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The GHR offers an exciting publishing opportunity for graduate students working on all fields and periods of history. We welcome original and innovative submissions from emerging scholars in history and related disciplines across Canada and the United States.

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COVER IMAGE
The cover of this issue of The GHR is a photograph taken by Andrew P. Hill between 1880-1920 in Big Basin, California. The image captures the enchantment of a Pacific Northwest cedar forest, reflecting The GHR’s roots on Vancouver Island. This public domain image was made available through the Rijksmuseum’s Rijksstudio program.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Front Matter
President’s Message vi
Chair’s Message vii
Editor’s Introduction viii

Research Notes
Setting the Starting Line of Global History: The Case for 1400 11

Articles
The Laws of Nature, State or Federal?:
A Legal History of the Informal Transition of Responsibility over Environmental Policy in the Australian Commonwealth, 1974 – 1983 23

Possibilities for Intersectional Theorizing in Canadian Historiography: The Subaltern Narrative of Canadian Medical Schools 46

The Final Nail: The Russians in 1916 83

The Unsaid of the Grand Dérangement: An Analysis of Outsider and Regional Interpretations of Acadian History 115

Of Grey Geese and Burning Lawyers: The Structures of the Feud System in Viking Age Iceland 139

Each Star Has a Story: An Ethnographic Study of Indigenous Astronomical Knowledge in the Pacific Northwest, ca. 1900 169
President’s Message

I am pleased to introduce this issue of the Graduate History Review, the University of Victoria’s graduate journal.

UVic is home to dynamic researchers with extraordinary ideas. Our university is committed to providing students with a fully immersed, research-enriched academic environment that empowers students to explore and create knowledge alongside their peers and mentors. An education in humanities is a great foundation for academic learning, critical and creative thinking, developing communication skills, and for creating innovative and active citizens.

The Graduate History Review features some of our finest graduate researchers. This year’s publication takes us on a journey to Medieval Iceland, pre-communist Russia, modern Australia, and back again, with research topics on Canadian history. The articles represent the diversity of historical thought and study on campus that contributes to new perspectives and ongoing debate and dialogue. This issue also highlights the collaboration between graduate students and faculty members from the UVic History and Art History departments who worked together to bring the publication to completion. The result is an excellent collection of work from students who are directly engaged in research-inspired learning.

Congratulations and thank you to the many dedicated UVic graduate students, faculty advisors and mentors for sharing their passion for history and research.

Sincerely,

Professor Jamie Cassels, QC
President and Vice-Chancellor
University of Victoria
Chair’s Message

What a pleasure to see a new issue of the Graduate History Review! As chair of the History Department I have a mandate to foster excellence in research, outstanding teaching, and the richest possible student experience. The GHR is what happens when all of these things come together perfectly.

This journal is not just a collection of the excellent work produced in our department by graduate student scholars, it is also a hologram of the UVic Department of History showing, from different angles, its better qualities. The best of graduate student writing is research that merits a wide audience and is of interest to many. The existence of so many high caliber articles speaks both to the quality of the students and the commitment to graduate teaching exhibited by History faculty. And the opportunity to experience both the role of an editor, peer reviewer, and to have one’s work carefully edited are examples of rich, experiential educational opportunities.

The GHR is also an example of other qualities of our department that we can all celebrate: a strong culture of student-faculty collaboration—eleven faculty and twenty-two students did peer reviews or otherwise contributed to the editorial work; a commitment to interdisciplinarity drawing, as it does, from anthropology, biology, cultural studies, linguistics and from across the historical spectrum; and a wide-ranging, open-minded perspective on history that encompasses the globe.

Finally, this journal is a gift on the part of the authors and editorial team who laboured long and hard to bring it to you in this engaging format. Congratulations and thanks for this rich offering!

John Lutz, professor and chair
Department of History
University of Victoria
Editor’s Introduction

I am delighted to introduce the fifth edition of *The Graduate History Review*! This issue represents a turning point in The GHR’s publishing history. In 2009, this journal began as a collection of the finest graduate work from UVic’s annual Qualicum conference. Today, the journal publishes high-quality graduate work from across Canada and the United States in various fields and periods of history. This current issue also marks a revival, as the last issue of The GHR was published in 2012. This publishing gap reflects some of the turbulence of graduate life, as editors and journal managers graduated or moved on to other projects. About two years ago, an enthusiastic group of UVic grad students, led by Noah Miller, sought to revive the journal. I have no doubt that this issue would not exist if it were not for Noah’s passion, vision, and dedication.

This year’s issue, which includes one research note and six articles, is also full of ‘turning points.’ In the first piece, Cassandra Painter critiques the long-standing notion that ca. 1500 marks the divide between medieval and early modern. She challenges instructors of World History courses to rethink periodization, and consider ca. 1400 as a more suitable starting point. Next, Blake Allen examines the complexities of Australian federalism. In his article, Allen identifies key pieces of government legislation which left lasting impacts on the country’s environmental governance. Institutional turning points also feature prominently in Taqdir Bhandal’s critical narrative of the colonial and patriarchal history of Canada’s medical schools. Her article tackles a long and complicated history, beginning with Indigenous systems of healing and ending with the corporatization, marketization, and privatization of medical knowledge. The next two articles speak to well-known historical turning points: the 1916 Russian Revolution and the Grand Dérangement, also known as the Acadian Deportation. In the first of these articles, Jeffrey Maciejewski makes a strong case for a fundamental shift in Russia’s socio-economic foundation
prior to the 1916 Russian revolution. In the second, Katie MacLeod applies an insightful historiographical framework to the academic debates surrounding the deportation of Acadians from New France in the eighteenth century. Two final articles examine the twists and turns of storytelling and cultural history. First, Chris Perrin explores notions of masculinity, strength, and honour in Viking Age society as recounted in Icelandic sagas. Finally, Dan Posey tackles the complexities of colonial ethnographic texts, and examines the importance of astronomical knowledge to indigenous people on the Pacific Northwest. These articles also reflect the distinctly interdisciplinary backgrounds of their authors, which include linguistics, cultural studies, anthropology, social justice, and biology. This diversity is a real reflection of the innovative work of graduate students and The GHR’s vision for publishing historical scholarship in a variety of historical fields.

I owe a huge thank-you to the dedicated team of students and faculty who have put this issue together. Twenty-two graduate students, from UVic and three from other universities served as peer reviewers, copy-editors, editors, and editorial advisory committee members for this issue. Thank-you to each of these students for your enthusiasm, diligence, and attention to detail at each stage of the publishing process. I would also like to thank the eleven faculty members from UVic and two from other universities who served as peer reviewers and faculty advisors. Thank-you for generously giving your time and energy to support graduate publishing. Thank-you also to Dr. Penny Bryden, the faculty advisor for The GHR, for your constant support and wise words of encouragement. Finally, I owe many thanks to Ezekiel Gow, my assistant editor, for his insightful advice, critical perspective, and outstanding resourcefulness. The publication of the GHR would not have been possible without the hard work of each of these volunteers.

There will likely be many more ‘turning points’ in The GHR’s future and I am looking forward to seeing where the
journal will go next. Best wishes to the new editorial team, Deborah Deacon and Kaitlin Findlay for the coming year of publication!

Sincerely,

Meghan Kort, MA
Editor-in-Chief
The Graduate History Review
Setting the Starting Line of Global History: The Case for 1400

CASSANDRA PAINTER

Abstract: Recent decades have seen a move away from traditional narratives of the “rise of the West” in History courses and publications, and toward a “Global History” paradigm. This paper provides an overview of this shift and the issues at stake before making the case for circa 1400 as a good chronological starting point for Global History courses and textbooks. Starting the narrative here provides a crucial fifteenth-century context of nomadic empires and crusading religious ecumenes, which not only enriches understanding of the more extensive global connections to follow, but also opens the narrative of globalization at a moment when it was by no means obvious or inevitable that Europe would come to dominate the globe.

“The historical approach is intellectually humble,” wrote Sir Lewis Namier: “the aim is to comprehend situations, to study trends, to discover how things work.”1 The task of teaching global history would seem to defy intellectual humility in the capaciousness of its subject. The trends it studies span continents, civilizations and centuries; the workings it seeks to discover are no less than the workings of the modern world. How does the historian describe and explain history on a global scale? Where should one begin? Perhaps an even trickier question: when should one begin?

The rise and fall of various candidates that have been suggested over the years as the logical starting point of a global history reveal the evolution of a historiography. Mid-twentieth century scholars such as David Landes, and more recent figures such as Samuel Huntington, developed a magisterial narrative of global history with clear starting points circa 1500 and 1750. The prelude of this global narrative began around the dawn of the

1 Quoted in Fritz Stern, “The Goldhagen Controversy: One Nation, One People, One Theory?” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1996); 129.
sixteenth century with the voyages of Vasco da Gama and Christopher Columbus. Portugal and Spain, soon followed by Britain, France, and the Netherlands, established trading networks which laid the foundations for the integration of Europe and Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Gunpowder and maritime technology, along with indigenous peoples’ susceptibility to Old World diseases, allowed Europeans to reach distant shores and overwhelm their native inhabitants, then to transport African slaves to plantations in the Americas and West Indies. Overseas empire expanded under the influence of political rivalry, Christian evangelical zeal, and an insatiable consumer demand for gold, spices, silks, tea, and tobacco. While the European “Age of Discovery” established the first links in the global chain of commerce and culture, so this old story goes, the beginning of the Industrial Revolution around 1750 marked the onset of a truly global community. The origins of this second great acceleration of globalization were found in the unique cultural and political conditions of Western Europe. Early modern Europeans had supposedly proved far more willing than their contemporaries in the East to apply rational decision making to technical and philosophical problems—that is, the adaptation of means to ends to produce the best possible result, rejecting magic and superstition. This openness towards experimentation, empiricism and the scientific method was a result of what Max Weber termed the “Protestant work-ethic,” the waning influence of religious dogmatism, and the Reformation’s sectarianism and individualism. Puritanical asceticism and sober industry encouraged productivity and efficiency; pervasive curiosity and a will to mastery over nature was a fillip to innovation. Furthermore, because Europe was a hotbed of warring states, its sovereigns could not afford to exert overweening and counterproductive control over the men of commerce and industry that provided the

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sinews of war, leading private enterprise to enjoy unique vitality and private property unique protection.⁴

Together, Landes and others have claimed, these advantages led to practices and institutions which laid the foundations of the Industrial Revolution: private property, capitalist free markets, and a bourgeoisie with the means and desire to seize political power from traditional landed elites. By the mid-eighteenth century, the rising demand for cotton as a fabric for rich and poor alike stimulated cumulative technological breakthroughs in textile production, and new methods of factory-based, mechanized labor. Similar cumulative advances in technology revolutionized metallurgy and machine-building, and revolved in particular around solving the problem of rapidly diminishing timberland. Coal became the substitute fuel, the need to pump water out of ever deeper mine shafts led to the development of steam engines, and so on. Production was no longer limited to the strength, energy and discipline of men and animals, relieving pressure on land. New World bullion and colonial markets provided capital for new industrial ventures, and the displacement of agriculture to distant plantations allowed Europeans to devote more of their energy to manufactures. The search for new markets and raw materials spurred a second wave of European imperialism, and with colonial rule came European goods, institutions, and ideas. In short, European ingenuity, superior technology, and military might might knit the world into one global economy.⁵

Since the mid-twentieth century, many scholars have exposed this master narrative as Eurocentric, its tale of global development little more than the “rise of the West.” It attributes all the initiative in the establishment of global connections to European conquest and technology, both supposedly the fruit of a uniquely European cultural predisposition for curiosity and innovation. The rest of the world, and particularly the civilizations

of Asia and the Middle East, are, in contrast, inwardly focused, despotic, decadent, and passive. They retained hegemonic religious or supernatural philosophies that discouraged the critical thinking necessary for innovation, narrowed intellectual horizons, and tended to regard the products of other civilizations as mere curiosities out of a false sense of superiority.\(^6\) A younger generation of scholars, led by Edward Said, has exposed this arrogant narrative of “the West and the rest” as fundamentally distorted, a product of Europeans’ condescending gaze at Eastern societies they willfully misunderstood in order to flatter their own egotism.\(^7\) Beginning global history in 1500 or 1750, with Columbus or the Newcomen engine, can easily serve to perpetuate this arrogant assumption of western superiority.

Thus, the periodization of global history has become entangled with the endeavor to move away from a Eurocentric historiography. One approach to the problem of avoiding a Eurocentric global history has been to push its starting point as far back as possible, when Europe was not in a position of obvious superiority. Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson, for example, have argued that the medieval period represents a “prehistory of globalization” with significant, if transitory, moments of long-distance connection, most notably the eighth-century expansion of Islam, the consolidation of vast empires in China and Russia, and the fourteenth-century “Pax Mongolica” of Genghis Khan.\(^8\) Similarly, A. G. Hopkins has edited an anthology of articles which collectively argue for the existence of three distinct eras of “archaic,” “modern,” and “post-modern globalization.” In this schema, “archaic globalization” corresponds to the medieval and pre-modern claims to universalism of religious ecumenes, and a broadly similar concept of “cosmic kingship” which drove Chinese, Ottoman, Safavid,

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\(^6\) Ibid, 16-18.


Mughal and Iberian rulers alike to acquire exotic goods as a symbol of their reach and influence.  

The problem with this approach is that by pushing global history so far back in time, it becomes less and less obvious what is distinctively “global” about it. As Joyce Appleby, Bruce Mazlish, and others have noted, if we define globalization and global history as simply the history of long-distance communications and trade, we will end up defining even the Roman Empire as a nascent “world system.” While it is important to recognize that connections between cultures have long been a part of human history, it is also surely necessary to distinguish what makes the modern, globalized world different from the age of Caesar or Genghis Khan. Furthermore, as Christopher Bayly, John Darwin, Niall Ferguson and others have noted, even as they avoid a simplistic narrative of the “rise of the West,” global historians must still explain why the modern world wears a western guise. Spread by British imperialism, and later by American pop culture and international media, western institutions, styles of dress, languages, and consumer products have taken root across the continents. Scholars of globalization must account for this unprecedented degree of global homogeneity: if the West has no inherent cultural superiority, how has it managed in the past two hundred years to make its stamp on every corner of the world? Meeting this challenge requires more than simply setting the clock of global history back.

In contrast to the impulse to archaize global history, other historians, most notably Kenneth Pomeranz and John Darwin,

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have taken the alternative approach of redefining 1500 and 1750 as moments of relative parity among European, Middle Eastern and Asian cultures. They have noted, for example, that the Iberian empire in the New World was only one of several Eurasian empires in the “Age of Discovery.” In Southeast Asia, Akbhar established in 1555 the Mughal Empire that would soon rule almost the entire Indian subcontinent, presiding over a cosmopolitan, religiously diverse society. Decades before the Spanish and Portuguese established their small trading outposts on the islands and coasts of the Indies, the Ottomans ruled from Constantinople to Bagdad, the Ming dynasty had conquered China, and the princely state of Muscovy had become the “gatherer of Russian lands.” In short, west Europeans around 1500 could claim no originality in the game of global empire, and if they enjoyed any advantage at this stage, it was their marginally superior grasp of maritime technology and fortuitous position on the Atlantic coast. Otherwise, European political, cultural, and intellectual achievements, though impressive, were equaled or surpassed elsewhere in Eurasia.12 So much for a uniquely European will to mastery propelling them on the road to empire.

Britain’s largely indisputable claim to the title of trailblazer of Industrial Revolution might seem to suggest that European superiority emerged in the eighteenth century or nineteenth century, if not the sixteenth; but here again, Pomeranz and other scholars have complicated the picture. Pomeranz argues that as late as 1800 not only natality and life expectancy, but even technological sophistication and economic productivity, in Europe and Asia were roughly comparable. Chinese laborers typically faced fewer legal and linguistic barriers to migration in search of work than their European counterparts. The Chinese state also actively encouraged peasant women to increase the economic stability of their households by engaging in crafts such as textile production and selling their products in competitive markets, raising production and teaching important skills. Though similar “putting out systems” existed in Europe, guilds often hampered their development before 1789. Both Europe and China

experienced what Jan DeVries has termed “industrious revolutions” through the eighteenth century, their economies fueled by an increasing and thus expanding output as households increasingly produced goods for the market in addition to their own domestic needs.\(^\text{13}\) While Europeans had established colonial trading connections in the Americas, the Indies, and the coasts of Africa, China had a network of diaspora trading communities scattered throughout Southern Asia.\(^\text{14}\) Populations expanded while arable land and wood fuel remained stable or declined, threatening to have the same Malthusian consequences in both Asia and Europe in 1750: thus, Pomeranz concludes, “Europe could have been a China.”\(^\text{15}\) Only Europe’s fortuitous possession of large coal deposits, and the exploitation of the abundant arable land of the New World, allowed them to overcome the limitations on development once imposed by the land.

This new perspective has transformed the historiography of globalization from a narrative of western domination and exploitation into a process in which non-western cultures, particularly in the Middle East, India, and China, played a crucial and pioneering role. While western states have dominated the latest phase of this process (that is, from about 1800 onward) as a result of their superiority in mobilizing resources, goods, and people, their path to the present was only one of many evolving “modernities,” and by no means the most natural or inevitable one. This view of global history replaces a linear, progressive model of historical change with one in which conjunctures, or the contingent coincidence of various environmental, socio-economic, political, and cultural conditions, determine long-term trends.

Drawing on these scholars’ latest contributions to the historiography of global history, it now appears that it is not


\(^\text{15}\) Pomeranz, *Great Divergence*, 9.
necessary to drastically lengthen the timeline in order to escape the trap of Eurocentrism. Specifically, circa 1400 can serve as an excellent entry point into global history for several reasons. First, as John Darwin has noted, it represents the point of transition between an older form of empire and the new colonialism of the “Age of Discovery.” Tamerlane was the last of the Eurasian warlords to attempt to create a “world-empire,” an attempt which ultimately failed because nomadic tribes could no longer maintain political control over settled states. His campaigns also represented the last significant challenge against the partition of Eurasia into West, Middle East and East, and coincided with changes in trade that would make the oceans, and not the land routes which met in the heart of Eurasia, the vital highways of empire. The early 1400s also marked the apotheosis of the Chinese maritime expeditions that had begun three centuries earlier, laying the foundation for a trading network of diaspora communities throughout Southeastern Asia. The end of Tamerlane’s conquests and the decline of China’s trading missions thus provide a helpful context for sixteenth century empires, Iberian as well as Mughal, Ottoman, and Safavid, at once indicating the antiquity of imperial aspirations, the novelty of sixteenth-century imperial methods, and the dynamic exploits of early-modern non-European cultures.

Starting in 1400 is also advantageous because it provides a convenient place to examine what are arguably the first ideological “global systems:” universal religious ecumenes, belief systems which were global in aspiration and self-identity. The Islamic civilization, for example, was the inheritor of classical intellectual culture, which at the dawn of the fifteenth century was only beginning to reach its fullest impact in Europe. It also benefited from rich agriculture in the Nile-Euphrates region and

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16 John Darwin, After Tamerlane, 5-6.
the wealth that came from being situated at the crossroads of Eurasian trade routes, though by this time their importance was beginning to decline. The Persian Safavid Empire continued to expand; the Ottomans captured Constantinople in 1453, dealing a massive symbolic blow to European Christendom, and their co-religionists were only driven out of the Iberian peninsula after almost a millennium of warfare in 1492. The impressive reach of fifteenth-century Islam testifies to how well it served in the early modern period to unite diverse peoples living in a vast swath of the globe under one universalizing religious ideology, in which shared reading knowledge of Arabic and international Sharia law continued to create lasting social, political, cultural, and economic links.

Similarly, 1400 is an excellent point at which to take stock of Christianity, which had by now firmly established itself throughout Europe and had yet to dissolve into ever more denominations in the Protestant Reformation. John Bossy has argued that Christianity in Europe of 1400 was characterized above all by the firm belief that religion was understood and experienced through “the extension of social relations beyond the frontiers of merely human society,” linking the patriarchal family with the Holy Family, the Holy Father in Rome and the paternal guidance of the monarch in an all-encompassing Catholic community, Christendom. Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth century the spread of devotional literature, improved training for clergy, new monastic movements, and more frequent sermons more actively engaged Christians in a common (albeit locally inflected) religious culture than ever before. Furthermore, the fifteenth century saw the last crusades against the Hussites and Ottomans, with their narrower ties to Hapsburg imperialism, lukewarm European response, and marginal results. This last gasp

of the crusades provides a significant backstory and point of contrast with the subsequent energetic efforts of European missionaries in the New World.\textsuperscript{21}

Providing this crucial fifteenth-century context of nomadic empires and crusading religious ecumenes enriches understanding of the more extensive global connections to follow. It also opens the narrative of globalization at a moment when it was by no means obvious or inevitable that Europe, still reeling from the devastating effects of the Plague, would come to dominate the globe. With this knowledge, the striking juxtaposition of Europe’s “Age of Discovery” with the sixteenth-century imperial aggrandizement of Mughal India, Safavid Iran, Ottoman Turkey and Qing China is no longer surprising; nor is the continued importance of international Islamic organizations or Chinese diaspora trading networks in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{22} With such a foundation, a course in global history can continue on towards Europe’s scientific and industrial revolutions, the high noon of British Empire and the postwar “McWorld” without falling into the trap of Eurocentrism. Namier defined “the crowning attainment” of the “intellectually humble” historian not as an all-encompassing explanatory narrative, but rather “a historical sense—an intuitive understanding of how things do not happen.”\textsuperscript{23}

As Pomeranz has argued, understanding “how things do not happen” for the global historian means asking not only “Why was China not Europe?,” but also “Why was Europe not China?”\textsuperscript{24} A good way to take Pomeranz’s as well as Namier’s advice is to shift the chronology of global history back ever so slightly, to around 1400. The view from 1400 is messy, the trends it encompasses multidirectional, and comprehension of the situation at this


\textsuperscript{22} For an compendium of the “archaic” elements which continue to operate in the modern globalized world, see Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, \textit{The World that Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present} (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006).

\textsuperscript{23} Stern, “Goldhagen Controversy,” 129.

\textsuperscript{24} Pomeranz, \textit{Great Divergence}, 9.
moment of history requires an abandonment of any simplistic narrative of the “rise of the West.”

**Bibliography**


BLAKE ALLEN

Abstract: Between 1974 and 1983 the Australian Federal Government in Canberra enacted a series of legislation which was designed to gradually transfer authority for environmental policy away from the state governments and towards itself. This informal transition was enacted, built upon, and completed by three consecutive governments representing both of the country’s main political parties, indicating the bi-partisan attitude towards reforming the federal relationship in Australia during this period. This paper, in looking at the constitutionality of Canberra’s actions, is one of the first attempts to produce a legal history of this legislative transition of environmental policies in Australia. Through this process it is obvious that the development of these pieces of legislation falls into two discernible historical periods defined by their effectiveness in asserting a federal presence in Australian environmental policymaking. In the background of these developments are important questions concerning the traditional emphasis placed by the High Court of Australia on state rights, and Canberra’s cautious manoeuvring around this contentious issue. By also addressing these questions, this paper helps to expand upon the relatively small body of work surrounding this period of great constitutional change in Australia, suggesting that these developments were instrumental in the fundamental changes to the federal relationship associated with the governments of Gough Whitlam, Malcolm Fraser, and Bob Hawke.

The exact constitutionality of binding environmental policies set forth by the Australian Federal Government is, at best, one of an ambiguous nature. By design, Australia governs itself under a constitution which strives to severely restrict the powers wielded by the federal government, hereby referred to as Canberra, in exchange for a greater emphasis on state powers. The continued
maintenance of the sovereign integrity which was first afforded the six colonies (now states) of Australia by limited home-rule in the nineteenth century became a guiding principle of the Australian Constitution. Article 51 of the Australian Constitution, which establishes legislative powers granted to Canberra, makes no direct reference to matters concerning the Australian environment. Article 51 along with Article 107, which sets all powers not vested by the constitution in Canberra as the responsibility of the state government, clearly makes matters of environmental protection solely a state responsibility. However, having capitalized on legal precedents set by High Court rulings, Canberra has carved itself an informal constitutional means to set its own national policies regarding the environment, capable of overruling state policies and law.

This development occurred over the span of three decades and under the guidance of three separate Prime Ministers: Gough Whitlam (Labor), Malcolm Fraser (Liberal), and Bob Hawke (Labor). This paper divides these three decades into two distinct periods that are defined by the effectiveness of the legislation in question. The primary focus of this paper will be the earlier of those time periods, which spanned from 1974–1982 and covers both the Whitlam and Fraser governments. This period is marked by the establishment of a legislative precedent by both governments in setting a national environmental policy, effectively entrenching Canberra’s constitutional capability to do so. The latter of these two periods spans from 1983 to present and was marked by the sustained growth of environmental legislation set by Canberra and upheld by the High Court. This paper touches on early legislation from the Hawke government passed in 1983 as it delineates the two periods, but will otherwise maintain its focus on the earlier period and the struggle to effectively set the precedents that were built upon by the Hawke government and its successors.

To fully contextualize this legal development, we must first address the legacy of the ‘Engineers Case.’ Better known as *Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd* (1920), the final ruling rejected the practice (or notion) that the
High Court should approach cases with *concern* for powers reserved, or that could be seen as reserved, for the State and instead ruled that the High Court should read the division of powers as *literal*.\(^1\) While this ruling does not explicitly grant additional powers to Canberra, nor remove powers from the state, it does grant Canberra the freedom to draft legislation that can usurp state powers, provided the legislation is written with a literal interpretation of the defined powers of Canberra (as set out in Article 51 of the Constitution). Prior to 1920 this was nearly impossible for Canberra to do because the High Court maintained an emphasis on state powers and rights during the considerations of their rulings.\(^2\) During this time, national environmental policy was set by means of creative interpretation of the various national powers, in line with the precedent established by the *Engineers’* case. Of these, there are two particularly prominent powers that form the primary foundation of national environmental policy: the power regarding trade and commerce (Article 51, Section 1), and the power regarding external affairs (Article 29). For this reason, we will consider both of these powers and their associated legislation independently.

**Art. 51 (1): Trade and Commerce with other countries and among the States**

Matters of trade and commerce were the driving forces of Australian Federation and a key issue around which the Constitution was structured. They formed the driving force behind the push for Federation in 1901 and were the overwhelming focuses of the biannual meetings of the Federal Council of Australasia (predecessor of the Australian Commonwealth).\(^3\)

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1 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. (1920) 28 CLR 129.
Because of this and despite its traditional emphasis on state powers, the High Court (Australia’s supreme judicial body) has almost always ruled in favour of Canberra’s power over trade and commerce. This is despite the frequent challenges to the extent of Canberra’s authority in matters of trade and commerce during the first decade of the Commonwealth. But the early judicial rulings, such as *New South Wales v. Collector of Customs for New South Wales* (1908) and *Australian Steamship Ltd v. Malcolm* (1914) enshrined an uncharacteristically high degree of federal authority in matters of the Australian economy.\(^4\)

Because Canberra’s authority over trade and commerce was usually upheld by the High Court even prior to its ruling on the *Engineers’* case, responsibility for trade and commerce emerged almost immediately as a possible avenue for the federal government to establish an effective environmental policy. This development first began under Gough Whitlam who inherited two particularly prominent environmental controversies: the mining of the Great Barrier Reef in Queensland and the damming of the Serpentine Valley in Tasmania. Whitlam was elected Prime Minister with a national majority in 1972 on a platform that made relatively few promises regarding these controversies and as such was uncertain of the full extent to which Canberra could interject. The Impact of Proposals Act of 1974 was something of an experiment for the development of national environmental policy. This Act established federal guidelines for the conduct of environmental impact statements (EIS) for commercial operations

\(^4\) These rulings acted as something of an early precedent before the *Engineers’* case, granting Canberra the authority to regulate the rights and obligations of people engaged in commerce. For example: *Australian Steamships Ltd. v. Malcolm* (1914) 19 CLR 298.
and projects as well as the procedure by which federal inquiries into such matters would be performed.\(^5\) However, because responsibilities regarding the environment were already regarded as a matter of state policy rather than national policy, the legislation could only be applied to projects that required financing from Canberra.\(^6\) Thus, Canberra could use its power to make financial grants to the states (Article 96) to force state governments into submitting to a federal EIS or inquiry (as the Whitlam government attempted to do with Queensland in 1975), but these were rarely effective and under Whitlam, both the Queensland and Tasmanian governments successfully resisted federal EIS pressures.\(^7\)

Further compounding the difficulties of making EIS legislation binding to state policies was the fact that many states had already established their own variation of environmental impact statements. Among the most comprehensive of these acts was the State Pollution Control Commission enacted by New South Wales in 1974, Tasmania also enacted its own variation of this legislation under the Environmental Protection Act of 1973. These state variations were seldom effective, however. Tasmanian legislation, for example, included an exemption that allowed the Mount Lyell Mine, the largest industrial polluter in the state, to continue the practice of releasing industrial tailings into the

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5 Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974, Article 5, Section 1 (Requirement for EIS); Article 14 (Guidelines for Inquiry).
7 Malcolm Fraser, *The Political Memoirs* (Carlton: Miegunyah Press, 2010), 559; Greg Buckman, *Tasmania’s Wilderness Battles: A History* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2008), 29 - 36. Controversy surrounding Whitlam’s use of environmental impact statements was not just limited to Tasmania and Queensland. Following pressure from a local citizen’s group in the Canberra Capital Territory to issue an EIS for the construction of a communications tower being built by Australian Post on Black Mountain, Whitlam took pressure for allowing the EIS to make use of selectively chosen composite photographs which minimized the impact of the tower on native flora.
already heavily polluted Queen River. The existence of state variations on environmental impact statements, the majority of which predated federal legislation, made it difficult for Canberra to establish a binding precedent for the use of its own EIS even in the rare cases in which it could be applied.

The early failures of a federal EIS system could be evidence of Canberra’s constitutional inability to protect the Australian environment from state policies. However, most of the failings of the EIS system are traceable to Gough Whitlam’s unwillingness to intervene in state authority in matters of the environment. While the Whitlam government was working to redefine the very nature of Australian federal relations, it found itself limited both by the considerable range of reforms the government had sought to enact (with issues such as education and social security commanding greater focus and attention) and the limited number of ‘friendly’ state governments (only South Australia and Tasmania were under Labor governments at this time). Further weakening Canberra’s effectiveness at this time was Whitlam himself, who was frequently criticized for his difficulties, at times bordering on incompetence, in governing. The veteran political correspondent Wallace Brown praised Whitlam as having “rivalled [former Prime Minister Robert] Menzies in his passion for the House of Representatives and ability to use it as his stage” yet heavily criticizes “his parliamentary skills [which]

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8 Buckman, *Tasmania’s Wilderness Battles*, 157 - 158. This omission allowed the Mount Lyell Mine to continue dumping approximately 2,000,000 tonnes of tailing discharge into the Queen River on an annual basis without ever having to file an EIS on its operations.

