Securing Europe’s Fringe
Civilizing a Barbaric Space in Kosovo

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The Balkan Wars threaten Europe’s civilized self-image by exposing barbaric methods of ethnic cleansing, premodern values, attitudes, and practices. These barbaric methods serve to substantiate the rhetoric of Balkan primordialism, which then leads to a sense that nothing can be done to stop the barbarians from killing each other.¹ The “international community” finally intervenes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when it perceives Serbia’s alien and barbarian actions of ethnic and sectarian essentialism² as a problem for EU security. It becomes evident that as long as Serbia refuses to adhere to the EU craft of civilized conduct it poses a challenge to the “new European order,” and will therefore remain on the margins of European identity.³ As a result, EU security discourse

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¹ This paper reflects a revised version of the ideas comprising the third chapter of Sarah's honours paper. Since Sarah had such a fabulous time working on this paper and wasn't quite ready to face the "real" world, she is currently working towards her MA in political science at UVic, focusing on biopolitics and immigration. She is grateful to have found UVic's political science program, which has forced her to challenge her preconceived understanding of "politics". In her spare time, Sarah takes pleasure in hosting and attending wine and cheese parties, or for that matter, any sort-of theme party. When not reading or writing critical political philosophy, Sarah enjoys snowboarding, surfing and running in the rain. Sarah would like to say thank-you to Jenny and Diane Vermilyea for not only supporting her intellectually, but also for clothing and feeding her (extremely well); without these friends, she would be anxious, lost and most likely lacking a decent "home". Sarah hopes to pursue a PhD and to make a career of encouraging others to think critically.
allegorizes the balkanization of Europe. The "problem of Kosovo" serves as the ultimate illustration of chaos and disintegration and stands in stark contrast to European peace and stability.

The story of Kosovo shows that those political actors who do not accept the European order and defy the "logic" of integration and co-operation, de facto deny their Europeanness and should therefore expect to face the consequences. Serbia's eruption into premodern savagery on European territory offers "civilized" Europe a chance to manifest and constitute itself as the pinnacle of modern, rational civilization. Through the legitimation of "civilian power" a European order is being produced in Europe, and imposed on Kosovo. Peter van Ham quotes Beaudrillard to show that the real European story in Kosovo is that the Serbs, "as vehicles of ethnic cleansing, are at the forefront of the construction of Europe; for it is being constructed, the real Europe, the white Europe, a Europe whitewashed, integrated and purified, morally as much as economically or ethnically". Consequently, Europe is fighting itself in a narcissist attempt to get rid of the undesirable state of chaos and anarchy on its fringe.

This essay examines how a sense of Europeanness materializes through both an attempt to build a civilized nation in Kosovo, and by the setting out of standards and conditions required for this process. This paper argues that this nation-building initiative in Kosovo can be understood as a process of Europeanization, where Europe stands in contrast to the barbaric space of Kosovo.

**Contextualizing Kosovo**

The collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s posed a threat to a secure "Europe". With the complex intermingling of nations and communities in Eastern Europe, the concept of national self-determination became difficult to orient. A cohesive European position towards Yugoslavia did not occur till later stages of the conflict: Germany, for example, prematurely recognized Slovenia and Croatia as separate states without the support of fellow EU Member States. Consequently, the EU was pressured to find a collective will with the goal of pursuing collective actions based on common interests. Thus the Balkan crisis led European policy-makers to formulate a more cohesive security policy.

The EU appears to offer an escape from the nation-state and the problematic forces of nationalism by moving towards a broader community form of integration through the amalgamation of nation-states. In the
case of Kosovo however, the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) mandates *nation-building*. How can these competing notions be reconciled? The fervent attempt to build Kosovo as sovereign nation within Europe reinforces nationalism. In particular: the European Community’s response to the collapse of Yugoslavia supports territorial integrity and, since the institution of sovereignty builds itself upon the idea of mutual recognition of existing borders among member states, this policy does not come as a surprise. As a result, one can see that the concept of sovereignty, the ultimate right of a nation to decide its fate is still very much alive in Europe today.

