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Bordering Through ‘Crisis’: Migrant Journeys, Border Industries and the Contestation of Control

Michael Gordon

Abstract

This article engages with the development and expansion of border industries in the global North. Recently, the state-led industries have grown in response to the rising number of irregular migrants contesting the borders of the global North. Situated within the constructed narrative of ‘crisis’, border industries are both materially and discursively produced as a direct response to the perceived threat of irregular migrant populations. The article interrogates the development of border industries from both the state and migrant perspectives. The purpose of the article is to examine not only the emergence of these border industries but to highlight the detrimental and deadly impact they continue to have on migrant journeys, ensuring the continuation of the structural and direct violence of borders. The development of these industries, particularly from the state-led perspective, is indicative of the violent, exclusionary practice and enactment of borders. The paper adds to the calls for rethinking bordering practices while simultaneously challenging the perpetuation and continuation of a hegemonic global apartheid regime constructed through state bordering practices in the global North.

Although much of the global community has experienced greater interconnectivity between states economically, culturally and diplomatically, a growing disconnect between the global North and South has evolved as legal opportunities for migration have diminished. Irregular migration\(^1\) has emerged as a prominent issue within an increasingly globalized international system. States are experiencing the friction.

\(^1\) The term “irregular migration” will be used in reference to the practice where migrants cross international state borders to gain entry to a state without state authorization achieved by going through the regular, documented and officially recognized administrative channels.
associated with large movements of increasingly irregular migrants who resist bureaucratic processes of control that seek to manage their mobility while contesting the geographic division. The growing trend towards increasingly militarized and restrictive border policy regimes has been enabled through developing and reinforcing both legal and physical barriers to the global North. In light of mounting restrictions, this article is keenly focused on interrogating the evolution of state efforts to contest migrant journeys and the growth of border industries from both the state and migrant perspectives. The primary question guiding this research interrogates how has the discursive production of ‘crisis’ and restrictive border practices enabled and encouraged the growth of both state and migrant border industries. Furthermore, what are the implications of these developments for irregular migrant journeys.

I argue the discursive production of ‘crisis’ has enabled the material expansion of border industries, particularly in the state-led sector, leading to an intentionally violent and detrimental impact on irregular migrant journeys. Conversely, this process has spurred the growth of migrant-led border industries in response as they contest the exclusionary performance of sovereignty as exemplified through state bordering practices in the global North. Despite the growing number of impediments for migrant journeys tied to the expansion and investment into the state-led border apparatus, irregular migrants maintain an active and effective resistance to this practice. Coupled with the direct violence materialized through growing investment in border infrastructure, the structural violence of borders reinforces a classed and racialized enactment of exclusion. The state practice of bordering has become a routinized form of both structural and direct violence against migrants through the development of state-led border industries in particular (Galtung 1969; Jones 2016; Andersson 2014). As a result, violence is increasingly understood as an immutable reality of highly securitized borders. In highlighting this reality, I seek to challenge current state bordering practices and performance of sovereignty, positing that they fail to appropriately respond to the needs of the global South, only further developing and entrenching a global apartheid regime (Richmond 1994; Sharma 2005). The notion of a global apartheid regime points to the structural division of the global North and South and is reinforced along racialized and classed lines that continue to marginalize ‘subaltern’ populations. In looking at the emergence of border industries, the distinction between the global North and South becomes ever more apparent as a structural, active and systematic effort to exclude.

My intention is to add to the growing body of literature surrounding the practice of both state and migrant-led border industries through outlining the interaction

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I use the term "migrant(s)" in broad reference to individuals who cross international borders, whether they be asylum seekers, economic migrants or individuals who do not fit into traditional, legal categories. While the term as used here is not unproblematic and bares gendered, classed and racialized connotations (Mainwaring, 2016), the simplified notion is used for means of clarity and coherence in the discussion that will take place in the following pages.

I use “crisis” in quotations in an effort to denaturalize the term within the broader reference to the border and in order to highlight the discursive production and performance associated with the word as it is often used by political actors, within the mainstream media and other popular outlets discussing migration. This is not to suggest that certain experiences of individuals could be categorized as “crisis” events, the goal here is to address the state usage of the “crisis” terminology as a means of producing a state of exception and emergency surrounding irregular migration and the borders of the global North and which operates to reaffirm the exclusion of irregular migrant populations.
and inseparability of these two distinct industries. I seek to critically engage with this process, highlighting the problematic, circular and paradoxical development of militarized bordering practices in the global North. The overarching contribution of this article is to clearly and unequivocally identify the violent logic and deadly implications of state bordering practices on the lives of irregular migrant populations. Enabled through the discursive production of ‘crisis,’ state bordering efforts ensure the persistence of violence, exclusion and segregation of the global South along classed and racialized lines.