9 Neal Blewett, “Review of ‘Gough Whitlam in and out of Government’” in *Australian Book Review*, no. 346, November 2012. Blewett offers a unique insight into this issue. The Tasmanian-born representative for South Australia in Canberra from 1977–1994 served as a high-ranking Minister under the government of Bob Hawke and as High Commissioner to the UK from 1994–1998. In his review of Whitlam, whose policies were dramatically expanded under the Hawke government, Blewett highlights the importance of Whitlam’s poor relationship with the states as a key component to the inevitable failure of his government, noting that Whitlam tried to maintain strong relations with Tasmania and South Australia but that eventually even these labour-controlled States turned on him (South Australia specifically).
were rhetorical and not tactical. He could devise a strategy and then often botch the tactics in trying to implement that strategy”\textsuperscript{10}. This critique, viewed in relation to the full range of his reform promises and limited political allies at the state level captures Whitlam’s inability to establish an effective environmental legacy in Canberra.

Rather than reverse the policies of his predecessor, Malcolm Fraser built upon many of Whitlam’s legislative actions and their potential to set important precedents for Canberra. Fraser ran on a platform that promised not to introduce new regulations to Australian businesses and was therefore constrained, compared to his contemporaries, in his use of the trade and commerce clause for establishing a national environmental policy. However, he did make use of the clause to strengthen Whitlam’s existing legislation, especially in regards to the growing controversy surrounding the Queensland government’s proposal to engage in mining activities on the Great Barrier Reef. Shortly following his electoral victory, Fraser publically challenged the unregulated, heavily pro-mining policies of the Queensland government. Following the recommendations of the EIS instigated by the Whitlam government (and boycotted by Premier Bjelke-Petersen) the Fraser government passed legislation which banned the export of mineral sands in 1976\textsuperscript{11}.

This legislation was written in accordance to a provision set up in the Customs Act of 1901 which permitted the Governor-General to ban “the exportation of goods absolutely.”\textsuperscript{12} Historically, this power had been reserved for Canberra in order to ensure that a minimum export price for any natural resource was guaranteed and to help prevent the exploitation of Australian


\textsuperscript{12} Customs Act, 1901, Article 112, Section 2A.
resources. However, Fraser enacted this power under highly controversial circumstances. It quite clearly had nothing to do with the health of the sand mining industry itself but rather was introduced for the purpose of crippling the Great Barrier Reef mining industry and ensuring that Canberra’s policy towards the ecosystem remained effective against the opposing policies of the state. Because of this the Murphyores mining firm, who held a lease to mine a small portion of the reef at Fraser Island that had been issued by the Queensland government, moved immediately to challenge the constitutionality of this legislation in the High Court.

*Murphyores Inc. Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth* is a little discussed, example of the legacy of the Engineer’s Case in the Australian judicial system. Surprisingly, it has been heavily overlooked in Australian historiography. This ruling set the first High Court precedent for a federal environmental policy, and established the legal foundation for the *Tasmanian Dams* case (to be discussed later). Despite the lease issued to Murphyores by the Queensland government for mining rights on Fraser Island, Canberra stepped in to halt all further exploration on the island until an EIS (which Queensland boycotted) was completed. Murphyores responded to this by challenging both the constitutional validity of Canberra’s actions and of the EIS itself. Had such a case been brought to the High Court before the 1920 ruling on the Engineer’s case, Canberra would have almost certainly been overruled due to its clear infringement on a policy which clearly falls under state authority. However, Fraser made this decision through the use of the clearly defined power granted to the federal government by the Custom’s Act (Article 112, Section 2A), whose constitutional validity had already been upheld by the High Court in previous cases. The High Court had unanimously ruled that both the EIS and the government’s actions were a valid exercise of the trade and commerce power of Canberra. More importantly, the High Court further ruled that

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the motivation and/or intent of Canberra’s legislation was ultimately irrelevant due to its adherence of constitutional divisions of power.\textsuperscript{15} This ruling was not only an early victory for federal environmental policy, but an early lesson in how its constitutional powers could be re-appropriated by Canberra to redirect state environmental policy.

Eight years later, Fraser was able to draw upon the legal trade, commerce, external affairs, and quarantine power of Canberra. He used these powers to set a monumental precedent for the federal government by drafting one of the most effective pieces of environmental legislation in Australian legal history. The Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act of 1982 was passed in conjunction with the federal government’s signing of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Drawing off the same precedent which had been set in the \textit{Murphyores} case\textsuperscript{16} this legislation granted Canberra the sweeping power to both regulate and prohibit trade in red-listed species, as designated by a director appointed exclusively by Canberra.\textsuperscript{17} This legislation, along with Bob Hawke’s Ozone Protection Act of 1989 dramatically expanded the scope of the precedent set by the \textit{Murphyore} case to allow Canberra the authority to set policy regarding the protection of specific species and regulation of pollutants, cornerstones of environmental policymaking. Successive governments following Fraser took note of this precedent and made use of it to the advantage of Canberra.

Fraser’s immediate successor, Bob Hawke, swept into power through a decisive electoral victory in 1983 in which he campaigned on what his platform termed the ‘New Federalism’ initiative. Marketed to the public as a policy that would bolster the economy and increase employment opportunities, New Federalism restructured the federal system so that it favored

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Murphyores Inc. Pty Ltd. v. Commonwealth} (1976) 136 CLR 1.

\textsuperscript{16} Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1982, Article 5, Section 1A.

\textsuperscript{17} Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1982, Article 17 – 18.
Canberra as the national policy director. The Labor Party believed this could be achieved through the literal interpretation of federal powers, as had been done by both the Whitlam and Fraser government to increasingly set a national environmental policy. In a speech made to the National Press Club, Hawke introduced the Australian public to this policy initiative. He identified one of the two objectives of New Federalism as the establishment of a “process to explore and map the areas where co-operation for common objectives is not only desirable but realistically achievable.” Hawke did not attempt to hide his intentions for federal reform and his sizable mandate from the 1983 election gave him the legitimacy to pursue such goals.

In the pursuit of further centralizing authority for the setting of environmental policies in Canberra, Hawke capitalized on the precedent set by Fraser under the trade and commerce power by passing the Endangered Species Protection Act. This legislation greatly expanded the scope of the Wildlife Protection (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act by introducing both the concept, and the responsibility for protection of, an “ecological community” into Australian legislation. Defined as an “integrated assemblage of native species” that “inhabits a particular area in nature”, this legislation expanded federal protections to entire ecosystems considered to be endangered (again, as assessed by a Canberra appointed director). Once such an ecosystem was identified, this legislation also granted the federal government the power to supersede state policies and regulations, and directly intervene with economic activities (i.e. resource extraction and industrial polluters) which operated in such environments.

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19 Ibid. This same speech also highlights, as the second of the two objectives of the New Federalism policy, the importance of “establishing in the public mind the urgency of the need to change.”
20 Endangered Species Protection Act 1992, Article 6. This article in particular is more interested in the identifications of ecological communities. The act itself, is divided into 176 articles each of which go into considerable detail for dealing with responses to activities which may be endangering flora and fauna
Regulation of internal and external state trade is traditionally viewed by constitutional scholars of Australia as the driving impetus for Federation.\(^{21}\) For this reason the trade and commerce power is one of the most well defined federal powers in Australia. The interpretive clarity of the trade and commerce power stems from the Customs Act of 1901 and various High Court rulings, many of which predate the Engineers Case, making this federal power considerably useful for Canberra in the setting of environmental policy. However, no other prerogative of Canberra’s has been utilized by the federal government more frequently and more successfully than that of external affairs. The effectiveness of this power concerning foreign interaction in relation to the development of Australian national environmental policy stems from the exposure to external attitudes, pressures, and approaches regarding environmental law and conservation which have been applied to the Australian state through the signing of treaties and conventions.

The foreign affairs power of Canberra formed the basis of “The Great Barrier Reef: Legal Aspects,” a paper presented to the Symposium on the Future of the Great Barrier Reef by former President of the ICJ Sir Percy Spender in 1969. Spender’s paper highlights several historical precedents which imply that the internal waters of Queensland (and other states) only extend to three miles off the mainland. At the same time, Spender draws heavily upon the Australian ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) as a way to effectively suggest that the Great Barrier Reef is located within Australian territorial waters rather than Queensland’s territorial water, making it subject

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\(^{21}\) Helen Irving, *To Constitute a Nation: A Cultural History of Australia’s Constitution* (Hong Kong: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 80.
to legislation from Canberra rather than Brisbane.\(^\text{22}\)

Part of what makes Spender’s argument so effective is that it does not impose on Canberra a responsibility for environmental stewardship, but rather manipulates prior precedents and High Court rulings to grant the Federal Government a means to fill this role. To be clear, the territorial distinctions which are made by the treaties of UNCLOS I are primarily concerned with the exclusive rights of states for economic activity. As has already been demonstrated, the creative uses of legal precedents have been fundamental to Canberra’s assumption of responsibility over its environment. To this end, the Spender Paper became an important early guide for Canberra in setting environmental policies, and was used by both the Whitlam and Fraser governments for drafting their own legislation regarding the conservation of the Great Barrier Reef.\(^\text{23}\)

One of the earliest pieces of legislation passed by the Whitlam government was the Seas and Submerged Lands Act of 1973, which was a second attempt at the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill which had found fierce opposition from the state governments and forced John Gorton to step down from the Prime Minister’s office. This act complies with UNCLOS I and...

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\(^{22}\) Spender derails Brisbane’s claim to ownership of the Great Barrier Reef by citing both the legal clarification of the 1855 State Constitutions as being intended to apply only to the mainland of the states in question, effectively nullifying the Coastal Island’s Act while simultaneously drawing international precedent to his side by citing a similar Supreme Court Case in Canada regarding British Columbia. Percy Spender, “The Great Barrier Reef: Legal Aspects” in *The Future of the Great Barrier Reef: Papers of an Australian Conservation Foundation Symposium* 3 (1969): 27-30.

\(^{23}\) In Whitlam’s memoirs he recounts the importance of a seminar at the University of Sydney given by Spender regarding his paper and his reference to precedents upheld by the American and Canadian Supreme Court are direct references to Spender’s paper. Whitlam, *The Whitlam Government*, 530-531. As Minister of Science, Fraser was invited to speak at the same Symposium as Spender, Fraser mirrored Spender’s conclusions and committed himself to the conservation of the Great Barrier Reef when he committed the Federal government wholly with the conservation of the Reef and claimed “In so far as the Commonwealth has the power, it will use this power to prevent the reef’s being despoiled.” Malcolm Fraser, *The Political Memoirs* (Carlton: Miegunyah Press, 2010), 177-178.
concedes to Canberra the sovereign control of the territorial seabed and all of its resources (an issue of great contention) beyond the three-mile limit of the state’s internal waters. 24 This legislation was subject to an immediate challenge in the High Court by the New South Wales government in New South Wales v. Commonwealth (better known as the Seas and Submerged Lands Case). The High Court ruling, while closely divided, ruled in favour of Canberra; and much like the Murphyores case, it set an important precedent for the federal government. The High Court ruled that federal sovereignty over the continental shelf was an established part of international law and therefore within the realm of Canberra’s external affairs power. 25 Seeking to establish a greater degree of clarity in the legal record Chief Justice Barwick defined the extent of the external affairs power as being applicable to anything “which in its nature is external [to Australia].” 26

With the sovereignty of Canberra’s territorial waters firmly established, the Whitlam government was free to enact more legislation that was clearly conservation-oriented. The most publically recognizable of which would likely be the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act of 1975, which established the reef as a national park subject to federal protections. The legislation identifies the whole of the “reef region” as part of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park but also grants the Governor-General the right to declare any additional territory within the reef area, which may not be included within the original park, a protected area under the Park Authority. 27 Furthermore, while the legislation does provide for a degree of reconciliation with Brisbane by granting Queensland a shared role in the administration of the Park Authority, it also shows an awareness to the commercial pressures facing the reef and restricts the activities within the park to those

26 Ibid.
27 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975, Article 30 (Marine Park Area); Article 31, Section 1 (Expansion by Governor-General). Article 31, Section 2 further clarifies that any expansion of the Marine Park under the Governor-General must abide by the definition of territorial waters set out by the Seas and Submerged Lands Act.
of an educational or recreational nature.\textsuperscript{28}

The successful application of federal authority over territorial waters as a means of establishing national environmental policies is one of the most resounding legacies of the Whitlam government and one which was further developed by the Fraser government. For its part, the Fraser government did not do away with the progress of the Whitlam government in restructuring the federal relationship of Australia, but rather developed Canberra’s authority over the states. Having also utilized the guidelines set out by the Spender Paper, the Fraser government moved beyond the mere establishment of marine reserves and pursued a policy which ensured the health of the marine ecosystem. The Environmental Protection (Sea Dumping) Act of 1981 identified specific types of waste that could be considered harmful to the marine environment and banned their disposal in territorial waters while also closely regulating the amount of non-hazardous waste which could be released into the sea.\textsuperscript{29} The High Court ruling in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case granted full sovereignty of Australia’s territorial waters to Canberra. Nevertheless, the Fraser government sought to further legitimize this legislation by citing Australia’s ratification of the 1977 London Protocol on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.\textsuperscript{30} This was emblematic of both the authority with which the external affairs power granted Canberra, and the uncertainty that remained over its full reach.

The fact that the Sea Dumping Act is valid within the coastal waters of the states, effectively granting the federal government the ability to interject itself into state policies concerning what were traditionally regarded as its territorial waters, validates its inclusion in this legal review. To fully appreciate the importance of this provision we need to consider

\textsuperscript{28} Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975.
\textsuperscript{29} Environmental Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981, Article 10A – D. This legislation doesn’t completely ignore the importance of creating spaces for conservation activity, and offers legal guidelines for the creation of an artificial reef in territorial waters. Environmental Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981, Article 10E.
\textsuperscript{30} Environmental Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981, Article 9.
legislation passed one year prior to the Sea Dumping Act. Following Canberra’s victory in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case the states called upon Canberra to pass legislation clarifying the exact distinction between Australia’s territorial waters and the internal waters of the state. The Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act of 1980 uses the same arguments put forward in the Spender Paper to justify a limit of only three miles as the full extent of state ‘coastal waters,’ while reaffirming the validity and full extent of territory granted to Canberra by the Seas and Submerged Lands Act.\(^\text{31}\) However, the Act also clarifies that within coastal waters the state has full authority over the regulation of all industrial, commercial, and recreational activities.\(^\text{32}\) Therefore, only one year after reaffirming the states prerogative in its own coastal waters, Canberra had once again restricted state authority when it passed legislation that was valid in both federal and state waters. The validity of this was achieved by way of the previously mentioned London Protocol which granted authority to national legislation, reaffirming Australian policy to the stated intent of the London Protocol.\(^\text{33}\)

A key component to the obligations stemming from international treaties granted Canberra authority over state powers became a key component to the legitimization of national environmental policies. By 1980, Australia had participated in a great number of environmental treaties, allowing the primary focus of the country’s national policies to expand beyond the scope of the Great Barrier Reef. But most environmental

\(^{31}\) Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980, Article 4. In Article 1, this legislation uses “any sea that is on the landward side of any part of the territorial sea of Australia” as its definition for ‘coastal waters of the state.’ This is similar to the precedents and arguments utilized in the Spender Paper when distinguishing state and federal waters in a historical context, and arguing for the legitimacy of federally controlled waters. Spender, *Great Barrier Reef Symposium*, 35-36.

\(^{32}\) Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980, Article 5.

\(^{33}\) The Sea Dumping Act even provides a provision that should the Minister be “satisfied” that individual state law is effective enough in meeting the goals of the London Protocol the full extent of the legislation may be eased in those specific coastal waters. Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981, Article 9, Section 1.
campaigns up until this point regarded the federal government as a powerless ally in the fight for conservation. In his book “Tasmania’s Wilderness Battles,” Greg Buckman notes the “key difference” in the failure to fight the Lake Pedder damming versus the successful stopping of the Franklin River dam lies in the failure of the Pedder protesters to approach Canberra, while an early appeal was made by the Franklin protesters to the federal government.34

In the case of the Franklin River, Canberra had successfully stopped the Gordon-below-Franklin dam project by invoking its obligations to protect its World Heritage Sites of which, the national parks of central Tasmania where the river was located, were listed as the “Western Tasmanian Wilderness.” The Whitlam government, at the advice of Barry Cohen, Minister for Environment, ratified the UN Convention Concerning the Protection of the World’s Cultural and Natural Heritage in 1974. Cohen urged the ratification to the Prime Minister due to his belief that federal environmental laws would be less likely to be challenged in the High Court if they were supported by international conventions.35 The fact that Australia’s World Heritage Areas were designed to serve a dual purpose as wilderness reserves was an open secret as all three of the country’s first inscriptions, listed by the Fraser government in 1981, were large tracts of potentially threatened wilderness.36

While both the Whitlam and Fraser governments saw potential in utilizing international treaties for the pursuit of

34 Buckman, *Tasmania’s Wilderness Battles*, 29-30; claim is further reinforced on 45, 57.
36 The Great Barrier Reef, Kakadu, and the Willandra Lakes Region—all of which were threatened by mining interests and all of which UNESCO recommended enlarging in order to maintain healthy ecosystems. UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Fifth Session (October 1981), Title VIII, Section 15. The national parks of Western Tasmania were added the following year for the purpose of curtailing hydroelectric development in the region. Whitlam, 101 – 102.
environmental policies, the extent to which Canberra could protect the environments of World Heritage Sites was still unchallenged and lacked legal clarification. The Hawke government sought to address these weaknesses by passing the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act in 1983. This was one of the more daring interpretations of the federal division of powers which, citing obligations under international treaties, granted Canberra the power to make proclamations relating to the conservation of specific sites. Simultaneously, this act also made use of the federal government’s corporations power (Article 51, Section 20) and the acquisition of property power (Section 31) to ban certain activities within designated areas. In this regard, this legislation which provided for three different types of proclamations was something of a legal masterpiece, and while its relevance to this paper is restricted, this legislation is certainly worthy of greater independent study.

The first of these proclamations concerned the protection of World Heritage nominated sites under Australia’s obligations to international treaties. Should the government be satisfied that such sites were at risk of being “damaged or destroyed,” then it could issue a proclamation halting the destructive activities occurring within the site (i.e. halting the construction of the Gordon-below-Franklin dam in the Western Tasmanian Wilderness). From here, the guidelines for unlawful acts set under Article 9 could be used to build a comprehensive conservation strategy through strategic limitations (i.e. the banning of logging). Every proclamation issued by the government had to be approved by both houses of the legislature, ensuring that they accurately reflected party policies.

The second form of proclamation applied to sites which were outside the coverage of the UNESCO treaty, which allowed the government to identify threatened sites but only granted

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37 World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983, Article 6 (definition of specific properties in question); Article 9 (unlawful acts within designated areas).
38 World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983, Article 6, Section 3.
Canberra the power, under the banner of its corporations’ power, to ban activities performed by foreign and/or trading corporations in the area.\textsuperscript{40} Similarly, the third form of proclamation also allowed Canberra to expand its reach beyond the scope of the UNESCO treaty by allowing the government to interfere in sites of “particular significance to the Aboriginal people of the race.”\textsuperscript{41} These three tiers of federal intervention in state and private actions granted Canberra a \textit{de jure} power to set its own environmental policies without the need to rescind any authority from state governments or issue any amendment to the Constitution.

The anticipated challenge laid by the Tasmanian government in the High Court, \textit{Commonwealth v. Tasmania 1983} (the Tasmanian Dams Case) resulted in the legality of Hawke’s legislation being upheld by a 4 to 3 ruling, with only Article 8 being ruled unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{42} The ruling constitutionally enshrined the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act as the foundation of modern, federal environmental policies in Australia. More so, its use as a means of further centralizing political authority in Canberra fell in line with the official platform of reforming the federal relationship of Australia on which the Hawke government had campaigned. The World Heritage Properties Conservation Act became one of the most effective means through which this policy was pursued.\textsuperscript{43} The Hawke government had been the first to make environmental issues a key aspect of its electoral campaign, and further cemented federal authority in the realm of environmental policy by building on the precedents set by the Fraser and Whitlam governments. Some of the most successful examples of this include the Ozone Protection Act of 1989 (in conjunction with Canberra’s ratification of the Vienna Convention and Montréal Protocol) and the Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act of 1983, built

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} The World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983, Article 10, Section 2.
\item \textsuperscript{41} The World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983, Article 8, Section 2.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1.
\end{itemize}
upon the foundations of Fraser’s Sea Dumping Act.\(^{44}\) In fact, the sheer volume of legislation passed by Hawke and other successive governments regarding the environment speaks to the firm establishment of environmental policy as a shared responsibility of both the states and Canberra.

**Other Avenues for Canberra and Conclusion**

At the beginning of this paper, the trade, commerce, and external affairs powers of Canberra were cited as the most important tools at the federal government’s disposal for asserting power concerning environmental policy. However, it would serve this analysis poorly if other avenues utilized to achieve this transition were not also addressed. Canberra also creatively used various other powers to set additional environmental policies. The Australian constitutional scholar Cheryl Saunders notes the taxation power (Article 51 Section 2), corporations’ power, race legislation power (Article 26), and seizure of property power as being of particular importance in the federal governments repertoire of relevant powers for environmental legislation.\(^{45}\) Also worthy of considerable attention in Saunders opinion is the financial assistance to states power (Article 96), which formed the foundation of Whitlam’s States Grants (Nature Conservation) Act of 1974, Fraser’s States Grants (Air Quality Monitoring) Act of 1976, and Hawke’s Soil Conservation (Financial Assistance) Act of 1985.\(^{46}\)

The purpose of this paper is not to say that the setting of environmental policy in Australia is solely a federal prerogative. Environmental protection constitutionally remains a state responsibility and to their credit the states have shown great commitment to the protection of the Australian environment.

\(^{44}\) Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1983.


\(^{46}\) Ibid, 67 - 70.
Rather, it is the goal of this paper to examine the constitutional means by which Canberra was able to appropriate a considerable degree of authority over matters pertaining to the environment, changing the direction of future environmental policies at both levels of government. The importance of such an analysis is fundamental to the study of environmental policies. In order for Canberra to use environmental policy as a means of exerting political authority over the states it required a legal basis to do so.
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Possibilities for Intersectional Theorizing in Canadian Historiography: The Subaltern Narrative of Canadian Medical Schools

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Abstract: This paper contributes to current debates on the importance of incorporating critical race and intersectional feminist theorizing into canonical academic disciplines such as history. It is my intention to draw a connection between the historical and contemporary position of medical schools and the social, political, and economic context of Canada as a settler colonial, liberal, democratic nation. Drawing on an interdisciplinary body of literature, I argue that Canada, a growing capitalist state, can be examined from the perspective of a country built on gender- and race-based hierarchies. Salient to current scholars of social theory, critical pedagogy, medical history, and medical education, I use this lens to reflect on the establishment of and reforms to medical schools as institutions from the pre-Confederation era into the modern paradigm of neoliberalism. This analysis suggests that medical schools are important sites to examine the gendered and racialized divisions of bodies and ideologies. This introspection of medical school history is an important part of making changes in our health systems to move forward global and local projects of health equity.

Medical schools in Canada have changed drastically since the founding of the first institution more than 150 years ago. The vast majority of recent scholarship on this topic has focused on the application of clinical based interventions, evaluation of competencies and practice, and cross-comparative analysis between countries.² However, as an emerging scholar attempting

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² For example, see the following articles in recent medical education literature: Barry Issenberg et al., “Features and Uses of High-Fidelity Medical Simulations that Lead to Effective Learning: A BEME Systematic Review,” Medical Teacher 27, no. 1 (2005): 10-28; Karen Mann, Jill Gordon, and Anna MacLeod,
to blur the boundaries between the natural sciences, health policy, critical pedagogy, and intersectional theories of identity, I find that there is an exciting opportunity for interdisciplinary analysis that explores the historical, political, economic, and social contexts in which medical schools operate and grow. The main thesis of this paper is that the establishment and reforms to Canadian medical education are a compelling departure point for medical historians, social scientists, and the public health community. Adding to the call for framing medical education research using social theory, I make a case for further examining the intersections of patriarchy, colonialism, capitalism and the institutionalization of biomedical dominance in health. On the health care system as a whole, critical health researchers state that ideologies of “egalitarianism and individualism” have permeated all aspects of policy and practice in Canada—ostensibly legitimizing the erasure of the inequitable processes through which one of the pillars of the health care system has been built. As an upstream element of the health


3 Brian Hodges, “The Many and Conflicting Histories of Medical Education in Canada and the USA: An Introduction to the Paradigm Wars,” Medical Education, 39 no. 6 (2005): 613.

4 Joan Anderson and Sheryl Reimer-Kirkham, “Constructing Nation: The Gendering and Racializing of the Canadian Health Care System,” in Painting
care system, I suggest that the area of medical education from a critical perspective is both under-researched and under-theorized. This paper has the aim of offering an exploratory feminist, anti-racist critique of the history of medical schools and the current medical paradigm in Canada.

In this paper, I construct an abridged though dynamic chronology of Canadian medical schools with special focus on the (c)overt exclusion of women and racialized groups from these institutions (which warrant further exploration by more skilled archivists). I attend to the ways in which the trajectories of medical schools align with political and economic changes starting with the establishment of the European medical system during pre-Confederation, reforms following the Victorian period and rise of liberalism, and how this has culminated in neoliberal higher education and contemporary Canadian racial exceptionalism. In this history, I suggest that race has at times been used as an exclusionary category to distinguish between settlers from the French and British founding nations and racialized groups (including other European immigrants, non-European immigrants, and Aboriginal peoples). Moreover, that ideologies of nation-building centering Whiteness used to justify the land on which medical schools have been built are the same ideologies that produced the violence of western medicine’s humanitarian mission of colonization.\(^5\) At the same time, gender has been the basis for carving out the category of ‘physician,’ a masculine figure corresponding with the ideal liberal individual, with women often being relegated to the softer and more feminine work of nursing. By pivoting an analysis of medical education history on sex/gender and race, two axes of power, the retention and

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5 Upon reading the chapter titled “Acts of Humanity: Indian Health Services” in *Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in British Columbia, 1900-50* by Mary-Ellen Kelm (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), the disjuncture in world-views between First Nations and Europeans is made abundantly clear. The civilizing-project virtually erased Indigenous healing practices in dominant settler society.
recruitment of individuals in student, faculty, and administrative positions within these institutions can be re-thought. In conversation with Canadian scholars that are doing the important work of looking at the current representation of women of colour within universities and colleges, I argue that gendered and racialized processes have shaped the deepening of educational and social stratification and new forms of health inequities. It should be noted that these are intersectional and emergent relations that work “in and through each other.”

This paper is structured by three sections: (1) a brief history of the formation of the Canadian medical schools until the end of the 20th century; (2) an exploration of the intersections of race and sex/gender in medical school history; and finally, (3) a few notes on the dominant paradigm of medicine and its relation to the logics of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism can be described here as the shift in the global political economy that has taken place in the last few decades, characterized by increased ‘free’ trade, opposition to state regulation, state refusal of responsibility for social welfare, and increase in resource privatization. As a non-historian drawing on the work of historians, health researchers, and social justice scholars as evidence, I aim to offer a re-thinking of the history of Canadian medical schools that is critical in its analysis. Indeed, this paper does not aim to provide a comprehensive review of the history of the Canadian medical schools or the medical profession. Instead, through my training

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6 See the work of Malinda Smith, President of the Academic Women’s Association at the University of Alberta.


9 For this refer to: John Joseph Heagerty, Four Centuries of Medical History in Canada and a Sketch of the Medical History of Newfoundland, Vol. 2. (Toronto: Macmillian Co. of Canada, 1928); Juanne Nancarrow Clarke, Health, Illness, and Medicine in Canada (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2004); William Canniff, The Medical Profession in Upper Canada 1783-1850: A Historical Narrative with Original Documents in Relation to the Profession, Including Some Brief Biographies (1894); Pat Armstrong, Hugh Armstrong, Ivy
as a developmental biologist, a policy analyst, a once budding pre-
medical student, daughter of Indian immigrant parents, and now a
gender and ethnic studies doctoral student, I wish to bring
attention to the ways in which medical schools have worked to
legitimize gender-ed and race-ed “ruling relations” in Canada.  

Medical Schools Until the Late-Twentieth Century

Medical Schools and the Two Founding Nations

Medicine began in Canada centuries before French and British
colonization. Indeed, there were intricate systems of medicine
practiced by Indigenous communities that centered around healers
drawing on herbalism, prayer, and the extraction of spirits—all
given the name of ‘Shamans.’ Although seen as peripheral to
allopathic medicine, Indigenous systems of healing having
continued to evolve parallel to and in interaction with dominant
European medicine, withstanding many extensions of this system
including residential schools, the reservation system, and eugenic
sterilization practices. Early settler writings describe the
Algonkian speaking traditional healers of the Ojibwa tribe who
had “the presumption and folly to fancy that [they were] immortal,
and possessed of the power of curing all diseases, by speaking to
the good and evil spirits.” These shamans were described to be
mediators of the Mide’wiwin or “Grand Medicine Society.”

Mary-Ellen Kelm, drawing on early ethnographies describes with
detail the road and selection process for becoming a healer in

Bourgeault, Jacqueline Choiniere, Eric Mykhalovskiy, and Jerry P. White. *Heal
thyself: Managing Health Care Reform* (Aurora: Garamond Press, 2000); and,
Hodges, *Paradigm Wars.*

10 Dorothy Smith, *Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of
Knowledge* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 74.

Ethnology, Washington, 1891), 156; Kelm, *Colonizing Bodies,* 98.

12 Louis Armand Baron de La Hontan, *New Voyages to North America Volume
2* (London: H. Bonwicke, 1703), 47.

13 Ruth Landes, *Ojibwa Religion and the Midewiwin* (Madison: University of
many west coast First Nations communities. In many cases, it required the prospective trainees to be isolated from the human world, perform “ritual purifications” culminating as a quest to hone healing powers, and ending with severe illness from which they would either recover, having passed their test, or perish. Upon successful transition novice doctors were re-integrated into the community through feast, dance, performance, and ceremony. Particularly relevant is her mention of the differences in paths for women and men. The prospective trainees were thought by some to have a particular connection and control over a spirit, passing through the liminal space between human and non-human worlds. For men this spirit would take the form of a wolf, killer whale, or bird and for women the spirit would exist in song. After marriage many women were seen as unclean and therefore not as desirable to the spirits, meaning fewer women healers. Historical accounts show that these healers did interact with and treat European settlers; in fact, as highly proficient herbalists Aboriginal Shamans remedied sailors accompanying Jacques Cartier of scurvy using the vitamin rich sources of spruce and hemlock buds and bark. It should be noted that these written accounts of Aboriginal beliefs and customs have been textualized by settlers, historians, and anthropologists using the romantic languages and their alphabets; traditionally, Aboriginal healing practices are passed down through oral histories and stories. Indigenous medicine began to break down after prolonged contact with the Europeans and their imported (often epidemic) diseases such as measles, typhoid, typhus, sexually transmitted infections, and smallpox.