A nation does not necessarily imply territorial integrity based on a state. Nations are groups, real and imagined, joined together with symbols such as history, language and traditions. They base themselves in common myths fabricated by those in power. As suggested by Will Kymlicka, a nation constitutes a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture. Identities as individuals and as members of groups are defined through the telling and remembering of stories, real or imagined. These stories shape our understanding of ourselves as heroes, martyrs, triumphant conquerors and humiliated victims. An identity based on victimization is dangerous because in order to preserve an identity, individuals feeling victimized may face the need to fight for this identity, linked to their survival. The multi-ethnic war that ensued in Kosovo was based on such myths. Although tensions between Serbs and Albanians have long existed, the war in Kosovo was not predetermined by ancient hatreds; rather, the war was ignited by storytelling.

In order to understand what is occurring in Kosovo now, I will discuss at least part of the history of the Balkans in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The region was made up of six Yugoslav Republics, which were united under former communist leader Josip Tito until he died in 1980. Twelve years later, on February 29th, 1992, Bosnian voters supported a move toward independence in a republic-wide referendum. One month later war broke out. Unable to stop the resulting disintegration, the EU used the concept of national self-determination to guide its policy. As a result, it quickly became conventional wisdom that Bosnian Serbs were the aggressor in the war in Croatia, and that Serbia provided support to Serbian forces fighting in Bosnia.

The leadership of Slobodan Milosevic was critical to the construction of an exclusionary Serbian identity. On the level of the state, or quasi-state, his leadership stimulated the myth of Serbian nationalism.
His first step in taking control of the Serbia’s history occurred after he took control of the federal government in 1987. He abandoned the traditional policies of the Communist Party, rescinded the autonomy granted to Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1974, and stopped the process of decentralization. Milosevic then used the Serbian Orthodox Church as an instrument to revive Serbian nationalism. Through it he argued that Montenegro was another branch of the Serbian nation and maintained a tight grip on that republic. Milosevic also used populist gatherings, or “meetings of truth,” where the euphoria of newly found togetherness was engendered amidst glorifications of the national past against the “other.” In 1998, he turned his attention to Kosovo, a region located in the Serbian republic, as a scapegoat for Serbia’s economic problems. He complained in public that Serbia had suffered under federalism, that huge transfers of industry from Serbia to Croatia and Slovenia had taken place between 1945 and 1991, and that these injustices needed to be rectified. Consequently, Kosovo became an abstraction, a set of national myths in the popular imagination, manipulated by Serbian officials to mobilize violent and nationalist pursuits.

Space for manipulation of these myths existed then, and continues to persist now in Kosovo. Groups often define their national identity of the “self” in opposition to an “other”; thereby fostering antagonistic relations. Julie Mertus evidences this when she argues that Serbs saw themselves as “cultured” in comparison to the “primitive” Albanians, while Kosovo Albanians see themselves as “peaceful” compared to the “aggressive” Serbs. Building on these distinctions, Serbian nationalism constructs itself up through: a sense of Serbian victimization, the need to defend its territory, the glorious struggle for Orthodox purity against the primitive, traitorous “other”, the Albanian, the Slavic Muslim, and so forth. Ironically, “civilized” Europe holds this same vision of its primitive, uncivilized, backward and historically fixed Balkan neighbors.

President Slobodan Milosevic allowed Kosovo to enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy within Yugoslavia until 1989 when he removed its autonomy and brought it under the control of Serbian Belgrade with the 1990 Serbian constitution. Eventually, all but two of the former Yugoslav Republics became their own states; however, Kosovo was never recognized as an independent country by any other state than Albania.

As soon as the Dayton Peace Accord ended the fighting between Bosnians, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia in 1995, Milosevic turned his attention to Kosovo. Milosevic then began to construct the threat of an emer-
gent militant Albanian group in Kosovo, thereby, intensifying preexisting feelings of Serbian victimization. By laying historical claims to the Kosovar territory, the Serbs under Milosevic’s leadership aggressively attacked Kosovar Albanians in 1998. This action displaces 120,000 ethnic Albanians from their homes by Serbs.\textsuperscript{16} The Albanians naturally retaliated and created the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Serbian forces then began attacking the KLA.

