In the summer of 2006 Israel undertook a weeks-long invasion of Lebanon in an effort to clamp down on Hizbullah, set off specifically by a cross-border raid in which two Israeli soldiers were taken prisoner. The Hizbullah raid occurred on 12 July, with the Israeli invasion following immediately after. The Israeli forces hit targets throughout Lebanon, causing massive infrastructural damage and population displacements. The United Nations Security Council passed no formal resolution on the conflict until 11 August, when it adopted UNSC 1701 (2006), which called for a cease-fire and established the conditions for post-conflict security. The United States, as a veto-holding Permanent Five member state and Israel’s closest ally, was instrumental in charting the course of the Council both in delaying a cease-fire and in shaping the terms of the resolution.¹

The actions of both Israel and the US were to many observers drastic. Israel had responded to attacks from a militant group within Lebanon by invading an entire country. The European Union and leading Western European states issued statements in the early days of the Israeli campaign condemning the Hizbullah attacks and cautioning against the “disproportionate” Israeli response.² As the conflict contin-
ued and the humanitarian and economic costs of the conflict grew, the US increasingly faced significant international pressure to expedite the imposition of a cease-fire. Yet they maintained that any ceasefire agreement must be on terms agreeable primarily to Israel and the US, allowing the conflict to continue for weeks. This essay will explore questions of why Israel responded with such asymmetrical force, specifically the extent to which this response is tied to ethnic components of the conflict.

Stuart Kaufman asserts that ethnic groups are mobilized through elite-led appeals to their emotionally powerful myth-symbol complexes, and that the success of these appeals to incite ethnic war depends on a number of specific conditions. I contend that the actions of Israel and the US in the summer of 2006 can be understood through such an explanation: the governments attempted to mobilize support for their actions by appealing to myths that resonated with their populations and with the broader international community. The invasion needs to be understood in the context of a broader ethnic conflict between Israel and Palestinians, and leaders within Israel and the United States attempted to mobilize support for the invasion as a component of this broader conflict.

This essay discusses the actions and motivations of Israel and the US. Primarily the focus is on Israel, though another essay could easily have advanced a similar argument as mine from a US-based perspective. On the one hand, the Israeli offensive was a direct conflict with Hizbullah and, indirectly, an assertion of power over Lebanon and Israel’s other neighbouring states. On the other hand, the US’s efforts supporting Israel and delaying a Security Council Resolution from passing are rooted in an understanding of the conflict as part of the “global war on terror,” within which Hizbullah is a target. The theme in both is similar, and there are points which I make using the US case that serve to illuminate the Israeli perspective.

There are three sections of this essay. The first portion presents a detailed overview of Kaufman’s theory of the symbolic politics of ethnic war. In the second section I will establish an understanding of the invasion as a drastic enactment of the broader ethnic conflict between Israel and Hizbullah as a Palestinian group. Following this is the largest section of the paper, which assesses the invasion of Lebanon from the outlined framework. Within this section I will demonstrate the existence of ethnic fear, opportunity for action, and myths justifying hostility from the perspective of Israel. Furthermore, I will provide a series of statements from senior Israeli officials that demonstrate their efforts to appeal to the emotional power of the Israeli and international myth-symbol
complexes. The paper concludes with a summary of the argument presented.

The Theory of the Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War

As this essay draws extensively from the theory of symbolic politics as advanced by Stuart Kaufman, it is relevant at this point to provide a detailed account of this approach.

Kaufman outlines his symbolic politics theory in his 2001 work, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Kaufman is primarily writing in response to what he sees as the inadequacies of rationalist accounts of ethnic conflict to accurately portray the underlying causes and characteristics of ethnic conflict. Overall, Kaufman works from a psychological perspective, integrating primordial and constructivist strands with work on the importance of emotion in decision-making. Especially important from Kaufman’s perspective is the power of myths and symbols, and their relationship together as the myth-symbol complex. Kaufman builds on previous theories of symbolic politics in defining myths as commonly held beliefs that give meaning to actions and events, and symbols as tools for referencing the emotional power of a corresponding myth. Thus a central tenet of symbolic politics theory is, “that people make political choices based on emotion and in response to symbols.” However, Kaufman’s most considerable contribution to the literature is applying this and related principles to ethnic conflict.