Due to the unfamiliar territory, the non-industrialized conditions of the land, and slow pace of ‘scientific’ development, European medicine in pre-Confederation Canada at the time of colonization was largely stagnant and there were sparse numbers of health professionals in the major settlements. In fact, “barber-surgeons” (all of whom were men) tended to most early French settlers’ illnesses, as at the time the universal treatment for

virtually every physical illness was “bleeding.” Most of these men had little formal training in anatomy and biomedicine. Others, such as Michel Sarrazin and Jean François Gaultier who were educated in French Schools of Medicine acted as accomplished physicians, scientists, and surgeons for the first colonists. Both men were part of the first groups of physicians at the Hôtel-Dieu, the first hospital in Canada, originally founded by a religious order from France in 1639.

Moving into the eighteenth century, the colony of New France was ceded to the British. By this time there had been more than a century’s worth of environmental uncertainty and acclimatization, disease, hunger, and continued disenfranchisement of Aboriginal peoples by French settlers. Furthermore, much of the settler activity was concentrated in Upper Canada (Southern Ontario), Lower Canada (the cities of Montréal and Québec, the surrounding area), the Maritimes (Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), and the West (Prairie Provinces and British Columbia). The imposition of the British medical system took largely the same form as the French; barber-surgeons and military surgeons continued to dominate the practice and organization of the profession, with the near total exclusion of Indigenous medicines and the imposition of the colonial framework of residential schools and reservations. French physicians were relegated to the role of serving poorer, rural areas as English physicians took control of the larger, urbanized cities. Some settlers, who could not access the services of European physicians, treated themselves with home remedies and cures based on Aboriginal peoples' prescriptions.

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18 Ibid., 16.
19 Ibid., 35.
19th Century Medical Education, Moral Reform, and Liberalism

During the 19th century, the population of physicians increased dramatically. If contextualized using the “third paradigm” of historiography anchored in centralizing ideology and state-formation, it can be proposed that this increase was due in part to the rise of liberalism in moral reform in Canada.20 For Canada as a progressing liberal state, ensuring the health and viability of individuals was (and is) paramount. However abstract the discursive formation of the ideal liberal individual, morbidity and mortality (materiality) is still part of the equation. The concentration of wealth, western knowledge, and White hegemony contributed to the growth of medical schools an essential “material precondition” of a liberal society and as sites of social, cultural, and financial capital and power.21 Indeed, the 1820s saw the establishment of the first medical schools. Dr. N Tait McPhedran has done the important work of writing an extensive volume on the history of medical school establishment in Canada—the only compilation of these histories to date.22 In the writing of his book he interviewed ten to twenty faculty members, deans, and other key informants at each of the sixteen medical schools in Canada, and supplemented this qualitative work with a review of primary historical documents. Missing from his analysis is the Northern Ontario School of Medicine, established in 2005.23 He writes that the founding of medical

21 Ibid., 628.
23 Marie Matte, Joel Lanphear, Roger Strasser, “Northern Ontario School of Medicine,” Academic Medicine, 85, no. 9 (2010): S628-S632. The Northern Ontario School of Medicine (NOSM) functions as collaboration between Lakehead University in Thunder Bay and Laurentian University in Sudbury and is registered as a not-for-profit corporation. As a not-for-profit corporation, NOSM is not in itself an academic body. It has a strong emphasis on learning medicine in the context of Northern Ontario communities and a social accountability model. In many ways it is an exception to the urban medical focus of the other sixteen medical schools in Canada.
schools was driven by settler physicians wanting to establish a Canadian pedagogical foundation for practicing medicine, standardize medical knowledge across the country, and to increase the numbers of health professionals able to serve the rapidly growing population. The majority of these men were educated in Edinburgh (English) or Paris (French) and were supported by politicians, members of the public, and other doctors who wanted to create distance between themselves and their US neighbours. It was generally felt that medical education in the United States was inadequate; that US medical schools kept low standards in order to profit from a high volume of students; and that Canadians studying in the United States would be “exposed to dangerous democratic principles” during their tenure.\(^{24}\) This coincides with the ideals of the Canadian social gospel and social purity movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.\(^{25}\) Driven by a growing national social sentiment of temperance and prohibition, one can interpret that medical schools and the medical profession played an important part in calls for increased public health during this national shift conceptualizing charity and philanthropy.\(^{26}\) This movement in Canadian morality and its ideological underpinnings can help explain the normative role that medicine took into the twentieth century.

The first medical school to open in Canada, the Montreal Medical Institute in 1822 (later absorbed as the Faculty of Medicine at McGill University in 1828), was headed by practicing physicians from Montreal General Hospital who had been trained at Edinburgh Medical School in Britain.\(^{27}\) In fact, most medical schools in Canada were established by small groups of medical men (educated in Britain or France) working together to provide


lectures on the basic sciences and pathologies of disease to supplement clinical training. Prior to this, “the only medical education available in the colony was by apprenticeship to an established practitioner for five to seven years, followed, if there was money, by further study in Europe.”

Early medical schools were proprietary, owned by one or a few physicians, operated on a for-profit basis, ran on the small amount of revenue generated from student fees, and relied heavily on the support of the Church and private funders. However, as a wealthy class emerged in Canada, as the different sectors of Canada became less isolated, and as industrialization swept across the country, optimism about the future of science and biomedicine quickly grew, leading to government interest in the support of medical education. By the end of the nineteenth century, there were eight established medical schools (all of which were in Eastern Canada). The curriculum and teaching of these schools began to take the form of research-based medicine, whereby laboratory learning, the scientific method, and specialization (a product of advances in technology) were set up as educational pillars.

Largely missing from the few accounts of early medical education in Canada is any description of (the lack of) gender- or race-ed diversity in the administration, faculty, and students in these schools. The sparse statistics available also show that White men of French or British descent dominated medical schools until the mid to late twentieth century; initially women and racialized groups did not have access to studying medicine. Marked by the very aliberal characteristics of community and kinship, racialized men, racialized women, and non-racialized women largely did not participate in the ultra-liberal transformation of medical education. The image of ‘sickness’ and the image of all women and racialized individuals were constructed as one and the same, and therefore in opposition to the role of medical expert. Indeed, the virtually un-erasable line between physical, felt, and real

28 McPhedran, Canadian Medical Schools, 2.
gendered constructions of modern medicine (female and male, XX and XY, vagina and penis) governed access to medical education. For example, the expectations of women in Victorian society and the “idealization of women as wives, mothers, and homemakers” largely rooted in biologically determinist views of femininity meant that women were seen as too frail and sickly to engage in medical practice. The same can be said about theoretically biological racial or cultural markers such as melatonin levels, religion, and rationales for illness whereby racialized groups were seen as primitive, diseased, and all around anti-modern. Described as a “hallmark of racial pride” the imposition of European medical science and practice in part justified colonialism, while simultaneously precluding racialized groups from gaining more knowledge about advances in western science. Moreover, scholars show that students were drawn almost exclusively from middle and upper classes, positioning doctors simultaneous in the bourgeoisie and as highly valuable. Despite structures put in place for exclusion of aspiring ‘non-preferred’ physicians (read: the Other), there are narratives from members of these marginalized groups who had the agency to overcome these barriers. For example, challenging the colourline in medical education, in 1856, Alexander Thomas Augusta graduated from Trinity College (which joined the University of Toronto), becoming the first Black physician in Canada. He later became the first physician of African descent to work in the United States Army. Studying under Augusta at the University of Toronto,

30 Wendy Mitchinson, The Nature of Their Bodies: Women and Their Doctors in Victorian Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 6. In this book Mitchinson provides a history of women as patients and physicians during the Victorian period and analyzes the ways in which interpretations of sex and gender influenced all aspects of women’s health at the time. In the introduction, she cites the work of other feminist thinkers on the topic including Gail Parsons, Regina Morantz-Sanchez, and Barbara Ehrenreich.

31 Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 101.

32 Howard Becker, ed., Boys in White: Student Culture in Medical School (Piscataway: Transaction publishers, 2002), 54.

Anderson Ruffin Abbott graduated with a license to practice in 1861 and became the second Black physician in Canada.\(^34\) In 1865, challenging the gender and sexual logic of the time, Emily Stowe, a White woman, attempted to join the Toronto School of Medicine after her husband was diagnosed with tuberculosis.\(^35\) Upon application, she was told by the Vice President that, “the doors of the University are not open to women and I trust they never will be.”\(^36\) After being denied by Canadian institutions, Stowe went to the United States to earn her medical degree. On her return to Canada and after several years of practice, in 1870, the president of the Toronto School of Medicine granted special permission to Stowe and another American trained physician Jenny Kidd Trout to attend their classes with the goal of eventually obtaining a Canadian medical license. Stowe and Kidd Trout became the first two Canadian women physicians. The first woman to begin her medical studies at a Canadian medical school was Augusta Stowe-Gullen, daughter of Emily Stowe, who was admitted in 1879 (her admission was largely attributed to the influence of a family friend who was president of the school at the time).\(^37\) In 1883, a public meeting of the Canadian Women’s Suffrage Association headed by Emily Stowe led to the creation of the Women’s Medical College, which became affiliated with University of Toronto in 1890.\(^38\) The establishment of a separate school for women, rather than co-education, is simultaneous illustrative of activism of women and the general sentiment of men.

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\(^{38}\) This is now Women’s College Hospital in downtown Toronto and is recognized as the only Collaborating Centre in Women’s Health in the Western Hemisphere designated by the World Health Organization.
(that medical education for women was perhaps a necessity, though should not be conflated with the more rigorous training of medical men). After twenty-two years of operation, the college closed in 1906 when women were accepted into University of Toronto Faculty of Medicine.\footnote{Augusta Stowe Gullen, “A Brief History of the Ontario Medical College for Women,” 1906, Accessed 7 November 2015, http://images.ourontario.ca/Laurier/2738529/data.} However, it was only in the 1920s, because of their contributions to the war effort that women were “admitted to [all] medical schools more freely.”\footnote{McPhedran, \textit{Canadian Medical Schools}, 16.} In a final and perhaps most striking example, Aboriginal peoples were prohibited from pursuing European higher education until the 1960s.\footnote{Michael Mendelson, \textit{Aboriginal Peoples and Postsecondary Education in Canada} (Ottawa: Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 2006), 81.} The first Aboriginal woman physician, Dr. Elizabeth Steinhauer of the Cree Nation, did not gain a license to practice until 1980.\footnote{The Record, “Laurier Student Uncovers Canadian Female Aboriginal Leaders,” 2013, Accessed 7 November 2015, http://www.therecord.com/news-story/2623994-laurier-student-uncovers-canadian-female-aboriginal-leaders/.}

**20th Century Medical Education**

By the early 20th century most schools had been absorbed into the Faculties of Medicine of Universities. Until this time, the establishment of medical schools in Canada occurred largely without any federal state regulation or intervention. The passing of the Canada Medical Act in 1912 by the federal government, however, created the Medical Council of Canada, which would set up “uniform standards for medical education, examination and licensing [which would be transportable between] all Canadian provinces” and aim to move beyond the period of provincialism.\footnote{McPhedran, \textit{Canadian Medical Schools}, 12.} Through this legislature and the creation of other professional bodies (e.g. Canadian Medical Association and Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada), medical schools and their administrators began to tightly control the Canadian medical field through strict accreditation. Three important events catalyzed this
institutionalization of medicine: the publishing of the Abraham Flexner report in 1910; the fallout of World War II and the Massey Commission; and the rise of Canadian welfare state.

The Flexner Report

There has been no single document that has had a greater impact on medical education in North America than The Flexner Report on Medical Education in the United States and Canada. The report was commissioned by The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching through a recommendation of the American Medical Association to survey the state of education at American and Canadian medical schools. Using Johns Hopkins University as the standard, Flexner visited 155 medical schools across Canada and the United States. Canadian medical schools included all the extant schools at the time: McGill, Toronto, Queen’s, Manitoba, Laval, Western Ontario, and Dalhousie University. Published in 1910, the document provided the first external review of Canadian medical education. Unlike some American schools, “every Canadian school survived and achieved Grade A status within twenty years” of the report. One of the main proposals was to have “fewer and better” students, which would eventually reduce the number of physicians and raise the

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46 Ibid., 269.
47 McPhedran, Canadian Medical Schools, 13.
social class standing of the profession.\textsuperscript{48} The Flexner Report described a strong commitment to scientific principles, laboratory research, and evidence-based medicine. The ideal curriculum in the eyes of Flexner would consist of a pre-medical degree followed by two years of basic sciences study with a medical focus and finally two years of clinical training—this is the model that has continued to dominate medical schools in Canada.\textsuperscript{49}

Interestingly, in his report, Flexner includes two short sections of two pages each titled “The Medical Education of Women” and “The Medical Education of the Negro.”\textsuperscript{50} An extensive search of databases suggests that the impact of Flexner’s reporting on women and Black students has seemingly not been taken up in the Canadian medical education literature. Despite the dearth of literature, it can be argued that this format explicitly designated the training of women and racialized persons as separate from and inferior to mainstream, masculinized medical education. In the first page on women, Flexner states, “now that women are freely admitted to the medical profession, it is clear that they show a decreasing inclination to enter it.”\textsuperscript{51} Though historical statistics on the admission of women into medical schools are available for the United States, there is no Canadian data available to substantiate this claim. Flexner was generally in opposition to segregated schools for men and women, and further states “if separate medical schools and hospitals are not to be developed for women, internal privileges must be granted to women graduates on the same terms as men.”\textsuperscript{52} This recommendation led to the further incorporation of women into

\textsuperscript{49} Abraham Flexner, \textit{Medical Education in the United States and Canada} (Washington, DC: Science and Health Publications, Inc. 1910).
\textsuperscript{50} It should be noted that the excerpts taken from these text are presented out of context of the full report—as such, the reader is encouraged to read the entire four pages of the report. Moreover, it should be noted that I, the author, do not endorse the racist language used in the Flexner Report.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 178.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 179.
possibilities for intersectional theorizing

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Medical schools from 1910 onwards with significant consequences. Within these institutions ‘female quotas’ were enacted in admissions and faculty positions and pioneering women advocated for their equal inclusion. Some evidence shows that male students were reluctant to consult with female colleagues, and women medical students were subject to forms of sexualized violence and harassment.\(^{53}\)

In reference to medical education for Black students, Flexner was much less inclusive. He states in his very first line “the medical care of the negro race will never be wholly left to negro physicians.”\(^{54}\) He further writes, “the negro must be educated not only for his sake, but for ours […] the negro needs good schools rather than many schools—schools to which the more promising of the race can be sent to receive a substantial education in which hygiene rather than surgery, for example, is strongly accentuated.”\(^{55}\) In reading these statements, I interpret that Flexner believed in the importance of high quality education, but maintained the status quo when it came to race and racialization. His report suggests that Black students should practice with a primary focus on the remedy of the poor ‘hygiene’ of the Black population and the treatment of ‘Black diseases.’ This invokes notions of “Black inferiority” and the divergence between self/Other, liberal/non-liberal, civilized/primitive.\(^{56}\) Hunt finds in the US context that “because of inadequate clinical and surgical experiences, Black practitioners [are] aware of their deficits and [suffer] from low professional self-esteem. In turn, Black patients became skeptical of Black practitioners and often resisted their treatment.”\(^{57}\) Flexner’s statements and the subsequent consequences are reflective of the current and historical neglect and systematic violence that is imposed on Black communities through mediated relations of power, based on concepts of


\(^{54}\) Flexner, *Medical Education*, 180.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., 180.


\(^{57}\) Ibid., 154.
Whiteness and Blackness. Given the distinct history of slavery and arrival of African immigrants to Canada (e.g. the destruction of Africville and the construction of the African Nova Scotian subject), a further examination centering the experiences of medical students, faculty, and administrators from these communities would provide salient insight into the tensions between nation-formation and multiculturalism. Moreover, this could also be further studied from an Indigenous and settler-colonial perspective in the Canadian context.

**World War II and the Massey Commission**

World War II also had important implications for medical schools. Firstly, McPhedran states, “for the first time the federal government provided financial assistance to medical schools, on the grounds that production of physicians was part of the war effort.”\(^58\) With this additional source of funding, medical schools began to accelerate their program in order to keep up with the need for physicians to be posted. Secondly, the majority of medical unit leadership within the military consisted of faculty members from various medical schools across the country, leading to the creation of “strong nationalist links in the previously fragmented Canadian medical profession.”\(^59\) Thirdly, due to the impact made by advances in science and technology in warfare, the importance of scientific research contributed to large numbers of veteran men pursuing degrees in the medical sciences and engineering. Under pressure to increase class sizes and research capacities, universities lobbied the federal government for funding, “arguing that universities were national institutions and therefore a federal responsibility.”\(^60\) In 1951, the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (also known as the Massey Commission) published a report that would lead to the allocation of $150 - $200 per student registered in professional schools, including medicine.\(^61\) In addition to the powerful rise of

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58 McPhedran, *Canadian Medical Schools*, 18.
59 Ibid., 19.
60 Ibid., 19.
the women’s movement in Canada, this expansion in the capacity to intake students was one of the main reasons for the admission of more women into medical schools. The turn to new, more ‘scientific’ medicine was also heavily promoted by private interests (such as the Rockefeller foundation)—beginning the corporatization of the medical school.\textsuperscript{62}

**Effects of the Canadian Public Health Care System on Medical Education**

The post-war mindset, characterized by public dissatisfaction with high unemployment, huge debts, and general deprivation, led to an optimism about state intervention—contributing to the development and subsequent expansion of the Canadian public health care system.\textsuperscript{63} Progressively, starting largely in 1947 through the work of Tommy Douglas in Saskatchewan, policies such as the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act in 1957, the Medical Care Act in 1966, and the combination of this Act with funding for post-secondary education called the Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing Act in 1977 created an expansive public system.\textsuperscript{64} Upon implementation of the 1984 Canada Health Act, “virtually all services provided within the hospitals and all necessary doctor care were paid for from the public purse, without user fees.”\textsuperscript{65} This also meant that medical schools would need to further expand their capacity in order to meet the demands of the predicted shortage of physicians. During this time, four additional medical schools were established, bringing the total up to sixteen schools (which would

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\textsuperscript{65} Armstrong et al., *Heal Thyself*, 16.
remain until 2005). The Health Resources Fund, a collaborative action between provinces and the federal governmental, fueled this expansion that promoted the development of ‘academic health sciences centres’ consisting of a university hospital, related clinical institutions, a medical school, and other health professions schools. In parallel to structural changes, amendments to medical curriculum included “early clinical exposure, emphasis on self-directed learning and integration of subject matter from the various disciplines” and a “revision of the public health component” to include a social sciences and humanities perspective (albeit a small one). At this point, the state became highly involved in medical education because of its control over university and hospital funding and because of its direct funding of hospital residency placements. Indeed, one could argue that medical education under the golden age of welfare was largely folded into the extensive fabric of state-run and regulated services, and following the increasingly neo-liberal turn in the late twentieth century has followed in the trajectory of financialization.

**Thinking Race, Sex/Gender, and Their Intersections in Medical School History**

I argue that the gendered division of power and access within medical schools is evident in the history presented above. As shown in the literature, the participation of women in medical schools has gone from almost total exclusion to women forming the majority of new admissions—termed the “feminization of medicine.” The trend however is segregated by specialization,

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69 Susan P. Phillips and Emily B. Austin, “The Feminization of Medicine and
Possibilities for Intersectional Theorizing

whereby women are significantly underrepresented in residencies such as surgery, obstetrics/gynecology, and emergency medicine. This can arguably be attributed, in part, to the extended length of these residencies and the corresponding pressure put on women students who are foundationally expected to perform the lion’s share of unpaid work in the household, such as childcare. In a recent study at a Canadian medical school, researchers found that at all career stages (medical school, residency, practice, and teaching) women were less likely than men to recommend parenting to their peers, were more dissatisfied than their male colleagues with the amount of time spent with their children, and were more likely to consider flexibility in their academic responsibilities. A rich but largely missing body of literature might also look into the heteronormativity of the institution and the erasure of queer, two-spirit, trans, and/or gender non-binary students throughout this history. Only in the last five years (of more than 100 years of medical education in Canada) has research on this topic begun to emerge. In the largest North American study on sexual and gender identity among medical students, Mansh et al. show that sexual and gender minority students are likely to experience discrimination based on their non-heteronormative identities, and therefore may choose to conceal these identities for fear of reprisal from peers, faculty members, and patients. The authors present a quote from an


Matthew Mansh, William White, Lea Gee-Tong, Mitchell Lunn, Juno

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Aboriginal medical student in Canada who states, “there are students in class who are conservative/religious/homophobic [...] Unfortunately, the idea of variation in sexual identities is not very well accepted in our society yet, even in medical schools and among the younger generation.”

Though a plurality of gender identities exists in medical education institutions, gender, as a social construct enforced by power relations, affects how the experiences of self-identified women and gender non-binary students are conceptualized, valued, and supported with differential impacts on their academic and personal lives. I believe that there is room to expand our understanding of how this distribution of power is historically linked to the disadvantages afforded to women and other marginalized genders in medicine, as a male/men-dominated profession.

Perhaps surprisingly (or not), issues related to race-based discrimination have been largely ignored by most medical schools, despite their inter-connections with issues of gender, the rise in feminist, anti-colonial, anti-racist student activism on campuses, and the proliferation of scholarship deploying intersectionality and postcolonial feminist theory.


74 Ibid., 641.

universality need to be avoided—when speaking about ‘women’ and their gradual acceptance into the medical profession, I am writing specifically about White, European women, as their racialized counterparts have been largely left out of admissions, literature, and statistics. To speak of gender in the context of the medical school history, one must consider how this intersects with the history of immigration, slavery, women’s movements, and colonialism. Moreover, we should also think about the tensions between gender and race in discussions of equity and inclusion in institutions of higher education. Though overt racist practices have been eliminated from admissions criteria such as those described by Flexner, one could make the claim that they have now taken on more diffuse and less spectacular forms. It could be suggested that medical education institutions continue to leverage their equal acceptance of women into the institution to erase the exclusion of Black and Aboriginal students from their ranks. As of 2002, approximately one-third of Canadian medical students are from racialized groups, the majority of whom are classified as South Asian and Chinese. Black and Aboriginal students were underrepresented in the classroom, comprising only 1.2 and 0.7 percent of students.76 In my own review of the current ‘deans of medicine’ of the seventeen schools across Canada, fifteen are White men, one is a White women, and one a racialized man, who is a ‘chair’ rather than a dean.77 A similar quantification of ‘diversity’ could be studied in the numbers of racialized vice-deans, department heads, and faculty. As one of the only Canadian scholars to have taken up the issue of racism in medical schools, Brenda Beagan finds that micro level interactions that constitute “everyday

76 Brenda L. Beagan, “Is This Worth Getting into a Big Fuss Over? Everyday Racism in Medical School,” Medical Education 37, no. 10 (2003): 852-860; Irfan A. Dhall, Jeff C. Kwong, David L. Streiner, Ralph E. Baddour, Andrea E. Waddell, and Ian L. Johnson, “Characteristics of First-Year Students in Canadian Medical Schools,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 166, no. 8 (2002): 1029-1035. Note: in the second study 1223 medical students across twelve medical schools were surveyed, which included schools in the major urban centers.

77 These numbers are based on an online search of the respective administrators on Faculty and departmental websites.
“racism” are still prevalent in medical schools and in the experiences of racialized medical students. Bannerji describes this situational experience of racialized groups in Canada. She states:

Here we are marked by a difference which has less to say about us—our histories and cultures—than about a mode of socio-political interpretation within a pre-established symbolic and practical schema of a racialized or ethnicized colonial and slave-owning discourse.

The “mode of socio-political interpretation” Bannerji refers to above is neoliberalism and the process she describes can be framed using an anti-racist, anti-colonial critique as ‘recolonization.’ In other words, I would argue that the spatial dispersion in a largely non-racialized population subjugates racialized persons to colonizing structures and rhetoric that are still present in the thoughts and imaginations, constructions of knowledge, and public policies of settler-colonial countries. Racialized groups in medical schools have, in general, very different histories with the Canadian state as described by McGibbon and Etowa. However, in their interactions with the institution, they share the common relation of being non-White and their experiences of racialization can be theorized by tracing the dualism between center and margin in Canadian history. Historical narratives presented above describe perceptions of the differences between women and men, and racialized and non-racialized medical students, indicating that structural disadvantages for the former groups can be further understood. Indeed, Razack et al. in their review of discourses of academic excellence, diversity, and equity on the websites of the medical schools in Canada find that these institutions “appeal to the

78 Beagan, “Is This Worth Getting into a Big Fuss Over?” 2003.
80 Elizabeth McGibbon and Josephine Etowa, Anti-Racist Health Care Practice (Toronto: Canadian Scholar’s Press, 2009), 33.
trappings of superficial diversity (race, ethnicity, gender, and the like) as a commodity of cosmopolitan sophistication.”  

Through a critical perspective, the visual, textual, and corporeal representation of historically marginalized persons within the medical school can be situated in as objects derived from the White gaze discontinuous with the history of colonialism on which these institutions have been built. Linking this to the intersections presented above, the positioning of gender as separate from race, both currently and historically, echoes a cultural politics in which there is a pre-occupation with establishing boundaries in identity. It is ultimately a system based on categorization, and a filling of these categories with certain significance which influences who is and who is not rationalized to fit the expectations of medical schools as they have been constructed.

**Modern Paradigm of Medicine, the Body, and Neoliberalism**

Stemming from the increased relevance of medical research within the medical school after the release of the Flexner Report described above, medical education has been primarily organized into disease or organ blocks that emphasize microbiological, biochemical, and pathophysiological causes of illness, often termed “biomedicine.” The very existence of medical specialization rests upon a reductionist analysis of the body and disease, and as such curriculum and institutional departments began their division into specialized technical topics founded upon scientific medicine. As illustrated above, starting with colonization, the rise of liberalism, and catalyzed by visions of

technology after WWII, Canadian medicine quickly adopted European ideologies of the body as a bounded entity with a focus on the diseased body—drawing a distinct line between Indigenous knowledge and the western scientific knowledge. It can be argued that this modality reproduces the conservative orientation towards individualization, marginalization of patient voice, and clinical invisibility of the social construction of illness.

I would link this crystallization of the dominance of biomedicine with the new economy of the body in the West, whereby the bodies of individuals become the sites of institutional intervention—the major object on which the institution can exert its power. Indeed, I argue that this rise in the dominance of biomedicine is elemental to the rolling out of a neoliberal agenda in the late twentieth century influencing the spheres of education, social security, and health care. As stated above, neoliberalism can be broadly defined as a political and economic philosophy that articulates the transfer of responsibility for employment and wellbeing from the state onto households in the form of labour participation.83 The ideological convergence of modern medicine and a neo-capitalist mode of governing renders a ‘victim-blaming approach’ to health that justifies state retrenchment from providing citizenship rights to health care and other social services, and also strongly reformulates health as an individual responsibility. This is an approach that “limits its attention to the materiality of the body and fails to pay sufficient attention to the politics of health.”84 Both diverge from a materialist analysis of disease and disease prevention towards a model that places the onus almost squarely on communities for their aggregate health outcomes, while neglecting to critically engage with the production of systemic inequality and poverty by international and domestic institutions and decision-makers. Moreover, it actually provides a shield against uncovering Western complicity in the creation, spread, and maintenance of poor public health trends.

83 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 56.
This contradictory context has had a role in the transformation of the medical school and medicine in general, involving corporatization, marketization, and privatization of knowledge. This is demonstrated in the increased presence of the pharmaceutical industry in the Canadian medical school classroom.\(^85\) In this model, universities are increasingly seen as sources of industrial innovation, whereby national science policies in Canada encourage private investment in science and a strengthening of the academic-industrial complex.

**Conclusion**

In this paper I have argued that the processes of colonialism, patriarchy, and capitalism have played a role in the shaping of medical school history and its contemporary position in Canada. The building of these institutions began with British and French settlement in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With an escalation of the colonial population in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Canadian medical schools began to take shape. Through the actions of the Flexner report, the advances of WWII, and the rise of the public health care system, the medical school situated itself at the dominant power in the medical division of labour and care in Canada. Analysis of the intersection of race and gender in the bodies occupying these institutions illustrates the fundamental reality of the privilege granted to certain groups, and the exclusion of others. Moreover, the rise of biomedical dominance in medical schools in conjunction with neoliberal ideologies help explicate the commodification of health (and all forms of social life), that continue to widen gaps in health equity in Canada. Overall, the history and critical analysis presented in this paper begins to show that the institutions of medical schools are constitutive of the processes of racialization, feminization, and historical subjugation that shape life opportunities and health in the present. I write this paper not as an affront to the medical profession, but rather a vantage point from which to re-

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conceptualize what the next paradigm of medical education could be. Through this paper, I hope to encourage the proliferation and uptake of this critical stance within the literature of Canadian history, medical sociology, and health professions education.

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The Final Nail: The Russians in 1916

JEFFREY MACIEJEWSKI

Abstract: The events of 1916 broke Tsarist Russia, putting it on an unavoidable path to revolution, but it was not the revolutionaries that set the empire on that path. Instead, the combination of a small-scale defeat at Lake Narotch, the success of the Brusilov Offensive, the addition of Romania as an ally, and economic changes fundamentally altered Russia’s socio-economic foundation. This negative shift provided the fertile ground the revolutionaries needed to expand beyond being manageable annoyances. As a direct result of 1916’s wartime events, Russia’s longstanding radical sentiment finally began to boil over into actual revolutions in 1917.

Introduction

Winston Churchill once wrote “the very rigidity of the (Russian) system gave it its strength and, once broken, forbade all recovery.”¹ In this respect, 1916 was the decisive year for the Russian Empire as it broke the Tsarist system. World War I’s first two years went poorly for Russia, but circumstances shifted in 1916, offering the Russians their best chance for victory; their economy had significantly improved and their enemies believed they had broken the Russian Army. New leaders with fresh ideas emerged to challenge the Central Powers like never before and with victory Russia gained a new ally, Romania. The Russians finally seemed to have reached parity with their enemies and the ability to fully assist the Allied cause.

It was the make-or-break year for Russia. Given such changes in fortune, why did 1916 break both the Russian Army and the Tsarist government? The confluence of changes and events, even positive ones, simply overwhelmed Russia. New stresses—massive military losses, a new ally that further taxed Russia’s already strained forces, and economic changes—

fundamentally altered the Russian war effort and put Russia on the unavoidable road to revolution.

**After 1915**

The disasters of 1915 laid the foundation for Russia’s decisive year in the war. Germany’s Chief of the General Staff, General Erich von Falkenhayn, believed the Russian Army had been broken to the point that “recovery would hardly be possible.” Believing that revolution was imminent, the Germans started moving west, leaving the Austro-Hungarian Army to control most of the Eastern Front. The Austro-Hungarian Army had seemingly improved in the war’s second year with successful operations against the Russians, but they remained inferior to German forces. As such, the Russians would focus their attack against them the following summer.

German field marshal Paul von Hindenburg agreed with Falkenhayn’s sentiment but remained less confident about Russia’s demise as Germany had failed to strike a deathblow. He did believe, however, that Russian losses in the Great Retreat had reduced Russia as a significant threat, but remained cautious. Activity in the Russian rear remained high though it took place away from Russia’s best railways, but near locations that Hindenburg also believed were vulnerable points in the German line. One could never underestimate Russia, a fact history repeatedly demonstrated. Still, after the Central Powers’ great victories in 1915, there was reason to believe Russia had moved closer to collapse.

