'state' as collective house keeping but also asking him to reflect on: (1) the discussion of technology in Grant, cf. Footnote 12 (2) Bakunin's statement in his debate with Marx on the subject of life at the end of History. "The people is not learned, so it will be entirely freed from the cares of governing, wholly incorporated into a governed herd". Marx, *Werke*, Vol. 18, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962 and (3) Section 56, Part II of Tocquevilles *Democracy in America.* This is something of what Heidegger has to say on the subject. Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, Tubingen: Max Neimeger Verleg, 1953, pp. 28-9. "This Europe in its godless dazzling, constantly leaping to stab itself, is situated today between the great tongs of Russia on the one side and America on the other. Russia and America are both metaphysically equal in the same desperate madness of unchained techniques and bottomless organization of the normal men. Whenever the most distant corner of the globe will be conquered and exploited technically, whenever any event, at any place and at any time, in any speed becomes attainable, whenever an attempt on the life of a king of France and a symphony concert in Tokyo simultaneously can be 'experienced,' whenever time is only speed, instantness, and simultaneity and time as befalling it gone out of the *Dasein* of all nations, whenever a boxer is considered the great man of a nation, whenever a meeting numbering a

million is a triumph — then, yes then the question remains as spectre over all this phantom — what for, where to, and what then?"

60. Hegel, *Asthetick*.

61. *On Tyranny*, p. 222.

62. These archetypes can be recognized today in other forms. First in the 'ideology' of surrealism, we have the ideology of the bodyless soul that would hold that the imagination alone is real. Next, among the many examples of the ideology of the soulless body is the literature of Marquis de Sade and his successors.

63. The obliteration of succession through the simultaneous grasping of contradictory appearance is close to what Jung calls Synchronicity, but it is perhaps closer to Neitzsche's notion of Eternal Return of the identical and will to power. For example, in the last book of *Zarathustra* Nietzsche deals with the problem of cause and effect and the embracing of accident as the first step in overcoming the utilitarianism of last men. Nietzsche calls this gaming (*Spielen*). It is a type of play as contest. It has long been noted that this attitude is common to the various art forms in post-modern culture. For specific sources see Paul Valéry "Méthodes", *Mercure*, mai, 1899, and Joseph Frank "Special Forms in Modern Literature", The *Sewanee Review*, Spring, Summer, Autumn, 1945. An excellent general source dealing with this attitude, viz. the arts, is Roger Shattuck *The Banquet Years: The Origins of the Avant-Garde in France, 1885 to World War I*, Random House, New York, 1968.

64. Plato, *Symp.* 202a. For a full explanation see Eric Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience" in *The Southern Review* Baton Rouge, Vol. X, Spring 1974, p. 252.

Editor's Note: After being accepted for publication, Professor Darby's manuscript together with replies by Professors Shell and Kroker were presented at the Learned Societies Meetings in Montréal, Québec, June, 1980.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. V, No. 3 (Fall, 1981).

THE CONFESSION OF VOEGELIN

Susan Meld Shell

Allow me to summarize what I take to be the gist of Professor Darby's argument. The modern world is in crisis, of which the use and abuse of technology is one pervasive sign. This crisis follows, in whole or in part, from modern secularizing thought, which culminates in the philosophy of Hegel. In Hegel's philosophy the modern attempt to conquer nature is radicalized and revealed for what it is — a misguided effort to abolish the difference between man and God.

In considering Hegel, Darby is guided by Nietzsche and Heidegger, who recognized and struggled with the problem posed by what Hegel called the death of God, and by Alexandre Kojève, who accepts the death of God with apparent equanimity. According to Kojève, who Darby takes as *the* modern spokesman for Hegel, modern life represents — in principle or in fact — the end of history and the circular culmination of human striving. Still, modern life for Kojève is not without its difficulties and absurdities. For the end of history is, paradoxically, the end of humanity, whose essence lies in striving and negativity. The universal satisfaction made possible by the homogeneous modern state and by modern technology eliminates the creative or dialectical tension on which human freedom depends. If man is a radically historical being, if he makes and remakes himself and his world in order to attain satisfaction, then in attaining satisfaction he completes himself, and, paradoxically, ceases to be.

The result, for Kojève, of the completed cycle of history is, as Darby notes, either the reanimalization of man (something like Nietzsche's last man, who says he is happy and blinks), or a culture of gratuitous "snobbism," a formal and so to speak meaningless assertion of difference, not as part of the process of history and the quest for satisfaction, but for its own sake.

Professor Darby accepts Kojève's description of our world as accurate, without accepting all the claims Kojève makes on behalf of that description. Instead, Darby treats Kojève's claim that Hegel's science is true, that we are satisfied, and that history is in all important respects over, as itself a symptom of the modern sickness, and indeed a symptom that points beyond itself to a possible cure or at least a more adequate image of health. Thus, in discussing Kojève's curious notion of snobbism, Darby departs from the letter and spirit of Kojève by associating snobbism with the Greek *aidos* or shame, and thus with religious reverence and piety. The culture of absurdity, of the gratuitous gesture, to which much of modern society seems reduced, appears for Professor Darby to hide in its folds traces of the mythic awe that held together

pre-philosophic cultures like that of Homer. Kojève, the insistent atheist, proves unconsciously at least to be something of a pagan believer.

The theme of religion manqué is an important one for Darby, witnessed, for example, by his discussion of Hegel's attempted supersession of Christ. Hegel must resort to "magic", and one not of the whitest sort, according to Darby, conducted in a realm of pure ether, following a descent into hell, undertaken to overcome the dismemberment of the human spirit. Darby does not so much aim at refuting Hegel as at showing that Hegel's innermost principles are a reversal and perversion of Christianity and a so to speak satanic denial of the transcendent.

Along these lines, Darby suggests that: 1) the alleged worldly syntheses, by the Hegelian system, of action and thought, time and eternity, Napoleon and Hegel, remain unachieved and unachievable; and 2) that the level at which these syntheses are spuriously achieved — the ether that is the realm of Hegel's science — betokens the depersonalized, cyberneticized world system in which we find ourselves increasingly enthralled.

To these criticisms several responses might be made. Beginning with the second, more practical charge, it is striking how closely Darby's accusation of depersonalization and even sorcery in Hegel resembles Marx and Engel's charge in the *Communist Manifesto* that capitalism threatens to turn men into the tools and slaves of their own products. At any rate, it may be useful to remember the fear of man's enslavement to the system he has created is not a new one and that Hegel himself takes it into account. Professor Darby cites a rather menacing phrase from the *Phenomenology*, to the effect that science requires individual self-consciousness to rise, and thus implicitly that it is science and not individuals that truly possesses self-consciousness. But this phrase is taken somewhat out of context and is for Hegel only a partial account of the truth. If science requires individual self-consciousness to rise, so, Hegel goes on to say, the individual "has the right to demand that science . . . show him that he has in himself the ground to stand on." This right, says Hegel, "rests on the individual's absolute independence . . . for in every phase of knowledge, whether science recognizes it or not, his right as an individual is the absolute and final form . . .".[1]

Hegel's system, then, aims not at depersonalization but at a synthesis of science and person that for the first time gives the individual his due and fully satisfies his rights. The individual's assertion of his rights is, as Hegel puts it elsewhere, the central pivot of history.[2] To state matters another way, Darby does not seem to take adequately into account the benefits by way of individual satisfaction which accrue from the modern conquest of nature, benefits without which the power and attraction of the modern project seems inexplicable. The modern effort to "better man's estate," in Bacon's phrase, stems not only from demonic hubris but also, arguably, from charity.[3] To

renounce the modern project too immoderately and unqualifiedly is in our time not without political risk.

It is clear, however that in Professor Darby's eyes the Hegelian synthesis and the satisfaction it claims to install are spurious; and this leads us back to Darby's first, more theoretical criticism of Hegel's secularizing project.

Darby accepts Hegel's or Kojève's claim that man exists in a state of tension, but he rejects their claim that this tension is merely human. For Darby, as for Eric Voegelin, the tension that defines humanity is a tension toward the "divine ground." For Darby, God is dead, not, as for Kojève, because we recognize God as a human artifact and projection, but because we have lost sight of God. According to Darby, following Voegelin, the fundamental human experience is that of the difference between world, man and God, an experience Voegelin calls *metaxy* or in-betweeness. Hegel's attempt to eliminate the tension between man and God abolishes man, not (it is charged) by completing and satisfying him, but by obliterating his access to transcendence.

What might Kojève say in response? According to Kojève all theological discourse, all human reference to God, is ultimately self-contradictory; for it claims access to that which is by definition inaccessible. Voegelin seems to grant as much when he admits in *Anamnesis* that taken literally, the concept of temporal man experiencing eternal being is "unintelligible." And yet, Voegelin goes on to say, neither the temporal being of man nor his experience of divine being can be doubted.[4] But why can't it be doubted? One wonders whether Voegelin's *metaxy*, which he describes as a loving and hopeful urge toward the divine and as a call and an irruption of grace, does not in the last analysis depend on a religious and even a specifically Christian faith.

