Leadership & Ambition

Comparative Insights from
France and Costa Rica's Fossil Fuel Moratoria

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Abstract

This comparative analysis highlights the enabling factors for France and Costa Rica to pursue supply-side fossil fuel restraints (fossil fuel exploration and extraction moratoria). This study helps clarify the pathways to adopting these policies and looks at intrinsic and external factors motivating state behaviour. The presence of executive leadership commitment acts as international driver combined with the enabling material conditions of carbon free / renewable electricity systems coalesce to produce fossil fuel bans; while the pursuit of climate-leader status within the international context of climate change negotiations stands out as an external motivating factor.

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Introduction

In the context of the global climate crisis, state actors have not used their structural capacity to meet sustainability targets in congruence with international agreements despite the urgent need for climate action. This comparative analysis highlights the political dynamics lending to France and Costa Rica's decisions to pursue fossil fuel exploration and extraction moratoria, namely the adoption of bans which restrict or phase out economic activities to keep burnable fossil fuels in the ground. The research question guiding this analysis is as follows: why did France and Costa Rica both pursue fossil fuel bans? Based on the question posed above, the similarities found suggest: the presence of executive leadership commitment acts as an international driver of adopting fossil fuel bans in tandem with the enabling material conditions of carbon free/renewable electricity systems; while pursuing recognition as an international climate leader acts as an external motivating factor. The importance of this study helps clarify what causal agents could be important to provide a general understanding of the pathways available to adopt "supply side" policies as an instrument to constrain the supply of burnable fossil fuels available on the market. Researching the causal agents behind the supply side approach pertaining to moratoria could motivate and enable certain states to pursue similar decisions to address the climate crisis.

Topic and Hypothesis

The 2015 Paris Agreement set current greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets to keeping global temperatures below 2.0ºC, despite the need to strive for 1.5ºC target to mitigate against the catastrophic effects of 2.0ºC warming. Additionally, the Paris Agreement created a general basis for cooperation within the international community by requiring states to pursue climate action and submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change. Five-year updates which required states to set more ambitious goals in subsequent meetings were also mandated. This is important within the context of the climate crisis, as a report by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that more pathways to limit global warming

are required to achieve 1.5ºC through extensive systems transitions. It is imperative states work towards their climate targets, as by doing so, they can prevent subsequent climate-related risks to global health, human security, sustenance, life, and the environment of the 1.5ºC target alone.

The global implications of climate change frame the salience of this research when discussing the mitigation of carbon emissions through international climate governance, national climate legislation, and policy implementation. In addition to the significant role of the UNFCCC and Conference of Parties (COP), climate change negotiations also play in shaping the national climate action. While noting how global climate governance may prime state actors to pursue climate action by adopting international norms, state actors may potentially emerge as climate leaders amidst this global challenge.

The UNFCCC defines climate leadership as the "transformational and replicable government action and ambition at any level (national, regional, city, town, etc.), helping to strengthen the case for the increased climate action and ambition that is urgently needed to ensure the world can limit the increase in global average temperature this century to 1.5 degrees Celsius and to build resilience to climate change". Within the context of international climate governance, the establishment of international norms promoting climate action alter the perception of appropriate action and interests among state actors in response to the climate crisis (Blondeel et al., p.64). Where further participation in climate governance norms shapes the interests of states seeking to ascribe to or provide examples of leadership within the context of climate governance. This study examines how climate leadership aspiration and positioning between France and Costa Rica influences executive decision-making pertaining to the fossil fuel moratoria. In addition to discussing what similar material conditions enable each country to

pursue moratoria policies between comparative climate action strategies.

Domestically, Costa Rica and France's climate actions are informed by the country's individual decisions and motivations. However, the influence of international climate change negotiations, and influence and participation in the norms which emerge within these contexts, also affects state behaviour. In this respect, Costa Rica has committed to its fossil fuel exploration and extraction moratorium since 2002's first executive order. Ever since, later executive orders – namely Order 36693 in 2011, the order's extension in 2014, and Order 41578 in 2019 - propel like-minded commitments. Similarly, albeit through legislation, France has enacted a ban on domestic fossil fuel exploration and extraction by 2040 using Law no. 2017-1839 passed in 2017. At the time of these domestic decisions, Costa Rica and France were also participating in the COP negotiations from the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and COP15 (Copenhagen) in 2009 to reaching the Paris Agreement (COP21) in 2015. These events not only shape global climate policy but contextualize the political and legal climate that informed Costa Rica and France's decisions to adopt fossil fuel bans or moratoria.