Kaufman outlines three necessary conditions for ethnic war to emerge, and two processes through which ethnic wars develop. The first necessary condition is the presence of myths that justify ethnic violence. These myths can serve varying functions – they may emphasize protection of a homeland or identify another group alongside a mythical enemy – but they must connect emotionally with their target audience. The second condition is a fear for ethnic survival, perhaps initially only held by one group within a conflict but eventually held by all. Though such fear can be manifest in a number of ways, typically from a group’s myth-symbol complex portraying the group as threatened or victimized, it functions to legitimate hostility against another group because it allows groups to frame this hostility as self-defense. The final condition is the opportunity for ethnic groups to mobilize, free from state coercion or hierarchical control.

The mere presence of the three necessary conditions is not sufficient to create ethnic war. Ethnic war will only break out if these conditions combine to create mass hostility, in-group politics of extreme na-
tionalism, and a security dilemma. According to Kaufman, the forces that lead to these three elements of ethnic war can be elite- or mass-led. Elite-led mobilization sees conflict escalate through elites stoking ethnic myths and symbols in an attempt to build support and incite broader populations into ethnic violence. Mass-led mobilization occurs in cases where the necessary conditions are strong, especially myths justifying ethnic hostility and ethnic fears, and a change in political climate triggers or crystallizes a response among a large population. Elites then seek to position themselves as leaders of the group by employing ethnic-nationalist rhetoric.

Kaufman also provides a number of insights into the three components of ethnic war: mass hostility, extreme nationalism, and a security dilemma. His commentary on ethnic security dilemmas is especially pertinent, arguing that in many cases they are the result of open and stated goals of dominance — rather than the result of structural conditions and information failures — and that they cause anarchy rather than emerge from it in cases of ethnic war. As well, he suggests that the requirements for ethnic war are so powerful that all three of the causes must be present for an ethnic war to initiate. Additionally, Kaufman argues that the many causes and processes of mobilizing ethnic groups for conflict are mutually reinforcing through positive feedback loops; strengthening one aspect is likely to strengthen others. The sequence of events is thus less important than the presence of the causes because, “events need not happen in any particular order. The causes are universal, but the paths to ethnic war are multiple.”

Despite his detailed attention to the conditions required and mechanisms through which ethnic war develops, Kaufman spends little time dealing with identifying ethnic war. He defines ethnic war as conflict over the status of ethnic groups or ethnic markers such as language or religion. His definition, which is at first glance beneficially parsimonious, is vague and amorphous. This tendency to progress without attempting to clarify the definition may partially be a result of the nature of his project in Modern Hatreds: Kaufman examines specific cases of conflict in Eastern Europe. He may already have in mind the conflicts he seeks to explain, and thus has little use for implementing a more rigorous and developed definition. He suggests that his goal in the book is to, “develop a theory to explain why ethnic wars occur and how they might be prevented,” a quote that indicates his primary interest lies beyond defining ethnic war.

As he is concluding his argument in the final pages of Modern Hatreds, Kaufman suggests that the symbolic politics approach has bene-
ficial application beyond the sphere of ethnic wars. The analytical strength of this approach is its emphasis on the emotionality of political decision-making and the power of the myths and symbols in elite-mass interaction. These factors have implications in any number of political questions, and Kaufman’s brief dealing with these highlights the possible benefits in wider political scholarship.

The purpose of outlining the theory of symbolic politics of ethnic conflict above has been to provide a sufficiently detailed summary of Kaufman’s work to enable a detailed analysis of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006 using the various analytical components of his work. Kaufman has provided an approach to ethnic conflict that is both specific in its emphasis on certain aspects and yet broad enough to capture the wide range of possible scenarios and integrate the complicated realities of those scenarios.

Situating the invasion

Kaufman’s framework is fundamentally interested in explaining how ethnic groups are mobilized to undertake drastic action, of which ethnic war is one example. In other words, individual actors or groups would not otherwise be taking these drastic actions; they are not behaving as they typically would. There is a series of events and decisions that must take place before actors will feel motivated to act in a particular way, and it is these Kaufman seeks to understand. For the purposes of understanding Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, it must first be shown that this was indeed a drastic action. Though Israel maintained a military presence in Lebanon for most of the last twenty years, the decision to re-conquer must be viewed as significant for three reasons.