Returning from this excursus into the Voegelinean legacy, one is compelled to question whether the best responses to the modern predicament are, as Professor Darby suggests, a Nietzschean assertion of will or a leap of faith.

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Notes

1. Hegel, *Phenomenology,* Baillie trans., p. 87.
2. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* Knox trans., p. 84.
3. On the relation between the modern technological imperative and Christian charity see for example George Grant, *Technology and Empire: Perspectives on North America,* Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969, pp. 17-36.
4. Eric Voegelin, *Anamnesis,* Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978, pp. 125-6.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. V, No. 3 (Fall, 1981).

LIFE AGAINST HISTORY

Arthur Kroker

In his remarkable *oeuvre*, "The Discourse on Language", Michel Foucault has this to say of Hyppolite's decentering of the Hegelian legacy:

> But truly to escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach ourselves from him. It assumes we are aware of the extent to which Hegel, insiduously perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge of that which permits us to think against Hegel, of that which remains Hegelian. We have to determine the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands motionless, waiting for us.[1]

I wish that I could say truly of Professor Darby's rendering of Kojève's Hegel what Foucault has said of Hyppolite's Hegel — that he took the trouble to make of the Hegelian system an experiment "... in which philosophy took the ultimate risk".[2] But, after Kojève, and after Darby's encounter with Kojève, the Hegelian discourse on History, on the incarceration of life itself within the abstract monism of Consciousness, remains intact. Professor Darby encounters the Hegelian legacy, only to confirm that nihilism itself is an unhappy retreat into the discursive powers of monolithic history. Marx is forgotten, and Nietzsche is transformed into Hegel's truth-sayer. Such, at least, will be the substance of the following remarks.

I

Not unmindful of the eloquent disputation between Professors Strauss and Kojève concerning the nature of classical virtue and tyranny, "Kojève's Hegel" is the author of a *Phenomenology of Spirit* which inscribes in History the struggle between the passion for recognition and moral virtue. In the vernacular of Professor Grant, Kojève's Hegel is the architect of the "universal and homogenous state", the memory in advance of Heidegger's dirge over the "completion of philosophy" in the universe of techné.[3]

This classical contestation of positions, the quarrel between ancient and modern visions of philosophy, is made all the more enigmatic by Professor Darby's rendering of the significance of the New World. The "evening-land"

of the post-historical is, in the eloquence of Kojève's phrase, the "non-time" between the crucifixion and the resurrection, between the "slaughter-bench" of Good Friday and the new morning of Easter Sunday. Professor Darby's analytic on the post-historical is, at first, not simply an exegesis of Kojève's Hegel, but a reaching back beyond Kojève to the unresolved paradox of Kojève's predecessor — Alexander Koyré. In Darby's reading of Kojève's interpretation of Koyré's discourse on the *Phenomenology*, there is a recovery of the "time-eternity" problematic. Thus, we are confronted with an exegesis three times removed from the original text. The analysis represents a threefold mediation of the meaning of Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, of the nature of absolute knowledge, and of the siting in Hegel of the realized state. A mediated philosophical discourse (a discourse which might also have involved the writings of Hyppolite, Marx, Croce, Lukacs, the British Hegelians) is not invalid by reason of its mediation. But this discourse is, at first, relative to a prior screening of the Concept, the Idea, through a theory of archetypes, tending to androgyny, which results now, perhaps in sympathy with an unannounced linkage of Kojève and Jung, in a version of Zen Hegelianism.

This interpretation of the Hegelian legacy has the advantage of attempting a rereading, in mythic terms, of the Hegelian legacy. In Sartre's sense, Professor Darby seeks a totalization of the human predicament, but one which fixates on the classic tensions of body-psyche, calculation-contemplation and imagination-corporealization. All of this for the necessary task of recognizing the horizon of nihilism which fringes the "non-time" of the modern era. One deficiency, however, of this mythic declaration on the Hegelian legacy is that the manuscript avoids a specific interrogation of Hegel's political thought. The analysis is thus marked by three absences: (1) Hegel's own ambivalence as expressed in *The Philosophy of History* concerning the "end of history" thesis, and the sense in which the change of the historical artifact would reopen the deployment of rational necessity; (2) an analysis of the relations of the categories of lordship-bondage as already reified categories which acquire their historical and philosophical signification with respect to labour; and (3) a specific discussion of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*: of the formation of juridical personality; the translation of *desire* into a natural, then a social world; the development of the state as an inscription of rational necessity; and the ultimate embourgeoisement of the individual ego, through property-interests, through labour.

Ultimately, this interpretation of the Hegelian legacy is incomplete to the extent that it abandons the political and epistemological contributions of Hegel. The Hegelian legacy is presented, instead, as simply philosophy of time. This is not, therefore, analysis of the problem of rational autonomy — the tension between Kantian rationalism and the dark side of Romanticism — nor is it a simple condemnation of Hegel as the exponent of the universal and

homogenous state.[4] It is, through Kojève, an analytic on the logos of history and on the *coincidentia oppositorium* between historical praxis and theory, between the ontic and the ontological.

Professor Darby organizes the first two sections of his argument —"Politics, Power and Wisdom", and "From Speculative Magic to Technology" — around a summary statement of Kojève's insights, presented in the *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, concerning the time-eternity problematic in the *Phenomenology*. In the third and concluding section of the analysis — "The New World Described" — Professor Darby begins to interrogate what is most original in Kojève's thought: the cosmic and, indeed, eschatological themes of nihilism and techné in the New World. It is, at this point, in Professor Darby's rendering of Nietzsche's pronouncements on "historical culture" that I would take exception with the analysis, and suggest that Nietzsche might be read more accurately as a "radical decentering" of "Hegel's theology made philosophy". I would argue that the categories of nihilism are, in fact, the categories of reason and rational necessity, that the fate of the post-historical is that madness now operates under the sign of the Concept. And, I would say after Nietzsche that the problematical feature of the "New World", of the fate of man in the age of the post-historical, is the dramatic struggle which now ensues between the *totality of History* and the indeterminacy of *Life*. Nietzsche, a philosopher of Life, understood that the danger of the universal and homogeneous state was its absolutist inscription of the seamless and undifferentiated sign of History on the body, on desire, on knowledge. Historical consciousness arraigns differentiated desire. History incarcerates the body. The "immediate, abstract ego" is objectified as self-consciousness reflecting upon itself and then mobilized into the circularity of Wisdom, of the State. Before the tension of the body and psyche, of imagination formalized and the "calculative rationality" of the consuming body — before, that is, the epochal insights of de Sade on desiring and Adorno on aesthetics — there is a prior reification. Hegel announces the recovery of History, and in this announcement there is already present the incarceration of life, of sensuality. Is not the metastasis of Napolon-Hegel the death-note of philosophy. And is not the unwinding into the future of the dialectical opposition which constitutes the Hegelian legacy — between Being and Time, between the finite and Infinite — a *forced* tension.[2] This is a tension which, while experienced as the inscription of History on Life, now operates in forgetfulness of life. I would argue that Professor Darby has obscured Nietzsche's *decentering* of Hegel, although he has eloquently posed, in Heidegger's terms the agony of the twilight of the in-between of World and Earth. In "The Use and Abuse of History", Nietzsche is not Hegel's adjunct, but his critic. His injunction in *Ecce Homo* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is not, in forgetfulness, to speak to the *Zerrisenheit*, the alienation, of the

modern, by returning us to the sign of the Concept; rather, his injunction would be — if Nietzsche is taken seriously in his notation that Hegel "ought to have said that everything after him was merely to be regarded as the musical code of the great historical rondo" — that we might better substitute for the critique of the history of the concept, the criticism of the Concept of History.

II

Professor Darby argues on behalf of Kojève that his is a discourse important not only for its exegesis of Hegel and for its instruction of Sartre, Lacan and Merleau-Ponty, but also as a distinctive contribution to a philosophical understanding of politics and technology.

Certainly, Kojève's perspective on power, wisdom, dialectical opposition and the problem of time is not unorthodox. With and beyond Koyré, Kojève describes the essence of the *Phenomenology* to be a philosophy of time, and he notes that a philosophy of time, of history, is not possible unless time were to be ended. The philosophy of history is immanent in the moment of rational necessity. The revelation of the truth of the Concept will only occur with the coming of the dusk, with the movement in Hegel's *The Philosophy of History* "of the Sun from the One of the East to the Many of the West". As Professor Darby notes, the dialectic is resolved, in Kojève's terms, with the appearance of the dyad —Napoleon-Hegel— with, that is, the tense reconciliation of power and wisdom, praxis and theory, State and System. From the imagery of Napoleon-Hegel there thus emerges a philosophy of history conceived as a totality, without irruption, without fissure, without differentiation.

However, in Professor Darby's summation of Kojève's interpretation of History as time, there is a sustained silence on two problems: (1) the problem of Universal Recognition as giving rise to the will to technology; and (2) the flattening of the horizon of ontology and history under the "weight" of an interpretation of the philosophy of history which does not speak to the problem of rational autonomy or to the problem of power in Hegel's thought.