While the Gorlice-Tarnow Offensive’s effects were significant, they were not decisive. Field Marshal August von Mackensen, for all his success, failed to envelop and crush the retreating Russians. Had the Germans annihilated Russian forces in 1915, the Eastern Front’s strategic face would have been

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drastically altered. Industrial era warfare required an enemy’s eradication; massive defeats no longer sufficed. Even in light of this, events on the Eastern Front appeared to be moving in the Central Powers’ favor and their confidence in victory was high.⁵

Not all World War I leaders felt the way that Germany’s leaders did. Churchill believed that Germany’s strategic position was worse. In his mind, the Russian Army remained a “first-class” power, one whose manpower reserves and vast territory could negate the advantages the Germans had gained throughout 1915.⁶ Furthermore, the shell crisis, the overall lack of artillery munitions, which hit all countries had subsided, and despite the Great Retreat, the Russian lines held. The Germans failed to gain an actual advantage and rested on their overconfidence in the strategic landscape. It appeared to them as though it would take only a little more persuading to bring Romania into the Central Powers’ fold and with it vast amounts of food, fuel, and troops. Romania’s entry would further destabilize the Eastern Front, and even possibly force Russian capitulation. Churchill believed that this overconfidence led Falkenhayn to dismiss the Eastern Front and plan an offensive against perhaps the strongest point in the French lines, Verdun. In yet another mistaken decision, Churchill continued, the Germans believed that Austro-Hungarian forces on the Eastern Front were more capable than they really were. As such, Falkenhayn largely placed Austro-Hungarian forces in charge of the front, allowing Germany to transfer divisions to France.⁷ This overconfidence set the stage for 1916’s battles and afforded the Russians an opportunity to achieve a great and potentially decisive victory.

In terms of materiel, the Russians developed a strong foundation for 1916’s campaigns. The shell crisis of 1915 jumpstarted Russia’s industry in ways the war had otherwise not. New factories opened and more employees joined the Russian war

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effort. Even as conscription forced more men to the front lines, the economy grew 13.7% when compared to a 1913 baseline, and machinery output increased by nearly 146%. Economic historian Peter Gatrell notes that Russian industry’s production of shells, artillery, and firearms increased dramatically as did individual worker efficiency. This provided a stark contrast to Russia’s early war effort, especially as 1916’s production levels of many munitions types increased three and four fold over the course of that year. This meant that the Russian Army no longer faced significant materiel shortages that plagued their earlier operations. The number of frontline troops also increased. Previously, Russia had fewer men on the frontlines than did France, despite having a population nearly four times larger and a significantly longer front. Despite this change, the Tsarist government still had to balance their demands for troops with their precarious relationship with the Russian people. Since a close partnership between the people and the Tsarist government simply did not exist, the government feared that placing too large a burden on the massive peasant population could create enough unrest to threaten the government.  

Those who saw the Russian Army firsthand agreed that Russia’s war effort improved. Major General Alfred W. F. Knox, a British observer on the Eastern Front, wrote that the Russian military situation going into 1916 improved beyond the expectations of its allies. Not only did ammunition, artillery, and firearm output increase, but soldier morale and the number of reserve troops did as well. The Russian Army stood better prepared than ever before. With Germany’s attention turned westward and the improvements in Russia’s war-making ability, the Russians held a distinct advantage.

Even with these improvements, Russia still faced a number of critical problems. Its internal infrastructure, namely its railroad network, strained under the yoke of war. It lacked the capacity to transport both troops to and around the front and Russia’s vast resources to factories. Furthermore, Russia’s remaining lackluster leaders organized campaigns in areas that its allies believed to be of less strategic importance, such as the Caucasus, rather than areas of greater strategic importance like Galicia. French and British leaders also feared that after Russia’s 1915 setbacks that another revolution was brewing, much like how Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War brought about the 1905 Revolution.

Russian general Yakov Zhilinski surprised Allied leaders at Chantilly when he stated that Russia eagerly supported a unified Allied offensive in 1916. The plan involved a French and British attack along the Somme with Russian forces attacking somewhere along the Eastern Front. Theoretically, all areas would become vulnerable and subject to breakthrough, paralyzing any effective response. While Zhilinski’s bravado sounded reassuring, Russia’s internal problems would stifle such plans in 1916. The Russians could not hope to support their operations with a defunct logistics network and its associated problems.

Russian leadership would prove to be another fundamental issue as the war entered its third year. Zhilinski, like many Russian generals, was a failed leader, one whose ideas and planning contributed to the massive defeats at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes. This stemmed from Russian military thinking that remained “intellectually impoverished” according to Peter Kenez. The Russians failed to study their own military history,

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10 Each Russian name has a variety of spellings based on the transliteration. I will maintain consistency in how I spell their names with the exception of direct quotes and bibliography entries.
examine preceding conflicts in depth, or analyze how modern weaponry changed warfare. As they fought in the first modern war – the Russo-Japanese War – Russian military leaders should have gained a distinct advantage over their adversaries during the interwar years. Sadly, the Russian generals’ lack of intellectual curiosity ensured that any lessons would remain unlearned while Russia’s enemies studied them in depth. Furthermore, the Tsar’s refusal to dismiss hapless generals like Aleksei Kuropatkin, the architect of Russia’s failed effort against the Japanese, meant that Russia would face a competent foe with incompetent leaders. Many of these generals believed that Russia had no prospects for victory and as a result cared more about maintaining their reputations and social standing than winning a war. Their incompetence and defeatist attitudes would be impossible for Russia to overcome.

Nevertheless, Russia did have a few competent leaders, ones who understood how to fight a modern war. New and able officers rose through the ranks as Russia replenished its losses. These men, Stone writes “were thoroughly discontented with ‘the system’—men of high military competence.” By 1916, they had gained enough influence to affect change on the officer corps, but it would not be enough to overcome the damage caused by entrenched leaders. This would prove to be the Russian Army’s greatest challenge going forward, especially as later conscripts decreased in quality, knowledge, and skills while their susceptibility to revolutionary agitation increased.

Chief among these bold, competent leaders was General Aleksei Brusilov. He assumed command of the Southwestern Front in early 1916 and led Russian forces in what some historians believe to be World War I’s most effective operation: the Brusilov Offensive. Brusilov believed Russia possessed the ability to achieve victory on the Eastern Front, especially as Russian troops

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remained healthier than in previous wars and their morale remained high. Furthermore, they finally had sufficient ammunitions, shells, artillery, and firearms to sustain offensive action. He viewed 1916 with optimism as he wrote, “we had every cause to reckon on being able to defeat the enemy and drive him across our frontier.” Brusilov placed other competent generals under his command, ones whom he trusted to carry out his plans. They would help provide Russia its greatest chance for victory during the war. It would be the other generals, in spite of Brusilov’s successes, who would squander Russia’s last chance for victory.15

The right combination of events and circumstances in 1916 provided the foundation for Russian war time success and the potential to stem the growing revolutionary sentiment. Historian W. Bruce Lincoln argues that Russia had a chance to avoid revolution that year, but only if their military situation changed dramatically. The year was a balancing act, where the changes Russia made would either restore the country's strength or destroy it; everything hinged on the year’s military outcome. Given the strategic climate, it certainly seemed plausible that Russia could shift the tide of the war in its favor.16 German plans, however, quickly changed everything.

**The Lake Narotch Offensive**17

The German attack at Verdun derailed Russia’s plans for 1916 before Russia even had a chance to exploit its positive changes materiel production. Churchill recorded that Allied planners at Chantilly argued against any “side-shows” during the 1916 campaign season so they could focus on a unified plan to keep the Germans occupied on all fronts.18 Germany’s unexpected attack at Verdun meant that Russia’s first action would be such a sideshow.

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17 Also spelled Naroch and Narocz.
In the grand scheme of the war, the Lake Narotch Offensive appears inconsequential but this small and largely obscure battle had far-reaching effects. While the economic and industrial changes during 1915 provided Russia the materiel and men necessary for victory in 1916, Lake Narotch reshaped Russian fighting attitudes with devastating results.

After the opening German salvos at Verdun on 21 February 1916, French marshal Joseph Joffre pleaded with the Russians to change their offensive timetable to relieve pressure on the Western Front. Given Russian generals’ overall reluctance to fight and the compressed timeline with which they now had to plan an offensive, the results were catastrophic. Led by the feuding Kuropatkin and General Aleksei Evert – another failed general – the Russians amassed 350,000 troops against fewer than 100,000 Germans. With the past year’s production improvements, the Russians also enjoyed superiority in the number of shells, but poor planning negated that advantage. They launched the offensive in late March, coinciding with the spring thaw. It was neither an ideal nor intelligent time to fight.\footnote{Lincoln, \textit{Passage Through Armageddon}, 185-87.}

Predictably the offensive failed from the start. Mismanagement, poor Russian communication, and infighting between the Russian leaders made certain the offensive became an utter disaster. The spring thaw slowed operations as Russian troops slogged through water and mud in frigid weather. Unable to move troops effectively and comprehend confused orders issued by the feuding commanders, Russian forces lost 100,000 men without gaining any territory while the Germans lost 20,000.\footnote{Lincoln, \textit{Passage Through Armageddon}, 185-87; Stone, \textit{The Eastern Front}, 231.}

Whatever help the Russians did provide to the French, if any, was hardly worth the cost.

The Russians became a victim of their own overconfidence in their numerical superiority and rushed planning. Given Zhilinski’s bluster at Chantilly, the ostensibly prepared Russians could not refuse to answer their ally’s call for help. Russia’s poor execution meant that the Germans, despite vastly superior Russian
numbers, only needed to transfer three divisions to counter the offensive, none of which came from the Western Front. The Russians accomplished nothing except needlessly losing men and expending materiel.\textsuperscript{21}

The Lake Narotch Offensive had far-reaching effects on Russia’s 1916 war effort. Stone argues that the offensive was “one of the decisive battles” of World War I as “it condemned most of the Russian army to passivity.”\textsuperscript{22} It solidified a defeatist mindset for many Russian generals, believing that if their superiority in men and shells could not bring victory, nothing could. The Russian Army’s Chief of Staff, General Mikhail Alekseev, perpetuated this belief as he observed the French routinely refused to go on the offensive without having approximately four times the shells per gun that the Russians had when they launched their failed operation. Alekseev believed that the Russians could not hope to accumulate matching numbers. Rather than work to make the Russian logistics system more reliable, Stone argues they “would have no stomach for attack” going forward.\textsuperscript{23}

The Lake Narotch Offensive’s consequences remain vitally important to understanding the coming summer campaign. When one combines their defeatist spirit, dearth of military intellect, and poor planning, it paints Russian military leaders as men who wished to enjoy their aristocratic military rank without its commensurate duties and responsibilities. Without men willing to confront and accept the war’s harsh realities and their role in it, Russia could no longer hope for victory in 1916.

Despite this, the Lake Narotch Offensive offered a silver lining. It validated German beliefs regarding the Russians’ incompetence and inferiority. As a result, the Central Powers, already bogged down against stiffer than expected French resistance at Verdun, committed more and more men and materiel to the Western Front. While German planners still worried about the abilities of their Austro-Hungarian allies, Verdun consumed their attention. They believed that even the inferior Austro-

\textsuperscript{21} Stone, \textit{The Eastern Front}, 227-31.
\textsuperscript{22} Stone, \textit{The Eastern Front}, 231.
\textsuperscript{23} Stone, \textit{The Eastern Front}, 227-31.
Hungarian troops could withstand any future Russian offensive should the Russians, after such a disaster, attack again.\textsuperscript{24}

The Lake Narotch Offensive had significant effects on the Eastern Front going forward. But how would those effects manifest themselves and influence a summer campaign? Would they be a boon to future Russian operations or relegate them to failure? To understand this and the overall effect the offensive had on future operations, historians must examine the most consequential operation on the Eastern Front: the Brusilov Offensive.

**The Brusilov Offensive**

The Brusilov Offensive would be Russia’s high water mark and it would also start Tsarist Russia’s unraveling. The plan for a summer offensive caught many senior Russian leaders off-guard. Brusilov’s predecessor on the Southwestern Front, General Nikolai Ivanov, had led the Tsar to believe that his troops would be unable to engage in any significant military action that year. Brusilov wrote that he surprised the Tsar with his push for specific, aggressive action only a few months later during a war conference with other Russian leaders. His Southwestern Front would be the main attack, with supporting offensives along the Northern and Western fronts. Kuropatkin and Evert commanded those fronts, respectively. With a propensity to shun decision-making, the Tsar urged Brusilov to present his plan to the Russian Council of War for further discussion. Brusilov’s ideas shocked many generals as well. After submitting his plans, Brusilov noted that some leaders grew more optimistic about Russia’s prospects for that summer. Brusilov eventually persuaded even Kuropatkin and Evert though they still harbored some doubts, even as Alekseev assured them they would have the necessary resources. The fact that they needed such assurances shows how Russian leadership began to believe that effective operations were impossible without an overwhelming superiority in both men and shells.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{24} Neiberg and Jordan, *The Eastern Front*, 90-92.
Brusilov agreed with their concerns about resources to a point, but he also saw no reason not to attack. Russia, he argued, must seize the initiative and restore hope. If all Russian fronts attacked in unison, they could prevent the Germans from transferring troops to specific areas to repel piecemeal Russian attacks. With the Germans and Austro-Hungarians engaged both at Verdun and along the Italian Front, and the British and French about to launch a joint offensive along the Somme, the Russians had an opportunity to negate Germany’s central location and stretch German forces thin. Alekseev eventually approved the operation with Kuropatkin and Evert agreeing to support the offensive, but they did so only in hopes of maintaining their favor with the Tsar, not supporting Brusilov. Their combined unwillingness to lend Brusilov active support guaranteed that Russia would squander its best chance for success.26

Brusilov needed more than confidence to achieve victory. After carefully studying previous offensives, he concluded than many failed because operations focused on fronts which were far too narrow. Russian artillery lacked the experience, numbers, and accuracy of enemy artillery units, leaving enemy positions largely unmolested. This allowed the enemy to easily concentrate their firepower and reserves on that narrow front as Russian troops funneled through. Brusilov realized that he needed to attack on a broad front with a massive, but short, bombardment. With such a large attack, the enemy would be paralyzed and unable to focus their efforts and reserves against any one sector.27

The Russians had every opportunity for success when their guns opened fire on 4 June 1916, especially as they caught Austro-Hungarian troops unaware as they were celebrating Conrad von Hőtzendorf’s – their army’s chief of staff – birthday. Believing the Russians were largely defeated, the Central Power’s leadership dismissed Brusilov’s opening attacks. Given the failure of Lake Narotch, they believed that they could easily halt the new Russian operation, but this offensive would be different. The Russians possessed little numerical advantage this time as they amassed

26 Brussilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 210-18.
27 Neiberg and Jordan, The Eastern Front, 92-93.
some 650,000 troops against 500,000 enemy troops, the vast majority of which were Austro-Hungarian. While Austro-Hungarian forces proved capable of repelling poorly-led Russian attacks, Russian troops under Brusilov quickly overwhelmed and destroyed Austro-Hungarian units, sending German and Austro-Hungarian leaders into a panic. Russian forces captured some 40,000 troops in the first two days. After a week, the Russians had captured nearly 200,000, or one third of Austro-Hungarian forces on the front. The Russians also had pushed nearly twenty-five kilometers west from their original front lines.\textsuperscript{28} This was a feat nearly unheard of in a war where armies routinely slaughtered hundreds of thousands of men for no gain.

Brusilov’s momentum had the potential to strike a catastrophic blow to the Central Powers. With Austro-Hungarian forces in full retreat along the Southwestern Front and German leadership scrambling to respond, Brusilov needed Kuropatkin and Evert to launch supporting offensives. The likelihood of a massive Russian breakthrough was high; the Central Powers were simply overwhelmed. With nearly 1.5 million additional men sitting idle on the Northern and Western Fronts, even limited attacks would helped tie down all Central Powers forces.\textsuperscript{29} Brusilov’s attacks produced such a crisis that Hindenburg wrote “for a moment we were faced with the menace of complete collapse!”\textsuperscript{30} Along such a colossal front, against such a massive number of troops, concentrating forces at any one point would have proved impossible. Brusilov achieved considerable success but he needed active support before he exhausted his finite resources. Kuropatkin and Evert made excuses, however, and repeatedly delayed their offensive plans with dubious claims of insufficient troops and materiel. These details did not matter to Brusilov. He needed them to attack immediately because the Germans were rushing in reinforcements. Brusilov wrote, “even if


\textsuperscript{29} Lincoln, \textit{Passage Through Armageddon}, 253.

\textsuperscript{30} Hindenburg, \textit{Out of My Life}, 1:194.
Evert and Kuropatkin’s attacks should not be crowned with success, the mere fact of their taking the offensive in force would prevent the enemy opposite them from moving for a fairly considerable time, and would give him no chance of transferring reserves from their fronts to mine.”

Under Alekseev’s orders, Kuropatkin and Evert launched their supporting attacks, but only perfunctorily. Their unwillingness to fight demonstrated the lingering and decisive effects of Lake Narotch. Even when presented with the first true prospects for victory, both local and potentially war-changing, entrenched Russian leaders failed to seize the advantages. As a result, the Germans effectively transferred twenty-five divisions to aid beleaguered Austro-Hungarian forces, including eight from the Western Front. Facing more and better troops, Alekseev eventually transferred four corps from other fronts to aid Brusilov. The campaign continued until mid-September, eventually capturing nearly twenty-five thousand square kilometers of territory but at high costs. In all, the Russians inflicted some 1.5 million casualties on the Central Powers while suffering approximately a half million themselves.

The Brusilov Offensive had significant consequences for both the Central Powers and the Tsarist regime. With losses topping three-quarters of a million troops, Austria-Hungary broke. Germany quickly propped up the dying empire, transforming it into a German puppet state. This stretched German forces thin as Germany now had to provide men and materiel to replenish Austro-Hungarian losses. Austro-Hungarian morale shattered.

One would expect the exact opposite on the Russian side but despite the disparity in the numbers of casualties, Russian losses

31 Brussilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 243-44.
33 Lincoln, Passage Through Armageddon, 254-57.
34 Lincoln, Passage Through Armageddon, 257.
had a disproportionate impact on the Russian Army and the Russian people.

The territory gained proved another strain as it created a massive salient, one that required additional troops to secure, further stretching Russian forces after suffering heavy losses. During 1915’s Great Retreat, Russian losses yielded an unexpected bit of assistance. As they retreated, the Russians eliminated their massive salient, cutting the length of their front in half, which required fewer men and less materiel to hold the line. This allowed Russia to reconstitute its forces for action in 1916. By doing the opposite, Brusilov’s victory actually hurt the Russian war effort.\textsuperscript{36} It is possible that had the other front commanders attacked as planned the salient would not have existed or that it would have been smaller, straining Russian forces to a lesser degree.

For many troops and the Russian people, these casualties proved to be more than they could bear. Michael Kettle states that these losses “virtually ruined Russia as a military power.” The offensive was the apex of the Russian war effort and paradoxically “set the Russian Army on the path to revolution.”\textsuperscript{37} Desertions spiked and officers increasingly questioned the competence of their generals and the Tsar.\textsuperscript{38} Though they suffered two years’ worth of deprivation and humiliating losses, the Russian Army stood strong, seemingly unbreakable. Yet when they finally achieved perhaps the greatest victory of the war, the Russian Army fractured.

The Brusilov Offensive broke Russia internally, both the state and the army. Despite the state’s significant gains going into 1916, its position after the Brusilov Offensive was little better than it had been in 1914. War-weariness ignited latent revolutionary

\textsuperscript{36} Keegan, \textit{The First World War}, 233.
sentiment behind the front lines. This sentiment quickly metastasized, spreading into the ranks and fundamentally altering the relationship between the Russian Army and the Tsarist government.\(^{39}\) Stories from home of food shortages, rampant inflation, and other hardships, led Russian soldiers to revolt. They were willing to defend their Motherland but had nothing to gain from further offensive action. Russian lieutenant general Nicholas Golovine wrote after the war that Russian troops viewed their losses as unnecessary and no longer believed further sacrifice would not benefit the Motherland. In their eyes, the war was lost and their leaders were doing nothing more than squandering their lives. With growing hopelessness, the Russian Army began to disintegrate. As the army broke, so did the last remaining bulwark of Tsarist power. In 1905, the army helped quell the revolution and, in some cases, helped crush the revolutionaries. It would be different this time around.\(^{40}\)

The Brusilov Offensive, for all its tangible success, was little more than a Pyrrhic victory. The Russian Army lost a significant number of its new junior officers, ones who hoped to transform the army. While Russia could replace these men, it could not replace their competence and their desire to modernize both Russian military operations and thought. Furthermore, these losses forced the Russian Army to replace reformers with revolutionaries who would soon infect their fellow soldiers. New officers commanded little respect and could not instill discipline in their revolutionary-minded troops. Many regiments mutinied, even under penalty of death. Some officers refused to order their men into combat, fearing they would be shot.\(^{41}\) John Morrow Jr.


\(^{41}\) John H. Morrow, Jr., The Great War: An Imperial History (New York: Routledge, 2004), 138-39; 206-07; Allan K. Wildman, The End of Imperial Russia: The Old Army and the Soldiers’ Revolt (March-April 1917) (Princeton:
concisely states that “upon the heels of their greatest victory, Russian soldiers plunged into the depths of despair.” Once protected by the Russian Army, Tsarist rule became a target. The Imperial Guards and feared Cossack units, soldiers who helped crush revolutionaries in 1905, now helped facilitate the February Revolution as they protected demonstrators. In one instance, the Guards and Cossacks attacked the Petrograd police after the police opened fire on a group of protestors. With that, it became clear that the Russian Army would no longer submit to Tsarist rule. Without the army’s support, the Tsar had no choice but to abdicate.

In many ways the Lake Narotch Offensive set the stage for the Brusilov Offensive. With Kuropatkin and Evert convinced of offensive futility, Brusilov’s action held little hope of becoming the decisive victory that Russia needed. Brusilov despairingly wrote that “a vigorous collaboration on the part of our three fronts would have given us every chance, even in spite of our technical inferiority to the Germans and Austrians, of driving all their armies a long way to the west.” As such cooperation did not exist, Brusilov was left “tormented by the thought that a victory on so grand a scale as that which our Supreme Command, had it acted wisely, might have won in 1916, had been quite unpardonably thrown away.” As the troops broke, so did the Russian economy, fanning revolutionary sentiment around Russia. Romania’s entry to the war would compound the problem.

The Romanian Debacle

While the Brusilov Offensive broke Russia militarily and societally, Romania’s unfortunate entry into the war broke it externally. This ally did more to hinder the Russian war effort than bolster it. Now overlooked in the war’s grand schemes, Romania’s entry affected all of the war’s major belligerents but none more so

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43 Morrow, Jr., The Great War: An Imperial History, 138-39; 206-07; Wildman, The End of Imperial Russia: The Old Army and the Soldiers’ Revolt (March-April 1917), 106-107; Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 244.
44 Brussilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 266-68.
than Tsarist Russia.\textsuperscript{45} With a shared border, Russia became Romania’s lifeline; however, as Russia already relied heavily on its Western allies for support, Romania’s foray into World War I would tax Tsarist Russia beyond its means.

Romania’s entry was opportunistic as they played a waiting game, carefully deciding which side might be the victor. Their main goal was to regain territory lost to Austria-Hungary in the late nineteenth century, especially in Transylvania, Bukovina, and Banat. With Russia in full retreat in 1915, the Allies needed Romania more than ever. Allied leadership acquiesced to Romania’s demands, but still Romania held out for an even more favorable settlement. With Brusilov’s success, Romania’s leadership realized that they must act lest Austria-Hungary surrender to the Russians alone, wiping out any chance for Romania to reclaim territory. In early July, Romania joined the Allies but, despite Allied leadership having already conceded to Romania’s demands, did not declare war until 27 August.\textsuperscript{46} By then it was too late to aid Brusilov.

Not only did Romania join too late, their declaration of war became a burden. Stanley Washburn, an American war correspondent for \textit{The Times} of London, spent the war with the Russian Army. He recorded that even before Romania joined the Allies that Russian leadership saw Romania as a liability. He wrote that Alekseev was furious over Romania declaring war too late to aid Brusilov. Alekseev also realized that Romania’s entry could potentially extend Russia’s southern flank some five hundred kilometers since it would no longer be anchored on neutral territory. Furthermore, Russian leadership knew nothing about the Romanian Army’s capabilities or state of readiness. Washburn contended that perhaps Russian leadership’s largest fear was that Germany would quickly overrun Romania and press on towards Kiev. This would negate Brusilov’s achievements and


allow the Germans to capture resource-rich Ukraine. The risks Romania’s participation posed were more than the partnership was worth.\textsuperscript{47} Already exhausted, the Russians could ill-afford more losses; they needed Romania to remain a buffer state, securing Russia’s southern flank.

Even with the burden Romania’s entry posed, it had the potential to benefit Russia. Had the Romanians not hesitated to join, they could have supported Brusilov’s offensive from the start. Even with an unprepared army, Romanian assistance could have exacerbated the Central Powers’ crisis that summer, long before Germany diverted troops to the Southwestern Front. This holds especially true as Romanian troops achieved initial success against Austro-Hungarian troops. Whether Romanian support at that critical time could have changed the offensive’s outcome is speculative at best, but their late declaration of war ensured they could not provide any support whatsoever. Once the Romanian Army finally met German resistance, it crumbled. With an unprotected flank and broken troops, Romania’s demise forced the Russians to commit already scarce resources to hold the extended southern flank. It proved to be too much for the Russians to handle, and in December the Germans marched into Bucharest. With the capital’s capture, the Germans also seized vital resources that Russia needed to replenish their forces on the Southwestern Front.\textsuperscript{48} Russia could not make up for these losses, especially as its economic situation in late 1916 dramatically worsened.

Deep-seated mistrust doomed the Russian-Romanian relationship from the start. Romania’s failures validated Russian fears about their new ally. Romania also inherently mistrusted Russia after their alliance in the Russo-Turkish War in 1877. Despite Romania’s contributions to the Russian victory, Russia took Bessarabia from Romania in the postwar peace settlement. Romanian leadership feared that they would again lose more territory or fail to regain the territory promised to them. Once


\textsuperscript{48} Morrow, \textit{The Great War}, 139; Gilbert, \textit{The First World War}, 285, 288-89.
Russia diverted thirty percent of its forces, some one million troops in forty-seven divisions, to prop up a half-million Romanian troops in twenty-three divisions, what little cooperation that still existed between them vanished. Even with all its problems, the Romanian disaster provided the Allies some benefit as it forced the Central Powers to divert forty divisions to the Romanian Front, forcing Germany to halt all future offensives at Verdun.\(^{49}\)

Romania’s late declaration of war squandered the Allies’ chance for victory. If the Central Powers diverted that many troops just to contain a weak country’s entry, both Romania’s entry and a coordinated attack by Kuropatkin and Evert’s better trained and better supplied men surely had the potential to break Germany. This holds especially true if done before Germany transferred troops east. Instead the Central Powers gained more from Romania’s entry as an enemy than Romania’s neutrality, collecting the spoils of war which, as Stone points out, amounted to “over a million tons of oil, over two million tons of grain, 200,000 tons of timber, 100,000 head of cattle,” and other materiel. This, Stone concludes, “made possible the Germans’ continuation of the war into 1918.” These were resources the Russians could have used to stem their own hunger and supply shortages; instead they went to the enemy. While it is a stretch to call the effects of Romanian intervention decisive, it furthered the growing crisis in Russia.\(^{50}\)

**The Russian Economy**

As previously mentioned, the Russian economy staged a major turnaround in the latter half of 1915 and in early 1916. Russia’s industrial capacity grew to the point where it could generally support and sustain the war effort. Despite this, growing labor

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shortages, strikes, insufficient raw materials, a substandard logistics network, and food shortages remained, as did their reliance on the French and British. As 1916 went on, the Russian economy quickly spiraled out of control as massive military losses strained the economy. Inflation climbed sharply as the Tsarist government continually mismanaged Russia’s monetary policy, triggering massive food and commodity shortages. With a growing sense of hopelessness and frustration, the Russian people demanded change. Even those not subject to revolutionary agitation blamed the Tsar and his government for their woes. As the Russian economy collapsed, it adversely affected the troops, shattering morale and undermining discipline. Family concerns consumed them.

The relationship between the military and the economy cannot be overlooked. Part of the reason why the Russian economy struggled and failed rests on the fact that unlike its Western counterparts, Russia remained largely agrarian. Modern wars required modern industry to support it. Russian gross domestic product (GDP) and Russian per capita GDP provide an indicator of economic problems going into the war. While Russia’s 1913 GDP stood at $149.6 billion, trumping all other nations except the United States, its per capita GDP stood at only $900, far below all other belligerents except Japan. By contrast, German GDP and per capita GDP stood at $131.1 billion and $1,960, British at $135.5 billion and $2,970, and American at $368.2 billion and $3,790, respectively. Furthermore, Russia mobilized some 15.8 million troops, or forty percent of service-aged males, but this percentage remained below that of the major European powers. Germany, by comparison, mobilized eighty percent of service-aged males and Britain nearly fifty percent.51

These differences in per capita GDP and mobilization percentages were critically important in World War I. Russia possessed the manpower necessary to fight a world war but,

despite its economy’s quantitative size, lacked the economic prowess to support massive military operations. Despite their smaller populations, the French and British economies had the wherewithal not only to support their operations but also Russia’s. This highlights the important role per capita GDP played as compared to total GDP. Russia’s Western allies and even Germany, both with smaller populations and smaller overall GDPs, withstood the war much better. Russia’s comparative advantages in total GDP and population meant little with an economy that could not capitalize on them.

Such industrial failings manifested themselves in Russia’s infrastructure. Hew Strachan points out that Russia was “an industrialising power rather than an industrialised one.” Despite rapid economic and industrial growth during the three decades preceding the war, Russia still lagged behind its counterparts as the GDP statistics demonstrate. Gatrell points out that even with growth and expansion into modern industrial practices like chemical and electrical engineering, Russia’s industry still stood alongside primitive workshops. As such, Russia’s contemporary industrial methods lacked modernity, mixing old and new techniques and processes. Additionally, the vast majority of Russia’s 170 million people remained unskilled. To be an industrial power, Russia needed a large, skilled labor force. In fact, as factory production, conscription, and military casualties increased, Russian industry’s reliance on women and child laborers grew. Its productivity was lower than that of Western nations and its factories stood in rural areas, requiring transportation that Russia did not have. Production methods constantly changed, creating a random and eclectic supply of goods with little uniformity. It was an economy that resisted standardization and market control. Such an economy, even with the vast improvements it made transitioning into 1916, lacked the wherewithal to survive a modern war. Russia’s inability to

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modernize guaranteed an eventual break down. Retooling the Russian economy would take decades in peace time and was impossible during war.

