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*On Politics is printed on the Coast Salish Territories. The On Politics Team acknowledges with respect the Lekwungen peoples on whose traditional territory the university stands and the Songhees, Esquimalt, and WSÁNEĆ peoples whose historical relationship with the land continues to this day*

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## The Journal

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*On Politics* is a peer-reviewed academic journal published by the University of Victoria Undergraduates of Political Science. It aims to encourage and facilitate undergraduate scholarship by providing students and recent graduates with a unique opportunity to have their work published in a formal medium. The editors of this journal are drawn from the undergraduate student body.

Submissions are welcomed from students during our call for papers each semester. *On Politics* strives to publish writing from a variety of theoretical perspectives, both intra- and interdisciplinary, with a particular focus in uplifting marginalized voices and to showcase emerging undergraduate scholars at the University of Victoria. Although published articles are typically found within the realm of political science, we welcome political work from all fields of study.

We especially encourage students from adjacent disciplines to submit, acknowledging the existence of a vast body of political work that crosses beyond the disciplinary boundaries of academia.

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## Letter From the Editors

*Dear Reader,*

It is our pleasure to present the sixteenth volume of *On Politics*. This compilation of exemplary undergraduate scholarship would not have been possible without the hard work and combined efforts of our editors, proofreaders, reviewers, and of course—talented authors.

Providing a platform for student scholarship within political academia is an incredibly important endeavor. This volume of *On Politics* offers some of the fresh perspectives and critical thoughts of undergraduate students at the University of Victoria. Such perspectives are crucial in our rapidly changing political climate.

This particular volume of *On Politics* centers seven different undergraduate student voices—each on a different perspective and endeavour within 21<sup>st</sup> Century politics.

We are grateful for the opportunity to share this with you and would like to thank everyone who has aided in bringing this edition to life!

Simone Rutherford and Anna Alva

Editors-in-Chief

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# The Glorified Rapist

*How Militarized Masculinity Creates Militarized Sites That Foster Intra-Service Sexualized Violence Through an Examination of the U.S. Military*

**Molly Taylor**

## **Abstract**

The ratification of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 aimed to promote women's peace and security using a liberal feminist framework to advance gender equality in conflict settings. Its failure to redress underlying structural problems has raised justified criticism. This article probes to unpack the force of toxic hegemonic masculinity in conflict settings. The U.S. Army is highly regarded for safeguarding the nation-state. Yet, ironically, U.S. military institutions persist as sites of *intra*-service sexual violence which must not be understood as anything less than a national security concern. How militarized masculinities foster militarized sites and enable *intra*-service sexualized violence will be explored through a gendered lens using the U.S. military as a case study. Ultimately, this research finds that U.S. national heroes are being violated by uniformed rapists, who escape accountability shielded by militarism's toxic use of hegemonic masculinity.

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*Those who commit sexual assault are not only committing a crime, they threaten the trust and discipline that make our military strong. That's why we have to be determined to stop those crimes, because they've got no place in the greatest military on Earth.*

– U.S. President Barack Obama

## **Introduction & Essay Road Map**

After numerous sexually violent incidences within the United States (U.S.) military, President Barack Obama voiced the quote above, and members of Congress were quick to pass legislation to redress the Pentagon's failed handling of this crisis. Active in all sectors, units, and divisions of the U.S. military is *intra-service* (service personnel against other service personnel) sexualized violence. Indeed, an armed male soldier violating his female comrades is not a daily concern for most Americans; yet, gender operates to penetrate all aspects of our lives including the very institution funded to secure the protection and futurity of the nation. This essay considers how militarized masculinities create militarized sites that enable *intra-service* sexualized violence through a case study of the U.S. military.

Following a quick remark regarding the limitations of this research, considerable space will be provided for conceptual and contextual grounding as this problem is theoretically rooted in disposition. Once complete, this essay will explore U.S. military institutions as sites for *intra-service* sexualized violence. This exploration will lead into a deeper analysis of how hegemonic masculinity sanctions grand-scale *intra-service* sexualized violence.

## Limitations

Before moving on to the substance of this essay, it is fruitful to address the limitations of this work. Firstly, this work virtually ignores the experiences of those who are non-gender conforming and/or part of the LGBTQUI2S+ community, and by doing so, discounts their experiences of *intra*-service sexual violence in the U.S. military. Secondly, sexual violence is contextual; thus, this essay is far too short to claim to be an exhaustive account. Thirdly, *intra*-service sexual violence is not solely a result of hegemonic masculinity. However, this essay rigidly considers the role of masculinity, which may over promote *ungendering* the military as the ultimate means to eradicate this gross bodily violence. Lastly, the personal accounts and statistics used are likely inaccurate as sexual assault is traumatizing and underreported. *Intra*-service sexual assault is no exception considering the institutional power dynamics—and masculinities—at play.

## Unpacking Hegemonic Masculinity in Militarized Institutions

This section aims to unpack hegemonic masculinity in militarized institutions to provide contextual and conceptual grounding (Connell 1987 and 1995; Cheng 1999; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). What follows sustains the notion that military institutions are structurally heteronormative and hegemonically masculine, making them difficult and harmful spaces for women and all who deviate from the alleged masculinist ideal (e.g., men with feminized statuses). The latter is appropriate to research as military institutions will remain as hegemonic masculine sites until gender issues—especially those concerning masculinities—are addressed and rectified.

On October 31, 2000, The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ratified resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). The resolution bears a liberal feminist approach to peace and security as it: 1) demands increased representation of women

in decisions at all institutional levels regarding conflict, 2) mandates adequate protection of women in conflict, and 3) calls for the provisioning of security, justice services, and humanitarian aid. Despite the promise and significance of this resolution, it failed to mention men or masculinities which is extremely problematic because militarized institutions embody hegemonic masculinity. How can conditions be made better for women while gendered ideologies remain invisible, even in international policies? To this, feminist theorist Hannah Wright states that because gendered concepts have been assimilated into WPS policies, military institutions remain unchallenged and can normalize the workings of gendered ideologies to repress women. Susan Willett agrees with Wright, expounding, “gender discourse has been submerged by the dominant United Nations epistemology of hegemonic masculinity, militarism, and war.”

Criticism of UNSCR 1325 is not limited to feminist scholarly critique. Twenty years after its adoption, the Security Council stated UNSCR 1325 was deficient because most state actors have not fully enforced commitments, and initiatives to redress gendered violence in militarism largely remain small in scale (OECD 2020, p. 2). Therefore, although international recognition and law to safeguard women exists—especially in conflict settings—the Security Council NGO that ratified UNSCR 1325 concedes it is lacking and unsuccessful.

In 1982, Australian sociologist Raewyn Connell coined the term *hegemonic masculinity* (Connell & Messerschmidt 2005). It has since been used as an analytical instrument to study forces preventing women and non-heteronormative individuals from infiltrating sites of the public sphere. Essentially, hegemonic masculinity is a compilation of biological predispositions and socially-constructed gender norms that champion and privilege the masculine identity; it is not a homogenous fact for societal—or institutional—dominancy. In addition, hegemonic masculinity comprises heteronormativity, compelling masculine status men to discard femininity, queerness, and soft or weak attributes to assert their physical supremacy, which proliferates in capacities and professions monopolized by men and violence. Likewise,

militarism has been a site of masculinity since its inception, and the essentialist, hegemonic-masculine image of soldiers is a structural upshot of military institutions. The foundational role of militarism has created defence institutions that dominate over those who stray from the combatant masculine guise of a soldier. Although militarized institutions are not the only patriarchal structure that manifests toxic heteronormative masculinity, plenty of scholars have endeavoured to understand militarism's injurious use of gendered ideologies.

The sexual imagery of weapons is another factor to consider, as it is central to the image of militarism. The purpose is to exemplify how gender has diffused, creating connotations beyond the structure of military institutions. Thus, as proclaimed by Cohn, "both the military itself and the arms manufacturers are constantly exploiting the phallic imagery and promise of sexual domination that their weapons so conveniently suggest." Cohn expands upon this claim by considering advertisements such as that for the AV-8B Harrier II [ground attack aircraft]—"Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick." The phallic nature of militarized weapons is influential as this sexual imagery reveals linkages between military institutions/militarism and notions of hegemonic masculinity. Cohn's analysis indicates that the language of weaponized defence is phallic as it equips penis-like analogies. Along this train of thought, Henri Myrntinen (2003) highlights the irony behind the armed man as the protector of the powerless—often women and children—because it is more likely the armed male protector of the family will be the killer in domestic violence situations. Weapons are not necessarily a structural element of the military, signifying that military culture also needs reform beyond restructuring militarized institutions. However, if that is too large a task, this should at least confirm the need to study hegemonic masculinity—and all gendered ideologies—relative to militarism.

The ratification of UNSCR 1325, as stated above, aimed to promote women's peace and security through a liberal feminist approach by advancing gender equality in—for the most part—conflict settings. However, it relies on an *add-women-stir* framework (simply enlisting more women into the military to

increase women's representation to promote gender equality), and does not reference structural problems. Resolution 1325 is ill-suited to attend to domineering masculinities in military institutions and culture since the male gender is absent and not a unit of analysis. Women alone do not fully encapsulate gender. As stated by Sahana Dharmapuri, a gender analysis equips a sociocultural lens on power relations and can identify the unique priorities and abilities of men and women to promote peace and reconstruction efforts in the context of peace and security operations. The lack of gender awareness in UNSCR 1325 allows military institutions to remain toxic hegemonic masculine sites and to endorse the sexual phallic imagery of weapons. It is crucial that a gender analysis be conducted to accurately account for military institutions as sites that breed and tolerate *intra*-service sexualized violence of women personnel.

### ***Intra*-Service Sexualized Violence in Militarized Spaces**

Whether as proud patriots for their nation or seasoned soldiers, many highly regard militarists for exemplifying risk-taking, heroism and strength. Thus, it might be challenging to accept or grapple with the idea that military institutions foster sexualized violence, let alone *intra*-service. However, statistics confirm this reality at staggering rates. In the mid-1990s, a survey of 828 female veterans at the Baltimore Veterans Medical Center found that 41% reported rape, 55% experienced sexual abuse, and 27% revealed having undergone physical abuse, sexual abuse, and rape. Let it be noted that only six percent of servicewomen had attempted or completed a sexual assault complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs in 1995. According to recent reports, sexual assault rates from the mid-1990s have increased. In 2018, 20,500 service members—13,000 women and 7,500 men—reported some form of rape or sexual assault. Sexual assaults in the 2018 fiscal year rose by almost 40% from those reported in 2016. Specific to women's experiences, there was a 50% increase from 2006; however, 76.1% of victims did not report their sexual assault(s) for various reasons, including distrust for the system, presumed dissatisfaction, and fear of retaliation. Finally,

between 2016 and 2020, 59% of cases in which women reported rape stated that the perpetrator was someone of higher rank, and 24% was committed by someone in their chain of command. Therefore, quantitative statistical data denotes that sexual violence is not merely a problem with militarism ideology, but seemingly an inherent epidemic within military institutions.

I note that rates of sexual assault increase more during wartime than in peacetime (15 percent of servicewomen in Iraq and Afghanistan reported sexual assault or harassment). According to the Committee of Veterans' Affairs, this is due to the "stress of war." Perhaps we should all start pulling stuff like that from our asses it seems so logical and persuasive! On a more analytical note, perhaps there is some truth in this statement considering the adoption of UNSCR 1325 by the international community. However, even if there is a causal relationship between wartime and rape, it does not confirm nor excuse the act as morally or lawfully justifiable. It leads one to question what variable is at work to silence (to be further expounded upon) *intra*-service sexual assault in the U.S. military?

Sexual violence is a grave problem within military institutions that endures because their hierarchal structures and long chains of command facilitate *intra*-service rape. Joanna Bourke (2021) interviewed a U.S. armed forces survivor that experienced sexual trauma by her outranked abuser while in uniform at her workplace. Despite telling him to stop during the act and telling her colleague of the incident (who replied: "Look, everyone knows he does this stuff."), no justice resulted. Instead, the abuser exercised power and control over the woman by spreading rumours and threatening poor evaluations if she spoke out, as he was above her in the chain of command.

The pathologization of the victim in this case, and in cases of *intra*-service rape more broadly, motivated me to elect this research endeavour. I am a cisgender woman who acknowledges that gender inequality exists, but I refuse to assume the trivializing of rape. After all, if male soldiers intrinsically represent the hegemonic masculinist ideal, they should have no problem having

consensual sex with their fellow female personnel without penetrating her in uniform. This act, which is so prominent in the U.S. military, is not a testament to the strength, risk-taking, or all that entails being a male soldier; it is pathetic, cowardly, and all that defines a rapist—at least in my *womanly* opinion.

*Intra*-service rape is reaching society's attention, including through various mediums in mass media production. For example, the award-winning and Academy Award-nominated documentary, *The Invisible War* (2012) showcased sexual assault in the U.S. military by interviewing female veterans who recount their incident(s) of abuse. HuffPost blogger Soraya Chemaly wrote soon after viewing the film in 2012, "Indeed, militarisms and sexual violence seem to go hand in hand—but we don't usually think of rape being *intramilitary*." Why is this the case? Could it be that society has socialized us into championing the military without giving it a second thought? It is fitting to question why the military—despite having a fiscal budget in 2022 of \$1.64 trillion (14.3% of the total U.S. federal budget)—remains a site of *intra*-service sexual violence. Are military institutions unaware of this reality or too engulfed in its entrenched manifestation of hegemonic masculinity?

Hegemonic masculinity in military institutions, as is clear from above, yields high rates of (violent) sexual assault, disproportionately targets female personnel, and makes it virtually impossible to render safe and fruitful paths to acquire justice for victims. Why is hegemonic masculinity so ideologically powerful and decisive large scale? Connell states it is because it represents the *power of reason* that constructs the interests of society at large (Shannon 2022, p. 73). With that, one can better conceive the rigorous strength and force of hegemonic masculinity's facilitation of *intra*-service rape. As such, to conclude this essay, I offer Eileen L. Zurbruggen's work and consideration of epistemological assumptions to bring this issue full circle.

Zurbruggen believes that a significant reason male soldiers commit rape against their female comrades lies with the hegemonic masculine socialization that underlines military institutions. In

exploring this empirical association, Zurbriggen examines sex and sexuality. For example, nonrelational sexuality—an element of hegemonic masculinity—demands men ascertain their manhood through regular impersonal sex with an array of women. Indeed, it does not imply that soldiers should rape their female comrades to prove their masculinity, but it instills nonetheless that sex is inherent to being a *real* man. When coupled with other hegemonic masculine socializations such as toughness, aggression, dominance, power, and control, one can see how the puzzle comes together. Thus contemporary *intra*-service rape is excused and promoted, and ultimately transpires all too often within the U.S. military and is perpetrated by nationally glorified heroes.

