

Equalization and Access

Armed Conflict and the Political Economy of Civil War in
Sierra Leone

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The proliferation of intrastate conflict, rather than its anticipated corollary, since the end of the Cold War has prompted scholars to reconsider debates about the nature and causes of war. Demarcation between clearly defined enemies, geographical borders and perceived moral imperatives continue to blur and shift boundaries. While belligerents may fund rebel movements with illegal trade in timber, oil, narcotics, precious minerals (such as copper or gold) and gemstones (such as diamonds),¹ some political economy scholars argue that wars 'break out' *exactly* because a rich resource endowment is deemed a 'curse,' not a 'blessing.'² Another prominent argument explaining conflict determines that long-term resource rents adversely affect state governance, stability and security, employing a 'greed' theory to demonstrate why.³ Still other academics propose 'barbarism,' 'grievance' or 'ethnicity.'⁴ It is crucial to ascertain the cause or causes of war when one considers that between 1990 and 2000, there were nineteen major armed conflicts in Africa, the overwhelming majority of them in the sub-Saharan region.⁵ Thus the end of the Cold War has largely not brought peace to Africa, which has been cynically used by both the United States and the former Soviet Union in political and economic gamesmanship to

court Communist and anti-Communist clients and regimes. This debate becomes further mired when northern leaders and institutions, like the 2001 G8 Summit, determine that “dealing with the scourge of war [is] a *pre-condition* for Africa’s economic revival.”⁶ ‘Ending war first’ is precisely what this paper will demonstrate is wrongheaded about current academic debate about war.

There is no question that war is a scourge. Broadly speaking, the argument in this paper arises from the reasons typically given for post-Cold War conflict, such as ‘environmental scarcity,’ and the northern assumption that war elsewhere, especially in the south, simply ‘breaks out’ because one or two ‘conditions’ happen to be right.⁷

Specifically, this paper will look at Sierra Leone’s eleven-year civil war, among the first of several devastating internal conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa wherein western media and academics announced that the conditions for war were ripe: barbarism, greed, or tribalism, played out against the bloody exploitation of natural resources.⁸ But just how prominent were those resources and why? Did Sierra Leone’s resources—namely diamonds—cause the war? This paper’s research draws on field studies conducted in Sierra Leone in 2005, as well as recent literature in geopolitics, armed conflict and natural resources to make its point, arguing expressly that Sierra Leone’s diamond wealth did not ‘cause’ its civil war, nor is there tangible evidence to conclusively support the aforementioned theories.⁹ These explanations need to be re-evaluated because they are an oversimplification: they offer consequences of war disguised as causes. Instead, this paper offers an alternative analysis, incorporating a social and political context that situates Sierra Leone’s war at the intersection of historical and contemporary internal political antagonisms, exacerbated by the outside influence of organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). If “conditions were ripe for the anarchy that followed,”¹⁰ this article will explore the events that led to that point.

The outline of the paper is as follows: Part I begins the causes for conflict sections with environmental scarcity; Part II analyses ethnicity and tribalism; Part III examines greed theory; Part IV looks at war as a failure of the social contract; Part V explains the internal actors in the geopolitics of Sierra Leone; Part VI comments on the role of external actors in the geopolitics of Sierra Leone; and lastly, Part VII forms the concluding remarks.

Cause for Conflict: Environmental Scarcity

A number of recent theories explaining post-Cold War conflict have become influential. All are deeply rooted in 17th and 18th century European Enlightenment thought and therein lies a crucial problem. Can these theories realistically be applied to explain wars elsewhere in the world? The following sections will look at a number of recent explanations for war; what have been variously called the 'environmental scarcity,' 'resource curse,' 'new barbarism' and 'greed vs. grievance' debates. While each of these theories have certainly added to conflict understanding, especially in analyzing intrastate warfare and the attempts to link security and development, they remain limited in scope. Critics have noted that any of these explanations also reflect a "coalition of governments and aid agencies [imposing] on the south what could be termed 'liberal peace.'"¹¹ In other words, as this paper will demonstrate, these theories are problematic for two reasons. Firstly, while they may be well-researched and empirically 'proven,' they are undeniably based on "western economic interpretations of globalization."¹² Secondly, each takes a narrow, singular-cause view of war.