Transporting Russia’s vast resources to factories and troops to the front lines became problematic as the war continued. In previous conflicts, Russia typically took a defensive posture, relying on a strategy of defense in depth. This strategy forced invading armies to extend their lines while strategic consumption undermined the invader’s campaign plans. In pre-World War I planning, Russia took an offensive stance despite the fact that its logistics network lagged far behind that of its enemies and lacked the ability to support offensive action. Robert Service writes that Russia’s “railway network had barely been adequate for the country’s uses in peacetime; the wartime needs of the armed forces nearly crippled it.”

Golovine wrote that Russia stood at a distinct disadvantage when compared to its enemies. In 1914, while Germany possessed 10.6 kilometers of track for every 100 square kilometers, Russia only had one kilometer. When accounting for differences in population density and using Germany’s rail system for a comparative basis with a coefficient of 100, Russia stood at a dismal four. This created problems as the nation transported new recruits to the front. In central Europe, the average recruit only had to travel some 200-300 kilometers, but in Russia that distance nearly quadrupled. Inferior and aging locomotives exacerbated problems with the Russian railway system, especially as overuse during the war wore them out.

The problems the Russians faced pointed to a backwards economy. A number of historians argue that this “backwardness” was at the heart of Russia’s economic woes. Stone argues otherwise. He acknowledges that Russia’s economic difficulties exceeded those of its Western allies but he believes the Russian

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economy was not backwards. Russia’s improved ability to produce war materiel going into 1916 supports his viewpoint. Regardless of whether the Russian economy was backwards or not, the question remains: what role did the economy play in the Russian Revolution, if any? Stone argues that economic growth, ironically enough, contributed to Russia’s economic collapse. The Russian economy did not grow gradually; rather, growth lagged leading up to World War I and spiked during it. This growth vastly modernized the economy, but modernization also brought unintended consequences, like inflation. As Russia failed to cope with sudden and substantial modernization, it helped spark the Russian Revolution.\textsuperscript{56} It is this perspective that best explains why Russia collapsed economically in late 1916.

The economic and industrial growth of a modern war required vast amounts of capital and workers. As the Russian government spent, it printed rubles, and continually debased its currency from gold. Massive inflation followed. Using the first half of 1914 as the baseline, inflation began growing rapidly in the latter half of 1916 – after Brusilov launched his offensive – as the amount of currency in circulation expanded 336\% and the price index stood at 398. These numbers show a startling increase from the first half of 1916 when those numbers stood at 199\% and 141, respectively. The numbers only climbed from there.\textsuperscript{57} Despite the problems it later created, monetary expansion helped facilitate Russia’s wartime turnaround. Stone acknowledges that keeping the currency tied to gold would only have impeded the industrial expansion that Russia needed to support the war effort; the necessary capital would not have otherwise been available.\textsuperscript{58} Even without its economic and military problems, Kettle argues that by late 1916 Russia was quickly heading for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy alone had the potential to spurn its own revolution.\textsuperscript{59} It was a no-win situation for the Russian economy. Russia’s only hope was to

\textsuperscript{56} Stone, \textit{The Eastern Front}, 284-286; Gatrell, \textit{Russia's First World War}, 3.
\textsuperscript{57} Stone, \textit{The Eastern Front}, 287.
\textsuperscript{58} Stone, \textit{The Eastern Front}, 284-288.
\textsuperscript{59} Kettle, \textit{The Allies and the Russian Collapse}, 35.
end the war before its monetary mismanagement consumed the empire.

Inflation directly contributed to Russia’s food shortages as peasants horded food rather than sell it for rubles that rapidly became worthless. By late 1916 the food shortages had grown to a critical state. Already hurt by conscription, Russian agriculture suffered more as inflation caused many farmers to stop planting altogether. They had no incentive to work for nothing, especially when the government implemented price controls and requisition programs. The Russian Army’s dire need for draft animals handed Russia’s agricultural sector another setback. This proved ruinous for peasants as animal losses were not easily replaced. In the cities, food scarcity brought about food riots and, by the end of 1916, the people’s animosity towards the Tsarist government reached a tipping point. If the Tsar could not provide them with food, they would support someone who could. It is not surprising that a popular Bolshevik slogan became “Peace, Land, and Bread.” Perhaps the most tragic fact about the food shortages was that Russia’s wartime harvests exceeded prewar ones, even with the difficulties farmers faced. Inflation, hording, agricultural policies, and an inferior logistics network meant the food failed to reach those who needed it. These problems extended to all commodities, not just food.60

Inflation also played a role in labor and factory riots. While wages in many sectors increased as the war continued, the ruble’s fall cut purchasing power. Factory and industrial leaders also reaped massive wartime profits while workers’ wages grew at a much slower rate. These leaders became targets for worker frustration. As the Russian economy began spiraling downward, revolutionaries found ready recruits on the factory floor. This held

especially true in Petrograd as the city housed both the government and the heart of anti-Tsarist radicals. Workers’ strikes and protests grew larger and more frequent. The end of 1916 saw nearly 1,300 strikes involving almost one million workers, double the number that went on strike in 1915. By early 1917, the previous year’s problems yielded such discontent that 700,000 workers went on strike in January and February alone. Approximately 170,000 soldiers joined the demonstrations against the government. With this, the February Revolution had begun.

Russia could only blame itself for its economic undoing. Russian leaders failed to prepare the nation for both a modern war and a rapidly evolving worldwide economy. They failed to learn the basic lessons of modern conflict, all despite having firsthand experience in the Russo-Japanese War. They also failed to see just how important an effective logistics network was to waging a successful war, a clear lesson from the American Civil War. And yet, despite failing to learn anything about what a modern European conflict might look like, Russia changed its war plans, eschewing the defensive for the offensive without any way to facilitate such operations. By early 1916, Russia’s economy had evolved significantly but it was too little, too late. Russia’s economy collapsed under the weight of both 1916’s military operations and the rapid economic growth that enabled that year’s offensive operations. It was all too much for the people, the army, and the Russian economy to handle.

Conclusions

With the near constant protests in the cities, widespread food shortages, a worthless ruble, and military mutiny, the Tsar and his government lost control. On 15 March 1917, Tsar Nicholas II abdicated, marking the end of the Romanov Dynasty and the death of Imperial Russia. After a transitory time with the Provisional

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62 Lincoln, *Passage Through Armageddon*, 343. The Julian calendar date, which Tsarist Russia used during the war, was 2 March 1917.
Government, the Bolsheviks staged the October Revolution. Shortly thereafter, Russia descended into the bloody chaos of the Russian Civil War.

With so many changes, 1916 started out promisingly enough as industrial output improved to the point that it could support Russian military operations. With Germany turning its attention towards France, Russia should have been able to mount a war-changing Eastern Front offensive. Sadly, incompetent leadership and poor planning botched any hope for victory at Lake Narotch, where losses cemented a defeatist spirit in most military elites. Even when a daring leader like Brusilov achieved amazing results, cowardice and defeatism undermined any chance for success. Romania’s ill-fated entry into the war leeched Russian materiel and manpower just as Germany regained momentum in the East, a veritable death blow to the Russian Army. Rapid economic growth and poor fiscal policies, necessary as they were in the short term, ran headlong into an impotent logistics system, crumbling domestic infrastructure, and, the greatest enemy of all, time. This confluence of events overwhelmed Russia and created fertile grounds for what would be an unavoidable revolution by the close of 1916.

Revolutionary sentiment was always prevalent in Russia, simmering just below the surface. From time to time it would bubble up, forcing the Russian government to implement some reforms, but never fundamental change. Accustomed to hardship and privation, the fatalistic Russian people would simply continue on with their lives. Even after two years of war, terrific setbacks, and massive casualties, the Russian people somehow still carried on. Revolutionary sentiment grew but never enough to gain a substantial foothold in Russia. Everything changed in 1916. It was that year’s successes, losses, and the consequences of each that provided the catalyst necessary to bring the festering discord to a head. While the military situation was but one factor contributing to the Russian Revolution, it was undoubtedly a decisive factor. Had it not been for the war, it remains entirely reasonable to believe that Russia would not have started down a path to revolution, much less have reached the revolutionary tipping
point. Just as the Russo-Japanese War triggered the 1905 Revolution, World War I, 1916 in particular, brought about the Russian Revolution, starting Tsarist Russia down the path to annihilation.

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Books


**Journals**


The Unsaid of the Grand Dérrangement: An Analysis of Outsider and Regional Interpretations of Acadian History

KATIE MACLEOD

Abstract: This review article explores how historians’ interpretations of the grand dérrangement have varied from early scholarship in the 1800s to scholarship in 2012. Using Thomas Barnes’ “‘Historiography of the Acadians’ Grand Dérrangement, 1755’” as a starting point, this article seeks to compare and contrast literature speaking to the historic process as interpreted by regional and outside scholars. Overall, this review article seeks to assess how scholarly trends of analysis of the grand dérrangement have been maintained over time, and how others have shifted.

Introduction

The grand dérrangement, or the Acadian Deportation is a central event in Acadian history. This event has been recounted by numerous historians and has been deeply influenced by Acadian oral traditions. Within the colony of Acadie or Nova Scotia, Acadians remained politically neutral from both French and British settlers. On numerous occasions, the British requested that Acadians swear oaths of allegiance to the Crown; however, the vast majority of the population continuously refused. Fearful that that Acadians would become allies with the French or the Mi’kmaq, it was decided that Acadians would be removed. On September 5, 1755, Lieutenant-Colonel John Winslow announced to the Acadian men of Grand-Pré that all Acadians would be exiled from the colony of Nova Scotia. Over the course of 1755, 7,000 Acadians were deported by ship to North Carolina, Virginia, Philadelphia, and Maryland, others were transported to Europe. Over 14,000 Acadians were deported between 1755 and 1762. In
1763, the Treaty of Paris ended the Seven Years’ War and British authorities allowed Acadians to return to Nova Scotia.¹

In this article I explore various interpretations of the grand dérangement by historians who work within the region and those who do not primarily study the region or Acadians, who I classify as ‘outsiders.’ First, I will provide an overview of an article written by Thomas G. Barnes in 1988, which examined the historiography of the grand dérangement and provides a critique on regional and outsider understanding of the event. I use Barnes’ work as a starting point to provide my own analysis of the scholarship on the grand dérangement between 1988 and 2012. I will demonstrate that regional and outside scholars present contrasting views of the grand dérangement in regards to when it began, who was responsible, and to what degree it is spoken of when recounting Acadian history.

In 1988, Thomas G. Barnes, a professor emeritus of history and law at the University of California, Berkeley, published an article titled “‘Historiography of the Acadians’ Grand Dérangement, 1755.’” In this article, Barnes argues that the grand dérangement had been, for the most part, understood historically rather than historiographically. Historiography explores how historians have understood and studied historical work. Acadians and Acadian oral tradition tend to distance accounts of Acadian history from historical fact and have been heavily influenced by the mythologization of the Acadian past. Barnes attributes this understanding to the legacy of Acadian oral tradition in the post-deportation era, an oral tradition that placed an emphasis on survival rather than evidence.²

² Barnes, “Historiography of the Acadians,” 76-77.
Prior to 1895, all material written about the grand dérangement was written by non-Acadian ‘outsiders.’ Early writings, including the works of Thomas Chandler Haliburton in 1829, Thomas Akins in 1869, and Alfred William Savary in 1897—all Anglophone historians—provided critical accounts of the Deportation. Savary was particularly critical describing the event as a genocidal conspiracy. This early literature written by outsiders also had a tendency to defend British action and the role of Governor Charles Lawrence in the deportations. These historians did not write sympathetically about the Acadians and often portrayed them as responsible for their own fate.3

Any material published on the deportation after 1849 would have been influenced by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s poem Evangeline: A Tale of Acadie. Originally published in 1847, the poem recounted a tale of a young Acadian girl’s journey to reunite with her lover Gabriel after they were separated by the grand dérangement. Longfellow, a Cambridge poet who never travelled to Nova Scotia, used the work of various early writers on Acadian history, including Thomas Chandler Haliburton, as references when writing his poem. Although Longfellow uses Haliburton’s work as a reference point, the scene Longfellow sets is quite different. Haliburton provided a critical stance on the situation describing images of destruction and a people who were hopeless. On the other hand, Longfellow’s poem painted a picture of Nova Scotia as a primeval forest and Acadians as the innocent victims who were able to persevere after experiencing tragedy.4

Various editions of Evangeline were translated into French between 1864 and 1887. It was at this time that Acadians became aware of the poem, which spread throughout communities, and entered the education system. The oral traditions surrounding the

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grand dérangement had been salient in Acadian communities since their return in 1763; however, the poem provided them with a missing element and cultural tool they could employ to tell their story of survival and perseverance. Acadian writing on the grand dérangement emerged in 1895 with the work of Édouard Richard. Other Francophone scholars, including Antoine Bernard continued to write Acadian history into the 1920s. These regional accounts had a stronger focus on survival and return to a homeland and were critical of British action, characterizing Governor Lawrence as a villain during the grand dérangement. Within these later accounts, it is also evident that there was an influence from Longfellow’s poem. The presence of Acadian oral tradition and myth, Barnes argues, created a distance from the historical facts of the grand dérangement. Additionally, after the publication of the poem, Anglophone historians appeared to have an altered perception of the grand dérangement, becoming more sympathetic towards the Acadians.5

Moving forward, I will add to the historiographical understanding of Acadain history in the examination of Acadian historical literature since Barnes’ publication in 1988 until 2012 to determine if and how interpretations of Acadian history have changed. I will be using the term “outsider” to situate literature written by scholars outside the region of the Maritime Provinces, particularly American and British historians. I also use the term “regional” to refer to those working in the Maritimes, those who have spent a significant portion of their academic career studying the Acadians or the Maritimes, and/or self-identify as Acadian.6 Most significantly, scholars placed into the category of regional interpretations examine Acadian history at a more local level than those categorized within outsider interpretations.

6 For example, Naomi Griffiths is a historian who is not from the Maritimes nor Acadian; however, as she has spent the vast majority of her career studying Acadians, she is classified as a regional scholar.
Outsider Interpretations

There has been a tendency for outsider interpretations of the grand dérangement to be critical, less sympathetic toward Acadians, and defensive of British action. As an outsider himself, Barnes provides an interpretation of the grand dérangement that can be analyzed within the historiographical framework he employs in his article. In his analysis of the grand dérangement, Barnes compares the grand dérangement to other diasporas of the twentieth century, such as the Holocaust and Czarist pogroms; yet, he describes it as ‘modest’ in comparison. At times, Barnes is defensive of British action, but he maintains a balance between his critique and his defense of these actions throughout his article. Barnes only accounts for the deportations in 1755 and does not address the other deportations that came before or later in the process.7

In some cases, the outsider interpretation of the grand dérangement has not shifted from the early accounts described by Barnes. For example, Christopher Hodson’s 2012 book *The Acadian Diaspora* begins with a discussion of the grand dérangement and shifts to an analysis of its aftermath. Outside of agriculture and maintenance of a familial community structure, Hodson does not argue the Acadians were successful in maintaining their identities and social cohesion in the post-deportation era. Barnes notes that many Anglophone historians were sympathetic to British action and believed that the Acadians were responsible for their own fate; and Hodson portrays a similar lack of sympathy for the Acadians who experienced exile.8

Similar to interpretations of Halibuton, Hodson suggests that Governor Charles Lawrence was successful in his goals to suppress Acadian power in exile to other British colonies. In addition to working against the positions of regional scholars, Hodson criticizes their positive interpretations and the influence of the Acadian oral tradition of continuity and perseverance

7 Ibid: 75, 78.
present in their work. In the following excerpt, Hodson criticizes of past interpretations of the grand dérangement:

Yet histories of the grand derangement have emphasized continuity, persistence, and a happy ending. For, seen from one angle, the Acadians’ stopovers in the odd locations inventoried above are little more than brief, unpleasant interludes. Splintered by the violence of 1755, Acadian society seemed to reconstitute itself by instinct over the next two generations, with each “broken fragment of the former community” moving toward a broader, more lasting reunion. Slowly and torturously, loved ones found each other again crossing oceans and continents to gather in villages that resembled, save for a few environmental variations, those they had left behind in Nova Scotia—especially in southwestern Louisiana, where hundreds of Acadians settled beginning in the mid-1760s, and on the rivers and streams in present day New Brunswick, where those who managed to evade the raids of the 1750s established settlements on the ragged margins of British Canada. These areas remain the centers of Acadian (or Cajun) like even today. In the face of such tenacity, the Acadians’ North American, Caribbean, South Atlantic, and European voyages tend to come off as obstacles that merely reinforced their stubborn particularity and cemented their common desire to lock arms and re-create a lost world.

10 Here Hodson is citing Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme. New York: W.W Norton and Company Inc: 2005
In the quote above, Hodson provides a critique of the influence of Acadian oral tradition and mythologization and their influence on the historiography of Acadians. According to Griffiths, there is a tendency within the Acadian oral tradition to focus on the return to Acadie and the strength of the people. Hodson distances himself from the rhetoric of strength and survival and argues that there were fewer opportunities for social cohesion among the Acadian exiles due to “the harsh imperatives of a vast market for colonial labor.”

Hodson does, however, provide a deeper understanding of the situation after the Acadians left Acadie and offers more detailed information on their arrivals at various colonies and their further destinations of France and the Caribbean. Hodson argues that agriculture became a significant factor for Acadians who had been exiled to other countries and provided a cheap labour force, especially in the tropics. He asserts that the Acadians essentially became slaves in tropical climates based on the agricultural advancements in Nova Scotia and adaptations of dike construction techniques developed in Port Royal, Minas Basin, and Grand Pré that were originally adapted from techniques from eleventh century France. Although Hodson sees the grand dérangement as a process rather than a single event, he is not telling a story of the Acadian exiles; rather, he is providing a global overview of the aftermath.

Emmanuel Klimis, a researcher in Political Science at Université Libre de Bruxelles in Brussels, Belgium, and Jaques Vanderlinden, an emeritus professor in Law at Université de Moncton, place the grand dérangement within an international political sphere. Klimis and Vanderlinden analyze the deportation through international law and attempt to provide justification for the 1755 deportations. Their analysis is defensive of British action while introducing modern policy to examine a historic process.

With a focus on policy, Klimis and Vanderlinden frame the grand dérangement as ethnic cleansing. This emphasis on policy and international dialogue creates a degree of distance from the analysis of Acadian history because the international framework that is being employed would not have existed at the time of the grand dérangement.  

Other outside scholars, most notably, Geoffrey Plank and John Mack Faragher, place significant emphasis on British imperial policy as the determining factor in the expulsion of the Acadians from Acadie. Both scholars (Plank, a British historian, and Faragher, an American historian) examine the grand dérangement in the wider period between 1755 and 1763. Faragher acknowledges the uniqueness of the Acadian position as neutral subjects after 1690, because concessions such as these were not common at this time. Faragher provides a detailed overview of imperial policy, the grand dérangement, and its aftermath; however, the overview is significantly less critical than Hodson’s, and places blame and criticism on the British officials rather than the Acadians.

Faragher strongly asserts that the grand dérangement was a process of ethnic cleansing and bases this claim on the United

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Nations definition. The United Nations Commission defines ethnic cleansing as:

a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas. To a large extent, it is carried out in the name of misguided nationalism, historic grievances, and a powerful driving sense of revenge. This purpose appears to be the occupation of territory to the exclusion of the purged group or groups.\(^{18}\)

In this definition, Faragher relates the grand dérangement to modern instances of ethnic cleansing in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Similar to the emphasis Faragher places on ethnic cleansing, Savary argues the actions of Lawrence and the other British officers in the grand dérangement had genocidal intention. Conversely, many regional scholars do not see the grand dérangement as genocide. Maurice Basque, the director of Le Centre d’études acadiennes at Université de Moncton, argues that analyzing the grand dérangement through this framework of ethnic cleansing risks trivializing events like the Holocaust.\(^{19}\)

It is important to note that ethnic identities may not have been very clear the time of the deportations. As a result, the application of ethnic cleansing as an explanation becomes complicated and was likely less based on racial qualities but on religion and political position. Plank notes that in order to understand this history and identity of a people, it is important to analyze the inter-people relations in a people’s history. Faragher


notes that relationships between Acadians and Mi’kmaq were sustained through intermarriage and common religion. Additionally, there was the degree to which it was common for the various populations living together in Nova Scotia in this time period to borrow from one another’s cultures as they “adopted attributes of savagery or civility for the purpose of deception” in order to gain additional power.\textsuperscript{20}

As a result, ethnic identities in this pre-deportation period became increasingly complicated around strategies of alliance, survival and co-existence. Before 1749, the colonial administration attempted to place Mi’kmaq and Acadians into two distinct groups that would allow them to follow certain political, cultural, and economic development strategies as determined by the colonial officials. Thomas Peace, an assistant professor in History at Huron University College, argues that these relations were strongest in the seventeenth century. This likely resulted in the difficulty the colonial government experienced in categorizing ethnic populations in the eighteenth century. When the administration, in particular Samuel Vetch and Richard Philipps, attempted to implement this plan, it became evident that the “close ties between the Mi’kmaq and the Acadians made it difficult to distinguish the affairs of one group from those of the other and Mi’kmaq bands and Acadian villages often stood ready to support each other in times of conflict.”\textsuperscript{21}

In fact, when Acadians were asked to take the last oath of allegiance prior to the deportations, many refused unless they would be exempted from British military service, which may have been based on these prior alliances with the Mi’kmaq. In 1737,\textsuperscript{20,21}


\textsuperscript{21} Plank, \textit{Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign Against the Peoples of Acadia}: 161; Thomas Peace. “A Reluctant Engagement: Mi’kmaw-European Interaction along the Annapolis River at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century.” Forthcoming; Plank, \textit{Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign Against the Peoples of Acadia}, 161
Father Jean-Louis Le Loutre was a significant player in the successful movement of Acadians from Acadie to Île Royale; in addition he was principal person of contact between the Mi’kmaq in Acadie and French forces on Île Royale. This position led him to move his mission from Shubenacadie to French territory, encouraging his Mi’kmaq allies to follow him as he moved away from the peninsula. Acadians believe that they remained in Acadie after 1710 on their own terms, not because of British demands or oaths.22

Based on these Mi’kmaw-Acadian alliances, one of the aims of Governor Charles Lawrence and Governor William Shirley and other British officials was to sever these relationships with the physical removal of the Acadians from their Mi’kmaw allies. Of course, the British dealt with the Mi’kmaq separately with the negotiation of treaties throughout the eighteenth century. Captain Jean Baptiste Cope, a Mi’kmaq man who had strong language and negotiation skills, was deeply involved in the negotiation of the 1726 and 1752 treaties with the British. Captain Jean Baptiste Cope did not move to French territory with Father Le Loutre, although many Mi’kmaq from the Shubenacadie area did follow him. Due to his acculturation with the Acadians and the British, he was able to communicate with British officers and less subject to classification. Plank suspects that Captain Jean Baptiste Cope adopted the title of Captain after the earlier Captain Henry Cope, a successful British officer, because it was common for Aboriginal peoples in this time to adopt prominent names of people who had departed the territory in order to gain more power, further complicating the ethnic identities at this time.23

Barnes notes that early literature places Lawrence at the center of the blame for the grand dérangement; however, Faragher and Plank both describe larger imperial and colonial plans. They

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emphasize that there were plans to exile the Acadians prior to Lawrence’s arrival in Acadie. The deportation in 1755 devised by Lawrence was an adaption from an earlier plan developed in 1747 by Governor William Shirley. The plan was only moderately adapted by Lawrence to ensure the Acadians would be adequately dispersed so that they would not be able to retain any collective power after the plan’s implementation. In fact, Plank notes that prior to Lawrence’s arrival in 1753, the council in Nova Scotia had discussed the possibilities available to remove the Acadians from the colony.24

Faragher notes that New England played an important role in the early phases of the deportation plan and the processes that were overlooked by London at the time of Lawrence’s request to deport the Acadians. Through the emphasis Faragher places on New England and the Americanization of the grand dérangement as an imperial scheme, in addition to the ethnic complications described by Plank it is evident that the causes of the deportation are larger than the actions of Lawrence alone. The grand dérangement was a process, not a singular event, and was certainly not undertaken by a single actor, but by numerous imperial orders. The outsider interpretations make a significant contribution to the analysis and criticism of the various imperial and international policies and procedures that resulted in the occurrence of the grand dérangement and how Acadians experienced its aftermath.25

**Regional Interpretations**

The Acadians make up a large proportion of the ethnic minorities of Atlantic Canada; however, they have been largely excluded from Atlantic Canadian historiography. In 1971, the Acadiensis journal was established as a much needed platform for the study of the Atlantic region. Early publications of the journal were written by scholars who became known as “the Acadiensis

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generation,” a group of scholars who focused on Maritime history and historiography. During this period of scholarly production on the history of the Atlantic region, Acadian historiography was absent. P.D Clarke notes when attending the Atlantic Canada Studies conference in 2000, Naomi Griffiths and Jacques Paul Cauturier presented the only Acadian papers at the conference out of a total of forty-five. He saw this as an absence of Acadian historiography or Acadianité from “the Acadiensis generation” and argues that the “unsaid” says a lot about historiography.26

The “unsaid” was also quite prevalent within regional literature addressing the history of Acadians. Nicolas Landry, a professor of history at the Shippigan Campus of Université de Moncton, Nicole Lang, a professor of Canadian and Acadian history at the Edmundston Campus of Université de Moncton, and Naomi Griffiths, a professor emeritus in the Department of History at Carleton University, make strategic decisions to provide the reader with an absence of the grand dérangement. While other scholars spend entire books interpreting the event, Griffiths’ 2005, From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People, 1604-1755, ends just prior to 1755 deportation and Landry and Lang provide the following analysis:

Starting in 1750, the strengthening of French and English territories increased the political insecurity of the Acadians. The Deportation, which began in 1755 and continued until 1762 ended their peaceful life and led to lost lives among the deported and those who managed to escape. In addition to the loss of their possessions, the Acadians who managed to survive were scattered in the English colonies in America or England and faced the hostile reception of local people. Some reclaimed the Maritimes after 1763 and spurred the emergence of a new Acadia.27

27 Landry and Lang, Histoire de l’Acadie, 126.
Rather than addressing the grand dérangement specifically, Landry and Lang choose to emphasize the strength and perseverance of the Acadian people before and after the tragedy. They address the marginalization the Acadians have endured politically, religiously, and socially both before the expulsion and upon their return to Acadie. Landry and Lang weave a continuous thread of Acadian political strength through the pre- to post-deportation timeframes. This strength is what led to the reconstruction of the Acadian economy and agriculture as the Acadians re-established themselves within the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, eventually leading to the emergence of the Acadian Renaissance in the 1880s.²⁸

Compared to the outsider literature, religion is a more dominant theme within the regional interpretations. In the early settlement of Port Royal, Landry and Lang, like most outsider historians, provide focused analysis on Mi’kmaq conversions to Catholicism and the role religion played in the development of the colony. Aside from the important role Catholicism played in developing relations of coexistence with the Mi’kmaq, regional interpretations fall short of addressing the role of the Mi’kmaq at length. Peace argues that the Acadian-Mi’kmaq relations are more evident when examined locally. Although regional historians place a greater emphasis on the local during the grand

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dérangement, Acadians are given more agency but less attention is paid to the Mi’kmaq. 29

While Plank and Faragher provide detailed accounts of the importance of the Mi’kmaq at a more macro level, Griffiths argues that the close relations and intermarriage between Acadians and Mi’kmaq is speculation. Although Landry and Lang are not as dismissive of intermarriage as Griffiths, there is not much attention paid to Acadian-Mi’kmaq relations outside of their significance to religious relationships and the founding of Acadie. Most regional interpretations of the grand dérangement tell a very different story from that of Hodson and Klimis and Vanderlinden. While Hodson does not believe the Acadians were able to reconstruct their identities post-deportation, regional scholars (both historians in the 1800s and those writing between 1988 and 2012) demonstrate that this was possible, even without returning to Acadie proper. 30

With a more detailed explanation of religious developments at a local level, Landry and Lang are able to provide further insight into the implications of Catholicism as a political power. Although the British did not look upon it favourably, Catholicism gave the Acadians a degree of political advantage under the British rule whereby they were still able to practice and teach their religion in British controlled territory. Landry and Lang make a significant effort to address the important political and social advancements of the Acadians rather than dwelling on the events of the grand dérangement and letting it define the Acadians as a people. 31

In 2005, Ronnie-Gilles LeBlanc, a former archivist at the Centre d'études acadiennes at Université de Moncton and Parks Canada historian, published an edited volume titled Du Grand Dérangement à la Déportation: nouvelles perspectives historiques which filled a much-needed gap in the scholarship on the grand

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dérangement. The volume includes both Anglophone and Francophone scholars, and chapters are written in both English and French. This collection distances the contemporary literature from what Barnes described as “eschewed linguistic-ethnic ideology” that contained within it Anglophobia and Francophobia that was common up into the 1960s.32

In his contribution to the volume, LeBlanc draws the historiographic period back to 1749 rather than placing the focus on 1755, and other scholars in the collection situate the grand dérangement with this earlier start date. Establishing 1749 as the beginning of the grand dérangement, LeBlanc notes that there were a series of deportations that occurred between 1749 and 1752 where 2,900 Acadians were displaced, stressing the importance of paying attention to the years preceding the 1755 deportations. Not only did the deportation start before 1755, such removals continued until 1764. These dates that go largely unaccounted for lead LeBlanc to argue that the grand dérangement was a process rather than a focused imperial scheme based on the aftermath of the battle at Fort Beauséjour.33

Overall, the authors of Du Grand Dérangement à la Déportation: nouvelles perspectives historiques pay significant attention to 1749 as an important year preceding 1755 because it also precedes the initial arrival of Cornwallis and the policies that were implemented as a result of his arrival. The year 1749 is also significant because it marks the founding of Halifax. With the establishment of Halifax, there was an increase in British military power and a decrease in Acadian movement to Île Royale and Acadian trade relations with the French. In addition, the Mi’kmaq were placed under Cornwallis’ scalp-bounty, further differentiating the populations through different policy implementation. Overall, LeBlanc argues that the control established at Halifax and the plans being implemented by colonial officials suggests the grand dérangement should be

32 Barnes, “Historiography of the Acadians,” 80.
viewed more in terms of a revolution or a process that was ongoing before and after 1755.34

While LeBlanc emphasized the situation prior to 1755, Earle Lockerby, an independent historian, addressed issues in the historiography of the deportation post-1755 addressing the dispersal and destruction that occurred in 1758 on Île Saint-Jean. Like LeBlanc, he seeks to draw attention to the other deportations that happened before and after 1755. Lockerby agrees with Barnes that the myth of Evangeline and Acadian oral tradition can interrupt Acadian historiography. He argues that the story of Evangeline accounts for the distortions in historical understandings of this event and that 1755 distracts from the deportations outside of Grand Pré, particularly the dispersals on Île Sainte-Jean in 1758.35

Lockerby presents Major General Jeffery Amherst and Lieutenant-Coronel Andrew Rollo as key players in the deportations from Île Saint-Jean, who removed all inhabitants, took control, and expand Port-la-Joie. All deportees were first destined to be prisoners at Louisburg before being taken on ships to Europe. Lockerby describes the horrible conditions, illness, lack of necessities, inadequate clothing, and shipwrecks that led to deaths upon the deportation ships. Lockerby also addressed those Acadians who were able to escape and seek refuge in New Brunswick, Quebec, and the Gaspe. Similar to perspectives expressed by scholars LeBlanc’s collection, Lockerby demonstrates the regional and political differences at play in different Acadian communities and their varied experiences of the grand dérangement.36

36 Ibid, 76; Ibid, 82.
A. J. B. Johnston, a former staff historian with Parks Canada who is now an independent historian, describes the deportations in 1755 and examines those that occurred at Île Saint-Jean in 1758 and Cape Sable Island in 1756. He argues that Acadian deportations were not unique events and that it was not uncommon for people to enter into permanent or temporary exile in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whether it was within or across borders. While providing some justification for British action, he compares the Acadian deportation to other events of forceful removal in that time period, such as the Huguenot Diaspora in seventeenth century England and the removal of the Oklahoma Cherokees through the 1838 Indian Removal Act.37

Johnston notes that there were also early removals of Acadians during pre-deportation French rule. With French undertaking deportations of the Acadians themselves, this account could be interpreted as defensive of British action. Similar to Léger’s perspective, Johnston notes that it was unlikely that these decisions were based on ethnicity. As a result, ethnic cleansing would not be an appropriate term as decisions were made in preemptive action based in religion and political positions in order to reduce the risks to the colonial government.38

Looking closer at the grand dérangement, Maurice Léger, an independent historian and researcher, presents an argument for the role religion played in the deportation of the Acadians. Protestants made up a significant proportion of the colonial population and predisposed the Acadians to discrimination on religious grounds. Léger argues that their status as Roman Catholics should not be overlooked as a factor for deportation because regardless of their religious freedom they were still viewed as others. This examination correlates to the argument put forward by Plank

around complications in ethnic categorization. With the limited ability to use ethnic identifiers to deport the Acadians, Léger suggests religion, more specially Catholicism, was an ethnic identifier that could be used in order to exile portions of the population.39

Landry and Lang place an emphasis on religion rather than the events of the grand dérangement which could reflect a priority on religion within the perspective of regional scholars.40 The role the clergy played in the success of the Acadian Renaissance in the 1880s reflects the importance of religion within contemporary Acadian political and nationalistic movements. Ronald Rudin, a professor of history at Concordia University, also argues that there is a tendency for Acadians to avoid addressing the grand dérangement directly. His study of Acadian history at commemorative events exposes the distance Acadians create between historical fact and public memory. This distortion within public memory seems to have influenced regional scholars and created a common theme of absence within regional interpretations of the grand dérangement. P.D. Clarke notes that the “unsaid” says a lot about historiography. Historians, therefore, must be as attuned to silences within the construction and interpretation of these complex histories.41

Conclusion

In 2005, there was a shift in both outsider and regional scholarship with the publication of John Mack Faragher’s Great and Noble Scheme, Geoffrey Plank’s Unsettled Conquest, Naomi Griffths’ From Migrant to Acadian, and Ronnie-Gilles LeBlanc’s edited volume Du Grand Dérangement à la Déportation:

nouvelles perspectives historiques. These publications met a need identified by Clarke in 2000 as a lack of historiographical interpretation on Acadian history. These contributions, as well as others examined throughout this article, present important, yet varying interpretations of a key event in Acadian history.

