

---

# Beyond the Traditional Nation State

## *The Complex Case of Moldova, Transnistria, and their Domestic Minorities*

---

Kiegan Barron

**Abstract:** Moldova and Transnistria have a peculiar relationship. Moldova is recognized as an independent state by most all other countries. Transnistria, on the other hand, lacks this formal recognition of sovereignty but functions as an independent country in every other way. This odd but fascinating relationship between the two autonomous political units is worthy of its own study. However, this relationship becomes even more interesting when analyzing their minority relations. Both Moldova and Transnistria have their own minority populations. But as Transnistria is not technically an independent state, Transnistrians are therefore considered a minority within Moldova. To do justice to the inherent complexities, the thesis of this paper is twofold: first, it will argue that both Moldova and Transnistria have been relatively successful at integrating their own minority populations. Secondly, it will argue that Moldova and Transnistria have largely been unable to integrate with each other, a phenomenon attributable to their differing political development and threats of unification with other countries.

### **Acknowledgements:**

First, I would like to thank Dr. Valerie D’Erman, who helped me hash out my ideas when trying to make sense of this fairly complex topic. Her feedback and encouragement were both inspiring and challenging in ways that encouraged me to step outside of my comfort zone. Keiran Ellis also deserves special thanks for her editorial contributions and her tireless commitment to guiding me through this whole process. Moreover, David Collins has my gratitude for his insights on Moldovan history and his commentary from his experience working in the country. Finally, I would like to thank Michael John Lo and the entire On Politics staff for giving me this opportunity and their work on putting together this journal.

## Introduction

Moldova has a significant minority population. Similarly, the de facto independent state within Moldova's internationally recognized borders, Transnistria, also has notable minorities. However, as Transnistria is not officially independent from Moldova, its Russian-influenced population is, therefore, considered a minority *in* Moldova. This situation has led to complex minority politics in and between the two political units. Both Moldova and Transnistria have put significant measures in place to ease tensions with their domestic minorities.<sup>1</sup> However, notable strains still exist between Moldova and Transnistria themselves. This phenomenon leads me to ask: why have Moldova and Transnistria been unable to improve relations with each other, despite success in easing tensions with their domestic minorities? Given the multilayered nature of this question, a nuanced approach is required to examine it accurately. Therefore, in this paper, I will be arguing two points. First, I will establish that Transnistria and Moldova have, indeed, been relatively successful at integrating their domestic minorities, despite some differences in their approaches. Secondly, I will argue that the two autonomous political units have been unable to integrate with each other due to their differing political development and threats of unification with other countries. To demonstrate these two arguments, I will first explain the historical context surrounding Moldova, its minorities, and Transnistria's split. Then, I will examine both of their methods of dealing with their domestic minorities, first focusing on Moldova's treatment of the Gagauz, and then analyzing Transnistria's policies towards its three notable linguistic groups. Afterwards, a challenge to the first part of my thesis will be addressed. I will then comparatively examine the similarities and differences between Transnistria and Moldova's methods of dealing with their domestic minorities, before exploring their relations with each other.

## Background

Moldova's history can be summarized in one word – subjugation. Until 1812, the Ottoman Empire controlled the region that is now modern-day Moldova.<sup>2</sup> Due to a war with Russia that same year, it was

---

<sup>1</sup> When I talk about domestic minorities in this paper, I am referring to either minorities within Moldova's borders, excluding Transnistria, or minorities within Transnistria's self-declared borders.

<sup>2</sup> Bernado Venturi, "Civil Society Organizations and Conflict Resolution: Moldova-Transnistria." *International Journal on World Peace* 28 (2), (2011) 8.

subsequently overtaken by the Russian Empire.<sup>3</sup> The end of World War One resulted in unification with Romania, which was promptly followed by Soviet annexation in 1940.<sup>4</sup> This background is relevant because, upon declaring independence in 1990, Moldova had no experience of independent statehood.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the legacy of being conquered by different empires resulted in ethnic and linguistic diversity in the now-independent Republic of Moldova. The Romanian-speaking majority now comprises about 65 percent of the population, with Ukrainians making up 22 percent and Russians constituting around 13 percent.<sup>6</sup> Crucially, the legacy of Ottoman domination also resulted in a significant Turkic minority, called the Gagauz, living in the country.<sup>7</sup> As this last group has had the most notable tensions with the Moldovan state, excluding the Transnistrians, I will, therefore, focus on the Gagauz when looking at Moldova's treatment of its minorities.

