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The Value of Diversity in Creating Food Security and Maintaining Food Sovereignty

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The homogenizing effects of the proliferation of modern Western culture are eradicating diversity around the globe causing many communities to become food insecure. Diversity can be seen both biologically and culturally, the former as biodiversity or the variety of plant life in an ecosystem; and the latter as cultural diversity or the variety of human societies or cultures. The combination of these is known as biocultural diversity, a concept that includes the intimate link between biological, cultural, and linguistic diversity which are interrelated within a complex socio-ecological adaptive system.[1] This paper will look at the modern structural and institutional threats to biocultural diversity which produce food insecurity, and of the sociocultural and environmental consequences of the loss of these interlinked diversities.[2] The 1996 World Food Summit defines food security as: "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and preferences for an active and healthy life."[3] Food security is threatened by the loss of biocultural diversity, which is caused by homogeneous cultural and biological domination. Monoculture refers to both monocrops: the cultivation of a single crop or organism especially on agricultural or forest land; and a culture dominated by a single element: a prevailing culture marked by homogeneity.[4] Thus, monocultures can inhabit both the mind and the ground.[5] Monocultures of the mind are limitations in our perceptions of the world that lead to a "TINA – There Is No Alternative Syndrome."[6] Cultural and linguistic diversity is related to the diversity in the action of adapting ideas and therefore "any reduction of language diversity diminishes the adaptational strength of our species because it lowers the pool of

knowledge from which we can draw."[7] Monocultures of the ground include the practice of corporate "seed replacement: replacing the inferior varieties from farmers for the advanced modern varieties."[8] These programs ensure the destruction of alternative genetic seed varieties: "So biodiversity can be extinguished in one season - which is millennia of evolutionary history being extinguished in a second."[9] The dominating modern Western culture propagates a separation between nature and culture termed the 'nature/culture divide.' This divide is pervasive throughout history; from the biblical book of Genesis to the scientific revolution, nature has been viewed as fundamentally separate from humans. Our current struggle for food security is the fight against an oppressive conceptual framework that sanctions the philosophical logic of domination and the dualistic nature/culture divide. We cannot end the exploitation of the Earth until we radically address and overcome this conceptual framework which is deeply embedded in modern structures and institutions. This paper argues that monocultures destroy biocultural diversity, causing food insecurity and preventing food sovereignty.

Dominant Conceptual Framework

World leaders have been working together for decades trying to "solve" health, environment and hunger problems. Despite many efforts such as the 2009 World Summit on Food Security and the 2002 Millennium Development Project, food insecurity continues around the world. The struggle for food security is a struggle for justice and a fight against the dominant oppressive conceptual framework, which is rooted in the philosophical logic of domination.[10] The modern oppressive conceptual framework sanctions relationships of unjustifiable domination and subordination such as: hierarchical thinking, oppositional dualism, power over others, and selective privilege.[11] This dualistic thinking such as: male/female, mind/matter, and subject/object, has culminated in the divide between nature and culture. This

monoculture of the mind is based in a scientific knowledge system and is currently embedded in modern structures especially governmental institutions, economic market function and legal systems. This monocultural view legitimizes the domination and exploitation of nature and those who are intimately linked with nature by inequitably privileging one group: western scientific knowledge, and disadvantaging another: local knowledge and its intimate connection to nature itself. This monoculture prevents local food security by denying the connections between local knowledge, land use and ecological systems.

History of the Dominant Conceptual Framework

In many traditional societies humans, like all other animals, are viewed as a member of the biotic community. Throughout most of antiquity "every tree, every spring, every stream, every hill had its own *genius loci*, its guardian spirit. …Before one cut a tree, mined a mountain, or dammed a brook, it was important to placate the sprit in charge of that particular situation, and to keep it placated."[12] This is reflected in Native American cultures, Australian Aboriginal cultures, and Pagan animism. The rise of the Judaeo-Christian religion, its creation story and concept of linear time, overtook the Greco-Roman cyclical notion of time and polytheistic mythology, and eradicated pagan animism. This mirrors the ecological argument that we must function within the inherent structures of ecosystems: "ecologists point to the structure of natural ecological systems to argue that nature is modeled on self-sustaining circular systems that recycle resources, while our economic and social systems are based on non-sustainable linear processes that are out of sync with basic natural patterns."[13] Christianity's anthropocentric worldview as laid out in the Book of Genesis tells how God gave man dominion over the animal world. This prolific story of our origins situated "Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia's religions, [it] not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends."[14] Our great

philosophers would, from here on out, be restrained by this dualistic conviction as seen in Aristotle's hierarchical arraignment of life, the Stoics commitment to the superiority of the mind over body, traditional Natural law's faith in human reason, and the Cartesian view of nature as a machine.[15] Modern western culture continues to live this way, as we have for the past 2000 years. From industrialization and the development of market economies to modern agricultural science, humanity has attempted to understand and manipulate the natural world from the outside. Nature is seen as composed of reducible objects that can be viewed and studied by a rational objective observer: Man. Nature, interpreted in this way, has become a wild and savage 'other', separate and very different from mankind. Modern western culture is defined by the scientific knowledge system it ascribes to.

Dominant Scientific Knowledge Systems

Scientific knowledge is knowledge accumulated by systematic study and organized by general principles such as mathematics. The scientific knowledge system is a modern western cultural perspective, which uses the prefix science to elevate itself above society and other knowledge systems.[16] The dominant scientific knowledge system legitimizes the homogenization of the world, and the erosion of its ecological and cultural richness.[17] This positivist system is based on the scientific method, specialization, and a culture, class and gender bias; arguably Christian, educated, and male.[18] It is part of the parochial traditions which emerged from a dominating and colonizing western culture.[19] Its values are based on power, competition, domination and dispensability.[20] It encourages a reductionist, fragmented, atomistic and uniform worldview.[21] And it is closely linked to market based capitalism and economic growth.[22] Economic growth is defined here as "an increase of the transaction made on markets (goods, labour and capital markets), measured in monetary terms'" through the commercial output of goods and services: Gross National Product (GNP) of economic exchanges.[23]

Within international relations economic growth appears as a single shared purpose or common commitment, which reveals the presence of one dominant ordered system with which all major actors and institutions comply.[24] This form of governance is referred to as the growth paradigm.[25] As a policy priority, liberal theorists believe growth is "intended to improve social welfare by elevating standards of living and…ensur[ing] a safe standard of living for all,"[26] Yet modern scientific knowledge contributes to the destruction of biodiversity by converting wild ecosystems into manicured landscapes that produce economic commodities. The colonizing and globalizing force of our dominant western knowledge system negates local knowledge existence by "not seeing it."[27] Modern society views many local resources as only sustenance or non-profiting, and the locals who protect it as wasting the land because they aren't interested in maximizing it for profit. The divide between nature and culture enables modern society to dominate and exploit nature without considering the long term detrimental effects on biocultural diversity.

Biocultural Diversity and Local Knowledge Systems

Local knowledge systems relate to a peoples' entire system of concepts, beliefs and perceptions about the world around them, and is situated within an ecological continuum with the plant world.[28] It has been maintained over time by diverse traditional and local societies. Local knowledge focuses on forests, which provide both food and livelihood for local populations including: fodder, fuel and fertilizer, inputs to agriculture, and the conservation of soil and water.[29] Local knowledge systems depend on an ecological continuum and the sustained fertility of forests and fields.[30] It adheres to an inherently life enhancing paradigm where it must maintain the conditions for renewability.[31] Communities that are rooted in local knowledge are intimately linked to their physical surroundings, and natural environment. They have a long tradition of food security and sovereignty over local resources and food production systems. Food sovereignty can

be defined as the right of each nation or region to maintain and develop their capacity to produce basic food crops with corresponding productive and cultural diversity.[32] It emphasizes farmers' access to land, seeds, and water while focusing on local autonomy, local markets, local production-consumption cycles, energy and technological sovereignty, and farmer-to-farmer networks. [33] Local knowledge has nurtured culturally, biologically and genetically diverse agriculture systems with a built-in resilience that has helped them to adjust to rapidly changing climates, pests, and diseases.[34] Local knowledge has led to:

> The persistence of millions of agricultural hectares under ancient, traditional management in the form of raised fields, terraces, polycultures (with a number of crops growing in the same field), agroforestry systems, etc., document a successful indigenous agricultural strategy and constitutes a tribute to the "creativity" of traditional farmers. These microcosms of traditional agriculture offer promising models for other areas because they promote biodiversity, thrive without agrochemicals, and sustain year-round yields… Such systems have fed much of the world for centuries and continue to feed people in many parts of the planet.[35]

Due to the encroaching proliferation of scientific knowledge systems, local knowledge is at risk. It is apparent that the variety of cultural knowledge, beliefs, and practices developed by human societies are being placed in jeopardy by the socioeconomic and political processes that threaten the integrity and the very survival of indigenous and local cultures and the environments in which they live.[36] This massive and rapid change has profound implications for the maintenance of all life on earth.[37]

Biodiversity

The biological diversity of life on our planet has continually evolved over billions of years. Since the domestication of agricultural crops, farmers have used their local knowledge to save the seed from their unique micro-ecosystems that exhibit desirable traits such as resilience to pests, larger fruit, or specific climatic adaptations. Farmers who save seed have developed some of the most geographically specific adaptations, and genetically distinct varieties of agriculture crops on the planet. Farmers save and trade seed to enhance genetic diversity, which is "essential to protect their fields from blights or other depredation" and creates food security.[38] A wide variety of plant species, referred to as biodiversity, fosters resistance to diseases and pests, and adaptation to climatic and soil conditions. Diversity in plants and animals is vital to the health and stability of both biological and social communities. Evolving a multitude of species is nature's best survival tactic, operating as an insurance plan for sustaining life on earth.[39] Local and rural communities embody the intimate relationship between food insecurity and ecological degradation through deep connections to their environments:

> No segment of humanity depends more directly on environmental resources and services than the rural poor, who make up an estimated 80 percent of the world's 800 million hungry people. They make daily use of soil and water for farming and fishing, of forests for food, fuel and fodder, of the biodiversity of a wide range of plants and animals, both domesticated and wild. Their lives are interwoven with the surrounding environment in ways that make them both particularly valuable as custodians of environmental resources and particularly vulnerable to environmental degradation.[40]

An agriculture system that continuously degrades the environment puts rural and farming communities at risk; whereas, local knowledge recognises the value of biocultural diversity in creating food security.

The dominant scientific knowledge system is contributing to the loss of biodiversity through the widespread conversion of biologically diverse forests and farms to monocrops which promote landscape homogenization, export oriented economies, and the destruction of diverse habitat. The loss of traditional farming practices that serve to diversify species is contributing to biodiversity loss globally. In 1988 the First International Congress of Ethnobiology met in Belém, Brazil to link the common threats to cultural and biological diversity. The Declaration of Belem states:

> tropical forests and other fragile ecosystems are disappearing, many species, both plant and animal, are threatened with extinction, indigenous cultures around the world are being disrupted and destroyed and GIVEN—that economic, agricultural, and health conditions of people are dependent on these resources, that native peoples have been stewards of 99% of the world's genetic resources, and that there is an inextricable link between cultural and biological diversity;[41]

Cultural and biological diversity go hand in hand as seen in the ongoing worldwide loss of biodiversity which is paralleled by and seems interrelated to the "extinction crisis" affecting linguistic and cultural diversity.[42] The loss of biodiversity is a crisis that jeopardizes the well-being of life support systems that millions of people in third world countries depend on.[43] This is a result of powerful liberal nations pushing for an increase in economic productivity and growth over diversity preservation.[44]As a consequence of this economic mentality local knowledge that

fosters biodiversity is displaced by scientific knowledge that produces monocultures. Some of the consequences of monocultures include the break-up of community structures, the loss of traditional land management practices, the loss of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), the loss of species dependant on management, the loss of native species, and the destabilization of ecosystems.

Modern Structures and Institutions of Scientific Knowledge

The domination of scientific knowledge can be seen in modern capitalist society's commitment to the economic structure of market capitalism and its commitment to growth. There are three features of market capitalism that contribute to the commitment to economic growth: path dependency, economic convergence, and social convergence.[45] Path dependency is the tendency of capitalism to lock in its own competitive criteria to the exclusion of other socio-economic systems;[46] it dictates the pursuit of short-term material interests, and the competitive nature of international trade and mobile capital make it too costly for actors not to play by the rules of the game.[47] Economic convergence is a convergence of economic policies among states despite wide variations in states' histories, cultures, and levels of development,[48] with an overriding commitment to economic expansionism. Sociological convergence regards cultural dimensions,[49] from military security to national health, as deeply engraved in policy–makers collective psyche.[50] The global acceptance of economic growth was reinforced by the UN Charter of 1945 which used GNP as a universal quantifiable standard for development; "while per capita income was not deemed the sole measure of rising living standards (health, literacy, etc.), the key criterion was measurable progress toward the goal of the "good society," popularized by economists and U.S. presidential adviser Walt Rostow's idea of the advanced stage of "high mass consumption."[51] Thus, "Third World" development was marked by

a "range of modern practices and institutions designed to sustain economic growth."[52] The constant reinforcement of growth as the ultimate path to development has created a monoculture or normative concept in economics:

> Promoting growth – achieving ever-greater economic wealth and prosperity- may be the most widely shared and robust cause in the world today. Economic growth has been called 'the secular relation of the advancing industrial societies.'[53]

The dedication of economists to increase a nations' rate of growth of output and consumption prevents alternative economic structures from being appreciated. Scientific knowledge systems contribute to the modern oppressive conceptual framework that dominates the international political economy by forcing a single and narrow definition of growth, prosperity and well-being of all communities.

Environmentalists often stress the biological limits of the earth to support life and prescribe a more sustainable global economy.[54] A sustainable economy can be defined as: one whose essential practices can be carried on indefinitely while maintaining its population of humans and other species at a certain level of well-being.[55] This concept is similar to that perpetuated by local knowledge systems. It stands in direct contrast to the modern monoculture of infinite economic growth.

The Liberal Perspective

In the liberal perspective economic growth is essential for human welfare and the maintenance of sustainable development. "Most international economic organizations and the economic policies of most states today are strongly influenced by liberal principles."[56] The keystone international economic organizations (KIEO)—the IMF, World Bank, and WTO—uphold liberal

economic principles, and liberals therefore have a positive view of international economic relations as currently structured. They assert that the KIEO liberal principles are politically neutral and states benefit from economic growth and efficiency when their policies conform to those principles.[57] Liberals believe that economic growth leads to a greater ability to protect the environment in the long run, as Cohn outlines

> Orthodox liberals believe that economic growth increases peoples' incomes, giving them the ability and incentive to improve the environment. Even if the profit-oriented policies of some business firms adversely affect air and water quality in the short term, they contribute to economic growth which will improve environmental conditions over time. Thus, the best policy for the environment is to promote economic growth through open trade and foreign investment policies without government interference.[58]

Liberal ideology and policy supports the scientific knowledge system and contributes to the proliferation of an oppressive conceptual framework by continuing to promote a single mode of development: economic growth.