I proceed by first, outlining the concept of border industries. Second, I address the discursive production of ‘crisis’ as an integral component to the development of border industries. Third, I highlight the expansion of border industries from both the state and migrant perspective through analyzing the experiences of both the United States (US) and European Union (EU) routes. Fourth, I examine the deadly implications of the border on migrant journeys, exposing the structural and direct violence perpetuated through state bordering practices. Finally, the article concludes by discussing the failure of current efforts to secure borders despite the remarkable investment in border industries.

**Conceptualizing Border Industries**

Examining the growth and evolution of border industries provides a valuable entry point into the discussion around global bordering practices. There are numerous characterisations of this concept with scholars such as Castles and his colleagues (2012) suggesting the process of interaction between state bordering efforts and irregular migration practices is constituted as a ‘migration industry.’ Andersson (2014) refers to this process as the ‘illegality industry,’ viewing the state business of bordering as a multi-faceted industry that is expressly targeted at combating irregular migration, with billions of dollars invested in contesting these journeys and securing the state. Conversely, De León (2012, 482) offers a more migrant-oriented perspective referring to the coalescing of migrant goods and services as ‘border crossing industry.’ This migrant led-industry has emerged to facilitate irregular migrant journeys while responding to consumer demands.

The (re)production of border industries remains a central, organizing concept in this article. I see this process as the establishment of two distinct industries, both state and migrant led, that work in an oppositional manner to the other. The symbiotic nature of this relationship, as situated within a globalized border regime necessarily ensures the persistence of these industries. First, from the state perspective there have been growing bureaucratic efforts to limit migration, primarily through restrictive visa regimes, coupled with a growing trend in development of physical protection, enforcement and defense of the border (Andersson 2016b). The practice has coincided with increased militarization and surveillance efforts surrounding state borders, which entails billions of dollars being funneled into counter-migration initiatives and spending on border
security infrastructure and hardware (Andersson 2014). Exorbitant state investment in the material performance of the border through the proliferation of border defense contracts, the market response of technological innovation tied to border security and the increasing labour requirements of the border underscore the existence of state borders as a highly commodified industry of exchange. Second, this expanding border industry complex also incorporates migrants seeking entry into the global North as entire migrant-oriented markets are established to facilitate increasingly difficult and dangerous journeys into advanced industrial states (De León 2015). Migrant border industries involve a diverse range of components including smuggling ‘networks’ as well as border crossing towns, catering to the needs of irregular migrants in order to facilitate the journeys and often operating in response to market pressures and consumer demands. The simultaneous expansion of these two industries is directly linked to the increasing restrictions associated with borders and mobility.

The increasing investment in state-led border capabilities serves to reaffirm the necessity and development of migrant-led border industries designed to circumvent the processes of control. States seek to control the flow of migration by performing and enacting the border through (re)defining the territoriality of the state, as migrants attempt to circumvent these efforts of exclusion (Rygiel 2011a). From this process, two distinct, yet deeply enmeshed industries constituted by states and migrants have emerged as a very direct result of the current organization of state borders and the performance of sovereignty. Conceptualizing border industries as a symbiotic process between states and migrant communities highlights the dynamic nature of this process while reasserting the notion of migrant agency and subjecthood into the discussion. It is important to see both state and migrant industries as separate and distinct sets of producers and consumers, yet inherently linked through state bordering practices. State efforts to control migration through exclusion and migrant efforts to contest that segregation, establishes this as reciprocal relationship between the two industries.

While border industries are characterized by the traditional manifestations of the productive economy through the exchange of both material goods and services, there is further non-material production that occurs (Peterson 2003). On the material level of border industries, the production of border hardware is seen through the investment in walls, motion sensors, security cameras among other aspects of the security apparatus. Conversely, the production of non-material goods is understood through the discursive performance and securitization of borders which enables further growth of the respective border industries as will be examined shortly. The performance of the securitizing discourse provokes a particular sense of necessity for response. Securitization is, however, broader than the simple declaration of a speech act. Rather, it operates as a more pervasive process that becomes embedded in many different aspects of state security efforts (Huysmans 2006). State-led border industries in particular are at once both a material and discursive practice, where the material border industry is enabled through the discursive production and performance of ‘crisis.’ This notion of ‘crisis,’ as will be examined in the following section, is central to the organizing logic of the border industry process, allowing for the growth and expansion of the material practice of borders.
Bordering Through ‘Crisis’

