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The Journal

On Politics is a peer-reviewed academic journal published annually by the University of Victoria Undergraduates of Political Science. It aims to encourage and facilitate undergraduate scholarship by providing students and recent graduates with a unique opportunity to have their work published in a formal medium. The editors of *On Politics* are drawn from the undergraduate student body and the journal publishes writing from a variety of theoretical perspectives, both intra- and interdisciplinary.

Submissions

Articles may be submitted by any undergraduate or recent graduate of the University of Victoria. Submissions should be eight to fifteen pages in length and must have received a grade of A- or higher. Citations must consist of footnotes conforming to the most recent Chicago Manual of Style. Submissions should be directed to the Editor-in-Chief at onpol@uvic.ca and will be subject to a double-blind review by the journal's undergraduate editorial staff.

Acknowledgements

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Special Thanks To:

Xaviere Schneider | Mary Heeg | Declan Roberts

On Politics would like to thank the University of Victoria Students' Society, the Department of Political Science, and the Undergraduates of Political Science course union for their continued support and investment in undergraduate publishing and academic writing.

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Editor in Chief

Samuel McVicar is completing his degree in Political Science and professional writing. He plans to pursue journalism in the future but takes pleasure in editing the work of his peers in an academic setting. Samuel is interested in the increasingly important role played by non-state actors in the international arena and plans to focus on this subject wherever his career may take him. Samuel is incredibly thankful to the Undergraduates of Political Science and the associated course union for their ongoing support of undergraduate writing, editing, and publishing.

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Letter from the Editor

It was a difficult and turbulent year for both *On Politics* and political discourse in general. This year's journal showcases a variety of work addressing both domestic and international issues. Each article addresses a subject that has dominated the political zeitgeist and discourses globally in the past few years: gerrymandering in the United States, the Afghan opium economy, to climate change, the risk of resource scarcity, the patterns of Al-Qaeda franchises, the freedom of the press, and the impacts of electoral reform. All these fields of inquiry are addressed by this year's undergraduates of the University of Victoria who seek to break through persistent news cycles to deliver a more nuanced analysis of the patterns, events, and ongoing crises of our time.

Writing is a critical skill that should be practised by all university students regardless of faculty. Therefore, *On Politics* would like to thank the Undergraduates of Political Science course union and the faculty of Political Science at the University of Victoria for their ongoing support of undergraduate writing and publishing.

Undergraduate writing and editing is essential to the spirit of political academia on the University of Victoria's campus and the journal represents a culmination of that enthusiasm.

Finally, we would like to thank you, the reader, for reading and considering the thoughts and arguments of our contributors, who represent a cross-section of the undergraduate student body of Political Science on the University of Victoria campus.

—

Samuel D. McVicar

Editor-in-Chief, *On Politics*

Foreword

Dearest reader,

This is a lament for the promises made to us by a society that failed to follow through. This is a lament for a time that never existed; for the optimism we once held in spite of the overwhelming evidence that the glass was half empty; and for the days that were undominated by the fear and eco-grief that currently grips more of our waking moments than not. Thus, we find ourselves wondering what we can do to mitigate the rising sense of unease surrounding a degraded world that may very well be beyond our ability to repair.

Fortunately, there are few better ways to start mitigating that unease than to investigate the processes which shape our world. This is something that the brilliant authors of *On Politics* have accomplished in a variety of ways. Starting with my own paper, we are asked whether votes truly matter in American elections, or if the results are effectively predetermined. Hannah West identifies a foundational similarity between McDonald's and Al-Qaeda. Malcolm Stewart discusses the interplay of opium and the economy within Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Abby Koning explains how Canada's foreign policy plays into the 2015 Paris Agreement. Continuing this thread of articles about the environment, Tao Browne discusses water security and scarcity. Finally, this edition of *On Politics* concludes with Negin Saadati's discussion of the role of the Israeli media on the peace process and Paarth Mittal's analysis of New Zealand's electoral reform. Through these authors, some of the world's most obfuscated issues are elucidated with the concision one might expect from those with exponentially more experience in these areas.

Every era has its anxieties about what will come, but millennials are rightly convinced that the issues of our time will be unlike any that came before. The impending ecological devastation and regression of democratic norms haunts the writings of our authors' articles in a way that defies a true definition. Yet, the first step in fixing a problem is diagnosing its existence, and so our authors embark on their journey to dissect our domestic and international society in order to instruct us to do better than we currently are.

We are afraid, as we should be, but it is crucial to utilize this fear as an invitation to action rather than to indulge our continued petulant passivity.

—

Declan Roberts

Former Editor-in-Chief and current contributor, *On Politics*

Who Picks Who?

A Discussion of Supreme Court Rulings on Gerrymandering

By
Declan Roberts

Recently *Gill v. Whitford* was being decided by the United States Supreme Court (*the court*), with incisive and deceptively simple questions from Justice Sotomayor which cut to the heart of the matter: is there a benefit to democracy that can be gleaned from partisan gerrymandering?¹ After receiving an unsatisfactory answer in which Wisconsin's attorney misinterpreted Justice Breyer's dissent in the 2004 case *Vieth v. Jubelirer* (*Vieth*), Justice Sotomayor asked another question that is central to any debate surrounding gerrymandering: "It's OK to stack the decks so that for 10 years—or an indefinite period of time—one party, even though it gets a minority of votes, can get ... the majority of seats?"² These two questions are central in the debate surrounding both political gerrymandering, which is legal – despite a majority of Americans opposing it³ – and racial gerrymandering which, depending on circumstances, is banned by both the fourteenth amendment's equal protections clause and the spirit of the law in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). This paper will examine racial gerrymandering committed by the North Carolina General Assembly's (*North Carolina*) redrawing of the first and twelfth congressional districts, and the courts overturning of those maps as a demonstration of their illegality vis à vis the packing of minority voters into one district when not strictly necessary. While it would also be possible to see this argument of racial packing in the same districts through the both *Hunt v. Cromartie* (*Cromartie I*) or *Easley v. Cromartie* (*Cromartie II*) this case is best exemplified in the culmination of North Carolina's redistricting fights which is *Cooper v. Harris* (*Cooper*). This will be achieved by first discussing what gerrymandering is and how it is done, then by discussing the VRA, followed by an examination of *Cooper*, and

¹ Stern, Mark Joseph. "Partisan Gerrymandering Got the Sotomayor Treatment." *Slate*, October 4, 2017.

https://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/10/sonia_sotomayor_s_simple_devastating_question_in_gill_v_whitford.html.

² *Ibid.*

³ Kathy Frankovic, "Few Support Partisan Gerrymandering." *YouGov*, October 10, 2017. <https://today.yougov.com/news/2017/10/04/few-support-partisan-gerrymandering>.

finally by discussing *Cooper's* implications for gerrymandering more broadly. The culmination of these examinations will show that there is a trend moving away from gerrymandering – in part due to the further entrenchment of the *Gingles* test – in both forms due to its status as antithetical to democratic norms about voters selecting their representative.

The original Gerrymander was drawn for Elbridge Gerry and was so named because the district was shaped like a salamander. Redistricting is one of the two central ways in which gerrymandering has gained effectiveness, the other being a process called self-selection. Redistricting is a process that has its roots in Article One, Section Two of the Constitution within the apportionment clause:

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . . The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years.⁴

The Time and Manner clause also aids this by saying: the manner and time of when elections are to be held is a right retained by the state legislatures as per article one section four of the constitution. This means that when the number of districts for the house representatives changes based on census data, the state legislatures have the constitutional right to draw the new electoral maps. Thus, the state election prior to the decennial census is heavily contested and particularly important as they allow one party to shape the electoral map for the following ten years. Another reason that these elections were so hotly contested was because until 1962 there was only one rule regarding redistricting, which was that districts had to be contiguous.⁵ It was not until *Wesbury v. Sanders* (*Wesbury*) that districts had to be as equal in population as possible.⁶ While the “equal protections clause” was invoked in *Wesbury* it was not

⁴ Constitution Center, “Article I: The Legislative Branch,” National Constitution Center. <https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/articles/article-i>.

⁵ John N. Friedman and Richard T. Holden, “Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack,” *The American Economic Review* 98, no. 1 (2008): 115, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29729966>.

⁶ *Ibid*, 116.

until *Shaw v. Reno* that redistricting was adjudicated under strict scrutiny.⁷

However, it is unlikely that gerrymandering would have the same power if not for a process called self-selection. Self-selection is the phenomenon where individuals decide to live in areas that are heavily in favour of their party; the most obvious example of self-selection is a Democrat who lives in New York City. When enough people of one party pack themselves into a single area it becomes far easier to pack them into fewer districts. Furthermore, because Democrats tend to live in metropolitan centers they're packed more easily, and thus waste more votes.⁸ Without self-selection it would be significantly harder to draw reliable maps for political parties.

There are two main methods of gerrymandering that must be discussed prior to a discussion of *Cooper*: cracking, and packing. To crack a district is to segment the voters of a party into so many districts that their electoral power is heavily diluted. This can be seen in districts like those at issue in *Gill v. Whitford*, as while the state's partisan breakdown is roughly even, the state legislature is heavily Republican.⁹ FiveThirtyEight's "Gerrymandering Atlas", which allows individuals to see the implications of various redistricting strategies, shows that when the state is redistricted with competition as the foremost concern, Wisconsin has one safe seat for each party and the remaining six districts being classified as competitive.¹⁰ The other method, packing, is when map makers put as many supporters of a party in one district as possible. This ensures that their electoral power is confined to as few districts as possible. Examples of this can be seen in the first and twelfth districts in North Carolina.¹¹ The logic behind packing is that if a group is too large to crack, meaning the group may still be able to achieve electoral victory, then map

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Jowei Chen and David Cottrell, "Evaluating partisan gains from Congressional gerrymandering: Using computer simulations to estimate the effect of gerrymandering in the U.S. House," *Electoral Studies* 44, no. 1 (2016): 339. https://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/science/article/pii/S0261379416303201?_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_origin=gateway&_docanchor=&md5=b8429449ccfc9c30159a5f9aeea92ffb&ccp=y.

⁹ "Gerrymandering is on Trial," The Gerrymandering Project, from FiveThirtyEight, September 28, 2017. <https://fivethirtyeight.com/tag/gerrymandering-podcast>.

¹⁰ Aaron Bycoffe et al., "The Atlas of Redistricting," January 25, 2018, FiveThirtyEight. <https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-maps/wisconsin/#Competitive>.

¹¹ United States' Supreme Court. *Cooper v. Harris*. 22 May 2017. Legal Information Institute, Cornell U Law School, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-1262>.

makers concede a district and place as many of the group into that district, map makers then crack the rest of the group if needed. However, while packing and cracking are regularly considered legal, there is a variety of situations under the VRA where it would be illegal to crack or pack certain groups.

The VRA was signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson (Department of Justice). The spirit of the act was to counteract the multitude of disenfranchisement methods that were used on minorities with regards to voting.¹² Certain areas of the U.S are covered by section 5 of the VRA which gives extra powers to the Attorney General by forcing states to check with the attorney general that any change they make which will be “affecting voting” is acceptable.¹³ The only way to get around showing the attorney general any proposed changes to voting is to get clearance from a U.S district court for the District of Columbia.¹⁴ The purpose of these zones was for them to be implemented in the places where Congress felt that there was the greatest chance of discrimination.¹⁵ Due to the somewhat ambiguous wording of the law, as well as the large amount of discretion given to Congress in Section Five, the law has broad implications for many southern states and their redistricting processes. One important amendment to the law was made in 1982, wherein Congress changed the language so that states could infringe section 2 of the VRA – which banned the use of literacy tests as a method for abridging the rights of an individual to vote – so that plaintiffs could establish a violation of section 2 without the burden of proving intent.¹⁶ The reason that the VRA is at the center of many of the racial gerrymandering court cases is because the states’ argument is frequently that packing minority groups into a district is necessary to allow for the success of the group’s candidate of choice. However, packing in this manner may be breaking section 5 of the VRA; despite its original intention, the VRA can also be used as a method to circumvent the will of the people.¹⁷ This is because the

¹² Department of Justice. “History of Federal Voting Rights Laws.” July 2017, United States Department of Justice. <https://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws>.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Damien Waymer and Robert L. Heath, “Black Voter Dilution, American Exceptionalism, and Racial Gerrymandering: The Paradox of the Positive in Political

VRA can be used to ensure minority communities only have a certain amount of representation by enabling them to elect candidates in their constituencies, however, the candidates have no voting power due to their opposition's majority.¹⁸ Thus, some have raised the question: if the VRA means one minority politician is elected, but ensures that the politician will be in the minority of the legislature, how much good is being done?

Cooper is one of the most recent cases on racial gerrymandering to be granted a writ of certiorari from *the court*. In this case, the main question was whether the lower court was clearly erroneous in their determination that race was a predominant factor in the 2010 redrawing of the North Carolina first and twelfth districts. Therefore, this section will be broken into four separate discussions: what did the lower court do, what was the opinion of the Supreme Court, what was Justice Thomas' concurrence, and what was Justice Alito's partial concurrence and partial dissent?