Additionally, there is one significant difference between Kojève and Darby. Kojève in his protocol on the Master-Slave relationship, in his summation, with Hegel, of History beginning with the flight from Universal Recognition, did not abandon Hegel's insight that History is not only time, but that Work is time. Work is *Bildung* in the "double sense" of transforming the world and in transforming man.[6] For Kojève, it is Work, this overcoming of the "existential impasse" of Mastery, which allows the Slave to overcome the initial advantage of the Master. While the Master was determined "to risk his life for a non-vital, non-biological need", the Slave realizes his freedom with the recognition of "Work as Time". Unlike Kojève, Professor Darby's "cybernetized" Hegelianism abandons the transformational category of work; his analysis

suppresses Kojève's understanding of the critique of labour. And in doing so Darby abandons the insight of both Hegel and Marx that "the enslavement of the bourgeois world, its central phenomenon, is not the enslavement of the working man, of the poor bourgeois, by the rich bourgeois, but the enslavement of *both* by Capital".[7] In absenting from his analytic the notion of work as time, the beginning really of capitalist anthropology, Professor Darby remains silent on the possibility that the "dyad, formed by Napoleon and Hegel — this "Perfect Man", this completion of Christian theology in Enlightenment — may be overcome in actual history by the "third person" of Marx. The "non-time" of the post-historical may, indeed, be the "bourgeois world in which there are no Masters". Kojève ends the *Introduction* by noting:

> To say that there is Totality, or Mediation, or dialectical Overcoming, is to say that in addition to given-Being, there is also *creative* Action which ends in a *Product*.[8]

If the Hegelian dialectic is, as Kojève argues, "not a method of research or of philosophical exposition, but the adequate description of the structure of *Being*",[9] then the more adequate rereading of the discourse of Work as time, the discourse of the rise of the commodity form, is that of Marx. Is it not the logico-ontology of the "Hegelian-Marxist end of history" which haunts a purely eschatological reading on the non-time of the post-historical?

Finally, Professor Darby is most eloquent in his utterances on the meaning of the post-historical. However, his reflections, however ironic, on Kojève's archetypes of "reanimalization" — the eternal present of Sino-American existence and the nihilism of a "Japanized" form of life — begin a project which is not completed in the paper: the thematisation of nihilism, politics and technology. The devolution represented by Kojève's archetypes, this "playing backwards" of the Master-Slave dialectic, should really begin an exploration of nihilism in twentieth-century experience. Kojève's archetypes — pure nobility and baseness, the tensions of pure psyche expressed in reanimalization and "Japanized nihilism" — are for Kojève, as for Darby, the planetary dialectic. But Darby avoids an encounter with the nihilistic experience by withdrawing to the privileged position of the Concept. The drama of history — the actual deployment of politics and technology — is placed for security under the sign of the Concept; under, that is, the announcement that the end of history appears now in the form of the sovereignty of "absolute knowledge". Ultimately, Professor Darby might well have begun his interpretation of Kojève with an explanation of the active nihilist. And he might have initiated a more substantial inquiry into the nature of nihilism by asking: What is the relation of the continuous discourse of

History to the formation of *Zerrisenheit,* to life itself? And, is the reduction of the human to the tension of *metaxy* — to the still-life of the in-between — representative of a mode of thought which forgets Nietzsche's injunction against the death of god? After Nietzsche, we are not abandoned to an empty descent of the infinite and the ascent of the finite. We are confronted, instead, with an elemental choice between barbarism and humanism. In Nietzsche's utterance, the sages of a philosophy of the Concept, of History in its monumental sense as totality, are also the theologians of the new age. They are the auditors of a nihilism without hope, and without saving grace. And so, I conclude with Nietzsche's cry:

Do you understand
Dionysus or Christ?

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Notes

1. Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Harper and Row, New York, 1976, p. 235.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
3. George Grant, *Technology and Empire*,
4. Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1975, p. 541.
5. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thoughts Out of Season*, New York, Russell & Russell, Inc., 1964, p. 71.
6. Alexander Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,* (edited by Allan Bloom), Basic Books, New York, 1969, p. 52.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
8. *Op. Cit.*, p. 259.
9. *Op. Cit.*, p. 259.
10. Friedrich Nietzsche,

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de theorie politique et sociale, Vol. V, No. 3 (Fall, 1981).

PHENOMENOLOGY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Barry Cooper

Hwa Jol Jung, *The Crisis of Political Understanding: A Phenomenological* Perspective on the Conduct of Political Inquiry, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979, pp. xvii, 256.

In the opening pages of his book, Hwa Jol Jung states: "the present study is, I believe, the first systematic treatise on phenomenology in political inquiry or the phenomenological philosophy of political science which hopes to introduce phenomenology to those political scientists who wish to be self-conscious of what they are doing" (p. xiv). So far as the argument of the book goes, it may serve as an introduction to a phenomenological politcal science.[1] Whether the author's hope that it satisfies a desire for self consciousness is fulfilled, we shall have to enquire further. The aim of the book is limited: "it covers primarily one aspect of, or is a prolegomenon to, the phenomenological critique of politics as a new way of thinking" (p. xv). Likewise the modest conclusion: "the present study is a pathfinding effort in a small measure to impress this message on the conduct of political inquiry, which must be continued in any future comprehensive work on the *phenomenological critique of politics"* (p. 175). It is not simply a prelude to, or promise of, greater things, however. The title reminds readers of Edmund Husserl's *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,* delivered as a series of lectures in 1935 and first published in 1953. Like Husserl, Jung observed a crisis; his own work "is a phenomenolgical respose to the crisis of political understanding today" (p. 3). It is, then, one of a number of responses, to be ranked with those of Germino, Spragens, Bauman, Gunnell, Tinder, Blum, and many others.[2] But again like Husserl, Jung did not see phenomenology as merely one choice among several. Like most phenomenologists, he declared his approach to be "a revoluntionary or a new paradigm in man's understanding of himself as both knower and actor in the world" (p. xiii), but more importantly, it is the one "capable of synthesizing philosophy and science, fact and value, and knowledge and action. In other words, phenomenology claims to be a *complete philosophy of man and of social reality.* It is capable of synthesizing *theoria* and *praxis,* the tension of which has been the twilight zone of Western political theorizing since its inception in ancient Greece" (p. 174). In a similar mood, Husserl saw his own work as an apodictic beginning *(Anfang)* that would complete the primordial foundation *(Urstiftung)* of Greek philosophy. We shall consider shortly the meaning of this far from modest claim.

"Qu'est-ce que la phénoménologie?" Brunschvicg once upon a time asked his pupil and young colleague Merleau-Ponty. "Il peut paraître étrange,"

Merleau-Ponty replied, in the famous prefatory essay to this thesis, "qu'on ait encore à poser cette question un demi-siècle après les premiers travaux de Husserl."[3] Yet is is also perhaps not so odd. Certainly, it has become nearly obligatory for every phenomenologist to provide his own answer. In Jung's index, for example, there are eighteen entries of the type "phenomenology as... " One may well conclude there are almost as many phenomenologies as phenomenologists, and that Jung's telltale "as" indicates that he, like the rest of them, has great difficulty in saying what he is doing. This would not be an entirely unsound conclusion. Indeed, phenomenology would support it, though characteristically for its own reasons. In the first place, phenomenology is a logos, a descriptive account, of phenomena, of what appear. Now, the things that appear must appear to somebody. That is, one cannot account for phenomena, or more generally, for meanings, without also accounting for the consciousness that experiences the phenomena / meanings that way, namely as apparently meaningful. In order to undertake this kind of writing, phenomenologists have developed their own colourful idiom. Unless one reads rather a lot of it, the metaphors and unusual words can be baffling. Jung has clearly mastered the language, and writes with great confidence about various turns, elements, textures, correlates, transcendences, dialectics, disclosures, conditions, mediations, institutions, constitutions, horizons, embodiments, integrations, quiddities, interfusions, autopsies, topographies, and sedimentations. The purpose of such language should not be misconstrued: there is no attempt to hide emptiness behind a cloud of images, Rather, the language strives to express the lived and concrete immediacy of experience - and fails for the perfectly obvious reason that the expression of experience in a language that tries to account for itself is also the mediation of experience by language.

Yet, this very failure to be clear and distinct alerts one to what a phenomenologist is trying to do, namely express the actual participation of consciousness in a reality experienced. Because meanings cannot be said to appear in the absence of a consciousness for which they are meaningful, this personal element can never be expunged. Accordingly, phenomenologists often feel compelled to make a personal, and generally obscure, statement about what phenomenology "is," that is, what it is to that particular person. This is not a flaw. As Merleau-Ponty wrote, "l'inachèvement de la phénoménologie et son allure inchoative ne sont pas le sign d'un échec, ils etaient inévitables parce que la phénoménologie a pour tâche de révéler le mystère du monde et le mystère de la raison."[4] Because human consciousness is a participation in reality experienced, no final interpretation can be given. This is true also for political theory. Accordingly, "political theory, like any theory, is an effort to discover an intimate connection between meaning and existence" (p. 17). Here one finds stated another commonplace among phenomenologists, namely: theoretical or scientific endeavours reveal one's commitments. A commitment is neither a conscious or subjective intention nor a deeper or hidden motivation. Rather, it is the expression of one's understanding of the world; it is an ontological not a psychological term. To be committed to a theoretical or scientific understanding of politics is to confront oneself and others in an ongoing dialogue. One must

listen attentively if one is to hear; one must do more than look if one is to see. No doubt. But how?