It can be contended that epistemological assumptions behind militarized masculinities furnish a rationale for *intra*-service military sexualized violence. For instance, in the construction of militarized masculinity, women must be eliminated, including from military institutions. A woman in the military is viewed as an innately violent threat to masculinity as she veers from femininity (De Dauw 2020 p. 71). Put differently, a male soldier's ability to protect a woman hinges on his capacity to annihilate her. This construction frames military masculinity as entirely masculine, disallowing the feminine in its spaces and bodies (73 and 76). Perhaps this may be a theoretical stretch—or more so, a jump—but could this ascribe motive for the high rates of *intra*-service sexual assault of female personnel by their male counterparts in U.S. military institutions? The possible motivation is up for interpretation, however it validates my opinion that sexualized violence is a militant tactic to eliminate women from military institutions while fueling masculine sexual desire and ascribing his dominion.

## Conclusion

The U.S. Army stresses loyalty, selfless service, and personal courage; the Marine Corps pillars courage, honour, and commitment; and the Air Force emphasizes service before self, excellence, and integrity (O'Malley 2015, p. 4). Despite these

values, they serve to obfuscate and justify violence. U.S. military institutions stand as sites of *intra*-service sexual violence which cannot be understood as anything less than a national security concern. This essay explored how militarized masculinity endorses *intra*-service sexualized violence in the context of the U.S. military. After conceptually grounding ourselves, we shifted to unpack masculinity in militarized institutions, leading to a deeper analysis of *intra*-service sexual assault and its causal relationship with hegemonic masculinity. The nonsensical conviction of championing men that is core to U.S. military institutions must disband, as it has sanctioned the sexual abuse of the nation's heroes by its uniformed rapists. In closing, since its conception, the structural makeup of an institution designed to bring peace simultaneously breeds *intra*-service sexual violence. The U.S. Department of Defence can either continue to silence, repress, and discard its female soldiers or embark proactively to hold accountable the male soldiers who violate them.

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# Fusionism, Dominionism and the Contemporary Resurgence of Catholic Integralism

Alexander Nowitz

## Abstract

Over the last decade, Catholic commentators in the United States have debated the appropriate relationship between the Church and the liberal state. One hitherto dominant group, known as fusionists, have argued that the state ought to remain religiously neutral. An emerging group known as integralists, however, have claimed that this is impossible. Instead, they argue that the Catholic Faith should form the basis for law and public policy. Opponents of integralism have linked the movement to a supposed Protestant counterpart, dominionism. In reality, the two movements are very different, with dominionists attempting to realize the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, and integralists having more modest goals.

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I do not believe that any historical concept other than catechon would

have been possible for the original Christian faith.

—Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*

## Introduction

A spectre is haunting American Catholicism—the spectre of *integralism*. The Catholic commentariat in the United States has been intensely debating the appropriate relationship between the Catholic Church and the liberal state since roughly 2014. Advocating a radical reimagining of this relationship are a group identifying themselves as *integralists*, who believe the Catholic Faith should form the basis for all law and public policy. Opponents of integralism have attempted to link its contemporary resurgence to the “fundamentalist” Protestant movement known as *dominionism*, which seeks to realize Christ’s dominion over the earth. As I will demonstrate, however, integralism’s sudden resurgence has much more to do with the collapse of the so-called *fusionist* consensus in American conservatism, and with the alternative conception of freedom it has exposed. By contrast, it has little to do with Protestant dominionism, with which integralism has less in common than one might think, representing a radically different politico-eschatological outlook—the one an attempt to immanentize the eschaton, the other to restrain it.

## A Brief History

The idea that the temporal or secular power of the civil authority ought to be subordinated in some way to the religious or sacred authority of the Church is not new. Sometimes known as the “Doctrine of the Two Swords”, Pope Gelasius I gave it perhaps its earliest explicit articulation in AD 494. In a letter to the Eastern Roman Emperor Anastasius I, generally known as *Famuli vestrae pietatis* (its opening words, meaning “your family’s servants”) or *Duo sunt* (meaning “there are two”), the pontiff claims the world is ruled by two distinct powers, or “swords”: the sacred authority of the Church, and royal authority of the monarch, and the latter must be

subordinated to the former. The subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual one did not go uncontested during the pre-modern era, as anyone familiar with the Investiture Controversy knows. Nevertheless, the idea did help structure relations between the Catholic Church and the State (or at least its predecessors) for much of the medieval and early modern periods, particularly following the Gregorian Reforms of the late 11th and early 12th centuries.

As a distinct movement under its current name, true integralism emerged only in the late 19th century in response to the radical social upheavals that followed the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which increasingly called into question any subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual one. Derived from the French “*intégrisme*”, it is a name signifying, firstly, a desire to safeguard the Catholic Faith’s *integrity*, and secondly, a conviction that Catholicism represents the *integral* (i.e., essential) basis for the organization of society. What integralists desire is not an ecclesiocacy, in which priests exercise political authority directly (think of Vatican City or the Prince-Bishoprics of the pre-Napoleonic era), but rather a system in which religious doctrine informs secular (i.e., non-clerical) rule. The movement had its greatest successes in Western European countries such as France and Spain, with the *Partido Integrista Español* (or “Spanish Integralist Party”), founded in early 1889, being the first to adopt the title formally. Its influence on both civil and ecclesiastical affairs peaked in the first half of the 20th century, particularly during the pontificate of Pope Pius X (1903–1914), before suffering something of a decline in the wake of the Second Vatican Council and its various liberalizing reforms. Integralism did not disappear entirely with the Second Vatican Council however, and several integralist groups did emerge in the years following the council. Nevertheless, it is only recently that the debate over integralism has once again spilled over into mainstream publications.

### **Exit Fusionism, Enter Integralism**

It may seem surprising integralism would begin its resurgence under the United States’ first (at least nominally) Catholic Vice President, Joe Biden, and continue even after his

election as the country's second Catholic President. For American integralists however, the election of a second Catholic President who actively opposes socially conservative policies is evidence of the corrupting nature of engagement with liberal politics on its own terms. In their eyes, Biden has shown the liberal state is far from neutral, demanding they compromise on the principles of their faith if they are to play a prominent role in civic life. In its reevaluation of the liberal state's supposed neutrality, integralism—and its relatively sudden rise to prominence—must be understood relative to the ongoing breakdown of the hitherto dominant ideological tendency in American conservatism: fusionism.

A fusion of social conservatism and economic liberalism has dominated American conservatism since the 1960s. It is a synthesis developed at the magazine *National Review* under the editorship of William F. Buckley Jr. and associate editorship of Frank Meyer. From the beginning, this fusionism faced criticism from Catholic conservatives such as L. Brent Bozell Jr., who argued a libertarian conception of freedom was inherently incompatible with the formation of virtuous citizens. Nevertheless, for the time being, the fusionists won out. The synthesis continued to dominate American conservatism, reaching its apex during the Reagan era. This situation was not to last, however. In the words of E. J. Dionne, “the glue that held fusionism together was anti-communism”. It has therefore been living on borrowed time since the end of the Cold War, deprived of its longstanding constitutive opponent. Economic prosperity and the threat of Islamic terrorism succeeded in maintaining the consensus for a time. However, with the post-2008 deterioration of the American economic situation, and the receding threat posed by radical Islamism, fusionism has grown untenable. It is in this context conservatives have begun openly debating the merits of the social conservative alliance with libertarianism. These debates have been accelerated further by the election of Donald Trump. While Trump himself has only broken with the consensus in part, and often only rhetorically, he has nonetheless helped lay bare the growing weakness of the ideology.

When, in 2019, a series of conservative intellectuals issued a manifesto “Against the Dead Consensus”, a disproportionate number

of them were Catholic. These included integralists such as Sohrab Ahmari, an Iranian-American writer and Catholic convert. It is Ahmari who has come to best embody the anti-fusionist, integralist-adjacent party in the debate over the future of American conservatism. Their libertarian-conservative opponents, by contrast, are led by political commentator David French, a Calvinist. The dynamic between “Frenchists” and “Ahmarists” reflects a divergence between one Protestant conception of freedom and its Catholic counterpart. For Frenchists, freedom is individual autonomy; for Ahmarists (and integralists in general) it is the right to act virtuously. This distinction is important because it shapes each group’s approach to using state power. Frenchists remain deeply suspicious of any attempt to employ law or public policy to win victories in the so-called “Culture War”, fearing this will endanger the neutrality of the state and backfire against them. Ahmarists, by contrast, argue the state remaining neutral in such affairs is impossible. Instead, they believe conservatives must do everything they can to seize control of the state and its bureaucratic machinery for their own purposes, before it is too late.

If any Protestant–Catholic dynamic *can* explain integralism’s meteoric rise to prominence, it is the dynamic between the Frenchists and Ahmarists; between two wildly divergent conceptions of what it means to be free, and what this in turn means for how citizens relate to the state. It is a difference the fusionist consensus has succeeded in masking for more than half a century, but one which we can increasingly expect to see come to the forefront as that consensus continues to dissipate.

## Two Political Eschatologies

Not all critics of integralism have been conservative fusionists like David French. Perhaps integralism’s most prominent critic is the Italian Jesuit priest and journalist Antonio Spadaro, who is known to be a confidant of Pope Francis. Writing in the influential Jesuit periodical *La Civiltà Cattolica*, Spadaro and Marcelo Figueroa argue “[t]he religious element should never be confused with the political one”, and “[c]onfusing spiritual power with temporal power means subjecting one to the other.” Yet it is only by recognizing a

distinction between the two powers that integralists can argue one should subordinate the other. Subordination necessarily presupposes difference. More importantly for our purposes, Spadaro and Figueroa argue similarities between integralists and the “fundamentalist” Protestant movement known as “dominionism” have engendered a “surprising ecumenism” between them. Since Spadaro and Figueroa provide no evidence of this ecumenism in practice, we must constrain ourselves to addressing their claims regarding the parallels between them. However, whatever cooperation does exist, there remains a fundamental disjunction between the two ideologies.

Dominionism (or “dominion theology”) denotes a loose grouping of theocratic Protestant ideologies that have emerged in the American context. Its name derives from the King James Bible’s rendering of Genesis 1:28:

And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.

For dominionists such as the late Calvinist pastor R. J. Rushdoony (perhaps the ideology’s most prominent champion) this is generally interpreted as a command to establish a “theonomy”, in which society is governed in accordance with divine law as laid out in the scriptures. While this may bear a certain resemblance to the integralist vision of a Catholic-informed legal system, they in fact differ in two significant ways. The first is that integralists do not aim to apply divine law directly. Rather, following St. Thomas Aquinas, they see the divine laws of scripture as a reflection of a more general natural law which ought to inform the civil laws of the state.

The second difference, and the more important of the two, touches upon their eschatologies. In his magnum opus, *The New Science of Politics*, Eric Voegelin criticized the tendency of various modern political ideologies to *immanentize the eschaton*. That is, to attempt to realize the end of history within history itself, and to create heaven on earth. Voegelin was principally focused on the scientific movements of the 19th and 20th centuries, such as

positivism and Marxism. However, he also reached back further, pointing to explicitly religious movements such as Puritanism, and to its Hobbesian antithesis. As their name suggests, dominionists wish to bring about the dominion of Christ on earth. More importantly, they believe by realizing the Kingdom of Heaven in the here and now, they are in fact hastening the *Parousia*, or “Second Coming” of Christ. I suggest it is precisely this sort of immanentization which characterizes dominionism, and which is absent from integralism.

Integralists are certainly not unconcerned with man’s “end”, or *telos*. Writing for the integralist website *The Josias*, Fr. Edmund Waldstein, a monk of the Cistercian Order, offers the following three-sentence summation of the ideology:

“Catholic Integralism is a tradition of thought that, rejecting the liberal separation of politics from concern with the end of human life, holds that political rule must order man to his final goal. Since, however, man has both a temporal and an eternal end, integralism holds that there are two powers that rule him: a temporal power and a spiritual power. Since man’s temporal end is subordinated to his eternal end, the temporal power must be subordinated to the spiritual power.” However, while they believe civic life should be shaped by their end, integralists do not attempt to realize the end itself within history, and it is here that they differ from dominionists.

In contrast to dominionists, integralists envision an entity capable of restraining the (in their eyes) antichrist-like figure of the liberal Leviathan. This view is articulated explicitly by Adrian Vermeule, Ralph S. Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard and perhaps integralism’s most prominent living theorist. In a piece written for the *Catholic Herald*, Vermeule raises the possibility of creating a “katechon for the liberal State”. The term *katechon* is a biblical one, denoting “that which withholds”, an entity capable of restraining the antichrist—and, inadvertently, delaying the Parousia. What integralists aspire to then is, at most, what Vermeule calls an “indefinite truce” with liberalism (not exactly the Second Coming).

While the catechon long characterized pre-modern Catholic political theology, it has entered contemporary integralist discourse primarily through the work of Carl Schmitt. Importantly, Vermeule's Schmittianism is not an anomaly, and others have remarked upon the role of Schmitt's thought in contemporary integralism more broadly. Schmittian concepts such as the catechon thus have a broader purchase in integralist thought.

Moreover, Catholic thought in general remains deeply suspicious of any attempt to immanentize the eschaton. As the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* states:

“The Antichrist's deception already begins to take shape in the world every time the claim is made to realize within history that messianic hope which can only be realized beyond history through the eschatological judgment. The Church has rejected even modified forms of this falsification of the kingdom to come under the name of millenarianism. . . .”

One practical upshot of this is integralism cannot assimilate itself to movements with a palingenetic nationalist character as easily as dominionism, with its palingenetic aspirations. For example, this perhaps helps explain the reticence of some integralists to wholeheartedly embrace former President Donald Trump in a way their dominionist counterparts have found relatively easy.

I do not want to suggest the differences between dominionism and integralism foreclose all possibility of cooperation between their proponents. On the contrary, as Schmitt notes in *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, the Church can and has always cooperated with widely divergent ideological blocs. It is, in his words, a “*complexio oppositorum*”, or complex of opposites. Perhaps more importantly, he notes that “[i]n the tactics of political struggle, every party with an established world-view can form coalitions with the most disparate groupings,” and integralists are certainly no exception to this rule. Limited cooperation between integralists and any other group, even if it did exist, would therefore not necessarily indicate any similarities between them.

## **Conclusion**

Integralism's contemporary resurgence has little to do with Protestant dominionism, with which it has less in common than might at first appear to be the case. It has everything to do with the collapse of the fusionist consensus and the alternative conception of freedom it has brought to light. A misguided focus on supposed parallels with dominionism can only serve to obfuscate such truths. To understand the role of religion in contemporary American politics, we must appreciate the diversity of ways in which different religious groups express themselves politically, from their differing conceptions of freedom to their differing political eschatologies.