In an attempt to control these events the United Nations (UN) places an arms embargo on the entire former Yugoslavia region; however, this only serves to keep non-Serbs powerless. By 1999, the self-proclaimed international community chooses to intervene with a seventy-eight day bombing campaign. During these bombings, 1.8 million Albanians flee their country.\textsuperscript{17} This then leads to the failed Rambouillet Peace talks in February 1999, and eventual NATO intervention. In the end, the United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 1244 to establish civilian executive powers vested in the hands of the “United Nation Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)”.\textsuperscript{18} The resolution also authorizes a NATO-led international military presence, the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Building Kosovo through Europeanization

Understanding the conditions set up by the international community prior to the EU mandate in Kosovo is crucial to understanding the process of Europeanization. Both Resolution 1244 and its implementing mission focus on the creation of organized, political institutions.\textsuperscript{19} The resolution authorizes UNMIK to begin the process of building peace, democracy, stability and self-government and to facilitate the political process of determining Kosovo’s future status.\textsuperscript{20} However, as articulated by former Kosovo Prime Minister Rexhepi, there remains a widespread sentiment in the region that “being ruled 5,000 miles away in New York simply [does not work].”\textsuperscript{21}

The UN-led “Standards for Kosovo” process was initiated in December 2003. Following the March 2004 riots, the process prioritized attention on building a safe multicultural society.\textsuperscript{22} The European Union supports this process with its European Partnership, Council Decision 2004/520/EC of 14 June 2004. It bases its support on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnership (EP) with Serbia and Montenegro, which includes Kosovo as defined by the UNSCR 1244, a resolution adopted in June 2004. It also provides signifi-
cant financial assistance for the process via the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) programme. This programme serves to support the mandate set forth in the Stabilization and Accession Process (SAP), which is a process that seeks to promote both stability in the region and while developing closer integration into “Europe”.

Before any nation can be considered for integration into the EU, they have to undergo a process of Europeanization. Since Kosovo aspires to accede to the EU it must also undergo a process of Europeanization. The EU facilitates this process through a variety of programs. In the case of Kosovo, the first of these programs is the Program for Reconstruction and Recovery in Kosovo, which was drawn up by the European Commission and the World Bank in Support of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. This program has three main objectives:

1. To develop a thriving, open and transparent market economy, which can provide jobs quickly to Kosovars. This involves restarting the rural economy, encouraging the development of the private sector, and addressing the issues of public enterprises;

2. To support the restart of public administration and to establish transparent, effective and sustainable institutions. Particular focus should be placed on setting up the central institutions that are key for economic recovery, developing municipal governance, and restoring law and order through an effective police and judiciary.

3. To mitigate the impact of the conflict and to start addressing the legacy of the 1990s, with a focus on restoring adequate living conditions, such as housing and landmine clearance, rehabilitating the infrastructure networks needed for economic development (telecommunications, energy, transport), and the social sectors such as education and health.

These objectives exhibit the manner in which the EU imposes its liberal values on Kosovo. It forces Kosovo to undertake market liberalization and set up central market institutions under the guise of securitization and reconstruction. This form of imposition has been termed a Mission Civilisatrice, for its “civilizing” mandate in an attempt to refine Kosovo society, and make it more like Europe; an action that seems a throwback to the days of colonization. The purpose for his civilizing
mandate bases itself the fact that Kosovo constitutes a threat to European, liberal identity. As articulated by Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP, European values were under attack in Kosovo.26

Whether or not Kosovo can live up to “European standards” is another question, as the EU helps to establish further guidelines through the UN Resolution 1244. This resolution creates a joint protectorate of the EU and the UN over the Kosovo Region27. In doing so it allows the EU to measure the performance of local Kosovar institutions against imported “European standards”. Again, this serves to impose standards upon Kosovo as the SAP indicates that:

Our aim is to build a truly multiethnic Kosovo in which all citizens feel secure and equally treated. Our contribution today sets out the Commission’s approach to Kosovo’s long-term development. We are ready to continue helping Kosovo to make progress towards its European aspirations, provided political leaders demonstrate a clear commitment to democratic principles, human rights, protection of minorities, rule of law, market economic reform and the values on which the European Union is based. Ultimately, Kosovo’s future is in the hands of its people [emphasis added].28

In examining these conditions and benchmarks, one comes to the conclusion that it remains questionable whether Kosovo’s future actually rests in the hands of its people.