Environmental Critique of Economic Growth

The critical environmental perspective views economic growth and capitalism as a leading cause of global environmental problems and food insecurity. Many environmentalists outline the risks of ignoring the long-term mutual effects of the environment on the economy and vice versa, such as diminishing returns and resource exploitation. Critical environmentalists also believe that developed countries follow environmentally exploitative practices; and assert that environmental degradation affects some more than others because of globalization, domination, and inequality. They

believe that the overconsumption of resources threatens the Earth's ability to support life, but that it is difficult to limit resource use.[59] Critical environmentalists critique economic growth and capitalism from their primary viewpoint that the Earth is a finite planet with a limited biological caring capacity.[60] Environmentalists ascribe to the second contradiction of capitalism: the deterioration of the means of production or ecological exploitation.[61] The process of accumulation impairing or destroying its own conditions of production has been described as:

> To the extent the capital relation, with its unrelenting competitive drive to realize profit, prevails, it is a certainty that the conditions of production at some point or other will be degraded, which is to say natural ecosystems will be destabilized and broken apart… this degradation will have a contradictory effect on profitability itself (the second contradiction of capital), either directly as by so fouling the natural ground of production that it breaks down, or indirectly, in the case that regulatory measures, being forced to pay for the healthcare of workers, etc., re-internalizes the costs that had been expelled in the environment.[62]

Critical environmentalists condemn globalization for its homogenizing effects of cultures and species.[63] Thus, in 1992 the Convention on Biological Diversity, in Article 8 called for the protection and promotion of the "innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity."[64] The products that yield profit and definitions of profit vary greatly from western developers to third world resource management participants. In the opinions of many third world peoples, western agri-business is the main cause of biodiversity erosion and the accompanying social consequences, and monocultures are a metaphor for social control.[65] Homogenization

reduces environmental resiliency, renders the planet at risk to the harmful effects of climate change, destroys biocultural diversity and contributes to food insecurity.

The Dominant Monoculture of Scientific Knowledge as Seen in Agribusiness

The first agricultural revolution, or Green Revolution, began in 1945 and aimed to feed the world's growing population. It industrialized the farm with new mechanical and chemical technologies and expanded the practice of growing large single specie monocrops. Technology from the 1st and 2nd World Wars led to the development of synthetic nitrogen based fertilizers, and chemical pesticides and herbicides. To help spread these technologies, developers pressured governments to implement agriculture and trade subsidies in their support. Every year, wealthier countries hand out more than US $250 billion in subsidies to agricultural producers.[66] While the Green Revolution enabled farmers to feed hundreds of millions of people, it came at a cost to communities' food sovereignty and environmental integrity around the world. Shiva wrote that Green Revolution "produces more rice and wheat. But it destroyed our pulses; it destroyed our oil seeds; it destroyed all the multiple sources of food; it has left farmers in debt."[67] In 2001 the UN launched The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Project, with contributions from 1,300 international scientists. In 2005 they presented an evaluation on the condition of the earth's environment stating: "the experts agree that food production is the major cause of pollution and of the destruction of ecosystems."[68] The proliferation of modern agricultural production is destroying the cultures that practice locally sustainable food cultivation and local biodiversity. The homogenization of crop species or monocrops both decreases farm biodiversity and limits species diversity in surrounding "wild" areas. "Green Revolution technologies and strategies, reliant on monoculture, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, have destroyed biodiversity, which has in many places led to a decline

in nutrition output per acre."[69]This collapse can be seen throughout the world in: the failure of American Corn Belt in the 1970's due to the southern corn leaf blight which wiped out American farmers single strain of corn, and in the plight of the Irish Potato famine where:

> Ireland's was certainly the biggest experiment in monoculture ever attempted and surely the most convincing proof of its folly. Not only did the agriculture and diet of the Irish come to depend utterly on the potato, but they depended almost completely on one kind of potato: the Lumper.[70]

According to Pimbert, food sovereignty depends on biocultural diversity however, our "Current knowledge and policies for growth in food and farming are leading to the economic genocide of unprecedented numbers of farmers and rural livelihoods throughout the world."[71] The Green Revolution was a standard environmental management package which neglected local priorities, management systems, institutions and social organisation; and overlooked the value of local knowledge.[72] The consequences of monocultures include: the fragmentation of community structure, the loss of traditional land management practices, TEK, species dependant on traditional land management, native species and destabilized ecosystems.[73]

Genetically Modified Organisms

While global hunger continues to rise the next agricultural revolution has already begun; this biological transformation is commonly referred to as the Gene Revolution. Spearheaded by the biotech industry, it involves the direct manipulation of an organism's gene, and is termed genetic engineering (GE) or genetically modified organisms (GMO). The biotech industries practice of hegemonic agribusiness and the proliferation of genetically engineered crops pose a serious threat to biocultural

diversity. The biotech industries claim that the gene revolution and genetically engineered crops are increasing food production while "reducing agriculture's impact on our environment"[74] by lowering pesticide and herbicide use for farmers. However, "the principal strategy of many agrobiotech companies is to ensure that its agricultural chemicals match its engineered seeds;"[75] resulting in many GE crops being modified with herbicide tolerant traits. The crops are then sprayed with herbicide, killing everything but the desired plant. This is seen in the development of two main seed products, "Two traits—herbicide tolerance (HT) and insect resistance (Bt) engineered into four commodity crops corn, cotton, soybeans, and canola."[76] GE seeds are designed for monocrop farming thereby limiting farmers from diversifying or growing other plant species. There is a lack of peer reviewed scientific knowledge on the effects of GE crops on the environment or health, therefore the Convention on Biological Diversity decided that a precautionary approach should be taken towards GE crops because "much is unknown about how its products may behave and evolve, and how they may interact with other species."[77] GE crops and mechanized industrial farming practices create homogeneity in crops, destroy traditional land management practices and perpetuate further chemical abuse,[78] which threaten biodiversity though habitat loss and increased toxins in the environment. Over the past decade herbicide usage has risen rather than decreased, by approximately 250 million pounds.[79] The Gene revolution run by the biotech industry amplifies risks to neighbouring farmers, biodiversity and wild environments, and creates new political and economic threats to farmers who plant genetically distinct and organic crop varieties.

Patterns of Control and Profit

The companies that produce chemical fertilizer, pesticide and herbicide also manufacture the GE seeds. The unsustainable industrial agriculture system is completely dependent on inputs; seeds to grow crops, fertilizers to replenish the soil, and chemicals

to eliminate unwanted pests. The consolidation of control is dominated by a handful of corporations who use intellectual property laws to commodify the world's seed supply.[80] Treating food as a commodity or a product that is developed, marketed and sold has turned the global food system into a profit driven market run by a few large corporations. The corporate dominated food system is dependent on the exploitation of local communities, environments and consumers. This paradox can be seen in the ideology behind global North /South relations. For the North to have control over the South's diverse resources for profit, the North nations develop agri-business policies for the South that allow for the destruction of biocultural diversity.[81] These are the very resources which the dominant economic model depends on, and lead to a form of destructive colonialism.[82] Local communities, the stewards of biodiversity, rarely see portions of the profits reaped from the appropriation of their genetic resources, while Northern nations continue to neglect their role in the causes of biocultural destruction.[83] It has become common to blame the victims of biodiversity detriment, local communities, for the destruction to their own biocultural diversity if they do not follow an economic model that maximizes resource production according to the dominant Northern proxies. The causes of biocultural diversity loss lie just as much in Northern policy as in Southern geography and the consequences affect all of humanity.[84]

One modern example of the collaboration of economic and political power in pursuit of profit and economic growth is the war in Iraq. Many of the giant grain corporations such as Cargill, ADM, and Con Agra are looking to invest in the markets represented by "food aid" in Iraq.[85] The war in Iraq is as much about "blood for food and water" as it is about "blood for oil".[86] This war has its roots in the modern growth economy that fails to respect both ecological and ethical limits, such as: limits to inequality, injustice, greed and economic power.[87] This paradigm defines the entire world as "an enemy to be exterminated."[88] The creation of the present state of global war was the inevitable next

step for the modern dominating structures and institutions of scientific knowledge, as seen in economic and corporate globalization: "a handful of corporations and a handful of powerful countries seek to control the earth`s resources and to transform the planet into a supermarket in which everything is for sale."[89] All living resources that maintain life are in a process of being privatized, commodified, and appropriated by corporations.[90] This occurs through coercion, free-trade treaties, institutions such as the WTO, and ultimately by war. [91] Corporate globalization is a war economy based on violence against the poor, which robs them not only of their livelihoods and incomes, but of their very lives; and it is a war against the planet.[92] The structures of profit and control that make up our dominant economic and political structures reinforce the dominant scientific knowledge system and undermine local communities' ability to maintain holistic food production.

The Nature/Culture Divide

Scientific knowledge has positively contributed to our lives through modern medicine, education, science and technologies as seen by decreased infant mortality rates, increasing life expectancy, AIDS treatments, tsunami warning systems, and earthquake proof buildings. However, these same systems dominate and control nature by exploiting resources, polluting environments, the widespread conversion of land; and marginalize local cultures by devaluing and delegitimizing their knowledge. This has led to global environmental issues at a scale never before seen by humankind, and threatens the future of all species. The modern nature/culture debate can be seen between modern ecologists and environmental modernizers. Ecologists view nature as interdependent following an unwritten law of nature that must function within natural limits such as: carrying capacity, scarcity, and the 2nd law of thermodynamics.[93] Environmental modernizers understand nature through physics and mathematics, they attempt to manipulate and manage the environment and support Cartesian dualism.[94] Many also rely on technological fixes to solve our

current and future environmental ills. Finding a balance within modern society that can incorporate both technology and a respect for biocultural diversity is vital to overcoming the nature/culture divide, and in creating holistic food production systems.

The Dominant Monoculture of Scientific Knowledge Creates Food Insecurity

The dominant monoculture of scientific knowledge is destroying local knowledge through its modern structures and institutions such as the growth paradigm and agribusiness. This destruction of local knowledge leads to the destruction of local cultures and ways of life, which traditionally have managed and culturally modified ecosystems. When cultures are no longer able to maintain and manage their environments, ecosystems change, lose their integrity and experience the destruction of local diversity.[95] This destruction of biocultural diversity leads to the destruction of food security because local communities are no longer producing traditional foods and now must purchase them or their seeds from agribusiness. This is a destruction of local food sovereignty for local communities because they no longer control the means of production, and increasingly see the destruction of both the commons and traditionally managed lands. If monocultures of the mind are limitations in our perceptions of the world that lead to a "TINA" syndrome, than generating diversity is "the production of alternatives and keeping alive alternative forms of production."[96] Alternatives enable biocultural diversity to be resilient and sustainable; they enable local communities to be food secure, while creating and maintaining food sovereignty.

Solutions

Food security can be achieved by acknowledging and valuing local knowledge, enabling traditional land management practices, and by preserving biodiversity. In the international political community both scientists and environmentalists advocate

near-term mitigation policies to limit the harm of current market externalities,[97] such as: corporate responsibility, reclaiming of the commons, localization, reduction of consumption, transition to renewable energy sources, and eliminating fossil fuel dependence. Some environmentalists call for a radical restructuring of the global economy such as a dismantling of current global economic structures and institutions, changing how we measure progress, or moving towards steady state economy through the field of ecological economics.[98] Critical environmentalists prescribe various policy options including: the use of alternative economic indicators such as the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare and the Genuine Progress Indicator which adjusts for income inequalities and recognizes the importance of well-being respectively.[99]

There already exist alternatives to conventional farming that are ecologically harmonious, facilitate the abundance of biodiversity and create food security. Less destructive ways to produce foods are organic farming, agro-ecology and permaculture. These holistic farming methods operate in closed sustainable systems, recycling energy back into the soil, which requires little to no inputs from the farmer. Small scale farming with a diversity of plants has many benefits such as healthier soils, crop resilience and natural pest defences. Using alternative production methods is slowly gaining popularity as education around ecologically sustainable farming spreads. Many grassroots organizations have formed to raise awareness around and change conventional chemical intensive agriculture practice such as Navdanya in India:

> The Green Revolution that we are building through Navdanya is based on conserving biodiversity and conserving water while increasing food production per acre. What we need is biodiversity intensification, not chemical intensification. What we need is to work with nature's nutrient cycles and hydrological cycle,

> not against them. It is time to put small farmers, especially women, at the heart of this process.[100]

Navdanya is one of many examples of community groups working together to preserve local knowledge and biocultural diversity. Conserving indigenous agriculture is a vital key in creating local food security.

The most critical solution to biocultural diversity loss lies in democratizing knowledge, redefining knowledge to include and legitimise local and diverse sources.[101] Local knowledge is indispensible because it is more concrete in reality and is based on natural ecological systems.[102] Democratising knowledge is advocated by Shiva as:

> Such a shift from the globalising to the local knowledge is important to the project of human freedom because it frees knowledge from the dependency on established regimes of thought, making it simultaneously more autonomous and more authentic. Democratisation based on such an insurrection of subjugated knowledge is both a desirable and necessary component of the larger processes of democratisation because the earlier paradigm is in crisis and in spite of its power to manipulate, is unable protect both nature and human survival.[103]

Democratising knowledge enables cultural diversity to continue and for each culture to maintain the biological diversity it has generated. Democratising knowledge enables local communities to sustainably grow the food they need, gain access to and manage commons such as forests, rivers and fields, and combat the misappropriation of TEK.

Conclusion

This paper has outlined how modern Western structures and institutions threaten biocultural diversity. The sociocultural and environmental consequences of the loss of these interlinked diversities produce food insecurity and prevent food sovereignty. Generating diversity is the production of alternatives and keeping alive alternative forms of production creates options for future challenges. Biodiversity enables food security by ensuring future edible plant options and by making ecosystems more resilient. Cultural diversity enables food sovereignty by safeguarding traditional land management practices, saving seeds, and through autonomous resource management. Agribusiness and conventional farming practices threaten food security for billions of people around the world. Genetic biodiversity in our agriculture crops are necessary in ensuring a future with healthy food and ecosystems. The conventional industrialized farm is chemically dependent and biologically void while consisting only of GE monocrops. The Gene revolution dominated by a few biotech industries amplifies risks to biodiversity and environments, and creates new threats to farmers who plant genetically distinct varieties. The globalization of our food system has exposed developing farmers to the global Free Market economy leaving them indebted to the seed and chemical companies. The current system of food cultivation treats food as a commodity and causes food insecurity and environmental degradation. Biodiversity is vital to sustaining life on earth; humanity is dependent on the complex biologically diverse ecosystems that make up the Earth's biosphere, and alternative farming practices both facilitate and embrace nature's dynamic ecological process. The current unsustainable and environmentally degrading food production system causes food insecurity, whereas shifting to local holistic agriculture practice in harmony with the environment is the best way to create food security and maintain food sovereignty. Monocultures destroy biocultural diversity, the most vital element to creating both global food security and local food sovereignty.