This paper compares Costa Rica and France to find common factors explaining why both states pursued fossil fuel bans. The hypothesis is based on the examination of each country's executive leadership, contexts for bold decision-making, and the consideration of international leadership aspirations. This paper suggests that bold executive leadership, and the low reliance on fossil fuels for national electricity use, act as internal drivers which have led to fossil fuel bans in both cases. Meanwhile, aiming to pursue international recognition as a leader within the context of climate change negotiations operates as an external motivating force. The implication of this report seeks to identify core factors to contribute to supply-side fossil fuel literature within the context of the climate crisis whilst addressing the realities of climate change. These forms of moratoria or bans are forms of domestic climate action, representing key precedents to inform steps towards climate action across similar jurisdictions.

Analytic Framework

The comparative method of most difference will be used to investigate the different processes and timelines between France and Costa Rica's adoption of fossil fuel moratoria legislation between national and international scales of climate governance. This method of comparison is justified, as the research question identifies the shared outcome of fossil fuel moratoria as the dependent variable of study. Employing this method is useful to find common independent variables among different case studies, in which the common independent variable between case studies may represent causal factors within and across respective contexts.

Using this comparative method within the field of climate politics and policy research warrants the application of additional frameworks to understand both domestic and international factors motivating state behaviour. First, Stevenson's framework on the role of institutions, material conditions, and social aspects as influential factors motivating state behaviour, these factors are investigated to understand the political contexts between cases. Second, this analysis will incorporate how Keep It in the Ground (KIIG) policies, such as fossil fuel bans, often scale-up the level of analysis to consider the factor of international climate change negotiations and agreements. Third, on both national and international scales, the degree of effectiveness regarding how a state's executive leadership responds to climate change has differentiated climate leaders from climate laggards in comparative studies. Furthermore, this research considers the role of national executive leadership, notably its emergence or assertion, within the international domain of climate change negotiations. Based upon the literature, one can frame the key factors specific to climate politics and policy research, where differences within factors will come together to find the most similar and relevant dependent variable.

The use of supply-side policies on fossil fuels operate to constrain the available supply of burnable fossil fuels on the market. Within the context of climate policy and decision-making strategies moving away from fossil fuel energy production and consumption, moratoria can hedge against the possibility of carbon lock-in. Carbon

lock-in refers to the perpetual cycle of being reliant upon fossil fuel dependent energy systems, discussed within the scope of electricity systems—in which institutions, technologies, and norms are not pursuing low-carbon alternatives. For supply-side or KIIG policies, the use of fossil fuel bans alongside sociotechnical transitions represents a move away from carbon lock-in and towards the goals of carbon neutrality. These policies promote the norm of climate-action, aiming to scale up this precedent to other jurisdictions by making choices which do not perpetuate carbon-intensive systems within the scope of electricity systems and domestic policy. The adoption of moratoria relates to leadership emergence, as it is connected to pursuing innovative policies that only few countries have implemented. Thus, the example of leadership can be considered an as an influential precedent if other countries aim to follow similar pathways. In the following sections, Costa Rica and France will demonstrate why executive leadership from the domestic level, and international leadership aspiration are salient factors motivating similar climate laws.

France

The release of France's primary policy document, the 2017 *Climate Plan,* was a crucial moment for the country's climate policy post-Paris Agreement. This policy document was created to implement the 2015 Paris Agreement and forward national energy transitions institutionally, preceding France's law no. 2017-1839 which passed in December 2017. Law no. 2017-1839, phases out and bans fossil fuel exploration and exploitation on French territory, with no further permits to be granted by 2040. While the strategy of the *Climate Plan* outlines a range of environmental and climate issues, the legislation most important to highlight for the purposes of this paper include: (a) keeping global warming below 1.5ºC/2ºC, (b) mobilizing ambitious climate policies whilst accounting for socio-cultural complexities, and (c) reducing France's dependence on fossil fuels to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The timeline between the Paris Agreement, the publication of the *Climate Plan*, and the passing of law no. 2017-1839 correlate to the impact the Paris Agreement has had regarding France's commitment to passing the fossil fuel moratoria at a national level.