Thomas Homer-Dixon argues in favour of a causal connection between environmental scarcity and human conflict. He echoes Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), a British political economist, who argued that population increase always outstrips a resource base until reined in by famine, disease, war or voluntary restraint. Homer-Dixon assumes, like Malthus did, that the more people on the planet, the more conflict. While it is not necessary to detail his research here, Homer-Dixon examines six types of environmental change: climate change, ozone depletion, land degradation, forest destruction, water pollution and fisheries deficiency. His analysis assumes that any resource competition (meaning violence) is the result of environmental scarcity.¹³ Yet, his "key finding" in the end merely concludes that "scarcity of renewable resources ...can contribute to civil violence."¹⁴ While few would argue this point, it is hardly conclusive proof that 'environmental scarcity' leads directly to neo-Malthusian brutishness and causes war. So, for example, after studying the Senegal River Valley, Homer-Dixon acknowledges that violence between the Haratine (descendents of the Moors) and black Peul-speaking Africans was not because of 'environmental scarcity,' but because of a struggle to control land recently made more fertile by agricultural development.¹⁵ In other words, there was an underlying social or political context for this war—the same existing land had been made better, not worse, and contradicts

entirely the neo-Malthusian supposition. The Senegal violence was a consequence of perceived unequal land distribution and taxation issues, clearly concerns of a political and socioeconomic dimension.¹⁶ Paul Richards notes that if the scarcity thesis is valid – if, for example, hunger causes violence – then food aid would end wars.¹⁷ In fact, the opposite is true. Food aid too often prolongs war.¹⁸ In the case of Sierra Leone, environmental degradation was not a cause for war. Prior to the civil war, the country did not experience widespread security issues with food or water, nor a lack of arable land.¹⁹ Explanations for this civil war need to be sought elsewhere.

Cause for Conflict: Ethnicity and Tribalism

The ethnicity thesis claims that the Cold War threat of nuclear catastrophe was what kept warfare to a minimum. Since the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union, simmering ethnic resentments and hostilities accordingly resurfaced. For example, Robert D. Kaplan, whose book *Balkan Ghosts* is said to have been responsible for much of the Clinton presidency's foot-dragging on Bosnia, analyses former Yugoslavia in terms of 'ancient hatreds.'²⁰ The point for sub-Saharan Africa is that some scholars still attempt to explain conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan in this manner. Samuel Huntington takes ethnicity or tribalism a step further, calling any war a "clash of civilizations." Huntington believes that the world's major religious 'tribes' are separated by a hostile, insurmountable gulf, so naturally conflict must ensue. The attractiveness of this new barbarism theory is understandable. Certainly in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, it justifies international non-interventionism (too complex to intervene)²¹ and in regards to any Islamic 'clash' theorizing, a new enemy has been found to replace the Communists. Kaplan then gilded his theorizing by prophesizing primitive African wars would spill uncontrollably over borders and create anarchy and violence everywhere else.²² In fact, the opposite is true. In much of sub-Saharan Africa it is the "neighbours who inflame local conflicts by venturing across borders, seeking to control what might otherwise be quite localized fighting."²³ Examples of this include Ethiopian and Eritrean support for opposing militias in Somalia, and the role of six neighbouring countries (including Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe) in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is acknowledged that the civil war in Sierra Leone was exacerbated by neighbours and outsiders: Liberian rebels loyal to then-president Charles Taylor and the involvement of the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) and its military arm, the Nigerian-dominant Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). However, while these actors may have prolonged the war, none 'caused' the war outright.

While many conflicts have a cultural dimension, the groups that fight often use ethnicity to mobilize support. This is why ethnicity and tribalism do not adequately explain conflict, since many multicultural societies live peacefully and others the same until a conflict 'erupts.'²⁴ Critics of this theory have argued that cultural differences are not instinctive; rather they are "developed and accentuated by social and political events, by leaders and media."²⁵ In fact, Terence Ranger argues that this invention of ethnic custom dates back to the colonial period:

Almost all recent studies of nineteenth century pre-colonial Africa have emphasised that far from there being a single "tribal" identity, most Africans moved in and out of multiple identities, defining themselves at one moment as subject to this chief, at another moment as a member of that cult, at another moment as part of that clan, and at yet another moment as an initiate in that professional guild.²⁶