The first issue that the district court had to decide on was whether the plaintiffs were part of a different organization that had brought a suit similar enough that the case should be dismissed due to its already having been adjudicated.¹⁹ The state's argument was predicated on the idea that the same group could not ask the same question anew, which they argued because several civil rights groups had petitioned a trial court to adjudicate the possibility of a racial gerrymander in districts one and twelve.²⁰ However, the trial court did not find enough evidence for this claim to be substantiated, and therefore proceeded to the question of whether the districts in question were illegal racial gerrymanders. With regards to district one, the lower court asked whether an illegal racial gerrymander had happened, which meant first trying to determine whether there was a racial gerrymander, and then whether it could be justified. Regarding the first question the trial court found that the record clearly indicated a racial gerrymander, this was because they were shown a record of the state making an

Public Relations," *Journal of Black Studies* 47, no.7 (2016): 636.
<http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/doi/full>.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 638.

¹⁹ United States' Supreme Court. Syllabus. *Cooper v. Harris*. 22 May 2017. Legal Information Institute, Cornell U Law School,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-1262#writing-15-1262_SYLLABUS.

²⁰ *Ibid*.

explicit racial target.²¹ Following that, the state argued that because of section 2 of the VRA the state was forced to draw a majority-minority district for fear of non-compliance. However, the district court found that based on the *Gingles* test²² the state's argument did not hold – due to the lack of a cohesive white voting block – and the raising of the district's black voting age population (BVAP) constituted an illegal racial Gerrymander.²³ The state's argument regarding district twelve was slightly different than its previous argument; the state contended that the district was drawn without any considerations of race, and was strictly a legal political gerrymander, wherein any increase in the BVAP was incidental.²⁴ However, the plaintiffs contended that the BVAP of district twelve was raised with the intention of preclearance under section 5 of the VRA.²⁵ The state then suggested that since the plaintiffs offered no alternative to the current maps the case should be dismissed, an argument that was in turn dismissed by the district court. The state's argument was also hampered by the two chairs of the redistricting committee, State Senator Robert Rucho and State Representative David Lewis, who were found to be on the record talking about areas in the district, Guilford County specifically, that were subject to a need for VRA preclearance.²⁶ Due to inconsistencies within the state's arguments and expert testimony, and the perceived credibility of the plaintiff's experts who demonstrated that black voters in Guilford County were three to four times more likely to cast a vote in district twelve, the district court again sided with the plaintiffs.²⁷

In *the court's* opinion, they quickly dispensed with the state's first argument, that the plaintiffs had already brought a similar case previously, as well as its second argument, that the standard of review was incorrect. Following this, they moved into

²¹ Ibid.

²² The *Gingles* test is a three-part test from the Supreme Court to determine if a racial gerrymander is constitutional. It asks: is the minority group sufficiently large and geographically compact, is the minority group politically cohesive, does the districts white majority form a cohesive white voting block that is against the interests of the minority (United States Supreme Court Syllabus 2b)? If all of these conditions are met, then the state may make the majority-minority district.

²³ United States' Supreme Court. Syllabus. *Cooper v. Harris*. 22 May 2017. Legal Information Institute, Cornell U Law School, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-1262#writing-15-1262_SYLLABUS.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

a discussion on the merits of the case. *The court* decided that the district court did not clearly err, which is the standard for the overturning of a decision by a lower court, when they found that all other criteria were subordinated to race in the drawing of district one.²⁸ This decision was reached through the examination of a lengthy record which demonstrated that the state had set the target for the districts BVAP to be fifty percent plus.²⁹ Following that *the court* attempted to determine if the district could be justified as a racial gerrymander under strict scrutiny. Regarding this question, *the court* concluded that the district was unjustified.³⁰ This conclusion was reached as they found that the state's argument regarding the standards set in *Bartlett v. Strickland* was predicated on a flawed understanding of the decision; this in conjunction with the district's failure to pass the *Gingles* test meant that the state was not obligated to draw a majority-minority district.³¹

Cooper marks the fifth time that North Carolina's twelfth district is debated in the Supreme Court; the present issue with the district is whether the gerrymander that occurred was partisan or racial.³² In *the court's* examination for clear error vis à vis the kind of gerrymander the district court determined to have occurred, *the court* found no clear error.³³ Due to inconsistencies in the evidence that the state provided, *the court* found that the district court had not made a clear mistake in their determination of the record, and that the state had racially gerrymandered rather than gerrymandered for purely partisan purposes.³⁴ Finally, the state attempted to argue that the plaintiffs were required to provide an alternative map, an argument they believed rooted in the opinion of *Cromartie II*. However, *the court* found this argument to be unsatisfactory. They felt that an alternative map was merely one type of evidence, as were leaked emails, and testimony.³⁵ *The court* noted that unlike in *Cromartie II* the plaintiffs had a plethora

²⁸ United States' Supreme Court. *Cooper v. Harris*. 22 May 2017. Legal Information Institute, Cornell U Law School, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-1262>.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ United States' Supreme Court. *Cooper v. Harris*. 22 May 2017. Legal Information Institute, Cornell U Law School, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-1262>.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

of evidence to support their claims, and furthermore, there was no reason to treat one piece of evidence as the whole substance of a constitutional discussion, as then there would be no need to weigh evidence.³⁶ Based on these reasons, the decisions of the district court were affirmed.

There were two other opinions drafted for this decision, the first being a concurrence from Justice Thomas and the second being a partial concurrence and partial dissent from Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Roberts. Regarding Justice Thomas' concurrence, he elaborated on reasons that he believed the North Carolina's argument to be inadequate. For district one Justice Thomas believed that section two of the VRA did not apply to redistricting and thus could not satisfy a strict scrutiny examination.³⁷ Following this agreement, Justice Thomas also said *the court* had previously made a mistake vis à vis *Cromartie II*, and this was a "welcome course correction."³⁸

Justice Alito's opinion dissents only regarding the twelfth district, wherein he believes that *the court* should have used the *Cromartie II* standards, and required a second map; Justice Alito also believed that regardless of the existence of the map, the majority erred in their not finding a clear error in judgement of the lower court.³⁹ This was because he believed that the "good faith of the legislature" was not assumed.⁴⁰ Alito believed that the majority viewed the evidence of the case in the most damning way.⁴¹

The outcome of *Cooper* will likely lead to many changes in the drawing of majority-minority districts. This is because *Cooper* further entrenches the *Gingles* test which will allow groups to demonstrate that a racial gerrymander is unjust, and it overturns *Cromartie II*'s alternative map requirement. By overturning the alternative map requirement, *the court* has moved the jurisprudence of racial gerrymandering closer to the 1982 amendment of the VRA's logic. A logic which suggests that plaintiffs do not necessarily need the answers to their problems to

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Clarence Thomas, Concurring Opinion. *Cooper v. Harris*. 22 May 2017. Legal Information Institute, Cornell U Law School, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-1262#writing-15-1262_CONCUR_4.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Samuel Alito, Concurring Opinion. *Cooper v. Harris*. 22 May 2017. Legal Information Institute, Cornell U Law School, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/15-1262#writing-15-1262_CONCUR_5.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

assert that something is a problem, and have it stuck down. While plaintiffs will still need a myriad of evidence to make a compelling case there will no longer be one piece of evidence that reigns supreme above the others.

However, *Cooper*'s changes on gerrymandering more broadly may be less well defined. While the case may affect the way that certain districts are drawn there are still several ways that votes can be diluted or suppressed that fall within the scope of constitutionality. One such method is to reduce the number of precincts, thereby reducing the number of places wherein a voter can cast a ballot.⁴² Amos and his co-authors note that there is no scholarly consensus on the efficacy of convenience voting.⁴³ Advocates for reductions in the number of precincts regularly cite the furthering of convenience voting for their defence of removing physical places to vote which makes the logic regarding cutting the number of voting precincts particularly debatable. As Amos suggests: "any decision to alter the location of Election Day polling stations may have a disruptive effect on a voter's likelihood of going to the polls".⁴⁴

Cooper reinforced the usage of the *Gingles* test, which some academics are suggesting could be used to discuss partisan gerrymandering and the fairness of vote distribution.⁴⁵ Wang suggests that by using the principles underlying the *Gingles* test, partisan gerrymandering could be brought into the realm of justiciable discussion again. Wang's test is based on the idea that the number of votes for a party should roughly correlate with the number of seats that they get. Therefore, districting plans that move away from that level of proportionality, with results that are outside of the expectable range of seats one party may reasonably achieve, are unacceptable.⁴⁶ This assertion aligns Wang with the people of Wisconsin currently suing the state government for infringing upon their first amendment rights with the electoral

⁴² Amos, Brian, et al. "Reprecincting and Voter Behaviour." *Political Behaviour* 39, no. 1 (2017): 136. <https://link-springer-com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/article/10.1007%2Fs11109-016-9350-z#citeas>.

⁴³ Ibid, 141.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 142.

⁴⁵ Wang, Samuel S.-H. "Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering." *Stanford Law Review* 68, no.6 (2016): 1285. http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/ps/i.do?p=LT&u=uvictoria_p&id=GALE|A460507850&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

maps that were drawn. In this case, they are using the efficiency gap⁴⁷ to be the measure of what level of partisan redistricting is acceptable.⁴⁸ *Gill v. Whitford* brings the discussion of vote dilution to *the court* again, though this time it is the dilution of partisan vocalization rather than dilution of racial votes.

While it is tempting to suggest that with the removal of gerrymandering there would come a high turnover rate for congressional representatives, this is unlikely to be the case. This is in part because of the incumbency bonus, which is one of the reasons that in 2004 congressional representatives were re-elected in 97.4 percent of races.⁴⁹ Holden further argues that one of the reasons that incumbent re-election rates rarely dip below 90 percent is because of redistricting.⁵⁰ However, the incumbency advantage is neither good nor bad, rather it is a neutral phenomenon that arises in part from redistricting and in part from all of the other bonuses that being the holder of a position brings, chiefly name recognition and easier fundraising.

While many people see gerrymandering as one of the preeminent problems of modern democracy, it is the position of this paper that gerrymandering should be considered a problem in the same way that corruption and voter apathy are. Though some academics have tried to demonstrate the opposite, by asserting that major partisan gains are not made through gerrymandering.⁵¹ However, the authors seem to be mistaken, as states like Wisconsin demonstrate that regardless of a state's partisan breakdown one can still see routine control of legislature through redistricting. In conjunction with this is the idea that to understand a district without gerrymandering would require a different electoral system and different constitution, as in the majority of states the

⁴⁷ The efficiency gap is an instrument that is being used to respond to Justice Kennedy's concurrence in *Vieth*, saying that he would look at partisan gerrymandering was not justiciable; however, he did not rule out some metric being created in the future that could make it so (Gerrymandering on Trial).

⁴⁸ "Gerrymandering is on Trial," The Gerrymandering Project, from FiveThirtyEight, September 28, 2017. <https://fivethirtyeight.com/tag/gerrymandering-podcast>.

⁴⁹ Richard Holden, "Voting and Election: New Social Science Perspective," *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 12, no. 1 (2016): 261. <https://www-annualreviews-org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/doi/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110615-084704>.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 263.

⁵¹ Jowei Chen and David Cottrell, "Evaluating partisan gains from Congressional gerrymandering: Using computer simulations to estimate the effect of gerrymandering in the U.S. House," *Electoral Studies* 44, no. 1 (2016): 338. https://www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/science/article/pii/S0261379416303201?_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_origin=gateway&_docanchor=&md5=b8429449ccfc9c30159a5f9aeea92ffb&ccp=y.

redistricting process is completed by political actors. While Chen and Cottrell's quantitative work is impressive, their fundamental aims are flawed, which then harms their outcomes.

While *Cooper v. Harris* is specifically about racial gerrymandering, it could have much farther-reaching influence through the further entrenchment of the *Gingles* test. This paper has discussed how gerrymandering works, and some of the laws and cases surrounding it – including the VRA and *Cooper* – to demonstrate that racial gerrymandering is not adjudicated in a silo and decisions may have effects on partisan gerrymandering which is currently permissible. The intent of this paper was to demonstrate the illegality of racial gerrymandering, and its indefensibility under the VRA, however, it is also important to note the direction American society is leaning regarding gerrymandering in both forms, which is in the direction of abolition. This can be seen in both the academic and popular frameworks as – Chen and Cottrell notwithstanding – the bulk of the literature suggests gerrymandering's antithetical status to democracy, and the polling data seems to suggest a similar sentiment. Through the further entrenchment of the *Gingles* test it is conceivable that, with the aid of copious amounts of litigation, this trend will continue to progress towards a different method of electoral map making.