In the seeming innocence of that one question lies the whole difficulty of understanding what phenomenology entails. To begin with, for phenomenology there exists no external meaning that methodical or systematic procedures could uncover. The very requirement of attention and commitment means that one cannot formulate an exhaustive set of rules the assiduous application of which would bring to light the meaning of it all. On the contrary, for phenomenology, meanings exist only insofar as they are experienced by a specific and concrete consciousness with an equally specific and concrete attitude. To hold to the opinion that there exists a world "out there" whose meaning is clear and distinct or could be made that way by following an explicit rule of procedure, was named by Husserl the "natural attitude."

He described it as follows: "I find continually present and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which I myself belong, as do all other men found in it and related in the same way to it. This 'fact-world,' as the word already tells us, I find to be *out there,* and also *take it just as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there.*" One may doubt this or that aspect of it; one may reject part of it, but that in no way means one has given up the general thesis: " 'The' world as fact-world is always there; at the most it is at odd points 'other' than I supposed; this or that under such names as 'illusion,' 'hallucination,' and the like, must be struck *out of it*, so to speak; but the 'it' remains ever, in the sense of a general thesis, a world that has its being out there."[5] Within the context of our ordinary everyday attitude, Husserl was saying, there are some things that simply are not questionable. We do not question that there is a world and that it is accessible to everybody. It is real. It is essentially the same for all sane people. It is essentially the same at all times. It is typical. Whatever is unknown about the world is continuously related to what is known: in principle, what is to be discovered is more of the same world.

Sometimes, however, even the most ordinary experience is transfigured. A bureaucrat may wonder why there is government at all; a teacher may realize she has something important to say but cannot; one may wake up one fine morning to realize that one has turned twenty-five or even fifty! In short, from time to time, the ordinariness of the world may be shattered. No longer familiar, it becomes uncanny, sour, decomposed, or very strange. For Husserl, these are precious glimpses of the problematic of worldliness. They let us know that things could be different; more than that, that *everything* could be different. In short, the meaning of the world is inseparable from our believing in it. The natural attitude, therefore, expresses a particular (and, to the phenomenologist, problematic) unity of belief and what is believed in. It follows that *the* task of phenomenology is to overcome the commonsense ordinary way we live our daily lives, and make of it a topic for theoretical scrutiny. In this way, with the existence of the world problematic - or, as Husserl said, when its existence is placed within brackets - the essential structures of the world may appear to a consciousness whose attitude is "theoretical" rather than natural, ordinary, or everyday. One cannot, for example, simply enjoy the pleasures of life or suffer its

disappointments and at the same time be self-consciously aware *that* this is happening. Likewise, one cannot think about what the pleasures or disappointments of life mean at the same time as they are happening to oneself. To make the natural attitude a topic of reflection, then, means that one no longer shares it. The description of the experience and its relation to the account of it constitute the pith and substance of phenomenological analysis.

It follows that, whatever meaning appears, appears first to "me" and not to "us." The phenomenological voice is solo not choral. But it is not for that reason arbitrary or irrational inasmuch as *all* verification involves a consciousness that sees and understands for itself. Of the several implications that may be drawn from this observation, possibly the most important is that meanings are dynamic. Like a traveller whose passage through a landscape alters its aspect, the commitments of consciousness to the world change the world. In its simplest terms this means no more than that consciousness is historical and so, therefore, is the world whose meaning it seeks to understand. But again, this does not imply any kind of historical relativism but rather the awareness of theorizing as a continual interrogation, a continual self-questioning.

Subtending both the naive and immediate experience of the world in the natural attitude and the theoretical interpretation of it, is what Husserl called the life-world *(Lebenswelt)*, what Alfred Schutz termed "social reality." Such terms refer to the ultimate horizon of meaning within which co-exist several "sub-worlds" of work, of theory, of play, of madness, and so on. These are "provinces" of meaning divided from each other and from participating conscious human beings by space and time, proximity and distance. That is, social reality is multi-dimensional, heterogeneous, and internally articulated. Phenomenology, then, contradicts the belief, still widespread if not triumphant, that self-understanding is most truly found by way of mathematical or quasi-mathematical formalism, which is called by its exponents, "objectivity." When one turns from a concern with the reality of a conscious subject to the formal constructions of one's mathematical imagination, a two-fold absence is imposed. First, experienced reality is transmogrified into the opaque irrationality whose operations are completely unintelligible; second, the logic of calculative reason, which is crystal clear to itself, finds itself helpless to express the subtle, the ambiguous, the historically weighted, connotative meanings of life that give it, precisely, typicality and continuity.

These general remarks on phenomenological philosophy, which are in no way original, suggest the context of Jung's argument in the volume under discussion. Given the current configuration of commitments by political scientists to quasi-mathematical approaches to political reality, the initial task of a phenomenological political science is to bring to light the meaning of those commitments and thereby their limitations. And so, for example, Jung criticizes the notion of "political development," a widely favoured conceptual approach to comparative politics: "In the familiar terminology of modernization, the scientific, technological, and industrial civilization of the West is superior to the nonscientific, nontechnological, and nonindustrial culture of the non-Western world. Although it is an ideological phantom, the 'third world' is more than a

numerical designation: it is indeed a moral ordering" (p. 81). Even if the non-Western world is rapidly losing its heterogeneous moral order, it once expressed an autonomous meaning, which could not have been reduced to an obstacle to modernization without violating the integrity of that order. Of course such violations have taken place. How else could one describe the last century of Western imperialism? Any chatter about the "modernization" of Africa or China that ignores the systematic application of bureaucractic violence directly by the West or inspired by Western examples, is simply an alibi and bad political science.

More broadly, a phenomenological critique of behaviouralism, that successful protest movement which, for a generation now, has performed a rich and comic repertoire, brings to light the limitation of reducing the projective meaning of activity to its external manifestation, to its expression, to an event the significance of which must be imposed by one's conceptual framework. In short, for a behavouralist, political action becomes passive, its meaning the result of the investigator's activity. Construing science as method, the behaviouralist misunderstands his own intervention as merely following rules. That is, he understands himself also as passive, and not as an interventionist at all. But this means the investigator is unable to account for his own actions. The two points are obviously bound together: the behavouralist method is plausible only because the behavouralist ignores political action in order to attend to the rules by which behaviour may be observed. Accordingly, the behavouralist must violate the completely commonsensical assumption that "epistemology presupposes ontology. In the context of this work, this means that a critique of political knowledge presupposes a phenomenological ontology of man. In other words, *how to know* human action must be based on *what human actions is*" (p. 59). Granted, then, that the behaviouralist is reluctant to recognize himself as a knowing subject in the life-word, the better to conceive himself as an epistemological subject in the conceptual world of (his) science, a phenomenological criticism also insists that this reluctance is not innocent. There is more than an external similarity between the bureaucratic political practitioner, who merely follows rules, and his scientific counterpart. Both share identical commitments to a regular, smoothly functioning and predictable cultural order that truly behaves itself. Behavouralism is, so to speak, the spiritual aroma of bureaucratic regularity, an ideological dream where the administration of things (perhaps guided by properly stratified random sample surveys) actually does replace the governance of men.

Special attention is devoted to cybernetics, "the apex of political behaviouralism as scientific epistemology" (p. 109). With cybernetics the neutered behaviouralist becomes self-conscious. Here he actually is what he always has potentially been, an activist technician. Shorn of its touching but juvenile faith in liberal decency, "the cybernetic model of man is the culmination of technological rationality" (p. 110). Again, a phenomenological criticism must consider both the pragmatic and the theoretical aspects. "*Through* technology the annihilation of man in the atomic age is already an external possibility. *As* technology the cybernetic model of man is an internal threat to the being of

man" (p. 111). Atomic or other poisoning, as is well known, could have the practical consequence of ending human life on the planet. Theoretically, a thoroughly cybernetic self-understanding of existence would endow human life with an artificial, unhuman, and indeed unnatural meaning. The most obvious appearance of nature for human beings is through one's body; accordingly, the most obvious neglect of cybernetics is the embodiment of cognitive intelligence, to say nothing of emotions, gestures, feelings and excellences. When intelligence is reduced to the binary logic of an electrical switch, all ambiguity vanishes, all action and performance ends, all interpretation is superfluous. Or rather, the cyberneticist claims these things. The claim, however, is fraudulent not least because it is based upon the untenable assumption that externally imposed critieria, not experienced realities, constitute meaning.[6] But since any political community, however organized, is a community of embodied subjects, "the obection raised here is based not on the human pride of superiority but on the way in which man in his embodiment thinks and behaves qualitatively *differently* from any other organism or any mechanism whatsoever" (p. 121).