Borders are sites of intense securitization, exceptional power, surveillance, policing and exclusion that have expanded in scope despite living in a supposedly globalized international system. Borders are no longer limited to the traditionally envisaged territorial demarcation of the state, but are increasingly conceived as part of a mobile practice and process of enactment (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014). To understand how bordering practices are justified, it is instructive to look at how border industries evolve. One common thread in both the US and EU border contexts is the constant allusion to ‘crisis.’ Invoking notions of a border ‘crisis’ is problematic as it is through the production of ‘crisis,’ “that inevitably leads to calls for more money, more agents, more fences” (Graff 2014, 2). The rhetoric surrounding ‘crisis’ is linked to the conceptualization of irregular migration as an ‘illegal’ act. In particular, the discursive production of ‘illegality’ characterizes irregular migrants as physical, cultural and economic threats to the state, while efforts to reclassify migrants as ‘illegal’ is done in order to deny their legitimacy (Williams and Boyce 2013; Sharma 2005). Irregular border crossings become recast as ‘illegal’ migration, which are then tied to notions of criminality and presented an existential security threat to the state. When coupled with rising numbers of irregular crossings it allows for the rhetoric to be elevated to a state of ‘crisis.’

Hysteria and violent practices of exclusion rely on graphic testimony and the performance of ‘crisis’ to justify bordering practices (Sanchez 2016). Media portrayals and graphic imaginaries of the state under siege invoke an emergency narrative that is alluded to in order to justify the increased enforcement of the border. Constructing a state of emergency generates favourable conditions for supporting increasingly militarized response to migration (Andersson 2016b). The practice of invoking ‘crisis’ as situated within a state of emergency narrative, however, increases the precarity associated with the irregular journeys. The emergency framework is produced through what De Genova (2013) articulates as the border spectacle. Through the discursive and visual production of the migrant imaginary, the ‘illegality’ of the individual is revealed, thereby reaffirming their exclusion from the state. The production of the border spectacle generates increasing need for inherently violent, militarized landscapes. Through what has been described as, ‘a cat and mouse game’ (Donato, Wagner, and Patterson 2008), the violence of the border is made visible and renders migrant bodies increasingly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation in a segregated global system.

Common in both the US and EU contexts, fear is produced and constructed through the perception of a migrant invasion where migrants are situated as an embodied threat to the preservation of state security and sovereignty (Huysmans 2006; Ward 2014). Through the production of the ‘crisis’ narrative surrounding irregular border crossings, migrant bodies become the physical embodiment of these notions of threat and fear. The anxiety associated with irregular migration is subsequently performed and materialised through checkpoints, surveillance cameras, warning signs and physical barriers. These material actions shape and produce an emotional response that becomes
focused into further demands for intervention (Williams and Boyce 2013). By enacting borders through the militarization of borderlands and erecting physical barriers to mobility, the abstract concept of borders are assigned practical meaning. The enactment of borders represents the translation of policy through a relational process between the state and migrants and reifies the state in the process (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014).

Efforts in the EU have largely sought to construct the response to the migrant ‘crisis’ as a humanitarian effort. Curiously however, the humanitarian trope also necessitates military intervention, while depicting EU border guards as saviours of vulnerable migrants. The humanitarian characterization of the Mediterranean rescue missions represents an effort to legitimize the practice of the state in controlling migration and securing the borders by exposing the ‘illegality’ of migrant journeys (Musarò 2016). Constructing increasingly restrictive bordering practices in the interest of saving migrants represents a thinly veiled humanitarianism serving as justification for exclusion, simultaneously allowing for the reproduction of the very policies intended to deter migrant mobility (Brigden and Mainwaring 2016). This is tied to visual production of migrants being saved by border patrols in order to reaffirm their role as a paternalistic protector. The humanitarian rationalization relies on the positioning of irregular migrants as infantilized individuals while the state is represented as a saviour of the vulnerable. States perform the spectacle of the ‘humanitarian battlefield,’ necessitating a militarized response as an effort to both save and deter migrants through greater investment into border capabilities (Musarò 2016).