Raw ethnic hatred cannot explain the emergence of "new and transformed identities" nor can it clarify the long historical periods where tribe or race was simply not a "salient political characteristic."²⁷ In other words, for every instance of so-called ethnically- or tribally-induced violence, there are also cases of successful cultural compromise; for every Bosnia, there is a Czech Republic or a post-1994 South Africa.²⁸ In the case of Sierra Leone, Paul Collier's findings explain that neither social "fractionalization" by race or religion or economic stratification increases the probability of civil conflict. Indeed, he argues that where these variables are significant, they actually make societies safer.²⁹ Sierra Leone did not have simmering ancient hatreds. Its Muslim and Christian populations have successfully intermingled and intermarried for decades, often blending native West African animism into the religious mix. Its two main tribes, Temne and Mende, have certainly experienced political grievances against one another that had roots in British colonial administration policy, but they did not wage longstanding or open warfare prior to the civil war.³⁰ In such complex settings, the ancient hatreds approach and its attendant focus on ethnic rivalry as a cause for war, rather than a consequence of war, is untenable. Instead of ancient hatreds, it is more practical to consider how factors like political economy (such as access, globalization and market liberalization) may have spurred warfare that to outsiders appeared tribal and barbaric.

However, even the “horrified fascination” with the ‘new barbarism’ theorizing has been surpassed by the strength and performance of northern economies; consequently the ‘greed *versus* grievance’ debates are currently making the rounds.³¹

Cause for Conflict: Greed or Grievance

The greed *versus* grievance nexus has been applied to sub-Saharan African alluvial-diamond-producing countries, particularly Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. These three produce all of the world’s so-called ‘conflict’ or ‘blood’ diamonds (approximately four percent of total global output).³² African alluvial diamonds are easily mined in the bush, on beaches and in and around rivers, and thus easily smuggled. It is suggested that blood diamonds in all three countries were or continue to be the ‘cause’ of war. This debate has been further stimulated by Collier’s ‘lootables’ and Michael Ross’s ‘war booty’ analogies.³³ Collier argues that an abundance of these lootable resources (e.g. diamonds, timber and even oil) better explain conflicts rather than grievance or resource scarcity theories.³⁴ According to him, the decision to become a rebel is the “economic opportunity cost of violence” weighed against its anticipated utility.³⁵ But perhaps both theorists fail to place war looting in its proper social context. What are the underlying causes that led to warfare (and thus spoils acquisition) in the first place? Both Collier and Ross presuppose war in developing countries as a given and begin their examination from that point. There is some merit in arguments that suggest economic rivalries complicate and prolong war, but this does not explain the ‘cause’ of war. As with Homer-Dixon’s conclusion that resource scarcity can “contribute to violence,” (and while it is difficult to disagree with these scholars’ findings), fighting a war with no resources whatsoever would be next to impossible.³⁶ But this information alone does not conclusively indicate that resources are a curse.³⁷ Collier writes that

a country that is heavily dependent upon primary commodity exports, with a quarter of its national income coming from them, has a risk of conflict four times greater than one without primary commodity exports.³⁸

A country that derives twenty-five percent of its income on primary commodity exports has a governance issue, not a resource issue. This stems from factors such as existing low economic development experienced by the type of economies Collier is referring to (e.g. Kenya

and the former Yugoslavia) and is exacerbated by western agendas tied to foreign direct investment, existing local government instability (and the perception of using the primary commodities for the national 'good') and a nation's ability to withstand external and internal trade shocks.

Despite Secretary General Kofi Annan's terse summation of the conflict in Sierra Leone as a "poisonous mix"³⁹ of greed and diamonds that neither combatants nor peacekeepers alike could resist, diamonds are not a resource curse to that country. Diamonds played a role in the war in Sierra Leone, but they did not 'cause' the war. Resource theorists dismiss the possibility that a country's resources must also include nonmaterial, social dimensions such as access to media, political patronage, dispute resolution or voting rights.⁴⁰ None of these scholars address the notion that problems of a curse or scarcity or greed are, in fact, problems of justice, which in turn directly and indirectly affect resource distribution in countries experiencing economic inequality and stratification.