Behaviouralism and the quasi-mathematical vision of political reality is not the sole alternative to a phenomenological political science. In particular, Jung discussed the theories of C.B. Macpherson and Leo Strauss. The writings of both Macpherson and Strauss show that their admiration for behavioural political science is firmly under control. Nevertheless a phenomenological reading of their works may bring to light certain limits that otherwise may not be apparent.

According to Jung, Macpherson's political theory may be described as "sociologistic Marxism." Now Marxism and phenomenology have had a productive association, especially in France, for the last forty years or so. Macpherson's approach was, therefore, accorded its due phenomenological applause. Its chief glory is its great power to unmask ideologies, especially the liberalism of Hobbes and Locke, which Macpherson accurately described as "possessive individualism." Their liberalism, Macpherson argued, reflected the nascent and then more mature market societies of their own times so that, to the extent that this attitude and the assumptions that sustain it persist into the present, camouflaged as giveness or neutrality, it is an ideology of the status quo and imperfectly expresses the changed significance of contemporary public life. Jung pays his respects to Macpherson's approach, but argues that unmasking ideologies is not enough. Sociologistic Marxism is "inadequate to replace possessive individualism with a new ontology the endeavour of which must necessarily be normative and projective" (p. 13). By conceiving theory "solely as a critique of ideology or the reduction of theory to a sociologistic orientation," Macpherson thereby "undermines the normative construction of his own democratic ontology for the purpose of filling the 'essence of man' beyond the postulates of possessive individualism both now and in the future" (pp. 132-3). That is, if theorizing is chiefly dependent upon socio-economic changes, any genuinely creative theorizing would be impossible, insofar as it would be limited to the conditions or contingencies of its own genesis. "In order to change the world, we must first change the very thought of the world: the demand to transform the world by doing involves first the transformation of it by thinking"

(p. 143). Macpherson's theory, by this account, seems to make the thinker not a participant and so not involved in the same world that he "thinks." Whether this criticism of Macpherson's work is valid may at least be doubted: certainly it strikes one as odd to have Macpherson's theory criticized for not seeking to transform the world. One would have thought that was either one of its great strengths or its most grievous fault.

The second general shortcoming of Macpherson's approach seems to be at variance with the first in that Jung argues that Macpherson is, in fact, compelled to rely on, and so become part of, a movement that does indeed change the world, and change it for the worse, namely technology. Beginning with his study of Hobbes, it is argued, Macpherson systematically underestimates the importance of technology and scientism by treating it "as a surface structure or superstructure - if not a false consciousness or an epiphenomenon - of the market society" (p. 135). Macpherson is not simply in error, of course, but rather, "what he says of technology is inadequate in its depth and scope, that is his view of technology as merely instrumental to the ontology of man is deficient to understand fully the all-inclusive nature of the techological rationality of our time" (p. 136). Consequently, Macpherson's advocacy of the development of all human faculties to the greatest possible extent "is now inseparable from the anti-humanistic tendencies of technocentric culture" (p. 139). The reason for Macpherson's blindness, Jung remarks in a short demythologizing exercise of his own, is that, like most Marxists, Macpherson has been focally concerned with the relations among human beings, and not with the relations between human beings and nature. He does not view Marx as a *penseur de la technique,* and so does not see the anti-humanist core of technology for what it truly is.[8] Accordingly, a humanism "that ignores the antihumanistic tendencies of technocratic rationality cannot be fully humanistic" (p. 144).

It is clear that Jung respects Leo Strauss. But it is even clearer that he has grave reservations about Strauss's political science. Jung deals hardly at all with Strauss's major works, namely his careful reading of ancient Greek texts. His commentaries on, and interpretations of, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Thucydides, formed the heart of his mature reflections, and constituted the most important salvo in what he, at least, considered a still existent war between ancients and moderns. To fail or refuse to deal with Strauss on his own terms is certainly to violate Strauss's cardinal interpretative principle, to try to understand an author the way he understood himself. It also violates the first principle of a phenomenolgoical hermeneutic, namely that an interpreter must believe with the believer, must imaginatively recapitulate the believer's experience within his own critically aware consciousness. This is expecially important when the topic at issue is historicism, the opinion, or rather, "the assertion that the fundamental distinction between philosophic and historical questions cannot in the last analysis be maintained."[9] Two legitimate options seem to be open to any critic of Strauss's views. First, one could argue that his definition of historicism was inadequate. Jung, however accepted it. Indeed, he quoted with evident approval (p. 271) the judgement of Emil Fackenheim that Strauss's definition of historicism was "classical."[10] Secondly,

one could argue that, in fact, it *is* impossbile in the last analysis to maintain the fundamental distinction between philosophical and historical questions. That is, one could argue that the distinction is not, in truth fundamental. Jung did not do this.

What Jung does do is argue that his own assumptions are not those of Strauss, which can hardly be in doubt. He does so, moreover, in a deplorably inelegant way. To begin with, he labels Strauss's "position" as "essentialism" or "ontological objectivism." By this he means "the version of 'human nature' which is predetermined, unchanging, and universal" (P. 147). According to Jung, "Strauss defines the nature of man as ahistorical and immutable;... 'human nature' is a fixed, determinate, and finished essence subject to no historical vicissitudes and vectors whose eternity alone certifies knowledge or 'truth'" (pp. 166-7). In contrast, Jung affirms that, "contrary to the traditional view of 'human nature,' (the human being) has no fixed and predetermined properties like a thing: indeed he is *becoming* - not a being that is *always to be*" (p. 29). As so often seems to occur when criticism of this sort are hurled about, textual citations are rare.[11] The reason is not that a critic is moved by a charitable desire not to embarass, but that he encounters large, perhaps insuperable, difficulties in trying to show how intelligent and subtle minds appear to hold imbecilic opinions. One knows, for example, of no writing, certainly not by Strauss and probably not even by a behaviouralist, that maintain that human beings are things.

Jung's second argument appears at first sight closer to the mark, though it contradicts the first. After making the point that what was at issue between them is a "fundamental constitutional or ontological difference," Jung declares that his own phenomenological ontology "is an affirmation of the open future in the passage of time, whereas essentialism is a fidelity to the past" (p. 148). But surely the past belongs to the realm of becoming and is not, therefore, "always." Jung seems to have turned Strauss from a simpleton who thought humans were things into a historicist who found all meaning sedimented in past prior history, and none in the projected future. But when Strauss identified our "oblivion of eternity," our "estrangement from man's deepest desire and therewith from the primary issues" as "the price which modern man had to pay, from the very beginning, for attempting to be absolutely sovereign, to become the master and owner of nature, to conquer chance" — in short, as an important constituent element of historically modern political existence — he was not referring simply to our forgetfulness of Xenophon's political science.[12] Eternity, one would think, is more than a long time or even a long time ago. One need not know what eternity is in order to see that Strauss thought one could learn something about it by assiduously studying those writers for whom the term did not just mean old.

The discussion devoted to Strauss's contention that modern political science is radically different from ancient political science is also skewed. Jung is doubtless correct in his summary that modern political science "attempts to bridge the lacuna between philosophy and the polis by two innovations: (1) the identification of the aim of philosophy with that of the city and (2) the diffusion of philosophical results among the men of the city . . ."(p.154). Jung does not

question the historical accuracy of Strauss's contention, that the dichotomy between ancients and moderns is the overriding configuration of meaning in the entire history of Western political thought. Nor does he question the soundness of Struass's argument concerning the comparative truthfulness of ancient as compared to modern political science. Rather, Jung's criticism flattens into the charge that Strauss misconstrued Husserl. But surely the issue is greater than whether Strauss has seen the degree to which the later Husserl has abandoned the dream of phenomenology as a rigorous science.

His discussion of the relationship of Strauss to Heidegger seems to be skewed in the opposite direction. He rightly emphasizes Strauss 's respect for Heidegger as a thinker, and so as an adversary that Strauss could recognize as his peer. But their conflict was not simply over whether one may "revise" Greek philosophy rather than "preserve" it (p. 149). If one reads *What is Political Philosophy?* as a political[13] as well as a philosophic reply to the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, one may catch a glimpse of what was involved. Strauss was in deadly earnest in a way that today is not easy to imagine: their quarrel was also between Nazi and Jew.

Finally, in Jung's summary of the correspondence between Gadamer and Strauss, he endorses Gadamer's view that interpretation is both reproductive and productive. Strauss, he says, was naive "in not suspecting or examining his own prejudice, that is, [the prejudice that] truth . . . [is] 'unhistorical' " (p.160). Fortunately, the correspondence to which Jung refers has since been published, and those interested in such matters can decide the issue for themselves. [14] It is, however, rather shocking to think that Jung seriously believed that Strauss was naive. One would have thought that precisely the opposite was true, that his political science was "graceful, subtle and colourful." Has Jung learned nothing from Strauss's studies of other "naive" but polite writers?

I shall conclude by placing Jung's argument in a larger context. Contrary to the thrust of his polemic, phenomenology will not overcome the crisis of political understanding, nor will it change the world. These are harsh words. One should, therefore, soften them with the obvious qualification that in many respects Jung has written an excellent book. One refrains from praising its many merits however, because political science is seldom served by agreement and applause. And yet, one must say plainly, this is a useful book. Political scientists can be instructed by its intelligent discussion of temporality, natality, incarnation, language, and so on — all themes that have been prominently discussed in the writings of phenomenologists. It is, therefore, a good introduction. That is a more limited objective than Jung had set for himself, but it is one well met.