Bordering practices represent an opportunity for states to enact the border as the assumed prerogative to exclude migrants (De Genova 2013). There has been a distinct change in the construction, understanding and rhetoric surrounding, not only refugees and asylum seekers, but arguably migrants as a whole (Duffield 2008). The spectacle of migration helps to create an environment in which an increasingly militarized border becomes justifiable to the public as a legitimate means of preserving state sovereignty, despite increasing the precarity associated with migrant journeys. Indeed, efforts have been made to both discursively and materially construct the European continent as ‘Fortress Europe,’ yet migrants continue to come and die in the process (Mainwaring 2016). As Sharma (2005, 96) aptly suggests, the main result of state-led campaigns against irregular migration has served to “make illegalized migrations more dangerous.” It is important to note that the causal factors behind the precarity of the journey are both paradoxically and inextricably linked to the presence of border security forces as attempts to control migration produce increasingly dangerous journeys (Little and Vaughan-Williams 2016). The production and performance of ‘crisis’ enables a favourable environment for increased border security that provides the fertile ground on which border industries can evolve and through which the militarized and structural violence of borders becomes ever more apparent. The ‘crisis’ narrative becomes integral to the development and expansion of both state and migrant border industries as the expansion of one industry necessarily leads to the growth of the other.
In examining the production of ‘crisis,’ it is important to ask the question: ‘crisis’ for whom? While tropes of humanitarianism are drawn on in order to justify the militarized intervention, it largely remains a ‘crisis’ of maintaining hegemonic authority in a globalized system. Drawing on Benjamin’s (1989) notion of the state of emergency, the supposedly exceptional nature of ‘crisis’ has become an institutionalized norm for borders, the preservation of the nation-state and the continued subjugation of ‘the oppressed.’ Both ‘crisis’ and emergency are not to be seen as an exception, but rather the rule that facilitates the continued exclusion of non-western, ‘subaltern’ populations. States of the global North are not concerned with the ‘crisis’ of state sanctioned border violence (Jones 2016); unequal access of the global South in a globalized neoliberal economic system (Duffield 2007); destructive and violent colonial legacies (Mountz and Loyd 2014); or continual marginalization and subjugation of the ‘subaltern’ (Escobar 2011). No, this is a ‘crisis’ of advanced industrialized nation-states and the persistence of hegemonic dominance in a highly unequal international system. The expansion of state border industries is indicative of the effort to preserve the hegemonic position of the state under the guise of ‘crisis’ and highlights the structural violence of borders, which become manifest in the material efforts to exclude.

The militarized enactment of borders as produced through the constructed ‘crisis’ trope, legitimizes the expansion of border industries as acceptable and even necessary response to ‘uncontrolled’ migration. The implications of this action, however, ensures the persistence of both structural and direct violence against populations of the global South. Constructing ‘crisis’ as exceptional enables the justification for further investment into security infrastructure as part of the state-led border industries designed as a means of maintaining authority in a globalized international system. The production of ‘crisis’ is tied with calls for a more active response in order to protect the territorial integrity of the state. Through discursively producing an exceptional environment of ‘crisis,’ investment into border security becomes more palatable to the public as states seek to address irregular migration (Ackleson 2005). ‘Crisis’ paradoxically operates as an organizing logic for the development of state border industries. It is through performing the disorder and ‘crisis’ of ‘unmanaged’ migration that provides an opportunity for the growth of border industries as a means of both organizing and establishing control/order in an environment where migration is deemed to be disorderly.

The Border Industry

State-led Border Industry and Efforts to Secure the Border

For the past two decades, there has been a consistent build-up of the US border enforcement apparatus (Williams and Boyce 2013). In the mid-1990s, the US developed its border policy around the concept of ‘Prevention Through Deterrence,’ predicated on the assumption that heightened security capabilities and enforcement, particularly around urban centres would serve as an effective deterrent for irregular
migrants on the southern border with Mexico (Rosenblum 2012). It was initially believed that forcing migrants into harsher environmental conditions associated with desert crossings would serve as a natural deterrent for migrants. This logic however, has proven largely ineffective in curbing demand, while increasing the reliance on smugglers to facilitate irregular crossings (Cornelius 2001; Spener 2004). The policy has transformed the desert into a heavily militarized landscape of walls, fences and roads designed to impede the flow of migrants accompanied by growing surveillance, roadside checkpoints, planes and unmanned drones to contribute to the ever expanding scope of the border security industry (Williams and Boyce 2013). Efforts to secure the border, however, have been accompanied by a rising number of deaths as migrants take increasingly dangerous routes to evade the expanding border apparatus.