In some regards, outsider and regional interpretations of Acadian history between 1988 and 2012 fall within similar critiques presented by Barnes in 1988. Christopher Hodson follows in the footsteps of early 1800s historians in his critique and lack of sympathy of Acadians in their post-deportation situation. On the other hand, Faragher and Plank provide less critical stances on the Acadians and are more critical of British action. Outsider interpretations, including Klimis and Vanderlinden, Faragher, and Hodson focus on imperial and international polices involved in the process of the grand dérangement and its aftermath. Lastly, I believe that the contemporary outsider interpretations of the grand dérangement view the grand dérangement as a process rather than a single event, which is important in understanding the overall influence of the deportations.

Regional interpretations certainly still sustain influence from Acadian oral tradition and the mythologization of history from Longfellow’s Evangeline. Oral tradition and myth produce master narratives that become embedded into the lives of a people and become reconstructed throughout history. The focus Acadians had on returning to a homeland and their renewed strength in the post-deportation era created an overall distance from the grand dérangement itself. Some regional scholars still remain distant from the grand dérangement in their interpretations of Acadian history. As a result, the post-deportation understanding of the grand dérangement has created a distance between Acadians and their history. Myth, oral tradition and narratives of survival continue to be dominant in Acadian history. While there is an absence of engagement with the deportations in the regional literature, regional historians’ emphasis on the political, religious, and localized elements of the grand dérangement provides

significant insight that is not as present in the outsider interpretations.

Both outsider and regional literature sustain traces of what Barnes referred to as a collective “making sense” of the grand dérangement. As pre-emptive as the grand dérangement may have been, it is evident that the scholars examined in this article provide a wide array of interpretations behind the process of the grand dérangement. These interpretations are grounded in local political structures, nationalistic goals, religion, and agricultural labour. Each Acadian community experienced exile in different ways, and there is no way to identify a single cause for the grand dérangement. This article has shown that the majority of the literature, whether regional or outsider, provides a more coherent interpretation of the grand dérangement than was present in 1988 and sustains a focus on survival rather than betrayal. When these literatures and the various factors they identify as leading to the deportation are then placed within the view that the grand dérangement as a process rather than a singular event, they provide a more coherent understanding of the grand dérangement and how Acadians continue to live in its legacy.

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Of Grey Geese and Burning Lawyers: The Structures of the Feud System in Viking Age Iceland

CHRIS PERRIN

Abstract: The Icelandic sagas portray the world of the Viking Age as one of violence and death. In particular, the existence of the bloodfeud is often depicted. However, these depictions are without much examination as to how it functioned, let alone how it came into being and was mitigated. Moreover, there is little discussion in the sagas about where the feud stood within the legal structure of the period. What was the purpose of the feud in saga-age Norse society? What legal or social structures does it preserve or protect? The idea that the bloodfeud was an integral aspect of Icelandic (and, potentially by extension, Norse) legal culture is an idea that I will develop through an examination of a number of the sagas themselves and the ways other historians have interpreted them. Beyond the legal system itself, the feud features itself as a justification for various aggressive actions in the sagas, such as warring with neighbouring kingdoms or tribes, and the forswearing of oaths and breaking of alliances. The conceptualization of the feud in Norse society, therefore, must have been linked to other ideas of masculinity, strength, and honour. How is this portrayed within the sagas, and what potential abuses could this have led to, are other questions I explore. The significance of the feud, and the meaning ascribed to it, will be examined against its socio-legal status—if any—in an effort to determine how prevalent (or even useful) the feud was in medieval Icelandic society. By this I problematize the actual use of legal codes and attempt to situate them against the reality of communal acceptance and societal norms. To better examine this, I analyse whether the sagas were used to bolster a centralizing legal system, or a reflection of social convention at the time.

Vengeance was an aspect of Viking Age Iceland and the feud was its manifestation. Wrongs were committed, slights perceived, and each demanded vengeance to mitigate the dishonour. At times, the
feud extended from the physical to the legal, transcending corporeal reciprocity and taking the form of law suits. To carry out a feud, and to avenge a dishonour, was an important aspect of early medieval Icelandic society. At least as far as the sagas describe it, the feud was an object of admiration, drama, and politics that a good, honourable Icelander participated in whole heartedly. *The Story of Burnt Njal* (referred to throughout as *Njal’s Saga*) contains perhaps one of the best examples of the feud. Within the saga’s narrative, the feud serves as a device pushing the plot forward: from the killing of kinsmen to the paying of wergild and suits before the Althing.\(^1\) The implementation of the law appears as an extension of the feud, as does the physical violence that continues after a suit. This interaction between law and society is central to our understanding of the feud’s position as mechanism within the socio-legal apparatus of Viking Age Iceland.

How far the feud was able to function outside of legal rhetoric becomes difficult to measure as Icelandic law existed without a centralized state such as a hereditary monarchy. Near the end of the Viking Age, laws were written down in the form of the *Grágás* (or *Grey Goose Laws*, the written collection of Icelandic law), codifying the existence of the feud (among other things) and legitimizing its portrayal in the sagas as central to group dynamics and family-based interaction.\(^2\) This, however, is problematic. The Saga Age (930-1030 CE, the period in which the events of the

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\(^1\) The Althing was an assembly of goðar (landed freemen) and their thingmen (those men who came to the Thing with the goðar) held in the last two weeks of June. It was a festival of sorts, and many people travelled to the Thing Plain in south-western Iceland to sell, buy, drink, and find husbands for their daughters. It was the main form of government in Commonwealth Iceland. See: Jesse L. Byock, *Medieval Iceland: Society, Sagas, and Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 61. A note on spelling: I have chosen a more Anglo-Saxon form for the spelling of ‘Wergild’ simply to create some consistency within this article. I have decided to use Jesse Byock’s spelling of Althing over that of William Miller as well, mostly to accommodate my word processor.

sagas are reputed to have taken place) preceded the writing of the Grágás by at least eighty-seven years, and laws were generally maintained through the oral tradition of lawspeakers up until this time. Moreover, the sagas themselves were written well past the Saga Age, many in the thirteenth century. To analyze the use of the feud within Njal’s Saga would therefore be fraught with too many incompatible issues of perspective, false historicization, and subjectivity. By repositioning the Saga as a textual representation of how post-Saga Age authors imagined the feud allows for a deeper understanding of how the literature, and the feud itself, stood in relation to one another. Furthermore, this repositioning allows for Njal’s Saga, and the Gágás as well, to be seen as a mechanism within the greater feud structure of post-Saga Age Iceland. When evaluated in this way, promoted as a long-standing aspect of society, the feud transcends the legal framework of the time and becomes representative of a legally, and textually legitimized cultural norm with the Sagas acting as mytho-historical representations of the feud, and as contemporary (and therefore Christianized) moral tales that help limit it. The feud served as a safety-valve that helped order and maintain social interaction and politics. In detailing the way reciprocal violence was to be carried out (legally and physically) the feud limited the need for mass violence and large scale inter-clan warfare, maintaining the peace of the commonwealth, while the Saga’s represented the new, Christian interpretation of the feud within Icelandic legal framework.

**A Long Line of My Kin…**

Analyzing the sagas and other written sources for the Viking Age on a textual level, while not new, has not fully been explored. As such, while not suggesting wholly new methodologies or perspectives, this paper reflects a re-evaluation of sources through a contemporary, post-modernist lens. By proposing that the sagas be examined as *aspects* of a changing socio-cultural system (an Icelandic culture in the process of Christianizing) rather than

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records of a socio-cultural system (say, in the form of a pre-Christian history written by pre-Christian authors about their own culture), the sagas and other written evidence for the Viking Age can be seen within a slightly different context. Here this paper continues in the intellectual foot-steps of Margaret Clunies Ross, who has turned to a more Saidian interpretation of saga sources. Additionally, while much of the historiography regarding the feud in Viking Age Iceland tends to focus on what the sagas infer as evidence for the feud (from a variety of different paradigmatic angles), my intent is to evaluate both the sagas and the feud as aspects of living, malleable, and dynamic cultures, where the sagas represent the textual attempts of one of these cultures to understand and deal with the importance of the feud in their culture. Borrowing methodology from anthropology, ethnohistory, and colonial studies, this relativistic perspective allows for the evidence of the sagas to be seen more as how a culture in transition perceived and mythologized its own past.

Structure and the Feud

The feud included a number of facets not limited to physical violence, including suits, breaches of contracts, and failed alliances. The feud was a social mechanism that allowed for the creation of alliances and the division of others. Yet the feud is itself a highly nuanced concept that involved more than just physical reactions. As we will see, the legal system existed to accommodate feud in particular ways. That the feud was included in law codes, helped in the formation of regional judicial mechanisms (Quarters and local Things), and fed into a greater legal system (the Althing), indicates that it was an important aspect of Icelandic legal society. The structures that the feud was connected to, and the differences between social and legal aspects of the feud add a perspective that helps clarify the representation of the feud in the saga literature. To better understand why the feud

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depicted in *Njal’s Saga* seems to indicate the failure of the legal system, it will help to take a look at how the feud and other systems interacted.

An important difference here must be highlighted here between the feud and the blood feud. Jesse L Byock draws a distinction between the two by highlighting that a blood feud can be a result, or aspect of, a feud.\(^5\) By expanding on this notion the nuances of the feud as a concept can be better examined. As discussed in the following section, the feud can have both legal and physical consequences. The *Grágás* stipulates a wronged party had until the next Althing to physically avenge a wrong.\(^6\) This is the ‘blood’ aspect of the feud. By extension, the legal action that can be employed by a member of the wronged party at the Althing is an aspect of the feud-as-a-whole. Blood feud is therefore an integral (if not expected and permissible) aspect of the feud, which also includes legal recourse and payment of wergild. To better highlight the layout of the feud, see the below table.

![The Feud](Image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Recourse</th>
<th>Non-Physical Recourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blood Feud</td>
<td>Wergild</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Physical and Non-Physical Aspects of the Fued*

The blood feud is the most fundamental node within the overall structure of the feud. The method of suit is stipulated in the *Grágás*, as is the mode, payment, worth, and use of the wergild.\(^7\) The blood feud, therefore, stands in contrast to the non-physical aspects of the feud and, when the *Grágás* mention the blood feud (they do not use the term specifically), they do so in a highly

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\(^6\) Dennis, 161.

\(^7\) Dennis, 175-86.
methodological way, detailing the lengths one might go to before reciprocity becomes butchery. Moreover, the injuries detailed are listed not so much as being the ways in which one might exact vengeance, rather they are the forms of reciprocity the type of injury will require (allowable by law). Here, we start to see the circularity of the feud system. Each action opened different avenues of redress that the offended/injured party might take. Depending on the type of redress, and the levels to which the offended party went, then the initial perpetrator/offender may—should the payment not be perceived as equal—address this new perceived injury. This system of redress and counter-redress is, by its nature, a little confusing. Table 2 (see Appendix) presents a visual representation of the system. The table shows the perpetuation of the system and how injury can lead to either conclusion or further injury. This is an important aspect of social control and stability in Medieval Iceland, despite the potential for perpetual injury. The feud must be seen, then, as a structured, self-perpetuating system that is internal to itself, regardless of legalities. Indeed, there are legal aspects that propel and regulate the feud, each referable to another aspect of the system, allowing response in kind for perceived transgressions. Understanding the feud as including the blood feud, as well as the wergild and the suit, is integral to understanding how the feud is perceived within saga literature and the Icelandic legal system.

Perpetual injury was vital to the social and political consistency of Medieval Iceland, particularly in relation to bilateral kinship. Bilateral kinship, unlike patrilineal or matrilineal, uses both parents as the means of kin-based alliance formation in that neither the father’s nor the mother’s side were given prominence over the other. Participation in the feud was thus opened to a great number of people, with blood ties being

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8 Ibid., 140, 142.
optional or not specifically needed.\textsuperscript{10} This insinuates a broader alliance-based context, at the centre of which stood the feud. As a part of an honour-based society,\textsuperscript{11} medieval Icelanders were able to use the feud as a form of social currency, to create and maintain (or break) alliances that were fundamentally informed by kinship.\textsuperscript{12} Because kinship was somewhat amorphous, there was room for the ideas of kin to be modified, and once marriage bonds were formed, be they matrilineal or patrilineal, the extension of the kin group became so broad that it created the conditions for overlap and individual agency with regard to alliance making.\textsuperscript{13} If, as Stephen B. Barlau states, this kinship structure was “deeply embedded in the sociocultural fabric of Old Iceland,” then feud can be seen as enforcing social norms.\textsuperscript{14} Perpetual injury is the outcome of this enforcement: Perpetual injury allowed groups to validate or depart from alliances that might even be based nominally on kinship (again, because kinship is so broadly defined, there will be times when one aspect of an individual’s kin group will be at odds with another). The feud, therefore, acted as an important galvanizing (or not) aspect of society.

The interrelation within and between kin groups needed the feud as it allowed for change within what could be a static organization. Kin, as a concept, perpetuates the notion of alliance through descent and allows for the maintenance of social order.\textsuperscript{15} It provided (and in many places still provides today) a basic organizational structure that can accommodate other systems of social moderation and organization. Marriage, as an aspect of kinship, brings one group closer to another and, depending on concepts of heredity, is an important aspect of social

\textsuperscript{11} Miller, \textit{Bloodtaking}, 181.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}, 217.
\textsuperscript{13} Barlau, 191, 192.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, 192. For the notion of upholding social norms, see Miller, \textit{Bloodtaking}, 181.
organization. As we have seen, bilateral kinship implies a great deal of possible kinship-space to navigate when looking at organization. If Icelanders were related to everyone they generally dealt with (Icelandic kinship extended to the fifth-degree), and kinship made up an important aspect of social order, a fluid system for the modifying of alliances needed to exist. This fluidity, was provided through the nebulous social construct known as honour. Honour was that amorphous notion that allowed for the reordering of alliance, despite descent. Through the offence to one’s honour—each transgression demanding restitution—splits within kin groups could be navigated. Allowing myself some room for conjecture, one might suggest that the Icelandic context necessitated this. The population of Viking Age Iceland was not that high (estimates place Iceland’s population between 45,000 and 90,000 in the early twelfth century), and if kinship extended to the fifth degree, then there would be a great deal of overlap. Honour created the context for division and malleable alliances that kinship alone might have made too permanent—even to the point where slights might be saved and left unrevened for a time when they were needed. Within this complex system, honour was the means to division and cohesion. Assisting a member of the kin group in a feud reasserted the alliance between those parties. Alliances helped to solidify relationships within kin groups, and feuds helped to maintain social order.

The feud, seen in the example below (the Gellir/Oddr Feud), escalates within a certain framework and does not—normally—affect the whole of society. As such, there was no need for a centralized state apparatus (through a hereditary monarchy)

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16 Ibid.
17 Barlau, 192.
18 Byock, *Viking Age Iceland* (London: Penguin, 2001), 55. Due to this overlap of kinship, there is the suggestion that alliances held more social currency than actual sanguine ties (the section below on Kinship will elaborate on this).
20 Ibid., 124.
in the context of maintaining order. Vengeance within the feud structure, according to the Grágás, is a very personal action. Indeed, groups of alliance may be brought into it; nevertheless, the stipulations within the Icelandic legal structure imply that vengeance was a personal issue. Interestingly, according to William Ian Miller, the Viking Age legal system codified social norms through examples, not through the abstract principle of laws that make up the concepts of legal/illegal in more centralized social organizations. Once the feud is examined through such a lens, then the concept of escalation can be localized. For example, if someone included themselves within a feud who had nothing to do with the reciprocal exchange (perceived wrong and reaction), they would be violating social convention. They would, in a sense, place themselves at the mercy of both feuding parties. Defying socio-legal convention as such would allow for the full weight of society’s judgment to be placed on that interloper and they would suffer without creating a feud situation. In a social structure that did not include a central authority, it was this adherence to social norms as ascribed in a loose legal system that allowed for the maintenance of order within society.

**Legal Aspects of the Feud**

“It is prescribed that the man on whom injury is inflicted has the right to avenge himself if he wants to up to the time of the General Assembly at

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21 By order here I must point out that I only mean in relation to large-scale violence and do not wish to extend the principle to any other areas of governmental or social, organizations or divisions.
22 Dennis, 141-2, 172, 221.
23 Miller, Bloodtaking, 223, 229-30.
25 Ibid., 113. In Njal’s Saga the death of one of the principle characters indicates the manner in which feud ties into social convention. Upon the slaying of Gunnar, the children of Njal ask their father if they might make a suit against the killers. Due to Gunnar having been outlawed, however, Njal tells them that no vengeance can be taken. Social position also affected the legality of the feud, limiting its employment. The Story of Burnt Njal, chapter 77.
26 Miller, Bloodtaking, 217.
which he is required to bring a case for the injuries.²⁷

The Grágás codify the idea of vengeance within Icelandic society and, as such, officiate the notion of reciprocity among parties wronged in an assault. According to the Grágás a person may take revenge on another within a given time-frame and face no legal consequences.²⁸ From the moment of the offence to the next Althing (the assembly of goðar/land owners that took place once a year in the last two weeks of June),²⁹ the family of the wronged—or the wronged themselves—could take physical vengeance on the offending party.³⁰ Beyond that point, the wronged had at their disposal legal recourse at the Althing. Essentially, the purpose of these laws was to mitigate the level of vengeance acts taken by wronged parties. This is similar to the Germanic laws of Wergild (the worth of a person payable by the killer to the family of the slain), codified as early as the sixth century in the Salic Law of the Franks.³¹ Within the Icelandic system, however, the implication of a legal suit after a given time period extended the idea of vengeance away from personal injury and personal response and placed it within the notion of the community. Here is where Icelandic socio-legal custom differs from other contemporary examples: Viking Age Iceland had no centralized monarchy and therefore no mechanisms of a centralizing state authority. Other than the Althing, no central government existed to oversee the application of the law. There were no sheriffs or legal representatives of a monarch’s court in the countryside, overseeing the implementation of royal law upon the population. The implication is interesting, particularly in

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²⁷ Dennis, 141.
²⁸ Ibid.
²⁹ Byock, Medieval Iceland, 61, 114. Byock describes the goðar as successful farmers who had some access to power due to their prosperity and the size of their lands.
³⁰ Miller, Bloodtaking, 192.
³¹ Thomas Smith, Arminius: A History of the German People and of their Legal and Constitutional Customs, from the Days of Julius Caesar to the time of Charlemagne (London: James Blackwood, 1861), 397.
regard to laws that mitigate vengeance. Without a central authority, it was the task of the community to self-regulate, and self-enforce. To that end, the concept of the feud can be understood as a force of cohesion rather than division. The terms of the feud and the codification of it into law then provide the socio-legal framework that legitimized the communal regulation of society.

The regulation of laws was not ad hoc and the Icelandic legal system did have some level of oversight. At the yearly Althing, there was a council that sat specifically to oversee and discuss laws and the legal system. The purpose of this council (known as the lögtrétt, or ‘law council’) was to focus specifically on the legal code, including discussions on old laws and inclusions of new ones.\(^{32}\) This council—like all aspects of the Althing—was held in public and opened to any visitors who might wish to watch. This made the entire legal system accessible to the freedmen of Iceland. Although these freedmen did not hold a vote on the lögtrétt, they could at least witness its discussions and decisions. This implies that the laws were reflective of society, at least to a certain extent. Being accountable to members of the community, the Althing’s lögtrétt served as an expression of the socio-legal mentalities of the community it was intended to regulate. Jesse L. Byock explains how the lögtrétt was comprised of Iceland’s Chieftains, each of whom had the right to vote. The Chieftains were accompanied by two councillors who helped them to decide matters as they applied their vote, making the process conciliatory.\(^{33}\) This is not to suggest that Medieval Iceland was what we might term ‘a progressive democracy.’ Nor was it a system that represented the desires and opinions of every inhabitant of the island. This structure simply implies that there was a conciliatory decision making process that influenced the legal system of the island. There is the impression then that the legal system was a reflection of cultural or societal ideas. The ways in which the feud operated within this legal framework


\(^{33}\) *Ibid.*
indicates that the feud was important in the maintenance of peace throughout Iceland.

In the middle of the tenth century, for example, a feud erupted between two Chieftains, Thóðr gellir and Tungu-Oddr, which became a concern for all of Iceland.\footnote{Ibid., 65.} According to the Íslendingabók (a history of early Iceland written by Ari Þorgilsson in the early twelfth century), the feud began over the burning of a man (Þorkell Blund-Ketilsson) by Tengu-Oddr’s son. Although there was a suit, the two parties came to blows at the local Thing (a smaller, regional version of the Althing that served a similar purpose on a local level), making it impossible to carry out any legal action.\footnote{Íslendingabók, chapter 5.} Many of the problems of this feud stem from what Thóðr described as an issue of regional enforcement. Travelling to an ‘unfamiliar Thing,’ he allegedly said, did not benefit either party.\footnote{Ibid.} According to Byock (and confirmed in Íslendingabók), the structure of the Things were modified by this specific feud.\footnote{Ibid.; Byock, Medieval Iceland, 65.} Interestingly, although there are the same problems with sources here that are always encountered when working on Medieval Iceland, there is some causality that comes into play. Iceland, according to the ‘Assembly Procedures’ listed in the Grágás, was indeed divided into the legal Quarters described in the Íslendingabók.\footnote{Dennis, 103.} The Íslendingabók—like many of the sagas—was written in the twelfth century, long after the Gellir/Oddr Feud, and can be problematic in its depictions of events. The stipulation for Quarters in the Grágás, however, pre-dates the writing of the saga and corroborates the idea that feud, specifically, led to the modification of the legal system. Is it possible to suggest that Iceland was Quartered because of a feud, or because of a story concerning a feud? That is a question that will be addressed in the following sections. In the meantime, it is important to note that Iceland was Quartered into judicial regions on the basis of managing feud. The feud, therefore, was responsible for not only
physical redress for offenses and insults of honour, but for the managing/reordering of the legal system.

**Lingering Questions of Kinship and Alliance**

In order to contextualize the events within *Njal’s Saga*, some lingering issues that relate to alliance and kinship must be dealt with. Kinship, as stated above, tended to include a great number of people. Given the size of Iceland’s population, and the potential overlap of consanguine kin-ties, it is highly expectable that a family (which counted fifth-degrees of separation on both mother’s and father’s side) would fight internally. The family structure would be so large that, in essence, a feud that was to take place between families would be either very large or very small. Essentially, the entire idea of kinship must be re-examined in order to determine how, or why, feuds could exist without implicating a large component of society within them. In an effort to evaluate the feud within the Icelandic kinship structure, many academics who focus on Viking Age Iceland have found that fictive kinship served to create bonds of alliance that superseded those based solely on blood.

Fictive kinship is the creation of bonds of kin between people based on non-sanguine ideas. According to Miller, “kinship also provided the ideology and metaphor for fictive kinship bonds based on fosterage, blood brotherhood, and sponsorial [sic] relations.” Following this configuration, the notion of kin is extended to include those raised in a household under fosterage and who have sworn fealty to each other. Although this definition serves the subject matter well, Parkes’ definition for ‘adoptive kinship’ is equally salient [emphasis his]: “a construction of kinship by means of delegated parenthood.”

Within the Icelandic system of fosterage and alliance, the bonds of kinship were extended and modified, including groups while

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excluding others, even within the same consanguine family. This idea further complicated Icelandic social structures in that it adds another facet to the already confused notion of alliance.

In Iceland, “families never developed into territorially defined large clans as they did in Ireland,” limiting the scope of potential influence the consanguine will have on territorial matters. What developed instead were the interconnections of adoptive kinship in which groups within the overall kinship structure were linked or detached. Seeing as the adoptive structure was chosen and based on loyalty rather than biology, one could argue that these fictive bonds were stronger. The Icelandic feud structure was one of allegiance and loyalty. Adoptive kinship and the feud thus operated in relation to each other, and not in opposition. Rather, adoptive kinship was ideally suited to the feud system in ways that consanguine kinship was not. Byock explains how the consanguine kin structure “complimented political ties” except in the feud. This can be related to the above discussion on population and bilateral kinship. Blood-ties gave people the option to enter a feud, should it suit their political needs. From that point onward, the implication of allegiances would be politically motivated and tied to the idea of forming alliances through adoptive kinship. The laws, as well as Njal’s Saga, agree with this interpretation, placing the bond of adoptive kinship above that of consanguine kinship.

The interrelation of kinship and the feud allowed for and facilitated adoptive kinship. As we have seen, kinship was not a desirable basis for reciprocity in the context of the Icelandic feud. Kingroups were too large to accommodate the feud as a structure and remain regulatory. The addition of adoptive kinship (as a substructure), then, allows the idea of kin to remain focal to the feud

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41 From this point on I will use ‘kinship’ and ‘kingroup’ to represent the consanguine and ‘adoptive kinship/group’ or ‘fictive kinship/group’ for what they are.
42 Byock, Feud, 90.
43 Parkes, 742.
44 Byock, Feud, 87.
45 Ibid.
46 Miller, Bloodtaking, 171. The Story of Burnt Njal, chapter 92.
structure, while at the same time limiting the extent to which a feud might develop. All forms of self-regulation would have broken down had kin been the sole interaction of the feud based on the size of the population, and the use of bilateral lineage.

Feud in Literature

‘That is no breach of settlement,’ says Njal, ‘that any man should take the law against another; for with law shall our land be built up and settled, and with lawlessness wasted and spoiled.’

The Story of Burnt Njal depicts a feud in its entirety. Within the narrative the forming and breaking of alliances, the role of honour, how kinship and adoptive kinship relate to the undertaking of a feud, and how the feud can be divisive to society as a whole can be seen. Slight after slight, the feud in Njal’s Saga continues unabated for fifty years, highlighting the reciprocal aspects of the feud and the inability for the legal system to assuage its escalation. Already, this seems to contradict much of what this paper has argued concerning the feud structure as an aspect of social regulation. Indeed, the way in which the feud unfolds in Njal’s Saga cuts against much of the thesis. However, when examined not as a detailed account of a feud but as a representation, a more nuanced perspective emerges. The feud was able to mitigate the escalation of violence in Viking Age Iceland, and Njal’s Saga served as a cautionary tale that reinforced the laws and societal norms existing at the time. A caveat must be included here: This paper will not be conducting a literary analysis of the saga, nor will it quote or analyzing specific fragments of the text. The object is to place Njal’s Saga within the greater structures of the feud, considering it as a textual form of social regulation.

Problematizing the sagas as sources is not a new trick in Viking Age scholarship, and any discussion concerning a saga (or sagas in general) must acknowledge this. Since they were written long after the periods they discuss, it is difficult to accept the stories depicted in the sagas as unproblematic history.

47 Njal, Chapter 69.
Nevertheless, the difficulty is not placing them within an inquiry; it is the method of analyzing them. That the feud existed in Iceland in the Viking Age is not, at this point, a focus of debate. That contributed to social regulation is perhaps more open to question. Following similar methodology as above, I will attempt to situate aspects of *Njal’s Saga* into discussions of the law, and social structures, indicating in what ways the story is representative of socio-legal norms and a Christian cautionary tale concerning the practice of the feud as a whole.