Approach nine of the *Climate Plan*, "Leaving Oil Underground," addresses how France's institutions took up the Paris Agreement, in part, through the diffusion of norms surrounding global climate governance. Phasing out fossil fuels through supply-side bans was a primary tenet of this strategy. This approach seeks to reduce fossil fuel exploration activities, eventually phasing fossil fuels out completely while ceasing to renew extraction licenses by 2040. The underlying ethic behind this approach is to keep these combustible hydrocarbons in the ground as per the Paris Agreement's 1.5ºC/2ºC targets, therefore displaying the policy document's intent of solidifying France's national and institutional commitment to the Paris Agreement's targets. Subsequently, this intent informs the purpose behind law no. 2017-1839.

France's role as a fossil fuel importer, and the aim of the legislation noted above, is related to the material conditions of France's overall fossil fuel energy consumption. The 2017 *Climate Transparency Report* for France demonstrates energy related GHG emissions are associated with energy production, sitting at approximately 325 MtCO2 per year. Further, 14%, 25%, and 4% of energy consumption respectively corresponds to gas, oil, and coal sources. While 38% of 325 MtCO2 per year was produced from transportation, 26% from goods and services, 20% from industry, and 16% from electricity and heating sources. While the high degree of nuclear energy within France's energy mix is due was made possible due to decades of prior energy investment and restructuring, due to the limited fossil fuel resources to reduce dependencies on fossil fuels as an importer. Overall, during these two years, France relied on nuclear energy for about half of their respective energy mix. According to the 2021 *Climate Transparency Report* these energy mix ratios have not changed substantively despite the legislated bills and policymaking since the Paris Agreement, the 2017 *Climate Plan* and law no. 2017-1839. For EU member countries such as France, their efforts and contributions constitute part of the EU's overall NDC as per the Paris Agreement. France's material conditions of having a relatively low-economic reliance on fossil fuel production and consumption within the countries' overall energy mix. In addition to previous agendas to hedge against

importing fossil fuels for domestic electricity demands. Together, these factors make fossil fuel moratoria highly feasible today.

Prior to passing law no. 2017-1839 in December 2017, France underwent a Presidential election. After a 5-year term, François Hollande lost to incumbent president Emmanuel Macron, who entered office in May 2017. This change in executive leadership signified a shift from the president who had hosted COP21 in 2015, towards a more ambitious leadership style that Macron had championed throughout his campaign. Fossil fuel moratoria on shale gas, phasing out coal power within five years, and increasing investments to double renewable electric energy generation were all key commitments regarding climate action on his election platform. Furthermore, news media organization, *The Mercury*, reported on Macron's heckling of Donald Trump's climate denialism and pledge to uphold commitments made at COP21 during the tail end of his campaign.

Macron claimed to represent France as an innovator who is dedicated to climate change, clean and renewable energy, and new technologies. Despite this claim, Macron received a large amount of skepticism regarding his stance on environmental issues and climate policy by carrying forward Hollande's advancements like the *Energy Transition Law*. This law was established in 2015 which continued previous climate and energy legislation by setting comprehensive targets, reporting measures, and bolstering less use of fossil fuels within the energy mix. These insights regarding France's leadership transition are interesting because six months after his election in May, law no. 2017-1839 passed that December. The ambition of this next executive leader reified his commitment to climate-action while also demonstrating international status within climate change negotiations by challenging Donald Trump's climate change denialism. This characteristic of Macron's leadership establishes the domestic link of the political executive to the international context. Maintaining previously established progress and pursuing further strategies to address climate change through green technology and balancing carbon restraints with a strong economy sustain France's claims toward climate leader status.

Beyond changes in executive power, France has historically positioned itself as a leader in international climate change negotiations. From the late-1990s to the mid-2010s, France's continued reliance on nuclear energy and hydroelectricity from previous decades of energy restructuring has enabled emissions reductions to be decoupled from economic growth[OBJ]. This means that France's emissions reductions were achieved without substantially interfering with economic productivity, as France is one of the strongest and competitive economic powers in the world.

Prior to law no. 2017-1839, France banned the use of fracking technologies for shale gas in 2014 with 62% of French public opinion against the development of shale gas. With low public support in the case against shale gas and fracking methods, the pressure of civil society and public participation exerted notable pressure supporting the ban. The reliance on carbon free energy is a notable condition working together to produce this prohibition. It is probable the same public acceptance and condition of carbon free energy can be generalized to the successive law no. 2017-1839.