The EU has experienced a similar evolution in its efforts to control the border. Increased visa requirements, particularly for North Africans, lead to an increased number of irregular boat arrivals in the state beginning in the early 1990s. More recently, growing political instability in the Middle East as a result of protracted conflict has only served to supplement the rising number of irregular migrants (Andersson 2016b). Border controls have done very little to actually stop the flow of migrants, rather it displaces the point of focus somewhere else (Lutterbeck 2009). Andersson (2016b) highlights the contradiction in the EU mission to secure the borders suggesting that for many migrants who have travelled hundreds, if not thousands of kilometres, often fleeing extreme violence and suffering, the presence of fences, barriers or the sea will not dissuade them in their journey.

The commitment to securing the US southern border has come with significant material investment in border capabilities. The administration of border security in the US is divided among three institutions under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (DHS 2017b). The CBP apparatus employs more than 59,000 customs officers and border patrol agents with an annual budget of approximately $16.4 billion, which is an increase of nearly $2.5 billion from the previous year (DHS 2017a). Despite the significant budgetary growth, a supplementary $100 million has been earmarked to recruit, hire and train an additional 5,000 new CBP agents (DHS 2017a). Border Patrol specifically, which is primarily concentrated on the southern border, grew from 9,200 agents in 2000 to roughly 21,000 by 2011, with the reported number of Border Patrol agents as of 2016 holding at around 19,800 (CBP 2016b). At present, there are roughly 3,200 border patrol agents in the Rio Grande Valley alone (CBP 2016a).

The investment in militarized capabilities of the US has been striking. The US has amassed a fleet of roughly 250 planes, helicopters and Predator drones, along with high tech surveillance equipment including cameras, motion and ground sensors to detect the movement of irregular migrants, both in urban and remote regions of the border (Boyce 2016; Graff 2014). In 2010, the process of increasing militarization continued with the Obama administration deploying 1,200 national guard troops to the border.
regions. This was accompanied by signing “a $600 million emergency supplemental appropriations act to expand border enforcement, including 1,500 additional Border Patrol agents” (Williams and Boyce 2013, 910). The US has in effect, built a highly militarized border security and surveillance force with the expressed intent to stop irregular crossings.

The EU border industry has mounted a similarly remarkable build-up of the security apparatus. The budget for the EU border and coast guard agency, Frontex, has grown from a mere €19 million in 2004 to €143 million in 2015 (Andersson 2016b). Despite this significant 10 year rise, the 2016 operating budget had risen exponentially to approximately €232 million, while the proposed operating budget for 2018 tops out at €302 million in an effort to coordinate border enforcement across the EU (Frontex 2017). Furthermore, the EU has allocated 60% of its Home Affairs budget from 2007-13, which amounts to €4 billion to managing migration with €1.8 billion of that dedicated to an external borders fund while having spent roughly €11 billion in deportation since 2000 (Andersson 2016b).

The EU has also made a significant investment in border surveillance technology to monitor and control migration including costal radar systems and border fences, primarily in the eastern Aegean and northwest African regions. The European external border surveillance system (EUROSUR) has come with an approximated cost €1.4 billion being invested in defence industry procurement (Andersson 2016b). At sea, the Italian-led military-humanitarian naval mission, Mare Nostrum, was intended to both rescue migrants in distress and arrest smugglers, while stopping irregular entries into Europe and was estimated to cost €9 million per month alone to operate (Musarò 2016).

EU member states have also sought to externalize the scope of the border through tied aid with ‘transit’ states on the periphery of Europe. For example, Italy invested $5 billion in an Italy-Libya “Friendship Pact” in 2008 with the express intention of increasing the capability of the Libyan government to manage migration. Similar agreements have taken place between Spain and Morocco, and more recently with Greece and Turkey (Andersson 2014, 2016b). Funding for EU counter migration operations are included with this provision of aid and support for ‘transit’ states to address migration and point to the externalization of borders as part of the re-bordering process (Andersson 2016a; Rygiel 2011b). Despite the persistent investment in migration controls, the EU remains largely unsuccessful in stemming the flow of migrants into the region, especially given the increasing number of refugees seeking protection in Europe (Andersson 2016a). The efforts in the EU’s ‘fight against illegal migration’ has drawn parallels to the ineffective nature of the ‘War on Drugs’ which is largely viewed as a costly failure on both the human and political fronts (Andersson 2016b). The implications of the EU border industry failure, however, has dire consequences for migrant populations seeking irregular entry into the region.

