Conflict in Darfur

International Inaction and the Role of the African Union

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For the past four years Darfur has endured systematic killings, rape, and genocide. Despite the rhetoric of “never again” following Rwanda, the international community has stood on the sidelines while the beleaguered African Union force has been unable to stop the violence, protect the refugees, or secure Darfur. In the face of this humanitarian crisis, why has the international community done so little while the African Union has acted? This essay approaches this question by analyzing some of the core factors underpinning the actions and inactions of the major actors regarding Darfur. Specifically, this essay explores the African Union (AU), China, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU). Due to the complexity of the situation and the multiplicity of actors involved it is necessary to use a variety of theoretical and explanatory tools.

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to explore the roles of these actors. Thus, I approach the topic through analytical eclecticism. By drawing on different research traditions and explanatory tools, analytical eclecticism offers a more inclusive and robust approach, allowing for a more nuanced analysis. Through this approach this paper reveals a variety of ideational, material, and other causal factors underpinning the actions and inactions of the main actors. The AU’s motivation for acting in Darfur stems from the idea of pan-African security and the humanitarian intervention norm that constitute the AU as a collective security identity. China’s material interest in Sudanese oil for domestic use is the driving force behind its strong opposition to any Security Council imposed sanctions or intervention. There are a number of factors underlying US and EU inaction, stemming primarily from China’s opposition and the fear of jeopardizing the Sudanese peace process regarding the civil war with the South. Moreover, military overstretch and the US’s diminished ability to push international norms further prevent action.

The essay proceeds in four parts. First, I outline the conflict in Darfur and the international deliberations surrounding it. Second, after fleshing out analytical eclecticism, I examine the AU through primarily a constructivist perspective. Third, I examine the role of China through neoclassical realism. Finally, I employ a variety of explanatory tools and narratives to examine some of the main obstacles preventing tougher action from the US and EU.

The Conflict in Darfur

The current conflict in Darfur began in February 2003 when the two major rebel groups in Darfur, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), launched successful military attacks against al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur. The Sudanese government responded to the insurgency through both its military and the proxy militia force, the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed is composed of local Arab militias, the Popular Defense Forces, and assorted brigands and nomadic Arab tribesmen. By October 2003, reports emerged of village raids, killings, rape, and crop burnings committed by the Janjaweed against the non-Arab Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit ethnic groups in Darfur.\(^1\)

The SLM/A and JEM continued their guerilla activities throughout 2003 while the Janjaweed continued to target civilians and their villages. Negotiations were attempted on several occasions, but in January
2004, the government began a new air and ground offensive. President Deby of Chad hosted ceasefire negotiations in N'Djamena, producing two ceasefire agreements in April. The ceasefire agreements, however, were ill-conceived and the cycle of violence flared up once again.²

It was at this time that the international community began to pay greater attention to Darfur. In his April 7, 2004 address on the anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, Kofi Annan explicitly referred to the growing humanitarian crisis in Darfur, calling on the international community to take action if necessary.³ By the time Annan gave his speech, approximately 30 000 people were dead and 1.2 million had fled their homes with 200 000 of those pushed into refugee camps in Chad.⁴ Fact finding missions sent into Darfur and Chad by the UN and Human Rights Watch provided further evidence of “systematic” crimes, killings, rape, and forced displacement perpetrated predominately by the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed.⁵ The EU recognized that ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity were being committed by Khartoum and its militias, and going a step further, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, referred to the events as genocide in September 2004.⁶