Firstly, Israel knows well the challenges of fighting Hizbullah in Lebanon and of maintaining an occupation there, having done both in the past. Hizbullah waged a successful campaign against Israeli forces when they occupied the southern portion of Lebanon as a “Security Zone,” eventually culminating, after an eighteen year occupation, in a unilateral Israeli withdrawal in 2000. Secondly, though armed conflict between the two groups is common it is rarely direct or sustained. Israel maintains military dominance over Lebanon but rarely engages directly with Hizbullah. Instead, the two typically engage in a tit-for-tat form of combat, whereby an Israeli airstrike draws a Hizbullah rocket attack, which draws Israeli artillery fire. Thus a direct engagement and mobilization of the IDF represents a drastic divergence from the emergent pattern of security relations.
Thirdly, choosing to invade a country draws the attention of the international community and the United Nations because it is a violation of international norms and, in some cases, international law. By invading Lebanon Israel created the need to justify its actions to the international community, to reply to questions of self-defense and proportionality of response, and to face sanction by the UN Security Council. While the role of territorial sovereignty and international law in this conflict will be discussed in greater detail below, its mention at this point serves to highlight that Israel’s invasion was a drastic act not only because of its hard economic and security costs but also its international implications.

Before we turn to exploring the justifications Israel offered for its invasion, it is pertinent to establish the presence of an ethnic dimension of the conflict. Kaufman adopts Anthony Smith’s germane definition of “ethnic group” as a group sharing five traits: a name, belief in common descent, common historical memories, shared culture such as language and religion, and territorial attachment. Along these dimensions we can certainly see “Israeli” as an ethnic group, primarily tied to the common Jewish culture and religion, but also to the historical memories of independence and the struggles since then.

The case is less straightforward for Hizbullah. There are certain identifying markers for the group: symbols such as its flag and the image of its leader Hassan Nasrallah, its Shi‘i religion, its concentration in southern Lebanon, and the extent to which its history has been formed in resistance to the Israeli presence in Lebanon. However, Hizbullah is a political party, not an ethnic group. Hizbullah is more accurately understood as a militant wing of a broader Palestinian ethnic group. In this sense, Hizbullah is the focus of Israeli aggression and regional anti-Israeli support from Syria and Iran because it embodies aspects of the broader conflict between Palestinian and Israeli. Of course Hizbullah cannot be said to represent all Palestinians in its actions or its goals, but it is reasonable to suggest it serves a function in the ongoing dispute of relative political power between these groups. This proposition is additionally supported by the extent to which Israel worked to relate Hizbullah’s offenses to the Lebanese government and, to a lesser extent, population.

**Three Necessary Conditions**

Having established that the invasion of Lebanon can be understood as a drastic act undertaken within the context of a broader ethnic conflict between a Palestinian group and an Israeli one, we will now examine the
presence of the three conditions Kaufman posits are required for ethnic war to emerge: fears, opportunity for action, and myths justifying hostility.

Hizbullah poses a legitimate security threat to Israel. They receive significant support from two of Israel's greatest regional rivals, Syria and Iran, and they have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to strike military and civilian targets across northern Israel. Additionally, Palestinians as a whole continue to attack Israeli targets. The threat to Israel from Palestinian militants is not merely perceived, it is actualized on a routine basis. While Israelis may be justified in individually fearing for their safety, the extent to which they fear for the survival of their ethnic group is less clear. Take for example, Hizbullah's conscious effort to focus its most violent attacks against military targets rather than civilian ones. In a country of conscription and widespread militarization the division between civilian and military can be difficult for both Hizbullah and Israelis to make. Additionally, the great deal of anti-Israeli rhetoric presents a challenge because while some is likely little more than rhetoric, that it advances some group's political agenda is sufficient to suggest the presence of legitimate threats to the Israeli people. For symbolic politics to resonate with groups it is not required for fears to be founded in factual proof, only that groups perceive there to be reason to fear. In the case of Israel this possibility exists.

Opportunity to mobilize is the second necessary condition Kaufman points to. That is, groups must exist free from state interference under the state or be the state. The case of Israel's conflict with Hizbullah challenges Kaufman's framework in this regard because the two exist in separate states. Israel as a sovereign state is in principle free from internal impediments to mobilization, however, the international system and other states impose to some degree external limits on Israel's ability to undertake significant hostile action. Principles of international law, such as the UN Charter, govern the relations between states and there is a well-developed international legal tradition dictating both the acceptable conduct of war and the conditions under which use of force is permissible. The focus of this paper is not on determining the legality of Israel's invasion — though there are significant discussions of this point — and mention of international law at this juncture serves only to highlight that for whatever barriers Israel viewed international law as imposing, they were surmountable. Israel and the US insist that the conditions warranted the invasion under international law. It is notable that the contention of this paper is such that the Ministry was compelled to release a document addressing the legitimacy of Israel's response and its
document addressing the legitimacy of Israel’s response and its proportionality.27