War as Failure of the Social Contract

The north, reluctant to engage in meaningful political debate about the consequences of global economic restructuring and trade liberalization,⁴¹ finds it more important to force "humanitarian" peace on a south overrun by criminals, "bandits and drug lords."⁴² The West has shown a continued preference to marginalize developing nations with Enlightenment (and binary) suppositions, designed to reign in primitive anarchy, while refusing to acknowledge the structural inequality foisted upon these very nations. Thus what some economists might consider economic variables leading to war, others would consider political ramifications of the outbreak of war. Returning to Collier's earlier analysis of primary commodities, he argues that civil war is more likely where mineral wealth combines with poverty and high unemployment among young men with limited education, but he considers none of these issues to be political or social grounds for widespread dissent.⁴³ Still later versions of Collier's and the World Bank's analysis name and add "opportunity" as a cause for war, continuing to further neglect the social and political underpinnings of conflict in their pursuit of tidy economic agendas.⁴⁴ I would add that conflict needs to occur between one or more people, usually between groups. Collier and the World Bank continue to emphasize individual motivation as the fundamental cause of conflict.⁴⁵ Their argument centres on the desire of some to be a soldier in order to loot, profiteer from shortages and foreign aid, or trade arms

and drugs and illicit commodities. These are not ‘causes’ of war, they are consequences of war. They are consequences of social imbalances and injustices such as lack of employment, low to nonexistent wages, corruption, government appropriation of resource wealth and foreign aid, and a lack of political or social access to challenge it.

Frances Stewart calls this the “failure of the social contract.” Richards calls it “new war.” Both terms refer to the failure of the state to play its part in a society delivering the economic benefits (e.g. legal mining rights) or social services (hospitals and schools) it was put in power to do so. Both theorists argue social stability is premised on people accepting “state authority as long as the state delivers services and provides [things like] reasonable employment and incomes.”⁴⁶ Richards adds that

all war is long-term struggle, commonly but not always, using violence, organized for political ends, and neither the means nor the ends can be understood without reference to a specific social context...The danger of analysing war as an anarchic “bad” is that it tends to take war out of its social context. War...is organized by social agents.⁴⁷

Stewart and Richards reject notions of war as an automatic response to “stimuli,” such as neo-Malthusian population control, cultural competition or environmental degradation.⁴⁸ Again, none of these theories adequately explain the cause of war, only consequences, and speciously normalizes violence. Further, to argue singularly that resources are a curse is to ignore the fact that wars have also occurred where there are limited to no resources and there has been peace where resources are plentiful.⁴⁹ War does not break out, argues Richards, because conditions are right, but rather because social agents become or are organized. With economic stagnation or decline (like lower per capita incomes or persistent lack of jobs) and evaporation of state services (such as lack of hospitals which contribute to higher infant mortality rates) the social contract breaks down.⁵⁰ The social agents then turn to organizing their dissent, sometimes violently.

The Geopolitics of Sierra Leone: Internal Actors

It was underlying resentments inside Sierra Leone, argues David Keen, which turned a relatively small attack of Liberian-backed Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels into a protracted conflict that ended up displacing nearly half the population.⁵¹ Keen also acknowledges

diamonds were an “incentive for war, helped fund the war and thirdly, indirectly fuelled the war,” but, again, resources—diamonds—did not start the civil war.⁵²

Political networks dating back to the 1950’s provide the context in which resources played a role in the future conflict. The politics of this era emphasized a network of personal rule. This rule was not founded on conventional concepts of legitimacy or formal bureaucratic institutions.⁵³ Instead Sierra Leone’s presidents ruled by controlling economic markets, especially in diamonds, and deliberately limiting access to financial opportunities in order to shore up their political monopoly.⁵⁴ The 1955 Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme granted legal mining rights for locals, but in practice few could afford the licenses. Elite groups were the only ones able to access both licences and the capital to mine. Siaka Stevens, who was prime minister briefly in 1967, again in 1968 and then president from 1971-1985, offered protection for illegal digging to his supporters.⁵⁵ In response to repeated military coups attempts against his regime, President Stevens capped the armed forces’ strength to just 1,500 men in 1971, forming his own armed militia, the Internal Security Unit (ISU), and by 1978 Sierra Leone was a one-party state.⁵⁶