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# The Interests of Canadian Capital in Latin America

*A Case Study of Honduras and Colombia*

**Karen Strand**

## **Abstract**

This paper explores the often-overlooked topic of Canadian imperialism, which has global and local repercussions but receives less scrutiny than its American counterpart. Research reveals that Canada has been engaging in imperialist practices for decades, with Latin America as a primary target. Through case studies of Honduras and Colombia, this paper uncovers the negative impact of Canadian resource extraction on these countries, with a focus on mining. By analyzing the Canadian imperialist project in depth, this research contributes to a better understanding of the geopolitical landscape and highlights the need for more attention to be paid to Canadian imperialism.

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## Introduction

In the eyes of many people around the world, Canada is a ‘beacon of democracy.’ While this title is almost exclusively used to refer to the United States (US), Canada has a long history of being a key American ally and often shares this reputation as a result. However, there is a darker side and history of Canada on the world stage. This is a history of violent resource extraction throughout the Global South to secure Canadian capital interests. The focus of this paper will be Canada’s imperialist project in Latin America, specifically in Honduras and Colombia. I will argue the Canadian state is an imperialist actor, and its engagement in violent resource extraction in Latin America is a prime example of this.

## Theorizing Imperialism

Before exploring Canada’s imperialist foreign policy in Latin America, it is important to lay the theoretical groundwork for understanding imperialism. One of the most famous and heavily cited references on imperialism comes from V.I. Lenin’s 1917 book *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. While the global landscape has changed since this literature was published, much of it is still relevant today. A central feature of Lenin’s analysis is monopoly capital, which is the concentration of capital under the power of major global corporations and banks. Lenin identified monopoly capitalism as “the fundamental economic feature, the quintessence of imperialism.” Arguably, our international system today reflects the monopoly capitalism Lenin spoke of, and the dominance of major corporations are an example of this.

Definitionally, imperialism is also a large-scale struggle for control over resources imperialist states view as strategic. As Foster outlines, the role of imperialist states—the *core* of the global system—is to accumulate capital by restructuring labour in the *periphery*, or the Global South. The wave of accelerated globalization that has taken place since the 1990s has largely

facilitated modern imperialism, and we see exploitation occurring on an even larger scale because of how integrated states are. Finally, today's imperialism is neoliberal and has imposed the neoliberal project onto states throughout the Global South.

Of great importance to imperialism is also how the state functions in relation to it. Just as the state has an interest in maintaining and facilitating capital accumulation, so too does it have an interest in securing imperialism. This is again exemplified by monopoly capitalism. Major corporations with a secured national base and support from the national government provide national governments with the revenue needed to maintain their high positions. In return, the national government helps the corporation maintain dominance in the international economy. For example, Canadian transnational mining companies receive government tax incentives and in return, the government refuses to create supervisory bodies to closely monitor companies' actions. Thus, as Gordon and Webber analyze, state managers and "national capitals... are [therefore] drawn together into a series of mutually supportive relationships." Canada and its national mining industry are an excellent example of this mutually supportive relationship and will be the focus of this paper.

### **Canadian imperialism**

In his writings on Canadian imperialism, Schalk provides a clear manner for what classifies an imperialist state. He writes, "a state is imperialist to the extent that its leading corporations command and appropriate value on a global scale... [in] contrast, a state is dependent to the extent that it is dominated by, or drained of, global value flows." Canada's imperialist foreign policy towards the Global South matches this definition and has an extensive history. As a key American and European ally, Canada supported fellow NATO member states post World War II (WWII) as they squashed people's liberation and independence movements across the Global South. Canada provided millions of dollars' worth of weaponry to countries such as Belgium, whose colonies included the Congo and Rwanda, and Portugal, with Angola being one of their colonies. The

logic for such actions is left-leaning people's movements impede virtually unrestricted exploitation on behalf of imperialist actors.

In the last few decades, Canada's explicit interest has been in Latin America, and specifically, the mining sector. The region is home to around a third of the world's copper, bauxite, and silver reserves, 24% of oil, and 5% of the world's uranium reserves. It is also an incredibly biodiverse area, with 40% of the world's total diversity and 25% of total forests. In the eyes of Canadian capital, the former matters most.

Perhaps unbeknownst to many Canadians, Toronto is the "mining finance capital of the world." Approximately 40% of the world's mining equity is raised in the city each year. A significant portion of this equity comes from operations in Latin America. From the period of 1990-2013, Canadian investment in the region grew over 2000% to CAD \$60 billion. Even more astonishing, three of the biggest gold mining companies operating in Latin America are all Canadian and earned a net profit of US \$15 billion from 15 mines from 1998-2013. Of all the key imperial actors that engage in similar projects, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, Canada is the largest investor nation in the Latin American mining sector. None of this successful capital accumulation would be possible without the support of the Canadian state. As a result, this imperial policy has the full support of the Prime Minister's Office, Foreign Affairs Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and Natural Resources Canada.

The dark and less explored side of Canada's mining success is the critical and violent land dispossession of Indigenous and rural peoples. As will be presented, Canadian corporations have engaged in multiple activities that constitute grave human rights abuses and interference in the sovereignty of Latin American states in order to secure capital interests. Honduras is the first case study I will explore.

## Case study #1: Honduras

Of all the countries in the Western hemisphere, Honduras is one of the most dangerous. There is a lot of poverty in the country, as well as gang activity and drug trafficking. However, few people are aware of the factors that have led to this. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Hondurans began to protest en masse against the conditions they found themselves in and pressured the state to act. As a result, Manuel Zelaya, who sought social reform, was elected president. In 2008, Zelaya promised to not grant more mining concessions to companies operating in Honduras, many of which are Canadian owned. Zelaya also wanted to reopen the country's constitution to a popular assembly to make the country more equitable. This sparked anger amongst the Honduran political elite and Zelaya's government was overthrown by a military coup in 2009. For imperialist actors such as Canada that have stakes in resource extraction in Honduras, a move to make the country more equitable would have directly challenged their ability to continue business as usual.

After fraudulent elections in 2013, Honduras was under the leadership of Juan Orlando Hernández, a far right and oppressive president. In 2019, Hernández' brother, Juan Antonio Hernández, was found guilty of smuggling cocaine into the United States for over a decade. President Hernández was also found guilty of aiding and abetting his brother, and today the country is classified as a 'narco-state,' where drug cartels influence all levels of government.

Despite these concerning developments, Canada has remained an ally of the corrupt government. For example, Canada is Honduras' second largest foreign investor and provides the country with over \$600 million CAD in foreign direct investment (FDI). Even more startling, when the military coup took place in 2009, Canada never severed any aid to the illegitimate government, while other states including the US did. Such investments are troubling because they show that the Canadian state is willing to forgo commitments to upholding democratic principles in order to secure access to resources, such as mining.

As an imperial actor, Canada benefits disproportionately from its relationship with Honduras. Goldcorp, a major Canadian gold mining company, exemplifies this. As quoted in Shipley, Goldcorp was named by The Globe and Mail as “one of the best 100 Canadian companies to work for,” and has made billions in profits around the world, including in Honduran operations. Goldcorp’s mining operations have also had detrimental impacts. An environmental activist from Honduras named Carlos Amador testified in Canada that the company’s operations are responsible for the following: lead and arsenic poisoning; skin disease; women in their 30s losing their hair; and a woman losing twin babies as a result of arsenic poisoning. Despite these horrors, Goldcorp has not faced any punishments from the Canadian government, as their job of accumulating capital is being done. Canada’s involvement in Colombia is similar to the example of Honduras.

### **Case study #2: Colombia**

Like Honduras, Colombia is a country with a decades-long history of violence. This violence is directly related to the dispossession of Indigenous and rural peoples of their land, which began in the country when the Liberal and Conservative parties formed a ‘National Front’ in 1958. The purpose of this Front was to protect the class and capital interests of the two parties. What ensued was six decades of conflict waged by the Marxist guerrilla group ‘Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’ (FARC) against the state. While the Colombian government and FARC signed a peace deal in 2016 that was meant to bring an end to the decades of conflict, the country still faces turmoil. Within Colombia, over 7.7 million people are classified as ‘internally displaced persons,’ more than in Syria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo combined, and hundreds of thousands of people have fled the country as refugees. Current right-wing president Iván Duque is also responsible for the deaths of hundreds of activists and former FARC rebels.

Despite Colombia’s poor record of human rights violations or depending on the position, because of it, Canada has remained supportive of the government. Canada’s support is exemplified by

the 2011 ‘Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement’ (CCFTA), which the Canadian government under Stephen Harper pushed for despite the “[proliferation of] brutal paramilitary groups, murders of trade unionists... [and] Indigenous and Afro-descendent communities’ [forced displacement] from their ancestral homes.” In 2012, when the Colombian government was engaged in peace negotiations with FARC, Canada began to sell the country automatic military weapons, making it the first Latin American country to receive these arms from the Canadian government. To this day, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) runs officer training programs in Colombia despite the brutal killings of innocent civilians and activists that those officers engage in.

As in Honduras, Canadian mining companies have benefitted from political instability in Colombia. From 2005 to 2015, Canadian mining companies saw increased profits from CAD \$30 billion to \$210 billion. The Canadian government also allocated CAD \$6.7 million from CIDA to continue developing mining projects in Colombia. A 2017 Canadian House of Commons report said resource imports from Colombia amount to 83.76% with regards to merchandise trade. Crude oil being the most sought resource was valued at CAD \$202.7 million.

Canada’s ability to dominate mining operations in Colombia also goes back to the 1990s, when the Canadian government pressed the Colombian government to ratify a mining law drafted by officials from CIDA. This law was ratified in 2001. Under this law, 40% of Colombia became available for mining projects, including national parks and protected areas—if they are granted permits. Canadian mining companies also pay taxes at a significantly low annual rate of 0.4%. This example of Colombia, like that of Honduras, illustrates the main beneficiaries of Canadian mining in Colombia are those serving Canadian capital interests. Environmental protections in Colombia have only become weaker, and Indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians continue to be most vulnerable to violent land dispossession. Colombia and Honduras are two case studies from which a broader discussion of Canadian imperialism in Latin America can be formed.

## Discussion

As the case studies of Honduras and Colombia illustrate, Canada is a key imperialist actor on the international world stage and within the global political economy. While it may not be on the same level as the United States, it is still securing and maintaining its own capital interests. Canadian imperialism is less explored due to the attention paid to the US as the US is commonly represented as an unmatched imperial power. However, there is a growing body of literature on the topic of Canadian imperialism and this is important.

Canada's foreign policy poses a danger to states throughout the Global South, especially in Latin America where it is involved in mining and other resource operations. Canadian mining companies are complicit in the human rights abuses perpetrated by authoritarian governments and also commit their own abuses, as the example of RCMP police training in Colombia illustrates. Furthermore, a leaked report commissioned by the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada found Canadian mining companies responsible for one third of 171 high-profile Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) violations between 1999 and 2009. The report also stated: "Canadian companies have played a much more major role than their peers from Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States... [they are] more likely to be engaged in community conflict, environmental and unethical behaviour." As this statement outlines, Canadian imperialism is *worse* than that of the US in this respect.

To allow imperialism to continue, Canada is also borrowing some American tactics, such as 'democracy promotion.' According to Fenton, Canada has been engaging in activities of 'democracy promotion' that are notoriously thought of in connection with the US government. Canada does so through the 'Canadian Foundation for the Americas' (FOCAL), which is meant to maintain foreign policy interests in the Latin American region. This is done in the name of 'democracy, private enterprise, and free markets.' FOCAL was founded in 1990 when a cabinet decision was made to "deepen ties with Latin America." Put another way, this was created to secure Canadian capital interests. The Foundation says it is a 'non-partisan, independent NGO' but most outsiders view it as an extension of the

federal government. FOCAL is also connected to United States foreign policy in Washington via the Organization of American States (OAS). This makes it hard to counter that it is used to maintain imperial hegemony in Latin America.

As this example also illustrates, it can be concluded that Canadian imperialism has an extensive reach and shows no signs of disappearing soon. It may not be long before we have an ‘Ottawa Consensus’ as well as the ‘Washington Consensus.’ The Washington Consensus refers to neoliberal reforms enacted by major international financial institutions (IFI’s), such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s. These reforms proposed that governments undergo privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and a reduction in direct taxation. Countries in the Global South were forced to adopt these policies in order to maintain a free flow of capital investment, mainly between themselves and the United States.

## **Conclusion**

Canada has a reputation as a ‘beacon of democracy’ around the world. The country shares this title as a key ally of the US. Yet, Canada has a long and dark presence on the world stage. This history is marked by Canadian capital interests leading to violent resource extraction in the Global South. Canada’s imperialist project in Latin America has been extensive, particularly in countries such as Honduras and Colombia. I have argued that the Canadian state is indeed an imperialist actor on the world stage, and that its engagement in violent resource extraction in Latin America at the cost of livelihoods and human rights is one primary example of this.

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# Leadership & Ambition

*Comparative Insights from*

*France and Costa Rica's Fossil Fuel Moratoria*

**Ethan Elliott**

## **Abstract**

This comparative analysis highlights the enabling factors for France and Costa Rica to pursue supply-side fossil fuel restraints (fossil fuel exploration and extraction moratoria). This study helps clarify the pathways to adopting these policies and looks at intrinsic and external factors motivating state behaviour. The presence of executive leadership commitment acts as international driver combined with the enabling material conditions of carbon free / renewable electricity systems coalesce to produce fossil fuel bans; while the pursuit of climate-leader status within the international context of climate change negotiations stands out as an external motivating factor.

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## Introduction

In the context of the global climate crisis, state actors have not used their structural capacity to meet sustainability targets in congruence with international agreements despite the urgent need for climate action. This comparative analysis highlights the political dynamics leading to France and Costa Rica's decisions to pursue fossil fuel exploration and extraction moratoria, namely the adoption of bans which restrict or phase out economic activities to keep burnable fossil fuels in the ground. The research question guiding this analysis is as follows: why did France and Costa Rica both pursue fossil fuel bans? Based on the question posed above, the similarities found suggest: the presence of executive leadership commitment acts as an international driver of adopting fossil fuel bans in tandem with the enabling material conditions of carbon free/renewable electricity systems; while pursuing recognition as an international climate leader acts as an external motivating factor. The importance of this study helps clarify what causal agents could be important to provide a general understanding of the pathways available to adopt "supply side" policies as an instrument to constrain the supply of burnable fossil fuels available on the market. Researching the causal agents behind the supply side approach pertaining to moratoria could motivate and enable certain states to pursue similar decisions to address the climate crisis.