Phenomenological language, like any language, expresses and articulates the experiences of participation of consciousness in the life-world, social reality or, simply, reality. By attending to the form of language as well as to its rhetoric and significance, one can imaginatively reconstitute the essential features of reality experienced by an author. In this way one can bring to light the meaning of a text as well as the limitations it has set for itself, the outer edge of its coherence. For readers already familiar with phenomenological styles, Jung has well expressed the myth of nature that constitutes the experiential ground of thoughts that are expressed in phenomenological terms. The language is borrowed from

Heidegger, but the reverential mood, appropriate to express a true myth, was Jung's. "The natural luminescence of Being is cast on beings and unveils their whereabouts. Mortal man, earth, sky, and gods are the elemental *topos* [*sic*] of Being—its fourfold unity." Thinking really is thanking, an act of piety; questioning really is the piety of thinking, "a holy vision on things both natural and cultural" (pp.6-7). And yet, the limits to Jung's discussion may be more narrowly drawn than the topic he has chosen; his words may not express fully the amplitude of piety or acknowledge the full range of human experience. Human being, he maintains in good phenomenological fashion, is being-in-the-world, where world meant society, nature, and technology (pg.19). But where is sky? Where are gods? Where is his account or even acknowledgement of what Ricoeur, an author Jung relies on extensively, calls the wholly other that draws near? Or what Fackenheim, whom he also cites authoritatively, calls the ultimate other, which situates man humanly? [15] For Jung, as for other phenomenologists, most notably Merleau-Ponty, whom Jung cites more often than anyone else, such experiences and their symbolizations fall silently away. One wonders why. Are they imaginary? Do the gods have no relationship at all to the worlds of society, nature, and technology? Jung is silent about these things. All one can say is that Ricoeur and Fackenheim (and several other phenomenologists, many of whom have been published by the same university press as Jung) consider experiences of the divine and their symbolizations important even for the world-immanent themes Jung does discuss. Moreover, his account of the significance of wordly activities seems incomplete. To act, he says, "is to have a project, and to have a project is to choose a goal or purpose" (p. 23). But what of play? We do not reach into the future or think of it in the future perfect tense. Time seems suspended; one hardly thinks at all. Yet surely one *acts*. Indeed, the first common meaning of actor is one who acts in a play. Daniel Bell, whose post-industrial vision of games people play Jung thought worthy enough to mention, can hardly be considered an authority.[16] Neither play nor gods are terms to be found in the index. There seems to be something terribly *serious* about all this worldly humanism.

Myth-dwelling has its own dangers, even when undertaken in the full lucidity of phenomenological consciousness. "Properly understood, caring is letting things be as they are and appreciating their intrinsic value. It is reverential in that it respects the natural way of worldly things. . . . To dwell with care is for man to spare and save worldly things" (p.56). Jung's words are seductive and exquisite, and not a little cunning. But they betray one into softness. Now, it is true, as Aristotle said, that friendship and justice are human realities closely bound to one and another. But who has friends has enemies. Or even if one has no enemies, one's friends may have them. When, therefore, one speaks of friendship within the context of celebrating "the sacrament of planetary coexistence among all beings and things" (p.56), one no longer speaks of friendship, but of something else, soft and warm perhaps, like the ample bosom of mother nature. But friendship exists as much by the hardness of exclusion as it does by accepting others. Justice certainly demands that political science look at hard things as well as soft ones. Justice is often said to be hard, and often it is. That is why it is softened or tempered by mercy or by equity. Jung's attitude is

merciful and equitable, but it must be stiffened by justice.

From what has already been said of his discussion of the behaviourally persuaded and the cybernetic revolutionaries, it is clear that his criticism of the attitudes and work of those practitioners is sound. Yet, behaviouralism and associated movements are not simply mistakes. It is true that they are too hard and "scientific," too precise, brittle, and cold to express adequately the reality of politics. But, if what was said of the myth of nature underlying Jung's phenomenology was accurate, it would appear that his approach is too soft and unscientific, too imprecise, malleable and warm. In short, there exists a dialectic between "scientific," quasi-mathematical behavioural analyses and phenomenology. The issues raised explicitly by Jung as well as the limitations of his argument that I have tried to bring to light lead one into this most general of interpretative questions. No more than a few brief suggestions of what is involved can be made here.[17]

The constituent elements of this final dialectic may be identified as reminiscence and demythologization. On the one side reality is experienced as a genuine appearance of meaning, and on the other it is experienced as a mere show behind, or beyond, or above which the truth lies. With the first approach, endorsed by Jung, interpretation is a recollection of a manifest meaning that is addressed to one personally; with the second, endorsed by the behaviouralists and all their more and less respectable fellow-travellers, the task of interpretation involves purging the psyche of illusions that grow, from the ambiguities of consciousness. Only an unambiguous method, beyond doubt, can be relied upon. Opposed to Jung and his holy vision of things both natural and cultural is the iconoclastic school of suspicion ever alert to unmask the works of guile and mystifications, and committed to bringing lies, ideals, and idols into the clear light of truth where they may be seen for what they are. Between these two strategies it is foolish to choose: to obey or to doubt? One must do both, yet one cannot do both at once, no more than one can be both warm and cool, soft and hard. Yet, self-consciousness, which also seeks self-certainty or self-knowledge, must grasp both moments. It can do so only insofar as they are constituents of a single dialectical process. Phenomenology can open one to truth experienced; science, including behavouralism, at least in principle, can lead one away from illusion. Neither is privileged. One suspects the crisis of political understanding may well be part of political understanding.

Notes

1. The argument itself is divided into 175 pages of text and 43 pages of notes. That is, about a quarter of the book is citation, elaboration, and qualification. An additional 33 pages of bibliography and index reduces further the discursive proportion.

2. These works and the bibliographies they contain form a big collection of responses to a crisis variously identified with positivism, behaviouralism, scientism, historicism, nihilism, and so forth. Most discussants agree with Jung in relating our apparent problems in political science with the agonies of contemporary politics. See Dante Germino, *Beyond Ideology: The Revival of*

Political Theory, New York: Harper and Row, 1967; Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., *The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory: Toward a Postbehavioural Science of Politics*, New York: Dunellen, 1973; Zygmunt Bauman, *Hermeneutics and Social Science*, New York; Columbia University Press, 1978, John G. Gunnell, *Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation*, Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1979, Glen Tinder, *Political Thinking: The Perennial Questions*, 3rd ed., Toronto: Little Brown, 1979; Alan Blum, *Theorizing*, London: Heinemann, 1974.

3. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, Paris: Gallimard, 1945, p.i.

4. *Ibid.*, p.xvi.

5. E. Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, tr. W.R. Boyce Gibson, New York: Collier, 1962, p.106.

6. For an extensive discussion of the question see Hubert Dreyfus, "Why Computers Must Have Bodies in Order to be Intelligent," *The Review of Metaphsics* 21 1967, 13-22 or *idem.*, *What Computers Can't Do*, New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

7. One should add that not all the practical consequences of a cybernetic conception of human activities are either disastrous or potentially so; one does rely on the TTC or the CNR to be integrated systems, resplendent with servomechanisms, feedback loops, input buffer devices, and so forth. One would like to rely on the post office that way too.

8. But compare Macpherson, "Technical Change and Political Decision: An Introduction," *International Social Science Journal* 12 1960, 357-68.

9. Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1969, p.57.

10. See Fackenheim, *Metaphsics and Historicity*, The Aquinas Lecture, 1961, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961, p.61.

11. As authority for his assertion that Strauss "assumed . . . that the unchanging structure of *physics* assures the certainty of objective and universal knowledge of the intelligibility of the good" (p.148) Jung cited an article by Samuel J. Todes and Hubert L. Dreyfus, "The Existentialist Critique of Objectivity," in James M. Edie, Francis H. Parker, and Calvin O. Schrag, eds., *Patterns of the Life-World: Essays in Honor of John Wild*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, pp.346-87. In that article Plato and Kant are named but hardly discussed with anything like the detail necessary to make sense of the meaning of *physics*.

12. *What is Political Philosophy?* p.55.

13. In order to understand Strauss's argument one must see that, for him, political philosophy means both the attempt to replace opinion with knowledge about political things—i.e. that it is part of philosophy dealing with politics—but also that it is politic philosophy, philosophy written in such a way that it is intelligible to the men of the city.

14. Leo Strauss and Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Correspondence concerning *Wahrheit und Methode*," *The Independent Journal of Philosophy/Unabhängige Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 2 (1978) 5-12. The naivete to which Jung referred was *not* phenomenological naivete. Both Strauss and Gadamer were thoroughly conversant with the philosophical distinctions involved. In this, Jung's remarks form a stark contrast with those of Talcott Parsons. See Richard Grathoff, ed., *The Theory of Social Action: The Parsons-Schutz Correspondence*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.

15. Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosphy: An Essay on Interpretation*, tr., Denis Savage, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970, p.531; Fackenheim, *Metaphysics and Historicity*, pp.89-90.

16. One would have thought that Dunand, Kutzner, Caillois, the phenomenologist Fink, or even old Huizinga would have been more reliable guides to the topic than the "sociologist and futurologist" Jung relied on.

17. Ricoeur's *Freud and Philosophy* is the most complete expositon, using a vast range of

psychoanalytic evidence, of the topic known to me. I have applied a few of Riecoeur's insights to questions current in political science, and a fuller presentation of what is involved may be found in the following essays: "Reason and Interpretation in Political Theory, "*Polity*, XI:3 (1979), 387-99; "Hermenentics and Political Science" in H.K. Betz, ed., *Recent Approaches in Social Science*, Vol 2, Social Science Symposium Series, University of Calgary, 1979, pps. 17-30; "Reduction Reminiscence, and the Search for Truth," in Peter Opitz and Gregor Sebba, eds., *Philosophy of Order: Essays on History, Consciousness, and Order for Eric Voegelin on his eightieth birthday*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981, pps. 316-331.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale, Vol. V, No. 3 (Fall, 1981).

AN IDEOLOGY IN WAITING

In his "Theses on the Philosophy of History," the seer Walter Benjamin wrote that a "state of emergency" is the rule rather than the exception in bourgeois existence.[1] Now, more than ever, Benjamin's prophetic insights appear as an early diagnosis of the unprecedented threat to civilized life presented by the politics of the new right. The election of Ronald Reagan, this too perfect organ-grinder for multinational corporate interests and the self-appointment of Alexander Haig as the "village vicar" of a merciless American foreign policy, point to the surfacing, not in Europe but in the New World this time, of the beast that is at the heart of the western mind. In the face of this state of emergency, it is impossible to be silent. For this is an authoritarian politics which is as relentless in its assaults on popular democracy in El Salvador as it is pitiless in its "reality therapy" for the poor, for children, for the aged. We thought that Spencer was finally dead, only to discover in the slogans of "supply side economics" the birth anew of social darwinism.

Just as the New Left defined the political agenda of the 1960's, in the 1980's the political cycle finds its completion in the hyper-collectivism, the politics of emotional needs, of the new right. Indeed, towards the end of his life, Herbert Marcuse said in a prophetic commentary carried in the *Journal*:

> The tendency is to the Right. The life and death question for the Left is: Can the transformation of the corporate state into a neo-fascistic one be prevented?[2]

Marcuse's analysis addresses the possibility that the emergence of a rightist tendency is a born-again movement of the authoritarian personality, of what Theodor Adorno described as the renewal of the "potentially fascistic personality." The dominant fact about the political right today is that it no longer contained within the terms of a normal political opposition or of an orthodox economic strategy. Without doubt, the right expresses politically the strategic economic aims of dominant corporate interests. Milton Friedmann's nostalgic and Walrasian panegyric to the sovereign market-place, even as he stands in front of the sweat shops of Hong Kong extolling "freedom of choice" in the market-place, is a radical attack on the wage earnings of workers and the dispossessed. And J.K. Galbraith was not mistaken in noting recently that the economics of the neo-conservative regime—aimed directly at relieving the tax burden of the upper middle-class at the expense of public services—is really a barely disguised class struggle of rich against poor. The political slogans of the new right—the "disciplinary society," "waste in public regulation"—are not ineffective appeals aimed at resolving the contradictions of the "welfare state" in favour of organized private interests. Economically, the politics of the new right points to the existence of an economic crisis which has been displaced to the social sphere.[3]

But over and beyond the strident political vocabulary of the new right, something else is happening. The new right is *so* potentially dangerous because it represents a broader awakening of an "ideology in waiting." And this newly

surfacing ideology has its basis in the nihilism of a middle-class gone authoritarian. In the end, fear of loss of privilege, impotence in the face of overwhelming power and despair over the failure of the liberal consensus produce a psychological "readiness" for the therapeutic of the authoritarian state.

It is no secret that the conservative assault spills beyond the political realm, narrowly conceived. Attacks on gay rights, demands for the return of disciplinary education, offensives against the womens' rights movement, and nostalgic appeals for the defense of the family, neighbourhood and work-place—indicate the emergence in the politics of the 1980's of a personality type which is the psychological fuel of conservative political discourse. The "moral majority" is really a not unsubtle appeal to a politics of emotional distress.

In an excellent analysis, "Anxiety and Politics,"[4] the theorist Franz Neumann—who was, incidentally, one of the first of the critical thinkers to be deported from Germany by the Nazis—discussed the psychological basis of the authoritarian personality. Neumann claimed that the bourgeois individual lives today under the strain of two unresolvable sources of tension: an "outer anxiety" and an "inner anxiety." The outer anxiety expresses the ever-present dangers of the public world; the inner anxiety reflects the unresolved oedipal tensions of the bourgeois self. Desires for self-punishment, objectless feelings of guilt, a lack of confidence in the survival capacities of the self—these are the legacy of the inner anxiety. Neumann claimed further that the tensions represented by the outer and inner anxieties turn authoritarian, and thus, potentially neo-fascistic, when under the pressures of external economic crises and a more silent inner crisis, the outer anxiety meets the inner anxiety.

> The external dangers which threaten a man meet the inner anxiety and are frequently experienced as ever more dangerous than they really are. At the same time those same external dangers intensify the inner anxiety. The painful tension which is evoked by the combination of inner anxiety and external danger can express itself in two forms: in depressive or in persecutory anxiety.[5]

Politically, depressive anxiety may express itself in despair and resignation—it is the sure and certain source of the otherwise inexplicable suicides which come to dominate the mental landscape of today. Persecutory anxiety is the classic basis of neo-fascistic movements. It is the psychological fuel which produces a mass-based politics of emotional needs, referenda on happiness as the essence of electoral politics, and scapegoatism of vulnerable out-groups. It may also result in the projection of private anxieties of impotence, fatalism, and inferiority onto what Neumann describes as the "caesaristic leader," the strong leader who charismatically sums up in his personality the spontaneity, the violence, the passion of the "dark side" of the modern mind. As the epicentre of the meeting of the outer anxiety and the inner anxiety, the bourgeois individual is envisioned as suffering a dramatic loss of ego and abandoning himself to states of fantasy, delirium, and illusion. For Neumann, the bourgeois self was almost destined to move from the private experience of fantasia to the stronger medicine of the

cult, the evangelical religion, and then to active support of a mass politics of emotional needs. Voting analysts now call this phenomenon "mood politics."

I would follow Neumann in noting that the politics of the 1980's, and principally those of the American empire, are typified for the individual by the meeting of the outer anxiety, the public crisis, with the inner anxiety. The outer anxiety today is a crisis of political economy. The inner anxiety is an existential crisis. The socio-psychological basis of new right politics is the fusion of the outer and inner anxieties; the meeting of the existential crisis and the political crisis. The outer crisis which the individual meets, this external danger which activates an interior, neurotic anxiety, has been eloquently described by a number of theoreticians, including Sheldon Wolin and Jurgen Habermas, as a classic erosion of trust in liberal-democratic institutions. Wolin traces the crisis of the "political" to the original impulses of liberal ideology itself. Liberalism, in Wolin's terms, is the ideology which strips public life of any basis in a substantial concern with justice, equality or democracy. The anti-democratic sentiments of the new right are, in part, the end-product of liberalism's reduction of politics to a barren struggle of interest against interest.[6] Equally, Christopher Lasch in *The Culture of Narcissism* traces the decline of the public realm to the bourgeois individual's concern with using the public world only to advance through manipulation a narrowly calculated self-interest. And Michael Weinstein in a paper entitled "The Eclipse of Liberalism" notes that the decline of an authentic politics in the United States is symbolized by a breakdown of the "general will" as the basis of the social contract; and by the consequent development of a strong desire to neutralize the menacing face of public life by "contractualizing" all social relations.[7] Weinstein says that Rousseau's "general will" as the basis of public life has now given way to the more monadic principle of the "will of all." In a situation of economic triage, the return of an almost Spencerian survival ethic pits individual against individual. In addition to an erosion of confidence in political life, the inevitable economic crisis is such that the individual is under a constant treat of a loss of privilege, position and status. An "outer anxiety" thus grips the bourgeois self—inflation is the economic cancer which erodes the discretionary income of the middle class and this class cannot rest easy in the absence of contractual commitments guaranteeing a secured distribution of public goods.

Under the pressure of a "loss of privilege," of a daily anxiety over loss of confidence in the credibility of the political economy of the liberal state, the bourgeois mind oscillates to the other extreme. There is a retreat from public life, massive and wilful in character, into a private inner experience of fantasy and illusion. Reason gives way to private passion. The individual in the absence of a secure public realm tries to establish a private zone of emotional security, symbolized by the ideal of the Spencerian ego: privative, survival-oriented and exploitative. Max Horkheimer concluded in *Dawn and Decline* that this is an era typified by the appearance of monadology as an active principle of social life[8]. It is not unpredictable that the social counterparts of the outer anxiety are nostalgia, the return of a "myth of innocence," and a retreat to the family, if not to the body, as the last barrier against a public world verging on *stasis*. It is

equally predictable that the deflated bourgeois ego finds its most eloquent expression in, on the one hand, the almost surrealistic image of the "air-proof" house and, on the other, in a simplistic faith in business education.