Resolution 1556, the first Security Council Resolution directly concerned with Darfur, was passed on July 30, 2004. The resolution gave Sudan 30 days to disarm the Janjaweed with the threat of enforcement measures for non-compliance, imposed an arms embargo in Darfur, and declared support for the upcoming deployment of an African Union force in Darfur.⁷ Debate over Resolution 1556 took several forms and saw the introduction of the “responsibility to protect” language into the deliberations.⁸ Of the Security Council members at the time, the Philippines took the most aggressive stance, arguing that Sudan was failing to protect the people of Darfur and that the international community should prepare to assume responsibility when necessary.⁹ China and Pakistan were the harshest critics of the resolution. They abstained from the vote, claiming that the resolution went too far by threatening retaliatory measures. Moreover, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Brazil were especially adverse to the Philippines’s mention of intervention. The Sudanese representative to the Security Council opposed both the resolution’s content as well as any notion of humanitarian intervention. Occupying the middle ground, the US, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Chile adopted the responsibility to protect language and acknowledged the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, yet they also affirmed Sudanese sovereignty and responsibility over Darfur.¹⁰
Ultimately, Sudan failed to comply with Resolution 1556. The security situation in Darfur did not improve and there was only token and inconsequential disarmament. Humanitarian access was still largely impeded, and although there was an increase in police forces in Darfur, many of them were drawn from the Janjaweed.\textsuperscript{11}

The United States presented a draft resolution in September 2004. The draft found Sudan in breach of Resolution 1556 and called for targeted sanctions, an increased AU force, a no-fly zone for Sudanese military aircraft, and over flights to monitor the situation.\textsuperscript{12} Resolution 1564 was passed on September 18, and while it contained elements of the US draft resolution, it failed to find Sudan in breach of Resolution 1556 and it did not impose any measures on the government. Rather, the resolution reaffirmed the demands made in Resolution 1556 by calling for an increased AU force and the disarmament of the Janjaweed with the threat of enforcement measures.\textsuperscript{13} The actors within the Security Council maintained the positions they held regarding Resolution 1556. The US maintained that Sudan was in material breach of Resolution 1556, but despite pushing a tougher draft resolution, the US did not call for sanctions and did not publicly criticize Khartoum. Moreover, the UK maintained that responsibility for Darfurians remained with Sudan.\textsuperscript{14}

Without intervention from the Security Council or the West, the (AU) was the only foreign force in Darfur.\textsuperscript{15} In August 2004, the AU deployed its first 300 of an anticipated 3000 troops to protect its civilian observers monitoring the oft-broken ceasefire agreement between the rebels and Sudanese government.\textsuperscript{16} Khartoum’s reluctance of foreign intervention and the unwillingness and inability of the AU’s Peace and Security Council to violate Sudanese sovereignty led to a restrictive AU mandate in Darfur. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is limited to monitoring the ceasefire agreement, protecting the monitors and themselves, and protecting only those civilians who are “under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity” of the AU.\textsuperscript{17}

The limited capacity and logistical drawbacks of AMIS soon became apparent. By the end of September the 3000 person mission remained at just 300 troops. Even when reinforcements began to arrive in late August, the force was not strong enough to do anything but report ceasefire and human rights violations.\textsuperscript{18} AMIS was enlarged several times throughout 2005, and by the end of October it had almost achieved its full operational strength of 7000 troops, military observers, and civilian police. However, AMIS was not been able to secure Darfur due to its limited mandate and insufficient force size.\textsuperscript{19}
In March, 2006 the AU, whose mandate in Darfur was set to expire on September 30, agreed to allow the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to incorporate Darfur into its mandate and completely replace AMIS. Despite Khartoum’s strong opposition to a UN force, it seemed like international pressure was making progress. With a new resolution being prepared within the Security Council, the stage was being set for the UN to assume control in an effort to end the violence in Darfur. The UN, however, never assumed control from the AU or put a soldier on the ground. The anticipation generated by the AU’s invitation to UN forces turned out only to be a false hope. Meanwhile, the conflict had resulted in as many as 200 000 – 400 000 deaths, over 2 million displaced persons (about one half of Darfur’s population), and the destruction of approximately 75% of Darfur’s villages.