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McDonalds and Al-Qaeda

Two Radically Different Organizations, One Significant Similarity

By

Hannah West

Two non-state actors (NSA), Al-Qaeda and McDonalds, at first glance appear to be radically different organizations. However, they have one feature in common: their franchise structure. Neither Al-Qaeda nor McDonalds began as franchised organizations, although they both experimented with this structure during their evolution. Both bodies benefited from the franchise arrangement in a similar way; it facilitated the continued facade of Al-Qaeda's strength in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks while simultaneously allowing McDonalds to grow into the powerful multinational corporation that it is today.¹ This essay will investigate the affect of the franchise organizational structure on the growth and influence of each group. Analysis will begin with a brief introduction of each group's history, and the significant distinctions between them, in order to reinforce the fact that these two groups are in many ways vastly different organizations. The large contrasts found between the groups will be utilized to illustrate how such parallels in organizational structure are not likely a result of other correlations between them. Next, the outcomes of the two entities after they adopted franchisement models will be analyzed by looking to their relationship with the local population while also considering the influence of the central organization. Finally, it will be argued that the same franchise structures observed in both Al-Qaeda and McDonalds, two organizations that are markedly different, facilitate(d) the multinational presence of both groups.

Al-Qaeda gained international recognition in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001; 17 years later it is still one of the most widely-recognized terrorist groups in the world.² The 9/11

¹ Bruce Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27, no. 6 (2004): 552.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100490519813>.

² Austin Long, "The Al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of Al-Qaeda and Its Consequences by Barak Mendelsohn. New York, Oxford University Press, 2016. 288 Pp.

attacks provoked the United States of America's (USA) war on terror, and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, took responsibility for the attacks, which began the worldwide man hunt that culminated in his death in 2011.³ The USA's focus on catching him forced the terrorist group to change its organizational structure from a centralized hierarchy to decentralized franchises in order to continue operating while Al-Qaeda's core was under surveillance.⁴ The franchise structure continued until Bin Laden's death in 2011 when the groups were forced to evolve again with the disbandment of the unifying central leadership resulting in an increasingly globalized organization.⁵ Similar to Al-Qaeda, McDonalds did not begin as a franchise. It began as a family restaurant in 1948 until in 1955 the corporation started an American franchise before branching out internationally, forming the multinational corporation that it is known for today with restaurants in 119 countries.⁶ However, unlike Al-Qaeda, McDonalds was not forced out of necessity to franchise its operation, instead the leadership used this business model to increase profits and spread its brand globally. Although, it is worth considering that like Al-Qaeda, McDonalds would not have grown to its largest form without multinational franchises.

Their diverse histories allude to the many differences between the two groups. Terrorists and corporations have different motives for adopting franchise structures; terrorists harbor political aims while the motivation behind Multinational Corporations are entirely profit driven. Additionally, Al-Qaeda is prone to using force to gain control while economic organizations use trade and negotiations; very rarely is physical force used to advance the corporation's economic aims. Terrorism is often considered to be the weapon of the weak, a tactic that groups turn to when they feel they do not have any other choice. Conversely, multinational economic negotiations require a strong home state; thus, revealing

Cloth, \$99.00; Paper, \$27.95." *Political Science Quarterly* 132, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 566. <https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12678>.

³ Clint Watts, "The Three Versions of Al Qaeda: A Primer," (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2013), 1. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2013/12/the-three-versions-of-al-qaeda-a-primer/>.

⁴ Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda," 551-552.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 552.

⁶ Kirsten Srinivasan, "A Solid Model," (US Business review, October 2005), 1. file:///C:/Users/hanna/Downloads/A_solid_model__McDonald_s_thre.PDF.

the different state structures that terrorist organizations and Multinational Corporation's thrive within. These differences have been highlighted at the outset as the remainder of this paper is dedicated to analyzing the similarities between the two groups. However, there is not a plethora of connections between them, indicating that the parallels that have been found are of great significance. In the third section of this paper, I will argue that the anatomical similarities within the franchise structure are important because of the comparable outcomes that were exhibited when both groups adopted the franchise structure. However, I will first identify the anatomical similarities between the two groups based upon the franchises structure.

The franchise structure is an organizational model that is often associated with business management. However, in recent years it has not been isolated to companies and corporations alone as terrorist groups have also begun to adopt the same structure for their expansion and survival. A franchise is a new branch or cell stemming from a central organization, it can be strongly controlled by the primary command or present in a more decentralized form.⁷ While both Al-Qaeda and McDonalds have elaborate franchise structures, this essay will focus on each entity's relationship with the local population while also considering the influence of the central organization. These two narrow aspects of franchisement will aim to illustrate the anatomical similarities between the two groups.

Historically, it was advantageous to forge connections with the local leadership in any area in which an outside organization wished to impose a new idea on the population. This precedent continues to apply whether through the introduction of the Big Mac or a radical Islamic ideology, the locals are always valuable allies. Both McDonalds and Al-Qaeda recognized this, placing members of the local population in prominent positions within the franchise leadership.⁸ Al-Qaeda turned to supporters in states other than Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11 to continue attacks on

⁷ Joshua Kilberg, "A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35, no. 11 (2012): 814–815.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.720240>.

⁸ "Celebrating 50 years: Kroc's vision transforms burger drive-in into last-food empire," (Nation's Restaurant News, April 11, 2005), 16.

<http://link.galegroup.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/apps/doc/A131788947/ITBC?u=uvictoria&sid=ITBC&xid=f1fad44>.

western countries. This change in organizational structure was a result of the heightened attention on the group's central command by the US government. Such attention hindered the group's ability to organize strikes, stagnating the scope and depth of their ideological expansion. They allowed other organizations that adhered to a similar anti-western ideology to adopt Al-Qaeda into their existing group name in order to preserve the facade that the central command was still a powerful unified group; a reality that many scholars argue was far from the truth.⁹ One example of a franchise that local leadership was used to create became known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The franchise in Iraq had previously been called Tawhid wal Jihad and was formed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a leader who professed a more violent method of western resistance than Al-Qaeda.¹⁰ Al-Qaeda's central organization offered to help Tawhid wal Jihad grow with the use of Al-Qaeda's "name, reputation and ideas."¹¹ Despite al-Zarqawi's more violent methods, he did retain a direct connection to Al-Qaeda's 'brand' which gave the central leadership a degree of control over him. Conversely, most of the Al-Qaeda in Iraq's soldiers were from the local population, limiting Al-Qaeda's influence which resulted in most attacks being based on local grievances that react to the local demographics and sectarian tension on the ground rather than Al-Qaeda's anti-western ideology.¹² In Iraq there were three levels of local connections that Al-Qaeda formed: they took credit from the international community for the terrorist attacks carried out in Iraq by local Iraqi citizens that were unhappy with the American invasion in 2003; they incorporated local resistance movements as new Al-Qaeda cells instead of spending the time to create new ones; and they ensured that the leaders of the group, although often partially connected to the central leadership, had strong connections with the soldiers on the ground.¹³ Al-Qaeda in Iraq is an example of the central command having a degree of influence at

⁹ Alia Brahimi, "Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33 (2010): 93. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903488402>.

¹⁰ Al Qaeda franchises, (Foreign Policy, May-June 2010, 71), 1. <http://link.galegroup.com.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/apps/doc/A229227173/ITBC?u=uvictoria&sid=ITBC&xid=bb6134a2>; Brian Fishman, "Using the Mistakes of Al Qaeda's Franchises to Undermine Its Strategies," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (Sage Publications, Inc. American Academy of Political and Social Science. Accessed March 14, 2018), 48. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40375774>.

¹¹ Ibid., 47

¹² Ibid., 48.

¹³ Fishman, "Using the Mistakes of Al Qaeda's," 48.

the highest level in the franchise organizations; however, this was not always the case. In some instances, Al-Qaeda would allow an organization whose leadership was not in any way connected with Al-Qaeda to take its name; these groups engineered the most locally motivated attacks.¹⁴ Al-Qaeda in Iraq even broke off from Al-Qaeda's franchises structure in 2006 after al-Zarqawi died, becoming the Islamic State in Iraq due to their different understanding of the issues within Iraq. Some scholars have argued that Al-Qaeda had surprisingly little control over the franchises, a claim they support by citing the regional motivations for many attacks that Al-Qaeda took responsibility for rather than their own broad ideological ones.¹⁵

McDonalds also values its local liaisons; as the corporation spans 119 countries, they rely on locals to help them integrate the company into the local population.¹⁶ McDonalds claims that it believes in supporting local entrepreneurs to open their own McDonalds businesses, indicating that they often hire local people to lead the franchises on the ground.¹⁷ The managers, unlike certain Al-Qaeda cells, are not allowed to continue their own program under the McDonalds label, they are required to attend the "Hamburger University," that was set up in 1967, to receive adequate training and ensure that the central command retains control over the overall workings of the stores by teaching the managers the companies core values by which all McDonalds stores must adhere to.¹⁸ Another aspect of community liaison that is present in both groups is the adoption of structures already in place, for Al-Qaeda that consists of ideologically driven groups, for McDonalds a store front that is available below a pre-constructed skyscraper.¹⁹ The two groups, despite their obvious differences, have similarities in their local liaison practices which is partially the reason the two groups franchise structures are similar.

Not only are Al-Qaeda and McDonalds local liaisons comparable, their central organizational structures also exhibit

¹⁴ Brahim, "Crushed in the Shadows," 95.

¹⁵ Fishman, "Using the Mistakes of Al Qaeda's," 47.

¹⁶ Kirsten Srinivasan, A solid model, (US Business review, October 2005) 22. file:///C:/Users/hanna/Downloads/A_solid_model__McDonald_s_thre.PDF

¹⁷ Ibid., 24.

¹⁸ Kroc's vision transforms burger drive-in into last-food empire, 9.

¹⁹ History: McDonald's, Para 6.

similarities in training and central command control. Al-Qaeda restricted the type of group that could adopt its name to only organizations that had a similarly narrow, anti-western ideology.²⁰ They also offered training to new recruits as an incentive for joining their organization in order to influence them and retain control over the franchise.²¹ However, their lack of direct involvement in strikes on the west reduced their overall influence. Al-Qaeda's influence was also threatened by their claim to affiliation with locally motivated attacks which detracted from their central ideology. Their incorporation of only loosely connected terrorist cells might have helped the group to retain their reputation prior to Bin Laden's death. However, in recent years scholars have analyzed the charade, concluding that the franchise structure actually weakened Al-Qaeda's central command due to their association with differently motivated cells that diluted their ideological message.²² This realization has given scholars a window into the motivations of Al-Qaeda that western powers can use to increase their counter-terrorism measures. Brian Fishman suggests that the USA needs to recognize the structure of a terrorist organization. If they do they would be able to target the franchise that was responsible in the aftermath of an attack, not the central organization that is claiming to be involved due to their different underlying motivations.²³ McDonalds, like Al-Qaeda, also offered to train franchises as an incentive to join the company, however unlike Al-Qaeda they do not provide training for the lower members of the organization. The leaders are trained at the "Hamburger University" in their etiquette "quality, service, cleanliness, and value".²⁴ This training makes it easier for new entrepreneurs from other countries to start local businesses but it also ensures that McDonalds continues to have a say in their company's core values and business standards; a luxury that Al-Qaeda only partially retained due to the franchises' differing local motivation in which Al-Qaeda only retains control over the message that the world receives rather than having control over local motivations for an attack. Both Al-Qaeda and McDonalds understood that it was impossible to control every aspect of all

²⁰ Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda," 552.

²¹ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: global network of terror*, (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2003), 135.

²² Brahim, "Crushed in the Shadows," 106.

²³ Fishman, "Using the Mistakes of Al Qaeda's," 51.

²⁴ Kroc's vision transforms burger drive-in into fast-food empire, 123.

franchises from the central command. McDonalds was even willing to give their employees licence with the needs of the local population; therefore, McDonalds in France serves croissants alongside their Big Macs.²⁵

These similarities in the anatomy of the franchise organizational structure resulted in parallel outcomes for both groups by allowing them to expand as organizations. While Al-Qaeda was nominally weakened by the franchise structure, it was because of the central command's inability to gain significant control over the cells that adopted its name. However, it must be noted that between 2001-2011 the central organization did not have many options to turn to; their leader was confined to hiding in one state, unable to lead or plan new attacks which were deemed necessary to advance their cause.²⁶ Considering this, the franchise system appeared attractive, allowing Al-Qaeda to retain the attention of the world and continue to advance their anti-western ideology. Although in hindsight we see that the franchise structure made the group much weaker, they would not have realized that at the time and at least on the surface they still appeared to be a unified group that were steadfast in their fight against the west.²⁷ Since the focus of the western world shifted to the actions of ISIS, once the Islamic state of Iraq, it is often highlighted that this organization was called Al-Qaeda in Iraq between 2004 and 2006.²⁸ Scholars point to this, arguing that the franchise structures weakened the central organization by providing the space for potential rivals such as ISIS to emerge out of the franchises.²⁹ Although this argument has merit, the scholars that argue this thesis forget to consider that without the franchise structures, Al-Qaeda in its pre-9/11 form would have either been unable to continue advancing its ideology, or would have continued using its hierarchical central organizational structure to organize attacks, leaving themselves vulnerable to the USA's counter-terrorism measures.³⁰ As a result, I argue that overall the franchise structure

²⁵ Audhesh K. Pasman and C. Michael Wittmann, "Knowledge Management and Franchise Systems," *Industrial Marketing Management* 38, no. 2 (February 1, 2009): 178. <https://doi.org/10.1016/J.INDMARMAN.2008.12.005>.