The law stipulated the applicable recourse one might take to a perceived or a real slight to honour, and this is no different in *Njal’s Saga*. Principle characters are lawyers or lawspeakers (such as Mord and Njal) and a great deal of the interactions between feuding parties rest on the application of law.\(^48\) As with the *Grágás*, *Njal’s Saga* depicts Iceland as having been divided into Quarters, each with a Thing that oversaw local legal matters such as suits.\(^49\) It is to these Things and Quarter Courts where such issues are disputed and settled, and who are portrayed throughout the saga as having an influence over the feud. In each occasion, the settlement provided by the Quarter Thing is described as being fair and just and, for a time, halts the feud.\(^50\)

The wergild, another important aspect of the Grey Goose Laws, is also featured throughout *Njal’s Saga*. Similarly to the position of the suit and the Thing, the wergild acts as a deterrent in the continuation of the feud.\(^51\) The anonymous author, it might be said, was trying to indicate that the suit and the wergild were noble exits to a potential feud. This stands to reason in several ways, particularly as one wergild episode begins and concludes early on in the saga and stands as something of a foil to the remainder of the work. Written roughly around 1280, *Njal’s Saga* stands removed from the events it portrays and, as such, is a

\(^{48}\) *Njal*, chapters 1, 2, 7, 8, 20, 24, 27, 56, 108, 134, etc.

\(^{49}\) *Ibid.*, chapters 8, 56.

\(^{50}\) *Ibid.*, chapters 8, 24, 50 (in this example a suit is suggested as a ‘friendly way’ of ending a dispute).

\(^{51}\) *Ibid.*, chapters 11, 12.
product more of its own time than the time it depicts. Moreover, the morality of the period in which *Njal’s Saga* was written differed from that of the period it describes. During the years that separate the Saga Age and the end of the Viking Age, Christianity was introduced to Iceland and subsequently adopted (officially) at the Althing. Christianity and Christian morality are hard to remove from the perspectives of late-Viking Age authors and must be taken into account when analyzing their texts. As Miller argues, writing was one of the most important things that Christianity brought to Iceland and, as such, written sources should be evaluated with this in mind. Even though authorship of *Njal’s Saga* is anonymous, the period in which it was written allows it to be seen as a product of the changing socio-religious landscape, and therefore it must be regarded as more than simply a text with a bias.

Potential for escalation still existed within the context of successful suits and wergild paid in full, though the voice of the saga depicts these as being aberrant to Icelandic norms. Honour, here, becomes anathema to the functioning of society and is depicted as being the derisive aspect of the feud. The introduction of Christian morality played an important role in the writing of the sagas, influencing the desired representation of ethics and decency. In relation to the potential success of the suit at halting a feud the reliance on honour, and the perception of

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54 Miller, *Bloodtaking*, 270.
55 Miller, ‘Outlaws,’ 2083.
56 *Njal*, chapters 24, 44, 49.
57 Miller, *Bloodtaking*, 254. Also: Byock, *Feud*, 9. Here I do not mean to suggest that there was some nefarious propaganda machine that the Christians brought to Iceland. I do mean that Christianity imported with it writing (though the difference here is subjective). Those documents/sagas authored were thus influenced by Christianity, which is detectable and navigable and must be taken into account.
slight, corrupts the peace crafted by the legal methods. Moreover, honour is used as a form of currency when suits are not taken up immediately, or when old suits are resurrected in a delayed desire to repay a slight.\(^{58}\) It can be inferred then that honour, while binding in many stable ways, can serve (at least insofar as \textit{Njal’s Saga} is concerned) as an aspect not indicative of social stability (though it remains one of the main commodities within a system of social currency). When contrasted against the adherence to laws, honour creates room for deviance and can turn the functional legal structure into a tool of vengeance and perpetual violence.

One of the most explicit episodes specifically involves the coopting of the law by Gunnar (one of the main participants in the feud) to re-awaken an old suit that had previously been settled (against the other main participant, Hrut).

\(^{59}\) In this example, the law is used as a means to right a perceived dishonour and, as such, propels the feud outside of normal social limits. Nevertheless, the escalation of the Hrut/Gunnar feud (the feud depicted throughout \textit{Njal’s Saga} revolves around the persons of Hrut and Gunnar yet grows to include a great network of individuals and alliances) does not occur wholly on the basis of legal failure in the face of honour (or honour failing the legal framework). Social norms are also breached, fuelling further aggression and violent recourse (meted out in the form of suits as well as through physical violence).

Societal norms, similar to Icelandic law, drew out expected and specific reactions from feuding parties. For example, a breach of the feud structure by an individual not directly involved in the feud deviated from social (and legal) norms, permitting for reaction from the broader community. The interference of another into a feud within \textit{Njal’s Saga}, for example, is dealt with legally.\(^{60}\) Once again, honour becomes the peg to which the author attaches so much worth, portraying much of the feud’s drastic intensification as a result. In the episode mentioned in the previous paragraph, Gunnar takes advice from Njal and re-starts a suit against Hrut. This is rather normal within the legal structure of the

\(^{58}\) \textit{Njal}, chapters 24, 66.

\(^{59}\) \textit{Ibid.}, chapters 22, 23.

\(^{60}\) \textit{Ibid.}, chapter 56.
feud. However, what differs is the way it is undertaken. Njal
instructs Gunnar (one of the greatest warriors in all of Iceland) to change his appearance and bate Hrut into calling for the suit. Placing the impetus for the feud as a whole within this action is rather important to the implied morality of the saga. Being an honour-based society, subterfuge and deception were not highly regarded. Although deception being equated with a dishonourable act is not easily found in the scholarship, it is possible to infer this by the long explanation of how Icelandic warriors were expected to act in battle. Gaining honour was a primary focus of freedmen as it gave them social currency, notoriety, and fame, and (in addition to wealth won on raids) honour was one of the prime motivations for the actions of Icelandic warriors. The violation is, again, not wholly stated in Njal’s Saga, though Gunnar’s death comes through the ‘betrayal’ of Hallgerda, again for a small, perceived slight (Hallgerda was Hrut’s niece). In this the mighty warrior, who no man could slay, found his end, punishment for the slight against Hrut.

The morality is murky, yet still discernible. Gunnar initiated a suit on the basis of legal advice (normative) through dishonourable means (not normative). Having broken with the social convention attached to honourable warriors, Gunnar found his end. There is one reason to attach this notion of morality here: Gunnar’s involvement in the suit comes at the behest of Unna, Hrut’s ex-wife. In this the activation of an alliance allows a new participant to enter the feud. A question that arises in this example is Gunnar’s reliance on the employment of trickery to rekindle the suit when, as Unna’s decision shows, there was possibly another, alliance-based way to involve himself. With what follows in the story of the saga, the author has no reason to avoid the further involvement of alliances as Unna, in exercising her honour-bound

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61 Ibid., chapter 19.
62 Ibid., chapters 22, 23.
63 Miller, Bloodtaking, 219. Miller attributes all aspects of social and political life to ‘the idiom of honour and the avenging of perceived wrongs.’
65 Njal, chapter 76.
right, brings an alliance network into the feud (Gunnar, who then turns to Njal, implicating both of their kin groups) that had previously not been involved.

The morality of the text is therefore discernible, and the bias of the author is apparent within the greater context of the feud. *The Story of Burnt Njal* highlights a great many aspects of the feud, showing how it can defy social convention and escalate, despite a series of laws designed to mitigate such an occurrence. The careful reader will notice that an analysis of kinship does not come into the argument, despite it being one of the structures discussed above. It has been omitted for fear of leading the reader astray. The kinship structure within *Njal’s Saga* is representative of adoptive kinship, and does highlight the ways that adoptive kinship can supersede consanguine kinship in times of feud.66 However, to attempt a clear interpretation of the kin-based alliance system that comes into play throughout the saga would be thoroughly confusing and a work not suited to the bounds of this paper.67 Nevertheless, the notion that adoptive kinship serves as a form of alliance making is actually rather clear in the saga. It propels the Hrut/Gunnar feud well beyond the point of necessity (growing to include various families that were not initially implicated).68 By extension, the moral commentary of the author is somewhat lacking here. This is likely due to the continued practice of adoptive kinship in Christian Iceland.69 Or, conversely, the greater commentary is tied up in discussions of honour, and how alliances based on the *idea* of kinship can (and in this case does) lead to the slight being avenged by people who were never slighted. Contextualizing the saga and the author in this way is

66 *Njal*, chapters 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 40, 42, 43, 92, 93, among others.
67 I briefly attempted to find (and then produce) a flow chart that highlighted the interactions of alliances within *Njal’s Saga* including consanguine and adoptive kinship. Not only would it not have fit into the special limitations of this paper, the effort was abortive.
68 *Njal*, chapters 42, 43.
replete with difficulties and, obviously, I am limited in my problematization of them due to my perspective, and the realities of extant sources. Additionally, this section has yet covered how the feud was regulatory in any way, and has, as a point, illustrated how the feud was not regulatory. To read Njal’s Saga as a story representing the events of a feud that had taken place in the past, then this is understandable, as Njal’s Saga does not depict a particularly regulatory socio-cultural custom—quite the opposite. If, however, Njal’s Saga is re-evaluated not as a history of a feud but as a textualization of how the author and his/her culture hoped to explain the feud, then the expected, regulatory results that the saga—in its depiction of the feud—can be seen as having been successful.

**Njal’s Saga as Textual Structure**

It has been the purpose of this paper to examine and explain the various structures at work within the overall operation of the feud-as-social-regulator. The feud itself is a system, within which social norms, laws, and kinship all exist. Linking these structures together, effectively, and rather than simply elaborating on a connection between Njal’s Saga and the structures represented within, the saga itself is implicated as a final aspect of the framework that moderated the regulatory aspects of the feud. Texts are not created free of context. They are written within a given timeframe, and tend to reflect aspects of the social, cultural, and religious perspectives of the author. Njal’s Saga is such a work (as are all of the sagas) in that it “can be seen to form schemas that are mythic . . . in the sense of constructing stable cognitive models for making sense of human experience.”\(^70\) With this in mind, the authoring of a saga specifically elaborating on the derisive features of the feud while glorifying (or not) aspects of honour and legal adherence must be seen as a reflection of this construction (in regards to ‘cognitive models’). Particularly important is when this particular saga was written, for it reflects the development of a Christian morality in the Icelandic context.

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\(^{70}\) Ross, 159.
Written in approximately 1280, *The Story of Burnt Njal* reflects the socio-legal aspects of the feud. It does not do this so much in direct examples of how regulatory the feud was, but as a tale of warning. The feud was responsible for the Quartering of Iceland and the implementation of regional legal structures.\(^{71}\) Similar to the feud depicted in *Íslendingabók*, the Hrut/Gunnar Feud eventually sees a complete breach of social norms with fighting in the Althing, as well as the constant disregard for the legal regulation of reciprocal vengeance.\(^{72}\) The tales are similar to the point that they represent a trope within Icelandic literature, one that stresses the importance of halting a feud before it gets out of hand. When a feud is conducted on understandable levels, with proper respect given to social and legal norms, the feud is manageable and can come to a reasonable conclusion.\(^{73}\) This reinforces the existence of the wergild and the Althing. Both are aspects within the feud that, short of causing more bloodshed, permit honourable and manageable exits from the perpetuity of exchange. Although subtle, the implication throughout *Njal’s Saga* is that these options are often the most successful, cause little or no slight to honour, and are designed to mitigate violence, producing a textual basis for adherence.\(^{74}\)

Textuality is important in the creation of ‘cognitive models’ and can serve as an anchor for future social development. Similar to discussions of objectivity in history and the construction of a narrative, the basing of events/stories/concepts into textual form gives them a certain practical authority over the perceptions of a social group.\(^{75}\) This perception is not limited to the external,

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71 *Íslendingabók*, chapter 5.
72 *Njal*, chapter 144.
74 Ross, 159.
75 Peter Burke, ‘Performing History: The Importance of Occasions,’ *Rethinking History* 9, no. 1 (March 2005), 39. This is most clearly defined in Said’s theories. The applicability of orientalism in this case is next to zero (provided we entirely disregard Christianity as a colonial force), though Said’s perception of constructions based on text are here very useful, particularly as we move to situate the textual representation of the Feud (in this case, *Njal’s Saga*) into the
and the construction of a transferable notion relating to any subject provides a unifying basis for (in this case) social morality and acceptability. Therefore, to argue that *Njal’s Saga* (let alone all sagas) helps to define a physically transferable representation of an idea is navigable. To extend this creation of the textual to a tradition that was previously oral can give the text that much more authority, particularly when tied to the arrival of a new world-view (in this case Christianity). Very much like the writing of the *Grágás* in the twelfth century, giving physical form to stories made them specific and uniform for those who employed them.

By implying, arguing, and detailing certain themes throughout the saga, the author reinforces the structures that were desirable within the feud, based on the author’s perspective. Wergild and a reliance on the Thing are given a morality while honour and slights imply deviance. This is quite evident in the manner of constant escalation experienced in the Hrut/Gunnar feud. Reflecting the perpetual aspects of the feud structure, the use of honour as an excuse created the context for the feud to test the norms of Icelandic society. Honour, therefore, is not necessarily an evil that must be excised, it is something that must be utilized within relation to society. The individual, *The Story of Burnt Njal* implies, should hold the betterment of the community before the settlement of a slight on personal honour.

In many instances, *Njal’s Saga* implies that some form of conclusion in the feud could have been reached. If we refer back to table 2 (see the Appendix), for each node that allows for perpetuation there is an equal opportunity for conclusion. When Gunnar and Njal choose to reignite the legal dispute over Mord’s goods, they are selecting a possible alternative to conclusion.


76 Dennis, 15.

77 *Njal*, chapters 7, 8.

78 *Ibid.*, chapter 21, 22. The role and importance of women have, unfortunately, been wholly excluded from my examination. This is not an oversight, and was consciously done to focus entirely on the structures and system of the feud as a whole. More research should be done that includes women as an aspect of the system, for there is much to indicate that the gender divide allowed for
Based on Unna’s honour, an alliance is created that precipitates the events that follow. Here the troubles of kinship are touched upon, and elaborated throughout. As adoptive kinship ties became the cause for the involvement of a great many people in the feud, this desire to seek a conclusion is lessened and, based on honour, new participants create a complicated situation. Referring again to the importance of the whole over that of the singular, it is the agency given to the individual (here Unna) that is disruptive and not the feud-system in its entirety. By providing Gunnar with an excuse, Unna activates an alliance (Unna and Gunnar, who are kin) based on the breaking of another alliance (Unna and Hrut).  

Through this example it is possible to tie together several of the themes the author was (willingly or not) creating a textual base for: Community over the individual and law over bloodshed. The examination of the sagas as a textual basis for “constructing stable cognitive models for making sense of human experience” is noteworthy and relatively untouched in saga scholarship, with Margaret Clunies Ross being one of the only authors currently employing this analysis.  

The majority of authors who have taken an interest in written sources that depict the Viking Age, outside of philology, are limited to literary examinations and the substantiation of validity. By focusing on this substantiation, the Sagas have mostly been employed as evidence for the Viking Age rather than evidence for how the twelfth and thirteenth century authors mythologized their own history and infused it with a more contemporary moral perspective. This perspective, unfortunately,  

additional honour-based excuses within Njal’s Saga (in that a women is therein portrayed as the gate-keeper of violence). That being said, with the recent reevaluation of the role women played in Norse society based on mitochondrial DNA and pelvic measurements of skeletons found in warrior graves in Norse burials in England, the entire concept of the feminine/masculine delineation among Viking Age Norse might itself be a misrepresentation based on the textualization of certain colonial ideas from the 12th and 13th centuries. See: Shane McLeod, “Warriors and Women: The Sex Ratio of Norse Migrants to Eastern England up to 900AD,” Early Medieval Europe 19, no. 3 (August 2011), 332-53.

79 Njal, chapter 21. It is not defined in what way they are related.

80 Ross, 159.
fails to problematize the sagas adequately, and tends towards a false historicization of both the written sources and any realities that might have been experienced during the Viking Age itself. More research in this direction would not only be interesting, it has the potential to be employed in the context of other cultures who have experienced a shift (often through colonization or enculturation) away from oral traditions and into the more Occidental model that favors written histories. In a Saidian fashion, while to ask in what way the text supports or reinforces pre-existing structures is – at least in my mind – highly interesting and rather exciting. An example of this type of analysis comes from William Ian Miller. In his discussion, Miller explains how Christianity did not necessitate the Christianization of Icelandic law, “only the creation of new laws formally instituting the new faith.”

Following this line of thought, one can argue that Njal’s Saga was not attempting to Christianize the feud; rather it was the creation of a new moral perception that formalized the feud system and, in this case, can be seen as an aspect of acculturation. In the case of Njal’s Saga, the various structures of the feud are recreated within the text, given life and morality, and placed within a cultural format that mirrored older traditions and tales while ‘instituting’ new ethics.

The feud was an elaborate system of interlaced structures. It was self-regulating, self-normalizing, and self-containing and served to moderate and govern the interactions of groups within

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82 Miller, ‘Of Outlaws,’ 2088.
society. Like the feud itself, these structures existed free of specific oversight and control and adapted themselves within the overall framework of the feud. Society was composed of a community which in turn was comprised of various consanguine and adoptive kin groups. Alliances were maintained and destroyed depending upon honour and interaction, all of which helped to organize and oversee the people within the community. In addition, the social and legal norms of the community were enforced through the oversight of the community, and the laws governing reciprocal violence.

However, as the Grágás codified and legitimized the feud, the sagas served as the textual cultural basis for their management outside of the legal structure. An extension of the social and communal, stories such as The Story of Burnt Njal entrenched the feud within a tradition of shifting morality and altering world-view specific to the Icelandic context. In analyzing Njal’s Saga in this way, lingering issues of perspective, false historicization, and subjectivity can no longer be seen problematically. Rather, with this in mind, the construction of morality, through the interpretation of the saga, allows for (even needs) these issues that, under other circumstances, might challenge the use of a saga as a source. This has the benefit of placing the source within the structures of the feud system, allowing it to be situated genealogically in relation to the feud, the development of laws, and the events it claims to portray.

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Appendix – Table 2: Feud as Self-Replicating (Fractal) Structure
Each Star Has a Story: An Ethnographic Study of Indigenous Astronomical Knowledge in the Pacific Northwest, ca. 1900

DANIEL POSEY

Abstract: The earliest accounts of Indigenous cultures in the Pacific Northwest gathered by anthropologists in the late 19th century contain detailed descriptions of celestial bodies. This article will examine the accounts of astronomical knowledge present in these sources focusing on the Nlaka’pamux (Thompson), Secwépemc (Shuswap), and T’it’q’et (Lillooet) people of central British Columbia, as well as the Kwakwaka’wakw (Kwakiutl), Nuxalkmc (Bella Coola), and Haida from the Northwest coast.

The Jesup North Pacific Expedition conducted between 1897 and 1902 produced detailed ethnographic accounts of Indigenous cultures in the Pacific Northwest. Their findings indicate that some cultural groups maintained a rich and diverse level of astronomical knowledge at the time of their collection in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This paper utilizes such ethnographic sources to better understand the depth and diversity of astronomical knowledge in the Pacific Northwest. Together, these ethnographic collections suggest that astronomical knowledge was an important, if distinctive, element of Indigenous societies as a cultural referent for oral traditions, including narratives explaining the origin and appearance of the night sky, complex calendar systems, and detailed observations of the stars themselves. The issue remains that even including ethnographic collections the historical record lacks indigenous voice during this period. However, the level of detail collected on stars, and on individual objects, suggests a wealth of information that was not gathered during the Jesup Expedition.
It is important to note that there are serious concerns with using ethnographic accounts to determine Indigenous knowledge. This evidence, while a unique source, is a product of its time. The material they contain can be valuable and highly insightful, especially when directed at specific research questions. However, they are highly editorialized, and their creation was subject to the false assumption that cultures were disappearing from the Pacific Northwest.¹ Yet, as the earliest available recorded sources on the topic these provide important information for an understanding of Indigenous astronomical knowledge.

The contact and post-contact era was characterized by an exchange of cultural and intellectual ideas between the Indigenous inhabitants of British Columbia and Europeans. This paper will reflect on the problematic nature of recovering, applying, and interpreting Indigenous astronomical knowledge circa 1900, utilizing the theoretical frameworks of Julie Cruikshank, Eduardo De Castro, and Lynn Abrams.² Existing studies of Indigenous astronomical knowledge in British Columbia are of limited scope and extent. Since few traditional historical sources address astronomical knowledge, this paper will rely solely upon ethnographic collections on the Nlaka’pamux, Secwépemc, and

¹ This assumption was in part tied to a colonialist search for ‘authenticity,’ as the idea that cultures were disappearing created the need for ethnographers to rapidly record their findings. In his introduction to Forked Tongues historian David Murray described this process as “textualising the Indians out of existence.” Paige Raibmon provides further context in Authentic Indians observing that anthropologists were “[m]otivated to preserve what they believed were remnants of dying Indian cultures” attempting to “document old ways uncontaminated by White influence;” David Murray, Forked Tongues: Speech, Writing and Representation in North American Indian Texts (Indiana University Press, 1991), 3; Paige Raibmon, Authentic Indians: Episodes of Encounter from the Late-Nineteenth-Century Northwest Coast (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 5.

Each Star Has a Story

T’it’q’et peoples of central British Columbia, as well as the Kwakwaka’wakw, Nuxalkmc, and Haida from the Northwest coast, and, where possible, Indigenous oral traditions contained within these collections. A comparative study of these Interior and Coastal First Nations circa 1900 will engage differences and similarities in the forms of knowledge held by each group to examine how astronomical knowledge is represented by evidence collected during the Jesup Expedition.

The Euro-Canadian ethnographies created in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century for the Jesup Expedition represent one of the few sources of oral accounts from this period that historians can use to study the astronomical knowledge of Indigenous cultures in the Pacific Northwest.3 These are significantly flawed sources, as their creation was grounded in the assumption that anthropologists could create authoritative account

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of these ‘dying’ cultures. While these ethnographies were intended to record or ‘save’ important cultural elements of various groups, they are highly biased accounts that present a monolithic view of these dynamic cultures. Ethnographies must then be used with the appropriate scrutiny. Situating the Jesup ethnographic accounts utilized in this study, and ethnographic collections in general, in their historical context is important as they claim the authority to describe cultures without acknowledging external influences. In the case of British Columbia, these accounts ignore the post-contact concerns of trade, settlement, and industrialization in the Pacific Northwest experienced during the time of their collection. The interests of individual ethnographers heavily influenced the construction of these cultural accounts and the representation of this knowledge. However, James Alexander Teit’s ethnographic work, especially his accounts on the Nlaka’paumux of the Thompson River valley, provides informative, if fragmented, documentation of Indigenous astronomical traditions in British Columbia’s interior plateau region.

One of the main challenges in utilizing ethnographical accounts to determine specifics of cultural knowledge involves gauging how much the interviewer understood the topic in question, and the complex subjectivities involved in the interview process. Abram’s discussion of intersubjectivity and Cruikshank’s experiences with oral tradition underscore the fluid nature of oral history, suggesting the possibility that a rich astronomical discourse is present in these ethnographies independent of the ethnographer’s knowledge of astronomy. This conviction provides a theoretical basis for the analysis of the cultural importance of astronomical knowledge in this study. However, the assumption must be carefully situated, as it treats edited ethnographies as if they were raw oral interviews. Ethnographies, in effect, act simultaneously as primary and secondary sources due to their presentation of oral traditions within a written structure. They contain the representation of a cultural framework that can be used to understand elements of an indigenous society, but have

4 Abrams, “Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity,” 54-77; Curikshank, Do Glaciers Listen?.
been processed by Western professionals. A post-colonial approach calls the role of these editors into question. It may be possible to faithfully depict the cultures represented in an ethnographic or ethnohistorical work as displayed in Cruikshank’s publications, but depending on the motivations of the editors this outsider perspective can become problematic.5

The theoretical model used in this paper to approach the cultural importance of both literal and figurative celestial figures within the ethnographic record is based on Julie Cruikshank’s Do Glaciers Listen? Cruikshank incorporates oral and scientific narratives in her approach to the study of the significance of glaciers to the Tlingit and Athapaskan populations of the Alaskan Panhandle. This study is rooted in the ideas of Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) and involves an intersection of culture and climate as glaciers are revealed as sentient bodies within Indigenous oral histories.6 Cruikshank examines the way glaciers appear in both Indigenous and European memory, situating First Nations conceptions of glaciers as sentient entities, within Western understandings of geophysics. Adapting this approach has informed my attempts to engage astronomical knowledge from a Western perspective. Cruikshank’s description of glaciers as cultural actors allows for the examination of astronomical (and traditional) forms of knowledge from a nuanced perspective regarding Indigenous conceptions of the natural world. Following this example, I aim to engage astronomical knowledge as a simultaneously static and fluid entity, operating on numerous cultural and practical levels for Indigenous groups on the Interior Plateau and Pacific Coast.

Stars are an interesting starting point from which to examine the discourse surrounding Indigenous astronomical knowledge present in the Jesup collections. Individual stars, while informative from current scientific perspectives, did not have the

5 See Edward Curtis on the context of ethnographic photography in British Columbia. Curtis engaged himself in a form of cultural reconstruction, attempting to preserve a Western image of the Indigenous populations of British Columbia.

6 Cruikshank, Do Glaciers Listen?, 10-12.
Sun or the Moon’s daily influence on society. Their presence within the ethnographic record suggests deeper narratives of cultural power and knowledge associated with the study of the sky. As a case study on the importance of astronomy in Indigenous societies, we can turn to Teit’s description of star lore found in his ethnographies on the Nlaka’pamux. Teit noted that the Nlaka’pamux made reference to specific stars, and the descriptions of stars and constellations took on a narrative form.\(^7\) The narrator of these stories injected both power and authority through signifiers utilized in these tellings, empowering astronomical knowledge on a cultural level. Though various Western European traditions utilized narrative or folklore to describe celestial bodies, they did not contain the concept of natural agency discussed later in this article. This cultural discourse forms an epistemic barrier for both ethnographers and modern historians that foils attempts to contextualize the complexity of these relationships. These ethnographic accounts indicate a dynamic association, bound by cultural and linguistic ties that are beyond scientific description.

Teit identifies the stars as “transformed people.”\(^8\) The meanings of this are potentially vast, suggesting that stars, like humans, maintained voice within Nlaka’pamux society.\(^9\) Anthropologist Eduardo De Castro has identified similar cultural constructions in the Amerindian populations of the Amazon as a form of perspectivism that introduces animistic beliefs to create “a spiritual unity and a corporeal diversity.”\(^10\) Perspectivism suggests

\(^7\) Numerous examples of this will be provided in the following work drawn from Teit’s contributions to the Jesup North Pacific Expedition.


\(^9\) My use of voice here is to reference the importance of stars and other natural features as signifiers within an oral culture. To imagine stars as transformed people suggests a level of authority and agency that are not present in Western conceptualizations of nature circa 1900.

\(^10\) Animism and De Castro’s position of Perspectivism are being used in a very narrow sense for this paper. Animistic approaches were not isolated to celestial bodies, and were often applied to animals, natural features (see Cruikshank: Do Glaciers Listen) and objects. I focus on what I interpret as animistic practices
that while there are notable differences between animals and humans, each had a common origin of “undifferentiation” that allows for communication between these figures.\textsuperscript{11} De Castro situates shared humanity as an inverse of Western evolutionary perspectives. Western discourse claims that humans have progressed to separate themselves from the natural world; the commonality between humans and animals lies in their shared animalistic origins.\textsuperscript{12} For the Indigenous cultures studied by De Castro, the common connection between animals and humans was instead their common origin of humanity: “animals are humans, not humans ex-animals.”\textsuperscript{13} On a cultural level, this epistemological system allows for the possibility that animals, and stars, may retain their voices and accompanying narratives within Indigenous societies through the construction of this common past. My examination of early ethnography from the Pacific Northwest circa 1900 will utilize this perspective as a tool to engage with the concept of astronomy as a form of cultural expression. A human origin of celestial bodies is consistent with animistic traditions maintained in the Pacific Northwest, as it introduces a dynamic and interactive world that suggests a continued discourse between humans and the natural world within oral Indigenous cultures.\textsuperscript{14} James Teit’s collections from the Nlaka’pamux on the interior plateau of British Columbia reveal this world.

The oral narratives Teit recorded accentuate the duality of the Nlaka’pamux observational and cultural relationship with the sky. The first example from the story of “the Four Black Bears,” a Nlaka’pamux transformer tale, consists of two descriptions of the

\textsuperscript{11} De Castro, “Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism,” 470.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 471.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} This is a very general statement, and it may only have a situational application for Indigenous cultures in the Pacific Northwest, however, for some of the groups discussed in this paper namely the Nlaka’pamux I feel that it provides a valid if incomplete framework for understanding their relationship to the sky.
four stars or ‘brothers’ that form the handle of the ‘Grisly Bear.’ The figures of the story provide a larger narrative on seasonal change, and hunting practice for the Nlaka’pamux. Following De Castro’s model of perspectivism humanity is a beginning in this story, as the hunters were the offspring of a human hunter and their mother, Black Bear. In an act of jealous rage Grisly Bear killed both the hunter and Black Bear, earning the hate of Black Bear’s children. This story includes detailed descriptions of each hunter in the constellation, who like their mother took the form of a black bear. The first was a fast hunter closely on the heels of the Great Bear, while the second hunter had a dog as a companion, and the

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15 The constellation Ursa Major, known in Western Society as ‘The Great Bear,’ (and other names) incorporates the Big Dipper as the tail or hindquarters; Teit, “Mythology of the Thompson Indians,” 218-224.
16 Ibid., 218-19.
17 Ibid.
18 I am using the terms ‘story,’ ‘narrative,’ or ‘description’ in place of ‘mythology,’ ‘legend’ or ‘folktale/lore’ as the latter place these oral histories at a position of disadvantage or skepticism. My use of the term ‘story’ is not dismissive of the power these accounts hold, it is merely a convenient way of expressing their form of communication; Teit, “Mythology of the Thompson Indians,” 224.
19 As an illustrative measure this story can be categorized with contemporary understandings of the night sky, though the merits of this are suspect. This example should illuminate the distinct epistemological approaches that divide Western and Indigenous perceptions of the sky. In the story of the hunters, the hunter with a dog can be identified as the star Mizar, the second star in the handle of the Big Dipper, while the dog is Alcor. This can be deduced by the companionship of the pair in the narrative, as Mizar and Alcor form a visual binary (stellar pair). Moving beyond visual observation with the aid of scientific observation Mizar and Alcor are revealed as a complex multi-star systems, with the star Mizar consisting of four stars (a pair that each have a companion), while Alcor can be separated into two stars, resulting in a six-star system. Historically, the ability to separate the visible binary of Mizar and Alcor has been used as a vision test in many cultures. I include this complex description to highlight the distinction, and limits on how Western perspectives perceive astronomical knowledge in contrast to the Indigenous narrative of seasonal change and cultural practice that I have highlighted in the text. The stars are the same, but the cultural importance of those stars and their meaning is different. In simple terms, there is a distinction between learning about the stars and learning from them.
third trailed behind, held back by fear. The close observation required to separate the second ‘hunter’ from the dog, highlights the acumen of the Nlaka’pamux in their studies of the night sky, as these stars are difficult to split with the unaided eye. It is important to situate this observational capacity, as it was not directed toward a Westernized cataloging of the sky for organizational purposes. The excerpts collected by Teit contain elaborate descriptions of the sky, indicating that selected oral traditions required both an observational and cultural awareness of structures in the night sky.

