

Democracy and STV – Why Disagree?

Explaining the “Preference Gap” Between British Columbia’s Citizens’ Assembly and the Larger Public

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The meaning of democracy in Canada is a highly contested concept. Although many agree that a great rift exists between our ideal notion of democracy and the actual reality of our democracy as it is practiced on the ground, scholars do not always agree on what constitutes this “democratic deficit.”¹ Some, like Henry Milner, prefer to define the “democratic deficit” primarily in terms of low voter turnout. Milner suggests that the best way to improve our democracy is to motivate more people to vote, for example by improving civic literacy.² Others, like Graham and Phillips, define the democratic deficit primarily as a lack of trust in and a lack of engagement with political institutions on the part of the public. They call for a re-conceptualization of citizenship that encourages deeper dialogue and collective engagement with political institutions, not merely individualized voting behavior.³ Definitions of democracy thus clearly divide the academic world, but are voters equally involved in the deeper debate about the meaning of democracy? How can we explain public antipathy or apathy toward democratic reform? This paper will examine these questions with a special focus on the electoral reform debate in British Columbia.

Declining voter turnout and public disenchantment with formal politics have inspired calls for democratic reform in several Canadian provinces, including British Columbia.⁴ In 2003, British Columbia's Liberal government made an unprecedented move in the history of electoral reform when it decided to let the world's first-ever “citizens’ assembly on electoral reform” propose a new electoral system for the province. The government-appointed

British Columbia Citizens' Assembly (BCCA) consisted of 161 randomly selected members, drawn from all constituencies across the province. The assembly held meetings over the course of one year, learning about various electoral systems, identifying the types of values a new electoral system should reflect, and deliberating extensively about electoral system change. In December 2004, the BCCA published its final report, in which it recommended that the province replace its current single-member-plurality voting system with the more proportional single-transferable voting (STV) system.⁵ To the great consternation of many assembly members, however, public support for the STV proposal failed to pass the government-set 60% super-majority threshold for its adoption twice over, reaching 58 % in the initial 2004 referendum and only 38% in a second referendum of May 2009.⁶

The discrepancy between the citizen assembly's desire to implement the STV and the public's low enthusiasm for the new system is highly ironic. After all, the citizens' assembly was appointed under the assumption that it would accurately represent the full diversity of British Columbians and their views⁷. How can we explain the apparent "preference gap" between the ideals of the citizens' assembly members and those of BC's voters? I will argue that several factors contributed to the "preference gap." These factors include the failure of the media to act as an effective link between the BCCA and the public; the unrepresentative composition of the citizens' assembly itself; and the fact that only BCCA members, not the public, had the chance to engage in a focused deliberative process that nudged their preferences in a particular direction. Lastly, I will propose a fourth potential factor that has remained largely unexplored in the academic literature: Various key participants in the STV debate (the BCCA, political parties, and the pro-STV and anti-STV campaigns) employed a form of shallow, unhelpful rhetoric that failed to engage the public in a meaningful debate over the true meaning of democracy. The public, thus disengaged from a relevant debate about the very nature of democracy itself, was neither motivated enough or

properly informed enough to make an educated decision about STV.

Part A: Explaining the ‘Preference Gap’ between the BCCA and the Larger Public

The ‘preference gap’ between the BCCA and the larger public may be attributed to a variety of factors, including the role of the media, the composition of the BCCA, and the BCCA’s deliberation process. To begin with the role of the media, we have reason to doubt that the local news communicated the crucial features and implications of the STV to the public in a balanced manner. The media, according to Dennis Pilon, had been explicitly commissioned by the BC government to act as a key link between the citizens’ assembly and the public at large.⁸ Yet Pilon’s recent case study of the electoral reform debate in the province of Ontario has demonstrated that the provincial print media can easily fail at this task. In Ontario, a citizens’ assembly similar to that of BC had encouraged the province to adopt a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. Print media coverage of MMP, however, was highly unbalanced, over-representing those voices that opposed MMP.⁹ According to Pilon, Ontario newspapers thus failed to provide a deliberative space that would have empowered citizens to attain a critical, balanced understanding of the issues at stake.¹⁰ Although a similar study of BC’s print media has not yet been conducted, we may speculate that the situation looked quite similar in British Columbia. If this is the case, then the “preference gap” probably emerged in part because the media did not accurately communicate the BCCA’s proposal and its reasons for supporting this proposal to the province’s voters.