## Topic and Hypothesis

The 2015 Paris Agreement set current greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets to keeping global temperatures below 2.0°C, despite the need to strive for 1.5°C target to mitigate against the catastrophic effects of 2.0°C warming. Additionally, the Paris Agreement created a general basis for cooperation within the international community by requiring states to pursue climate action and submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change. Five-year updates which required states to set more ambitious goals in subsequent meetings were also mandated. This is important within the context of the climate crisis, as a report by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that more pathways to limit global warming

are required to achieve 1.5°C through extensive systems transitions. It is imperative states work towards their climate targets, as by doing so, they can prevent subsequent climate-related risks to global health, human security, sustenance, life, and the environment of the 1.5°C target alone.

The global implications of climate change frame the salience of this research when discussing the mitigation of carbon emissions through international climate governance, national climate legislation, and policy implementation. In addition to the significant role of the UNFCCC and Conference of Parties (COP), climate change negotiations also play in shaping the national climate action. While noting how global climate governance may prime state actors to pursue climate action by adopting international norms, state actors may potentially emerge as climate leaders amidst this global challenge.

The UNFCCC defines climate leadership as the “transformational and replicable government action and ambition at any level (national, regional, city, town, etc.), helping to strengthen the case for the increased climate action and ambition that is urgently needed to ensure the world can limit the increase in global average temperature this century to 1.5 degrees Celsius and to build resilience to climate change”. Within the context of international climate governance, the establishment of international norms promoting climate action alter the perception of appropriate action and interests among state actors in response to the climate crisis (Blondeel et al., p.64). Where further participation in climate governance norms shapes the interests of states seeking to ascribe to or provide examples of leadership within the context of climate governance. This study examines how climate leadership aspiration and positioning between France and Costa Rica influences executive decision-making pertaining to the fossil fuel moratoria. In addition to discussing what similar material conditions enable each country to

pursue moratoria policies between comparative climate action strategies.

Domestically, Costa Rica and France's climate actions are informed by the country's individual decisions and motivations. However, the influence of international climate change negotiations, and influence and participation in the norms which emerge within these contexts, also affects state behaviour. In this respect, Costa Rica has committed to its fossil fuel exploration and extraction moratorium since 2002's first executive order. Ever since, later executive orders – namely Order 36693 in 2011, the order's extension in 2014, and Order 41578 in 2019 - propel like-minded commitments. Similarly, albeit through legislation, France has enacted a ban on domestic fossil fuel exploration and extraction by 2040 using Law no. 2017-1839 passed in 2017. At the time of these domestic decisions, Costa Rica and France were also participating in the COP negotiations from the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and COP15 (Copenhagen) in 2009 to reaching the Paris Agreement (COP21) in 2015. These events not only shape global climate policy but contextualize the political and legal climate that informed Costa Rica and France's decisions to adopt fossil fuel bans or moratoria.

This paper compares Costa Rica and France to find common factors explaining why both states pursued fossil fuel bans. The hypothesis is based on the examination of each country's executive leadership, contexts for bold decision-making, and the consideration of international leadership aspirations. This paper suggests that bold executive leadership, and the low reliance on fossil fuels for national electricity use, act as internal drivers which have led to fossil fuel bans in both cases. Meanwhile, aiming to pursue international recognition as a leader within the context of climate change negotiations operates as an external motivating force. The implication of this report seeks to identify core factors to contribute to supply-side fossil fuel literature within the context of the climate crisis whilst addressing the realities of climate change. These forms of moratoria or bans are forms of domestic climate action, representing key precedents to inform steps towards climate action across similar jurisdictions.

## Analytic Framework

The comparative method of most difference will be used to investigate the different processes and timelines between France and Costa Rica's adoption of fossil fuel moratoria legislation between national and international scales of climate governance. This method of comparison is justified, as the research question identifies the shared outcome of fossil fuel moratoria as the dependent variable of study. Employing this method is useful to find common independent variables among different case studies, in which the common independent variable between case studies may represent causal factors within and across respective contexts.

Using this comparative method within the field of climate politics and policy research warrants the application of additional frameworks to understand both domestic and international factors motivating state behaviour. First, Stevenson's framework on the role of institutions, material conditions, and social aspects as influential factors motivating state behaviour, these factors are investigated to understand the political contexts between cases. Second, this analysis will incorporate how Keep It in the Ground (KIIG) policies, such as fossil fuel bans, often scale-up the level of analysis to consider the factor of international climate change negotiations and agreements. Third, on both national and international scales, the degree of effectiveness regarding how a state's executive leadership responds to climate change has differentiated climate leaders from climate laggards in comparative studies. Furthermore, this research considers the role of national executive leadership, notably its emergence or assertion, within the international domain of climate change negotiations. Based upon the literature, one can frame the key factors specific to climate politics and policy research, where differences within factors will come together to find the most similar and relevant dependent variable.

The use of supply-side policies on fossil fuels operate to constrain the available supply of burnable fossil fuels on the market. Within the context of climate policy and decision-making strategies moving away from fossil fuel energy production and consumption, moratoria can hedge against the possibility of carbon lock-in. Carbon

lock-in refers to the perpetual cycle of being reliant upon fossil fuel dependent energy systems, discussed within the scope of electricity systems—in which institutions, technologies, and norms are not pursuing low-carbon alternatives. For supply-side or KIIG policies, the use of fossil fuel bans alongside sociotechnical transitions represents a move away from carbon lock-in and towards the goals of carbon neutrality. These policies promote the norm of climate-action, aiming to scale up this precedent to other jurisdictions by making choices which do not perpetuate carbon-intensive systems within the scope of electricity systems and domestic policy. The adoption of moratoria relates to leadership emergence, as it is connected to pursuing innovative policies that only few countries have implemented. Thus, the example of leadership can be considered as an influential precedent if other countries aim to follow similar pathways. In the following sections, Costa Rica and France will demonstrate why executive leadership from the domestic level, and international leadership aspiration are salient factors motivating similar climate laws.

## France

The release of France's primary policy document, the 2017 *Climate Plan*, was a crucial moment for the country's climate policy post-Paris Agreement. This policy document was created to implement the 2015 Paris Agreement and forward national energy transitions institutionally, preceding France's law no. 2017-1839 which passed in December 2017. Law no. 2017-1839, phases out and bans fossil fuel exploration and exploitation on French territory, with no further permits to be granted by 2040. While the strategy of the *Climate Plan* outlines a range of environmental and climate issues, the legislation most important to highlight for the purposes of this paper include: (a) keeping global warming below 1.5°C/2°C, (b) mobilizing ambitious climate policies whilst accounting for socio-cultural complexities, and (c) reducing France's dependence on fossil fuels to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The timeline between the Paris Agreement, the publication of the *Climate Plan*, and the passing of law no. 2017-1839 correlate to the impact the Paris Agreement has had regarding France's commitment to passing the fossil fuel moratoria at a national level.

Approach nine of the *Climate Plan*, “Leaving Oil Underground,” addresses how France’s institutions took up the Paris Agreement, in part, through the diffusion of norms surrounding global climate governance. Phasing out fossil fuels through supply-side bans was a primary tenet of this strategy. This approach seeks to reduce fossil fuel exploration activities, eventually phasing fossil fuels out completely while ceasing to renew extraction licenses by 2040. The underlying ethic behind this approach is to keep these combustible hydrocarbons in the ground as per the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C/2°C targets, therefore displaying the policy document’s intent of solidifying France’s national and institutional commitment to the Paris Agreement’s targets. Subsequently, this intent informs the purpose behind law no. 2017-1839.

France’s role as a fossil fuel importer, and the aim of the legislation noted above, is related to the material conditions of France’s overall fossil fuel energy consumption. The 2017 *Climate Transparency Report* for France demonstrates energy related GHG emissions are associated with energy production, sitting at approximately 325 MtCO<sub>2</sub> per year. Further, 14%, 25%, and 4% of energy consumption respectively corresponds to gas, oil, and coal sources. While 38% of 325 MtCO<sub>2</sub> per year was produced from transportation, 26% from goods and services, 20% from industry, and 16% from electricity and heating sources. While the high degree of nuclear energy within France’s energy mix is due was made possible due to decades of prior energy investment and restructuring, due to the limited fossil fuel resources to reduce dependencies on fossil fuels as an importer. Overall, during these two years, France relied on nuclear energy for about half of their respective energy mix. According to the 2021 *Climate Transparency Report* these energy mix ratios have not changed substantively despite the legislated bills and policymaking since the Paris Agreement, the 2017 *Climate Plan* and law no. 2017-1839. For EU member countries such as France, their efforts and contributions constitute part of the EU’s overall NDC as per the Paris Agreement. France’s material conditions of having a relatively low-economic reliance on fossil fuel production and consumption within the countries’ overall energy mix. In addition to previous agendas to hedge against

importing fossil fuels for domestic electricity demands. Together, these factors make fossil fuel moratoria highly feasible today.

Prior to passing law no. 2017-1839 in December 2017, France underwent a Presidential election. After a 5-year term, François Hollande lost to incumbent president Emmanuel Macron, who entered office in May 2017. This change in executive leadership signified a shift from the president who had hosted COP21 in 2015, towards a more ambitious leadership style that Macron had championed throughout his campaign. Fossil fuel moratoria on shale gas, phasing out coal power within five years, and increasing investments to double renewable electric energy generation were all key commitments regarding climate action on his election platform. Furthermore, news media organization, *The Mercury*, reported on Macron's heckling of Donald Trump's climate denialism and pledge to uphold commitments made at COP21 during the tail end of his campaign.

Macron claimed to represent France as an innovator who is dedicated to climate change, clean and renewable energy, and new technologies. Despite this claim, Macron received a large amount of skepticism regarding his stance on environmental issues and climate policy by carrying forward Hollande's advancements like the *Energy Transition Law*. This law was established in 2015 which continued previous climate and energy legislation by setting comprehensive targets, reporting measures, and bolstering less use of fossil fuels within the energy mix. These insights regarding France's leadership transition are interesting because six months after his election in May, law no. 2017-1839 passed that December. The ambition of this next executive leader reified his commitment to climate-action while also demonstrating international status within climate change negotiations by challenging Donald Trump's climate change denialism. This characteristic of Macron's leadership establishes the domestic link of the political executive to the international context. Maintaining previously established progress and pursuing further strategies to address climate change through green technology and balancing carbon restraints with a strong economy sustain France's claims toward climate leader status.

Beyond changes in executive power, France has historically positioned itself as a leader in international climate change negotiations. From the late-1990s to the mid-2010s, France's continued reliance on nuclear energy and hydroelectricity from previous decades of energy restructuring has enabled emissions reductions to be decoupled from economic growth<sup>[OBJ]</sup>. This means that France's emissions reductions were achieved without substantially interfering with economic productivity, as France is one of the strongest and competitive economic powers in the world.

Prior to law no. 2017-1839, France banned the use of fracking technologies for shale gas in 2014 with 62% of French public opinion against the development of shale gas. With low public support in the case against shale gas and fracking methods, the pressure of civil society and public participation exerted notable pressure supporting the ban. The reliance on carbon free energy is a notable condition working together to produce this prohibition. It is probable the same public acceptance and condition of carbon free energy can be generalized to the successive law no. 2017-1839.

The role of carbon-free electricity systems allowed France to (re)seize their relevance as an international climate leader over the course of international climate change negotiations due to early energy system restructuring toward nuclear. Furthermore, France's leadership aspirations are exerted on the international level, while the constraints imposed by the EU positions France as a follower to the IGO's governance requirement for policy coordination. France's electricity system relies on carbon-free energy to bolster its political determination in legislating ambitious climate policies and fossil fuel bans. This is evident through self-declared rhetoric of "affirm[ing] its role as a pioneer by becoming the first country to put into practice such a policy and encouraging... other countries to join this commitment". Overall, France's pre-existing nuclear and hydroelectric energy systems and their low reliance on fossil fuels enabling executive leadership to drive decisions to pass fossil fuel moratoria and project the countries climate leader aspirations within international contexts.

## Costa Rica

Costa Rica's fossil fuel moratoria was the result of an executive order in 2002, centred on the primary rationale of ecological conservation of forests and the establishing carbon sinks. The establishment of carbon sinks is an outcome of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which promoted Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and the carbon trading credit systems. This system worked between industrialized countries and countries undergoing economic transition (Annex I) and developed countries financing CDM mechanisms for developing countries (Annex II) and developing countries. The establishment of this global climate governance norm operated upon Annex II countries financing CDM projects such as carbon sinks for developing countries, whereby carbon credit could be accrued for developed countries based on CDM projects investments. In addition, Kyoto only required industrialized countries to cut emissions. This often resulted in investor countries acquiring carbon credits, increasing the quantity of emissions beyond their Kyoto designated limit. At the time, the climate governance norm of carbon sinks between developed and developing countries informs why Costa Rica's moratoria was connected to the conservation of their forests.

At the time, Costa Rica was listed as a non-Annex I country, however, proceeded to implement this executive order nationally and unilaterally—without the investment of an Annex II country. Furthermore, Costa Rica institutionalized the CDM norm of carbon sinks contrary to the Annex I/II-developing bilateral relationship. Instead, Costa Rica became their own host country. In fact, through the national forest protection and reforestation program Costa Rica paid landowners for certain forest activities and carbon stock monitoring, where the country capitalized off selling carbon offsets to countries such as Norway, purchasing \$2 million USD worth of credit. This unique distinction in the case of Costa Rica demonstrates pursuit of climate governance and a display of national climate leadership despite bearing no obligation to participate as per international norms relegated to country classification. Namely, the influence of the Kyoto Protocol's CDM norms substantially

influenced why the executive order brought the fossil fuel moratoria into the force of law.

This bold demonstration of Costa Rica's national climate leadership surpassed expected international norms and furthered its leadership aspirations in subsequent COP negotiations. What is unique for Costa Rica is the political and institutional development as demonstrated by the sustained visionary approaches to promote environmental, economic, and social welfare by reallocating budgets from the country's abolished army in 1948. Furthermore, strategic planning for economic and social development in the last 25 years has helped Costa Rica pursue national interests by their own accord for a country in the global South. In negotiating these development pathways through fossil fuel extraction spurred core debates about the option between the early-2000s and mid-2010s. Such debates pertaining to extraction prompted civil society responses which defended against overturning the executive order and its subsequent extensions from national economic development and international investment from China and North American companies. The priority to maintain ecological integrity amidst transnational corporate and bilateral state investment underpins this case study amidst goals for economic, social, and national development norms for this middle-income, developing country in Latin America.

Despite Costa Rica's ecological conservation rationale underpinning the 2002 fossil fuel moratoria, the later years of the executive order's extension and international climate change negotiations began to reframe and even strengthen the motivations for the ban, with a new dimension of international recognition to rank as a climate leader in the global community. Furthermore, the dynamic between civil society pressure on executive leader decision-making serves as an internal motivating factor, articulated between international norms and within climate change negotiations which strengthens Costa Rica's pursuit of climate leadership.