Notes

[1] Luisa Maffi, "Linguistic, Cultural, and Biological Diversity," *The Annual Review of Anthropology* no. 29 (2005): 600.
[2] Ibid.
[3] World Food Programme, *World Hunger Series – hunger and markets* (UK and USA: Earthscan, 2009).
[4] Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, 2010, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/monoculture
[5] Vandana Shiva, *Monocultures of the Mind* (New York: Zed Books, 1993): 1.
[6] Ibid., 10.
[7] Maffi, "Linguistic, Cultural, and Biological Diversity," 603.
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The Obsolescence of Major War:
An Examination of Contemporary War Trends

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For centuries, the threat of major war has loomed over humanity. Defined as protracted struggles among the leading powers of the international system that tend to have significant geopolitical consequences, major wars have often been viewed as inevitable, albeit infrequent, calamities whose existence has played an important role in interstate relations.[1] And yet, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in the wake of the relatively peaceful end to the Cold War, this once prominent institution appears to be on the wane. Direct conflict among the great powers has been absent for more than half a century, and an unprecedented period of peace seems to have enveloped the developed world. Indeed, never before in history have so many well-armed great powers spent such little time warring with one another.[2] Coupled with a notable shift in attitudes surrounding warfare, this absence of major war has caused some scholars to begin positing its obsolescence, sparking a significant debate in the field of security studies and redirecting attention to the causes of war and the necessary conditions for interstate peace.

To be sure, the obsolescence of major war does not imply a decline in war in general. In fact, recent events would seem to indicate the exact opposite. As major war has declined, non-traditional threats to security, including guerrilla warfare and terrorism, have gained a new lease on life, resulting in more uncontrolled and irregular forms of conflict. Moreover, the decline in direct conflict between the great powers does not imply that these countries have abandoned war altogether. Interventions into the affairs of developing states, as well as proxy wars, remain as viable options for great powers to pursue.

Ultimately, although warfare itself is not dead, it would seem that major war is becoming obsolete. The trends this paper will examine to explain such obsolescence include the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons technology, the changing nature of the international economy, the spread of democracy, and the development of international norms and institutions.

Before proceeding, it would seem fruitful to clarify a couple of terms, the definitions of which will determine the scope of the argument to be pursued. As indicated above, major war may be defined as armed conflict among two or more great powers, referring to the few most powerful states in the international system.[3] Though non-great powers may also be involved, it is great power participation that truly defines major war. Indeed, in light of the great powers' capacity to mobilize and project vast economic and military resources across the globe, the scale and destruction of great power conflicts would seem to be major in the most fundamental sense.

And yet, despite its seeming prevalence, for some individuals, this definition of major war is insufficient. Deeming it too narrow, various scholars have sought to broaden this definition to include such things as war among dominant regional powers, or even more broadly, all interstate wars that produce a minimum number of casualties.[4] However, even if these broader definitions are valid, since interstate war in general seems to have been declining in recent centuries, adopting such definitions need not negate the thesis at hand.[5] In this sense, the obsolescence of major war holds regardless of whether a narrow or a broad definition is adopted. Thus, given the fact that the decline in interstate conflict appears to be clearer and more pronounced among the great powers, it is largely for the sake of concision that the proposed definition of major war will be utilized.

In light of this definition, it would be useful to clarify which countries fall within the group of great powers. For our purposes,

eight countries currently appear to meet the criteria of economic and military supremacy: the United States, China, Russia, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and India.[6] Together, these countries account for more than half of the world's GDP and more than two-thirds of its military spending.[7] Among them are the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, each of which, in addition to India, possesses large nuclear arsenals. And yet, despite their warring potential, peace between these powers has stretched on for more than half a century, a development that we will now examine in more detail.

Exploring Obsolescence

Since the end of the Second World War, direct conflict among the great powers has been seemingly non-existent, marking the longest absence of major war since the days of the Roman Empire.[8] Given the scale and frequency of major war in previous centuries, this absence may be the single most important discontinuity that the history of warfare has ever seen.[9] Though not without tension, great power relations are now generally characterized by a sense of peace, with states carrying out aggressions through diplomatic or economic, rather than military, means. Indeed, as the threat of major war has declined, most great powers have chosen to invest fewer resources in developing a strong military, undergoing a notable downsizing in both the size of their armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their disposal since 1945.[10] While most great powers had possessed forces numbering several million men throughout much of the twentieth century, as of the late 1990s, the only states maintaining forces exceeding a million and a half were India and China, and at that time, China had announced it would be cutting half a million of its troops.[11] In addition to directly cutting their forces, most states have also eliminated conscription, a once useful system that provided a great deal of cannon fodder for the institution of major war.[12] Air forces, naval forces, and nuclear weapons stores have also witnessed similar reductions worldwide.[13] Indicative of the

current sense of great power peace, these reductions would also seem to imply that none of the great powers anticipates a major war to break out any time in the near future, supporting the idea that major war is becoming obsolete.

However, having said this, it is important to note that, in and of itself, the extended absence of major war is a necessary, but not a sufficient, criterion for the obsolescence of major war. In fact, it is arguable that the current absence is not an indication of the institution's obsolescence, but simply a temporary period of peace within the broader cycle of major war, a cycle linked to the rise and fall of world orders.[14] On this view, international stability is tied to the presence of a hegemon that is capable of maintaining order in an anarchic international system due to its economic and military supremacy.[15] When such hegemony is challenged by a rising power, this theory asserts that major war is likely to break out as power becomes more equally distributed and the control maintained by the hegemon is lost.[16] Thus, just as the hegemonic presence of Great Britain ushered in a period of peace during the nineteenth century, it would seem that the prolonged peace we are currently witnessing may be attributable to the dominance of the United States in the contemporary international system, a dominance that remains open to challenge, particularly by rising powers like China and India. In this sense, instead of indicating its obsolescence, the current absence of major war may simply be a temporary manifestation of American hegemony that will inevitably be challenged and lost in the future, thus continuing the cycle of major war.[17]

Though not entirely devoid of merit, one should be wary of accepting this argument. Historically, some periods of hegemony have witnessed a general sense of peace among the great powers, but this does not mean that international stability is inherently tied to a unipolar structure. Indeed, many studies find little to no connection between power configurations and the incidence of war in the international system.[18] Nonetheless, even if it can be

accepted that war has been cyclical in the past, tied to changing power balances, economic waves, or otherwise, this need not imply that this cycle must continue, thereby discounting the thesis at hand. Even if the current period of peace is temporary, trends surrounding the frequency of major war for the past few centuries seem to indicate that such periods are becoming increasingly more frequent and may one day become the established norm.

In fact, extrapolating from the works of individuals like J.S. Levy and Evan Luard, both of whom have performed analyses as to the frequency of major war, it is arguable that the absence we are seeing today has been taking shape for centuries, with periods of great power peace growing in both frequency and length. Focusing on various periods between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, both Levy and Luard find the nineteenth century to be the most peaceful, followed by the twentieth, the eighteenth, the sixteenth, and the fifteenth centuries, with the seventeenth century appearing the most warlike.[19] Undeniably, the placement of the twentieth century in this sequence is problematic, though understandable given the spans of time these two scholars were considering. In 1984, the last year examined by Luard's study, great power peace would have lasted for just under forty years, placing the twentieth century neatly between the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries, which Luard records as having seen forty-three and twenty-seven years of continuous peace, respectively.[20] However, in light of the fact that the twentieth century saw no major wars between 1945 and its conclusion, exhibiting fifty-five years of peace that continues today, the twentieth century should arguably be readjusted in both Luard's and Levy's analysis as the most peaceful of those studied. Once this is done, it would seem that, with some exceptions, these analyses reveal an increasing tendency towards peace among the great powers, indicating that the current absence of major war may be the cementation of a trend that has been developing for centuries. Thus, if there is a cycle to major war, it would seem that we are witnessing its conclusion.

The significance of the current absence of major war cannot be stressed enough. And yet, while significant, it is important to note that the years following the Second World War have not been marked by absolute peace, not even for the great powers. Shortly after the conclusion of the Second World War, the Cold War broke out, a contest between the Soviet Union and the United States that would define the next few decades of history. Although most of the wars fought during this period took place in the Global South, the Soviet Union, the United States, and their respective allies often participated in these battles, providing logistical support or even their own military forces. These proxy wars, wherein powerful countries utilized civil conflicts in the developing world to carry out their aggressions and extend their influence, resulted in indirect engagement among great power forces.[21] Thus, although the last half century or so has not witnessed a major war in the proper sense, the great powers have engaged in indirect battles against one another.

In the post-Cold War period, proxy wars are no longer a well exercised avenue for great power aggressions, and, as indicated above, in recent years, even the United States and the Soviet Union have undergone notable reductions in the size of their armed forces and the amount of weaponry at their disposal. Yet, in spite of this, many great powers continue to prepare for and engage in war. What is noteworthy, however, is that the wars in which great powers are currently involved seem to fundamentally differ from those of the past. No longer do such wars seem to be primarily about expanding territory or influence, nor are they fought between great powers. Rather, these wars now seem to be generally motivated by humanitarian concerns, taking the form of collective operations sanctioned by multilateral institutions that aim to ensure the stability of developing countries wrought by violence.[22] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) efforts in Kosovo in 1999 and, more recently, in Afghanistan would seem indicative of such forms of intervention, with many great powers working together to protect human rights and promote human security

worldwide. To be sure, such protection is more necessary now than ever before as less conventional forms of violence, such as terrorism, have begun to flourish.[23] Ultimately, although the great powers are still engaged in war, such aggressions are no longer targeted at one another, nor do they appear to be aggressions in the proper sense. It would seem that their engagement in battle has undergone an evolution away from major war to humanitarian interventions, an evolution that can be tied to the shifting perceptions of war among populations in the developed world.

Indeed, beyond analyses as to the frequency of major war, further support for the obsolescence of this institution can be found in a shift towards a non-militaristic political psychology.[24] Evidenced not only by the reductions in military preparedness worldwide, but also by cultural and political trends, this shift would seem to be cementing in the developed world, particularly among the great powers whose behaviour is our primary concern.

In the past, war has been glorified as a heroic and virtuous endeavour, an inevitable product of human nature that cannot be overcome.[25] However, after centuries of violent warfare on the European and Asian continents, beginning as early as the seventeenth century, these views surrounding war began to change throughout the developed world.[26] The first truly active and persistent group that sought to reform sentiments surrounding war appears to have been the Quakers, a religious group that formed in England in 1652 and espoused a strong reverence for life.[27] Though vocal, their initial impact was limited. It was not until the end of the Napoleonic Wars of 1803-1815 that anti-war sentiments truly began to flourish, with the Quakers and others establishing the first anti-war societies in Europe and North America.[28] With many minority groups opposing or prophesising the conclusion of war, including such note-worthy scholars as Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, anti-war sentiment grew in the years leading up to the First World War, resulting in governments of major countries having to justify war in a way that had not been needed

in the past.[29] In some states, including Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Portugal, and the Netherlands, anti-war sentiment became so pronounced that governments sought to reform their foreign policy and avoid war altogether.[30]

However, it was not until the cataclysm of World War I that anti-war sentiments moved to the forefront in great power societies.[31] Novels and memoirs of the 1920s expressed these views profoundly and pushed them into even wider circulation.[32] Such sentiments were also present in international politics as almost all of the great powers of the time pursued a policy of war aversion. Arguably, World War II would not have broken out if it were not for the charismatic Hitler or the aggressive policies of the Japanese.[33] The consequence of World War I was that most major countries had foresworn war, at least major war. World War II simply reaffirmed these sentiments.

The growing disdain for war continued throughout the Cold War period and appears to have cemented today among the great powers. In the United States, the world's current superpower, anti-war sentiment became particularly pronounced during the Vietnam War, and negative sentiments can be seen today surrounding the Iraq War in both the United States and the United Kingdom.[34] None of these were wars were major wars, but the message remains the same, namely that citizens in these countries are wary of devoting resources and lives to the pursuit of war. Indeed, as indicated above, most of the great powers have reduced the amount of resources devoted to developing strong militaries and are generally on peaceful terms with one another. Countries like Germany and France, which, for centuries, have devoted significant amounts of time and resources to directly fighting one another or planning to do so, are now engaged in peaceful relations. Even Japan, a striking former aggressor state, seems to have embraced peace.

Ultimately, it would seem that the current absence of major war is not simply a temporary lull, but a more lasting change that has been developing for centuries. Major war is not simply absent, it is obsolescent. A wide range of causes come together to account for such obsolescence, which we will now examine in greater detail.

Accounting for Obsolescence

For many scholars, accounting for the obsolescence of major war need not go any further than pointing to the aforementioned shift in attitudes surrounding war. For these individuals, this shift is the most evident way of explaining the decline in major war, attributing it to a moral enlightenment of sorts.[35] However, while such enlightenment may have contributed to the obsolescence of major war, it is very difficult to quantify and leaves many questions unanswered. After all, even if a widespread moral enlightenment could be identified, the question remains as to what caused it. That is, what caused people to begin re-thinking the institution of major war?

Generally speaking, it would seem that the obsolescence of major war can be attributed to the culmination of a number of historical processes that have affected the profitability of warfare. According to Carl Kaysen, for most of history, societies were organized in such a way that the potential gains to be realized from war far outweighed the costs.[36] Early, predominantly agricultural, societies were organized around landholding, with land serving as the primary means of economic and political power. In such societies, the gains from war were clear, namely control over land and the labour tied to it, resulting in increased power for the landholder. Compared to such gains, the costs were generally quite minimal. In fact, as the scale of war was fairly small due to simple weaponry, the damage wrought by war to the landholders was usually, at most, the loss of one year's harvest. Moreover, in these societies, as the landholders themselves were those who engaged in

battle, there was a direct connection between those who would feel the costs and those who would benefit from war. Undoubtedly, this made war a more reasonable endeavour to undertake.

Even when changes came to societies in the developed world at the end of the fifteenth century, with cities growing in size, trade increasing in importance, governments becoming more complex, and the scale of armed conflict becoming larger, war remained a profitable endeavour. Until the eighteenth century, the governmental system was such that only a small elite made decisions surrounding war and truly benefited from such. Those who bore the brunt of the costs of war, directly engaging in armed conflict on the battlefield, now had little to no say in the foreign policy direction of their country. The new hubs of economic activity in major cities associated with trade also made for more enticing targets to be captured. And yet, while the scale of war was growing and the benefits to be obtained increasing, the associated risks remained low. Although more damage could be done to a city than to agricultural land, cities often had the opportunity to surrender before succumbing to assault. Thus, although the costs and benefits of war were less clear cut during this time than they had been in the past, war still remained a profitable pursuit.