In this patronage-based rule, Sierra Leone’s few leaders presided over the collapse of their own state, years before any fighting broke out. Reno argues “predatory personalist rule” and state collapse destroyed what was left of any other economic opportunities, especially those dependent on state stability.⁵⁷ With the economy in a downward spiral, unemployment escalating and health and education spending plummeting, neoliberalism was presented as an “alternative to state-based corruption” in the 1970s and 1980s.⁵⁸ Keen observes that the two tended to “interact to the benefit of a small clique around the president and to the detriment of the broad mass of people.”⁵⁹

Unsurprisingly, the RUF rebel group drew its key support from marginalized youth, like those in the ISU. Many of these youth were hired as petty ‘thugs’ for politicians throughout the late 1960s and 1970s.⁶⁰ It was not hard for the RUF to find revolutionary students and other dissidents. In the context of extreme poverty, rebels’ redistribution of stolen goods would be an attractive incentive, alongside emancipatory promises. There was widespread anger among Sierra Leonean youth, particularly males, at their perceived low status in a society that offered them few opportunities to advance or to perform a meaningful role.⁶¹ Richards stresses that the RUF’s initial violence—far from being ‘mindless’ or ‘random’—was a deliberate attempt to give voice to those

men and women “floundering at the margins of an exploitative world economy” within a country with a predatory state and collapsed social services.⁶² This is also why it would be a mistake to see this civil war as merely random, drug-fuelled anarchy.

In particular, Keen quotes a 2002 CARE International report that concluded:

Contrary to the widely-held notion that diamonds were the root cause of the war, more evidence points toward issues like corruption, poverty and bad governance, and the corresponding need for food security, justice, and the creation of democratic mechanisms capable of protecting the rights of ordinary citizens.⁶³

Governance and justice had failed in Sierra Leone and failed badly enough to trigger a brutal civil war that killed between 50,000-200,000, produced thousands of horrific amputations as a terror tactic and forced more than 10,000 children into combat. Diamonds did not do that; a lack of bread did. Richards and Caspar Fithen note that eleven long years later when peace was finally declared in January 2002 it was “accompanied by acceptance that war had social causes.”⁶⁴

The Geopolitics of Sierra Leone: External Actors

The effects of neoliberalism, like devaluation and privatization, suggest that it proved to be part of the cause of conflict in Sierra Leone. The struggle to keep up with debt payments in the 1980s was a key reason for the austerity (structural adjustment) programs that fed into the war.⁶⁵ At the time of this writing, this system is still in place. The Sierra Leonean government itself notes that “debt service payments (excluding debt relief) are estimated at 47.8 percent of export of goods and non-factor services....The debt burden militates against a sustainable economic recovery since it crowds out investments, particularly in education and health.”⁶⁶

Amy Chua agrees, further adding that war in Sierra Leone in the 1990s was the result of, among other things, hardships created by “what International Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiators called ‘bold and decisive’ free market measures,” meaning a removal of all tariffs and subsidies.⁶⁷ She says that IMF-created “conditions were ripe for the anarchy that followed.” The World Bank, in its Collier-led report *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, tacitly acknowledges its policies may have led to war. As the World Bank forced deindustrialisation (decline of manufacturing) and pushed

developing nations into dependence on fewer and fewer export commodities (which are cheaper than finished products), it belatedly realized that countries like Sierra Leone needed to “diversify out of dependence on primary commodity exports.”⁶⁸ This paper’s intent is not to single out World Bank or IMF policies as harbingers of anarchy because it remains too simplistic to identify and proclaim a single causal explanation for conflict.