However, an explanation of Moldova's history would not be complete without examining Transnistria. Historically, Moldova's Russian-speaking minority was ignored or actively suppressed. An example of this suppression can be seen in a 1989 law that made it mandatory for the Latin alphabet to be used in schools, thus resulting in Cyrillic being banned.<sup>8</sup> This law, in particular, sparked tensions between Russian and Romanian speakers who were already at odds. None of this was helped by rumours in the early 1990s of Moldova's potential unification with Romania.<sup>9</sup> All these tensions resulted in a civil war upon the breakup of the Soviet Union (USSR) between the now-self-declared independent state of Transnistria and the rest of Moldova, which ended in a 1992 peace treaty.<sup>10</sup> Transnistria now functions as an independent state in every way, lacking only the external recognition from other countries that would make it officially sovereign.<sup>11</sup> Like Moldova, Transnistria

<sup>3</sup> Venturi, "Civil Society Organizations and Conflict Resolution: Moldova-Transnistria.", 8.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

<sup>5</sup> William Crowther, "Moldova, Transnistria and the PCRM's Turn to the West", *East European Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (2007), 274.

<sup>6</sup> Crowther, "Moldova, Transnistria and the PCRM's Turn to the West", 274.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> William Alejandro Sanchez, "The 'Frozen' Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question Has Become a European Geo-Security Issue," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 22, no. 2 (2009), 157.

<sup>9</sup> Sanchez, "The 'Frozen' Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question Has Become a European Geo-Security Issue", 157.

<sup>10</sup> Sanchez, "The 'Frozen' Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question Has Become a European Geo-Security Issue", 158.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid; For instance, Transnistria has its own government, parliament, military, currency,

is ethnically and linguistically diverse, with no one group of people forming a majority. The largest minorities are Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians, although Russian is the most prominent language.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the important takeaway from this section is that Moldova and Transnistria both have diverse populations. Both governments have, therefore, made accommodations to these populations to ensure tensions do not boil over.

### Moldova and the Gagauz

About 126 000 Gagauzians live in Moldova, making up roughly 3 to 5 percent of the population.<sup>13</sup> Due to settling in Moldova hundreds of years ago, the Gagauz view it as a quasi-homeland.<sup>14</sup> They are Orthodox Christians and are generally considered the most “Russified” group in Moldova, excluding the Transnistrians.<sup>15</sup> For instance, a 1989 Soviet census reported around 72 percent of Gagauzians spoke Russian as a second language.<sup>16</sup> Notably, the Gagauz have been historically disadvantaged in Moldovan society, similarly to other Russian-influenced groups. This disparity could be seen coming into the twentieth century with an illiteracy rate of about 90 percent for the general Gagauzian population, including almost 100 percent of Gagauzian women.<sup>17</sup> Even by the time the Soviet Union fell, massive disparities still existed. For instance, only 107 Gagauzians were studying at Chisinau State University in the early 1990s.<sup>18</sup> All this resulted in separatist feelings, which the Moldovan government heavily discouraged.<sup>19</sup> To the uninitiated, this situation may seem like one that would lead to conflict, like what happened with Transnistria. However, the outcome has been very different.

---

coat of arms, national anthem, and countless other elements that one normally associates with a sovereign state.

<sup>12</sup> Alexander Osipov and Hanna Vasilevich, “Transnistrian Nation-Building: A Case of Effective Diversity Policies?” *Nationalities Papers* 47, no. 6 (2019), 986.

<sup>13</sup> Charles King, “Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of the Gagauzi,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20, no. 4 (1997), 740.

<sup>14</sup> King, “Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of the Gagauzi,” 740.

<sup>15</sup> King, “Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of the Gagauzi,” 741.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>17</sup> Oleh Protsyk and Ion Osoian, “Ethnic or multi-ethnic parties? Party competition and legislative recruitment in Moldova”, *European Centre for Minority Issues*. ECMI Working Paper (47), 2010, 17.