Beginning around the nineteenth century and continuing today, transformations in technology, economics, and politics would change the terms of the calculation surrounding major war, resulting in the obsolescence we see today. Firstly, the industrial revolution brought with it new, destructive weapons technologies that were capable of not only killing large numbers of people, but also destroying the increased productive capacity and infrastructure that came with this development, thereby increasing the costs of war. Secondly, the economy grew to be increasingly global in nature, resulting in the globalization of production and an increased economic interdependence among developed states, both of which reduced incentives for war. Thirdly, the spread of liberal democracy seems to have internalized these shifting calculations

surrounding warfare since those bearing the costs, namely the citizens, now have a direct say in government formation. In addition to this institutional constraint, a sense of common identity and values among liberal democracies has resulted in them almost never warring with one another. Finally, international norms and institutions, of which most great powers are prominent members, have developed to counter international anarchy, a leading contributor to major war. We will now turn to a more detailed examination of each of these developments.

The Destructive Capacity of Weapons Technologies

Paradoxically, as weapons technologies have improved and become increasingly more destructive, the likelihood of major war has declined significantly. Extending as far back as the fourteenth century to when gun powder was introduced into Britain, it would seem that the scale and destructive potential of war has only increased, the pinnacle of which was World War II, the most destructive war in human history.[37] To be sure, World War I was also a terrible war, and, arguably, World War III would be even worse, even if nuclear weapons were not utilized.[38] Since great powers possess large stocks of highly destructive weapons and have directly felt their devastating potential in previous wars, such technologies would seem to act as a deterrent to the outbreak of major war.

The major turning point in terms of the increasingly destructive capacity of warfare came with the Industrial Revolution, which began in Europe in the eighteenth century. Industrialization "replaced animal by mechanical and then electric power, natural and traditional materials by steel and manufactured chemicals, and small-scale handicraft by large-scale factory production."[39] Together with improved transportation and communication, as well as the en masse movement of rural populations to urban areas, these changes profoundly increased the magnitude and efficiency of production and, with it, war.[40] Indeed,

war too underwent a process of industrialization during this time. More powerful weapons technologies, larger armies, and other improvements to transportation and communication increased the scale and power of war efforts.[41] Unlike most wars of the past, wherein only a small segment of society had been involved, industrial societies geared the entire nation towards the war effort, resulting in highly destructive and costly wars.

Although, initially, these developments did not serve as a deterrent to major war, as time progressed, the physical costs associated with such total wars became evident, culminating in the catastrophic World Wars of the twentieth century. These wars, which saw the great powers mobilize their entire economies to devastate one another, far exceeded those of the past in terms of destructiveness and scale.[42] The loss of life tied to these wars was significant, with ten million people dying fighting during World War I and another fifty million during World War II, though, in the case of the latter, more than half of those who perished were civilians.[43] Although these numbers do not necessarily indicate that the World Wars killed a larger proportion of these societies' populations than previous conflicts, insofar as life expectancy and quality of life had improved, the opportunity cost associated with these casualties was higher.[44] Moreover, the costs of these wars were not limited to casualties. Beyond these high death tolls, those states that saw the wars play out on their home soil witnessed the destruction of a large amount of their infrastructure and tangible capital stocks.[45] The diversion of their economies to the pursuit of war also resulted in most states losing years of domestic economic growth.[46] Overall, the damage wrought by the First and Second World Wars, and the memory of such, would seem to restrain any great power leader from undertaking aggression.

Although the Second World War witnessed the use of nuclear weapons, it is arguable that conventional weapons would have been sufficient to deter the great powers from engaging in future wars with one another. That is, as argued by John Mueller,

while certainly devastating, the destruction wrought by conventional weapons during these wars implies that, even if nuclear weapons had never been created, the great powers would still be averse to warring with one another.[47] As indicated above, it would seem that many of the great powers had been sufficiently sobered by the atrocities of the First World War and would not have engaged in the Second if it were not for Hitler's aggressive behaviour. To believe that they would then engage in a Third, even without the presence of nuclear weapons, thus appears questionable. Ultimately, nuclear weapons may have increased the destructive potential of major war, but this need not imply that the destruction before was not sufficient for deterrence to occur. As Mueller asserts, "A jump from a 50th story window is quite a bit more horrifying to think about than a jump from a 5th story one, and quite a bit more destructive as well; but anyone who enjoys life is readily deterred from either adventure."[48]

That being said, although nuclear weapons did not necessarily instigate the trend towards obsolescence, they have certainly helped to entrench it and may even protect against the rise of another risk-accepting great power leader in the future, similar in kind to Hitler.[49] Indeed, nuclear weapons have changed the nature of war entirely. Following the introduction and use of nuclear weapons during World War II, their destructive power has grown in a seemingly unlimited manner. The introduction of hydrogen bombs in 1952-3 resulted in weapons that were three thousand times more powerful than the one that destroyed Hiroshima in the Second World War.[50] By 1960, ballistic missiles made it possible for such destructive weapons to be delivered from any point on the earth to another, with Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRV) and Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) allowing for as many as ten nuclear warheads to be put on top of a single missile.[51] Countries, or even humanity as we know it, could now be destroyed at the push of a button. Attempts to develop a "second strike capacity" to launch a counter-attack in the event of a nuclear war began to appear futile.[52] All it would take was one

missile for everything to be lost. Given such destructive capacity, fears of conventional wars escalating to nuclear conflicts would seem to prevent great power countries, which have access to such weapons, either directly or indirectly, from engaging in direct conflicts with one another.

Before moving on, it should be noted that, in addition to becoming increasingly more destructive, recent advances in technology would seem to be moving countries away from traditional warfare, from major war as we know it. As the Internet and other information technologies grow in importance, we seem to be witnessing a shift towards the utilization of technologies that unleash damage on countries in novel ways, shifts to cyber war or strategic information warfare.[53] Though the specifics of these new kinds of warfare need not concern us here, it is interesting to note that as they continue to develop, the outbreak of major war will likely become even less probable.

Ultimately, the costs associated with major war have increased. However, while significant, this fact alone cannot account for the changing profitability calculations surrounding major war. One must also examine the benefits to be obtained. If the benefits have declined in conjunction with rising costs, then it is arguable that major war is no longer profitable and, thus, obsolescent. An examination of the expected economic gains from major war would seem to reveal that this is the case.

Declining Economic Gains

Throughout history, one of the primary motivating factors for engaging in war was conquest, the capturing of another state's territory and the resources it contained. As indicated above, conquest was especially profitable in landholding societies, where land was the main source of economic and political power. It was also a worthy endeavour in early trading societies where city centers became the hub of economic activity and contained

valuable assets that could be easily captured in war. However, the extent to which conquest is still a profitable endeavour in the contemporary world, such that the benefits of undertaking this activity exceed the costs, is questionable, especially for the great powers. Although the opportunity for a one-time looting remains, and is likely even more advantageous than it was in the past given the available loot, the long-term benefits associated with major war and conquest seem to be lost.[54] Ultimately, it would seem that, when dealing with wars among great powers, this endeavour is no longer beneficial for a number of reasons, including the growth of nationalism, the economic interdependence among states, and the increasingly global scale of production.

Beginning with the idea of nationalism, it would seem that as these sentiments have grown, the benefits associated with conquest have become less of a guarantee. Attacking a country with even a minor element of nationalist sentiment, which appears to be held in some form by all of the great powers, is a dangerous endeavour, as one risks ensuing political hostility on the part of the conquered.[55] Not only would the conquering states have to undergo the costs of stifling uprisings, but the energy and efficiency with which the conquered economy operates would likely be lost, leading to less than favourable results than the conquering state had hoped to achieve.[56] In this sense, rather than undertaking the risks associated with conquest, it would seem far more prudent to simply increase domestic production and continue engaging in trade with the rest of the world.

Indeed, in today's world, economic strength does not arise so much from the control of territory and resources as it does from access to global markets.[57] States now operate in a truly global economy, relying on one another for imported goods and serving as markets for one another's exports. Although such interstate trade has been occurring for centuries, the economic interdependence among states that we are witnessing today is truly unprecedented, with states' economic prosperity depending on

peaceful trading relations with other states. Possessing the strongest economies in the world, the great powers are especially dependent on these relations. In fact, it was their efforts that brought about the World Trade Organization (WTO), formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to supervise these trading relations and ensure that they proceed in an orderly manner. In this sense, to engage in war with one another and disrupt these critical relations would seem equivalent to economic suicide, boding particularly badly for their populations who rely on international trade for their well-being.[58] Thus, the loss of the significant economic gains that typically accompany global trade would seem to serve as another deterrent to the pursuit of major war.

Closely related to this, it is arguable that the significant decline in the benefits of conquest among the most highly advanced countries is due to changes in the structure of global production. Proposed by political scientist Stephen Brooks, this argument asserts that trade is being overtaken by global production as the most important integrating force in the international economy.[59] In fact, much of the trade in today's world is a by-product of the globalization of production, of the outsourcing of the production of goods and services to locations around the globe in an attempt to minimize production costs.[60] Such globalization is changing the incentives facing states and contributing to the shifting profitability of major war.

As Brooks suggests, the globalization of production has played a profound role in the transition of most modern states from economies based on land to ones based on knowledge and human capital, a fact that has greatly lowered the benefits of conquest.[61] In the post-World War II period, the globalization of production has taken off as communication and transportation technologies have allowed development, research, and management to take place in one area of the world while production occurs in another. This trend has allowed the most advanced countries of the world to

increasingly specialize in knowledge-based industries as developing countries undertake the necessary production processes. As these changes have occurred, the benefits of conquest among great powers have significantly declined. Whereas, in the past, the economic assets available to the conqueror could be easily seized, whether in the form of land, machines, etc., this is no longer the case. After all, although they can be captured, human beings and the information they possess are highly mobile and difficult to definitively acquire.

The geographic dispersion of production associated with this globalizing process has also shifted the profitability calculations surrounding major war.[62] As global firms, which are typically based in the great power countries, have been increasingly outsourcing their production to areas of the developing world, the idea of conquering a great power country has declined in appeal as such a conquest would likely only result in obtaining a small portion of the global production chain. Even until quite recently, if a state invaded a country with a particular production sector, it would possess the entire chain of production and be able to produce all of the necessary inputs for the particular good. However, to do so now would likely require conquering multiple countries. Although it may be argued that possessing even a small portion of the production chain is valuable, the point to be made here is that it is less valuable than it would have been in the past. The argument is not that there are no benefits to be obtained from one great power conquering another, but that such benefits are significantly declining.

The final point of Brooks' analysis that is worthy of note pertains to the role of foreign direct investment (FDI). Brooks points out that, in addition to the declining profitability of conquest, a substitute can be found in the form of FDI, which has become increasingly more prevalent since the Second World War. According to Brooks, FDI allows states to achieve many of the same benefits of conquest without actually undergoing any of the

costs.[63] In this sense, although not a perfect substitute, when combined with the decreasing profitability associated with conquest, it is arguable that FDI has further reduced incentives for engaging in major war.

Ultimately, it would seem that, economically speaking, the benefits to be attained from major war have declined to the point of virtual non-existence. Not only are the anticipated gains less significant, but major war would also likely disrupt the trade and foreign investment upon which the economies of these countries depend. In fact, those citizens whose livelihoods are contingent on these economic relations remaining stable can be expected to lobby against major war and in favour of great power peace. However, this is only truly possible in a democracy, the spread of which also seems to have contributed to the obsolescence of major war.

The Spread of Liberal Democracy

The spread of liberal democracy, referring to a form of democracy that embraces a market economy, juridical rights for citizens, and a government based on universal suffrage, is another factor often deemed to account for the obsolescence of major war, with many scholars noting that democratic states almost never war against one another.[64] This generalization, which is referred to as the "democratic peace," has not yet been refuted by history, and while it could be argued that it is merely a coincidence, democracies having only existed for a short amount of time, it seems unlikely that this is the case.[65] As it stands, almost all of the great powers of the international system are democratic, with China being the only exception. Thus, if the democratic peace theory continues to hold with time, this could be another way to account for the obsolescence of major war.

To be sure, there are a number of possible reasons that liberal democracies may be averse to going to war with one another and why the spread of this political system has contributed to the thesis

at hand. For one, as simplistic as it may seem, there would seem to be a set of common identities and values that pervade these societies which may make them wary of fighting one another. According to Michael Doyle, liberal democracies typically subscribe to the basic notion that "states have the right to be free from foreign intervention."[66] They have a mutual respect for one another as citizens of the world who are all deserving of the same rights. Liberal democratic societies are also characterized by norms of non-violence and, domestically, tend to avoid resorting to large-scale violence due to institutional structures for redress. As a result, it is arguable that two liberal democratic societies embracing this kind of political culture will take a similar non-violent approach when interacting with one another, choosing to use diplomatic means to solve disputes.[67] Moreover, closely tied to the idea of liberal democracy is the idea of secularism. Insofar as religious beliefs triggered many wars of the past, the official separation of church and state would seem to remove a strong motivator for violence from these states' existing arsenal.[68]

While these reasons help to account for the democratic peace, it would seem that certain institutional barriers exist within liberal democracies that may serve as a more telling indication as to why these countries are averse to engaging in war with one another.[69] Insofar as these states are characterized by universal suffrage, providing all citizens of a certain age with a direct say in who runs their country, governments require the consent of the public in order to operate legitimately. Such consent is dependent upon the government's ability to provide for the economic and social well-being of its people, an endeavour that, as evidenced in the sections above, will likely not be best served through the pursuit of war. Indeed, in the short-run, the general public bears the greatest costs of war. They are the ones whose lives are lost in battle and the ones who feel the immediate economic hardships. Even in the long-run, it is unlikely that the populace will be compensated for its strain. Thus, by empowering those who pay the highest price for such conflict, it would seem that liberal democratic states best

internalize the shifting cost-benefit analysis of major war. The gap that was presented in former societies, wherein small elites benefited from and made the decision to go to war while the general populace suffered, no longer exists in democratic states, at least in theory.

Other barriers to the pursuit of war beyond the notion of universal suffrage also exist within liberal democratic societies. Even if they are not always mindful of what the electorate desires, democratic decision-makers are often institutionally handicapped in foreign affairs. In countries like the United States, the division of powers requires war to be consented to by multiple decision-making bodies, making the decision to undertake such efforts slow and time-consuming.[70] Moreover, the transparency of public business typically displayed by liberal democracies hinders the pursuit of war as it makes surprise attacks difficult.[71] Viewed more positively, while such open communication deters major war, it also fosters a sense of trust among democratic states. Assuming the messages they deliver to their citizens align with their actual objectives, these states have a clearer sense of one another's intentions, facilitating the development of cooperative interstate relations.

Ultimately, a seemingly non-violent political culture, universal suffrage, the division of powers, and public transparency make it difficult for liberal democracies to engage in war, especially with one another. In this sense, insofar as most of the great powers fall into this category of states, it would seem that the democratic peace theory helps to account for the obsolescence of major war. However, having said this, it is important to note that while the spread of liberal democracy is a contributing factor to such obsolescence, it does not appear to be a cause in the proper sense. That is, it would seem unlikely that the spread of liberal democracy caused the shift in attitudes surrounding warfare or really contributed to the shifting profitability of such. Rather, liberal democracy is properly viewed as the political structure that

best internalizes and expresses such a changing view of major war. Similarly, international norms and institutions also seem to strengthen and provide an avenue through which these shifting attitudes can be effectively expressed.