We can identify a second explanation for the “preference gap” by looking at the composition of the BCCA. Contrary to the government’s statement that the BCCA represented British Columbia “in all its rich diversity”,¹¹ the assembly did not, in fact, accurately represent marginalized viewpoints in the province. The

BCCA failed to include a proportionally representative number of young people, visible minorities,¹² labourers holding daytime hour jobs,¹³ and only two First Nations representatives were asked to occupy seats in the assembly.¹⁴ Field researcher Amy Lang has noted, moreover, that the very process employed by the BCCA for making decisions tended to side-line minority viewpoints. Members usually deliberated in small discussion groups, who would later report back to the entire assembly. Yet instead of articulating the full diversity of viewpoints present within their circle, these groups were encouraged to reach a *consensus* on each issue under discussion before reporting back.¹⁵ As a result, views that did not already resonate with the majority in each small group did not come to be articulated to the larger group. It is also worth noting that those citizens who had responded to the governments' invitation to join the ranks of the BCCA tended to fit a particular citizen profile. Carty notes that nearly 90% of BCCA members were active in local voluntary groups and that virtually all of them voted on a regular basis.¹⁶ The assembly was therefore already comprised of what we might call *active citizens* with a considerable level of interest in politics. The same cannot necessarily be said of the average citizen in BC, given the strikingly low levels of voter turnout among Canadians.¹⁷ Quite possibly, the BCCA's final decision and overall rhetoric did not accurately express the preferences and interests of British Columbians, prompting many to reject the assembly's STV proposal.

One notable example of a marginalized interest that came to be side-lined in the BCCA deliberation phase was women's representation. Despite the fact that an equal number of men and women had been appointed to the BCCA,¹⁸ women's representation was never included in the BCCA's list of criteria for judging electoral systems.¹⁹ This development was probably due in part to the rigid procedural guidelines by which the assembly had to abide. At one point in the BCCA's deliberation phase, members were asked to identify the top three democratic values that they felt

should guide the BCCA's evaluation of electoral systems. Several of the BCCA's small discussion groups identified "social and cultural representation" (of which women's representation was a key component) as an important democratic value.²⁰ Unfortunately, this value was listed just below the BCCA's overall "top three."²¹ Despite the fact that several of the discussion groups expressed a desire for further discussion of social and cultural representation, BCCA staff maintained that only *three* values could be included and insisted that the assembly move along to the next point in their schedule.²² The staff also demonstrated reluctance to bring in a speaker on the issue of women's representation, even after considerable demand from the members.²³ Thus, the influence of the BCCA's rigid agenda and the preferences of BCCA staff steered the assembly in a particular direction, one that did not sufficiently address the issues that were important to women. This marginalization of women's interests is just one example of the way that leaders' decisions and the rigid procedures of agenda-bound decision-making can push the discussion of particular democratic values into the background. We may speculate that just as the citizens' assembly was not permitted to enter into a deeper engagement with the issue of women's empowerment as a potential key value in a truly democratic system, they also were not permitted to engage more deeply with the importance of amplifying other marginalized voices, such as those of ethnic minorities and First Nations, in a reformed and truly "democratic" electoral system.

The "preference gap" between the BCCA and the larger public may not only be attributed to imbalanced media coverage and an unrepresentative assembly composition, but also to the fact that only BCCA members, not the public, had the opportunity to engage in an extensive process of interactive deliberation that significantly shaped and transformed their opinions. As Pilon has observed with reference to citizens' assemblies, "people do not have entirely fixed preferences that merely await aggregation: instead, their preferences may be formed through the collective

process of deliberation itself."²⁴ Lang, based on her field study observations of the BCCA, agrees that it was largely the process of interaction between members that determined what kinds of interests the assembly came to articulate and support in the end.²⁵ In addition to group interaction, the top-down influence of the leadership staff also shaped the BCCA's views and preferences. The BCCA supervisory staff exerted influence over the BCCA's viewpoints by organizing the assembly's schedule in strategic ways. To illustrate, we may consider the first day of the citizen assembly's learning phase. Immediately after their first rewarding experience of cooperative, consensus-based group work, assembly members were confronted with a lecture entitled "Our Adversarial Political System."²⁶ This first experience may well have primed them to adopt a particularly negative view of the first-past-the-post system and a strong preference for systems that would produce cooperative, consensus-oriented decision-making that resembled what they had experienced in their discussion groups. These preferences later came to be reflected in the BCCA's final report.²⁷ A combination of group interactions and staff influences thus seems to have produced a 'fishbowl effect' by which the BCCA's conception of the ideal democracy came to be vastly different from the public's conception of the same.