Long, "The Expansion of Al-Qaeda and Its Consequences," 561.

²⁷ Brahim, "Crushed in the Shadows," 93.

²⁸ Fishman, "Using the Mistakes of Al Qaeda's," 49.

²⁹ Watts, "The Three Versions of Al Qaeda," 7.

³⁰ Gunaratna, "Inside Al Qaeda," 131.

in fact nominally benefited Al-Qaeda rather than harming the organization.

In comparison, it is a lot easier to see the correlation between the franchise structure and a positive outcome with the McDonalds organizational model. McDonalds would not have evolved from a small burger joint in California to the largest multinational burger company in the world without international franchises.³¹ I will not argue that if McDonalds had not adopted a franchise model their business was at risk; however, they would not have become the multinational corporation that they are today without it. The overall outcome of the two groups, with scholars arguing for Al-Qaeda's weakness and McDonalds never being in danger of collapse, does not provide a direct comparison, however the similarities that are exhibited are significant given the monumental differences between the groups. If one considers that these groups have contrasting motivations, carry out their operations dissimilarly, and are held accountable by states in a different way, it becomes apparent that the small divergences in the outcome are not due to a different franchise structure but are due to the multitude of diverse forces that are acting on either organization at any given time.

Parallel to the wider group's expansion, specific elements within them were also positively affected, such as the growth of followers for both groups. The media attention that Al-Qaeda received after the 9/11 attacks and the outset of the American War on terror attracted many followers to the central organization. As well, the franchises, which allowed the wider network to carry out more attacks, also resulted in attracting another wave of peripheral followers.³² In 2002 the CIA said that there were 6-7 million people that believed in Al-Qaeda's wider goals with 120,000 that were willing to take up arms in aid of the cause.³³ Without the numerous franchises, less people would have been exposed to their specific brand of militant Islam; reducing the number of recruits and therefore curbing the entire organizations effectiveness. The same outcome can be seen in McDonalds franchisee strategy. The first international McDonalds store opened in Canada in 1967, while people in other countries still longed for a slice of the

³¹ Kroc's vision transforms burger drive-in into fast-food empire, 8.

³² Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda," 551.

³³ Gunaratna, "Inside Al Qaeda," 127.

'American dream.'³⁴ McDonalds franchises were part of the spread of this image which helped them gain customers but also employees and managers that wanted their slice. Without franchisement, the niche market of consumers and workers that wanted to be part of this global fantasy would have been monopolized by another company preventing McDonalds from achieving the size and profitability that the company currently experiences. As a result, it can be said that each franchise not only benefited each group's wider goals, it also benefited them at a micro-organizational level.

Al-Qaeda, an international renowned terror organization, and McDonalds, the world's largest multinational burger chain, at first glance may seem to have nothing in common, however their similar franchise structure is the common link that exposes parallels between the two organizations. This essay began by highlighting the differences in the groups, going on to describing the anatomical similarities in their franchise structures, and concluding with an examination of the outcomes of the companies during their franchise phase. This essay argued that the similar franchise structure resulted in positive outcomes for both groups as it ensures that they both retained international status and continued to grow in the international system. A comparison between McDonalds and Al-Qaeda can appear to have little practical implication, because Al-Qaeda is as unlikely to begin flipping burgers as McDonalds is to undertake violent actions. However, a greater understanding of a terrorist group's internal structure, although no longer in use, through the comparison to a tangible entity makes a theory about their operation much easier for people to understand. As a result, it is easier for policy makers to create applicable counter-terrorism policies to implement in the continued fight against terrorism. With this information, policy makers could attempt to target terrorist organizations prior to an attack occurring. Realizing that the central command is only a figurehead would have allowed the USA to focus their efforts on their networks, placing pressure like the constrains placed on the central leadership, potentially curbing their ability to launch damaging attacks on the west.

³⁴ Kroc's vision transforms burger drive-in into last-food empire, 10.

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Afghanistan's Opium Economy
Rural Subsistence and the Taliban
By
Malcolm Stewart

A rural support base is essential for the longevity of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, and the crucial point of issue which allows the Taliban to maintain the support of Afghan farmers is their protection of the opium economy. Because of systemic factors to be discussed in the opening arguments of this paper, opium is the only viable crop for Afghan farmers to grow in order to support themselves. Occupying forces are pursuing deeply flawed counter-narcotics policies, and it will be considered why this disaffects them from the rural population to the detriment of their own counterinsurgency policy. One proposal to remedy these problems is a licensing program meant to allow some farmers to sell to the legitimate pharmaceutical market; this proposal is evaluated next. From there the paper suggests instead the legalization of opium, and ultimately goes further in considering what options there are beyond that.

It is the conclusion of this paper that the legalization and legitimation of the Afghan opium economy is one crucial step towards rebuilding and securing the infrastructure and economy of Afghanistan, as well as rooting out the endemic corruption within it. Doing so will allow the same farmers of opium poppy to then branch out into other, alternative livelihoods, including the cultivation of legalized cannabis — already extensively, illicitly cultivated — perhaps allowing farmers to distance themselves from the opium economy in the end.

One brief definition to clarify at the beginning of this paper is the potential role private military corporations (PMCs) have to play in Afghanistan. PMCs are regularly hired by states wishing to pay for their security services, instead of raising their own conventional armies, “as a cost effective way of getting the same outcomes.”¹ International organizations do much the same. A problem that may arise from the use of PMCs in Afghanistan is

¹ Malcolm Stewart, “Shooting Blanks: International Law and Private Military Corporations,” *On Politics* 9:1 (Spring 2016): 35.

that since it is a relatively weak state, it may not be able to control the PMCs as well as more established governments.² Nonetheless, this paper will make occasional reference to PMCs as plausible solutions to a number of issues raised within the literature on Afghanistan's opium economy.

Opium's Rise in Afghanistan

It will be conducive to a full understanding of the depth of Afghanistan's opium quandary to briefly outline its expansion as an economic sector. There are two recognizable factors — one external, and one internal — that fostered Afghanistan's opium economy: externally, the crackdown on opium production in Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey in the 1970s, forcing traffickers to seek elsewhere for illicit opium; internally, the instability and security crises brought about by the Soviet occupation of the 1980s — effectively destroying Afghanistan's agricultural trade infrastructure and forcing farmers to cultivate opium in order to survive.³ Poppy is identified as a crop which, considering its intense labour requirements, is suited to places where there is a large population with few to no opportunities out of the fields.⁴ The cultivation of poppy was only proliferated when the *mujahideen* found they could use the profits to fund their resistance,⁵ while farmers pursued it as a means of (modest) upward social mobility.⁶

Opium poppy cultivation increased 15% annually during the Soviet occupation. After the withdrawal, the lack of effective central government left a friendly environment to the growth and manufacture of narcotics on a greater scale.⁷ This had important, beneficial consequences for the rural population by offering

² Stewart, "Shooting Blanks," 42.

³ Jeffrey Clemens, "Opium in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Success of Source Country Drug Control Policies," *Journal of Law & Economics* 51:3 (August 2008): 409; Christopher J. Coyne, Abigail R. Hall Blanco, and Scott Burns, "The War on Drugs in Afghanistan: Another Failed Experiment with Interdiction," *Independent Review* 21:1 (Summer 2016): 98.

⁴ Clemens, "Opium in Afghanistan," 409.

⁵ Graham Farrell and John Thorne, "Where have all the flowers gone?: evaluation of the Taliban crackdown against opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan," *International Journal of Drug Policy* 16 (2005): 82.

⁶ Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention," *International Peacekeeping* 16:1 (February 2009): 102.

⁷ Farrell and Thorne, "Where have all the flowers gone?" 82.

employment and thus creating access to land — Adam Pain of the Middle East Institute doubts there is any other crop which could have done the same.⁸ Farmers rely on opium simply because they can't get any other crops to market without any export infrastructure that would allow them to get decent prices in foreign markets. Even cotton, intermittently subsidized by the government, is not a reliable option since the government has proven unable to pay farmers the high prices required for them to sustain themselves. This forces farmers back to opium cultivation.⁹ Cultivation is also likely encouraged by political circumstances; poppy is most densely farmed in those parts of Afghanistan where the central government has little to no control — where instead, insurgencies and war-lords hold sway.¹⁰ To make matters worse, those families who can't sustain themselves in the Afghan countryside and migrate to Pakistan often have younger members ending up in a fundamentalist *madrassa* supported by the Taliban — where they become the group's newest recruits.¹¹

Counternarcotics and Counterinsurgency Policies in Afghanistan

The Taliban have had a long history entwined with the opium poppy. Vanda Felbab-Brown credits the Taliban's success in the Afghan Civil War to the cessation of opium eradication, which effectively allowed it to politically consolidate in territory which it conquered from other factions retreating to the north. This is in direct contradistinction to the consequences of its strict eradication policy of 2001; this decimated the rural economy and undermined rural support for the Taliban so much that they remained passive as NATO forces ran the Taliban out of Afghanistan.¹² The essential lesson to be taken out of this example

⁸ Adam Pain, "Afghanistan's Opium Poppy Economy," *Middle East Institute* (20 April 2012).

⁹ Sean Carberry and Sultan Faizy, "Afghan Farmers: Opium is the Only Way to Make a Living," *National Public Radio* (14 November 2013). <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/11/14/245040114/afghan-farmers-opium-is-the-only-way-to-make-a-living>.

¹⁰ Victoria A. Greenfield, Letizia Paoli, and Peter H. Reuter, "Is Medicinal Opium Production Afghanistan's Answer?: Lessons from India and the World Market," *Journal of Drug Policy Analysis* 2:1 (2009): 10.

¹¹ Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies," 107-108.

¹² *Ibid.*, 104.

is that by not eradicating opium, the counterinsurgency had the tacit support of the rural population.

In the late 1990s, the Taliban took in \$100 million (according to high estimates) in opium tax revenue.¹³ However, for unclear reasons, Mullah Omar announced a *fatwa* against opium poppy cultivation in July 2000 which was enforced from October until the fall of the Taliban the following year. The *fatwa* was strictly enforced throughout the organization's chain of command, with local *shura* councils doing the same in each village. These councils were also held responsible to the Taliban itself. Any violators were forced to destroy their crops, suffer physical beatings and a walk of shame, and serve prison sentences of two years — any *shura* councils found to not be enforcing the *fatwa* were treated in similar fashion.¹⁴ As a direct result the reduction of poppy cultivation in Taliban territory was 99%.¹⁵

From the fall of the Taliban until 2003 the US military understood that a passive stance on the opium economy allowed it to maintain civil relations with farmers, and even gather crucial intelligence on the Taliban from them.¹⁶ And as the power vacuum in the opium economy expanded with the expulsion of the Taliban, warlords and power brokers throughout the country stepped in and took over the most profitable, controlling roles in the drug trade.¹⁷

When the UK forces in Afghanistan were given control of the counternarcotics program in 2002, they approached eradication with the necessary compensation of farmers in mind. However, this approach was faced with many setbacks in the field such as local rulers embezzling compensation, farmers not eradicating their poppy crops in the first place, and even failure to pay those farmers who did follow through with commitments to eradicate their poppy crops. This policy was aborted, not least because compensating farmers for the loss of one crop of poppies would not compel them to turn to other crops instead. In its place the policy was adopted of targeting large-scale traffickers and producers. Unfortunately this, too, was manipulated by strongmen who sought to eliminate rivals and small time producers — consolidating corruption and control

¹³ Coyne et al., "The War on Drugs in Afghanistan," 98.

¹⁴ Farrell and Thorne, "Where have all the flowers gone?" 85.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 87, 91.

¹⁶ Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies," 105.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 105.

of the drug trade amongst the few even further.¹⁸ Interdiction of any sort actually had the immediate effect of allowing the Taliban to penetrate the opium market once again, doing so through investment, protection rackets, and even trafficking.¹⁹ Competing interests within NATO forces — those reluctant to alienate the rural population via eradication on one hand, and those who saw eradication as the only sensible option on the other — began to operate separately, eventually seeing the American State Department set up parallel counternarcotics agencies to commit to the eradication campaign themselves. These parallel operations were hindered both by corruption on the part of Afghan officials as well as their own contradictory nature.²⁰ The fact that there were no effective legal alternatives in place for farmers to grow crops entrenched corruption even more — because the black market was the only recourse for these farmers — and thus made state-building initiatives (like creating rural infrastructure) even more difficult.²¹

The first manual eradication effort in 2004 was abandoned when the population of Kandahar erupted in protest. Only around two-hundred hectares had been destroyed. When opium was effectively suppressed in Nangarhar the next year, the population fell into deep poverty without any meaningful alternatives available.²² In other places where these policies have been enacted similar consequences have occurred; with nowhere else to turn the farmers would rely on the insurgency for support.²³ Effectively, by criminalizing the livelihoods of the majority of Afghan farmers and farm-workers, the counternarcotics agencies working in the countryside alienated these farmers from the central government and forced them to go to the likes of the Taliban who promised to fight against those forces who perpetrated such perceived injustice.²⁴

Pain points to the causes of the opium economy as what should be receiving attention, and not the opium economy itself: state weakness, poor governance, and poverty.²⁵ “While some

¹⁸ Ibid., 106.