The role of carbon-free electricity systems allowed France to (re)seize their relevance as an international climate leader over the course of international climate change negotiations due to early energy system restructuring toward nuclear. Furthermore, France's leadership aspirations are exerted on the international level, while the constraints imposed by the EU positions France as a follower to the IGO's governance requirement for policy coordination. France's electricity system relies on carbon-free energy to bolster its political determination in legislating ambitious climate policies and fossil fuel bans. This is evident through self-declared rhetoric of "affirm[ing] its role as a pioneer by becoming the first country to put into practice such a policy and encouraging… other countries to join this commitment". Overall, France's pre-existing nuclear and hydroelectric energy systems and their low reliance on fossil fuels enabling executive leadership to drive decisions to pass fossil fuel moratoria and project the countries climate leader aspirations within international contexts.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica's fossil fuel moratoria was the result of an executive order in 2002, centred on the primary rationale of ecological conservation of forests and the establishing carbon sinks. The establishment of carbon sinks is an outcome of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which promoted Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and the carbon trading credit systems. This system worked between industrialized countries and countries undergoing economic transition (Annex I) and developed countries financing CDM mechanisms for developing countries (Annex II) and developing countries. The establishment of this global climate governance norm operated upon Annex II countries financing CDM projects such as carbon sinks for developing countries, whereby carbon credit could be accrued for developed countries based on CDM projects investments. In addition, Kyoto only required industrialized countries to cut emissions. This often resulted in investor countries acquiring carbon credits, increasing the quantity of emissions beyond their Kyoto designated limit. At the time, the climate governance norm of carbon sinks between developed and developing countries informs why Costa Rica's moratoria was connected to the conservation of their forests.

At the time, Costa Rica was listed as a non-Annex I country, however, proceeded to implement this executive order nationally and unilaterally—without the investment of an Annex II country. Furthermore, Costa Rica institutionalized the CDM norm of carbon sinks contrary to the Annex I/II-developing bilateral relationship. Instead, Costa Rica became their own host country. In fact, through the national forest protection and reforestation program Costa Rica paid landowners for certain forest activities and carbon stock monitoring, where the country capitalized off selling carbon offsets to countries such as Norway, purchasing $2 million USD worth of credit. This unique distinction in the case of Costa Rica demonstrates pursuit of climate governance and a display of national climate leadership despite bearing no obligation to participate as per international norms relegated to country classification. Namely, the influence of the Kyoto Protocol's CDM norms substantially

influenced why the executive order brought the fossil fuel moratoria into the force of law.

This bold demonstration of Costa Rica's national climate leadership surpassed expected international norms and furthered its leadership aspirations in subsequent COP negotiations. What is unique for Costa Rica is the political and institutional development as demonstrated by the sustained visionary approaches to promote environmental, economic, and social welfare by reallocating budgets from the country's abolished army in 1948.. Furthermore, strategic planning for economic and social development in the last 25 years has helped Costa Rica pursue national interests by their own accord for a country in the global South. In negotiating these development pathways through fossil fuel extraction spurred core debates about the option between the early-2000s and mid-2010s. Such debates pertaining to extraction prompted civil society responses which defended against overturning the executive order and its subsequent extensions from national economic development and international investment from China and North American companies. The priority to maintain ecological integrity amidst transnational corporate and bilateral state investment underpins this case study amidst goals for economic, social, and national development norms for this middle-income, developing country in Latin America.

Despite Costa Rica's ecological conservation rationale underpinning the 2002 fossil fuel moratoria, the later years of the executive order's extension and international climate change negotiations began to reframe and even strengthen the motivations for the ban, with a new dimension of international recognition to rank as a climate leader in the global community. Furthermore, the dynamic between civil society pressure on executive leader decision-making serves as an internal motivating factor, articulated between international norms and within climate change negotiations which strengthens Costa Rica's pursuit of climate leadership.

The first fossil fuel moratoria was established in 2002 by President Espriella in response to civil society pressure through coalition groups in favour of environmental conservation. President Espriella pursued bold action to implement this ban when he began

office, explicitly responding to this concern by addressing environmental conservation through law. He stated: “we will create a legal system so that deforested areas will be reforested with native species and to make clear that we won't be an oil enclave”. This bold act from a newly elected executive leader demonstrates how the executive role has the agency to commit to affirmative actions in response to civil society pressures. The combination of committed executive leadership with mounted civil society pressure works cohesively to effectively steer executive decision-making for this ban. The pressure and voice from civil society played a historic and ongoing role for environmental conservation in Latin American countries who have instated supply-side fossil fuel bans. Costa Rica’s civil society pressure from environmental-coalition activism is a normalized means for representing interests within the state. Namely, how civil society interventions pertaining to opening the country’s territories up to resource extraction resisted the possibility, maintaining a constant political pressure against violating such norm. This bold executive leadership history informed how Costa Rica approached Kyoto Protocol, COP15, and the Paris Agreement, and became an international climate leader.