In summary, various factors contributed to the rift between the BCCA's enthusiasm for STV and the public's lack of interest in electoral reform. The media may have failed to provide an effective link between the citizens' assembly and the larger public. Moreover, minority and marginalized groups (particularly women) probably did not see their interests reflected in the BCCA's priorities and final decision, due to the unrepresentative composition of the assembly and the influence of staff over the assembly's agenda. The preferences of BCCA members were furthermore shaped by a transformative process of deliberation that was not sufficiently replicated for the public on a larger scale. These three factors probably help explain a large portion of the 'preference gap.' However, I would also like to propose a fourth

possible factor that has remained largely unexplored in the academic literature: both proponents and opponents of the STV used shallow and ineffective rhetoric when speaking to the public about electoral reform.

My examination of BC's electoral reform rhetoric is based on a content analysis of political party websites, the BCCA's final report, and the websites of the pro-STV and anti-STV campaigns that became active prior to the 2004 and 2009 referendums. As the discussion that follows will reveal, the rhetoric used by these actors to speak about electoral reform framed democracy largely in terms of populist ideals, shared values, and regional interests. It also framed the citizen as an individualized political agent whose primary political power lay in voting. Underlying this common rhetoric was the assumption that a general consensus on the meaning of democracy and citizenship already existed within BC. This assumption prevented any meaningful debate over the precise meaning of true "democracy" for British Columbians. We should therefore not be surprised that 36% of eligible voters in 2004 felt they were not sufficiently informed about STV to make an informed decision in the referendum.²⁸ Because voters were not engaged in a meaningful debate, they had no incentive to properly inform themselves about the STV. And because voters were not informed, they likely did not feel inclined to support electoral reform.

Part B: Unhelpful Rhetoric and the Democratic Debate

One reason why voters were not engaged in a meaningful debate about BC's democracy is that the electoral reform discourse defined democracy largely in terms of vague "values" rather than real political interests. These values, which all British Columbians were presumed to share, were forwarded as the proper basis for the ideal electoral system. In fact, the very government mandate to the BCCA had included the identification of three core "values" that should define BC's democracy in the future. The BCCA identified

fair election results, effective local representation, and greater voter choice as these core values, and opened its final report with a lengthy discussion of each.²⁹ The pro-STV campaign “Power Up Your Vote” and the anti-STV campaign “No STV” quickly picked up on this value-based rhetoric, making frequent reference to terms like fairness, accountability and (ironically) women's representation as key principles that should prompt British Columbians to either support or reject STV.³⁰ Even BC's New Democratic Party (NDP) leader Carole James could not stay away from “values” when talking about BC's democratic debate. “We're guided by common values,” she asserted in her 2005 response to the throne speech, “—the values shared by the vast majority of British Columbians. Fairness. Balance. Compassion. Responsibility. And democratic accountability.”³¹

The emphasis on values is problematic for a democratic debate in two respects. To begin, as Pilon explains, value-based questions such as “Do you value local representation?” shift our focus away from the more relevant analytical questions like “Can we demonstrate that local representation is indeed important for the workings of our political system?”³² The value-focused debate thus precludes a deeper discussion of the underlying assumptions we tend to hold about the workings of a democratic system. Furthermore, words like “fairness” and “accountability” are essentially empty words that mean different things to different people but are, at the same time, generally assented to by all. Few would argue that they reject electoral reform because they disagree with “fairness” or “accountability.” The use of such words leaves us without a basis for disagreement and debate in our discussion of democracy. Without a clear and specific explanation of what each side means by “fairness,” voters are left without a clear understanding of the actual ideological differences that divide the proponents and opponents of STV. The value-based rhetoric therefore failed to engage voters in a meaningful debate about the real implications of democratic reform. Voters, in turn, did not feel

motivated to educate themselves about these implications and to make an informed decision on voting day.