¹⁹ Ibid., 107.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Pain, “Afghanistan’s Opium Poppy Economy.”

²⁴ Coyne et al., “The War on Drugs in Afghanistan,” 107.

²⁵ Pain, “Afghanistan’s Opium Poppy Economy.”

counter-narcotics action at the production end of the value chain may be necessary,” he argues, “it has to be consistent with good counterinsurgency practice. This would entail focussing on changing the context of insecurity, economic opportunity, and local governance, which dictates household choice.”²⁶ The scale of eradication efforts required to have an impact on the opium economy are beyond the means of the relatively weak Afghan central government; even if it did have the means, exercising such policy would severely damage its credibility in rural areas and would strain the loyalty of the farmers therein.²⁷ Eradication also increases the price of opium,²⁸ benefitting most those farmers who are willing and able to contravene the law while harming those farmers who would otherwise only cultivate opium out of economic necessity.²⁹

It has been established that eradication campaigns undercut the willingness of rural populations to provide information on insurgencies to the occupying forces; what is even more problematic is that intelligence instead moves in the other direction.³⁰ The Taliban strengthen their political clout by protecting and supporting the opium economy and representing themselves as the opposition to the eradicating forces, and in so doing present themselves as the “protector of the population’s livelihood.” This is essential to the Taliban’s relationship with rural communities.³¹

Likely in relation to this ‘protector’ role, there is a strong correlation between the cultivation of opium poppy and insurgent violence and terrorism.³² Christopher J. Coyne et al., in “The War on Drugs in Afghanistan: Another Failed Experiment with Interdiction,” argue that this link is causal by pointing to a correlation between bumper crops of opium and record levels of insurgent violence on an annual basis; furthermore, these peaks in violence occur during the harvest periods each year.³³ It is simultaneously interesting to note that the DEA opened ninety-five

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Clemens, “Opium in Afghanistan,” 427.

²⁸ Ibid., 419.

²⁹ Ibid., 429.

³⁰ Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies,” 109.

³¹ Ibid., 102.

³² James A. Piazza, “The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24:2 (2012): 214.

³³ Coyne et al., “The War on Drugs in Afghanistan,” 112.

offices in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2013, with an annual budget increasing by \$6 million every year; under its auspices, the opium crop almost tripled in size within the same time period.³⁴ Coyne et al. go into detail regarding the inordinately massive amount of resources poured into the eradication campaign and exactly how such resources failed to achieve any lasting reduction (rather, the opposite!) in the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan.³⁵

From 2009 on, the US government distanced itself from eradication campaigns — instead paying local governors to strategically target high level traffickers and producers — while seeking to provide alternative crops for cultivation. Those who criticize this particular program note that the funds allocated to this objective went mostly to high-profile, short term projects — instead of adding any significant value to the local economy via long-term investment.³⁶ This suggests that those who controlled spending on the ground did not have the best interests of the rural population in mind. In principle, Vanda Felbab-Brown supports the interdiction of opium supply, but only in the case of those corrupt officials and ex-warlords who have consolidated power over the drug trade. Eliminating them from the political sphere, she says, will be an important step in clearing out graft before an effective state-building initiative can take hold.³⁷ Yet even this selective interdiction approach had its own flaws in practice. Cartelization of the Afghan opium economy came about in two ways: first, the eradication campaign made the costs of business so high — via the risks of interdiction and punishment — that only large and organized producers could cope; second, those responsible for interdiction more often than not chose to target small producers — to show their ‘productivity’ — without actually confronting the more dangerous and powerful actors who produced opium on a large scale. These large-scale producers therefore took advantage of the ensuing market vacuum by consolidating their power with the aid of the Taliban and in doing so, increasingly came under their influence; thus creating a cartel of producers throughout the Afghan countryside.³⁸

³⁴ Ibid., 96-97.

³⁵ Ibid., 98-102.

³⁶ Coyne et al., “The War on Drugs in Afghanistan,” 102-103.

³⁷ Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies,” 111.

³⁸ Coyne et al., “The War on Drugs in Afghanistan,” 106.

The retired commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, John Allen, commented on this: he is quoted as saying that compared to corruption in Afghanistan the Taliban are a mere “annoyance,” even though US policies have only strengthened both since the beginning of the occupation.³⁹ Felbab-Brown similarly states:

The poppy is deeply entwined in the socio-economic fabric of the country, and hence, inescapably, in its political arrangements and power fabrications. Corruption is endemic. The Taliban profits from the drug trade, as do the Afghan police, tribal elites and ex-warlords-cum-government-officials at various levels.⁴⁰

This often-parasitic relationship between Afghan officialdom and the general population is a direct result of the illegality of opium and undermines the central government.⁴¹ Collectively, corruption and the narcotics economy hollow out the legal, civic, and economic structures of Afghan society and in doing so create opportunities for insurgencies to substitute their own.⁴²

Pain notes, “the opium economy traverses three conceptually distinct economies that in practice are seamless: a welfare or coping economy, a black economy where profit is the motive, and a war economy wherein, it can be argued, opium is a conflict commodity.”⁴³ Thus far the first two interrelated economies have been demonstrated; now the discourse turns to the Taliban’s use of opium as a revenue source after its fall from government.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime states that half of the Taliban’s 2016 income — approximately \$150 million — came from its taxation of the opiate trade in the territory over which it holds sway.⁴⁴ This revenue tends to go toward arms procurement and the paying of their foot-soldiers;⁴⁵ the Taliban is

³⁹ Ibid., 108.

⁴⁰ Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies,” 101.

⁴¹ Ibid., 102.

⁴² Piazza, “The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism...” 217.

⁴³ Pain, “Afghanistan’s Opium Poppy Economy.”

⁴⁴ “World Drug Report 2017, pre-briefing to the member states,” *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime* (16 June 2017).

⁴⁵ Piazza, “The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism...” 215.

thus able to pay its soldiers approximately \$200 per month — over twice that paid to the average Afghani police officer — likely ensuring that the best fighters and enforcers go over to the insurgents.⁴⁶ James A. Piazza notes that the illegal opium economy is a double-edged sword: not only does it indirectly fund the insurgency, but it also drains the resources of the central government seeking to fight the narcotics trade. This prevents it from committing more resources to the counterinsurgency;⁴⁷ Felbab-Brown concurs by adding that it also makes state-building nearly impossible.⁴⁸

Instead, she says, “state-strengthening efforts need to take place before massive eradication is adopted. Counter-narcotics efforts can only be effective once the security situation has improved and the insurgency has been defeated, not the other way around.”⁴⁹ In particular, Felbab-Brown recommends that the regular police be completely removed from the sphere of counternarcotics operation in order for them to build legitimacy in the eyes of the rural population as arbiters of peace and security.⁵⁰ As noted at the beginning of this paper, this might be one of the cases in which private military corporations could prove effective in the place of state security organs.

Aside from the massive growth in rates of opium cultivation, and the massive growth of corruption along with it, and possibly because of the role of opium as a war commodity, the War on Terror has similarly failed in its objectives: the number of terror attacks annually throughout the Middle East has more than quadrupled in size.⁵¹ If nothing else, it speaks to the limitations of military power against the will of an entire population. A key failure of the counterinsurgency after the fall of the Taliban was its inability to address the insurgency’s foundational causes: the deep structural flaws in the economy, the dominance of the black market in narcotics, and other compelling socio-economic conditions that lead to opium cultivation.⁵²

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 216.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 217.

⁴⁸ Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies,” 101.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 111.

⁵¹ Coyne et al., “The War on Drugs in Afghanistan,” 97.

⁵² Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies,” 105.

Two essential messages may be gained from this section: the first is summed up nicely in the statement that counternarcotics policy is less effective at reducing opium cultivation than bad weather and a saturated market.⁵³ The second, simply, is that Afghanistan *cannot* pursue a counternarcotics policy while simultaneously fighting a very strong insurgency; the intertwining nature of the two problems do not permit a concurrent resolution to ever be accomplished.

Licensing of the Opium Economy

One way of mitigating the effects of the black market would be to license the growth of opium, and to allow farmers to sell to the legitimate pharmaceutical market. Peter van Ham and Jorrit Kamminga are advocates of cultivating poppies for the medicinal market:

Poppy crops can be used to produce medicines such as morphine and codeine, which are high-demand painkillers in a growing global market. ... Such a system would allocate existing poppy crops for medicinal purposes, offering all stakeholders, from farmers to warlords, an opportunity to profit in a legal economy.”⁵⁴

There is a precedent for such an idea. Turkey managed to eliminate illegal poppy cultivation while simultaneously keeping its farmers employed by implementing a market agreement with American and sourcing its opium via the poppy-straw concentrate method.⁵⁵ (As opposed to harvesting opium gum — and from that, morphine and codeine — by scoring the seed pods and waiting for it to ooze out, poppy straw concentrate sources certain opioid alkaloids like thebaine from the mature, dried plant.) Local militants have not been able to enter this poppy-straw concentrate market, likely because of its degrees of mechanization, and instead smuggle opium from Afghanistan.⁵⁶ Yet the global pharmaceutical industry

⁵³ Ibid., 101.

⁵⁴ Peter van Ham and Jorrit Kamminga, “Poppies for Peace: Reforming Afghanistan’s Opium Industry,” *Washington Quarterly* 30:1 (Winter 2006-07): 70.

⁵⁵ Vanda Felbab-Brown, Harold Trinkunas, and Sultan Barakat, “Breaking bad in the Middle East and North Africa: Drugs, militants, and human rights,” *Brookings Institute* (22 March 2016): n.p.

⁵⁶ Felbab-Brown, Trinkunas, and Barakat, “Breaking bad in the Middle East and North Africa,” n.p.

has shown its preference for poppy-straw concentrate over opium gum, which has been speculated may prove to be an issue for Afghanistan.⁵⁷ That said, if farmers knew of the demand for poppy-straw, there is little reason to doubt they wouldn't oblige. This method has in fact been proposed for Afghanistan with the caveat that its less labor-intensive method might cause the loss of some jobs.⁵⁸ In any case, under the 'Poppies for Medicine' proposal put forward by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), the licensing program would be enforced by local council authorities.⁵⁹

Victoria A. Greenfield et al. criticize the ICOS proposal by pointing to the case of India: the licensing program did help some of its opium farmers, but corruption did not stop, nor did the illegal trade in opium — legally grown opium was diverted to the black market by corrupt officials. They also point to the strong policing and governance institutions in India as reasons for why there has been relatively little issue with criminality around the fringes of its opium economy.⁶⁰ Yet this is another instance where private military corporations may prove effective: PMCs can be contracted to strictly regulate and protect opium flows — and unlike state military or police, if any one company fails, another can be hired in its place. At the very least, PMCs can be utilized in Afghanistan until the native institutional capacity is built-up over time.

Greenfield et al. also point to the inevitable diversion of legal opium to the black market as a problem with a licensed economy — illegal traffickers can outbid the legal industry, and farmers would likely sell to them.⁶¹ Yet this point does not strike as that much of an issue: it is purely market-oriented. If the legitimate market wants the goods it must pay for them, even if subsidies might be necessary to achieve this. These subsidies would likely cost less than the current counternarcotics policy. They further illustrate the likelihood that the scale of Afghanistan's opium production would vastly exceed global demand for pharmaceutical opiates, and thus not be able to sell comparatively much of its product. This would undercut the purpose of the

⁵⁷ Greenfield et al., "Is Medicinal Opium Production Afghanistan's Answer?" 9.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁹ Greenfield et al., "Is Medicinal Opium Production Afghanistan's Answer?" 1-2.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

⁶¹ Greenfield et al., "Is Medicinal Opium Production Afghanistan's Answer?" 3.

program.⁶² Here, the point must be raised: there is no *legal* market for opium big enough to accommodate Afghanistan's production. That means that even if opium and its production were completely legalized in Afghanistan, the illegal markets in other parts of the world would encourage further drug trafficking out of Afghanistan. This points to a systemic driver of the illegal narcotics industry that is well beyond the scope of Afghanistan alone: yet since the War on Drugs is also well beyond the scope of this paper, not much space can be devoted to its discussion.