Explaining Action and Inaction in Darfur

In this essay, I will use analytical eclecticism as a theoretical tool to identify and explain reasons for action and inaction in Darfur among the various actors. Analytical eclecticism recognizes the “existence of, and possible complementarities between, multiple research traditions” and allows for the selective blending of different theoretical frameworks, concepts, and explanatory sketches. This approach builds off of different research traditions and explanatory sketches in order to uncover new problems and propose more nuanced explanations. Research traditions, such as realism and constructivism, allow us to identify and analyze certain aspects of our social reality. Explanatory sketches “refer to any interpretation of a set of observations that is intended to generate a causally significant understanding of specific empirical outcomes.” Thus, a range of empirical claims, observations, and historical narratives have explanatory power irrespective of the particular research tradition that generated them. In the words of Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil:

Analytical eclecticism detaches explanatory sketches from the competing metatheoretical systems in which they are embedded. It offers us an opportunity to draw upon clusters of empirical observations, causal logics, and interpretations spanning different research traditions. It thus permits us to take advantage of complementarities in the problems we address and the empirical claims we make.
Due to the complexity of the situation and the multiplicity of actors involved in Darfur, relying on one particular research tradition is theoretically limiting. By using an eclectical approach, we can generate a more robust and multifaceted explanation of the situation. I do not attempt to cover all the possible explanatory sketches and empirical variables at work in Darfur. Rather, I will use a combination of constructivism, neoclassical realism, and other explanatory sketches, narratives, and empirical observations to analyze some of the causes of action and inaction by the AU, China, the US, and the EU in Darfur.

The African Union

As the only international force in Darfur, understanding the AU’s role in the conflict is crucial for understanding the situation in Darfur. Analyzing and explaining the AU and AMIS is best approached through a constructivist perspective and through other explanatory sketches stemming from empirical realities in Sudan.

Constructivism is concerned with the role and impact of norms on international relations and society. Norms “are intersubjective beliefs [i.e. shared understandings rooted and reproduced through social practice] about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action.”27 The theory asserts that ideas can have a powerful casual role in society and can constitute political actors, influencing their interests and actions.28 Together, the interests, norms, and shared understandings constituting an actor help shape its identity. Constructivism is often criticized for failing to take into account power asymmetries, but analytical eclecticism gives us a greater ability to incorporate empirical realities within a constructivist perspective so that we can more effectively analyze the relationship between identity and power. This relationship is particularly important for situating the role of the AU within the conflict in Darfur. An eclectic approach pushes us to ask what the ideas and norms that constitute the AU are and how they interact with empirical power realities.

There are two fundamental ideas and norms embedded within the AU’s collective security identity that illuminate why it became involved in Darfur; at the same time, the connections between the AU’s identity and empirical realities in Sudan have shaped the role of AMIS. The first central idea constituting the AU’s collective security identity is the notion of a pan-African security regime. The AU’s predecessor, the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), attempted to develop a collective security framework for the continent, but an effective pan-African security apparatus never fully emerged. To remedy the ineffectiveness of the OAU’s security mechanisms, the AU created and institutionalized the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in December 2003. Pan-African in scope, the PSC is designed to “promote peace, security and stability in Africa... implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction... protect human rights... [and] develop a common defence policy for the Union.”

The second idea constituting the AU’s collective security identity is a strong institutionalization of the humanitarian intervention norm. While the AU’s Constitutive Act affirms the primacy of state sovereignty, it also provides for a strong protection mandate in the cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Article 4(h)). Moreover, unlike the OAU, the AU does not require the consent of the state whose sovereignty is being violated to proceed with an intervention. Thus, the AU is taking the institutional steps necessary to operationalize a pan-African security regime, even when it requires the violation of sovereignty.

These foundational ideas and norms highlight the AU’s motivation in Darfur. The AU aims to provide pan-African security and it has formalized a strong protection mandate within its Constitutive Act. Darfur is arguably the largest humanitarian crisis in Africa. Thus, if the AU remained on the sidelines then the goals and foundational ideas of the AU would be rendered ineffectual and meaningless. It is precisely conflicts such as Darfur that the AU’s security mechanisms are designed to prevent or resolve.