The US acted to help create the opportunity for Israeli action in a number of ways. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 a principle of justifiable intervention in states harbouring terrorists has been advanced by states such as the US. Israeli leadership adopted a similar argument regarding the invasion of Lebanon. The earliest statements of Israeli officials such as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni made it clear that Israel viewed both Hizbullah and Lebanon as responsible for the attacks for two reasons: Hizbullah was an active participant in the Lebanese government, and the Security Council had many times demanded that the Lebanese government disarm Hizbullah.28 The statements also indicted Syria and Iran for their support of Hizbullah, but actions against these states was less possible. These attempts to tie the actions of Hizbullah, a socially and militarily powerful sub-state group with foreign and domestic support, to the justification of reprisals against the Lebanese state and its population are indicative of Barry Buzan’s argument, who maintains that in some cases it is acceptable to hold populations to account for the actions of groups directly or indirectly supported by them.29

US support for Israel generally and in the specific case of the invasion of Lebanon also allowed Israel to operate with less international pressure. The US worked to build support for Israeli action, or at least to limit open dissent, in organizations such as the G8 and UN. American conditions were crucial to the delays in ceasefire discussions, and numerous draft resolutions in the Security Council were threatened with veto.30

For us to understand the invasion of Lebanon as a component of the broader ethnic conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, Kaufman suggests there would also need to be myths that justify hostility on the part of Israel. Some of these myths pertain to the international community, some to the domestic Israeli audience and others to both. Rather than attempting to completely list the extent of the myths employed, I will highlight four of the most pertinent myths and discuss their importance. And rather than discussing these myths in abstract, I will deal with each one in relation to the efforts to evoke them in support of the Israeli invasion. Thus the following section both completes the account of Kaufman’s three necessary conditions and explores the application of the elite-led effort to mobilize support.

One of the most powerful myths is that of Israel as a country – and Israelis as a people – under siege. There are two direct aspects of this
myth: the need to defend the imperiled homeland and the notion of being isolated and surrounded by enemies. On the day of the Hizbullah raid, 12 July, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni issued a statement that spoke to both aspects of this myth:

Israel views the government of Lebanon as responsible for today’s unprovoked aggression. There is an axis of terror and hate, created by Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas that wants to end any hope for peace. … In these circumstances, Israel has no alternative but to defend itself and its citizens. We also expect the international community to act. We will fight back, in order to fight for peace.31

Israeli officials delivered other similar statements, in the early stages of the invasion. With statements such as this the Israeli leadership hoped to engage with the domestic and international audience and access the emotional aspects of decision-making such that undertaking drastic action against Hizbullah, as a component of a broader Palestinian opponent, would be acceptable. These statements buttress feelings of fear and isolation, and attempt to increase the perceived opportunity for action by suggesting that there are “no alternatives” and that the international community is “expected to act.”

A second myth evoked by the Israeli leadership is that of the Israeli (Jewish) nation suffering and surviving. This is a deeply historical myth and is fundamental to the identity of the Jewish and Israeli nations and the Israeli state. In his first official statement following the Hizbullah raid Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said, “The State of Israel and its citizens now stand in an hour of trial. We have withstood difficult tests in the past, even more difficult and complex than these. We, the State of Israel, the entire nation, will know how to now overcome those who are trying to hurt us.”32 Appealing to this myth is both a form of reassurance to citizens and a reminder that with solidarity suffering can be overcome. The reference to the, “State of Israel and its citizens,” is additionally bridging the gap between fear for individual and community security, tying the survival of all citizens to the nation and to the state.

The third myth employed by Israeli and US leaders is the myth of the virtuous self against the senseless terrorist.33 In relating to this myth the leaders of the US and Israeli governments aim to equate their actions with moral superiority, and often suggest that violent response is not optional but required. Additionally they portray the actions of their opponent as baseless and senseless, violence for the sake of terror rather than political advancement. Following an Israeli strike that killed 57
Lebanese civilians in Qana, the same town where 110 had died in a similar incident ten years prior, the Defense Minister said in a speech to the Knesset:

This is a war that was forced on us after we did everything to prevent it. … While we make every effort to target only terrorist elements, Hizbullah strikes indiscriminately [sic] at Israeli civilians and population centers. They send suicide bombers to explode in buses and restaurants. While they have no regard for human life, not giving a second thought to using innocent Lebanese civilians for their purposes, we make every effort to avoid harming uninvolved civilians. When they succeed in killing innocent train workers in Haifa, they consider it an operational success. When we kill innocent civilians, we consider it a tragedy to be investigated thoroughly.