Greenfield et al. further identify a lack of technical expertise and oversight as problems facing Afghani pharmaceutical production, and they also worry about quality control.⁶³ Again, the private sector can provide. Pharmaceutical companies can easily shore up technical expertise, and they can also pay for PMCs to provide oversight. Letting multinational pharmaceutical companies produce within Afghanistan would allow them to orchestrate their own quality control programs.

In order to avoid sending conflicting messages to farmers, the Afghan government would need to clearly communicate the procedures involved in a licensed medicinal opium cultivation project as well as clearly communicate its expectations to those who would seek to run it.⁶⁴ This would be especially pertinent in regards to the competing black market. Mark Malloch-Brown argues that allowing a legal opium trade would put legitimate purchasers in direct competition with illegal traffickers, thereby pushing up the price. Meanwhile other farmers would likely drop their usual crops in order to farm poppy to meet the growing demand.⁶⁵ A combination of appropriate security, along with good and fair prices from the legitimate market, should put a dent in this trend — though of course it can never be stamped out. If anything, it seems that counternarcotics hawks will have to learn to develop a tolerance for a certain level of illegal narcotics trade. As to farmers rushing to meet the demand, this presupposes that they would already be well-off enough to be able to cultivate anything

⁶² *Ibid.*, 6-7.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁶⁴ Van Ham and Kamminga, "Poppies for Peace," 77.

⁶⁵ Mark Malloch-Brown, "Opium production in Afghanistan," *British Medical Journal* 336 (3 May 2008).

other than opium — something already observed in the previous section. Greenfield et al. continue:

With so much surplus land — and labor — in Afghanistan, the creation of a legal opium industry cannot, itself, make the country a less attractive place to produce illegal opium. The task of suppressing illegal production, already impossible, will only be made more difficult by the need to distinguish it from legally licensed production.⁶⁶

While being a rather facetious argument — it does nothing to address the fact that there is no way suppression can ever work in the first place — it does raise critical concerns about the soundness of licensing at all. Greenfield et al. also identify local leadership (cited by ICOS as a regulatory mechanism) as a key link to the illegal market, where they support the trade and make a profit from it. This is nothing to say of corruption within the political elite; Greenfield et al. also suspect that licensing and regulation through local authorities would encourage nepotism and embezzlement, while also pointing out that licensing may then subsequently legitimize corruption.⁶⁷ This would only be exacerbated by the fact that the Afghan government would have to choose, from a plethora of eager and starving farmers, who would get licenses from the small pool which would likely be available.⁶⁸

The above observations in regard to a proposed licensed opium cultivation program in Afghanistan are not all insurmountable; however, the few that are pose grave condemnations about the possibilities of it being systematically effective at reducing the black market. This leads to the question: instead of suppressing opium, or worrying about a licensing program, how about making it legal? Adam Pain makes a prescient observation which can be applied to the licensing program: “One could question the consistency of seeking to destroy a crop deemed to have been grown for illicit purposes, while considering its cultivation by others licit.”⁶⁹ As noted previously, the Afghan central government suffers from a crisis of legitimacy; an inconsistent policy towards opium cultivation that has even the

⁶⁶ Greenfield et al., “Is Medicinal Opium Production Afghanistan’s Answer?” 3.

⁶⁷ Greenfield et al., “Is Medicinal Opium Production Afghanistan’s Answer?” 5.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁶⁹ Pain, “Afghanistan’s Opium Poppy Economy.”

most remote possibility of legitimizing nepotism will not be conducive to changing that fact.

Legalization of the Opium Economy

If anything, legalization of the opium economy would bring it all out into the open and let market forces have more influence — rather than corruption, at least. Afghanistan's black market — in which opium is the largest commodity — causes inflation in both currency and property values while undermining economic stability and legal production of other goods,⁷⁰ all significant reasons for legalization. Coyne et al. make a bold statement:

... if the goal is to weaken the Taliban in Afghanistan, one policy to consider would be to fully legalize opium and poppy production, which would lower the price of opium, decrease the benefit to using violence, and very likely erode the Taliban's monopoly over the industry. It would also likely reduce opium-related corruption in politics.⁷¹

It would certainly win political points too, simply because of what good opium has done for Afghanistan. By supporting the rural economy, opium has prevented urban migration and instead made social interaction between different groups within the country less tense outside of the conflict sphere. Conversely, where opium cultivation has declined, there has been a causal downturn in the rural economy, as well as food security, with many individuals and families moving to neighboring countries.⁷² One problem with criminalization of opium is also the criminalization of its possession and use, and the consequences that arise out of that: to avoid further radicalization within the penal systems — such as notoriously happened to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi⁷³ — Felbab-Brown et al. recommend the de-penalization of opium, specifically in regards to incarceration.⁷⁴

However, opium itself is not necessarily the issue. Crucially, it is the *black market* which pulls resources — in the

⁷⁰ Felbab-Brown, "Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies," 102.

⁷¹ Coyne et al., "The War on Drugs in Afghanistan," 112.

⁷² Pain, "Afghanistan's Opium Poppy Economy."

⁷³ Brian H. Fishman, *The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 7-8.

⁷⁴ Felbab-Brown et al., "Breaking bad in the Middle East and North Africa."

form of a tax base — from the central government and puts it in the hands of warlords and insurgents who do not recognize any authority higher than their own.⁷⁵

Beyond Opium

Perhaps the most compelling argument that Greenfield et al. make is that provided Afghan farmers have the means and training to do so, they can take up again the traditional growing of vineyards and orchards which had been lost during the Soviet occupation over thirty years ago.⁷⁶ This will likely be important in the future, especially if poppy-concentrate becomes more commonly produced. By streamlining the harvest process of opium via a focus on poppy-straw concentrate, the number of people involved in the opium economy will decrease. Excess labor will then need to go elsewhere. This will present a favorable labor market for farmers beginning to cultivate other things, such as vineyards or orchards. One NGO encouraging the resurgence of traditional farming is called Roots for Peace; they offer ‘starter kits’ for Afghan farmers to revitalize old vineyards and thereby rejuvenate the local economy. Crucially, these initiatives in particular are also tied to more accessible and stable markets, and have little security risk involved.⁷⁷ If poppy-straw concentrate does not come into high demand, it won’t be the end of the world. Clemens notes that by improving non-opium employment opportunities, the labor market will shift in their direction. In doing so the labor market will then become unfavorable to the labor-intensive harvesting of opium gum, as all employers will have to pay more for labor in order to attract harvesters in the first place.⁷⁸

Unfortunately, those infrastructure projects meant to enable farmers to pursue alternative crop cultivation have often been abandoned because of insecurity and insurgency in the region.⁷⁹ This appears to suggest security cannot be achieved without economic reconstruction while economic reconstruction cannot be achieved without security — but this is only true for the *status quo*.

⁷⁵ Clemens, “Opium in Afghanistan,” 408.

⁷⁶ Greenfield et al., “Is Medicinal Opium Production Afghanistan’s Answer?” 10.

⁷⁷ “Afghanistan — Roots of Peace,” Roots of Peace (Accessed 22 November 2017). <http://rootsofpeace.org/programs-page/afghanistan>.

⁷⁸ Clemens, “Opium in Afghanistan,” 414.

⁷⁹ Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies,” 109.

Were opium to be legalized, security issues would likely decrease. And where farmers have access to such essentials as trade infrastructure, land, water, food, and employment, the reported drop in opium cultivation has been substantial, anyways.⁸⁰

Alternative crops may not be enough, however, in all cases. Jeffrey Clemens calculates that alternative crops and alternative sources of income (off-farm) do not appear to be able to have any significant impact on the level of opium cultivation — and even though it would allow prices to drop, neither does a complete cessation of eradication.⁸¹ This goes against the material cited above, but even if Clemens is mistaken, it would be wise to factor this into further consideration. For instance, where rural development and alternative livelihoods in the north are not as successful as had been hoped, farmers have turned to growing cannabis.⁸² This presents some interesting opportunities.

Cannabis production seems like a perfectly reasonable alternative to opium, one that is even more likely to be feasible on the international market as cannabis increasingly starts to ‘go legal’ in the West. There is a strong base for it already, too: according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan produced more cannabis resin and hashish than any other country in the world in 2010. In the south of the country, cultivation already tends to occur alongside opium; over 60% of cannabis farmers also grew opium in that year. And also the same as opium, cannabis farming is mostly motivated by poverty; fascinatingly, income from cannabis in 2010 was almost double that of opium (US\$9000/ha to US\$4900/ha, respectively).⁸³ This is all to suggest that cultivation of both opium and cannabis should be legalized in Afghanistan — to mitigate the negative effects and multiply the benefits.

In consideration of the failures of counternarcotics policy across the board, and keeping in mind the critical flaws of any proposed licensing program for poppy cultivation, the only reasonable conclusion to be had is the legalization of opium and its cultivation. That opium is crucial to the economic survival of much

⁸⁰ Malloch-Brown, “Opium production in Afghanistan.”

⁸¹ Clemens, “Opium in Afghanistan,” 427.

⁸² Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Amongst Poppies,” 101.

⁸³ “Afghanistan: Cannabis Survey 2010,” *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime* (June 2011), 7.

of the Afghan population should be a central consideration in any decision on whether or not to implement this conclusion as policy. Furthermore, since it is the black market as a whole that damages both country and government, legalization of cannabis — another massive component of said black market — is only logical and should be seriously considered.

But Afghanistan is not the be-all and end-all of the implications of this discussion. This same model could, and arguably should, be implemented around the world. There is no reason to think that there is a substantial difference between the cultivation of opium in Central Asia, *khat* in Africa, coca in South America, or even cannabis in North America. This does not only apply to cultivation, either: the most effective way to curb the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan, and globally, is to curb end-market demand.⁸⁴ This has important implications for the discourse on the War on Drugs everywhere.

⁸⁴ Malloch-Brown, “Opium production in Afghanistan.”

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Canadian Foreign Policy and the 2015 Paris Agreement

By

Abby Koning

In the midst of the Cold War in 1988, the consensus at the Conference on the Changing Atmosphere was that “humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war.”¹ There are important implications of the fact that climate change was acknowledged to be a comparable threat to that of a nuclear holocaust during this time. Three decades have passed since this view was articulated, and while the world may not be on the potential brink of nuclear devastation, the impacts of climate change continue to threaten all aspects of society and the natural world. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an example of a current attempt at a multilateral and institutional approach to solving this intercontinental and formidable challenge. In 2015, the 21st UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP 21) met and negotiated the Paris Climate Agreement. The purpose of this agreement was to ensure that there would be a concerted global effort towards the mitigation of climate change. Canada was a signatory of this agreement, along with 175 other parties. The signatories, including Canada, recognized the numerous risks that climate change poses for the global population. There are a number of determinants that influenced Canada’s role in the negotiation and participation in the agreement. However, Canada’s participation in the Paris Agreement can primarily be attributed to its extensive involvement in the international system and its attempt to rebuild and maintain a positive international reputation.

¹ Eve Savory, “Scientists appeal for ‘urgency and determination’ on climate issues,” CBC News, June 27, 2008, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/scientists-appeal-for-urgency-and-determination-on-climate-issues-1.705882>.

Context and Overview

This paper will begin with a description of the context in which the Paris Agreement negotiations took place and a description of the agreement itself. The UNFCCC, which entered into force in 1994, currently consists of 197 countries deemed ‘Parties of the Convention.’² The convention describes its overarching goal as “preventing ‘dangerous’ human interference with the climate system.”³ There are arguments to be made about whether or not dangerous human interference with the climate system has already occurred, but the fact remains that the Convention aims to prevent catastrophic and irreversible damage from anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. While the focus is on mitigation, the adaptation to current and inevitable future effects is also taken into account.⁴ The Convention is built upon an equitable framework, in which the roles of each country are not equal. Developed countries are expected to do more to address the issue of climate change, as they have more resources, economic and otherwise, that allow them to assume more responsibilities.⁵ The Paris Agreement was the result of the 21st annual convention, or COP 21. The Paris Agreement’s primary focus was ensuring that average global warming is kept well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures, while aiming for a 1.5-degree target.⁶ Although there are mandatory elements of the agreement with regards to transparency and reporting, the targets of the agreement are ultimately not legally binding, meaning that countries may set their own targets and a country that does not meet its targets will not face legal consequences.⁷ The agreement is binding for parties who have ratified it, therefore requiring them to

² United Nations, “First steps to a safer future: Introducing The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” accessed April 6, 2018, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ United Nations, Paris Agreement, 2015, 4, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf.