The first fossil fuel moratoria was established in 2002 by President Espriella in response to civil society pressure through coalition groups in favour of environmental conservation. President Espriella pursued bold action to implement this ban when he began

office, explicitly responding to this concern by addressing environmental conservation through law. He stated: “we will create a legal system so that deforested areas will be reforested with native species and to make clear that we won't be an oil enclave”. This bold act from a newly elected executive leader demonstrates how the executive role has the agency to commit to affirmative actions in response to civil society pressures. The combination of committed executive leadership with mounted civil society pressure works cohesively to effectively steer executive decision-making for this ban. The pressure and voice from civil society played a historic and ongoing role for environmental conservation in Latin American countries who have instated supply-side fossil fuel bans. Costa Rica’s civil society pressure from environmental-coalition activism is a normalized means for representing interests within the state. Namely, how civil society interventions pertaining to opening the country’s territories up to resource extraction resisted the possibility, maintaining a constant political pressure against violating such norm. This bold executive leadership history informed how Costa Rica approached Kyoto Protocol, COP15, and the Paris Agreement, and became an international climate leader.

Although Costa Rica’s purpose for implementing the 2002 ban was premised on ecological conservation to protect national forests while serving as carbon sinks, the emergence of the UNFCCC COP negotiations continued to influence later executive extensions of the initial executive order of 2002. Prior to this, the international expectations for countries to reduce their emissions was only expected by Annex I countries during the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, meaning that Costa Rica was not under this international pressure. Years later in 2006, President Sánchez won office and established the “Peace with Nature Coalition” which included the 2007 Carbon Neutral Pledge which brought together domestic agency for the nation to become aligned with the global climate crisis on the international level. Costa Rica’s aspirational pledge was presented at COP15 in 2009 as an idea, until COP21 in 2015 when Costa Rica’s pledge embraced pathways to reduce emissions. After this ambitious claim at COP15, the moratoria were extended by executive order 36693 in 2011 and 2014, which eventually led to Costa Rica to form carbon offsetting with the aim to achieve carbon

neutrality to develop and pursue national NDCs to effectively reduce GHG emissions.

The material factors influencing Costa Rica's ability to pursue this decision come from decades long, centralized renewable electricity system which structure the feasibility to have confidence in a forward-reaching fossil fuel ban linked to decarbonization policies. Costa Rica is dissimilar to their Latin American neighbours because its electricity power generation comes from nearly 100% of renewable energy sources constituted by hydropower, geothermal, wind, biomass, and sun—while the transportation section remains Costa Rica's largest carbon-intensive system. The establishment of renewable energy, primarily hydroelectricity, is the result of national investment from decades prior. The extensions of the fossil fuel ban have become linked with the direction to continue this progression to carbon neutrality as per their aspirational commitment to COP15 and COP21. Costa Rica has followed its "history of bold decisions," and aspired to become an international climate-leader via their ability to set precedents alike this fossil fuel moratoria and carbon-neutral pledge. The claims to bold national and international climate leadership is further supported by the lack of obligatory action from Kyoto, and their bold presentation at COP15 despite their relegation based on country classification.

## **Discussion**

Several key differences between the processes and national characteristics between Costa Rica and France, despite the two countries achieve similar results by passing fossil fuel moratoria. Firstly, the gap between Costa Rica's executive order in 2002 and the legislation of France's law no. 2017-1839. This is relevant because the development of international climate change negotiations and governance norms between post-Kyoto and post-Paris structure different rationales and purposes for each moratorium. Second, how different country contexts are informed by country classifications between the global North and global South, in addition to respective economic prosperity. Third, in the case of France, how the EU membership affects France's national priorities through policy coordination and representation within UNFCCC

negotiations. Fourth, how Costa Rica's executive order was extended on two accounts in response after debates of overturning the moratoria but were unsuccessful due to civil society pressure and to affirm climate action and to continue leadership performance within UNFCCC negotiations.

Cost Rica's executive order corresponds to the climate governance norms established post-Kyoto, and the role of ecological conservation for forests is reminiscent of this order. The intention to conserve forests in addition to nationally banning fossil fuel activities are uniquely interlinked. Despite Costa Rica's exclusion from Kyoto obligations based on its development and income status as a non-Annex country, Costa Rica unilaterally participated in establishing its own carbon offsets through the establishment of carbon sinks, instead of receiving investment from industrialized or more developed states seeking to acquire carbon credits. Due to Costa Rica's economic and development classifications, Costa Rica was able to link this law to national development strategies by selling and hosting their own offsets to countries such as Norway. This differs from France because of the country's substantial economic power within the global economy and status as a developed country in the global North. The norms most relevant to law no. 2017-1839 draw from the 2017 *Climate Plan* seeking to implement the pathways to achieving the country's NDCs from the Paris Agreement, in a concerted effort with other EU member states.

Although civil society influence was salient in the case of Costa Rica, little evidence, or possible literature gaps regarding the role of France's civil society engagement was not equally substantive when compared to Costa Rica. For Costa Rica, the replication of the executive order through subsequent extensions demonstrates the greater effect of civil society opposition than in the case of France. Even though France has a strong civil society, the already apparent public acceptance of stances against the shale gas and fracking ban demonstrates less pressure required for France to legislate a similar—although more extensive fossil fuel ban. Furthermore, the norms established during the Paris Agreement brings the EU in alignment for meeting emissions reduction targets. Whereby, the unique effect of EU policy coordination contributes to

more substantive organizational pressure among members such as France.

Mutual histories restructuring electricity systems toward renewable, or carbon free energy establish key material conditions necessary to implement fossil fuel moratoria. For Costa Rica, the investment in renewable energy in the form of hydroelectricity has played a substantial role for supplying the country's electricity demands. Similarly, France's investment in nuclear energy in prior decades has produced a low reliance on fossil fuel within the country's energy mix. Together, the overall low reliance on fossil fuel for electricity production as fossil fuels importers, for the primary purpose of transportation also constitute the material conditions necessary to pursue fossil fuel moratoria.

Both fossil fuel moratoria in Costa Rica and France occurred after executive leadership transitions. Both President Macron and President Espriella implemented these bans promptly after entering office. Additionally, these political executives boldly affirmed environmental interest claims through responsive action. In each case, the role of civil society influences were of note—although, this evidence was too limited in France to draw any concrete conclusions. However, each successive political executive carried forward previous environmental and climate developments to develop climate-action and ambition rather than regressing.

The role of executive leadership's commitments to prioritize efforts to address climate change within both countries was another similar factor present in both cases. Both cases revolve around maintaining institutional and policy developments derived from UNFCCC climate change negotiations and how moratoria relate to implementing and adapting the norms established from such agreements. The influence of Kyoto on Costa Rica's initial ban and the subsequent re-commitment to following extensions of the ban can be analyzed through both national and international recommitments to climate governance. This is demonstrated by the bold leadership claims expressed at COP15 and further involvement at COP21. Demonstrating how the role of bold climate leadership pursued by the executive branch at both the national and

international level remained a pivotal factor for commitment whilst also observing the effect of UNFCCC negotiations and agreements played as an external factor influencing state behaviour. Similarly, Macron's commitment to his political platform advertising the ban was fulfilled and the implementation of the Paris Agreement's NDCs were put into policy months after he entered office. In addition, the intersection between his political stance against the US climate (in)action and denialism, and the meeting his responsibilities for France's efforts within the context of EU policy coordination demonstrate the aspirations for fulfilling climate leader obligations.

Although it was civil society pressure that initially motivated Costa Rica to establish fossil fuel moratoria through an ambitious act of leadership to pursue ecological conservation, the latter extensions for this executive order were influenced by international climate change negotiations. However, the main similarity between these two cases was the ambitious executive leadership in response to civil society undercurrents. Furthermore, after Costa Rica's initial fossil fuel ban, it became more like France after establishing a problem linkage between ecological conservation and their pledge to become climate neutral. For Costa Rica, the reframing of the ban with emissions reduction norms is due to the country's self-alignment and aspiration to be recognized as an international climate leader based on their domestic policies from COP15 to COP21. This external motivation to become international leaders became similarly causal and apparent between both cases after Costa Rica made this problem linkage and led a normative shift in global climate governance. After establishing these linkages, Costa Rica reinforced subsequent decisions to extend the ban through later decisions made by the executive, which coalesce with civil society resistance but also the investment in their role as a climate leader. This demonstrates how a presence of international influence and both international and domestic factors was ascertained by these quasi-reproductions of the initial 2002 fossil fuel moratoria.

## **Conclusion**

The material conditions of France's low-carbon electricity system based on nuclear energy is alike Costa-Rica's renewable

electricity system as energy source requiring significantly less carbon emissions than relying on fossil fuel sources. Therefore, both countries are materially enabled to pursue climate leadership based on each's low reliance on fossil fuels in their energy mixes, with low economic reliance pertaining to fossil fuel extraction as producers. Between cases, the largest sector of imported fossil fuel is attributed to transportation. Overall, this positions each country with the ability to implement these bans due to their relatively low reliance on fossil fuels consumption for electricity demands or economic production through export. Consequently, enabling each country to either emerge or aspire to position themselves as climate-leaders to procure status and recognition, which is motivated by political executives to commit to the norms of climate action to enact fossil fuel bans and moratoria.

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# Marxist-Leninism

## *An Exploration of Ideological Adoption and Influence*

**Megan Ryan-Lloyd**

### **Abstract**

Questions of “Marxism in Action” are prominent in many aspects of political discourse. This study proposes that the main tenant of Marxist thought missing in Leninist political theory and the application thereof to the U.S.S.R. is the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This argument draws on Marxist theory, Leninist theory, and the on-the-ground dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. between 1917 and 1924. This paper serves as a reminder of the common discrepancy between political theory and application, as every significant political doctrine is subject to an inevitable play of influences, modifications, and alterations in the geopolitical arena.

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Marxist political theory requires careful interpretation and specification. Various Marxist interpretations of political life highlight unique tensions within Marxism, which are less noticeable in the area of political theory. The United Socialist Soviet Republic (U.S.S.R.) was founded on Marxist Leninist ideology: that is, Marxism as interpreted by Vladimir Lenin. Through this, Lenin sought to adapt the central tenets of Marxism to the experience of Russia. Upon reflection, Marxism has not been applied to geopolitical situations as a static ideology. As such, we may ask ourselves, what aspects of Karl Marx's thought were altered by Lenin as an adopter of Marxism and a revolutionary Russian politician? In this essay, I investigate aspects of Marxism not represented in Marxist-Leninism and discuss how Marx's death has affected this aspect of politics. Considering this question, I argue that the key element of Marx's thought missing in Leninist political theory and the application thereof to the U.S.S.R. is found in the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This paper seeks to make this argument by highlighting Marxist theory, Leninist theory, and the on-the-ground dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. between 1917 and 1924.

First, we must investigate Marx's idea of communism as a social, political, and economic goal. To explore this, we can look at Marx's *Communist Manifesto*. While this work focuses more on the rise of capitalism than articulating communist principles, we still gather some elements of Marx's vision of communism. These elements include an overhaul of existing economic and, thereby, social relationships and collective ownership of the means of production (Tucker, 1978 p. 207). In the *Communist Manifesto*, we see Marx provides us with an account of communism as a final stage of history, marking the end of class struggle and the beginning of the state of social and economic equilibrium. He highlights the dictatorship of the proletariat in the *Communist Manifesto*, as he says: "The proletariat will use its supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all

capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class” (Marx & Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, Ch. 2).

As we gather, the *Communist Manifesto* is more framed as a call to action than an articulation of principles. However, it provides a brief glimpse of the importance of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For this reason, we can look to other writings on Marx to supplement this piece. Marx’s first reference to the dictatorship of the proletariat occurs in the third trilogy of articles under “The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850” (Bellis, 1979, p. 4). These writings are written about the Paris Commune, which was a revolutionary government that took control of Paris in 1871 during the Franco-Prussian war. This historical moment is of great importance to Marx and appears in many of his writings. We can see Marx highlight the dictatorship of the proletariat as he says, “the declaration of the permanence of the revolution, the class dictatorship of the proletariat as the necessary transit point to the abolition of class distinctions generally, to the abolition of all the relations of production on which they rest, to the abolition of all the social relations that correspond to these relations of production, to the revolutionizing of all the ideas that result from these social relations” (Marx & Engels, 1850).

Additionally, according to Marx in “the Critique of the Gotha Programme”, the Paris Commune intended to abolish that class property, to make the labour of the many the wealth of the few, and to transform the means of capital, production, land, and social relations (Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme: Section 1*). However, the most crucial aspect of the Paris Commune was an instance of the working class holding political power. As such, the Commune allowed for the opportunity to lay out elements of the transition period between capitalism and a classless communist society. It is essential to understand the transitory stages of communism, as it is through the Paris Commune that Marx

highlights that communist revolutions “cannot simply lay hold of ready-made state machinery” (Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme: Section 1*). However, the Paris Commune still serves as an example of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is a central point for Marx's idea of communism.

After Marx wrote about the Paris Commune, the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was incorporated into the first of six statutes of the universal society of communist revolutionaries (Bellis, 1979, p. 173). As such, the dictatorship of the proletariat is central to the end goal of Marx's teleological account of history via the revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat serves as an intermediary stage between a capitalist economy and a communist society. As well, the dictatorship of the proletariat is not necessarily a goal but rather a means of reaching the goal of a developed communist society. A developed society in this sense is a “new society with no classes and no system of private property” (Feigan, 2015, p. 23). In a letter, Marx himself wrote, “Only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois law be left behind in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” (Feigan, 2015, p. 24). As such, the importance of the dictatorship of the proletariat comes from the politically dominant class, i.e., the proletariat (Kivotidis, 2019).

Upon analysis, we can see that the classical texts of Marxism agree that the dictatorship of the proletariat is an essential element of the communist revolution. It is also important to recognize that the dictatorship of the proletariat, as defended by Marx, requires the development of the conditions for the elimination of classes and the abolition of class rule and the state.

Once we take the foundational principles of Marxism and apply them to the political atmosphere, we gain insightful ground for political analysis. Marxism–Leninism was the official ideology of

the former U.S.S.R. and, by extension, of the international communist movement during the twentieth century. Lenin is an important figure in Russian history, as the essential establisher of communism in Russia. Leninism is an ideology that highlights and interprets various aspects of Marxism. While Marxist-Leninism can be understood as one unit of political theory, there are some divergent aspects contained within the two ideologies. It is important to note that many divergent aspects occurred because of socio-political struggles implementing communism rather than as a point of ideology for Lenin. As such, due to the uniqueness of the Russian political situation, Lenin is often credited with turning Marxism on its head. This can be argued as both a conscious effort and a political-environmental reaction. I will now outline some of Lenin's philosophy. However, it is still important to note that because of Lenin's position as a political actor, there is no clear-cut distinction between his ideology and leadership approach.