Despite these robust foundational ideas, the AU has accepted a very limited protection mandate in Darfur and has proceeded only with the consent of Khartoum. This is due to the empirical realities in Sudan and the AU. Khartoum is reluctant to give the AU greater leeway in Darfur, and the AU has neither the political capacity to force the Sudanese government to acquiesce to a stronger mandate nor the military capacity to intervene without consent. As it stands the AU is incapable of adequately carrying out the limited mandate it does have, let alone acting as an intervention force.
China

China has been greatest opponent within the Security Council to UN imposed sanctions or intervention in Darfur; it is thus important to explain its standpoint. China’s actions can best be explored through the relationship between realism and foreign policy encapsulated by neoclassical realist theory. Neoclassical realism incorporates both domestic and systemic variables in analyzing state interests and behaviour. The theory argues that:

a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and … by its relative material power capabilities … however … the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the [domestic] level.

China’s opposition to UN action in Darfur stems from its substantial material interest in Sudanese oil. In the 1990s, China projected an oil shortfall, driving it to foreign oil reserves to meet its growing domestic needs. In 1996, the China National Petroleum Company purchased 40% of Sudan’s largest oilfield, making it China’s largest overseas oilfield operation. As a result, China opposes enforcement measures against Khartoum, especially economic sanctions, for fear of jeopardizing its economic interests. Furthermore, to sacrifice its material gains in Sudan for the sake of humanitarian norms would represent a relative material loss. Thus, through a neoclassical realist perspective we can identify the domestic needs, interests, and issues of relative power that are driving China’s opposition to enforcement measures in Darfur.

It is not simply the fact that China has interests in Sudan that is hindering UN action; it is the ability of China to translate these interests into desired outcomes through its permanent seat on the Security Council. Neoclassical realism argues that states have the tendency to “use tools at their disposal to gain control over their environment.” This highlights the significance of China’s material interests in the workings of the Security Council. Because China has the ability to veto any resolution concerning Darfur, countries like the US and the UK cannot easily push through tougher resolutions. This was clearly seen with the watered down Resolution 1564, which failed to find Sudan in breach of Resolution 1556 despite clear evidence to the contrary.
The United States and European Union

Throughout the crisis, many have looked to the US and the EU to take greater measures, either unilaterally or through the UN, to end the genocide in Darfur. Other than providing some logistical support to AMIS the West has remained inactive. The multitude of interconnected factors underpinning the US and EU’s inaction reflects the complexity of the situation in Darfur. As a result, a coherent and accurate analyses of the roles of the US and EU requires the use of different theories, empirical observations, and historical narratives that analytical eclecticism allows for. This section examines the casual significance of China’s opposition, the Naivasha peace agreement, the US’s diminished status as a norm carrier, and American military overstretch as possible reasons inhibiting both UN and unilateral intervention.

China’s opposition to sanctions and intervention is an initial factor hindering America and European action through the Security Council. Of the permanent members on the Council, the US has taken the most aggressive stance against Sudan, but the threat of China’s veto has made pushing tougher resolutions difficult. Although a realist might contend that the Security Council deliberations over Darfur demonstrate the triumph of state power and interests over norms, analytical eclecticism suggests a more complex relationship between norms, interests, and power. Unlike realism, constructivism does not assume state interests; rather, constructivists seek to explore how interests and identities are created. This allows norms, and not just material interests, to constitute a state’s identity. A realist may argue that norms lack the necessary power to triumph on the international stage, but from a more constructivist viewpoint we can see how countries like the US can use their material power and clout within the Security Council to push particular norms. When viewed in this way, China’s material power did not trump normative considerations unconditionally; rather, the US, the UK, and France failed to sufficiently push for stricter actions against Sudan in response to its violation of both international human rights norms and Resolution 1556.

In 2004, the Naivasha peace process was poised to end Sudan’s civil war between Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The agreement was still very fragile and the fear of jeopardizing the end of Africa’s longest civil war played a large role in deterring Western intervention. It was argued that intervention
would disrupt the necessary cooperation between the SPLM/A and the government by emboldening both the SPLM/A and the rebels in Darfur, prolonging the civil war. Moreover, President al-Bashir feared a widespread movement for regime change if the SPL/A, JEM, and SPLM/A all gained momentum. Consequently, some contended that putting too much pressure on Khartoum over Darfur and Naivasha simultaneously not only risked prolonging the civil war, but also risked toppling President al-Bashir and unraveling the security structures within Sudan.