Rather, she SAP seems to base the determination of Kosovo’s future status in international law with the objective that Kosovo subject itself to that law. This presumes that Kosovo can only advance towards a fair and just society if it embraces the requirements set before them. The former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), Michael Steiner indicates that these standards mirror those required for Kosovo’s potential integration into European structures: “It must be a democratic, safe and respectable Kosovo on the way to Europe”.29 However, Bernhard Knoll, points out, since the EU-Western Balkan Summit of 2003 in Thessaloniki, appeals to the territory’s “European destiny” have been regularly employed as part of the international community’s rhetoric machinery in order to exhort civic virtues in the absence of a nation state.30 Knoll’s statement reads into the rhetoric and indicates that this promise, although beneficial as a mechanism of indoctrination, coercion and securitization for the EU, may not bear fruit for Kosovo in its quest for inclusion.
Conditionality in Kosovo

An explication of the how the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) functions will help clarify the process of conditionality in Kosovo. The SAP originates in 1999. Through this programme, the EU offers comprehensive Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with the ultimate objective to offer potential accession to the EU. These agreements force a country engaged in the SAP to implement EU-specific political, legal and economic reforms in exchange for the promise of potential EU membership. This approach has been termed the “carrots and sticks” approach. The EU found it necessary to compliment the SAP with another program. It therefore established and adopted the CARDS Program in December 2000. Within the framework of the CARDS program, the EU provides the financing for projects and programs aimed at supporting the creation of an institutional and legislative framework to underpin democracy, the rule of law, human and minority rights, reconciliation and the consolidation of civil society. By engaging in this process, a country establishes a formal association with the Union over a transitional period, during which the country concerned gradually adopts its laws to the core standards and rules of the Single Market. The SAP also requires any country aspiring to accede to the EU, to harmonize its legislation with that of the Community. This harmonization includes a “conditionality” clause:

Respect for the democratic principles and human rights as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and as defined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, respect for international law principles and the rule of law as well as the principles of market economy as reflected in the Document of the CSCE Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation, shall form the basis of the domestic and external policies of the Parties and constitute essential elements of this Agreement.33

Within these parameters, the hegemony the EU establishes through its commitment to function as a protectorate over Kosovo, serves to “accelerate and shape internal political and legal reforms in the Western Balkans, much in the same way it did in the Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC)”.
Kosovo. Through these “soft” tools (vis-à-vis “hard” military tools), the EU shapes Kosovo’s future.

**Legitimating Securitization**

The strength of the EU’s influence stems from its capacity to stimulate the development of international legal norms. One vehicle through which the EU exerts this influence appears in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This policy has a mandate to engage the broader field of the rule of law. It does so by establishing Fact Finding Missions. Between February 19th and 27th, 2006, the European Council and Commission drafted a report from a Fact Finding Mission (FFM) which had the objective of identifying areas in the broader field of the *rule of law* where the EU could potentially assume a greater responsibility in Kosovo. The goal was to develop a basis to legitimize contingency planning for an ESDP mission and future Community assistance programs. The report recommended a policy of “progressively normalizing relations with Kosovo within the strategic framework provided by the European Partnership and SAP programme”. Throughout this planning document, the correlation between *security* and the *rule of law* [emphasis added] is paramount. Part of the “civilian ESDP mission” in Kosovo would be to establish the rule of law as this would help Kosovo to foster a “European perspective” on the one hand and on the other hand to prepare the EU on for a “role in Kosovo”. The EU furthers this project by using the monitoring system established by both the Copenhagen criteria and SAP.

The intended takeover of the UNMIK by the EU lends further momentum to the ability of the EU to establish “reforms based on *European standards*, [while incorporating] the UN standards for Kosovo”. Evidence for this lies in the fact that, two new Ministries, of Justice and Interior were set up by UNMIK in December of 2005. As indicated, these ministries have a profound impact on the “EU engagement in the area of Rule of Law.” This impact increases as EU assistance develops the ministries’ capacity throughout 2006. The FFM report indicates that it endorses this development by directly stating that the EU should emphasize “capacity building in the context of European integration.” By establishing this framework, the EU exhibits that it also aims to use the SAP to address broader human security needs within Europe. The FFM report concludes by stating that EU work needs to be consistent with the EU’s overall strategy for the Western Balkans and existing best practice guidelines. With this understanding one can deduce that the ESDP mission in
Kosovo pledges to be the biggest and most complex civilian ESDP operation for the EU. One can also see how the “international community” constructs the future of Kosovo through a combination of “legitimate” securitization measures premised in European economic and legal norms.