⁷ Aslak Brun, “Conference Diplomacy: The Making of the Paris Agreement,” *Politics and Governance* 4, no. 3 (2016): 116, <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v4i3.649>; Peter Christoff, “The promissory note: COP 21 and the Paris Climate Agreement,” *Environmental Politics* 25, no. 5 (2016): 775, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2016.1191818>.

provide timely documentation of their progress.⁸ Countries must submit nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that outline their goals and the steps they will take domestically to achieve these goals. NDCs are updated and submitted every five years, and countries are expected to “put forward their best efforts through [NDCs] and to strengthen these efforts in the years ahead.”⁹ Canada signed the agreement on April 22nd, 2016 and ratified on October 5th, 2016.¹⁰ The agreement entered into force on November 4th, 2016, after being ratified or similarly accounted for by the necessary 55 parties, accounting for approximately 55 percent of total global greenhouse gas emissions.¹¹

The commitments made by Canada in the Paris Agreement are important to assess and will be analyzed later, however; Canadian involvement in other aspects of the COP 21 are analytically significant as well. There are two aspects of Canadian involvement that this paper will briefly address: Canadian actors and Canadian influence. First, newly elected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau attended the convention along with a comparatively large team of over 300 individuals.¹² Among these delegates were 7 Premiers and many other politicians and bureaucrats.¹³ Second, Canada did not take on a passive role in the negotiations of the agreement. The Canadian Minister of Environment and Climate Change, Catherine McKenna, was a strong and early supporter of the inclusion of a 1.5-degree average global warming target as a supplement to the standard 2-degree benchmark.¹⁴ However, while this inclusion was advocated for, whether Canada would aim for this target itself was not specified at the time.¹⁵ These factors illustrate Canada’s desire to appear as a strong and committed

⁸ Peter Christoff, “The promissory note: COP 21 and the Paris Climate Agreement,” *Environmental Politics* 25, no. 5 (2016): 777, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2016.1191818>.

⁹ United Nations, “The Paris Agreement,” accessed April 6, 2018, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php.

¹⁰ United Nations, “Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification,” accessed April 6, 2018, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² CTV News, “The price of Paris: Canada sends more than 300 delegates to climate talks,” CTV News, December 3, 2015, <https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/the-price-of-paris-canada-sends-more-than-300-delegates-to-climate-talks-1.2686239>.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ John Dillon, “Huge Challenges for Canada after the Paris Climate Conference,” Kairos Discussion Papers, (2016): 1, <https://www.kairosCanada.org/product/huge-challenges-canada-paris-climate-conference>.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

participant through a large physical presence at the conference itself and the public advocacy of ambitious objectives.

Addressing the agreement in a more Canada-specific context, there are varied expectations from different states in terms of targets, reductions, and methodology. In a broader sense, the Convention itself has been divided into different tiers of states: Annex 1, Annex 2, and Non-Annex. Annex 1 countries are considered those industrialized countries that are part of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) as well as parties with economies in transition (EIT), and Annex 2 countries include OECD members but not EIT.¹⁶ The agreement states that developed Annex 1 countries should “lead the way”¹⁷ with the justification that these countries have consistently been the highest emitters due to their early development. In order to level the playing field, these countries must allow underdeveloped countries to have opportunities to develop their economies, while making up for the heavily one-sided damage they have caused. In the Paris Agreement, Annex 1 countries are determined to be the leaders of emissions reduction. Canada is an Annex 1 state, meaning it has a higher level of responsibility in reducing overall global emissions. In Canada’s intended nationally determined contribution (INDC), Canada stated that its goal was to “achieve an economy-wide target to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030.”¹⁸ The target was described in the same document as “ambitious, but achievable.”¹⁹ While this target is a larger percentage reduction than was required of Canada under the Kyoto Protocol (a 6% reduction of emissions), the base year from which emissions reductions will be calculated is 15 years later (1990 under the Kyoto Protocol).²⁰ It is important to take into account Canada’s emissions increase between 1990 and 2005. Canada’s emissions of carbon dioxide equivalent rose by 111 megatons

¹⁶ United Nations, “First steps.”

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Canada, Canada’s INDC Submission to the UNFCCC, 2015, 1, <http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx> (accessed April 6, 2018).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Canada, Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, 2007, <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/K-9.5/20070622/P1TT3xt3.html>; United Nations, “Kyoto Protocol,” accessed April 6, 2018, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.

between these years, so the starting point of the Paris Agreement target is significantly higher.

Canada's first NDC, submitted in 2017 as a revised version of Canada's INDC, revealed the official targets and methodology for Canada's contributions. The target of 30% reduction from 2015 levels by 2030 remained the same, but it was also proposed that with Canada's plan, the country may be able to exceed this target.²¹ Specifically, this was in reference to the implementation of the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, the plan that is intended to oversee the efforts to achieve (or potentially surpass) the Paris targets.²²

Multilateralism

This paper has explained the targets that Canada chose for itself and the influence that Canada had on the negotiations and agreement as a whole; however, Canada's justification for these actions has yet to be examined. To begin, Canada was under no official obligation to partake in this agreement. Of the 197 Parties that are members of the Convention, 22 still have not ratified.²³ While this is only slightly above 10% of Convention participants, it still displays that adhering to the agreement is not a necessary measure for states to take in order to remain involved in the overall institution. That being said, there is an expectation of Canada to sign, as a member and furthermore as an Annex 1 Party. All Annex 1 Parties signed the agreement, and so there is pressure from both the international system to participate along with other developed countries as well as pressure domestically to display Canada as benevolent and a key player on the global stage. Canada has historically been a large supporter of multilateral institutions.²⁴ While the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States is of immense importance to Canadian foreign policy in a number of ways, multilateral relationships are also prevalent in

²¹ Canada, Canada's 2017 Nationally Determined Contribution Submission to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2017, 1, <http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Party.aspx?party=CAN> (accessed April 6, 2018).

²² *Ibid.*

²³ United Nations, "Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification."

²⁴ Tom Keating, "Multilateralism: Past Imperfect, Future Conditional," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 16, no. 2 (2010): 9. <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2010.9687305>.

Canadian foreign policy patterns. While multilateralism has been a consistent part of Canada's foreign policy values, there was a push away from this under the Harper government.²⁵ The discussion of the effectiveness of multilateralism aside, the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement illustrate the fact that Canada is still a significant player on the international stage. Trudeau has shown a reversal of Harper's move away from multilateralism and continues to do so.²⁶ Whether or not actions of the Trudeau government are highly differentiated, the message they are intent on sending is one of differentiation.²⁷

The Paris Agreement in Contrast with the Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol was adopted by the UNFCCC in 1997 and entered into force in 2005.²⁸ This protocol's targets, unlike the Paris Agreement, are legally binding and are not set individually.²⁹ Canada signed, ratified, and entered the agreement into force, but withdrew in 2011.³⁰ This begs the question, why has Canada committed to the Paris Agreement after removing itself from a different UNFCCC agreement? Being from the same UNFCCC group of states, the protocol offered the same multilateral opportunities and expectations as Paris but was ultimately not enough to maintain Canada's involvement. There are two points regarding these two agreements that this paper will address. The first is that the same legally binding aspects of the Kyoto Protocol are not present in the Paris Agreement, which offers a way for Canada to withdraw if it is unable to reach its targets. Second, the domestic political climate in these two contexts is very different, namely in the contrast of the governing parties.

The expectations and consequences involved in the Kyoto Protocol differ from the Paris Agreement. If Canada had not met its required targets under the Kyoto Protocol, it would have faced

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Amelia Hadfield, "Maple Leaf Zeitgeist? Assessing Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's Policy Changes," *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 106, no.1 (2017): 27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2016.1272954>.

²⁷ Ibid., 24-25, 29.

²⁸ United Nations, "Kyoto Protocol.

²⁹ Christoff, "The promissory note," 775.; Canada, Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act.; Brun, "Conference Diplomacy," 116.

³⁰ Christoff, "The promissory note," 775.

“\$14 billion in penalties.”³¹ The Paris Agreement does not include enforced penalties in the same way and allows each country to determine its own targets. However, there is still a risk of facing international political backlash if a country were to remain a participant of the agreement but not meet its targets.

In terms of political climate, the Paris Agreement negotiations occurred weeks after Prime Minister Justin Trudeau assumed office. This change in government came with a stark change in priorities as well. The previous Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, having been a vocal opponent of the agreement and a strong supporter of domestic oil and gas production.³² The Harper government did not display climate change as a priority, while Trudeau, although not detailed in his message, was quick to paint Canada and the new government as a strong face of climate leadership.³³ The difference in recorded values of the parties and their leaders plays a significant role in the differences in responses to the two UNFCCC treaties. This goal of differentiating the new Liberal government from the former Conservative rule is emulated here again, as seen with the return to Canadian multilateralism discussed earlier.

Canada-United States Relations

As mentioned above, Canada and the United States have a notable bilateral relationship, and maintaining this relationship is often a Canadian priority. The US participation in the Paris Agreement is another incentive for Canada to involve itself, providing Canada with another opportunity to align itself with the goals of the US. If Canada were to actively oppose US emissions reduction targets, this would have negative implications for the bilateral relationship between the two states.

³¹ Eunize Lao, “Canada and the Kyoto Protocol,” accessed April 6, 2018, <http://www.alternativesjournal.ca/community/blogs/current-events/canada-and-kyoto-protocol>.

³² Ibid.

³³ Hadfield, “Maple Leaf Zeitgeist?” 29.

However, in 2017, US President Donald Trump announced that the US would withdraw from the Paris Agreement.³⁴ Due to the close ties between Canada and the US, this could have potentially influenced Canada's decision regarding whether or not to remain a party to the agreement. However, arguably the basis on which the US is withdrawing is not necessarily relevant to the Canadian context, in that Canada's continued commitment to the agreement does not undermine its relationship with the US. As described by Zhang et al., the United States' withdrawal was due primarily to domestic politics in the US, including the presidency of Donald Trump. These domestic influencers are exemplified in Trump's own climate skepticism, a demonstrated will to overtake Barack Obama's former presidential legacy, and close ties to the US fossil fuel industry.³⁵ Canada's position towards the Paris Agreement has no bearing on the factors that led to US withdrawal, thus allowing Canada to remain a part of the agreement despite US actions. While the withdrawal does give Canada a politically safe escape from the agreement in regards to its US relationship, there are political benefits of remaining party to the agreement, such as establishing a positive global reputation and forming multilateral relationships. Additionally, as demonstrated by the change in valuation from the Obama to Trump presidency, changes to US participation may still occur in the future. US withdrawal does create potential barriers to the Paris Agreement's success, as the US is an influential state and large emitter. Politically, however, its withdrawal provides an opening for states to show themselves as global climate leaders.³⁶ Canada has a chance to fill some of this space, as a new primary representative of North America within the agreement, which diminishes incentives to follow the US' lead.

Additionally, in reference to the Kyoto Protocol, when US President George W. Bush spoke against the agreement in 2001 and the US did not ratify the protocol, Canada demonstrated its commitment by ratifying the agreement without the US in 2002. While the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement are not

³⁴ Hai-Bin Zhang, et al., "U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: Reasons, impacts, and China's response," *Advances in Climate Change Research* 8, no. 4 (2017): 220, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accre.2017.09.002>.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 221-222.

³⁶ Eva Palacková, "The Race for Climate Leadership in the Era of Trump and Multilevel Governance," *European View* 16, no.2 (2017): 252. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-017-0451-9>.

operating within the same contexts, this offers a past example of incongruous paths taken by the two countries, with Canada-US relations being left intact.

Global efforts and large-scale participation in the agreement have had a clear effect on Canadian involvement. Having withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, Canada lost some credibility as a key player in the global fight against climate change. The Convention provided Canada with an opportunity to rebuild its reputation around climate leadership. On top of rebuilding a renewed international reputation, Canada was able to highlight its change in foreign policy priorities under a new federal leader. Attempting to create a meaningful reputation has been a consistent aspect of Canadian foreign policy practices and taking this kind of opportunity is not uncharacteristic.³⁷

The Theory of Liberal Internationalism

The Canadian foreign policy theory of liberal internationalism (LI) asserts that Canada is a middle power, meaning that it is not as important or influential as great powers but is more so than smaller powers.³⁸ Canada does not necessarily have to be as involved in global affairs as great powers, but its decisions still hold sway and importance. Unlike small powers, middle powers are not as susceptible to the commissions of great powers and thus can make decisions independently, according to their own interests. While Canada can use this position to act of its own accord, because of the level of power it does attain, Canada should take on the role of a “helpful fixer.”³⁹ This combination of independence and ability grants Canada the space to focus on global issues that are both beneficial to its national interest and that Canada has the capacity and resources to invest in. The helpful fixer title provides Canada with an expectation of working to maintain a positive reputation within the global system.⁴⁰ For

³⁷ Adam Chapnick, “Peace, Order, and Good Government: The “Conservative” Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy,” *International Journal* 60, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 363, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40204053>.

³⁸ John Holmes, “Most Safety in the Middle,” in *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy*, ed. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2015), 42.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Canada, gaining power is not a priority, as a realist worldview would suggest. However, the goal is to maintain a positive reputation and continue to be an active member of the international system, while participating in activities that are in its self-interest and attainable. LI also promotes multilateralism, the practice of diplomacy, and international institutions as important components of Canadian approaches to international relations. These allow for Canada to use leverage as a middle power to expand its authority and privileges, while still maintaining its middle power status. Cooperation with other states is key, as opposed to operating within a framework of “every state for itself.”