The point in bringing it up here is to identify it and suggest for further analysis the very real possibility that these international financial institution policies might not *directly* cause conflict, but that certainly IMF conditionality (structural adjustment) programs in sub-Saharan Africa have been “statistically associated with lower growth over decades and this is one of the variables linked with conflict.”⁶⁹ Particularly in the case of Sierra Leone, the World Bank concedes that “ill-planned and inflexible stabilisation and adjustment programmes provoked an unnecessarily severe decline, which undermined the population’s limited confidence in the government to manage the economy.”⁷⁰

Conclusion

That development and security should be integrated is a vital idea, but unfortunately it has received a belated response from governments. Aid that builds up state services and infrastructure are crucial in minimizing the opportunities for violence and conflict. The way to go about this is not through punitive programs of structural adjustment. In Sierra Leone this contributed to the collapse of education, health services and political accessibility, and engendered poverty, thus directly contributing to the eleven-year civil war.⁷¹

A social contextual approach is essential for looking at what causes war in the first place. Theorists and practitioners must first determine if corruption and bad governance trigger inequality, marginalization and abuse. The creation and implementation of egalitarian mechanisms capable of protecting the rights of citizens goes further in underscoring the roots of conflict rather than ethnonationalism, tribalism or resource scarcity. Furthermore, the number of mishandled or failed peacekeeping missions and peace processes are a clear signal that practitioners do not understand the local social issues well enough.⁷²

For example, Philippe Le Billon suggests that one key action to take in this area is to “link resource exploitation and institutional

capacity building more systematically." This would ensure that resource revenues go to the community first, serve basic needs, create stability, foster security and more importantly reintroduce legitimate state authority.⁷³ If the domestic governments cannot or will not do so, international and nongovernmental organizations should pressure governments to further undertake transparency, accountability and parity processes in the allocation of natural resource revenues such as the Diamond Development Initiative, the Kimberley Process and Global Witness.

The central argument of this paper is that single-cause theories do not adequately explain war and may even hamper meaningful analysis. In particular, this paper has argued and demonstrated that the "resource curse" theory does not work in the case of Sierra Leone. To say that diamonds caused the eleven-year civil war is an oversimplification by constructed media narratives of limited communicative literacy and academic 'cause and effect' arguments. Better governance plays a significant role in conflict prevention and termination. Through better governance comes equitable, properly taxed natural resource administration and that too feeds into conflict prevention and termination. Conflict and war are explained by underlying social and political factors and as such, can be said to be 'caused' by a lack of justice or access. As noted by an Angolan journalist jailed for denouncing corruption and war in his diamond-rich country: "It's fashionable to say that we are cursed by our mineral riches. That's not true. We are cursed by our leaders."⁷⁴

Notes

¹ See Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective" in Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); see Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, "Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49.3 (2005): 319-336; see Michael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence From Thirteen Cases," *International Organization* 58 (Winter 2004): 35-67.

² Richard M. Auty, *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis* (London: Routledge, 1993).

³ Collier, "Doing Well Out of War."

⁴ Paul Richards, "New War: An Ethnographic Approach" in Paul Richards (ed), *No Peace No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts* (Oxford: James Currey Press, 2005) 4-9.

⁵ Tony Addison and S. Mansoob Murshed, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Some Analytical issues" in Augustin Kwasi Fosu and Paul Collier (eds), *Post-Conflict Economies in Africa* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 3.

⁶ Richards, 3 (original emphasis).

⁷ Richards, 4.

⁸ William Reno, "Political Networks in a Failing State: The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone," *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 2 (2003): 44.

⁹ See David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, *International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 320* (London: Oxford University Press, 1998); see William Reno, "Political Networks in a Failing State: The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone," *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 2 (2003): 44-66; and see Philippe Le Billon, "The Political Ecology of War," *Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts*, *Political Geography* 20 (2001): 561-584.

¹⁰ Fabien Lefrancois, "World Bank, IMF: Helping peace or creating conditions for war?" *Bretton Woods Project*, Monday 5 April 2004, last edited: Saturday 23 October 2004 <<http://brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=43345>> (last accessed September 17, 2006).

¹¹ Richards, 6.

¹² *Ibid.*, 6.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁴ Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security* 16.2 (1991): 110.

¹⁵ Richards, 8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁸ See David Keen, *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); see Alex de Waal, *Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan 1984-1985* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

¹⁹ Marilyn Silberfein, "The Geopolitics of Conflict and Diamonds in Sierra Leone," *Geopolitics* 9.1 (2004): 235.

²⁰ Richards, 2.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²² Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War* (New York: Vintage, 2001).

²³ Richards, 8.

²⁴ Frances Stewart, "Development and Security," *Conflict, Security and Development* 4.3 (December 2004): 269-270.