Enabled in part through the persistence of the ‘crisis’ narrative and reaffirming calls for
a bolstered security apparatus to control state borders, the counterproductive evolution of the border security industry remains a central piece in the efforts of the global North to control migration. The discursive production of the ‘crisis’ trope facilitates the growth of state bordering practices. The desire by states, as enacted through militarized displays of control over the border, is an effort to display and communicate to the citizenry that they control the proverbial gates (Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud 2007). The material practice of state-led border industries reinforces the violence of borders as enacted zones of exclusion and entrenches the segregation of the global South in a supposedly globalizing international system. The expansion of state-led border industries continues to have adverse impact on the lives of irregular migrant populations, while tremendous profits are made in the process. The state-led border industry is producing the ‘crisis’ environment it intends to curtail, through ensuring more precarious journeys for irregular migrants, which is then used to justify further highly profitable investments in counter-migration initiatives (Andersson 2014). Despite the obstinate failure, states have continued to funnel billions of dollars into border industries intent on stopping irregular migration. The coordination and expansion of state-led border industries has deepened the organization of the border regions as zone of exclusion. Paradoxically, however, despite persistent failure to stop clandestine migrant journeys, the continued investment in the border security apparatus has spurred the growth and expansion of migrant-led border industries.

**Migrant Border Industry and the Contestation of Control**

The emergence of migrant oriented border industries challenges the hegemonic authority of the state, operating as resistance and contestation to the growing state securitization of borders in an exclusionary neoliberal system. While the US and EU have responded to irregular migration through increasing investment in the border security apparatus, migrant-led border industries have evolved to counter increasing barriers to mobility, using smuggling as a means to facilitate the irregular entry. Smuggling is a mechanism by which migrants seek to circumvent the efforts of the state to control mobility, with the act itself often motivated by both notions of help and profit and can be viewed as an emergent form of labour in the neoliberal economic system as a response to the exclusion from formal economic processes and state markets (Castles et al. 2012; Sanchez 2016). Serving as a reply and reformation of the illegality imposed on migrants by the state, smuggling shifts the conceptualization of labour and community formation processes tied to efforts to survive in the neoliberal economic system.

Smuggling operations compete for business through “‘normal’ competition at the levels of price and quality of service,” who in many cases, are not professionals but

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4 Smuggling is defined by the United Nations (2000, 54–55) as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident.” Sanchez (2016, 3) conversely outlines smuggling as “the criminal designation of the series of activities that facilitate the voluntary, assisted and negotiated travel of individuals into a country different than their own avoiding official forms of state control.”
rather individuals assisting the transport of friends or family (Spener 2004, 303). Scholars have suggested that in some cases, migrant smuggling operations represent a “cottage industry” consisting of “mom and pop” style outfits to facilitate the process, either through the direct transportation of migrants but also through facilitating safe houses and sale of goods and services used by the migrant community in the journey process (Spener 2004; Herman 2006). Smuggling has even been viewed as a transnational service industry with firms of varying size and degrees of organization, often involving multiple actors, while remaining aware of their reputation and quality of service provided (Bilger, Hofmann, and Jandl 2006). The shifting realities of border crossing associated with a growing militarization of the border increase the reliance on smugglers to facilitate irregular migration (Donato, Wagner, and Patterson 2008). The good treatment of clients, increases the likelihood that facilitators will not be exposed as smugglers if they are caught by border patrol, and therefore it is in their interest to treat their clients favourably (Spener 2011; Bilger, Hofmann, and Jandl 2006). While abandonment and harassment can undoubtedly feature in the process, it remains counterintuitive, as to do so can impair the reputation, harming the ability to ensure a constant flow of customers and minimizing risk. The purpose is not to argue that the increasingly violent role of cartels or other organized crime groups is not problematic. Rather, the intention is to disturb the homogenized, criminal imaginary of smugglers and suggest there is variance in the size and scale of smuggling operations as well as the experience for the individual.

There is a constant demand for the services of smugglers in response to increasingly securitized borders as assistance is required to facilitate the journey, creating new opportunities and markets for exploitation (Sanchez 2016; Spener 2011; Aronowitz 2001). Even in the non-traditional industries of irregular border crossing, profit-driven, neoliberal capitalist markets persist in response to the hardening of borders. Smuggling represents a complex market with both small and large service providers willing to offer their services to paying customers. The cost associated with smuggling has risen as the border apparatus evolves, increasing the precarity associated with the journey (Gordon 2015; Vogt 2013). The rising costs tied to irregular migration makes smuggling a lucrative industry and encourages the development of techniques and knowledge in order to circumvent the barriers and maintain a profitable business.