This myth builds support for hostility against the terrorists by simultaneously lauding Israeli military action and demonizing the actions of opponents. It also addresses questions of motivation by suggesting that while terrorists undertake action because they choose to, Israel must take action because it is forced to. The notion of being forced to act in self-defense is central to rationalizing violent action and is a persistent theme through Kaufman.

Finally, Israeli and American leadership referred to the myth of the failed state as universal security threat. This myth understands a state with competing sources of authority as a security threat both to itself and its neighbours and as such paves the way for legitimizing outside intervention. In Lebanon, the US and Israel saw a state unable to properly function because of the presence of multiple armed authorities within its territory. Intervention offered the possibility of “improving” the state, of acting to reduce the influence of Hizbullah while strengthening the Lebanese government. Throughout the conflict both the Israeli government and the US government repeatedly evoked the myth of the failed state by supporting the instatement of UNSC 1559 (2004), which called for the disbanding of all militias and the extension of the Government of Lebanon’s control to all Lebanese territory. In referencing this resolution both Israel and the US are selective in their emphasis, because they minimize any mention that the resolution also goes to great length to reaffirm calls for strict respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. Though there appears to be an objective conundrum in calling for a strengthened Lebanese government while destroying the country and in calling for the sovereignty of a state one is currently in-
vading, the focus of symbolic politics is on how claims affect the emotional core of the intended audiences.

Conclusion

The purpose of this essay has been to explore the nature of the conflict between Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon as it was expressed through the invasion of 2006. It has been argued that the conflict can be understood as an application of the conflict between ethnic Israelis and ethnic Palestinians in which Hizbullah served as the focal point for aggression on both sides. Using Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory of ethnic war and its emphasis on the importance of emotional appeals to ethnic myth-symbol complexes, I have demonstrated the efforts of the Israeli and American leadership to build domestic and international support for their drastic efforts to combat Hizbullah. To do so they undertook a number of appeals to myths relevant to the Israeli nation and to the international system as a whole.

What has not been discussed up to this point is the success or failure of these leaders' efforts, partially due to the difficulty of measuring success of this kind. To measure it by public support, according to newspaper polls 86% of the Israeli public supported the Israeli action four days after it began, suggesting success. As time passed and casualties on both sides mounted support waned, however, and the invasion has since been seen in a much less positive light. This change is partially the result of changes in Israelis’ perceptions of the actions of the Israeli military relative to the actions and justifications of Hizbullah and Lebanese more generally.

To some, the invasion has become a symbol in its own right, representing the rampant militarization of Israeli society and leadership, and the massive asymmetry of military power between Israel and its neighbours.

Notes

5 Ibid., 15.
6 Ibid., 16.
7 Ibid., 29.
8 Ibid., 30.
9 Ibid., 31.
10 Ibid., 32.
11 Ibid., 34.
12 Ibid., 37.
13 Ibid., 36.
14 Ibid., 37.
15 Ibid., 34-35.
16 Ibid., 36.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 17.
19 Ibid., 2.
20 Ibid., 218-221.
22 Ibid.
23 Kaufman, 16.
24 Harik.
25 There has been significant scholarly and public debate regarding the extent to which Israel was within its international legal rights to invade Lebanon and conduct the invasion as it did, with most suggesting it likely was not. See for example, Richard Falk and Asli Bali, “International Law at the Vanishing Point” in *The War in Lebanon* (see references for full citation), and Victor Kattan, “Israel, Hezbollah and the Conflict in Lebanon: An Act of Aggression or Self-Defense?” *Human Rights Brief* Vol 14 (1), Fall 2006 (http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/14/1kattan.pdf?rd=1).
28 Israel Office of the Prime Minister, *PM Olmert: Lebanon is responsible and will bear the consequences,*
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2006/PM+Olmert+-+Lebanon+is+responsible+and+will+bear+the+consequences+12-Jul-2006.htm
(accessed 14 November 2008).


32 Israel Office of the Prime Minister.


35 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Excerpts.


38 Laor, 254-259.