The fear of aggravating the conflicts in Sudan demonstrates the utilitarian form of decision making employed by the West. The risks associated with an intervention, combined with the perceived importance of ending Sudan’s civil war in the south relegated Darfur to a secondary concern. The outcome of non-interference reached through utilitarian reasoning, however, can be called into question. First, the violence in Darfur has increasingly spilled over into Chad, making the conflict harder to resolve and raising the humanitarian cost of allowing the violence to persist. The Janjaweed have been attacking Darfuri refugees as well as Chadian citizens. There is also evidence of the Janjaweed coordinating its cross-border attacks with both the Sudanese military and Chadian rebels. Second, the Naivasha peace process was one of the immediate causes of the insurgency in Darfur. Darfur has historically been neglected by Khartoum and the Naivasha agreement painted a false dichotomy of the country by privileging the south while ignoring the longstanding grievances in Darfur. This suggests that peace in Sudan needs to be conceived of more comprehensively by including, rather than excluding, Darfur.

Following the invasion of Iraq, a constructivist approach suggests that another reason for American inaction in Darfur is its diminished ability to act as a norm-carrier. The US presented humanitarian justifications for the invasion of Iraq, but because many states feel that the invasion was both illegal and illegitimate they view the US as using humanitarian arguments to veil self-interest. Subsequent incidents, such as the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, have further discredited the humanitarian justifications offered. As a result, other actors have developed skeptical perceptions of the US diminishing its ability to use humanitarian justifications in the future. This makes it harder for the US to gain the support needed to push the Security Council further, especially when it faces a formidable barrier from China.

Sudan articulated this argument clearly, asking “whether the Darfur humanitarian crisis might not be a Trojan horse? Has this lofty
humanitarian objective been adopted and embraced by other people who are advocating a hidden agenda?” While Sudan would likely oppose American intervention regardless of the US’s status as a norm-carrier, there are reasons for the international community to suppose that the US might in fact use humanitarian intervention to veil its interests in Sudan. Perhaps an intervention would veil the US’s attempts to gain greater access to Sudan’s lucrative oil fields, an industry the US plays a very small role in at present.

American military overstretch and preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan are often cited as reasons for the US’s minimal support for intervention. America’s current wars undoubtedly limit the country’s political will and capacity to undertake unilateral interventions; however, this reason has limited explanatory power regarding America’s reluctance to push for a UN mission to Darfur. There have been nine UN peacekeeping missions in Africa since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. For troop contributions, the UN has drawn on dozens of countries for each mission, and there are approximately thirty African contributors. Out of the seven current UN missions in Africa, the US contributes military personnel to just two. Therefore, there is little reason to suppose the US would need to provide the troops if it successfully pushed for a UN mission. Consequently, the US’s decreased status as a norm-carrier, the Naivasha peace agreement, and China’s opposition serve as better explanations of the barriers facing UN intervention.

European inaction in Darfur is more difficult to explain than American inaction for several reasons. First, the EU arguably has a larger interest in African security and stability. Europe has a more extensive historical relationship with Africa, and many EU members have longstanding relationships with their former colonies. Trade agreements, aid packages, and foreign investment link the EU and Africa, and European concerns with illegal immigration and internal security threats are also being increasingly associated with instability in Africa. Second, unlike the US, the EU (with the exception of the UK) does not have a tarnished image as a norm-carrier. Moreover, the EU is not facing the sort of military overstretch the US is experiencing in Iraq. Charles Pentland argues that the EU’s capability for military action in Africa is actually increasing as the EU develops and enhances its military mechanisms. Finally, European intervention in Africa is not unprecedented. Recently, the UK sent troops to Sierra Leone in 2000, and France deployed its military to Cote d’Ivoire in 2003. In 2003, the EU deployed its first multilateral force in Africa to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Al-
though it was a small contingent of 1800 and a short three-month mission, the EU’s involvement in the DRC highlights the potential for Europe to effectively intervene in Africa for humanitarian purposes. Europe has an interest in Africa, an increasing military capacity to intervene, and is free from some of the restraints facing the US, yet the EU has done little but provide AMIS with some logistical support. Also, in the Security Council it has been the US, not the UK or France, pushing for tougher resolutions. An initial factor preventing unilateral action by the EU is the size and duration that the mission would entail. While the EU’s mission into the DRC was successful, Darfur would require significantly more troops for a longer period of time, making unilateral intervention problematic. Moreover, acting without the consent of the Security Council is particularly troublesome given that the Darfur case has been so divisive within the Council. But primarily, the EU’s inaction gives credence to the strong causal role that China’s opposition and the Naivasha agreement have had on the inaction of the Security Council, the US, and the EU. Through the Security Council’s deliberations, these two issues have produced perennial obstacles for both Europe and the US.