Lenin wrote that the Marxist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat involved the proletariat obtaining political and economic control within a democratic system. He argued for the destruction of the foundations of the bourgeois state and its replacement with what is described as an ultra-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat based on the Paris Commune system (Bellis, 1979, p. 30). Following the conclusion to which Marx led in their appraisal of the Commune, Lenin argued that the proletariat must, upon seizing power, destroy the existing state apparatus, a political form inscribed in its socio-economic subjection (Bellis, 1979, p. 30). Lenin's emphasis on the destruction of the bourgeois state apparatus did not imply that the revolution could be equated with violence or that a degree or extent of violence could be taken as the measure of its success. The proletarian revolution involves not only the transfer of power from one class to another; it constitutes replacing one type of power with another. Both aspects are necessarily interlinked (Bellis, 1979, p. 30). The bourgeois state

apparatus would be supplanted by something which was no longer state proper, that is, by a state so established that it begins to wither away. Although he maintained that the new proletarian state would consist of the “proletarian armed and organized working class,” there are few indicators of the specific form (Bellis, 1979, p. 31). In 1917, following the revival of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, Lenin wrote his letters from afar that represented the dictatorship of the proletariat as the “embryo of a worker's government.” At the same time, he argued that the proletariat must smash the existing state apparatus. Lenin acknowledged that it was not possible to eliminate bureaucracy “at once, everywhere and completely” (Bellis, 1979, p. 33). It was necessary to convert the functions of the bureaucracy into simplified administrative operations. Thus, for Lenin, this was the practical meaning of the abolition of the state and the deinstitutionalization of political power (Bellis, 1979 p. 35).

One divergent factor was that Marxism believed people would spontaneously become aware of their status and rise for a revolution. However, Leninism thought that a party should be formed to guide people because otherwise, the revolution happening would not be a practical idea. We explore these divergences through Lenin's theory of the vanguard party, the essentials found in the classic pamphlet “What Is to Be Done? Painful Questions of our Movement and Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism”. It is here that we see Lenin outline his analysis of imperialism and state theory. Lenin's revolutionary theory is constructed on the economic grounds of the theoreticians of the Second International; the break with their mechanistic and evolutionary materialism has not been undertaken in its entirety (Santamaria & Manville, 1976, p. 79). Lenin, in effect, will formulate a problematic transition in which the movement of history, even in its most brutal ruptures, will be conceived as a development of productive forces, objective structures anchored in social matter with intrinsic principles of

emergence for new relations of production (Santamaria & Manville, 1976, p. 79).

Having provided a summary of Marx's goal of history and Lenin's theoretical approaches, I will now highlight some gaps in the Leninist application of Marxism. As such, this section is focused on the on-the-ground application of Leninism instead of theoretical analysis. Here, I will discuss the primary gap with the application of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The organization of the Bolshevik government was partly a product of the Russian revolution of 1905. At this time, the proletariat engaged in mass action, which required a form of mass organization (Kautsky, 1919, p. 70). In Russia, the Paris Commune model form of government was realized in the Russian Revolution of 1905. Here, it was the task of the Soviets to depose the capitalist-monarchical state to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Additionally, when the second revolution broke out in 1917, the Soviet organization again came together. However, this time, it was on a firmer basis, corresponding with the development undergone by the proletariat since the first revolution (Kautsky, 1919, p. 71).

As we saw in the earlier section, within the phrase "the dictatorship of the proletariat," Marx had in mind the class content of the power system. However, Lenin's application of this got mixed in with the dissolution of democratic institutions. Lenin expressed that "the social union is to be the organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat," which is the most painless transition to socialism made possible (Kautsky, 1919, p. 74). However, this was not a repudiation of democracy entirely. In his speech in April 1917, Lenin described the Soviet organization as a higher type of democracy. It was higher in the sense that it was a complete break from "middle-class distortion, and the proletariat thereby secured freedom (Kautsky, 1919, p. 74). We also see in his writing of "What is to be done" that

the proletariat could not necessarily make the revolution as Marx theorized. Instead, the revolution would be led by a vanguard party. The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat was then, in practice, transformed into the dictatorship of the communist party in the name of the proletariat (Ball & Dagger, 2022). As such, as some scholars had foreseen, the proposed dictatorship of the proletariat in turn became a dictatorship of the proletariat *by extension*. This development cannot be fully accredited to Lenin's approach to the revolution. However, there is a connection between his adjustment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the ground transformation.

Some Marxists have claimed that the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states had little to do with Marxism, as they were not Marxists (Townshend, 1995, p. 74). This argument highlights that the regime of the Soviet Union had little in common with Marxism, precisely when it came to proletarian emancipation. However, others argue that it is essential to recognize the connection between the U.S.S.R. and Marxism. This is because the soviet state had been overseen by individuals who were acting in the name of Marxism. Furthermore, they implemented some critical aspects of the Marxist political programme, such as public ownership and welfare employment measures (Townshend, 1995, p. 75).

Overall, it is a mistake to see Lenin as a leader uninfluenced by their political environment. It is essential, in this analysis, to consider the vast complexity of the Russian political climate in this era. To argue that Lenin and the Bolsheviks somehow betrayed their revolutionary principles by not adhering strictly to Marxist policies is far too optimistic for the actualities of political life (Debo, 1991, p. 106). As such, one must place both Leninism and Bolshevism in the context of the Russian revolutionary movement. Lenin is a Marxist of a highly original variety in this application of theory. Additionally, his political realism structurally informed his Marxism on the ground. Considering this, some may argue that Leninism, in

some ways, is more practical than Marxist thought. Alternatively, Leninism and Lenin's legacy as a political leader may highlight some crucial aspects of applying Marxist principles to political life.

It is also essential to consider how Leninism influenced Marxism as an ideology after the death of Marx. After Marx died in 1883, Engels became the chief expositor of Marxist theory, which he simplified in several respects (Ball & Dagger, 2022). This is important considering that early 20th-century Russia was an unlikely setting for the proletarian revolution that Marx predicted. As such, Lenin has a significant effect on how Marxism's ideology has continued since Karl Marx's death. As the leader of the revolutionary uprising that brought communism to power in Russia, he is an important figure in the political history of the 20th century. The fact that Lenin did not create the political dream he wanted highlights some key areas of struggle for communism's implementation. As such, his legacy lives on both in terms of a historical-political force and part of the brutality which developed under the U.S.S.R.

This essay argued that the primary difference between Marxist political theory and Leninist political theory and the application thereof to the U.S.S.R. is the differing application of “the dictatorship of the proletariat.” From this discussion, I also discussed the diverging factors of the rise of the revolution and despotic socialism between Leninism (both in theory and on the ground) as compared to Marxism. In conclusion, the Leninist version of Marxism was no more than a version; an attempt to put into practice Marxist ideas, which Marx presented without straightforward principles of political interpretation. In many respects, the communism we saw posited by Lenin is not the communism that Marx theorized. This is quite a common occurrence, as every major political doctrine is subject to an inevitable play of influences, modifications, and alterations in the geopolitical arena. The bigger question may be, was the functioning of the U.S.S.R. a logical

outcome of Marx's doctrine? Perhaps any intrinsic contradictions or weaknesses of Marxist political theory are one thing, and what happened, and is happening in Russia, is simply another.

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# Queering Whanganui River's Legal Status

Eric Willis

## Abstract

This study discusses the political implications and consequences of subverting colonial frameworks and legal definitions of personhood to include more than human entities. I argue that the Whanganui River's legal recognition as a person recognizes the value of Māori worldviews; however, I am not convinced such recognition indicates an interruption of ongoing settler-colonialism. I authored this paper to facilitate conversations about decolonization and self-sovereignty that are mindful of the process without utilizing reformist politics.

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In 2017, New Zealand officials granted the Whanganui River, the third-longest waterway in Aotearoa/New Zealand legal personhood. Aotearoa is the Māori traditional endonym for New Zealand. New Zealand will be used in this paper to refer to the colonially constructed country, its legal system and government officials whereas Aotearoa will be used only in relationship to Indigeneity. The decision to use both names is not to suggest Māori people are outside of New Zealand but rather to indicate different perspectives and values in relation with land. The move to denote the Whanganui River as a legal person is rooted in traditional Māori ways of knowing and being. Iwi are the regional Māori tribes and Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa. The extension of personhood status to the Whanganui River is an existing example of how legal titles and legal systems are socially constructed institutions. Countries with legacies of colonialism like New Zealand reinforce their presence and control through socially constructed institutions, continuing to have authority over how person, property and land are defined. By using a Queer theoretical framework, we can begin to conceive of futures outside of colonial institutions and frameworks.

*What's the Use? On the Uses of Use* offers the reader a language of use that is as diverse and nuanced as embodied experiences of Queerness and thus unable to be fully captured here. However, Sara Ahmed's language of use is foundational in developing productive understandings of why extending the legal status of person to the Whanganui River is not an act of decolonization. Moreover, using Queer theory accomplishes a re-understanding of the limits of colonial legal systems and their uses.

Ahmed's argument frames my discussion of decolonization and Queerness, aiding in my exploration of why New Zealand's legal reorientation to incorporate aspects of Māori ontological, epistemological, and metaphysical histories, worldviews, and relationships is complex. I will address how and what the Whanganui River's newfound title is as well as its ability to

challenge but not interrupt existing colonial legal systems and conceptions of person and property. This discussion will include an interrogation of anthropocentrism as an oppressive reasoning model that is difficult to challenge within socially constructed and colonial institutions. Lastly, I will continue to elicit a conversation on the potential downfalls of the legal concept of personhood when it intends to protect non-human entities, especially concerning industries and climate change.

The word *Queer* has many connotations attached to it. Within this paper, I reject the use of Queer as a negative descriptive word. Queer instead will denote creativity, intervention, reimagination, and most crucially, interruption. *Queer use* can also foreground the unappreciated, changing the experience of use by subverting what it means to use something. For instance, Ahmed's description of *Queer use* suggests the Te Awa Tupua Act subverts the legal definition of a person; remaking the human experience through an altered legal concept of personhood. Used in this way, Queer demystifies the normalcy of legal statuses—often taken for granted by white, non-Indigenous, middle-class, cisgender, able-bodied, heterosexual members of the commonwealth—making visible legal titles' malleable when officially extended to the Whanganui River. The Te Awa Tupua becomes the legal name for the Whanganui River as an entity with personhood. Furthermore, when Ahmed's framework of Queer use is applied to the Te Awa Tupua Act, it suggests that the altered legal concept of personhood has a developed awareness of what is at stake, namely for the river itself and all the life that exists in constant relationship with the river. Indeed, the environment, non-human entities, and more than human animals have been positioned in a different light than they have previously been seen in before.

Ahmed characterizes *Queer uses* as "when things are used for a purpose other than the ones for which they were intended, still referencing the qualities of things; queer uses may linger on those qualities rendering them all the more lively." Framing the

Whanganui River's legal personhood through Ahmed's work draws attention to what qualities contributed to this legislation. In "The Whanganui River a legal person," Abigail Hutchison discusses the qualities taken into consideration when in 2014 the Whanganui iwis proposed a change in the river's legal status. This proposal reflected a "concern for the river's health and desire to preserve the resource for future generations." An intimate relationality to the river is implied through the Whanganui iwis' positionalities. Within this understanding, the river has qualities that, when threatened, challenges the river's integrity and future. If the river's integrity must be protected, it must possess "intrinsic value of its own," and such qualities denote the river as having a life separate but equal to humans and corporations that have similar legal standings. However, the intrinsic value of the river, namely because it is a river, is lost within the legal definition.

The Whanganui iwis have a proverb that articulates the relationship they have with the river, that is characterised by the truth that they are connected with the river; it is "I am the River. The River is me'." Whether through longstanding historical and reciprocal relationships with geographies, or distinct connections to place by nature, or an identification with the whole of creation, these features characterize the Māori worldview. Moreover, Māori iwis know the Whanganui river to be their living ancestor. An open system theory characterizes the Māori worldview. The perceivable differences or borders between a river and human are perforated to exchange knowledge, ceremony, communication, community, identity, and material physiological exchanges.

Open system theory relies on a language and understanding of systems as organizational structures around which we can understand and perceive dynamic relations. Therefore, the Whanganui River and the Whanganui iwis have distinct open systems that maintain a perpetual flow of inputs and outputs provided by their longstanding relationships. Open system theory

thus suggests that all pollution that the Whanganui River experiences will, in part, transfer to the Māori iwis through a receptive circulation or feedback system. This may account for the Māori iwis' ability to use their worldviews to elicit convicted emotional and validated responses from New Zealand officials. The relational argument by the Māori iwis has successfully granted the river legal status, invalidating the definition of personhood as separate from the environment. Subsequently, the Te Awa Tupua Act provides a way to orient humans as one system within a network of forever exchanging systems, concluding that the health of one depends on the health of all.

I am not suggesting that the relational linkages between the Whanganui River and settlers should be valued equally, as there is a longstanding system of mutual exchange between the Whanganui River and Māori iwis. However, one can understand the level of conviction from such an argument is deeply rooted in respect and reciprocity with the river, which exemplifies the river's agency and integrity. The Māori iwis' argument shifts the status quo of what a river can be and what will be the Whanganui River's appropriate use, as to not impose on the river's rights, integrity, and future. In the view of the fact that the Whanganui River attained personhood through the Māori iwis gifting New Zealand officials their worldviews, from the perspective of New Zealand officials, the river's legal status significantly depends on the people living in relation to it. Without the Whanganui iwis issuing the claim of personhood, there might never have been a move towards a New Zealand legal system which makes space for non-human entities. The Te Awa Tupua Act alludes to a perceived inherited responsibility that Māori iwis have to care and advocate for the environment in order for it to be respected.

The limitation of the Whanganui River's legal status of person is that it was only gained through the rights of those in a relationship with it. The "Deed of Settlement [that] comprises two

documents, Ruruku Whakatupua – Te Mana o Te Awa Tupua (‘Framework Document’), which contains the agreed terms of a new legal framework for the river, and Ruruku Whakatupua – Te Man o Te Iwi o Whanganui, which includes the other elements of the native title settlement” provide modes of operations that the Whanganui iwis provided on behalf of the river Whanganui River. The limitation reinscribes proper use of those with the legal status of personhood. The Framework Document instructs how and in which contexts one can use the river and protects private ownership of the pre-existing river. The Framework Document permits parts of the river to continue being used for development, farming, forestry, and run-off which challenges the river’s health and ecology by introducing fecal bacteria and fine sediment. The dual status of the Whanganui River as a person and property is not new, as we can compare it to the legal status of corporations. However, it begs the question of whether the Whanganui River’s legal status as both person and property actually (1) Queers the legal use of person and (2) effectively protects the river’s rights, integrity, and future.