Unfortunately, the private zone of emotional stillness sought by the bourgeois mind is itself illusory. One lesson of the hegemonic tendencies of the technological order is that the social as well as the psycho-analytical foundations of identity have already been colonized. What C.B. Macpherson has described as "possessive individualism"—the sense that the modern "self" has been transformed into a propertied aspect of the economic order—is a haunting image of contemporary times. In flight from public life, the individual encounters an inner self whose laws of psychical action resemble the catastrophe theorems of the outer world. The individual leaves behind the anxieties of the public world only to discover an inner self which borders, on one side, on the return of beastialism and, on the other on absorption into the socio-psychological imperatives of the corporate political economy. This is the beginning of the crisis of the Spencerian ego; the source of the inner anxiety. Daily, the suspicion develops that it is impossible to survive on the terms of the Spencerian compact. Cultural darwinism, having left in its wake a vacated ego, the deflated self finds its inner resources under the colonial rule of the social order.

Following the reflections of the thinkers as diverse as Neumann and Weinstein, the political formula of the nihilistic personality might be envisaged as a ceaseless movement of the bourgeois mind between an ambivalent attitude to public life on the one hand and desparate anxiety over the survival capacities of the self on the other.[9] It is this restless movement between the delegitimated self and the under-authorized state which provides a base of political support for the harsher economic strategies of the new right.

The bourgeois individual retreats from participation in public life because of a deep distrust of political leadership, but at the same time, needs for economic self-interest to secure the political arena. And the bourgeois mind needs to affirm the self as the basis of an individualistic survival ethic, but is haunted by the suspicion that the self will not prove adequate to the task. The individual is thus caught in a classic psychological contradiction. The outer anxiety increases; the economic crisis threatens actual loss of privilege. The inner anxiety intensifies; and the inner crisis, the need to affirm the self as the basis of survival in a "hostile world," is intensified by the external danger.

Classical symptoms of the failure of the bourgeois individual to resolve the tension betwen a "retreat from public life" and a "loss of confidence" in the survival capacities of the individual ego are, in part, the appearance of sporadic and highly symbolic violence, and the movement of religion into the political realm. In religious fundamentalism, the existential crisis of the self is resolved by a flight beyond the individual ego to immolation in a group mind. In symbolic violence, there is found the signature of the return of the collective unconscious. What Carl Jung described as the dark anima of the Shadow returns to haunt public life. This is an age in which criminals become once again truth-sayers of the normal imagination.

Politically, the result of the psychic explosion which occurs when there is a

meeting of the political and existential crisis is the production of persecutory anxiety; a displacement of the crisis into a style of politics which provides a *therapeutic* for both actual threats to the self's zone of privilege and to its feelings of emotional inadequacy. In *The Anthoritarian Personality*, Adorno, Frankel-Brunswick and others traced out the political implications of the authoritarian character-type. Their work, completed in the 1950's, reads like an anticipatory diagnosis of the politics of the contemporary decade. It indicates that in the politics of the new right we are dealing, in part, with a broader distemper. As a working-out of a personality type which has "no pity for the poor,"[10] the bourgeois mind goes for itself, undermining the consensual basis of the liberal-democratic polity. The class-hidden and power-disguised foundation of the social contract dissolves. A surplus-class of the dispossessed appears which is forced outside the system of political administrative relations. In brief, the outer anxiety of the authoritarian personality is met with political sadism. The inner anxiety, the existential crisis of the frightened and melancholy bourgeoisie, is resolved through masochism. Political masochism involves the application to the self of harsher and more punitive forms of self-repression and self-censorship. All of this to sustain a "spurious inner world" which will act as a defense against outer reality. The therapeutic of political sadism finds its analogue in the politics of cynical self-interest. The principle of economic triage is applied to vulnerable out-groups. Political violence, domestically and internationally, is viewed as one strategy among others to sustain economic privilege. Or, in the analysis of *The Authoritarian Personality,* stereotypy "works as a certain kind of corroboration of projective formulae." In short, the new right organizes into an authoritarian politics, a "free floating distemper" which is the essence of contemporary American politics. In the end, projection and displacement are the psychological tools of a middle-class which has radically severed public from private existence and which finds itself torn between a deauthorized state on the one hand and a mutilated self on the other.

***

The critical tradition has traditionally acted on the basis of a dialectical understanding of crisis. The present crisis, typified by the return of the authoritarian personality, vanquishes human hope in the dispensation of history. But the sheer immanence of this danger, this rebirth of fascism in comfortable middle-class guise, also provides opportunities for new solidarities and, ironically, in this time of great turbulence with the possibility of creating a vision of social utopia in the development of a more democratic polity. The gap between the real and the ideal, the gulf between our actual condition of immiserisation and the possibility of a free society—this gap, this wound, never closes. But the intellectual responsibilities of thinkers today is with Adorno, Benjamin, Sartre and others to address on behalf of a suffering humanity, the "wound" of history.

AN IDEOLOGY IN WAITING

Standing on the Spanish border in the early 1940's, Walter Benjamin chose suicide rather than surrender his person, his vision of culture, the "angel of history" itself, to the torturers of the Gestapo. In the same way that Artaud wrote of Van Gogh, Benjamin was a man *suicided* by society. It is the same authoritarian tendency, this natural face of the modern order, which after Benjamin has driven Poulantzas, Artaud, Aquin, and Phil Oakes—the best minds of our generation to the stillness of madness, to the despair of suicide. I remember again Allen Ginsberg in *Howl*:

> I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, starving, hysterical, naked
>
> dragging themselves through the negros streets at dawn looking for an angry fix
>
> ...who passed through universities with radiant eyes hallucinating Arkansas and Blake..light tragedy among the scholars of war
>
> who were expelled from the academies for crazy and publishing obscure odes on the window of the skull.[11]

I cannot forget, I must not forget, that now when history has turned bleak again, when as Brecht said, "gansters strut around like statesmen on the stage of history"—that we, the survivors are the only links between past and future, between a past of critical rebellion and a future of utopia.

We serve the past best by keeping alive the act of remembrance, but also by seizing the future, by insisting in an uncompromising way on the practical possibility of the ideal. Surely the present is a dead-zone of politics: it is a killing ground for the right. For today who in the tradition of the critical imagination does not stand with Benjamin on the Spanish border, with the choice of suicide on the one hand and history in the form of the new right, of the coming again of the beast first seen by Nietszche, on the other.

Sartre, the philosopher who remained loyal to the free human subject, said finally, with irony. "Man is a useless passion."
And Kolakowski replied, for those who survive:

> The left still needs a utopia...the contradictions of social life cannot be liquidated; this means that the history of men will exist as long as man himself. And the Left is the fermenting factor in even the most hardened mass of the historical present. Even though it is at times weak and invisible, it is nonetheless the dynamite of hope that blasts the dead load of ossified systems, institutions, customs, intellectual habits, and

closed doctrines. The Left unites those dispersed and often hidden atoms whose movement is, in the last analysis, what we call progress.[12]

Arthur Kroker

Notes

1. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations,* New York: Schoken Books, 1969, p. 257
2. Herbert Marcuse, "The Reification of the Proletariat," *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory,* Vol. 2, No. 1, 1978, p. 23.
3. Jurgen Habermas, "Conservatism and Capitalist Crisis," *New Left Review,* No. 115, 1979.
4. Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory,* Glencoe: Free Press, 1957, pp. 270-300. The term "ideology in waiting" is taken from this essay.
5. *Ibid.,* p. 275.
6. For an eloquent account of "dependent man, the rump remains of democratic man," see Sheldon S. Wolin, "The Idea of the State in America," *Humanities,* Vol. 3, No. 2, 1980, pp. 151-168.
7. Michael A. Weinstein, "The Eclipse of Liberalism," MSS., p. 21.
8. Max Horkheimer, *Dawn and Decline*, New York: The Seabury Press, 1978, p. 17.
9. Weinstein, *op. cit.*, p.9.
10 T.W Adorno *et al*, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York: Harper and Row, 1950, p.699.
11. Allen Ginsberg, *Howl*, San Francisco: City Lights, 1956, p.23.
12. Leszek Kolakowski, *Toward A Marxist Humanism*, New York: Random House, 1968, pp. 82, 83.

Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory
Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale

Subscription information should be addressed to:

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Montréal, Québec H4B 1M8

The Journal acknowledges with gratitude the generous assistance of the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada/Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada.

Publication of the Journal has been facilitated by the generous assistance of Concordia University and, in particular, by the support of Dean J.S. Chaikelson and the Department of Political Science.

Indexed in/Indixée au: International Political Science Abstracts/Documentation politique internationale; Sociological Abstracts Inc., Advance Bibliography of Contents: Political Science and Government; Canadian Periodical Index.

Member of the Canadian Periodical Publishers' Association.

ISSN 0380-9420 Printed in Canada

$5.00