Another key feature of the STV discourse that likely disengaged voters was the tendency to define democracy along the lines of regional interests. This particular emphasis can be traced back, once again, to the influence of BCCA staff over the assembly's deliberation process. When BCCA members from BC's rural constituencies started advocating for better "rural representation" in BC, the staff strongly encouraged this focus. They invited a guest lecturer to speak on BC's demographics and made special accommodations for a rural caucus meeting.³³ The focus on rural/local representation later came to be reflected in the BCCA's final report, which listed effective local representation among the core values of British Columbians.³⁴ The STV campaign messages likewise spoke to local representation. While the "Yes" side's website featured an entire flyer devoted to the BC-STV's ability to improve local representation,³⁵ the "No" side argued against STV on the basis that it would give larger (urban) districts a higher percentage of the vote and that this was unfair to smaller ridings.³⁶ Both the BCCA and the STV campaign messages clearly proceeded under the assumption that British Columbians defined their political interests along regional lines, not taking into account the active role that the BCCA staff played in bringing this particular political identity onto the BCCA agenda.

The focus on regionalism as our primary political identity is highly problematic, as becomes evident when we consider what has happened at the Canadian federal level. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, have documented the tendency of so-called Canadian "brokerage parties" (parties brokering for support across a variety of political cleavages) like the Liberals and Conservatives to define politics along the lines of regional, linguistic, and national interests.³⁷ This practice has allowed them to avoid the type of "class politics" that has traditionally dominated in Europe³⁸ and to marginalize non-regional interests such as race and gender.³⁹ In a

similar way, the focus on “local representation” in BC assumes that voters in a particular constituency must necessarily share a common set of interests. Yet these constituents may be divided along the lines of class, ethnicity, race, religion, gender or ideology. The discourse around STV thus revolved around a particular political identity—regionalism—that did not necessarily resonate with the larger public. It failed to engage the public in a discussion of the real political cleavages that must be addressed in democratic reform debates.

In addition to value-based rhetoric and regional rhetoric, the various sides of the STV debate also relied heavily on populist rhetoric in their discussion of electoral reform. Populism is an ideology defined by a public distrust in political parties and elite interests as “corrupt,” and by a desire to shift political control from these elites to ordinary citizens.⁴⁰ It has enjoyed widespread appeal in Canada, particularly in the western provinces.⁴¹ Not surprisingly, British Columbia’s political parties felt the need to appeal to populist sentiments when discussing electoral reform. The BC Greens, for example, maintained that in order to improve BC’s democracy, the province needed to instigate greater transparency in the political system to prevent its elected representatives from continuing to “betray [voters] behind a veil of secrecy.”⁴² The BC Liberals made special efforts to ensure that politicians were excluded from the electoral reform discussions altogether, seeking to minimize contact between elected representatives and BCCA members as far as possible.⁴³ On their party website, the Liberals reassured voters that the citizens’ assembly had operated completely outside the realm of “political interference.”⁴⁴

The populist antipathy towards political parties also shines through in the BCCA’s final report. The report strongly critiques party discipline⁴⁵ and frequently refers to the need to make BC’s politicians “work harder.”⁴⁶ Finally, the pro- and anti-STV campaigners employed similar populist rhetoric. While the “No”

side criticized STV for making members of the legislative assembly more dependent on their parties,⁴⁷ the "Yes" side critiqued BC's current system for putting parties above people.⁴⁸ Thus, whether voters looked to political parties, to the BCCA report, or to the STV campaigns, they found themselves confronted with essentially the same underlying message: "Political parties tend to be corrupt and should have as little power as possible in our political system." No one thought to question the underlying assumption that political parties were inherently antithetical to democracy.⁴⁹ No one cared to ask what political parties *can* and *do* achieve for us in a democracy, and how the relationship between parties and people could be realistically improved. Had the STV discourse placed more emphasis on the actual existing relationship between parties and constituents, voters might have found themselves engaged in a more realistic and relevant debate.⁵⁰