<sup>18</sup> King, “Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of the Gagauzi,” 742.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*

For instance, the Moldovan government introduced measures to appease Gagauzian separatists, indicating their radically different approach when compared to Transnistria. One example of this difference in action includes state-funding of Gagauzian newspapers and universities.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, by the middle of the 1993-1994 academic year, forty-four non-Gagauzian universities had introduced Gagauzian as an optional language.<sup>21</sup> The Constitution of 1994 also made key provisions. For instance, it declared the region known as “Gagauzia” an autonomous republic, giving it control over taxation and education, and included a provision allowing Gagauzia to declare independence if the rest of Moldova unified with Romania.<sup>22</sup> However, perhaps the most important measure taken to appease Gagauzian separatists was Moldova’s forging of strong diplomatic ties with Turkey in the early 1990s. Considering the Gagauz’s Turkic ancestry, these ties had enormous symbolic *and* tangible importance. For instance, it showed Moldova’s willingness to provide cultural accommodations to the Gagauz, with Ankara and Chisinau now jointly funding Gagauzian cultural opportunities.<sup>23</sup> Cultural events and education have since become regulated in the education system; as of 2016, Gagauzia, its people, and its history are mandatory subjects in Moldovan state schools.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, while helping to lessen historical tensions, such education policies have also allowed for further recognition of Gagauzia’s distinct nature.

To analyze the effectiveness of these policies, we may find it useful to look to the popularity of the mainstream political parties. Generally, while Gagauzian nationalist parties have played a role in Moldovan politics, most Gagauzians have voted for the dominant Moldovan parties. For instance, the voting base for the Communist Party between 2001 and 2010, the largest party in Moldovan politics at that time, was about 8 percent Gagauz, despite them only making up 3 to 5 percent of the population.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, 4 percent of the Social Democratic and Centre parties’ electorate was Gagauz as well.<sup>26</sup> These

---

<sup>20</sup> King, “Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of the Gagauzi,” 742.

<sup>21</sup> King, “Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of the Gagauzi,” 745.

<sup>22</sup> Protsyk and Osoian, “Ethnic or multi-ethnic parties? Party competition and legislative recruitment in Moldova”, 15.

<sup>23</sup> King, “Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of the Gagauzi,” 747.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues on Her Mission to the Republic of Moldova,” (2017), 9.

<sup>25</sup> Protsyk and Osoian, “Ethnic or multi-ethnic parties? Party competition and legislative recruitment in Moldova”, 9.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*

electoral statistics imply that the measures taken by the Moldovan government to accommodate the Gagauz have worked, as they have not felt the need to create their own representative institutions. Instead, they vote proportionately and sometimes disproportionately for the already established political parties. This contentment with the Moldovan state can be seen further by the lack of significant Gagauz independence movements since initial tensions in the early 1990s.<sup>27</sup> All this indicates that the Moldovan government has successfully curbed tensions with the Gagauz and has even integrated them into the mainstream political system.

### Transnistria And Its Minorities

As previously mentioned, Transnistria contains no majority population. Russians and Moldovans make up about 29 percent of the population, while Ukrainians constitute about 22 percent, with their linguistic preferences falling along these ethnic lines.<sup>28</sup> Due to these linguistic barriers, it is reasonable to assume that forming a cohesive and non-prejudicial society would be difficult. The Transnistrian government has recognized these potential challenges from the outset and has introduced considerable measures to address them. For instance, in the 1992 Constitution, Article One guaranteed Transnistrian citizens “linguistic sovereignty”.<sup>29</sup> This freedom was made clearer in a 1994 amendment that assured citizens the right to use their language of birth.<sup>30</sup> The Constitution also emphasizes linguistic diversity. For instance, it is constitutionally mandated that all Transnistrians learn a second language.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, despite Transnistrian state schools primarily being instructed in Russian, they must offer classes in the two other prominent languages.<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Kamil Cașu, “Gagauzia: Growing Separatism in Moldova?” *OSW Centre for Eastern Studies*, (2018), 7.

<sup>28</sup> Osipov and Vasilevic, “Transnistrian Nation-Building: A Case of Effective Diversity Policies?”, 986.

<sup>29</sup> Osipov and Vasilevic, “Transnistrian Nation-Building: A Case of Effective Diversity Policies?”, 987.

<sup>30</sup> Girogio Comai and Bernardo Venturi, “Language and Education Laws in Multi-Ethnic de Facto States: The Cases of Abkhazia and Transnistria”, *Nationalities Papers*, 43, no. 6 (2015), 890.

<sup>31</sup> Comai and Venturi, “Language and Education Laws in Multi-Ethnic de Facto States: The Cases of Abkhazia and Transnistria.”, 891.

<sup>32</sup> Comai and Venturi, “Language and Education Laws in Multi-Ethnic de Facto States: The Cases of Abkhazia and Transnistria.”, 892.

Regarding more general cultural differences, the Transnistrian government has made significant efforts to lessen potential tensions by putting on many state-run cultural events.<sup>33</sup> Such events are conducted to introduce people to different cultures, thus lessening fears of unfamiliar ideas and cultures.