The Development of International Norms and Institutions

The strengthening of international norms and institutions that seek to put an end to major war has been progressing for centuries. Beginning with such things as the Concert of Europe, it is arguable that these norms and institutions have managed to defray the anarchy of the international system which realists propose will lead to conflict. Closely tied to the argument that international stability is best served by the presence of a hegemon that can operate as an unofficial governmental body, realists hold that the lack of a central government to enforce rules in the international system makes war inevitable.[72] To be sure, this seemingly Hobbesian argument is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is its acceptance of war as a natural part of the human condition.[73] Nonetheless, even if this realist assertion can be accepted, existing norms and institutions to which the great powers subscribe may be able to counter the outbreak of major war.

In recent centuries, as the profitability of war has shifted, attempts to achieve international security and stability have increased. The first real development in this regard came with the League of Nations in 1919.[74] Although this attempt at collective security proved to be a failure in the lead up to the Second World War, it provided the basis for the United Nations, which serves as the closest thing to a world government that humanity currently possesses. Fostering international cooperation and discourse, the United Nations is joined by other organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the G8/G20. These organizations all work to ensure the proper functioning of the cooperative relations needed to keep war at bay.

Although these norms and institutions may not be *responsible* for the obsolescence of major war, they do serve as important checks on its outbreak, contributing to the installation of communities in which the willingness to wage war declines.[75] Violent force and coercion could be used to ensure state compliance with international norms, including those against conquest and the forceful revision of territorial borders; however, insofar as the military might of these organizations is provided by the great powers, there will always be at least a few of them who are above the rules in systems run by coercion.[76] In this sense, it would seem more effective for these institutions to create an environment where major war remains an unprofitable endeavour, fostering the three factors described above that contribute to obsolescence.

For example, many of these institutions, most notably the WTO, encourage economic interdependency and provide a positive avenue through which trading relationships can be effectively pursued and benefited from. Others encourage the liberal democratic sentiment that we are all members of the same community, all comprised of populations that have rights and responsibilities to one another on the international stage.[77] Potentially even more significant, most of these organizations provide avenues for mediation and conflict resolution outside of the scope of armed combat and facilitate the transparent processes that are required for arms reductions.[78]

Ultimately, it would seem that there is a feedback loop of sorts at play with international institutions and norms and their relationship to the obsolescence of major war. While they reflect and are a product of the shifting profitability surrounding major war, they also provide a systemic means to invoke and continually reinforce these shifts. Although not as significant as the other three factors described above in accounting for obsolescence, in many senses, these international norms and institutions provide the bedrock that allows the other three to function, serving as the

avenue which unites the great powers under a common banner and allows them to engage in the cooperative relations needed to avoid major war.

Conclusion

For the foreseeable future, conflicts among the great powers appear unlikely. Once viewed as a heroic, even inevitable, endeavour, major war has been absent for more than half a century and shifting attitudes surrounding this institution would seem to imply that it does not lurk on the horizon. War among the great powers is simply no longer a rational, profitable pursuit. However, although major war is obsolescent, it would be an error to completely discount its possibility in the future. Indeed, while major war, devastatingly expensive and minimally useful, seems unlikely right now, what the coming decades could bring is unknown.

Despite military downscaling worldwide, all states retain the capacity to fight one another. Although significant, the trends indicated above that have contributed to the shifting profitability surrounding major war are not absolute, and the cost-benefit analysis could shift in years to come. Memories of past conflicts could fade. International institutions controlled by the now-powerful United States could crumble. Democracies could transition to authoritarian systems of governance that are generally less favourable to peace. Basic resources like food and water could grow increasingly scarce and, if trade could no longer provide all states with an adequate supply, wars of conquest may once again become profitable. The development of new great powers, which have not been as influenced by the developments that have contributed to great power peace, could fundamentally alter the international system. In essence, there are countless situations that could arise in the future to overturn the thesis at hand.

And yet, as it stands, major war appears obsolescent. Major war may not be impossible, but, based on current trends, we seem to be heading toward a time when its non-occurrence will become the norm, a time when international prosperity becomes fully realized.

Notes

[1] Michael Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete?" *Survival* 40 (Winter 1998), 20.

[2] John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 5.

[3] Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete?" 20.

[4] For a thorough analysis of these and other definitions of major war, see Raimo Väyrynen, "Introduction: Contending Views," in *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates*, ed. Raimo Väyrynen (New York: Routledge, 2006), 13.

[5] Kalevi J. Holsti, "The Decline of Interstate War: Pondering Systemic Explanations," in *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates*, ed. Raimo Väyrynen (New York: Routledge, 2006), 135-37.

[6] Raimo Väyrynen, "Introduction: Contending Views," 13. The inclusion of India in this group may be open to contestation. Given its large population, accelerating economy, and possession of nuclear weapons, it arguably meets the criteria needed to be a great power. If not a great power, India is at least a rising power, soon to be included in this group of states, and its inclusion for our purposes simply subjects the validity of the given thesis to a higher standard.

[7] Joshua G. Goldstein, Jon C. Pevehouse, and Sandra Whitworth, *International Relations* (Toronto: Pearson, 2008), 66.

[8] John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 3. To be sure, in 1962, India and China waged a border war against one another, but it is arguable that they were not great powers at the time. See Väyrynen, "Introduction," 14.

[9] Evan Luard, *War in International Society* (London: I.B. Taurus, 1986), 77.

[10] Martin van Creveld, "The Waning of Major War," in *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates*, ed. Raimo Väyrynen (New York: Routledge, 2006), 102.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., 103.

[13] Ibid., 104-5.

[14] Goldstein et al., *International Relations*, 164.

[15] Robert Gilpin, "The Rise of American Hegemony," in *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-2001*, eds. Patrick Karl O'Brien and Armand Clesse (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2002), accessed January 1, 2011, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/gilpin.htm. This is referred to as "hegemonic stability theory."
[16] Goldstein et al., *International Relations*, 68.
[17] Holsti, "The Decline of Interstate War," 146.
[18] Ibid., 147.
[19] J.S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 134; Luard, *War in International Society*, chp. 2.
[20] Luard, *War in International Society*, chp. 2.
[21] Goldstein et al., *International Relations*, 36.
[22] Väyrynen, "Introduction," 15.
[23] Michael O'Hanlon, "Coming Conflicts: Interstate War in the New Millennium," *Harvard International Review* (Summer 2001): 42.
[24] See John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*.
[25] John Mueller, "Is War Still Becoming Obsolete?" (paper presented at the Annual General Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 29-September 1, 1991), 2, 13-18. According to Mueller, war is not inevitable. The argument that humans are naturally predisposed to engage in war is discredited by the fact that many countries, most notably Switzerland, have taken an entirely anti-war stance. Others have argued that, though not biologically necessary, war serves as a necessary social institution through which aggressions can be channelled, and until another device is invented to serve this function, war must continue. Viable alternatives seem to have been found in international institutions like the UN, an idea that will be examined at a later point in this paper.
[26] Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, 25.
[27] Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, 25.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid., 19.
[30] Ibid., 19-21.
[31] Mueller, "Is War Still Becoming Obsolete?" 2.
[32] Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?: A Review Essay," *International Security* 14 (Spring 1990): 45. Kaysen points to such works as Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* (Germany), Robert Graves' *Goodbye to All That* (England), Henri Barbusse's *Under Fire* (France), E. E. Cummings' *The Enormous Room* (America).
[33] Mueller, "Is War Still Becoming Obsolete?" 20.

[34] Jeffrey M. Jones, "Opposition to Iraq War Reaches New High," *Gallup*, April 24, 2008, accessed January 11, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/106783/opposition-iraq-war-reaches-new-high.aspx; ""Million" March Against Iraq War," BBC News, accessed January 11, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2765041.stm
[35] See Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*.
[36] Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?" 49-51. The points elaborated on in the rest of this paragraph and the next are all taken from these pages of Kaysen's article.
[37] Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, 7.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?" 52.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., 53.
[43] Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete?" 21.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?" 53.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Mueller, "Is War Still Becoming Obsolete?" 4.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] von Creveld, "The Waning of Major War," 98.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid., 99.
[53] Lawrence Freedman, "The Changing Forms of Military Conflict," *Survival* 40 (Winter 1998): 44-45.
[54] Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?" 54.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Väyrynen, "Introduction," 6.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Stephen G. Brooks, "The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43 (October 1999): 654.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid., 654-57. The rest of the argument outlined in this paragraph can be found on these pages of Brooks' article.
[62] Ibid., 660-663. The argument in this paragraph is outlined in greater detail on these pages.
[63] Ibid., 665-666.
[64] Goldstein et al., *International Relations*, 89.
[65] Ibid.

[66] Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer and Fall 1983): 213.
[67] William R. Thompson, "Democratic Peace and Civil Society," in *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates*, ed. Raimo Väyrynen (New York: Routledge, 2006), 215.
[68] Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete?" 23.
[69] Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete?" 57. The following argument can be found on this page of Kaysens' article.
[70] Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete?" 26.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Goldstein et al., *International Relations*, 60.
[73] See Mueller, "Is War Still Becoming Obsolete?" 13.
[74] von Creveld, "The Waning of Major War," 107.
[75] Patrick M. Morgan, "Multilateral Institutions as Restraints on Major War," *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates*, ed. Raimo Väyrynen (New York: Routledge, 2006), 160.
[76] Holsti, "The Decline of Interstate War," 142-143.
[77] Morgan, "Multilateral Institution as Restraints on Major War," 176.
[78] Ibid., 168-169.

Challenges to Police Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Naomi Phillips

The South African Police Force (SAP) played a crucial role in the apartheid system in South Africa by using violence to control people and maintain 'racial' segregation. The SAP's work required constant affronts to the dignity of black and 'coloured' or mixed race South Africans. It is estimated that during the apartheid era only ten percent of the police force was actually involved in "crime detection and investigation."[1] The centrality of police to the apartheid system meant that policing in post-apartheid South Africa required major reforms in order to support the country's democratic institutions and represent the interests of the public. In this essay I will argue that the three main challenges to the ongoing process of police reform in South Africa are police culture, emphasis on community policing and the failure of the government to maintain a commitment to the reform process. In the first section of the essay I will examine the way members of the new national police service, the South African Police Service (SAPS), view one another and their jobs. Next, I will compare the level of service afforded by different community policing frameworks. Finally, I will highlight how the South African government broke with the original vision of police reform in the late 1990s in favour of a 'war on crime.'

Police Culture: Discrimination, Short Cuts, and Nostalgia

Understanding police culture is important to understanding how police practices can differ significantly from law and official policies. In this section I will examine how police culture of the SAPS threatens the SAPS's official goals of representation, accountability, and professionalism. By detracting from the

SAPS's official goals, the culture within in the SAP compromises the organization's ability to protect the rights of South Africans. Culture within a police force includes how police rationalize their behaviour and the way they view their work and fellow police members.[2] It also includes the way police treat the people they encounter in the course of their work and the methods they use in carrying out their work.[3] Examination of police culture in the SAPS reveals that it can differ greatly from official policy.

The ability of the SAPS to represent people from different 'races' as well as gender is strongly tied to the way police view their fellow members. Through the transition process, many members have maintained the belief that 'racial' and gender differences are inherent and determine the ability of individual police officers to do police work.[4] Racial categorization by the state is still a part of public life in South Africa. The four racial categories used under apartheid, White, Asian/Indian, African and Coloured (or mixed race) continue to be used in South African public policy and law in the form of "equity legislation and programmes."[5] Sociologist Monique Marks has recorded the persistence of belief in inherent race and gender differences in her fieldwork with the Durban Public Order Police (POP) unit of the SAPS from 1996 to 2001.[6] Marks noted that members of all backgrounds used racial stereotypes and saw difference as inherent rather than socially constructed.[7] Racial stereotyping included the belief, by members of European background, that Indians lacked the courage and physical capability necessary to police work while members of African background where viewed as "warriors" who, along with whites, possessed the courage and masculinity to be successful in their jobs.[8]

In 2000, six years into the transformation process, the Durban POP continued to have few female members with the majority not working in field operations.[9] A female Inspector, who participated in field operations, identified the feeling that she must outperform men in physical challenges and the way she was never

chosen when tasks involved group work as impediments to her integration in the unit and personal fulfillment in being a POP member.[10] Another female recruit described being kept from operational work by others members, who claimed it was for "'her own safety,'" and repeatedly given the task of making tea.[11] Significantly, these obstacles to women's integration in the POP come from the culture within the police service rather than official policy.

Police culture, including the belief in inherent racial difference, has also affected the way members of different 'racial' backgrounds work together. This is evident in the interactions within the Durban POP. The platoons and companies within the unit did not 'racially' integrate until 2001.[12] The beliefs of upper level managers as well as the social preferences of POP members posed a challenge to integration. In the late 1990s, high ranking members of the Durban POP as well as rank and file members seldom socialized with co-workers who were not of the same 'racial' background.[13] This practice demonstrates that simply integrating units does not ensure that members will trust their colleagues or work efficiently together. The fact that self-segregating tendencies reached into management highlights the failure of management to lead by example in reinventing police culture. In the case of the Durban POP, management was not given diversity training to prepare for integration and "felt ill-equipped to deal with racial tensions."[14] This failure to ease the integration process suggests that both the SAPS and government policy makers could have done more to address the effect of police culture on the process of police reform.