The development of migrant-led border industries have become manifest in other visible ways. As smuggling has become a major industry, border towns such as Altar, Mexico, have developed as staging grounds for migrants attempting to cross to the US. The evolving border industries associated with Altar, draws in coyotes, vendors and
manufacturers of specialised goods such as clothing, food, water, or shoes needed for the migrant crossing, transforming the town into a veritable migration hub (De León 2012). In Altar, for example, a town of roughly 9,000 people, there are six water-bottling plants that produce the bottles most commonly used by irregular migrants to the US. Interestingly, migrants began painting or concealing the traditionally used white jugs in burlap sacks in the belief that it would help reduce detection by CBP. The industry responded to the migrant needs, however, by producing the same product but with black plastic as a result of migrant preferences (De León 2012). Both the licit and illicit markets adapt to the needs of migrants, showing a responsiveness from industry to address the needs of migrant populations with numerous other towns experiencing a similar border industry evolution (Anderson and Salas 2016; Taylor 2016).

In the EU, there is a similar development in relation to the increasing securitization of the border. Mainwaring and Brigden (2016, 247) suggest that, “A political economy of transit emerges in the migration corridors, as shopkeepers and food vendors tailor their services and ware to the needs of a transient population. Archipelagos of motels, smugglers’ drop houses and humanitarian shelters link migration corridors, providing respite for weary travellers.” As Andersson (2016b, 1061) notes, “given that smuggling is a market driven by rampant demand, punitive measures only tend to drive business further underground while new risks are transferred downwards from provider to client.” State-led efforts to control the border have played a key role in the development of new migrant-led industries as individuals seek to circumvent the barriers and control mechanisms that operate to limit the mobility of “subaltern” populations.

Border industries from both the state and migrant perspectives do not operate in isolation from one another, but rather are inextricably linked in the process and production of these industries; the existence of one, feeds the reciprocal growth of the other. The reactive response by states signals an effort to preserve the structures of exclusion and inequality as typified by the strict enforcement of the border. The continuation of physically and structurally violent state-led industries is implicated in the increasing death and precarity associated with the borders of the global North. There is a certain adaptability of migrant-led border industries to the increasing pressures of state-led industries as the discursive production of “crisis” has fostered the expansion and materiality of border industries. The performance of sovereignty and subsequent migrant response has ensured a circular relationship persists in the violent enactment of the border, embedding both structural and physical barriers for irregular migrant communities.

Border Industries, Death and the Migrant Journey – The Persistence of Violence in a Globalized System

Understanding the negative impact and violent implications of the state-led border industry is integral to challenging the ontologized nature, practice and policy of borders. Despite rising death tolls, attacks against migrants and anti-immigrant sentiment,
negative migrant experiences have done little to deter migrants crossing (Slack and Whiteford 2011). The transformation of borderlands into militarized zones of exclusion through greater investment and expenditure in securing the border has resulted in deadly consequences for irregular migrants. Deaths associated with the US border from 1994 to 2009, have been estimated at approximately 5,600 as migrants die from drowning, hypothermia, dehydration, or heat stroke. Despite the deterrence efforts, there is little to suggest that there has been any substantial reduction in migration (Castles et al. 2012). Particularly during the summer months, the death toll rises as physical barriers, primarily located along urban areas of the border forces migrants into more remote and rural areas where they contest the rugged terrain in an effort to evade detection as outlined with the perverse logic of ‘Prevention Through Deterrence’ (Spener 2004; De León 2015).

In the EU, an unintended consequence to the development of the illegality industry, has created further demand on both sides of the migration control equation (Andersson 2016b, 2014). As state-led efforts demonstrate, policies of exclusion promote precarity in the journey and create an increasingly fragmented, non-linear, social process of negotiation and renegotiation for irregular migrants (Collyer 2010; Koser 2010; Mainwaring and Brigden 2016). The consequences of these maneuvers have been similarly dire. Over 20,000 people have died in the Mediterranean in the past two decades, as the EU now has the dubious distinction of representing the deadliest migrant destination in the world (Musarò 2016). As border controls continue to increase and journeys become more precarious, the death toll in the Mediterranean continues to rise with nearly 3,800 dead in 2015, rising from approximately 3,300 in the previous year (IOM 2016). Current estimates in the Mediterranean are on pace to at least match last year’s totals, with the recorded number of deaths surpassing 2,000 on June 20, 2017, World Refugee Day (UNHCR 2017; Dearden 2017). Efforts to secure the border have not been able to address the structural aspects of the migration industry that are spurred by growing inequality and exclusion as the global North only responds with short term solutions to these issues (Andersson 2016b). The temporary, hot spot approach, only serves to put out small fires without addressing structural inequality between states. While EU officials managed to “close off” the viability of migration routes from North Africa to the Canary Island and into much of Spain, it only shifted the routes into the Central Mediterranean (Lutterbeck 2009). At present, there are similar experiences in Greece, as the closing of borders forces more people into the sea. It is the misdirected focus of counter migration efforts that embolden smuggling, force more dangerous clandestine routes, and amount to an unwinnable battle against irregular migration (Andersson 2016b).