The STV discourse not only painted a particular picture of democracy, but also of the democratic citizen. As Graham and Phillips have described, Canada has recently seen the rise of a new conception of citizenship that frames the citizen as a customer or consumer. This consumer-citizen is focused on receiving efficient services from the state rather than on actively shaping state institutions through collective action and dialogue with these institutions.⁵¹ This is precisely the picture of citizenship painted by the BC Greens, who promoted the STV largely on the grounds that it would be easy for voters to use. "[Y]ou won't need to deal with the complexities...complete the ballot...and then enjoy all the benefits",⁵² the Greens advertised. The BCCA's final report likewise stated ease of use as the first merit of the STV system.⁵³ The underlying assumption that voters (as "customers" of the system) are primarily concerned about *ease of use*, rather than the *political implications* of a voting system, reinforces the conception of citizenship as an apolitical identity. It fails to encourage voters to actively engage in dialogue with political leaders and with one another about the real implications of electoral reform. Had more emphasis been placed on education and dialogue as crucial aspects

of responsible citizenship, the public may have had more incentive to educate themselves properly about the STV's political consequences, and perhaps to lend it more support.

Evidently, the type of rhetoric employed by political parties, the BCCA, and the "Yes" and "No" campaigns in BC's electoral reform debate failed to engage voters in a variety of ways. Voters found themselves confronted with a common emphasis on meaningless "values," a common focus on local representation at the expense of other political interests, a common populist rhetoric that failed to take into account the real relationship between parties and voters, and a particular rendition of citizenship that failed to encourage critical dialogue about the political outcomes of electoral reform. Voters felt disengaged by this kind of debate and consequently were not motivated to educate themselves sufficiently about STV before entering the voting booth. That many chose to vote against STV or not to vote at all in the 2004 and 2009 referendums⁵⁴ should not surprise us in light of these facts.

To summarize, the "preference gap" between the BCCA's enthusiasm for STV and the public's apparent apathy towards reform may indeed be due not only to the failure of the media to produce a balanced debate, the unrepresentative composition of the BCCA, and the 'fishbowl effect' of the BCCA's deliberation process, but also to the flat debate created by the rhetoric of various participants in the STV discourse. How can we explain the construction of such a flat debate? The similarity in rhetoric between political parties, the BCCA, and the STV campaigns probably resulted from a 'trickle-down effect.' The BC Liberals, who initiated the entire BCCA process, set the tone for later discourses by describing the BCCA in terms of populist rhetoric, pulling political parties out of the reform process, and appointing particular people as BCCA staff who would encourage the assembly to adopt certain "values" at the expense of others. Consequently, the BCCA, under the leadership of government-

appointed staff, adopted a values-based, populist, regional-interest focused approach that came to be reflected in its final report. Picking up on the types of issues already highlighted by the BCCA, the “Yes” and “No” campaigns then continued the electoral reform discussion with much the same rhetoric.

The question now becomes how the emergence of such a flat debate might have been prevented. Habermas has prescribed certain criteria for what he calls the “ideal speech situation” (meaningful and critical discourse) in democratic deliberation. Habermas has argued that the an ideal speech situation will most likely occur when all actors involved in a debate clarify precisely what their statements mean and make an effort to question underlying assumptions that become evident along the way. Furthermore, those wishing to construct the ideal speech situation must draw variety of voices into the debate, allowing them equal expression, and they must create spaces where genuine interaction can take place.⁵⁵

The application of Habermas's principles to the electoral reform debate in British Columbia might have prevented the kind of flat debate that has been described in this paper. For example, greater public pressure on political parties and the "Yes" and "No" campaigns to explain exactly what they meant by vague terms such as "fairness," and to question underlying assumptions such as “local representation is essential for democracy,” would have created a much deeper debate about the true meaning of democracy for BC. Such pressure, of course, would have necessitated voters who already viewed themselves as responsible citizens with a duty to educate themselves and engage deeply with the issues at stake. Perhaps the promotion of a more comprehensive conception of citizenship than that of the “consumer-citizen” would have been necessary to generate public pressure for a more meaningful democratic debate.