Police culture, specifically the way police view their jobs, also affects the accountability of the SAPS. Police accountability is often discussed with reference to an independent body of oversight or as following the law rather than enforcing the interests of the government.[15] I will focus on the way police view their jobs and how this interferes with their duty to uphold the law. This is

evident in Steffen Jensen's fieldwork among the SAPS in the Cape Flats (townships of Cape Town) in the late 1990s. Jensen found that police at all four levels, including administrative officers, street patrols, the specialized Crime Prevention Unit and detectives, thought of their work as coming under one of two categories.[16] These categories were "hopeless cases" referred to as "kak cases" (shit cases) and "real police work."[17] Kak cases were those that were difficult to solve because they involved multiple parties (i.e. domestic disturbances, arguments between neighbours) or cases that were unlikely to be solved. Police avoided dealing with these cases by filing false reports that witnesses had not returned their calls.[18] Two detectives actually employed illegal means to avoid what they saw as kak cases by stamping cases as dismissed with a stolen magistrates' stamp.[19]

Similarly, in her work with the Durban POP, Marks noted examples of police who did not have a problem acting according to their interests rather than seeking to uphold the law in a timely and efficient manner. Police put off investigating a tip until their arrest statistics were low.[20] She also found some police members willing to avoid actively patrolling because they wanted to make their supervisor look bad.[21] Examples like these show how police culture informs the decisions that police make about the urgency or validity of the complaints they receive based on their personal interests. These decisions in turn affect the ability of average citizens to advocate for their own rights and access formal legal justice. The way police culture circumscribes accountability to the law is also significant given that police are very aware that most poor South Africans do not have the resources to pursue formal complaints against the police.[22]

Police culture in South Africa in the transitional period includes a tendency to be nostalgic for the old ways of policing. Nostalgia for apartheid era methods of policing within the SAPS threatens the professionalism of the organization. It has the potential to undermine new training focused on respect for the

rights of the public that members have received since the end of apartheid. Nostalgia means police often measure their current experiences against those of the past. It should be noted that some SAPS members express the sentiment that their actions under the apartheid regime were regrettable. Even so, members also explain the use of extreme force in the past on the grounds that they were responding to violence in the townships or that they did not see black people as worthy of more even handed responses.[23] The presence of nostalgia for the past does not necessarily mean that police will lapse into violent methods especially when they are adequately prepared for their tasks and given clear orders.[24] The fatal shooting of a student protestor by a member of the Durban POP at the University of Durban-Westville in May 2000 is an example of how attachment to former practices can undermine the democratization of the police. Members of the POP who responded to the protest on campus did not follow the planning and crowd assessment procedures they had been trained in and failed to don the proper protective gear.[25]

Apart from threatening the professionalism of the SAPS, memories of the past also provide a way by which members of the police service can measure the success of policing in the post apartheid era. Comparisons to the past were used to question the value of South Africa's constitutional protections of human rights. Jensen found commanders and supervisors in the Cape Flats in the late 1990s who suggested that they had been more productive prior to the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.[26] These high ranking members of the police were overt in stating that legal protections of human rights were undermining their effectiveness by allowing "'criminals to walk free'" and rendering police impotent in the face of "numerous [legal] technicalities."[27] As we will see, important figures within the South African government came to publically denounce the relationship between protecting rights and policing. This shift created a significant parallel between official discourse on policing and the strains of nostalgia and selective memory found within the SAPS.

Community Policing: Unequal Services

Challenges to police reform in South Africa extend beyond the culture of the police and the behaviour and actions of members. The nature of the institutional framework that provides police services has also affected the prospects for democratic policing in South Africa. In this section I will outline how community policing programs have posed significant challenges to the process of police reform in South Africa. Examination of the most universal of community policing programs, Community Policing Forums, suggests that these bodies have not been able to meet the expectations placed upon them early in the transition process. Yet while this somewhat universally applied form of community policing has foundered, the prominence and legitimacy given to the idea of community policing has contributed to the establishment of unequal police services in different neighbourhoods. This is evident in the contrast between Cape Town's Community Improvement Districts (CIDs) and a street committee in the Guguletu township (within in the municipality of Cape Town).[28]

In the transition from apartheid, community policing was seen as a way to improve the relationship between police and the public and to ensure that the police represent the interests of the public in their daily work.[29] The central role envisioned for community policing in dealing with crime in the newly democratized South Africa is underscored by in the inclusion of articles concerning community policing in South Africa's Constitution, *Police Act* and in the SAPS's Strategic Plan.[30] In 1996, the SAPS handbook described community policing as an "equal partnership between the police and the public through which crime and community safety issues can be jointly determined and solutions designed and implemented."[31] What community policing means for different South African communities is especially important for understanding police reform in South Africa given that "community oriented policing" was the basis of official policy in the democratization process.[32]

The most tangible and universal expression of community policing was the creation of constitutionally mandated Community Policing Forums (CPFs).[33] By 1997, CPFs had been established at all but approximately twenty-one of South Africa's 1221 police stations.[34] The state and police emphasis placed on CPFs has been criticized on the grounds that focus on CPF meetings has taken place without the effort to ensure that community policing ideals of public consultation and accountability to the public are incorporated in all aspects of police work.[35] The CPF's have had limited successes and their achievements are often tied to the income level of the community they serve. Ted Legget suggests the CPFs have been most effective in well to do neighbourhoods where people have the "time and resources to empower the police."[36] CPFs have not been as effectual in rural or poor neighbourhoods.[37]

Generally, the effectiveness of CPFs has also been hampered by police members who seek to use them for gathering intelligence and power struggles within neighbourhoods over who will speak for the community.[38] The problem of conflict over who should speak for the community was compounded in Cape Town in the late 1990s where there were few bodies other than the CPF that allowed for individuals to bring their concerns to the state.[39] Concerns raised in CPFs might extend beyond the purview of the police to "street lighting or poor road maintenance" but municipalities were not constitutionally required to be involved in the CPF.[40] The broad range of concerns presented and the inability of the police to resolve them meant both police and the public became frustrated with the CPF model.[41] In the late 1990s both state and police commitment to CPFs waned. At this time, new legislation curbed the powers CPFs had been granted to hold police accountable and limited their function to consultation.[42] In this period, police involvement in CPFs in both affluent neighbourhoods and townships also declined.[43]

The waning of the powers and emphasis placed on CPFs has not been accompanied by a decline in the formal recognition given to 'community policing' initiatives. The ambiguity of the concept of community policing has also meant that a variety of bodies and approaches to policing are categorized as community policing.[44] This is evident in the contrast between Community Improvement Districts (CIDs) and street committees in Cape Town.[45] CIDs are public-private partnerships that provided services within a designated area. Property owners within these areas are required to pay a levy to the municipality with the funds then being administered by a non-profit organization.[46] CIDs are guaranteed a minimum level of services; if services fall below these levels the CID can supplement or provide these services and then charge the municipality the difference.[47] This system means that business owners in CIDs benefit from both publicly and privately funded police and security services. The public-private aspect of the CID arrangement as well as the guaranteed level of service means private security services are given the same legitimacy as the public police force. This raises concerns around accountability as well as the potential for heightened security presence in the CIDs causing crime displacement to areas outside the CID.[48] Cape Town's city council has effectively prohibited CIDs in residential areas and the expense of an added levy means they are not an option for business owners in townships.[49]

Street committees in the Cape Town township of Guguletu stand in stark contrast to the city's CIDs but they also come under the umbrella of 'community policing.'[50] Street committees date to before the mid-1970s and were developed to deal with the lack of policing that met the needs of township neighbourhoods. Their continued existence points to ongoing disparity in the distribution of policing resources in poor black and coloured neighbourhoods compared to more affluent areas, like the CIDs, that benefit from using public funds for private security work.[51] In Guguletu, street committees act like a court for a cluster of streets and deal with "theft, property damage, physical assaults, child welfare concerns

and contractual disagreements." [52] Police are left out of the process as complaints are taken directly to members of the committee.[53] Potential advantages to the street committee system include an emphasis on restorative justice and cultural values and the high level of human rights training that committee members have received from NGOs.[54] Nevertheless, street committees, like Cape Town's CIDs, raise issues around accountability and equality before the law within South Africa's community policing framework. Under each type of community policing, residents find ways to address crime. However, Cape Town's business districts and the city's townships are not receiving equal benefit from a democratic and professional police force.

Street committees operate without the financial resources of the state funded criminal justice system. In Guguletu, the street committees do not receive financial support from the government, corporations or the community.[55] This lack of resources affects the consistency of committee decisions as they often have to cancel meetings if they cannot secure a meeting place.[56] Moreover, the investment of time in the meeting process can be a considerable burden on those who keep them operating as their 'spare' time is restricted by working and commuting.[57] Township residents involved with street committees do not wish to see a "state monopoly on crime control;" however, they do ask that the SAPS increase staff and resources in their neighbourhoods.[58] This would address the history of consolidating police resources, like station houses, in white neighbourhoods. Moreover, increasing police resources in townships could potentially bring the service levels in these neighbourhoods closer to the contemporary consolidation of public and private police and security services enjoyed by property owners in affluent areas like Cape Town's CIDs.

Government Position on Policing: From Reform to the War on Crime

As we have seen with the restriction of CPFs' powers to hold police accountable, police reform policies have changed over time. In the late 1990s shifts in official discourse and a new law that broadly defined criminality show that incoming government officials did not have the same commitment to protecting human rights as those involved at the outset of the transition process. In 1996, the first National Police Commissioner of the SAPS, J.G. Fivaz, described the goal of police as emphasizing key aspects of democratization. Accordingly, police were to become a:

> professional, representative, efficient and effective, impartial, transparent and accountable service ...[which] upholds and protects the fundamental rights of all people, and which carries out its mission in consultation and co-operation with the needs of the community.[59]

However, in 1999, Steve Tshwete became Minister of Safety and Security and gave voice to a very different expectation of how the police must act. Tshwete's view of how police should treat suspects is clear in what is by no means an isolated statement on his part:

> Criminals must know the South African state possesses the authority, moral and political, to ensure by all means, constitutional or unconstitutional that the people of this country are not deprived of their human rights.[60]

Tshwete's approach to suspects and legal protections for human rights echoed the views of police who maintained the memory of being more effective prior to 1994. Police who felt vilified and left impotent by the post-1994 reforms felt vindicated by Tshwete.[61]

The SAPS website credits Tshwete with improving police morale and "improving their capacity to deal with crime." It also includes a page paying tribute to Tshwete who died in 2002.[62] Marks, Shearing and Wood note that Tshwete alone was not responsible for "the remilitarization of police discourse," but rather it was subsequent police ministers and commissioners and their emphasis on cordon and search operations and increasing arrests.[63]

The shift in government policy from police reform to a war on crime is very evident in the introduction of the *Prevention of Organized Crime Act, 1998*. This legislation makes no distinction between organized crime and street gangs.[64] It also allows for a broad definition of criminality. Under this act police do not need to prove suspects have broken the law. Instead individuals can be arrested and prosecuted for association with particular organizations. According to the act, a "gangster" or criminal can be identified based on the information of a parent or "'reliable informant;'" their place of residence; style of dress and appearance; history of arrests and associations; or through physical evidence.[65] This broad definition of criminality means "poor, young coloured men," who are commonly stereotyped as belonging to street gangs, are at risk of being targeted on the basis of where they live, how they dress and the colour of their skin.[66] *The Prevention of Organized Crime Act, 1998* and stereotypes that collapse distinctions between youth culture and criminal activity both draw on physical appearance and personal associations to identify criminal offenders. It is clear this piece of legislation leaves township residents vulnerable to arrests based on how they look and who they know.[67]

Moreover, enforcing the use of stereotyped knowledge in making arrests through state legislation is likely to help reproduce the stereotyped knowledge of inherent racial and gender difference that is already persistent in police culture. The way this act expands the legal definition of who is a legitimate target for arrest in combination with Tshwete's statements about criminals and

human rights is highly significant to the way police are likely to approach their work and treat the people they encounter. Instead of being required to support the human rights of all South Africans, police are given the message that criminals, defined by race and class, do not have rights and that the police can and should be selective in the attention they pay to the Constitution. Analysis of the wide social impact of South Africa's war on crime as well as the questions of who supports this approach and its likely outcomes is extremely important to understanding the prospects for democratic policing in South Africa; however, these topics are beyond the scope of this paper.

Conclusion

Police culture, the framework of community policing and the government's break with the original vision of police reform all present major challenges to police reform in South Africa. The significance of these challenges is heightened by the complex ways in which they are intertwined. Police culture can prevent police practice from following official policy or slow the implementation of policy as is the case with racial integration and gender representation in the SAPS. If South African police culture were more attuned to upholding the Constitution, rather than following personal rationalizations or the demands of the government of the day, the SAPS would be in a better position to stay on track with police reform in the face of a dramatic shift in the government's approach to policing.

Similarly, the shape that community policing takes is tied to the government's stance on crime as well as police culture. The shift to a 'war on crime' approach to policing supports the privatization of security services manifest in cases like Cape Town's CIDs. The tactics employed in fighting crime support the differentiation of treatment for affluent profit generating business districts and poor areas deemed to harbour criminals. When residents in areas, like Guguletu, ask for increased police presence

in their neighbourhoods they are not asking to be treated according to stereotypes or to have their complaints buried in an 'unresolved' file. This kind of treatment underscores the profound effects of police culture and government policy on the prospects for poor neighbourhoods to realize their aspirations for policing that reflects their needs.

On a more optimistic note, community organizations can make significant contributions to the resiliency of police reform in South Africa. Scholars have noted that the SAPS should expand 'lateral entry' of civilians formerly involved in NGO work and civil society organizing into the police service especially at a managerial level. [68] This is a way to combat the reproduction of discrimination and racial and gender stereotyping within police culture and make police more cognizant of their responsibility to uphold the Constitution. This approach also has the potential to make police more responsive to community needs without perpetuating the community policing model that requires communities with few material resources to police themselves. Maintaining the status quo of prejudice in police culture with little emphasis on accountability in combination with privatized community policing and a lack of government commitment to police reform amounts to 'poor justice for poor people' rather than a democratized police service.[69]

Notes

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[4] Monique Marks, "Looking Different, Acting Different: Struggles for Equality within the South African Police Service," *Public Administration* 86, no. 3 (Sept. 2008): 654.

[5] Marks, "Looking Different, Acting Different," 644-46.

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[8] Ibid., 653-654.
[9] Ibid., 648.
[10] Ibid., 649.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., 652.
[13] Ibid., 653.
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[17] Ibid., 131.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Marks, *Transforming the Robocops*, 164.
[21] Ibid., 204.
[22] Ibid., 248.
[23] Ibid., 150.
[24] Ibid., 152, 155.
[25] Ibid., 161-162.
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[27] Ibid., 135, 133.
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Gendercide and the Bosnian War

Joshua Kepkay

Ethnocentrism is the fuel of ethnic conflict, as it can lead to wars where military strategies quickly become extremist. People become divided by nationality, causing them to believe that ethnicity is linked to social privilege; class privilege is mistaken as the state's intentional social and economic oppression of poor ethnic groups. Such misrecognition sparked explosions of gendered extremism during the Bosnian war genocide. The territorial unit of the former Yugoslavia, embedded with cultural acrimony and patriarchalism. It became a politicized male space where women's bodies represented territory to conquered by means of rape. The genocidal rape of non-Serb women and the mass murders of non-Serb men constituted a "gendercide" committed against non-Serbs within Bosnia and Herzegovina; men and women suffered differently at the hands of the Serbs intending to emasculate, terrorize, and weaken states of whom they sought to control. The gendering of this conflict arose from Slobodan Milosevic's political opportunism, which he predicated on mythic ancient ethnic hatreds, and the patriarchal masculinity embedded within Balkan culture.[1]

Slobodan Milosevic and Ethnic Cleansing

The late Slobodan Milosevic, ex-president of Serbia, is the personification of Balkan patriarchy. His war crimes reflect a patriarchal masculinity that equates male power with domination and devaluation of the feminine and feminized "others." Rising to power on an ultranationalist platform, Milosevic cited Serbian supremacy over all other Balkan ethnic groups. He paired his extreme right ideologies with the skilled demagoguery of a charismatic leader. By speaking of a Greater Serbia that would emerge through the seizure and cleansing of territory, he garnered

the approval necessary to commence an "ethnic cleanse" within the Balkans. Before Milosevic's rekindling of the "ancient hatred" between Bosniak Muslims and Serbs, those residing in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been content in a relatively peaceful multicultural state for many years. Milosevic's nationalist campaign, however, inspired hostility towards non-Serbs by constructing a distinctive Serbian identity to encapsulating the nation through what Satzewich puts forth as the foundations of ethnic identity.[2] Urging Serbs to rise up and claim class privilege, the ultranationalist campaign rests on employing race as a category for designing difference.[3] Describing the Balkans as the historical territory of Serbs, Milosevic ordained that Serbia ought to reclaim them. On the anniversary of Serbia's 1389 defeat by the Ottoman Empire, he symbolically invoked Serbian history in a speech directed at Serbs all across Europe proclaiming: "Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet."[4] Recreating the Serbian ethnicity through his charismatic leadership, extreme right ideology, and a claim to territory, Milosevic's invocation of history, nationalism, and racial privilege served a powerfully effective justification for war.