In terms of linguistic understanding, Transnistria has seen notable advances. For instance, 57 to 58 percent of the population speaks Romanian as a second language.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the percentage of Ukrainian speakers increased from 3 percent in 2001 to 30 percent by 2010.<sup>35</sup> It is difficult to find a direct link between the government's cultural initiatives and decreased tensions, but there are some possible indicators. Most notably, a 2006 referendum with almost 80 percent turnout revealed that 98 percent of Transnistrians approved of independence from Moldova and the current incarnation of the Transnistrian state.<sup>36</sup> This statistic is remarkable, especially considering that almost a third of the population self-identifies as Moldovan. Therefore, despite different languages, cultural traditions, and even different national identities, this contentment with the Transnistrian state has not been affected. If rampant discrimination and prejudice due to different cultural backgrounds were common, it is unlikely that this level of contentment would be present. Therefore, I can say with relative confidence that efforts by the Transnistrian government to lessen potential tensions between Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians have been successful.

Before moving on to my analysis that will look at Moldova and Transnistria's relations with each other, it is important to first make some caveats to the first part of my thesis. While I have described a rosy picture of the treatment of the Gagauz in modern-day Moldova and the many minorities in Transnistria, there are still notable challenges. For instance, in a report conducted by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2016, several problems were found in the linguistic management of Gagauzia. One example included key medical documents only being made available in Romanian.<sup>37</sup> Transnistria faced similar challenges, with the Russian language still dominating most aspects of

<sup>33</sup> Osipov and Vasilevic, "Transnistrian Nation-Building: A Case of Effective Diversity Policies?", 993.

<sup>34</sup> Comai and Venturi, "Language and Education Laws in Multi-Ethnic de Facto States: The Cases of Abkhazia and Transnistria.", 891.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> Osipov and Vasilevic, "Transnistrian Nation-Building: A Case of Effective Diversity Policies?", 991.

<sup>37</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues on Her Mission to the Republic of Moldova," (2017), 10.

society.<sup>38</sup> These concerns are all worthwhile and valid. However, in the report, these issues are mentioned in the context of both governments trying to eliminate said issues.<sup>39</sup> In other words, they are problems *despite* governmental efforts rather than *due* to a lack of effort. While this does not mean such problems are unimportant, or that actions taken by both governments have been perfect, it does indicate that progress is being made.

## Analysis

Before I look at Moldova and Transnistria's relations with each other, it is necessary to compare their policies towards their domestic minorities. Both the Moldovan and Transnistrian constitutions contain sections that explicitly deal with the treatment of minorities. Moreover, there have been similar efforts towards linguistic comprehension, with Moldovans and Transnistrians being familiarized with minority languages through state-run education. Transnistria and Moldova have also encouraged cultural and historical understandings. However, Moldova has done so in a more formal, educational setting, as seen by Gagauzia being a mandatory subject in Moldovan schools.<sup>40</sup> While such policies have also been put in place by the Transnistrian government, they have also set up more informal cultural events, like music festivals or art exhibits related to a particular minority.<sup>41</sup> When cultural events have been established in Moldova, they have been done in conjunction with Turkey, which highlights another difference between Moldova and Transnistria. Strong formal ties have been made with Turkey to help appease the Gagauz. However, while this has occurred with Russia and Transnistria, thus appealing to the Russian minority, the same cannot be said for ties with the rest of Moldova, or Ukraine.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, as will be discussed later, Transnistria's Russian ties are much more foundational than Moldovan and Turkish relations.

---

<sup>38</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues on Her Mission to the Republic of Moldova," (2017), 18.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid

<sup>40</sup> United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues on Her Mission to the Republic of Moldova," (2017), 9.

<sup>41</sup> Osipov and Vasilevic, "Transnistrian Nation-Building: A Case of Effective Diversity Policies?" , 991.

<sup>42</sup> Frank Jacobs, "Transnistrian Time-Slip," The New York Times (The New York Times, May 22, 2012)



Despite these differences, both Moldova and Transnistria have been relatively successful in dealing with their minority populations, as was demonstrated in the previous section. Thus, out of this comparison comes the question: why have Moldova and Transnistria been unable to improve relations with each other, despite success with their own minorities? This fact is even more interesting given the nature of these minorities. As previously mentioned, the Gagauz are heavily Russian influenced. Yet, Moldova has successfully integrated them while failing to do the same with the similarly Russian-oriented Transnistrians. Reasons as to why this failed integration has occurred will be the focus of the rest of the paper.