The government could have made greater efforts to draw a variety of voices into the debate by ensuring that visible minorities, young people and daytime laborers were better represented in the BCCA. The government also should have offered greater financial support to the "Yes" and "No" campaigns, which were vastly underfunded.⁵⁶ Better government funding would have allowed for more research and thus a deeper engagement with the issues on the part of the campaigners, resulting in higher quality communication of these issues to the public. Finally, the Liberals should have made efforts to create more interactive spaces in which the public could engage in a meaningful process of deliberation. Special 'mini' citizens' assemblies in each of BC's ridings, open to all who wanted to discuss BC's democracy, might have filled this role. Public schools and universities could have been encouraged to create similar interactive spaces. By following Habermas's recipe of clarifying statements, challenging assumptions, drawing in a variety of voices, and creating spaces for true interaction,⁵⁷ British Columbia might have emerged from its democratic debate with a mobilized public and a strong impetus for reform.

Conclusion

The creation of the "ideal speech situation" surely is no easy task. Yet, given the fact that the government had already poured 5.5 million dollars into the creation and operation of the citizens' assembly,⁵⁸ it would have done well to match its concern for the citizens' assembly with an equal emphasis on the creation of meaningful and engaging public dialogue. Future governments who instigate similar citizens' assemblies on electoral reform may learn from the situation in BC and make more concerted efforts in this direction. However, they will inevitably have to navigate the challenging terrain of ideological rhetoric, which needs to be balanced between simplicity and popular appeal on the one hand, and an adequate discussion of complex political cleavages on the other.

Notes

- ¹ Dennis Pilon, *The politics of voting: Reforming Canada's electoral system* (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2007), 182.
- ² Henry Milner, "The problem of political drop-outs: Canada in comparative perspective," in *Canadian Parties in Transition*, ed. by Alain-G. and A. Brian Tanguay (Petersborough: Broadview Press, 2007), 437-438, 453-457.
- ³ Katherine A. Graham and Susan D. Phillips, "Citizen Engagement: Beyond the Customer Revolution," in *Canadian Parties in Transition*, ed. Alain-G. and A. Brian Tanguay (Petersborough: Broadview Press, 2007), 259-261; 267-270).
- ⁴ R. Kenneth Carty, "Turning Voters into Citizens: The Citizens' Assembly and Reforming Democratic Politics," *Democracy and Federalism Series 3* (2005): 1; Milner, "Political Dropouts," 437-440.
- ⁵ "Making Every Vote Count: The Case of Electoral Reform in British Columbia," *British Columbia Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform*, accessed November 2, 2009, http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/final_report.pdf: 1,14; Amy Lang, "But Is It for Real? The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly as a Model of State-Sponsored Citizen Empowerment," *Politics and Society*, 35 (2007): 36.
- ⁶ Neil Hall, "BC-STV Soundly Defeated in Electoral Reform Referendum," *Vancouver Sun*, May 13, 2009, accessed November 11, 2009, <http://www.vancouver.sun.com/technology/soundly+defeated+electoral+reform+referendum/1589893/story.html>; Amy Lang, "For Real?" 36; F. Leslie Seidle, "Provincial Electoral Systems in Question: Changing Views of Party Representation and Governance," In *Canadian Parties in Transition*, ed. Alain-G. and A. Brian Tanguay, 308-312. Petersborough: Broadview Press, 2007.
- ⁷ "For All Citizens: Real Democratic Reform," BC Liberals, accessed November 10, 2009, <http://www.bcliberals.com/media/Page25.pdf>.
- ⁸ Dennis Pilon, "Investigating Media as a Deliberative Space: Newspaper Opinions About Voting Systems in the 2007 Ontario Provincial Referendum," *Canadian Political Science Review* 3, (2009): 2.
- ⁹ Pilon, "Investigating Media," 17.
- ¹⁰ Pilon, "Investigating Media," 17.
- ¹¹ "For All Citizens: Real Democratic Reform," BC Liberals, accessed November 10, 2009, <http://www.bcliberals.com/media/Page25.pdf>.
- ¹² Lang, "For Real?" 41.
- ¹³ Dennis Pilon, *The politics of voting: Reforming Canada's electoral system* (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2007), 97.
- ¹⁴ Lang, "For Real?" 41.
- ¹⁵ Lang, "For Real?", 44.