Conclusion

Over four years of systematic killings, rape, destruction, and genocide have devastated Darfur. It is hoped that a UN mission will bring long sought relief to the region, but until then the insecurity and destruction continues. Throughout the past four years the international community, with the exception of the AU, has failed to respond to the crisis. In order to understand why this essay has examined some of the underlying causes motivating the primary actors in this situation. By using a variety of theoretical approaches and explanatory tools allowed for by analytical eclecticism, a number of conclusions were highlighted. A constructivist perspective identifies the constitutive norms that spurred the AU into action in Darfur. Neoclassical realism highlights China’s focus on its domestic interests and concern for relative power, causing it to oppose intervention or sanctions. Through the utilitarian reasoning employed by the Council, the threat of undermining the Naivasha peace process was also a crucial concern. Moreover, America’s diminished status as a norm-carrier and military overstretch serve as further explanatory sketches underpinning the US’s inaction. The EU seems to have an interest in African security and does not suffer from military overstretch or a dimi-
nished status as a norm-carrier, yet it failed to act also. This highlights the extent to which China and the Naivasha agreement served as barriers to intervention. By bringing together different theoretical perspectives and explanatory sketches, a multifaceted account of some of the core reasons underpinning action and inaction in Darfur emerges.

Appendix: Recent Developments

There have been a number of developments since this paper was first written in March 2006. While the past year and a half has seen prospects of hope and progress towards ending the conflict in Darfur, recent developments have unfortunately followed the same patterns as laid out above: the AU’s capacity to carry out its mandate has not increased; the Sudanese government, which has provided a veneer of cooperation, still remains committed to frustrating a UN mission on its soil; unilateral action by the EU or US is a remote possibility; and the Security Council is reluctant to deploy without Khartoum’s consent.

When the original paper was completed, the AU had recently agreed to allow UNMIS to replace its mission and assume control in Darfur. Khartoum’s ability to withstand international pressure appeared to be diminishing, and it seemed that after years of negotiations, failed peace talks, and watered down resolutions the time for action by the UN had come. This feeling culminated in August 2006 with the passing of Resolution 1706, the most robust UN resolution on Darfur to date. The resolution called for the deployment of 22 000 UN personnel. Troops were to be deployed by the end of 2006, but it was thought that peacekeepers could be on the ground as early as October to correspond with the termination of the AU’s mandate at the end of September.

Resolution 1706 provided the strongest mandate yet under which a substantial UN force could be deployed; however, the international community failed to agree on a specific course of action and deployment never occurred. The hopeful situation became precarious as the AU’s mission was set to expire while the UN had taken no steps toward the implementation of Resolution 1706. The Sudanese government’s opposition to the resolution was intense as was their denunciation of the AU for looking to the UN for assistance. Less than two weeks before the expiration of AMIS, the AU voted to extend its mandate until the end of 2006. This move was approved by Khartoum only under the condition that the UN would not support the AU. This prevented the withdrawal of the only foreign force in Darfur, yet did nothing to solve the ongoing
problems within AMIS and the violence in Darfur continued.\textsuperscript{65} Given the lack of any UN mission, the AU’s mandate has been extended until the end of 2007.