Moldova and Transnistria's very different political development is a large reason why tensions remain high. The roots of these specific divisions started with the civil war. The war in itself partially explains why Moldova has been able to make amends with the Gagauz but not with Transnistria, as a violent conflict on that scale often heightens polarization.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, the war cemented Moldova and Transnistria as two separate political units, which has allowed them both to develop politically in fundamentally different ways. Furthermore, Moldova's democratic development has led to tensions with Transnistria. The country is by no means a perfect democracy, officially classified as flawed by the World Bank.<sup>44</sup> However, this also means that there has been a genuine effort to implement democratic norms and institutions. Transnistria, on the other hand, has maintained the authoritarian system of the Soviet Union.<sup>45</sup> The preservation of the Soviet system is related to their reasons for splitting in the first place, which was not just linguistic, but also due to continued loyalty towards the USSR.<sup>46</sup> Specific instances of Moldova's democratic development, most notably the elections of 2001 and 2005, have caused legitimacy challenges to the Transnistrian regime.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, when Ukraine underwent its Orange Revolution in late 2004, resulting in democratic challenges to its government, this gave Moldova even more

---

<sup>43</sup> Reasons as to why civil war happened with Transnistria and not with Gagauzia are plentiful and worthwhile to explore. But given the scope of this paper, I do not have the time to explore them thoroughly.

<sup>44</sup> "Moldova," World Bank, accessed March 22, 2020.

<sup>45</sup> Osipov and Vasilevic, "Transnistrian Nation-Building: A Case of Effective Diversity Policies?" 991.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid

<sup>47</sup> Oleh Protsyk, "Moldova's Dilemmas in Democratizing and Reintegrating Transnistria," *Problems of Post-Communism* 53, no. 4 (2006), 30.

leverage to pressure Transnistria.<sup>48</sup> However, Transnistrians continue to have an aversion to democracy.<sup>49</sup> Moldova and Transnistria have not faced these sorts of challenges when dealing with their domestic minorities, as tensions have been over cultural and linguistic differences rather than political systems. Therefore, issues of differing and opposed political development have not been sources of division, whereas they are foundational issues for Moldovan and Transnistrian relations.

The second reason for these divisions can be attributed to fears of unification with other countries. As previously described, one of the main reasons for Transnistria's split from Moldova in the early 1990s was over fears of unification with Romania. These worries persist to this day. However, to accomplish their de facto independence, Transnistria also became closely tied with a foreign actor – unsurprisingly, Russia. The seeds of this alliance were planted with the fourteenth Russian army fighting for Transnistria during the civil war.<sup>50</sup> This alliance has since expanded, with Russia and Transnistria signing numerous joint declarations and friendship agreements over the past thirty years.<sup>51</sup> However, perhaps most decisive in cementing tensions between Moldova and Transnistria was Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014. Since then, there has been considerable fear from the Moldovan government that Russia would attempt a similar annexation of Transnistria.<sup>52</sup> Transnistrians themselves have done little to dissuade these fears. For instance, as previously mentioned, a 2006 referendum revealed that 98 percent of Transnistrians were open to future integration with Russia.<sup>53</sup>

Worries about foreign actors have cemented the divide between Moldova and Transnistria, as both fear unification or annexation with or by Russia and Romania, respectively.<sup>54</sup> Concessions to both countries' domestic minorities have been made without any fears of unification with another country and have not implied fundamental changes to their current political system. For instance, as previously mentioned, gestures were

---

<sup>48</sup> Protsyk and Osoian, "Ethnic or multi-ethnic parties? Party competition and legislative recruitment in Moldova", 18-19.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid

<sup>50</sup> Jacobs, "Transnistrian Time-Slip," *The New York Times*.

<sup>51</sup> Protsyk, "Moldova's Dilemmas in Democratizing and Reintegrating Transnistria," 32.

<sup>52</sup> Thorbjorn Jagland, "Bring Moldova Back from the Brink," (*The New York Times*, August 10, 2015).

<sup>53</sup> Osipov and Vasilevic, "Transnistrian Nation-Building: A Case of Effective Diversity Policies?" 991.

<sup>54</sup> Jagland, "Bring Moldova Back from the Brink,".

made towards Turkey regarding the Gagauz, but these were more along the lines of formal diplomatic ties and cultural exchanges, normal interactions between states and nothing that would indicate unification. All this is indicative of the problems with having a functionally independent state that is still officially part of another country. Transnistria operating on the international stage differently than Moldova, while still technically being part of Moldova, would understandably cause tensions not easily solved by traditional methods of minority integration. Overall, however, when these differing foreign ties are combined with the polarized development of Moldova and Transnistria's political system, it is even easier to see how deepening divisions between Transnistria and Moldova occurred - resulting in challenges not seen in their domestic minority relations.