European Security and Civilization

Kosovo provides a backdrop against which an integrated European security and defence policy was set in motion. At the St. Malo declaration in 1999, both Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac agree that the EU needs to play a larger role on the international stage in order to assume some of the burden of legitimacy and enhance its credibility as a civilian power. It also becomes clear that the United Kingdom (UK) and France both support a more coherent defence integration between their own countries and the EU. Blair shows his support for this in one of his speeches at the conference where he states that:

In a world with US power, there is a need for new alliances, with new partners such as Russia, India and China... Europe’s citizens need to be strong and united. They need the EU to be a power in the world. Europe today is no longer just about peace; it is about projecting collective power. Such a Europe can, in its economic and political strength, be a superpower, not a super-state, but a superpower.41

So what does this desire for security integration mean? It can be understood as a mission to defend “Europe”. It can also represent a desire to protect a European civilization from ‘outside’ threats. In this instance, Europe can be seen to construct the “threat” as uncivilized and representing an intellectual barbaric space, which is why it could in turn be seen as a threat to European self-image.

By examining this process through a reflectivist lens, we can see how rational European interests are reified through the protection/reproduction of its society, thereby replicating the existing discourse of exclusionary rationalist ontology. In essence, the Kosovo crisis marks the fringes of the modern state-system. In a modern environment, liberalism, democracy and state capitalism define the dominant civilization. “European” civilization exhibits “Western” civilization, a civilization generally associated with “American hegemony” as it too emphasizes liberal-democratic values. While many argue that the US culture of he-
gemony can be expressed as “Empire”, similar logic can be applied in the examination of the expansion of European culture. Since the imperial, civilized culture of an empire is exclusionary, the un-civilized, barbaric identity becomes excluded. Consequently, this forces the “civilian’ versus “barbarian” discourse to inhabit international security discourse. This places the tension between civilians and barbarians on an equally perverse footing as inter-state conflict.

Reflections on Kosovo

_The Balkans are not worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier_  
– Otto von Bismarck

The squalid Balkan backyard served as an embarrassment to Europe. The referent object in the war in the former Yugoslavia has not merely been the state, but more importantly, society and individuals. The present structure of international politics remains organized around territorially exclusivist and nationally defined states. On one level the European Union purports to challenge nationalism through European integration; however, we must problematize these challenges and examine what is being excluded from this security community. Jef Huysmans, for example states that:

> Security practice can be likened to a form of gardening that concentrates on protecting the beautiful and harmonious life in the garden against contamination, parasites and weeds, which are perpetually trying to destroy it.

Security politics reflect a _choice_, not merely a response to events. Security discourse is not merely an analytical lens, but a political technique used for framing policy questions with a capacity to mobilize fear. As a result, the elite in positions of authority, stand at the centre of one of the most prominent and ubiquitous myths of modernity – nationalism, or in the case of the EU – Europeanism. A nation is founded on myth and memory and the EU is a collective myth formulating a security community. On one hand the EU claims to operate contrarily to nationalism and the violence it ensues, though on the other hand there is a genuine effort to generate a sense of Europeanness, which appears to parallel the nationalism project in some respects.

The mode of governance being practiced in Kosovo in the language of “Europe” presents a new narrative of modernity. This con-
structured account fabricates and rationalizes European domestic society vis-à-vis the unruliness and backwardness of the Balkan fringe. Through the discourse of liberal, tolerant and integrative European security, boundaries are drawn to discipline the behavior of those who distinguish the outsiders from Europe. As Peter van Ham suggests, by altering the referent of security to speech act, “Europe” de facto finds and constructs itself. Paradoxically, European security discourse produces a parallel paradigm of European sovereignty. According to Peter Van Ham, Kosovo stands for the continuity of “international politics” and the “inside/outside” divide that privileges and legitimizes the domestic space of identity and continuity over the anarchic space of difference and discontinuity. This residual Balkan space emerges as exterior to the rational truth offered by integration and reasonable humanity. Problematically, Kosovo society and culture is being silenced and disciplined.

Conclusion

This analysis shows the EU’s attempt to superimpose its economic, political and legal values on Kosovo through the security discourse of Europeanization. This paper articulates that European security should be evaluated as a dual narrative: as a strategy for its geopolitical boundary, and concurrently as an important practice through which European identity is formulated. “Securing Europe” can be viewed as an effort to manipulate the plurality of the continent’s identities and to reduce multiple meanings to a fixed, particular ideal, in an attempt to solidify a fluid European identity. So long as the politics of integration nullify political respect and space for multiple identities to flourish, multi-ethnic societies may fall prey to the process and logic of state-building and ethnic cleansing – literally, and spatially.

In examining the EU’s security policy as a defense of the civilized European society we witness the fragility of European civility. We also witness the challenge European policy-makers face in living up to the EU’s claim of being an open and tolerant society. By framing European identity as a “community”, the limits of inclusion are being re-drawn. Marked against the intellectual space of the barbarian, the confines of an integrated political community are emphasized.