With the unwillingness of the UN to push Resolution 1706 in the face of Khartoum’s opposition, another round of negotiations began with the aim of reaching an acceptable compromise between the UN and Khartoum. In November 2006, representatives from the AU, UN, and the Sudanese government met twice in Addis Ababa and Abuja. The idea put forward, and tentatively agreed upon by all parties, was the creation of a joint UN-AU force. The current level of 7000 AU troops was to be augmented by a 20 000 strong UN force.\textsuperscript{66} It soon became clear, however, that Khartoum would do its best to prevent effective UN action if it ever acquiesced to UN involvement. After the meetings, the Sudanese government made it clear that in its understanding a hybrid force would consist only of UN advisors and technical support, but no UN soldiers.\textsuperscript{67} While the end of 2006 saw the continuation of AMIS, Resolution 1706 was effectively dead. No progress had been made toward deployment of UN personnel and negotiations had switched focus to a hybrid option.

Progress on international action in Darfur again seemed to be made in June 2007 when the Sudanese government accepted the idea of a joint UN-AU force consisting of peacekeepers from both international bodies.\textsuperscript{68} In July, the most current draft resolution was put forth by the UK, France, and Ghana that sought to capitalize on Khartoum’s apparent softening by allowing for the deployment of 26 000 peacekeepers and police.\textsuperscript{69} Contained within Chapter VII of the UN charter, the draft resolution allows the peacekeeping force to use “all necessary means” to protect its troops and maintain peace.\textsuperscript{70} As with previous drafts, this one was also watered down. The threat of sanctions to be applied if Sudan failed to cooperate with any part of the resolution was removed.\textsuperscript{71} Nonetheless, the draft resolution allowed for a joint force with significant UN troop involvement.

Predictably, this draft resolution has met strong opposition from Khartoum and like Resolution 1706, the Security Council is reluctant to press ahead without compromise and consent. The Sudanese government continues to insist that its sovereignty should not be violated by the implementation of a resolution it does not support and the UN Security Council continues its reluctance to intervene without Sudan’s consent. As with the Addis Ababa and Abuja meetings, Khartoum has reverted to a position in staunch opposition to a meaningful UN presence. Hope for compromise over the resolution seems to be lost because at the end of
July 2007, Khartoum, while still supporting the idea of a joint UN-AU mission, rejected the ability of UN peacekeepers to use force. In other words, Khartoum rejected the Chapter VII mandate, precisely the strong mandate needed to make a UN mission in Darfur meaningful. Unless the UN is able to put the mission into gear without Sudanese consent, this current draft resolution, even if passed will become yet another failure at compromise with Khartoum.

In the original paper, one focus was on the inability of the UN to bring forth a strong resolution on Darfur. I stressed the important causal role of China’s opposition to action in Sudan and the importance of maintaining the Naivasha peace process. While these factors are still important, recent developments have highlighted the lack of political inertia within the UN to operate without Khartoum’s consent. Chinese opposition to intervention effectively limited the strength of Resolutions 1556 and 1564, but this cannot explain the failure of Resolution 1706, a resolution that was passed by the Council. The failure of the UN to act on Resolution 1706 clearly demonstrates the UN’s inability to act without the consent of Khartoum even when it has the mandate and when external factors hindering intervention, such as China’s opposition, are diminishing. A further analysis of the UN’s failure to act on Resolution 1706 and the probable failure of the current draft resolution should encompass not only the external realities in Darfur and the motivations of the actors discussed in this paper, but also the inner workings of the UN, its institutional weaknesses, and ultimately its inability to spur its member states to act against another state’s sovereignty even when the mandate is provided.

If momentum for the current draft resolution builds it is possible that UN troops could be on the ground by early next year, when the latest AU mandate expires. Given the history of the conflict, however, it seems unlikely that action will soon be taken in Darfur. The government of Sudan is unwilling to acquiesce to a UN force and the UN, unwilling to act without Khartoum’s consent, continues to pursue a fruitless policy of compromise. This situation has allowed the conflict in Darfur to continue. Even if the UN successfully implements a mission in Darfur, it could not be considered one of the UN’s successes. After more than four years of conflict, the international response will surely come too late.
Notes