The title settlement includes Whanganui River's right to own riverbeds that were previously Crown property. This move to return stolen land is directly connected to the river being brought back partly to a state of *self-ownership*. Self-ownership is a concept that Carole Pateman outlines, that opposes definitions of autonomy as independent. Pateman suggests *property in the person* is a more meaningful concept because it clarifies the divide between subject and object constituted within legal definitions of personhood. The ethical consequences of *property in the person* reveal that within personhood, some attributes are alienable. *Property in the person* would ensure the Whanganui River rights and jurisdiction over oneself while being honest about the duality of its personhood status. Property in the person, would provide legal personhood appointed with greater importance because of its sincerity. Property in the person grants the river distinct sovereignty separate from the state of

New Zealand and to occupy in the legal system as an entity with the ability for self-sovereignty. For instance, self-sovereignty for a river may include the right to bifurcate unrestricted. Self-sovereignty has a different connotation than property in the person because self-sovereignty recognizes one is right to alienate aspects of oneself—the ability to negotiate with other sovereign nations and to occupy and protect with the mindfulness of one’s relationships and responsibilities.

Hutchison suggests that the Whanganui River’s “new legal standing will afford it the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person. However, what is less clear is what the nature of the rights affords to the river and whether they will be 'river specific' or take the form of rights extended to humans and corporations.” Nonetheless, I suggest that whether the rights attributed to the river are person or river specific through an open system theory, the Whanganui River owning itself in-parts provides a basis for the Whanganui iwis to move towards a post-colonial identity and reclaim core characteristics of themselves, including land-based knowledges, through the self-sovereignty of their ancestor.

Consequently, from The Framework Document, the property interests of the river will be skewed by the “rights in the river that will impose corresponding obligations on others to respect those new rights and will challenge already established interests in the river.” The Framework Document changes how one can form property interest while within the colonial framework of legal use. Notably, the newfound legal status of the Whanganui River reflects the notion that within existing social and political arrangements there is protection of the rights of personhood to ensure the continuation of an existing contract that preserves the rights of personhood as a legal concept. Simultaneously, The Framework Document also protects the interests of Genesis, a hydroelectric power who has legal rights to divert the river until 2039 for power generation. Using a contract

theory can help us understand how the contract is expanding to include the Whanganui River but with limitations.

Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills view contracts as a mechanism that reinforces the domination of the "subjects of the contract" or contractors, who in this case study are the New Zealand officials that have the political power to determine governing legal systems and definitions of person and property. The other parties are known as "objects of the contract," who are instrumentalized to re-justify the contractors' domination and subjectivity. There are also "objects with respect to which the contract has implications." This tier includes those that are impacted by the governing legal contracts and, therefore, have access to the benefits attainable to the legal concepts of personhood. The Whanganui River's legal status may fall somewhere unclearly in both the "objects of the contract" and "object with respect to which the contract has implications" because the "subjects of the contract" ascribes the Whanganui River's legal status and re-establishes New Zealand's governmental officials ability to provide rights as well as revoke them. Additionally, even though the Whanganui River now falls within the legal definitions of person, the Whanganui River can not autonomously access the benefits which reside in those legal concepts. Understanding the contract's legal limitations aids in making sense of the power relationships that persist within social and political arrangements.

Legal use is different from everyday use. Legal use denotes a normative use for regulating interaction between humans. Everyday use denotes a tentative use that guides relationships, behaviours, and responses. Everyday use might be guided by legality or rather it may be outside of legal frameworks, creating Queer relations, behaviours, and responses. Legal and everyday uses are similar in that they orient the terms of use. They are different in that they orientate the contractor's subjectivity in different yet sometimes simultaneous ways. Ahmed would argue that legal systems are normative because all institutions are like "a well-worn garment: it has acquired the

shape of those who tend to wear it such that it is easier to wear if you have that shape.” Ahmed’s argument about the “well-worn garment” considers how normative uses by design are not as accessible to everyone and that their designs are informed by those who create and enforce them. For those who are initially left out from the design of colonial frameworks and legal systems, such as the Whanganui River, using its legal status is arduous. Contemporary, everyday use by the Māori iwis are historical examples of relationships, behaviours, and responses that were originally prior to and outside of colonial frameworks and institutions. Additionally, what happens to these pre-existing relationships, behaviours, and responses when use becomes normative?

At first, the use of personhood as a normative use of the legal system to identify and protect the rights of humans, corporations, and non-human entities—such as the case with the Whanganui River—appears to favour fixing “broken” legal and political systems that are permitting environmental ownership, degradation, and exploitation. However, under further consideration, the positivity of reparations is mitigated by a condition of appropriate use that must be followed. The Whanganui River’s uncertain everyday use status is bound to a normative legal use that protects ownership, degradation, and exploitation of a significant percentage of the river. The usefulness of The Framework Document lies in what it claims to protect. The shortcoming of the usefulness of the legal system is that it does not always effectively protect what it sought out. If Ahmed describes Queer use as “when we aim to shatter what has provided a container,” Queering the legal definition of personhood as well as the legal and political system by association should bring about effective impediments on the river’s use. A more encompassing confinement of normative use or proper use resembles a contradiction: is it Queer if it reproduces the traditional use of a legal system's normative function?

Anthropocentrism is the point of view that humans are the only or primary holders of moral standing. Anthropocentrism is human-centred or *anthropocentric*. The human-centeredness of colonial frameworks of social and political governing is killing the planet, Indigenous societies, the global South, and all life that sees their survival as inseparable from the planet's survival. On the one hand, decentering humans from the legal concept of person challenges human supremacy within legal systems designed to regulate and stabilize human interaction. Alternatively, it is a re-inscription of human knowledge and intelligence as superior, as the Whanganui River attained its legal status by association with Māori iwis' proposed to protect and preserve the river's integrity and futurity. The intra-human qualities thus are bolstered to attain a status of a legal person. Expanding legal concepts does not entirely challenge anthropocentrism, but it arguably subverts or reorients it, resembling Ahmed's conceptualization of Queer use.

In *Queer Phenomenology*, Sara Ahmed reminds the reader that it is important to question one's orientation as "what we can see in the first place depends on which way we are facing. What gets our attention depends too on which direction we are facing." It is also important to ask questions that appear out of sight due to the orientation one is provided. With that in mind, I want to acknowledge the importance of asking the questions as I have, about the actual limitations of colonial frameworks and socially constructed legal definitions of personhood to include rivers instead of protecting rivers because they have inherent value as rivers. Furthermore, what is lost when we use the term Queer to denote a change rather than an interruption? Interruption, specifically as an end that precedes a new beginning, rather than a continuation of the same only presented as different.

Ahmed's study of phenomenology, in short, sums up how we "perceive things insofar as they are near to us, insofar as we share a residence with them. Perception hence involves orientation; what is

perceived depends on where we are located, which gives us a certain take on things." My own orientation as a Queer, non-binary and non-Indigenous person has taught me to be skeptical of normalcy that is presented before me, including the legal victories of the Whanganui River's personhood status. My orientation towards the subject of the case study, the Whanganui River, is unfamiliar; thus, my understanding is more or less familiar only in loose relationships, through studying and thinking about decolonization in Canada. Additionally, from the orientation of the Whanganui iwis, their historical understanding of the world and the Whanganui River is being vindicated by New Zealand officials, a significant win in the move towards Indigenous sovereignty. Nevertheless, vindicating the Whanganui iwis' orientation towards the Whanganui River offers a better alternative than leaving the river situated at complete risk of further degradation and exploitation by industry and climate polluters.

In conclusion, the Whanganui River's legal status as a person is latent with contradictions and ambiguity. For the Māori iwis, the legal status of the river is undoubtedly a success within a history of separation from land and culture due to colonialism and ongoing settler-colonialism. I have shown through the use of open systems theory that the greatest success of the Whanganui River's legal status is a reconnection to self-sovereignty not only for the river itself, but also for the Whanganui iwis who gifted their traditional worldviews to New Zealand officials. Furthermore, I discussed the limitations of changing socially constructed legal status to be more inclusive. Consequences include reinscribing the "subjects of the contracts" authority to designate and provide legal protection to whom or what they find appropriate. For New Zealand officials this means remaining within a colonial framework. Additionally, reinscribing anthropocentrism into the legal system because the Whanganui River's legal status was only appointed through Māori iwis proposition to respect the river's integrity, and not because of the

orientation that nature is inherently deserving of respect. The New Zealand officials have shown that their beliefs are the river is only inherently deserving of protection by association to humans. Because of these contradictions, I am skeptical if expanding the legal concept of personhood as well as using colonial legal systems to protect unconventional entities is an act of Queering. I suggest from my orientation, in order to Queer the use of the colonial frameworks and legal system, one must renounce them instead of reforming them.

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# Developing A Critical Approach Towards Contrasting Protectionist and Free-Trade Paradigms

**Elliot Goodell Ugalde**

## **Abstract**

This paper utilizes critical theory to interrogate the normative ontological and epistemological assumptions undergirding free-trade and protectionist paradigms, the two dominant paradigms within Western economic orthodoxy. In comparing both paradigms, this paper argues that protectionism better aligns with critical economics' agenda of remaining responsive and aware of theory's undergirded, normative assumptions. This argument is inductively corroborated using the empirics of the 1994 EZLN uprising. Ultimately, given a binary between free-trade and protectionist paradigms, as per Western economic orthodoxy, critical economists should advocate for protectionist measures as they better align with their political project.

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to dedicate this research in loving memory of Jin Woo Park who will always be remembered by the University of Victoria's undergraduate community. We love you buddy, rest easy.

## Theoretical Context

Political theory and economic theory by extension, can be subdivided between problem-solving theories and critical theories. Problem-solving theories, including both free-trade and protectionist paradigms, prescribe policy to remedy normatively identified economic problems. Contrasting, critical theories employ a meta-analysis of problem-solving theories to expose both their identified problems and their prescribed policies as epistemologically and ontologically contextual. This paper bridges the empirical debates between free-trade and protectionist paradigms, concluding that if we assume a binary between free-trade and protectionism, as per Western economic orthodoxy, then protectionism's responsiveness to shifting normative contexts better aligns with critical theory's advocacy of remaining aware of theoretical context, thus should be advocated for, by critical economists.

Crucially, this paper refers to free-trade and protectionism as an economic binary only insofar as they are assumed as such within Western economic orthodoxy evident in both being the two dominant paradigms within western economic tradition and that within the hegemonic dominance of Western economic orthodoxy, deviant economic traditions are interpreted as pertaining to either a protectionist or free-trade paradigm. This paper cites the tendency for "deviant" economic traditions, such as Mesoamerican Indigenous economic traditions, to be interpreted as effectively protectionist within Western economic orthodoxy as evidence that protectionism proves more accommodating of "sociologically deviant" economic traditions. Ergo, between protectionist and free-trade paradigms, critical economists should advocate for protectionism as it better aligns with critical economics' agenda of remaining responsive and aware of theory's undergirded, normative assumptions.

## Argumentative Structure

This paper's deductive component will begin by outlining various critical approaches and argue that neo-critical/poststructuralist approaches provide the best analytical

framework to compare the normative assumptions undergirding both free-trade and protectionist paradigms. Secondly, this paper will compare poststructuralist meta-criticisms levied against free-trade orthodoxy with those levied against the protectionist paradigm to expose the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning both economic approaches. This is important because both paradigms are undergirded by their own normative fallacies. Ergo, exposing fallacies which underpin only one of the two paradigms is not a sufficient argument in support of the other paradigm. This comparison will expose that between the two, the free-trade paradigm tends to assume an economic ontology, whereas the protectionist paradigm is more open to assuming a social/environmental ontology. Lastly, this paper will engage in a further meta-analysis of the normative assumptions undergirding both theories and ultimately conclude that although protectionism is not the necessary contrapositive to free-trade, since it better accommodates social/environmental ontologies it is more responsive to critical economics emphasis on being aware and responsive to shifting normative contexts when compared against the free-trade paradigm. Thus, if assuming a binary between free trade and protectionist paradigms, as per Western economic orthodoxy, protectionism should be favoured by critical economists. Rephrased, this paper's deductive argument follows this set of premises:

1. Critical theory encourages problem-solving theories to be aware of their normative contexts
  2. Free-trade and Protectionist paradigms are both problem-solving theories.
  3. Free-trade paradigm tends to subscribe to an economic ontology
  4. Protectionist paradigm tends to subscribe to an social/environmental ontology
  5. Social/environmental ontologies are more responsive than economic ontologies to changing contexts and are more aware of normative biases.
- Conclusion: Assuming a binary between protectionism and free trade paradigms, protectionism is more able to be responsive to changing normative contexts and thus, should take precedence.

Inductively, this theoretical framework and its corresponding conclusion will be further corroborated alongside the empirics of the 1994 Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) uprising which is interpreted by Western, orthodox economists as effectively protectionist despite EZLN motivations ideologically predating western economic orthodoxy. As a result, this paper reiterates that if assuming a binary between free-trade and protectionism, as per western economic orthodoxy, protectionism better aligns with critical economics' agenda of remaining “reflexive”, responsive and aware of a theory’s undergirding normative assumptions.

### **Determining Methodology: Selecting A Suitable Critical Approach**

Whereas there are an indiscernible number of potential biases within positivist approaches, and thus an indiscernible number of problem-solving theories, critical approaches can be generally categorized into two approaches. These approaches criticize the ontological and epistemological assumptions of problem-solving theories as being either materially contextual or holistically contextual. Critical approaches, which explore the material context

of a problem-solving theory's normative biases, are regarded as historical-materialist approaches. For example, orthodox realists derive their understanding of a state's universal and unchanging ethos as extensions of a self-interested and rational ontology. In challenging this assertion, a historical-materialist would employ critical theory to argue realism's assumed state ontology is materially contextual, what Marxists refer to as "the means" and "relations" of production. According to historical-materialists, these contextual means and relations of production ultimately define how a state will behave in the international arena, undermining realist assumptions about nation-states' universal, rational self-interest. Contrasting historical materialism, neo-critical/poststructuralist critical theories assert that the normative assumptions that undergird problem-solving theories are more holistically contextual. This differs from a historical-materialist approach in allowing for the possibility that a given problem-solving theory's normative contexts are ideologically constructed, not always wholly materially constructed.