He shares traits similar to those of past charismatic leaders such as Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin; however, he is perhaps more admirable (or despicable) depending on the value one places on honesty. To gain the territory of other Balkan states, Milosevic wrote ethnic cleansing into official policy allowing him to effectively propagate genocide; Hitler was more secretive in his genocidal campaign. The gendered genocide of the Bosnian war can be seen as a battle between a patriarchal, nationalist leadership and a threatened body of women.[5] Milosevic's mandate provided Serb citizens, military, and paramilitary forces with the rationale to justify the raping of women, the pillaging of their nation, and the murder of their men as a means to secure economic redistribution that would favor those of Serbian ethnic background. Allen describes the Serb policy of genocidal rape as follows:

1. The policy is aimed at the destruction of a people.
2. The best way to achieve this goal is to attack the women and children.
3. Rape is the ideal means to this destruction.
4. Rape is used as a torture preceding death and is used on males as well as females regardless of age.
5. Enforced pregnancy and eventual child birth.
6. Enforced pregnancy negating all cultural identifications of victims, reducing victims to sexual containers.
7. Three forms of genocidal rape
    a. Publicly
    b. Within concentration camps
    c. Within rape/death camps[6]

Rape Warfare and Gendercide

In order to engage in a proper discourse of genocidal rape during the Bosnian war it is essential that we clarify the difference between rape warfare and peacetime rape. Lene Hansen distinguishes the former as a collective threat to a nation and the later as an individual risk. Raping of an individual is predisposed by the victim's sexual features rather than their ethnicity.[7] Moreover, wartime rape lacks the sexual connotations that surround the rape of an individual since it is perpetrated in the name of a nation, religion, or an ethnicity. In the Bosnian War, bodies became gendered and sexed, as non-Serb men were perceived to pose a military and sexual threat to Serb dominance; women were recognized as national territory and sexual container to be conquered and colonized.

Mary Hawkesworth explains that the genocidal rape that transpired during the Serbian incursion in Bosnia was strategically employed to achieve psychological and military objectives; raping Muslim women functioned to demoralize Bosnian men and to dehumanize the women. Women's bodies were regarded as an arena for political contestation and thus dehumanized, politicized,

and perceived as male space.[8] The patriarchal construction of women as political male space suggests that women are objects and their bodies a battlefield in a contest between rival males. Warfare becomes a contest of masculinity where the penis is weaponized and males fight to emasculate opponents by invading the bodies of their nation's women. The ethnic gene pool is thus contaminated by the appropriation and colonizing the nation's female bodies. This is because, in patriarchy, the inability to protect one's woman and to control her sexual and procreative powers is recognized as weakness in men.[9]

Michael Kimmel's four rules of manhood state that femininity in any way, shape, or form invalidates masculinity.[10] By this logic, raping a mass of ethnic women emasculates the men and feminizes the entire ethnicity, effectively weakening it beyond reconciliation. Milosevic used such societal norms and values to weaken enemy nations in his conquest of the Balkans. Non-Serb men were humiliated and weakened because they failed to be reliable protectors when confronted by Serbs. They were unable to maintain the dominance and control of women that patriarchy commands. It becomes clear that patriarchy is inherently homosocial as it concerns men and what goes on amongst them, pitting them one against one an "other" in a struggle for power, control, and domination. Misogyny and the oppression of women may be an important part of patriarchy but it is not the purpose.[11] The goal of patriarchy is to maintain (male) privilege and control of "others." Balkan patriarchy adopts genocidal rape as a tool to eradicate or at least subordinate the "other." Eradication in the Bosnian war lies at the nexus of ethnicity and gender where a man's failure to fulfill his gender role is a reflection on his ethnic group.[12]

The Three Forms of Genocidal Rape

Allen describes the three forms of genocidal rape that Milosevic incorporated in his attempts to ethnically cleanse

territory. They were part of a three-pronged approach to remove the Muslims and Croatians residing in Bosnia. First, militias (such as the Chetniks or other irregular Serb forces) would enter a village belonging to Bosnian-Herzegovina or Croatia and violently rape the non-Serb women in public. Soon, the whole village would hear news of the rape, which effectively humiliates Muslim and Croatian men who were powerless to protect "their" women. The women become scared, worrying that they may be raped too, and then official Serbian soldiers enter the village offering safe passage out of the village if villagers promise never to return. The largely unarmed villagers usually accept their coerced emigration that renders them stateless refugees. The second part of the Serbs rape campaign is to capture enemy women and confine them to concentration camps where they are raped at random. This is a method of torture preceding death. The last, and perhaps the most paradoxical, form of "ethnic cleansing" involves Serb forces arresting and imprisoning non-Serb women only to continually rape them until impregnation. Prisoners are held and subjected to physical and psychological torture until their forced pregnancy has progressed past any stage of safe abortion. The women who survive this brutal torture are later set free to have Serbian babies, their bodies having been successfully colonized in the eyes of Serbs.[13]

The first of the two forms of genocidal rape Allen describes can be understood as war tactics of humiliation. Target populations are intimidated or exterminated, but the third form (enforced pregnancy) is perplexing, as the policy misunderstands eugenics. Improving the genetic composition of Bosnia's population is sought through the extermination of what Milosevic saw as "undesired" ethnic groups. The murders were as strategically sound as they were evil because less non-Serbs would strengthen the numbers of the Serbs for political purposes, but forced impregnation fails to serve the same purpose. Forced impregnation is premised on the misconception that the victims lack any identification other than sex. Females are recognized only as empty

vessels or sexual containers. In reality, the resulting child will only be half Serbian. More importantly, if the mother decides to raise the, she will certainly not socialize it to a Serbian nationality, preventing the child from learning any allegiance to Serbia in the primary institution of socialization, family. Serbian policies of forced impregnation can only function if their torture methods effectively brainwash victims, robbing them of their national and religious attachments. Thus, the logical explanation behind forced impregnation is that the victims, who survive the rape as well as the resulting children, serve only as a lasting symbol of the nation's defeat and feminization and nothing else.[14]

Rape is equated with the immediate conquest of the women through penetration, conquest of the men, insofar as the women are regarded as objects owned by the men, and the entire nation because women's bodies (in patriarchy) correspond to the ethnic group's national territory. In a speech to the UN Security Council on 24 August 1993, Bosnian Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey graphically illustrated the Bosnian crisis through symbolism arguing that:

> Bosnia and Herzegovina is being gang raped. . . . I do not lightly apply the analogy of a gang rape to the plight of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we know, systematic rape has been one of the weapons of this aggression against the Bosnian women in particular.[15]

In the past rape was thought of as "normal" behavior in warfare because testosterone and male sex drives were perceived as primal needs that required satisfaction. It was commonly accepted that men had to rape enemy women after a battle to satisfy sexual "needs."[16] Today, it seems obvious that this "need" is not of a sexual nature, but of violence and power. Gang raping the enemy nation is a strategy through which to gain power and control through sexual conquest.

NATO officials within the international community claim that rape used as weaponry is a traditional element of Balkan warfare. They argue that since wartime rape is a part of Balkan warfare, it may not be used as grounds for foreign humanitarian intervention.[17] Considering the fact that all of the nationalities residing within the Balkans have raped their enemies during war, this may be true. Unfortunately, the U.N. Peacekeepers furthered the atrocities committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. One Bosnian Serb commander of a concentration camp testified that U.N. soldiers often visited his camp for food and drinks, to watch television, and for the girls too.[18] U.N. soldiers of Canadian, French, New Zealanders, Ukrainian, and African nationalities have been identified as having occupied the camps for likely the same reasons. When one U.N. commander was questioned about his visits to the camp he struggled to maintain a plausible answer. Beginning with a complete denial of having ever attended any such place, his story began to deteriorate until, after being met with evidence, the commander spontaneously recollected being there for what he said were "official U.N. reasons" that certainly had nothing to do with rape.[19] The participation of soldiers not originating or trained within the Balkans falsifies NATO's insinuation that the rape of prisoners by soldiers is exclusive to Balkan culture.

What makes the Bosnian war different is that the Serbs are the only people to have written a mandate of genocidal rape into state policy. By writing rape into policy, Milosevic provided the ethnic cleanse with an air of legitimacy on which reluctant NATO officials capitalized. Officials defended their disregard for the victims by claiming that could not intervene in the Bosnian war because to do so would be culturally insensitive. According to them, rape warfare is part of Balkan culture[20] and thus protected under the cultural difference defense; they claim that Balkan wars are wars of rape, while Western wars are not. These racist assertions of NATO officials have since fallen in light of evidence the exposes scandals of Peacekeepers raping Bosnian women.[21]

This indicates that U.N. personnel aim to demonstrate masculinity and dominance through sexual conquest and that patriarchy remains a prevalent issue within western institutions; women's bodies remain recognized primarily as male-space by a diverse group of men, not Balkan soldiers exclusively.

However, using rape as weaponry may not be as easy as once thought when the aggressing soldiers know they are violating basic human rights. Survivors of the Serb rape camps report that some Serb soldiers were unable to achieve an erection when commanded to rape by their superiors.[22] Soldiers who were unable or unwilling to perform were ordered to rape the prisoners or be subject to punishment. Survivors divulge that soldiers were forced to "short-circuit" of any ethical or moral barriers they might hold through viagra usage in combination with illicit drugs and pornographic materials.[23] In other instances soldiers used objects to rape and sodomize their prisoners. Threatened with their own death, Serb soldiers may have themselves experienced a gendered abuse of human rights. A policy that calls for the rape of enemy women as a means of national conquest creates the perception that raping women part of being a soldier and a man. When particular men are reluctant to violate their neighbours, their manhood is brought into question and with it the manhood of their nation. As such, the forced rape and impregnation of women illustrates how men and women suffered differently due to hegemonic conceptions of gender that construct men are to be aggressive, violent, and unemotional dominant protectors of a nation, one of which women are the body in their duties as primary caregivers.

Despite the atrocious human rights violations committed during the Bosnian war, gender-selective mass killing is commonplace in human conflict. While Bosnians were evacuating the cities and towns that surrendered to the Serbs, militia divided men from women and adults from children; they lined up the men and conducted mass executions.[24] The slaughter of the target population's battle-age men frees the aggressor from the concern

that subsequent generations will claim their revenge in the near future.[25] The Serbs did not adopt a "root and branch" extermination where the target population gets murdered as a whole in systematic fashion; however, this may have been the ultimate goal with eradication of non-Serb males serving only as a prelude murder of females.[26] Dating back to antiquity patriarchy is manifest in the domination of men over women as well as men over "other" men whose difference is constructed as feminine, whose lack ethnic ties to the aggressing group as a threat to hegemony.[27] Historically, men who defended their land were killed; those who were spared were forced into slavery along with the women and children. In many cases, the men were also castrated leading to a further marginalization of their ethnic group.[28] No longer a sexual threat, the inapt mates serve only as a symbol of their people's feminization.

Reluctant Humanitarians

The Western world (with exception to the U.N.) remained completely oblivious to the genocide befalling Bosnia and Herzegovina until journalist Roy Gutman brought the story to the forefront of media in 1992.[29] Croatian media subsequently provided video footage of Serb militia shelling villages and towns which shocked and appalled Westerners and the plight of Bosnik Muslim women became the center of media focus. What was left in the background, out of focus, was the male suffering. Feminist scholars write the bulk of academia surrounding rape warfare and gender and this may inadvertently lead to the absence of men and male on male rape.[30] The media, too, is guilty of overlooking the situation of men. Men are supposed to be tough, consequently, their suffering is considered less valid in the eyes of the public, whereas the raping of women inspires outrage because women are perceived as weak and vulnerable. Women are thought to require protection whereas men are not, thus, the genocide committed against Bosniak Muslims was not a "femicide" but rather a "gendercide,"[31] as Non-Serb men and women received distinct

abuses at the hands of Serbs by virtue of their gender specific social roles. Non-Serb men were raped with foreign objects to humiliate them and their nation before they, the emasculated soldiers, were killed and the women raped and impregnated to figuratively claim the nation's body. Serb forces executed this gendercidal murdering of masses of battle-age men in addition to raping thousands of women. Such represents the patriarchal dominance of Serb men over all "others."

The gendercide befalling Bosnia-Herzegovina went on for months before the crisis was given any attention from the United Nations. Allen shames the U.N. in her analysis of the Bosnian war where she gets "the impression that Europe is testing the limits of suffering" (12). Only when Western media released video footage taken by the Croatian media did the U.N. Security Council begin to feel sufficient pressure to make a humanitarian intervention. Up until the expressed outrage, the international organizations embraced a realist stance towards state security and reasoned that they were unable to contribute support to the Bosniak Muslims, as it did not serve the interests of the powerful member countries.[32] They avoided involvement by deeming the Bosnian crisis a civil war in which humanitarian intervention would not equal sound foreign policy. In reality, the U.N. had the authority and the moral duty to intervene because genocide falls contrary to Article II of the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and because rape is against international humanitarian law.[33] Bosnians were being persecuted on the basis of gender and ethnicity while the decision makers on the Security Council paid little regard. Human rights intervention, for them, is not sound policy when there is no potential for monetary gain.

When press coverage of the atrocity had sparked enough public outrage for the U.N. to get involved it was too late. Milosevic's campaign of genocidal rape had already crossed many borders of territories and inhumanity. Thousands upon thousands of Croatian and Bosniak Muslim women had been raped,

impregnated, or killed and the men had been sodomized preceding their extermination. One Serb militiaman put it well when he told his female prisoner: "You may have got your country but it will be a land full of widows."[34]

The U.N. proved itself to be an intergovernmental organization with foreign policy reflecting the preferences of an elite group of state leaders during the Bosnian war. The decisions of an international organization should exemplify the preferences of the majority of people it represents, not the powerful few. It took mass media to catalyze global democracy in order to end the suffering of Bosniak Muslims during the Bosnian war. The problem is that it was too late for many men and women. The solution is to establish a check on foreign policy. Political bodies (domestic and international) must work together to establish a democratic dialogue; they must look to the grassroots of which they represent as well as to the non-governmental organizations to determine the best course of action. International relations will only have an outspoken effect on wars once global polities have moved towards intergovernmental organization within a substantive global democracy where the media is not the only source of pressure for action. Media is not reliable as the only check on international governance as it too can be biased towards maintaining the status quo and towards other corporate profit-seeking interests.