3 Clough, “Darfur,” 3.

4 Williams and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 30.


6 In his paper, “Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement,” Alex de Waal argues that the usage of the term genocide in Darfur is detrimental to the peace efforts because it fuels the artificial polarization between Arab and African that underpins the conflict. As de Waal demonstrates, Darfurian identities have been formed through complex historical and social processes and cannot be reduced to a simplified Arab-African dichotomy. This polarization of identities makes the formation of collective Darfurian identity difficult because it polarizes identities that in reality are much more intertwined. In addition, de Waal argues, the claims of genocide by the US can be used by the Sudanese government to portray itself as the target and victim of a US foreign policy that is discriminatory towards Arabs. This specifically plays on America’s diminished status as a norm carrier in the wake of the Iraq war (to be discussed later in the paper). After all, if Darfur is a genocide, other African conflicts could similarly be named, but are not. This discussion also leads into the debate over whether or not genocide is actually occurring. If, on one hand, the identities of Darfurians cannot be clearly reduced to “African” and “Arab,” then talk of killing along ethnic lines becomes obscure. On the other hand, once these identities are widely held they become socially significant. Regardless of being artificial and exaggerated, they can then be exploited to fuel hatred of one group over another.

7 Williams and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 32.

8 Alex Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 19.2 (2005): 42. In 2000, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS proposed the responsibility to protect norm, which assigns primary responsibility over citizens to the state. If the state is unwilling or unable to fulfill its obligation, responsibility shifts to the international community.

9 Ibid.

10 Williams and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 32; and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?” 42.
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11 Williams and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 33.
12 Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?” 46; and Clough, “Darfur,” 3.
13 Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?” 46.
14 Ibid., 47. Resolution 1564 was the last comprehensive resolution concerning Darfur until 1706; however, Resolution 1591 imposed a travel ban on suspected war criminals and Resolution 1593 referred Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
16 O’Neill and Cassis, “Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced,” 16; and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?” 43-4.
18 Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?” 44.
19 Ibid., 44-5; and O’Neill and Cassis, “Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced,” 27.
20 When the creation of UNMIS was first debated in early 2005, the US wanted its mandate to allow for the force to be deployed to Darfur, not just southern Sudan. Both Russia and China informally opposed this. Resolution 1590 established UNMIS, but sidestepped the question of Darfur.
21 Please see Appendix for the latest developments since this paper was first written.
24 Ibid., 20.
25 Ibid., 13.
26 Ibid., 16.
28 Ibid., 50.
As mentioned earlier, Russia has also opposed sanctions and intervention throughout the Security Council deliberations. But because China has been a more ardent opponent, I have focused my analysis on it.


Ibid.


Ibid., 458.


Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” 157.

Slim, “Dithering Over Darfur?” 819. China never expressed any serious concerns with the AU mission in Darfur. From a neoclassical realist perspective, this is unsurprising since, unlike UN sanctions, AMIS did not threaten China’s economic interests. Some argue that it was also a way of deflecting UN intervention by placing hope and responsibility with the AU.

Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?” 46-7.

Ibid. and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 38.

The agreement was signed on January 9, 2005 and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was deployed in March 2005 to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement.

Williams and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 38.

Ibid., 39.

Slim, “Dithering Over Darfur?” 822. Arguments of this nature came from various sources. The UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on internally displaced persons, Francis Deng, argued that intervention would aggravate the conflict by provoking resistance (Williams and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 39). Even the SPLM/A expressed concern when a spokesperson worried that Western intervention risked turning Sudan into another Iraqi quagmire (Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?” 48).

Williams and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 38.
Conflict in Darfur


50 Slim, “Dithering Over Darfur?” 822.

51 Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?” 39.

52 Williams and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 37.

53 Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?” 38. Alex Bellamy notes that others make the stronger claim that the invasion of Iraq with humanitarian pretenses has discredited the norm of humanitarian intervention itself, not just the US’s ability to carry it.

54 Ibid., 42.

55 Williams and Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” 37-8.


60 Ibid., 924.

61 Ibid., 931-2.

62 Ibid., 934.

63 Evans and Roth, “Security Council Must Take Action to Protect Civilians in Darfur.”


66 Africa Action, “Six Months Since 1706.”

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.


70 Ibid.


73 McDoom, “Sudan Rejects Use of Force by UN-AU Darfur Mission.”