Crucially, if critical approaches encourage proponents of problem-solving theories to be wary of normative assumptions, then critical approaches must not employ the use of any of their own normative assumptions. It would be paradoxical for a critical theory to employ meta-narratives while simultaneously exposing problem-solving theories' usage of meta-narratives as normative and contextual. Yet, poststructuralism criticizes historical-materialism's economic determinism by equating it to a meta-narrative. Recast, historical-materialism arguing that problem-solving theories' normative biases are materially contextual is itself a normative bias. If the purpose of this paper is to levy the normative assumptions of free-trade orthodoxy against those of the protectionist paradigm, utilizing an approach which can be criticized for employing its own normative ontology would leave it subject to criticism. Ergo, poststructuralism proves as a better descriptivist critical approach than historical materialism in dismantling protectionism and free-trade's respective normative ontologies.

Notably, poststructuralism does not discredit historical-materialism entirely. Instead, poststructuralists argue that historical-materialism's tendency to be economically deterministic has stunted its ability to challenge all a problem-solving theory's normative

assumptions. Rather than discredit historical materialism's economically deterministic biases, poststructuralism supplements them by arguing problem-solving theories are undergirded by both ideologically contextual assumptions, as well as materially contextual assumptions. Simply, poststructuralism does not limit its meta-criticisms of problem-solving theories as unitarily materialist by positing that free-trade orthodoxy is simultaneously maintained by both ideological and material contexts. For example, poststructuralism does not disagree with historical-materialism's position that the free-trade orthodoxy fails to identify the material contradiction between capital's infinite growth as an antithesis to earth's finite bio-power. However it might additionally add that free-trade also legitimizes itself via ideological contexts such as the contextual dominance of western epistemologies informing free-trade's capital centric nature. Again, since poststructuralism proves itself a more holistic approach to critical economics than historical-materialism, poststructuralism will be the primary mode of analysis used in this paper to challenge protectionist and free-trade paradigms.

Further, as problem-solving theories, free-trade and protectionist paradigms prescribe policy to address identified political problems. Additionally, the role of critical theory is to provide a meta-commentary on both paradigms by exposing normative assumptions in the paradigms' identified political problems and their corresponding political prescriptions. Yet, since free-trade and protectionist paradigms both employ normative assumptions, it must be noted that free-trade is not the contrapositive to protectionism. Therefore, poststructuralist meta-criticisms of free-trade orthodoxy are not sufficient arguments in favour of protectionism. Similarly, poststructuralist criticisms of protectionism cannot be interpreted as arguments in favour of free-trade. Rephrased, exposing the ontological underpinnings of free-trade as contextual does not render the ontological underpinnings of protectionism any less contextual. As a result, properly contrasting these paradigms requires employing poststructuralist analysis to determine the nature of each paradigm's ontological and epistemological assumptions. Once determined, this analysis compares each paradigm's biases to determine which proves more

responsive and aware of shifting ontological contexts, and thus, is more in line with critical economics' agenda of remaining responsive and aware of theory's normative contexts.

Additionally, to reiterate that free-trade is not the contrapositive to protectionism, it is noted that both paradigms often share normative assumptions. For example, a shared Western-centric epistemology between free-trade and protectionism has encouraged both ontologies to assume a commodity-centric understanding of land tenure. By contrast, prior feudal modes of production, as well as certain contemporary Indigenous modes of production, predate Western understanding of land as a commodity. Protectionism and free-trade's shared historical processes such as the ontological imposition of binding land to the commodity form were forcefully imposed on these competing Indigenous modes of production resulting in both paradigms' shared normative assumptions. Further, shared historical processes are evident in the transition between feudal and capitalist modes of production which encouraged land commodification by enclosing the commons, as well as contemporary agrarian land reform projects designed to snuff non-capital centric, Indigenous resource management practices in the Global South. The existence of these Indigenous competing modes of production, and their forced subversion to Western epistemologies, corroborates the poststructuralist position that objective ontologies do not arise from a liberal, free marketplace of ideas. Rather, poststructuralism posits that there is no teleological trajectory towards an objective epistemological end-point and that epistemological and ontological assumptions simply assume dominance through historically imposed hegemonic structures. As such, protectionism and free-trade paradigms share normative assumptions as they both remain tied to Western epistemologies, which are established and maintained via shared historical processes.

Another example of overlapping normative assumptions between free-trade and protectionism resulting from Western-centric epistemology, is both paradigms' subscription to Westphalian state-centrism. Protectionism, if advocated for within the context of realist nationalism, assumes an ontologically Westphalian nation-state model. Similarly, free-trade paradigms, which subscribe to Kantian

peace theory, dismiss the internal contexts of nation-states on the international arena arguing instead that nation-state behaviour is universal and can equally be coerced into cooperation under specific economic conditions. Again, these overlapping normative assumptions wholly contrast Indigenous ontologies that predate the shared state-centric assumptions shared by protectionist and free-trade paradigms.

Still, despite their shared normative assumptions, free-trade and protectionist paradigms differ ontologically. Contrasting these differences concludes that the free-trade paradigm tends to situate itself within an economic ontology whereas the protectionist paradigm is more willing to assume a social/environmental ontology. Although free-trade and protectionist paradigms are both informed by normative ontologies, whichever ontology is more responsive and aware of its normative contexts will better align with critical economics' advocacy for remaining responsive and aware of a theory's normative contexts. Ultimately, I conclude that social/environmental ontologies are more responsive to these contexts because they can form out of non-Western-centric ontological contexts. By contrast, the economic ontology often assumed by free-trade orthodoxy is less malleable to non-Western contexts. Therefore, if assuming a binary between protectionism and free-trade, protectionism better aligns itself with the project of critical economics.

### **Competing Ontologies and Their Responsiveness To Shifting Contexts**

The argument that despite being subject to its own ontological assumptions, the protectionist paradigm is more responsive than free-trade to changing theoretical contexts relies on three provable premises. Firstly, free-trade orthodoxy tends to assume an economic ontology. In comparison, protectionism is more willing to assume a social/environmental ontology. Lastly, a willingness to assume a social/environmental ontology is necessarily more responsive to undergirded contexts and assumptions when compared to a rigid economic ontology. As such, critical economics should support protectionism as it better aligns with its meta-

objective of remaining responsive and aware of a theory's normative contexts.

Using a poststructuralist approach to interrogate free-trade's normative assumptions emphasizes free-trade's tendency to assume an economic ontology. For example, according to Robert Driskill, free-trade advocates argue free-trade is beneficial "on average" while acknowledging some people will necessarily be worse off because of it. Driskill argues free-trade orthodoxy's tendency to reduce the human experience to a set of economically deterministic variables neglects the social contexts of individual people. He posits that assuming that the economic detriment of some people caused by free-trade will not evolve into social detriment that outweighs the economic benefits of other people is a wholly normative assertion. Rephrased, reducing human contexts to universal economic variables, and using such variables to generalize policy, ignores the human contexts that critical theory implores us to attend to. By contrast, Driskill posits protectionism is necessarily defined by changing human contexts. Protectionism ontologically decentralizes power which allows various human contexts to permeate through its political prescriptions.

Aside from Driskill's challenge against free-trade orthodoxy's tendency to reduce the human experience to economically deterministic variables, other poststructuralist challenges to free-trade similarly expose its overreliance on an economic ontology. For example, George Stigler criticizes David Ricardo's 'labour theory of value' for overprescribing the role of labour in production. In reducing labour to a universal, measurable variable, anthropocentric contexts embedded within that labour are lost. Such contexts include neglecting the potential alienation of labour, the physiological degradation induced by various types of labour, the environmental and sociological impacts of various types of labour as well as the social contexts of individual labourers. Another poststructuralist challenge to free-trade's economic-centric ontology confronts Kantian peace theory. A poststructuralist interpretation could challenge Kantian peace theory's assumption that the way in which a nation-state will behave is determined by its economic relationship to other nation-states. Again, this approach

neglects the possibility that shifting human contexts influence a state's behaviour on the international arena.

In contrast to free-trade, protectionism better allows the permeation of social/environmental ontologies. Although protectionism often employs economic-centric policies, such as "protectionist monetary policies and the restriction of foreign investment", these policies are often socially/environmentally informed. This reflects protectionism's non-expansionary tendencies when compared to free-trade. For example, protectionism can justify itself via an economic ontology like protecting jobs. Equally, protectionism can justify itself via a social ontology of preserving traditional approaches to production. Here, protectionism has adopted two entirely different ontologies for its justification based on shifting ontological contexts. The free-trade paradigm also sometimes assumes a social/economic ontology, such as asserting that the revenue produced from free-trade can finance, and thus preserve, local cultures. However, this argument assumes non-capital centric modes of production are not a part of these cultures. Since culture influences production, just as production influences culture, an injection of Western economic practices will snuff traditional production practices. As such, whereas the protectionist paradigm can easily assume a social/environmental ontology, the free-trade paradigm struggles to do the same.

Further, social/environmental ontologies prove less expansionary than Western-informed economic ontologies. As noted, if protectionism assumes a Western economic paradigm, it shares free-trade's understanding of land as a commodity. This commodity-centric ontology proves antithetical to many non-Western resource management practices. Still, the difference between free-trade and protectionist paradigms is evident in protectionism's ability to abandon its economic ontology more easily for a social/environmental ontology. Thus, protectionism can also more easily abandon the expansionary tendencies of Western economic ontologies. For example, if assuming a social ontology, a hypothetical 'expansionary-protectionism' would only encourage various regions to enact measures to better control their resources. Each region could hypothetically assume an ontology in line with

their regional values to inform the ways in which they exercise control over those resources. By contrast, 'expansionary-free-trade' still bound to an economic ontology would involve the forceful imposition of epistemologically Western resource management practices. In this situation, market mechanisms would challenge traditional resource management practices for hyper-productive alternatives.

### **The EZLN As a Corroborating Case Study**

The tendency for advocates of distinct ontologies and distinct resource management practices to support protectionism rather than free-trade further illustrates protectionism's responsiveness to shifting normative contexts when compared against free-trade. As mentioned, certain Indigenous ideologies predate free-trade and protectionist paradigms of state-centrism and commodified land tenure. Despite this, advocates of these Indigenous ideologies often subscribe to the protectionist paradigm when situating their struggle within the western-centric context of the two paradigms. The tendency for Indigenous ideologies to favour protectionism over free-trade corroborates protectionism's malleability to different ontologies. Additionally, bridging this paper's theoretical underpinnings alongside the empirics of the 1994 EZLN uprising further strengthens the claim that critical economics better aligns itself with protectionism than free-trade.

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) consists of Mesoamerican Indigenous peoples from Chiapas, México. Crucially, their *extra commercium* conception of land tenure contradicts both free-trade and protectionist ontologies of land commodification. Notably, EZLN land tenure and EZLN ontology refuse to situate themselves Western economic paradigm. Despite EZLN's ontological assumptions contradicting protectionism—within Western economic orthodoxy's assumed free-trade/protectionist binary—EZLN policies remain effectively protectionist. This is exemplified by the EZLN's challenge to free-trade expansionism evident in the EZLN uprising occurring the same day, and as a direct response to, the North American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA) implementation. This is because NAFTA's

free-trade expansionism proved antithetical to the EZLN's understanding of *extra commercium* land tenure. Contextualized, EZLN leadership considered NAFTA the latest in a long line of free-trade imposed revisions to *Article 27* of the post-revolutionary Mexican constitution which had prohibited the privatization of Mesoamerican land. Reiterated, given the binary between free-trade and protectionism, free-trade's inability to escape an economic ontology proved more antithetical than protectionism when pitted against Mesoamerican ontological conceptions of land tenure.

Unlike free-trade, protectionist ontological malleability allowed the EZLN to redefine a Western-economic ontology to one newly informed by Mesoamerican social ontologies. This shift redefined epistemologically Western protectionism from a concept of protecting jobs within a very specific, capital-centric economic ontology to one useful to the "protecting of Indigenous land rights". Ultimately, this is a result of protectionism's ability to abandon its economic ontologies and redefine its existence based on Indigenous social ontologies.

In many ways, Mesoamerican ideology, which informs the EZLN's 1994 militancy, parallels poststructuralist theory. Like poststructuralism, Mesoamerican ideologies stress pluriversality—a rejection of meta-narratives, with an emphasis on remaining critical of normative biases. The EZLN conceptualizes this pluriversality of ontologies via establishing "a world in which many worlds fit". This ideology directly opposes the mono-logical approach of problem-solving theories and their propensity to subscribe to one set of ontologies/epistemologies. Despite its apparent poststructuralist leanings, Western economists tend to interpret the EZLN's 1994 uprising as protectionist. This interpretation is a result of protectionism's ability to justify itself via distinct social ontologies and individual human contexts. In this sense, although protectionism effectively remains a problem-solving theory, when compared with free-trade, it better parallels critical theory in its ability to abandon the mono-logical assumption of a single economic ontology.

## Theoretical Applications

Critical theory exists as a tool for theoretical introspection. Still, as a descriptive theory, it is often criticized for being unable to produce applicable policy. Paradoxically, when critical theory produces policy, it often requires subscribing to its own set of ontological and epistemological assumptions. For example, Marxist prescriptions of historical-materialism assume an economically deterministic ontology as well as a dialectically derived epistemology. This paradox ultimately led me to abandon historical-materialism as a suitable meta-theoretical approach in this thesis' analysis. In contrast, critical theory's assertion that there is no policy free of ontological bias, or that "theory is always for someone and some purpose" produces a self-defeating prophecy. If normative contexts inform theory and theory informs policy, critical theory will never realize a policy free of normative bias and evolve from a descriptive into a prescriptive theoretical approach. The closest prescriptive political application of critical theory is to produce policy that is self-aware of its own ontological biases while being malleable enough to accommodate a plurality of changing contextual ontologies.

Ultimately, neither the theoretical interpretation of this paper's deductive argument, nor the inductive empirics of the EZLN uprising argue that protectionism exists as a practical application of critical theory. Rather, it concludes that, if assuming a binary between free-trade and protectionist paradigms, as per western economic orthodoxy, protectionism's willingness to accommodate shifting ontologies rather than remain dogmatic to a Western-centric economic ontology better aligns with critical theory's project of theoretical contextual awareness.

Critical theory exposes the ontological and epistemological biases of problem-solving theories. As a result, critical theories either struggle to manifest their insights as policy (as is the case with poststructuralism) or they paradoxically adopt their own normative assumptions (as is the case with historical-materialism). Further, since free-trade and protectionist paradigms exist as problem-solving theories, they each subscribe to normative biases. However, in

analyzing the biases employed by free-trade and protectionist paradigms, it becomes clear that free-trade tends to assume an economic ontology whereas protectionism is more willing to assume a social/environmental ontology. Protectionism's willingness to accommodate a plurality of ontologies is further corroborated by the empirics of the EZLN uprising. Although subject to their own normative biases, if assuming an economic binary between free-trade and protectionist paradigms, protectionism better aligns with the interests of critical theory. As such, protectionism with critical theory's advocacy of remaining aware of theoretical context, thus should be advocated for, by critical economists.

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