The Aftermath

The Dayton Agreements marked the official end of the Bosnian war, but not the end of the Serbian genocidal campaigns. Leaders of the Bosnian Serbs were indicted on international war crimes and genocide charges, but Milosevic managed to continue waging his war on the Balkans in Kosovo. He was eventually stopped by NATO and brought to The Hague face similar charges of grave Geneva Convention violations.[35] Throughout the late 1990s to the mid 2000s, war criminals such as Slobodan Milosevic,

Radislav Krstic, Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, Zoran Vukovic, and various other Bosnian Serb fighters were indicted, apprehended, and brought to trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).[36] They were charged with an array of crimes such as mass rape, genocide, and forced prostitution.[37] The trials were riddled with witnesses and victims from rape camps giving testimonies recalling rapes, tortures, forced impregnation, enslavement, and forced prostitution. Victims testified behind blinds with their voices altered, but in the courtroom they face and must identify their tormentors. Many rape victims refused to testify and others could not be contacted.[38] They had been conquered and humiliated, causing the numbers willing to relive the atrocity in a public forum to be few and far between.

The strength of the women who survived and forced themselves to testify against their tormentors, despite the inhumane physical and psychological torture they endured, helped bring justice to victims everywhere. Many remain upset, they feel robbed of justice because Milosevic was never officially sentenced for his crimes in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, though he did not die a free man. He died in custody on March 11, 2006 of cardiac arrest before any convictions were reached.[39] Perhaps the primary instigator of the Serb hostilities did escape his earthly punishments, but the same cannot be said of his accomplices. The ICTY announced numerous sentences for war crimes and Judges set new precedents designed to protect women from future injustices.

It has been more than a decade since the Bosnian war reminded people around the world of the human capacity for evil. International organizations have learned from this crisis and have tried many Serb politicians and military leaders, however, the memory still haunts survivors and international institutions maintain a democratic deficit. International law has been rewritten accordingly to add protection for women but we must remain critical of these laws. They may only be new renditions of the “add

women and stir" method of writing women's policy.[40] The Fourth Geneva Conventions already had provisions for protection of women against rape in humanitarian law.[41] Is the ICTY adding the same excerpt into another law book or is this the true defining law of women's protection? Judges may have the authority to rewrite laws to include gender, but the power to enforce those laws lies in a bureaucracy that is often ruled by elites who operate by their own agendas; the status quo remains secure.

The Bosnian war is a dark chapter in world history. Not only did it see a monster rise to great power, it bore witness to an organization, which by definition claims to serve humanitarian interests, ignore the plight of a plurality of nations. The nationalist Serbians made Slobodan Milosevic powerful and he propagated their "rightful" privilege, rallying them to claim it. Pathologically, he convinced himself and his countrymen that the other Balkan ethnic groups had undercut them throughout history. Milosevic was a patriarchal dictator peddling majoritarianism and colonialism to Serbs throughout the Balkans, claiming that they would in engage in a "cleansing" of the lands and emerge as the Greater Serbia that they ought to be. Serbian incursion into Bosnia-Herzegovina achieved psychological as well as military objectives. These nations were humiliated and thus weakened internationally by the Serbian gendercide, which emasculated men by violating the bodies of their mothers, sisters, and daughters as well as through the extermination of men and seizure of territory.

Humiliation can be extended to the United Nations as well, but not by the hand of Milosevic. The UN embarrassed itself and its member nations in its failure to remedy the Bosnian crisis; Western societies thought the lack of humanitarian intervention outrageous and deplorable. Media capitalized on their discovery of the U.N.'s negligence and transmitted the public opinion to governments who began to move on the issue. Although less than humanitarian interests may have motivated the media, they did effectively catalyze the international organizations' response the

genocide occurring in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere.[42] However, the U.N.'s embarrassment does not stop with their lack of stamina in foreign policy; peacekeepers furthered the humiliation when media exposed their illicit visits to the Serb rape camps.[43] Intergovernmental organizations certainly demonstrated their need for reform during the Bosnian war.

Conclusion

Ethnicity and gender were allowed exist as legitimate political reasons for murder and rape during the Bosnian war when international organizations decided to stand idly by as Milosevic legislated gender specific violations of the Geneva Code against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following through to commit these many atrocious mass murders of men and forced impregnations of women, supporters of Milosevic's ethnic cleansing agenda were largely successful in the Bosnian gendercide. Enemy non-Serb men within Bosnia and Herzegovina were feminized and the bodies of women were rendered a politicized male space. Political opportunism and patriarchal masculinity are connected as they intertwine to form the roots of the Bosnian war. Patriarchal manhood requires men to associate domination with power and privilege. What Milosevic did was provide a difference-based justification to unite Serbs against non-Serbs so that they might exert control over women and men lacking immediate ties to Serbia. Non-Serbs were feminized by their inability to protect and control their women. The rules of masculinity had been broken and the consequence was eradication. The consequences that follow this tragedy are debatable, but fortunately the U.N. and NATO did react somewhat faster to the subsequent crisis in Kosovo. International humanitarian law is updated and the criminals convicted and sentenced; the Dayton Agreements have brought peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina for the time being. Resolutions emerging from aftermath of the Bosnian war are now up against the test of time and, hopefully, patriarchy in the Balkans (and elsewhere) continues to dissolve, bringing contemporary society

slowly towards the understanding societies modeled on domination are less stable than multicultural ones based on partnership and mutual recognition.

Notes

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Canadians Say “Play Fair” to the United States

Simone Fattouche

The international economic crisis of the 1980’s marked the beginning of a new era in the global economy. Governments, who had been previously unable to protect their nation’s economies, began to discuss new and profound policies such as free trade. The concept of free trade, combined with new ideologies, created a new sense of what it meant to be sovereign, and secure.[1] In addition, national interests began to be discussed in the context of global aspirations. These global aspirations, although positive for many, also sparked questions and concern pertaining to the security of the state, as free trade began to challenge notions of boundaries.[2] As a defense mechanism, when states felt threatened they had the option to prohibit lucrative options, which favoured private and foreign interests.[3]

These changing paradigms and interests were all justified in the name of a misplaced patriotism. With the concept of patriotism in mind, one of the events in American history that has shaped the hearts and minds of Americans and American foreign policy alike was the War in Iraq in 2003. When countries such as Canada said “NO!” to entering the war, it was seen as the ultimate foreign policy initiative, which aligned with Canada’s national interest. As a result, when the discussion about reconstruction projects in Iraq came about in late 2003, it was made very clear by the Bush administration that Canadian companies would have no part in the primary bidding process for reconstruction projects of Iraqi infrastructure.[4] Their reasoning was that as a matter of “national security”, they must protect American national interest by denying these “private and foreign interests” as a way of securitizing the nation. Many Canadians refuted this claim, including Prime Minister Paul Martin, as a violation of international law, while

others felt that the American claim to national security was completely legitimate, based on the fact that American foreign policy must be taken into consideration.

The question I seek to answer in this paper is whether the U.S. rejection of Canadian companies bidding in the Iraqi infrastructure reconstruction process was a violation of international law? I will argue that based on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) article 1105 of Chapter 11, which requires all NAFTA governments to live up to the standards of "fair and equitable treatment of investment", the denial of equitable access to industry can in fact be seen as a violation of international law.[5] Accordingly, I will begin with a brief discussion of NAFTA under which I will seek to analyze this chapter and article, which will aid in the process of understanding why the rejection of Canadian companies from the reconstruction projects in Iraq were a violation of international law. I will then provide the alternative perspective as seen by Rosalyn Higgins and the New Haven Approach, argue that international law is a policy process, and that states should use it to protect policy initiatives. Finally, I will seek to reject this notion proposed by The New Haven Approach, by analyzing a case within NAFTA, and demonstrating that decisions in everyday legal cases do not necessarily account for this policy protection.

Canada's involvement in NAFTA has always been controversial. As argued in the article No to NAFTA Canada's desire to be involved in NAFTA was about more than the idea of "free-trade"; it was about gaining a mechanism to protect Canadian exporters from measures that would block their access to the American market.[6] These Canadian exporters are given the name "investors" under NAFTA. It is important to keep in mind that "investors" in NAFTA refer to individuals such as corporations, as opposed to only states as dictated in the World Trade Organization.[7] As such, it was necessary that to enable this concept of free trade, these investors must be protected. This protection

was largely unattainable until the creation of Chapter 11 in NAFTA, in 1994.

Under Chapter 11, investors have the right to take NAFTA member states to arbitration for compensation when actions taken by those member states have adversely affected their investments.[8] In addition, there are three mechanisms outside of NAFTA? that allow investors to seek recourse against member states: the World Bank International Centre for the Settlement of Investor Disputes, The Rules of the United Nations Commission for the International Trade Law, and the member states' domestic courts.[9] These courts seek to remove impunity from states, and allow for the settlement of investment disputes that will ensure equal treatment and due process before an impartial tribunal under Chapter 11.[10]

Within this chapter, there exist three sections. The scope of this paper will focus explicitly on Section A, specifically article 1105. Article 1105, according to Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "assures a minimum absolute standard of treatment of investment of NAFTA investors based on long-standing principles of customary law."[11] In addition, Article 1105 sets forth a further minimum standard of treatment to which investors are entitled. The article states, "each party shall accord to investments of investors of another party, treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."[12] Finally, the Free Trade Commission (FTC), which consists of members from each state, has declared that international law is limited to and includes international customary law.

This notion of international customary law brings forth serious problems in disputes, particularly related to linguistic differences.[13] This is because definitions of "fair and equitable treatment" are heavily debated and critiqued. Consequently, in 2001 the FTC, in their desire for an enhanced procedure, issued an interpretive note to clarify the application of Article 1105. In this

note they state, "the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens [is] the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another party."[14] This interpretive note has been controversial in demonstrating international customary law. While it has led to many awards (successful claims) being granted to disputing parties, many question the court's ability to interpret certain cases under Article 1105 which as seen by the New Haven school, is a measure of taking into account foreign policy in the decision making process.

Rosalyn Higgins from the New Haven School of International Law, which offers an unconventional approach to international law, argues, "international law is a continuing process of authoritative decisions."[15] This view rejects the notion of law merely as the impartial application of rules. International law should be seen as the entire decision-making process, and not just in reference to past decisions, which are termed 'rules.'

This decision making process is where choices over competing rules are made every day, which draws on notions of legal realism, and challenges the very notion of law as being objective.[16] Academics from the New Haven school believe that international law is about the union of law and politics. Discussing politics Higgins states:

> (P)olicy considerations, although they differ from "rules", are an integral part of the decision making process which we call international law…. A refusal to acknowledge political and social factors cannot keep law 'neutral', for even such a refusal is not without political and social consequence.[17]

From the New Haven Perspective, the bidding process in Iraq may not necessarily be constituted as a violation of international law, as the tribunal could view this as a means of foreign policy-

that which protects the interest of the American people. The decision would then be up to the tribunal, in how they interpret America's claim to "securitizing the nation", which Higgins would see as having primary importance over the objective nature of the claim of violation. As a result, while notions of international law as a process of authoritative decision-making in, can be useful in widening our scope of analyses, it is important to keep in mind the significance of these approaches in everyday legal disputes.

This can be highlighted in the relationship between the principles of international law, and what actually happens on the ground. This is more commonly referred to as *de jure* (concerning law) vs. *de facto* (concerning fact). Claire Cutler discusses the importance of this binary relationship and the complications of corporation as central players linking global and local politics when she states, "the *de jure* insignificance of corporations in the face of their *de facto* significance reflects a disjunction between theory and practice."[18] It is the influential nature of individual corporations, or "investors", which renders discussions of law as a process, and series of authoritative decision-makings, theory laden while having very little practicability.

Such practicability can be highlighted in examining cases such as S.D. Myers vs. Canada. This case occurred when Canada banned the export of polychlorinated biphenyl waste, which effectively shut S.D. Myers out of the Canadian PCB waste treatment market. S.D. Myers argued that this was a violation of Article 1105, in the denial of fair and equitable treatment.[19] Canada counter-argued S.D. Myers claim by stating that they were simply carrying out orders and complying with various international environmental agreements, and effectively with Canadian policy on the environment. However, it was argued that Canada's attempt to ban S.D. Myers was as a means of preventing its competition in the Canadian PCB waste market. The tribunal found that the intentional discrimination on the basis of nationality is in fact a breach of international law, and therefore, a breach of Article

1105.[20] This decision shows that the tribunal clearly did not take into consideration the effective environmental policy claims, which were presented by the Canadian government from a policy perspective, and which the New Haven School would see as a necessary part of the authoritative decision making process based on the interplay between law and politics.[21]

We can then compare this ruling, with the case of America's decision to reject Canadian companies from the bidding process in Iraq. Although from a New Haven Perspective, policy initiatives should be kept in mind, according to *de facto*, as seen above in the case of S.D. Myers, these policy initiatives are not always taken into consideration in the ruling. From an international law perspective, and according to NAFTA regulations, we could compare the case of S.D. Myers, and the tribunal findings with that of the case of Iraq and the United State's ban. Although one clearly had environmental concerns and the other security, the two cases present a similar dilemma in the role of NAFTA and the protection of the investor at the expense of the violating states policies. One cannot speculate how the case would be handled in the tribunal; however, the fact that Canadian companies were rejected from the bidding process, means that they have suffered arbitrary and discriminatory treatment compared to US, British and Australian companies. It was corporations from these countries that were invited to participate in the process regardless of their states' contribution to the military campaign in Iraq.[22] This is a clear violation of Article 1105, which was created, as stated by Gaines, "to protect investors from government abuse when major investments are at stake and their claim has substantial merit."[23]

To conclude, approaches to international law are varied, with different interpretations of actors, arenas, and opinions about whether international law even exists. While the New Haven School of International Law could be considered a hallmark approach, its view of international law as a process of authoritative decision making based on policy making, fails to explain what

actually happens in everyday courts as seen by the case of S.D. Myers. Although one cannot completely compare the two cases, a comparison serves to illustrate that what is posited in theory and what happens in actual legal practice are often very different. In the case of Canadian companies in Iraq, it is clear that America's decision to not allow Canadian companies a part in the primary bidding process was a violation of Chapter 11, Article 1105. And while many are doubtful as to the efficacy of NAFTA, it is possible to look at the victory of Chapter 11 in laying to rest the many fears surrounding the notions of open borders and security threats that have been perpetuated. This essential development marks a way of protecting investors and their investments, and encouraging free and fair trade for all.[24] While NAFTA may not be perfect, it helps to ensure Canadians will have equal access to American markets, which is something that would not have even had been discussed thirty years ago.

Notes

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