Although Costa Rica’s purpose for implementing the 2002 ban was premised on ecological conservation to protect national forests while serving as carbon sinks, the emergence of the UNFCCC COP negotiations continued to influence later executive extensions of the initial executive order of 2002. Prior to this, the international expectations for countries to reduce their emissions was only expected by Annex I countries during the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, meaning that Costa Rica was not under this international pressure. Years later in 2006, President Sánchez won office and established the “Peace with Nature Coalition” which included the 2007 Carbon Neutral Pledge which brought together domestic agency for the nation to become aligned with the global climate crisis on the international level. Costa Rica’s aspirational pledge was presented at COP15 in 2009 as an idea, until COP21 in 2015 when Costa Rica’s pledge embraced pathways to reduce emissions. After this ambitious claim at COP15, the moratoria were extended by executive order 36693 in 2011 and 2014, which eventually led to Costa Rica to form carbon offsetting with the aim to achieve carbon

neutrality to develop and pursue national NDCs to effectively reduce GHG emissions.

The material factors influencing Costa Rica's ability to pursue this decision come from decades long, centralized renewable electricity system which structure the feasibility to have confidence in a forward-reaching fossil fuel ban linked to decarbonization policies. Costa Rica is dissimilar to their Latin American neighbours because its electricity power generation comes from nearly 100% of renewable energy sources constituted by hydropower, geothermal, wind, biomass, and sun—while the transportation section remains Costa Rica's largest carbon-intensive system. The establishment of renewable energy, primarily hydroelectricity, is the result of national investment from decades prior. The extensions of the fossil fuel ban have become linked with the direction to continue this progression to carbon neutrality as per their aspirational commitment to COP15 and COP21. Costa Rica has followed its "history of bold decisions," and aspired to become an international climate-leader via their ability to set precedents alike this fossil fuel moratoria and carbon-neutral pledge. The claims to bold national and international climate leadership is further supported by the lack of obligatory action from Kyoto, and their bold presentation at COP15 despite their relegation based on country classification.

Discussion

Several key differences between the processes and national characteristics between Costa Rica and France, despite the two countries achieve similar results by passing fossil fuel moratoria. Firstly, the gap between Costa Rica's executive order in 2002 and the legislation of France's law no. 2017-1839. This is relevant because the development of international climate change negotiations and governance norms between post-Kyoto and post-Paris structure different rationales and purposes for each moratorium. Second, how different country contexts are informed by country classifications between the global North and global South, in addition to respective economic prosperity. Third, in the case of France, how the EU membership affects France's national priorities through policy coordination and representation within UNFCCC

negotiations. Fourth, how Costa Rica's executive order was extended on two accounts in response after debates of overturning the moratoria but were unsuccessful due to civil society pressure and to affirm climate action and to continue leadership performance within UNFCCC negations.

Cost Rica's executive order corresponds to the climate governance norms established post-Kyoto, and the role of ecological conservation for forests is reminiscent of this order. The intention to conserve forests in addition to nationally banning fossil fuel activities are uniquely interlinked. Despite Costa Rica's exclusion from Kyoto obligations based on its development and income status as a non-Annex country, Costa Rica unilaterally participated in establishing its own carbon offsets through the establishment of carbon sinks, instead of receiving investment from industrialized or more developed states seeking to acquire carbon credits. Due to Costa Rica's economic and development classifications, Costa Rica was able to link this law to national development strategies by selling and hosting their own offsets to countries such as Norway. This differs from France because of the countries substantial economic power within the global economy and status as a developed country in the global North. The norms most relevant to law no. 2017-1839 draw from the 2017 *Climate Plan* seeking to implement the pathways to achieving the country's NDCs from the Paris Agreement, in a concerted effort with other EU member states.