²⁵ Stewart, 270.

²⁶ Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa" in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Canto, 1983) 248.

- ²⁷ Bruce W. Jentleson, "Preventative Diplomacy and Ethnic Conflict: Possible, Difficult, Necessary" in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998) 298.
- ²⁸ David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement" in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds), *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) 342.
- ²⁹ Paul Collier, "Rebellions as a Quasi-Criminal Activity." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44.6 (2000): 839-840.
- ³⁰ "Minorities at Risk: Assessment for Mende in Sierra Leone," *The MAR Project*. December 31, 2003 <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=45103>> (last accessed August 17, 2006); author interviews.
- ³¹ Collier, "Doing Well Out of War," 95.
- ³² Richards, 9.
- ³³ See Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective" in Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); see Michael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases," *International Organization* 58 (Winter 2004): 35-67.
- ³⁴ Benedikt Korf, "Rethinking the Greed-Grievance Nexus: Property Rights and the Political Economy of War in Sri Lanka," *Journal of Peace Research* 42.2 (2005): 204.
- ³⁵ Collier, "Doing Well Out of War," 102.
- ³⁶ Richards, 10.
- ³⁷ See Richard M. Auty, *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis* (London: Routledge, 1993).
- ³⁸ Collier, "Doing Well Out of War," 97.
- ³⁹ Philippe Le Billon, "Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist Consumer," *Antipode* 38.4 (September 2006): 782.
- ⁴⁰ See Ann Jordan, "Women and conflict transformation: influences, roles, and experiences," *Development in Practice* 13.2&3 (May 2003): 239-251; see David Keen, "Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths: The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone," *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 2 (2003); see Donna Pankhurst, "The 'sex-war' and other wars: towards a feminist approach to peace building," *Development in Practice* 13.2&3 (May 2003): 154-177; see Paul Richards, "New War: An Ethnographic Approach" in Paul Richards (ed), *No Peace No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts* (Oxford: James Currey Press, 2005); see Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey Press, 1996); see Frances Stewart, "Development and Security," *Conflict, Security and Development* 4.3 (December 2004): 259-270.

- ⁴¹ See Lisa H. Schwartzman, *Challenging Liberalism: Feminism as Political Critique* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006); see International Labour Organization (ilo.org); see Human Rights Watch (hrw.org).
- ⁴² Richards, 10.
- ⁴³ Ibid.; see Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective" in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
- ⁴⁴ Stewart, 270; see Paul Collier, V.L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington: World Bank; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- ⁴⁵ Stewart, 272.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., 275; Richards 7.
- ⁴⁷ Richards, 3.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., 4; Stewart 276.
- ⁴⁹ Le Billon, "Political Ecology of War," 565.
- ⁵⁰ Stewart, 275.
- ⁵¹ David Keen, "Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths: The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone," *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 2 (2003): 67.
- ⁵² Ibid., 47.
- ⁵³ Ibid., 68.
- ⁵⁴ William Reno, "Political Networks in a Failing State: The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone," *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 2 (2003): 45.
- ⁵⁵ Keen, 68.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., 70.
- ⁵⁷ Reno, 46-47.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., 47.
- ⁵⁹ Keen, 75.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid., 78.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., 77.
- ⁶² Ibid., 78.
- ⁶³ Ibid., 69.
- ⁶⁴ Caspar Fithen and Paul Richards, "Making War, Crafting Peace: Militia Solidarities & Demobilization in Sierra Leone," in Paul Richards (ed) *No Peace No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts* (Oxford: James Currey Press, 2005) 121.
- ⁶⁵ Keen, 87.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., 87-88; Republic of Sierra Leone, *Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Report* (2001): 13; author interviews.
- ⁶⁷ Lefrancois (see Note 10).
- ⁶⁸ Ibid.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Lefrancois.

⁷¹ David Keen, *Endless War? Hidden Functions of the "War on Terror."* (London, UK; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006) 215.

⁷² Richards, 5.

⁷³ Philippe Le Billon, *Fuelling War: Natural resources and armed conflict*, *International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 373* (London: Oxford University Press, 2005): 81-82.

⁷⁴ Le Billon, *Fuelling War*, 8.