## Conclusion

Despite making substantial efforts to ease tensions with their domestic minorities, Moldova and Transnistria still face enormous challenges with their diplomatic relations. Both have made strives with their domestic populations through education, linguistic understanding, and cultural events. However, the development of different political systems and opposing foreign ties has prevented similar improvements *between* Transnistria and Moldova. One question needs to be considered regarding takeaways from this analysis: are there any strategies used for Moldova and Transnistria's domestic minorities that could be applied to improving relations *between* Moldova and Transnistria? There is reason to think that linguistic education would help ease tensions, as one of the reasons for Transnistria's declaration of independence was due to fears of losing the right to speak Russian. Cultural events could maybe have a similar de-escalating effect. However, the most obvious example is the provision in the Moldovan Constitution that allows for Gagauzia to declare independence in the event of unification with Romania. The possibility of a similar provision for Transnistria has been floated in the past.<sup>55</sup> Despite this, it would do little to solve the problem of Russian aggression, therefore, limiting its effectiveness. The problem of different political systems remains as well. Regardless, overall, this analysis has shown that success in one instance of minority integration does not mean success in another. This notion is particularly true when one of those minorities, as

---

<sup>55</sup> Venturi, "Civil Society Organizations and Conflict Resolution: Moldova-Transnistria.", 9.

is the case with Transnistria, operates as an independent state – leading to challenges that may not be present with domestic minorities. Therefore, the specific circumstances must always be considered to assess if policies to appease one group will ease tensions with another.

## Bibliography

- Caľus, Kamil. "Gagauzia: Growing Separatism in Moldova?" *OSW Centre for Eastern Studies*, (2018). <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-10/gagauzia-growing-separatism-moldova>.
- Comai, Giorgio, and Venturi, Bernardo. "Language and Education Laws in Multi-Ethnic de Facto States: The Cases of Abkhazia and Transnistria.", (2015). *Nationalities Papers* 43, no. 6: 886–905, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1082996>.
- Crowther, William. "Moldova, Transnistria and the PCRM's Turn to the West". *East European Quarterly*. 41, no. 3, (2007). 273-304. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289980860\\_Moldova\\_transnistria\\_and\\_the\\_PCRM's\\_turn\\_to\\_the\\_west](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289980860_Moldova_transnistria_and_the_PCRM's_turn_to_the_west).
- Jacobs, Frank. "Transnistrian Time-Slip." *The New York Times*. May 22, 2012. <https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/transnistrian-time-slip/>.
- Jagland, Thorbjorn. "Bring Moldova Back from the Brink." *The New York Times*. (2015). <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/opinion/bring-moldova-back-from-the-brink.html?auth=link-dismiss-google1tap>.
- King, Charles. "Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of the Gagauzi." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20, no. 4 (1997): 738–56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1997.9993987>.
- "Moldova." World Bank. Accessed March 22, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/country/moldova>.
- Osipov, Alexander, and Hanna Vasilevich. "Transnistrian Nation-Building: A Case of Effective Diversity Policies?" *Nationalities Papers* 47, no. 6 (2019): 983–99. <https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2018.26>.
- Protsyk, Oleh and Osoian, Ion. "Ethnic or multi-ethnic parties? Party Competition and Legislative Recruitment in Moldova". *European Centre for Minority Issues*. ECMI Working Paper (47), (2010): 1-22. [http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2721/pdf/working\\_paper\\_47\\_en.pdf](http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2721/pdf/working_paper_47_en.pdf).
- Protsyk, Oleh. "Moldova's Dilemmas in Democratizing and Reintegrating Transnistria." *Problems of Post-Communism* 53, no. 4 (2006): 29–41. <https://doi.org/10.2753/ppc1075-8216530403>.
- Sanchez, W. Alejandro. "The 'Frozen' Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question Has Become a European Geo-Security Issue." *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 22, no. 2 (2009): 153–76. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040902917917>.

- United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to the Republic of Moldova”, (2017). <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/58adaa204.pdf>.
- Venturi, Bernardo. “Civil Society Organizations and Conflict Resolution: Moldova-Transnistria.” *International Journal on World Peace* 28 (2), (2011) 7–34. <http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=63795367&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.