- ¹⁶ Carty, "Voters into Citizens," 7.
- ¹⁷ Milner, "Political Dropouts," 237-240.
- ¹⁸ Lang, "For Real?" 41.
- ¹⁹ Amy Lang, "Agenda-Setting in Deliberative Forums: Expert Influence and Citizen Autonomy in the British Columbia Citizens' Assembly," in *Designing deliberative democracy: The British Columbia citizens' assembly*, ed. M.E Warren & H. Pearse, 101.
- ²⁰ Lang, "Agenda-Setting" 101.
- ²¹ Lang, "Agenda-Setting" 99; "Making Every Vote Count," 2.
- ²² Lang, "Agenda-Setting," 101-102.
- ²³ Lang, "Agenda-Setting," 100.
- ²⁴ Pilon, "Investigating Media," 4.
- ²⁵ Lang, "For Real?" 55.
- ²⁶ Lang, "For Real?" 42-43.
- ²⁷ "Making Every Vote Count," 3.
- ²⁸ Seidle, "Provincial Electoral Systems," 311-312.
- ²⁹ "Making Every Vote Count," 2.
- ³⁰ (No STV, 2009; Power Up Your Vote [PUYV], 2009a, 2009b, 2009c)
- ³¹ "Bringing your voice to Victoria," New Democratic Party of BC, accessed November 10, 2009. <http://www.bcndp.ca/carole-james/carole-speaks-out/bringing-your-voice-victoria>.
- ³² Pilon, "Politics of Voting," 136.
- ³³ Lang, "Agenda-Setting," 98.
- ³⁴ "Making Every Vote Count," 2.
- ³⁵ "BC-STV: A Voice for Communities," Power Up Your Vote, accessed November 18, 2009. http://stv.ca/sites/default/files/BC-STV%20-%20a%20Voice%20for%20Communities_0.pdf.
- ³⁶ "Confused About STV? Don't Take a Chance with British Columbia's Future!" No STV, accessed November 10, 2009, http://www.nostv.org/NoSTV_Leaflet.pdf.
- ³⁷ Catherine Smith, "Arenas Catherine "Arenas of Influence: Parliament, Parties, and Elections," in *a civil society?* ed. Catherine Smith, (Peterborough: Broadview Press, DATE), 91.
- ³⁸ Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen: Stability and Change in Brokerage Politics," in *Canadian Parties in Transition*, ed. Alain-G. and A. Brian Tanguay, (Petersborough: Broadview Press, 2007), 38-39.
- ³⁹ Smith, "Arenas," 97.
- ⁴⁰ A. Brian Tanguay, "The Paradoxes of Direct Democracy," in *Canadian Parties in Transition*, ed. Alain-G. and A. Brian Tanguay (Petersborough: Broadview Press, 2007), 469-474.
- ⁴¹ Tanguay, "Paradoxes," 469-481.

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- ⁴² “Reforming Government: No More Betrayal,” Green Party of BC, accessed November 2, 2009, www.bcgreens.ca.
- ⁴³ Lang, “For Real?” 40.
- ⁴⁴ “For All Citizens.”
- ⁴⁵ “Making Every Vote Count,” 3.
- ⁴⁶ “Making Every Vote Count,” 1-8.
- ⁴⁷ “Confused about STV?”
- ⁴⁸ “BC-STV Electoral Reform,” Power Up Your Vote., accessed November 18, 2009, <http://www.stv.ca/download/handout.pdf>; “Compare the Choices: FPTP vs. STV,” Power Up Your Vote, accessed November 18, 2009, <http://www.stv.ca/download/compare.pdf>. (PUYV, 2009c, 2009d)
- ⁴⁹ Milner, “The problem,” 5, 8.
- ⁵⁰ Pilon, “Politics of Voting,” 161.
- ⁵¹ Find Graham and Phillips!!! Graham and Phillips, (pp. 263-264, 267-268)
- ⁵² “Reforming Government.”
- ⁵³ “Making Every Vote Count,” 1.
- ⁵⁴ Neil Hall, “BC-STV Soundly Defeated in Electoral Reform Referendum,” *Vancouver Sun*, May 13, 2009, accessed November 11, 2009, <http://www.vancouver.sun.com/technology/soundly+defeated+electoral+reform+referendum/1589893/story.html>; Seidle, “Provincial Electoral Systems,” 311-312.
- ⁵⁵ Pilon, “Investigating Media,” 6.
- ⁵⁶ Lang, “For Real?” 49-50.
- ⁵⁷ Pilon, “Investigating Media,” 6.
- ⁵⁸ Lang, “For Real?” 39.