In both the US and EU, the prevailing mentality of ensuring precarious border crossing is a direct effort to shirk the responsibility surrounding the deaths of irregular migrant populations. Through presenting the deaths associated with irregular crossings as an unfortunate reality of “illegal” and dangerous crossings, it distances the responsibility of the state and its implication in the systemic deaths of irregular border crossers. The nefarious effect of this mentality positions the state in such a way where government
officials are able to argue the harsh and dangerous environmental conditions were responsible for the deaths of irregular border crossers, not the violent bordering practices that deliberately produced increasingly precarious journeys. Indeed, it provides the “moral alibi” that state sanctioned policy did not kill vulnerable migrants, harsh environmental conditions did (Doty 2011). The environment and physical characteristics of the borderlands become employed as an active participant in the defence and security of the border despite the seemingly apolitical characterization by the state (Nyers 2012). However, migrant deaths are not an unfortunate reality of irregular migration, but rather the direct and intended consequence of state efforts to control the border. Instead of addressing the failings of current border policy efforts and the violent practice of securing the border, state officials are willing to continue to express disbelief at the number of individuals who die, without acknowledging the role of the state and the implication in the deaths of migrant populations.

The violence associated with the border and enabled through the production of “crisis” reinforces a hegemonic global apartheid regime predicated on the exclusion of the global South. Achieved through, “maintaining global inequalities insofar as it maintains separate social, political, and economic spaces in the world-system” (Spener 2011, 117), “crisis” becomes the vehicle through which exclusion is justified. The current approach to borders as a militarized means of exclusion contributes to the creation of a new post-colonial apartheid regime both materially and economically (De Genova 2013). Immigration control has become a means of ensuring hegemonic, planetary order through controlling the mobility of “subaltern” populations as states of the global North have established and maintain the separation from the South through control over migration and security (Duffield 2006; Hyndman 2009). This contradiction underscores the logic through which states of the global North have approached globalization. Marked with different rules for different actors despite the appearance and rhetorical efforts to espouse equality in access to global markets (Andersson 2016b), the persistence and expansion of classed and racialized exclusion – including the deaths associated with this exclusion (Jones 2016) – becomes evermore apparent as a central organizing logic in the global system. The production of “crisis” and the continuation of structural violence through the embeddedness of a global apartheid regime, produces precarity and violence on migrants involved in clandestine journeys due to the restriction of their mobility.

**Conclusion**

Castles and his colleagues (2012, 145) argue that “migration should be seen not as a threat to state security, but as the result of human insecurity that arises through global inequality.” Approaching migration from a securitized perspective, predicated on a misleading trope of “crisis,” fails to see migration as inherently structural and cannot be fixed through punitive approaches to migration control (Andersson 2016b). Examining border industries reveals the relationship between the state and migrants as policies of exclusion and drive the growth and development of the respective industries. The
practice of bordering remains highly problematic as it increases the precarity associated with the irregular migrant journeys. The unwavering commitment to the security narrative and the production of “crisis,” coupled with the obfuscation of state’s role in migrant deaths, will continue to lead to further, more substantial investment in border industries capabilities.

The circular and paradoxical nature of border industries has been highlighted throughout the article, suggesting that efforts to control the border are met with increased innovation and resistance from migrant populations. This contributes to greater state efforts to control borders in a seemingly never-ending process (re)negotiation of the border and efforts to secure the perceived territorial integrity of the state in a globalized era of increased interconnectivity. There is a need to critically rethink borders in a supposedly globalized system. The perverse logic that currently frames the understanding and performance of sovereignty is antiquated and desperately needs to move beyond the inside/outside logic that has served to entrench classed and racialized segregation in the international system. Embedding barriers, both physical and structural, remain intact ensures the violence of borders will persist and the marginalization and deaths of irregular migrant populations will continue.
References


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