Although civil society influence was salient in the case of Costa Rica, little evidence, or possible literature gaps regarding the role of France's civil society engagement was not equally substantive when compared to Costa Rica. For Costa Rica, the replication of the executive order through subsequent extensions demonstrates the greater effect of civil society opposition than in the case of France. Even though France has a strong civil society, the already apparent public acceptance of stances against the shale gas and fracking ban demonstrates less pressure required for France to legislate a similar—although more extensive fossil fuel ban. Furthermore, the norms established during the Paris Agreement brings the EU in alignment for meeting emissions reduction targets. Whereby, the unique effect of EU policy coordination contributes to

more substantive organizational pressure among members such as France.

Mutual histories restructuring electricity systems toward renewable, or carbon free energy establish key material conditions necessary to implement fossil fuel moratoria. For Costa Rica, the investment in renewable energy in the form of hydroelectricity has played a substantial role for supplying the country's electricity demands. Similarly, France's investment in nuclear energy in prior decades has produced a low reliance on fossil fuel within the country's energy mix. Together, the overall low reliance on fossil fuel for electricity production as fossil fuels importers, for the primary purpose of transportation also constitute the material conditions necessary to pursue fossil fuel moratoria.

Both fossil fuel moratoria in Costa Rica and France occurred after executive leadership transitions. Both President Macron and President Espriella implemented these bans promptly after entering office. Additionally, these political executives boldly affirmed environmental interest claims through responsive action. In each case, the role of civil society influences were of note—although, this evidence was too limited in France to draw any concrete conclusions. However, each successive political executive carried forward previous environmental and climate developments to develop climate-action and ambition rather than regressing.

The role of executive leadership's commitments to prioritize efforts to address climate change within both countries was another similar factor present in both cases. Both cases revolve around maintaining institutional and policy developments derived from UNFCCC climate change negotiations and how moratoria relate to implementing and adapting the norms established from such agreements. The influence of Kyoto on Costa Rica's initial ban and the subsequent re-commitment to following extensions of the ban can be analyzed through both national and international recommitments to climate governance. This is demonstrated by the bold leadership claims expressed at COP15 and further involvement at COP21. Demonstrating how the role of bold climate leadership pursued by the executive branch at both the national and

international level remained a pivotal factor for commitment whilst also observing the effect of UNFCCC negotiations and agreements played as an external factor influencing state behaviour. Similarly, Macron's commitment to his political platform advertising the ban was fulfilled and the implementation of the Paris Agreement's NDCs were put into policy months after he entered office. In addition, the intersection between his political stance against the US climate (in)action and denialism, and the meeting his responsibilities for France's efforts within the context of EU policy coordination demonstrate the aspirations for fulfilling climate leader obligations.

Although it was civil society pressure that initially motivated Costa Rica to establish fossil fuel moratoria through an ambitious act of leadership to pursue ecological conservation, the latter extensions for this executive order were influenced by international climate change negotiations. However, the main similarity between these two cases was the ambitious executive leadership in response to civil society undercurrents. Furthermore, after Costa Rica's initial fossil fuel ban, it became more like France after establishing a problem linkage between ecological conservation and their pledge to become climate neutral. For Costa Rica, the reframing of the ban with emissions reduction norms is due to the country's self-alignment and aspiration to be recognized as an international climate leader based on their domestic policies from COP15 to COP21. This external motivation to become international leaders became similarly causal and apparent between both cases after Costa Rica made this problem linkage and led a normative shift in global climate governance. After establishing these linkages, Costa Rica reinforced subsequent decisions to extend the ban through later decisions made by the executive, which coalesce with civil society resistance but also the investment in their role as a climate leader. This demonstrates how a presence of international influence and both international and domestic factors was ascertained by these quasi-reproductions of the initial 2002 fossil fuel moratoria.

Conclusion

The material conditions of France's low-carbon electricity system based on nuclear energy is alike Costa-Rica's renewable

electricity system as energy source requiring significantly less carbon emissions than relying on fossil fuel sources. Therefore, both countries are materially enabled to pursue climate leadership based on each's low reliance on fossil fuels in their energy mixes, with low economic reliance pertaining to fossil fuel extraction as producers. Between cases, the largest sector of imported fossil fuel is attributed to transportation. Overall, this positions each country with the ability to implement these bans due to their relatively low reliance on fossil fuels consumption for electricity demands or economic production through export. Consequently, enabling each country to either emerge or aspire to position themselves as climate-leaders to procure status and recognition, which is motivated by political executives to commit to the norms of climate action to enact fossil fuel bans and moratoria.

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