This process establishes an unresolved tension between respecting individual identities/freedoms and conditions that foster collective ways of life. In a valiant attempt to navigate/mitigate this tension, Talal Asad suggests that “Europe” needs to consider itself in terms of “com-
plex space and time, where multiple ways of life and identities can flourish”, not just the “European way”. Otherwise, it may be fated as no more than “the common market of an imperial civilization, always anxious about exiles within its gates, and barbarian beyond”. Without the realization of the possibility or need for changes to the European security policy, Europe may continue to be perceived as an Empire concerned with security framed against “new barbarians” incapable of achieving the sophistication offered by the European, liberal, democratic society. Presently, boundaries are being drawn between European culture and other cultures – beginning with the dividing space between Europe and Kosovo.

Boundaries constitute divisiveness rather than inclusiveness; they encourage exclusion over inclusion. By creating metaphysical boundaries, and limiting “Europeanness” to a select group, and excluding the “barbarian”, the EU’s claim to be a tolerant and open entity is contestable. The EU cannot justifiably claim to be the archetype of an open and democratic society while at the same time perpetuating myths to strengthen unity in the face of a constructed enemy depicted as a challenge to the social and cultural order of all of Europe. The problems associated with this societal insecurity need to be addressed in order to allow space for multiple to flourish. In a context of insecurity where individuals, communities or states feel threatened, the push must be to go beyond tolerance to understanding in order to promote acceptance and dialogue.

It is beyond the capacity of this paper to propose “the” solution to the problem of exclusionary European security discourse. However, I can offer some hope for the direction in which further research could begin. We must first acknowledge that this problem exists, and situate ourselves within the problem at hand. Following such an acknowledgment, we need to open up space for dialogue and understanding; tolerance is not enough. Heidi Liebsman clearly articulates this point when she asks:

Why does empathy have to rely on emphasizing similarities over differences? [...] in cases where people, cultures, and experiences are dissimilar, feelings of empathy require a much greater conscious effort and work of imagination, listening and relating oneself to the other from the other’s perspective and not simply the reading of oneself into the other.49
Through not only the recognition of difference, but also the understanding of difference, we can hopefully move towards a more accessible multicultural societal space. As suggested by James Tully in reference to Aboriginal peoples, we need to move towards mutual recognition. Mutual discourse shifts away from “inferior/superior”, “us/them”, “inside/outside”, “civilized/barbarian” discourses. Mutual understanding allows us to distance ourselves from dangerous binaries, which essentialize societies. Through mutual recognition, intercultural dialogue and understanding, we can move towards living cooperatively in pursuit of a postmodern condition.

Notes

1 Julie A Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1999), 5.
2 Peter Van Ham, European Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy, Identity (London: Routledge, 2000), 198.
3 Ibid., 198.
4 Ibid., 199.
5 Ibid., 200.
7 Ibid., 127.
8 Mertus, xix.
9 Ibid., 1.
12 Mertus, 7.
13 Ibid., 232.
14 Ibid., 232.
15 Ibid., xvii.
16 Ibid., 276.
20 Kosovo Under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
21 Knoll, “From Benchmarking to Final Status?” 639.
23 Kosovo Under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
27 Europa “EU-Kosovo Relations”.
30 Knoll, “From Benchmarking to Final Status?” 639.
33 Ibid., 235.
34 Pippin, “The Rocky Road to Europe,” 234.
35 Joint Council-Commission Report from the Fact Finding Mission to Kosovo between 19-27 February regarding possible future ESDP and Community engagement in the broader field of the rule of law. No. 7048/06
36 Ibid., 3.
37 Ibid., 8.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 9.
40 Noted in the endnote of the FFM’s report: The European Commission has developed best practice guidelines for integrated border management approach as well as a detailed conceptual framework for strengthening the rule of law in the Western Balkans. Work will also need to be informed by core Council of
Europe and OSCE standards and relevant UN guidelines, in particular, UNSCR 1325 on women peace and security.

41 Rezun, *Europe’s Nightmare*, 133.

42 The concept of “Empire” has been articulated by Susan Marks in “Empire’s Law” *Indiana Journal*, 2002.


45 Van Ham, *European Integration and the Postmodern Condition*, 200.

46 Ibid., 199. Also connected to Rob Walker’s work, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*.


48 Ibid., 227.