The story of the hunters incorporated cultural lessons that were reinforced by the stars. Perspectivism suggests the human origin of celestial bodies allows stars to function as cultural referents, providing an epistemological basis for knowledge to transfer between the stars and human tellers. The transformer tale of the “Four Black Bears,” or “Qwa’qtqwal brothers” incorporates themes that include conflict between grizzly and black bears, familial responsibility, and the duties of husband and wife into the origin story of the constellation. The conclusion of this narrative is worthy of note, as it suggests the eternal character of the stars themselves as signifiers for the Nlaka’pamux’s oral traditions:

We will be seen by all future generations, who will tell our story [emphasis added].’ Hence the one Grisly Bear, followed by three Black Bear hunters and the dog, in the group of stars called ‘Grisly Bear.’

The oral narrative of the hunters is then reinforcing the cultural referent of the ‘Grisly Bear,’ while being simultaneously strengthened by the unchanging structure of the sky across generations.

The origin of stars as living individuals is important to the way the Nlaka’pamux explained the organization of the heavens.

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22 Ibid., 224.
As discussed, some Nlaka’pamux in the lower valley “believe the Dipper to be Transformers, the children of the Black Bear turned into stars,” suggesting that the stories that accompanied the stars, or the stars themselves, retained agency within oral tradition.\(^{23}\) This was not the only understanding, as a separate excerpt described the stars as “roots growing into the upper world.”\(^{24}\) Celestial bodies maintained fluid definitions, and remained separated from the corporeal world. However, they could impart a narrative across this barrier due to societal understanding of their origin as individuals.\(^{25}\) This allowed celestial bodies to provide cultural instruction despite their separation from the ‘world.’ For example, in the story “Old-one and the Earth, Sun, and People,” the Stars, Moon, Sun and Earth existed before the world had formed.\(^{26}\) These beings had human relationships with each other, as ‘Sun’ and ‘Earth’ were married, but they separated due to ‘Earth’ finding ‘Sun’ “nasty, ugly, and too hot.”\(^{27}\) The Sun’s relatives, ‘Moon’ and ‘Stars,’ left with him when they separated. These accounts suggest that celestial objects were expected to display human behavior.

Lessons grounded in human experience then informed understandings of the sky. However, the oral narratives based on the interaction of these celestial bodies could also inform human interactions. Following the departure of the ‘Moon’ and ‘Stars’ the Earth was sorrowful, so the ‘Old-One’ transformed them into the celestial bodies “plac[ing] them all so that they should look on the Earth-woman, and she cou[ld] look at them.”\(^{28}\) The story goes on to describe the creation and population of the Earth, beginning with an ordering of the heavens. Due to its position at the head of this


\(^{24}\) Attributing one definitive answer to explain the nature of an object is a Westernized concept that would ignore some of the fluidity present in these early ethnographic accounts: Ibid.

\(^{25}\) In this sense, the authority of celestial objects is a projection of the Nlaka’pamux cosmogony. Understanding the origin of the stars as people gives them voice that is revoked by ‘scientific’ interpretations of nature.

\(^{26}\) Teit, “Mythology of the Thompson River Indians,” 321.

\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Ibid, 321.
Each Star Has a Story

Posey

story the sky features as a prominent element of the narrative. It is thought that the sky once had human characteristics, which allows observers and tellers to relate to celestial bodies. Similarly, references to the Pleiades star cluster are an excellent example of using human experiences to describe celestial structures. For example, the Pleiades, called ‘bunch’ or ‘cluster’ by the Nlaka’pamux, were said to have formed after a crowded visit to ‘Moon’s’ house.\(^{29}\) This story explained the origin of their image on the sky through the application of accessible human experiences in the narrative.

The ethnographies Teit produced with the Nlaka’pamux contain other references to the stars through both specific description and narrative that can be used to draw parallels between Indigenous and Western knowledge. While references to these celestial objects are relatively infrequent, it should be noted that the presence of their organization suggests a broad ordering of astronomical knowledge on a cultural level, as individual stars are more difficult to observe than the Sun or Moon. The stars were identified into unique figures, with the structures similar to European constellations as we have noted from our discussion of Ursa Major.\(^{30}\) These designations clearly came from observed patterns in the night sky, yet there is a possibility that the names of star groupings present in Teit’s ethnographies were corruptions of European terminology introduced during the translation and editing process.\(^{31}\) Yet Teit’s collections indicate a deep system of observation and explanation in the Nlaka’pamux approaches to the sky. Individual and collective celestial bodies maintained their own narrative and meaning. This indicates both an organizational and cultural importance to the study of the sky. Each star and

\(^{29}\) Teit, “Traditions of the Thompson River Indians of British Columbia,” 91.
\(^{31}\) In Teit’s translations (or perhaps Boas’s editing) the celestial objects are referred to by European descriptions (The Big Dipper instead of the Grisly Bear etc.), with the Indigenous title featured in quotations, or brackets. An example of this is Venus being referred to as the “Morning Star” (a European title for Venus), while the Nlaka’pamux were unlikely to identify it this way.
constellation incorporated into this oral tradition had a story connected to it.

It is possible to produce recognizable images of the Cygnus and Orion constellations by breaking down Teit’s brief descriptions in “The Thompson Indians of British Columbia.” They gave individual stars unique names such as ‘Swan’ followed by ‘Canoe,’ who was said to be filled with hunters chasing the larger pattern of the Swan. Through the examination of modern star-charts, one can infer that “Canoe” is likely a reference to the star Deneb, which forms a part of the European constellation Cygnus the swan. Teit records state that ‘Canoe’ was filled with hunters chasing the star ‘Swan’ suggesting a narrative to accompany this formation not noted in his ethnographic account. In this section, Teit provides detailed descriptions of named stars in the Nlaka’pamux figure of the Hunter:

Still others are called ‘women engaged in roasting roots,’ ‘fishermen fishing with hook and line,’ ‘weasel’s tracks,’ [and] ‘arrows slung on body.’ These are said to have been a hunter carrying his bows and arrows.

When compared to star-charts, this passage describes the structures and features of the constellation Orion, also known as ‘the hunter.’ The star ‘women engaged in roasting roots,’ suggests fire, and an affinity to the colour red. This appears to be a reference to Betelgeuse, a bright red giant star in Orion. The next star, ‘fishermen with hook and line,’ has a connection to water, and paired with the reference to ‘the Hunter’ is the blue giant star Rigel, also in the Orion constellation. Another, ‘Weasel’s tracks’

32 In doing this I am following the model provided by Cruikshank in addressing traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) in Do Glaciers Listen while contextualizing it in parallel to Western referents.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
37 Betelgeuse forms the shoulder of Orion constellation, while Rigel is the left foot. They are both amongst the brightest stars in the sky; Ibid, 285.
suggests the pattern that form three stars that make up Orion’s belt, while the ‘Arrows slung on the body’ represent the European image of Orion’s sword. The complete image of a ‘hunter carrying his bows and arrows’ replicates the contemporary image of Orion, as a band of stars surrounding his outstretched left hand appear to form a bow (or sometimes a shield). The observation, and stories attached to each star underscore a cultural connection to the night sky for the Nlaka’pamux worldview in Teit’s collections. The names of the stars that form ‘the Hunter’ are stories in their own right. Other individual stars maintained their own traditions and stories. The bright star that follows the Pleiades star cluster (Aldebaran) was known as “the dog following on their trail.” Teit, not focused on the collection of astronomical knowledge, only recorded the names of the brightest stars and alluded to three major constellations in his references. However, this does not detract from the likelihood that the Nlaka’pamux maintained a far richer understanding of the heavens beyond these prominent objects.

Descriptions of the stars continue to appear within the ethnographic record from other interior plateau First Nations groups Teit visited in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The Secwépemc and T’it’q’et provided Teit with stories about the sky within the broader cultural collections he gathered for Boas. These stories share similar elements encountered in the Nlaka’pamux tradition, namely the transitional nature of the sky as both cultural actors, and fixed objects. For example, the story “The Gambler’s Son and the Star-Man” recounts a wandering boy encountering a star that became man upon falling to Earth. The

38 The middle “star” of Orion’s sword is known as “The Great Nebula in Orion,” and is the brightest nebula visible in the northern hemisphere. It appears as a hazy star, and the bright point of light is in fact a cluster of stars at the heart of the nebula known as the Trapezium. Teit’s records do not indicate the Nlaka’pamux observed features of the nebula itself.

39 This stylistic form of organizing the heavens is likely a product of the oral society maintained by the Nlaka’pamux at the turn of the century, as it is a notable departure from European naming schemes.


41 Teit, “The Shuswap,” 726.
‘Star-Man’ accompanied the youth, taking many forms, including a horse, and helping him rebuild a lost family fortune before returning to the sky as a star. This story differs from the Nlaka’pamux collections as the ‘star’ interacts with a human rather than other celestial bodies, but highlights the connection between the celestial and terrestrial world. The sequence of the narrative transitions from star, to human, to animal, and then reverses this order upon conclusion. The phases of this story are consistent with de Castro’s perspectivism. In this account, the star-form at the beginning and end of the story suggests a position of authority through the immutability of the star as a referent. This story also describes ‘falling stars,’ highlighting the importance of celestial observation to the Secwépemc for it to be present in their oral tradition. Indeed, this reinforces that the Secwépemc did not view the celestial realm as a fixed entity unlike the Aristotelian traditions that endured until the sixteenth century. It is significant that the Secwépemc both observed, and saw importance in these events, as they are among the more dynamic (if brief) changes that can happen in the sky.

The Secwépemc ethnographies provide further details of celestial knowledge and cultural interaction on the interior plateau. Teit notes that Secwépemc star names were very similar to those used by the Nlaka’pamux. Their conception of the stars originating as humans is also comparable, if specific to the Secwépemc cultural beliefs. Here I will focus on an informative distinction between the two collections. An interesting addition included in Teit’s ethnographies from the Secwépemc is the revelation that only some stars in the sky have names. The story of “The War with the Sky People” states that “those without names are believed to be members of a war-party of earthly people who

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42 Ibid., 726-7.
43 Due to the nature of Jesup ethnographies as broad cultural collections, it is difficult to ascertain whether the variance between the recorded Indigenous traditions are exaggerated or minimized. It is important to note that despite both the Nlaka’pamux and Secwépemc being close neighbors, they maintain distinct cultural values and history.
were slaughtered by the sky people and transformed into stars.”

All of the evidence presented in this article has been used to infer a broader understanding and significance of astronomical knowledge within interior societies. This is the first statement that introduces cultural limits on that knowledge: only some stars were named. There is an explanation to the origins of these unnamed stars, creating a ‘celestial hierarchy’ not unlike the constellations commonly referenced in colonial societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Similarly, the full story of “The War with the Sky People” describes the attack on the heavens, and explains how the earth people that could not retreat were killed. In effect, this represents the establishment of order from chaos that has similarities to Greek Cosmogonies again indicating an ordering of celestial knowledge.

Teit also collected astronomical narratives from the T’it’q’et near present day Lillooet. The T’it’q’et described the heavenly bodies as transformed people, maintaining the animistic traditions visible on the Interior Plateau. Like the Nlaka’pamux, the T’it’q’et identified the Big Dipper as ‘animal’ or ‘grisly bear [sic]’ with the handle representing hunters in pursuit. The Pleiades were also noted, as were larger stellar groupings or constellations. The T’it’q’et identified a star they called ‘middle of the earth’ that did not change its position in the sky. This reference is significant as it confirms that the Lillooet also named stars. Furthermore, the T’it’q’et star ‘middle of the earth’ is likely the same one used for navigation in many cultures in the northern hemisphere, also known as Polaris, or the ‘North Star.’

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45 Ibid., 597.
46 Ibid., 749.
47 An interesting distinction between this story and the Greek Cosmogonies, is that this appears to have been a voluntary attack by the ‘earth people,’ as the story does not describe the ‘Sky-people’ as being unjust. The ‘ordering’ is slightly nuanced, as it transitions from order, to chaos, to order.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Like the star ‘middle of the earth’ the position of Polaris on the night sky does not appear to change, as it is located near the northern axis of the Earth.
tattooing practices often featured celestial bodies, including the Pleiades and other stars featured alongside Sun and Moon. The celestial features the T’it’q’et described to Teit were once men with the appearance of the stars, and phenomena like eclipses or rainbows, being attributed to the actions of these once human figures. By adopting an animistic paradigm we can understand how the human actions attributed to these bodies by T’it’q’et observers explained changes in the night sky.

There was a distinct link between the sky and daily activities on the interior plateau. The Nlaka’pamux maintained a detailed lunar calendar, using the sky to keep time. Important events and dates were then reliant upon this knowledge, forming a firm connection between spatial and astronomical awareness. The Nlaka’pamux used a Lunar calendar similar in function to that of European society, maintaining individual names for many of the moons, or months in the Western tradition. In the Spence’s Bridge area, the first moon, Tcuktcukt, occurred in November, signaling a final hunt before winter. The second moon, N’ulxtin, “going in time,” rose as Fall shifted to Winter, and the Nlaka’pamux retreated to their winter dwellings. During the third moon, bucks shed their antlers, and during the fourth, PEsqa’pts, “spring [winds] time” occurred as the season shifted to spring. The fifth moon, Nxu’itin, signified the growth of plants, and the full arrival of spring, while the sixth ushered in the fishing season. The ninth moon, Texwauzsi’kentin, or “middle time”

53 Ibid., 275.
54 In many ways this echoes Western societies, who also organized seasonal shifts on the Lunar calendar and solstices. Further, the primary method of determining time during the period these ethnographies were collected was through detailed observations of either Jupiter’s moons, or the scheduled occultation of stars by the Moon; J. S. Plaskett, “The History of Astronomy in British Columbia,” Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada, 77, no. 3 (1983): 108-120, 108-9.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
contains the summer solstice, another celestial marker in the calendar, and marked the ripening of berries, as well as the first hunts. The tenth moon, *Laxa’ks*, accompanied the first salmon runs, while the following moon “[t]he next moon,” *kekaitka’in*, indicated the silver salmon run, and the end of the fishing season. The following months were termed *Lwa’istin*, “the rest of the year” or “fall time,” when the Nlaka’pamux carried out their main hunting season. Teit’s collection shows that both subsistence and cultural activities were guided by the detailed observation of relationships between celestial activity and the surrounding world.

Residents of the lower Thompson valley maintained a similar calendar, with slight modifications to the names. The second moon was *N’ulx* (going in), the third moon was *Wawi’t ta sn’ulx* (the last going in), the fourth moon was *Nxu’xuet* (little coming out), the fifth moon was *N’ulxwa’uas* (going in again), the sixth moon was *Nxu’it* (coming out), with the remaining moons maintaining similar naming and activity structures until the eleventh moon, *KokauxEmu’s* ‘to boil food a little’ during which the Thompson prepared fish oil. This calendar was structured around five seasons: winter, spring, summer, early autumn, and late fall. The period of late fall allowed the Nlaka’pamux to conform their calendar to the solar cycle, as the lunar and solar cycles do not fully align. The Secwépemc also utilized a lunar calendar following a similar organizational pattern. The only major difference in the calendars of the two cultures is the

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60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 238-9.
64 Ibid., 239.
65 The European calendar prior to the alterations of Pope Gregory XIII’s Gregorian Calendar, operated in a lunar cycle, with a solar year similar in principle to the Nlaka’pamux’s design. Due to the moon cycle lasting 29.5 days, and the solar year containing 365 days, the occurrence of important dates began to shift over time. Days were added to the moon cycles in the Gregorian Calendar to account for this. The late fall of the Nlaka’pamux calendar performs a similar function.
suggestion that the Secwépemc retreat to their dwellings earlier in the Fall, perhaps due to geographical reasons. Like the Nlaka’pamux, the T’it’q’et also began their calendar in November. For the T’it’q’et, Teit’s collections do not record the clear distinctions between the seasons utilized by the Nlaka’pamux. Despite the missing detail, he does note that the T’it’q’et employed a similar calendar of seasonal progression, reliant on celestial observation throughout the year.

The lunar calendar maintained by the Nlaka’pamux marked different societal events. Daily activities operated in accordance with the skies and in conjunction with indicators of seasonal shifts. Likely, these included religious ceremonies and cultural events. Therefore, developed celestial knowledge was probably important not only to the subsistence lifestyle of the Nlaka’pamux, but also to the religious, and historical facets of society. Teit’s description of the Nlaka’pamux Lunar calendar occurs immediately prior to his discussion of cultural hunting practices. This proximity suggests that observations of the heavens were important for traditional hunters. As the following section will discuss, observations of the sky provided hunters with navigational aids, and an awareness of the availability of game. This trend is repeated in Teit’s works “the Shuswap” and “the Lillooet.” He states “Hunting, trapping, and snaring of game was one of the most important occupations of the Thompson Indians.” Despite this he introduces the method of tracking the seasons before this, suggesting a distinct link between celestial knowledge, and subsistence practice. The link between astronomy and hunting can be seen in artwork attributed to a Nlaka’pamux puberty ceremony. These figures featured in Teit’s “The Thompson Indians of British Columbia,” include an apron

67 Ibid.
72 Ibid., 237-9.
worn during a puberty ceremony, and a drum. \(^{73}\) The apron and drum skin feature both animals, and celestial objects prominently, suggesting that hunters maintained a relationship with both the animals they killed, the celestial objects that guided them.\(^{74}\) Teit noted that the “two moons and six stars painted around [the hunter] suggest his nightly travels,” referring to the key navigation points the sky provides at night.

The Pleiades, a famous star cluster, feature prominently in Teit’s descriptions of Nlaka’pamux astronomy. A story depicting a visit to Moon’s house and a Coyote story collected by Teit both affirm them as a cultural landmark, emphasizing the importance of their continuity in the night sky. These stories contain detailed descriptions and explanations for the appearance of the natural world. In the Nlaka’pamux story “The Moon and His Younger Sister,” the Moon invited all of his friends amongst the stars to his house, yet only the Pleiades came.\(^{75}\) The members of the Pleiades were numerous. As the small house was crowded, the Moon allowed his younger sister to sit upon his face, forever dimming his appearance. This story explained why the Pleiades appeared as a cluster in the night sky: the small size of Moon’s dwelling pressed the members of the Pleiades together, shaping them into a tightly knit group of stars. This account also explains the molted nature of the Moon’s surface as some Nlaka’pamux oral traditions suggest the Moon was originally brighter than the Sun prior to this gathering.\(^{76}\) There is a feedback between the stories explaining the function and appearance of the natural world, and celestial bodies acting as referents for the oral traditions of the Nlaka’pamux.

Like the Moon, the Pleiades functioned both as practical and cultural references, denoting the complex relationship the Nlaka’pamux maintained with the natural world. The importance of the Pleiades to Nlaka’pamux society goes beyond the observation and explanation of the celestial features, as Teit recorded they “used to tell the time of night by [the Pleiades],

\(^{73}\) Ibid, 380.
\(^{74}\) Ibid.
\(^{75}\) Teit, “Traditions of the Thompson River Indians,” 91.
\(^{76}\) Ibid, 92.
reckoning by their position in the sky.” Like the Moon and Sun, the Pleiades were an important timekeeping device. Indigenous cultures located outside the Pacific Northwest found similar uses for the cluster. Gregory Cajete, of the University of New Mexico, illustrates the importance of the Pleiades to the Navajo people of New Mexico in his book *Native Science: Natural Laws of Interdependence*. Cajete explains that the Navajo, like the Nlaka’pamux, maintained a developed relationship with the skies, and within this the Pleiades had an important role. The Pleiades, called the “Planter” were an indicator of the Navajo agricultural seasons, dictating when planting was to start by their disappearance from the spring sky. Observation of the positions of the night sky were important, and bright, identifiable celestial objects such as the Pleiades aided this by creating seasonal reference points that remained constant over time.

The three Indigenous groups from British Columbia’s interior we have discussed maintained detailed descriptions of the stars, Sun, and Moon when Teit collected stories for the Jesup Expedition. This article posits that the richness recorded in Teit’s collections points towards the significance astronomical knowledge must have had in the cultures he observed. Yet, the question remains: was astronomical knowledge equally important to cultures in other areas of British Columbia? Weather conditions vary on the Northwest Coast, and it is possible that the sophisticated observations displayed by the Nlaka’pamux, Secwépemc and T’it’q’et stemmed from environmental conditions that provided clear skies more frequently.

To expand the discussion beyond the works of Teit, I will shift from the Interior Plateau of British Columbia to the island populations of the Norwest Coast. In order to do so I will draw upon John Swanton’s collections on the Haida published in 1905

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77 Ibid., 341.
79 Though I have not engaged with the topic of the Sun choosing to focus on the night sky, it was a similarly prominent celestial body in these ethnographic collections.
and 1908, and Franz Boas’s work on the Kwakwaka’wakw and Nuxalkmc circa 1900. The content of Swanton’s accounts differed from Teit’s collections, as Swanton encountered distinct perspectives on the night sky. Life on the islands of Haida Gwaii differed from that of the interior plateau. Rain and cloud-cover are markedly higher on the Pacific Coast and one can assume this contributed to relative importance of astronomical knowledge within Indigenous societies. It is also important to acknowledge the cultural differences that were present between Interior and Coastal First Nations, as the projection of cultural values into the narratives surrounding the sky would reflect shifting perspectives. Given these differences, and acknowledging the skill displayed in Teit’s ethnographies, it is surprising that John Swanton collected such detailed astronomical accounts from the Haida.

Like the interior Indigenous groups, Swanton’s collections from the Haida contained direct references to stars. In direct contrast to Teit’s ethnographic records, one of the first statements Swanton makes about the stars is that they are considered to be ‘inanimate’ objects within Haida ‘legends.’ His description featured short narratives explaining the visual appearance of the Moon, but relegated the stars to a less significant position. This account elevates the status of the Moon over the Sun, and claims that these two celestial bodies were “inhabited by a supernatural being who sometimes spoke through shamans.” His record still allows for celestial voices, however, it is very different from the Plateau discourse surrounding the cultural importance of the sky. Despite Swanton’s observation that “the Sun occupies a markedly unimportant position” in the Raven story shamans were respected members of society, suggesting a power association between their societal standing and the Sun and Moon. Swanton even noted the

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80 I will refer to the collective knowledge of the Nlaka’pamux, Secwépemc and T’it’q’et as ‘Interior’ knowledge during my discussions of the Haida for simplicity in comparing geographical regions. While I generalize, it is not a homogenous form of knowledge, and should not be interpreted that way.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
Moon ‘belonging’ to the Raven Clan, further tying celestial objects were to the hierarchical functions of Haida society.  

While celestial objects and astronomical knowledge were not granted the level of engaged importance present in the Interior manuscripts, it is possible this failing results from Swanton’s approach toward ethnographic collection. Stars within Haida society do appear as participants of the cultural power dynamics, however they lack the agency suggested in Interior accounts. While they are not given individual voices in Swanton’s collections, stars perform as elements of cultural memory that help to situate both history, and status. For example, the clothing of the Cod-People incorporated astronomical motifs to honor the memory of a former chief:

The Cod-People wore stars in memory of Ski’laowe, their first chief. He had his house filled with holes; so that, when the light shone through, it looked from the outside as if covered with stars. 

The stars are a cultural referent and symbol for Ski’laowe’s respected standing. Oral tradition present in the passage also implies a form of cultural importance for the stars, as Ski’laowe chose to utilize them as a symbol. While the stars may not have their own voice within Haida society when Swanton collected his accounts, they had been incorporated into the oral traditions he collected, fulfilling an important cultural function. The ‘Star-house’ or Ka’-i1ana’as created by Ski’laowe appears numerous times in Swanton’s ethnographies, inferring an important social status for the building and that the construction of ‘Star-House’ was an important feature for some of the historical narratives he recorded.

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid, 111.
86 Ibid, 290.
The most complete accounts involving stars and celestial bodies collected by Swanton take the form of Raven stories. As with any form of oral tradition, there is some regional variance based on the setting and the teller. In Swanton’s collections, an explanation of how the stars were created is found in a Raven story gathered in Masset. Raven traveled to the ‘sky-country’ and created the Sun, Moon, and stars out of ‘Moon’ before placing them in the sky.88 Raven’s choice to place stars in the sky involved an exchange of goods, further establishing that the function of stars for the Haida in this story differs greatly from the Interior traditions discussed earlier.89 The stars are depicted as a form of currency, rather than active beings. A second Raven story recorded by Swanton also featured the celestial bodies being fashioned from the moon. This account did not feature the exchange of goods, but Raven still carried out the transformative acts of the first story, beginning with the Moon as the origin of celestial bodies.90 Swanton includes an expanded version of this story that describes Raven playing with the ‘Moon’ in a time of darkness.91 Raven traveled to the Nass River, and offered to exchange light for eulachon.92 Raven threw the ‘moon’ from a high mountain breaking it in two:

He threw half of it up, and said, ‘You shall be the moon. Your face shall give light in the night.’ And he threw the other half of it, and said, ‘You shall shine in the middle of the day.’ Then he threw up the pieces, and said, ‘You shall be the stars. When it is clear, they shall see you all during the night.’93

This story once again features forms of bartering, linking celestial bodies to trade relationships. In a notable departure from Interior

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89 Ibid.
90 Ibid, 74.
91 Swanton, “Masset Dialect,” 310.
92 Ibid, 311.
93 Ibid.
origin accounts that feature the celestial bodies as transformed humans, the celestial bodies in this account are all formed from a single inanimate object. Nevertheless, these variations provide insight into both Haida culture, and the focus of Swanton in his ethnographic collection. It suggests that the skies are valued primarily for the production of light, alluding to their value as navigational aids for Haida mariners. The phrase ‘when it is clear’ is important to note, as this alludes to a difference between the observational platforms of the Coast and the Interior, potentially explaining the disparity in focus on celestial bodies between the two regions.

Accounts involving the Moon continue to surface in Swanton’s works. The story of “The Woman in the Moon” is the only narrative collected by Swanton that displays the stars as sentient actors in a fashion reminiscent of Teit’s collections.\(^{94}\) The narrative describes how a woman came to rest on the face of the moon, and the role of stars as active pursuers in this process. The woman points at a star, and is pulled into the sky.\(^ {95}\) As her brothers rescued the woman from the sky, the stars followed in pursuit.\(^ {96}\) The stars in this story do not have the individual names and explanations present in Teit’s Interior ethnographies. It is possible that this level of detail was not present in Haida oral narratives, or that Swanton’s ethnographic collections were not as sensitive to nuanced information on this topic as it was relayed by Haida informants.\(^ {97}\) Yet, Swanton’s stories on Raven and ‘Star-House’ provide a basis to evaluate the importance of celestial bodies on a cultural level.

It is difficult to evaluate the cultural importance of astronomical knowledge through ethnography, as there is considerable variance between the records of different ethnographers. The absence of references to the stars or other

\(^{94}\) Ibid, 450-51.
\(^{95}\) Ibid, 450.
\(^{96}\) Ibid, 451.
\(^{97}\) This is not to say that the Haida oral histories did not contain the same level of detail, just that the importance of the stars may have shifted toward other natural features due to the Haida’s proximity to the Pacific Ocean.
Each Star Has a Story

Posey

celestial bodies is as likely to be a failing of the ethnographer, as a commentary on an Indigenous group. To examine this further this paper will now turn to Franz Boas’s collections from the Kwakwaka’wakw of northern Vancouver Island and Nuxalkmc of Alert Bay. The ethnographies produced on the Kwakwaka’wakw stand in stark contrast to the collections of Swanton and Teit, as there is not a single mention of ‘star’ or ‘stars’ in the texts.98 Looking past the stars, Boas makes a total of three references to the Moon in these accounts.99 In contrast, Swanton makes three references to the Moon in the table of contents for his ethnography on the Masset Dialect and at least seven in the text.100 This emphasizes the importance of the ethnographer in the collection of cultural records, as Boas failed on three occasions to incorporate celestial narratives into his depictions of the Kwakwaka’wakw. Boas does make one reference to the stars in his study of the Nuxalkmc, however, it is limited to a brief description and image of a mask used to depict patterns on the deities Aimald’ftEla and Ai’umki'lik-a.101 Boas makes numerous (eight) references to the Moon, however, his accounts are still very limited in comparison to Swanton and Teit.102 While the ethnographic records lack the detail of Teit’s recordings from the Interior plateau, Swanton’s collections from Haida Gwaii and, to a very limited extent, Boas’s work with the Nuxalkmc allow for the conclusion that coastal Indigenous populations maintained keen observations of the sky that accompanied their oral narratives that described celestial bodies. These narratives suggest that the celestial bodies were still culturally significant, if poorly recorded.

Shifting focus back to the Interior, the examination of a Nlaka’pamux contact narrative will conclude this investigation of

celestial agency in the Northwest. In Wendy Wickwire’s article “To See Ourselves as the Other’s Other: Nlaka’pamux Contact Narratives,” she investigates accounts of Simon Fraser’s first meetings and contact narratives regarding the Indigenous population of the Thompson River valley. Her article identifies a series of historical concerns over the collection and production of ethnographic accounts relevant to the study of Indigenous astronomical knowledge. Wickwire provides further contact narratives in support of the conclusion that the origin of celestial bodies as humans granted them agency within Nlaka’pamux society. Wickwire uses five oral accounts of Fraser’s passage through Lytton including ‘mythological’ accounts from Teit’s ethnography. In each account, Fraser was identified as the ‘Sun.’ In Teit’s account, the canoe that held Fraser, or ‘Sun,’ was also filled with ‘Moon’ and ‘Morning-Star.’ In effect the ‘mythological’ version of Fraser’s visit posits that the outsiders were celestial bodies. This offers new insights into the influence of cultural beliefs on the events surrounding the Contact era and the relative importance of astronomical beliefs to the Nlaka’pamux that they were the first ‘mythical’ figures listed. It is possible that this was an isolated experience, however, it suggests deep cultural relationships with the sky that could have extended beyond the Nlaka’pamux. Furthermore, it informs how these relationships influenced the experience of Contact.

Indigenous cultures maintained advanced systems of knowledge relating to the stars and celestial mechanics that are not typically acknowledged in the historical record. Taken together, these ethnographic accounts indicate that Indigenous cultures in the Pacific Northwest maintained a rich and diverse level of astronomical knowledge at the time of their collection in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This research suggests

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104 Ibid, 2-3, 8-10.
105 Ibid, 12, 17.
that astronomical knowledge was both present and important to Interior and Coastal communities. The conclusions that can be drawn are limited by imperfect sources as knowledge has often been obscured by the bias displayed in these early recordings. Yet the information that remains still conveys the understanding that the Indigenous groups maintained a detailed understanding of the night sky that was readily incorporated into oral tradition. The regional study suggests that Interior conceptions of the sky were more developed than those on the Coast; however, the identity and interests of the ethnographers in these collections cannot be ignored. While conclusions of astronomical knowledge in the Pacific Northwest are limited by the extent of this study, the ethnographic collections discussed suggest that it was an important element of Indigenous societies as a cultural referent for oral traditions. Rather than presenting concrete conclusions this preliminary study presents an opportunity for continued engagement and research with Indigenous communities. Further study of this topic must include new measures of collaboration to incorporate Indigenous voice into the historical record without the editorial oversight displayed in these early collections.

**Bibliography**