The theory of LI is relevant to Canada’s participation in the Paris Agreement in a number of ways. In regards to Canada’s role as a middle power, it is not taking on any tasks that are outside the realm of its ability, especially in consideration to potentially disadvantaging itself in relation to other countries that it has ties to. As one of 175 parties, Canada is facing similar changes and responsibilities to other countries. Additionally, regarding the institutional nature of the United Nations, multilateralism, diplomacy, and international institutions are all a large part of this procedure. Through aligning itself with these other parties, Canada is participating in a widespread and collective multilateral agreement that is focused on an issue that is recognized as universal. The UN is a prime example of an international institution that was created and continues to be based on liberal values, thus inserting itself directly into the framework of LI. Canada’s ties to international organizations and focus on multilateralism have been historically strong, and while both of these were devalued under the government of Stephen Harper, there are aspects of Canada’s involvement in the Paris Agreement that point to a move away from Harper’s policies under the Trudeau administration.⁴¹

The Dominant Class Theory

In opposition to some of the international determinants prioritized under LI, the dominant class theory (DCT) of Canadian foreign policy is concerned with internal determinants as the

⁴¹ Hadfield, “Maple Leaf Zeitgeist?” 27.

primary factors that influence Canadian foreign policy decisions. In particular, DCT views Canada as predominantly controlled by a capitalist sentiment of economic growth, and this determinant takes precedence over other interests. Making capitalism a priority is a result of the values of the dominant class.⁴² DCT ultimately views the state “as heavily influenced by structural and class factors.”⁴³ Those who hold power within the workings of the state are a section of the dominant class because of the “intimacy of their links with the property-owning class and the corporate sector and the great influence wielded by the latter.”⁴⁴

Regarding Canada’s foreign policy decisions in the Paris Agreement, DCT can be utilised to examine the role of the team of individuals that attended the Convention and the influence of province participation in negotiations and decisions. The number of people from Canada in attendance is large by itself, but in comparison to other countries it may be considered “excessive.”⁴⁵ By the earlier definition, each delegate is a member of this dominant class, and is in attendance to pursue their own interests along with the class or sector they represent. While the goal of climate change mitigation as stated by the Paris Agreement is an example of an interest seemingly dominated by ethical reasons, Canada does have personal stakes in the issue as well. Canada’s participation in the Paris Agreement is not without domestic opposition from members of the dominant class; however, the actions being taken within the agreement still advance capitalism, which, as a DCT perspective would suggest, is a primary aspect of Canadian foreign policy. The domestic political factors at play also provide insight into Canada’s role in the agreement. DCT puts domestic determinants above international ones on a scale of importance; however, although utilising the Paris Agreement as a means to contrast past and current administrations does occur domestically, it is also used as a means of altering international reputation as well.

Ultimately LI is a more useful explanatory tool to understand Canadian motives for joining the Paris Agreement. In

⁴² Pratt Cranford, “Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus,” *International Journal* 39, no. 1 (1984): 100, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070208403900105>.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁴⁵ CTV News, “The price of Paris.”

its position towards the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, Canada has shown itself to be a middle power. Its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol was impactful but did not have the same effect that the US' refusal to ratify had on the efficacy of the agreement. Canada's efforts to be seen as a positive global force are illustrated by its maintained dedication to the UNFCCC and its continued commitment to multilateralism after the withdrawal of the US. Through its substantial representation at the negotiation itself and its vocal change in values, the current administration has made it clear that it wants to be an influential player in an agreement that it believes it has the capacity to be involved in. If Canada were to avoid being involved in the agreement, it could theoretically "free-rid[e]"⁴⁶ on the climate mitigation efforts of other countries, providing a potential economic incentive to wait out other countries for a 'solution' and push for the instant capitalist payoff of fossil fuels and emission-incurring industries. Therefore, Canada's promise to reduce its emissions represents a departure from the preferences of the dominant class.

Conclusion

Canada's participation in the Paris Agreement is a necessary first step in taking on (or returning to) a strong position of global climate leadership. In order to build its reputation, conform to the goals and policy of the UNFCCC, and broaden its abilities to build ties with other countries, Canada has chosen to pursue this global agreement. These values are most prevalent in Canada's decision, as economic losses and difficult domestic policy may result from the implementation of policies designed to meet the targets of the agreement. The theory of Liberal Internationalism illustrates that the justifications for Canada's foreign policy decisions in this case can be clearly identified as promoting the values of multilateralism, diplomacy, and the role of international institutions. Canada is situated as a middle power, and through this agreement may be able to act in its role as a 'helpful fixer.' The extent to which Canada adheres to the targets it has set for itself is a measure that will further determine Canada's foreign policy values and the efficacy of its commitments.

⁴⁶ Hai-Bin Zhan, et al. "U.S. withdrawal," 222.

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The Debate on Water Scarcity and Security

By

Tao Browne

Introduction

Water security has emerged as a particularly significant issue that poses a threat to societal order and has become aggravated by the phenomenon of climate change. According to a 2017 United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNIWEH) report, as of 2017 there are 2.4 billion people in the world who do not have access to clean water and safe sanitation facilities; furthermore, the report predicted that by 2050, there will be an additional 2.3 billion people who will be living in areas where there is no access to safe water sources.¹ The reality that 32% of the world's population currently does not have access to safe water supplies and that an additional 2.3 billion people will be added to that list by 2050, begs the question: to what extent does water scarcity pose a threat to security? This essay will analyse the impact that water scarcity has on both traditional and human security in order to demonstrate how water deprivation, whilst posing a threat to traditional security, will produce a more significant threat towards human security. This paper will be divided into four sections: the first section will define the terms of human and traditional security, the second section will analyse how water scarcity poses a threat towards traditional security, the third section will analyse how water scarcity affects human security, and the fourth section will evaluate which security approach is most significantly affected by water scarcity.

Section I: Defining Human and Traditional Security

To provide a foundation for this paper it is necessary to first define human and traditional security. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) first coined the term “human

¹ Andersen Guppy, “Water Crisis Report,” United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health, (2017): 5.

security” in their 1994 report, which identified seven components of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.² Economic security is defined as the ability of individuals to sustainably secure their essential needs with dignity, which includes access to basic shelter, hygiene, food, health care, and education.³ Food security entails that all people have economic and physical access to basic food at all times; the UNDP’s definition stipulates that there must be both enough food to go around and, in turn, individuals must have an entitlement to this supply of food.⁴ The UNDP views health security as having the aim to guarantee a minimum protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles.⁵ In order to be environmentally secure, as per the UNDP’s definition, nature must receive short and long term protection against man-made threats, and the deterioration of the natural environment.⁶ Personal security is the protection of people from physical violence, whether it stem from the state or external states, domestic abuse, non-state actors, or violent individuals; the UNDP report noted that for many people, the greatest cause of anxiety is crime, particularly violent crime, which proliferates in developing states.⁷ In regard to community security, the report states that the majority of people obtain security from their membership in a group, such as family, an organization, a community, or an ethnic group, and that such groups offer practical support and protection to their weaker members.⁸ However, the report notes that traditional communities can also perpetuate oppressive customs such as employing bonded labour, promoting female genital mutilation, and are also more prone to ethnic violence.⁹ Thus, community security is the protection against the loss of such traditional relationships and from sectarian and ethnic violence.¹⁰ Finally, political security ensures that people live in a society that honours their fundamental human rights.¹¹ These

² United Nations Development Program, “New Dimensions of Human Security,” Human Development Report 1994 (1994): 24.

³ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ United Nations Development Program, “New Dimensions of Human Security,” 32

¹¹ *Ibid.*

seven components compose the contemporary definition of human security, which constitutes the most widely cited and most authoritative formulation of the term.

Differing from the perspective of human security, traditional security places greater emphasis on the traditional security threats of interstate war. Kjell Goldmann defines traditional security as: “domestic freedom of political decision-making even under pressure from an external aggressor.”¹² In addition, according to Walter Lippmann:

a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.¹³

Thus, the traditional security approach places greater emphasis on state-centric security rather than focusing on the individual’s security, as does human security, and is therefore more concerned with interstate war. The traditional security perspective perceives the international system to be anarchic, as there is no world government, and thus holds that states are responsible for providing for their own security.¹⁴ Due to this conception of the international system, traditional security theorists emphasize the importance for governments to focus on military strength, which is designed to act as both a deterrent and a defensive mechanism in the event of an attack.¹⁵ As this section illustrates, whilst human security places emphasis on issues such as health, environment, and food security, traditional security maintains a state-centric definition of security that focuses primarily on the threat of interstate war. Using the definitions of both human and traditional security, this paper will proceed to analyse how water scarcity applies to each of these approaches.

¹² Johan Eriksson, “Observers or Advocates?: On the Political Role of Security Analysts,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 3 (1999): 313

¹³ Arnold Wolfers, ““National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no.4 (1952): 484.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 483.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 490.

Section II: Water Scarcity and Traditional Security

The rising disparity in access to safe water sources is demonstrated by the evidence that 12% of the world's population¹⁶ uses 85% of the earth's fresh water, which in turn, raises concerns regarding the possibility of violent interstate conflict over the control and access to fresh water.¹⁷ The threat of interstate war is particularly prevalent in regions where multiple states share ownership of a singular waterway, such as the Nile River. Accordingly, this section of the paper will focus on analysing the impact that water scarcity has on traditional security.

The continual decrease in the accessibility of safe water supplies, particularly in developing and conflict prone states, produces concerns regarding the possibility that water scarcity will instigate interstate wars. According to Thomas Naff, water is an exceptionally volatile strategic resource, particularly during severe water shortages, which in turn, indicates that water scarcity can produce violent conflict.¹⁸ Through the examination of the history of interstate water disputes it is evident that conflicts over water have produced serious tensions, threats of violence, border clashes, and invasions. One particular case of concern is the ongoing dispute over the Nile River between Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sudan.¹⁹ Although Egypt is the primary beneficiary of the Nile River, Egypt has to share the river with eight other states. Moreover, Egypt is the downstream state, and is thus subject to potential risks from political or economic shifts in the other eight states.²⁰ Furthermore, Egypt depends on the Nile for 97% of its irrigation and thus any reduction in water levels within the Nile would pose a significant threat to the survival of both Egypt's population and economy.²¹ Egypt has recently condemned Ethiopia's decision to construct the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance

¹⁶ This 12% of the world's population constitutes the population living within developed states.

¹⁷ Maude Barlow, "Water as Commodity-The Wrong Prescription," *The Institute for Food and Development Policy* 7, no. 3 (2001):4.

¹⁸ Douglas A. Borer and Jason J. Morrissette, "Where Oil and Water Do Mix: Environmental Scarcity and Future Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa," *Parameters* 34, no. 4 (Winter 2004-05): 88

¹⁹ Mary E. Morris, "Water and conflict in the Middle East: Threats and opportunities," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 20, no. 1 (1997): 3

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

²¹ David Michel & Ricky Passarelli, "Conflict Basins: Powderkegs to Peacepipes," *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 35, no. 1 (2015): 153.

Dam (GERD), which includes a 74 billion cubic meter water reservoir.²² As of August 2017, the GERD was 60% complete with no estimated completion date yet established; however, upon completion, the GERD's 74 billion cubic meter reservoir is estimated to take an additional three years to fill.²³ During these three years the Nile would lose 25% of its water and, in turn, Egypt would lose 51% of its farmland, which would affect the livelihoods of nineteen million Egyptians.²⁴ Thus, the construction of the GERD has become a contentious issue. In 2010, the Egyptian government declared any upriver diversion of the Nile's water to be a "red line that involves the national security of Egypt," and that Ethiopian attempts to siphon water off the Nile would provoke Egyptian airstrikes against Ethiopian dams.²⁵ Moreover, prior to President Mohamed Morsi's removal from office in 2013, Morsi stated "we will defend each drop of Nile water with our blood if necessary."²⁶ Thus, the completion of the GERD has the potential to significantly heighten the likelihood of armed conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia. Through these analyses it is apparent that water scarcity bears the potential of producing interstate conflict.

Section III: Water Scarcity and Human Security

In addition to producing the traditional security threats of interstate conflict, water scarcity also poses threats towards human security. In 2017, UNIWEH reported that over 2.4 billion people are unable to access safe water supplies and that approximately 3.5 million people die per year as a result of water scarcity and contaminated water sources.²⁷ Moreover, the UNIWEH report stated that by 2050, there will be an additional 2.3 billion people living without access to safe water supplies.²⁸ This section of the paper will analyse how water scarcity impacts human security by

²² Stefan Liersch, Hagen Koch and Freed Fokko Hattermann, "Management Scenarios of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Their Impacts under Recent and Future Climates," *Water* 9, no. 10 (2017): 2.

²³ *Ibid.*, 9

²⁴ "Death of the Nile: Egypt fears Ethiopian dam will cut into its water supply." *Telegraph*, October 2, 2017

²⁵ Fred H. Lawson, "Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile River: The Continuing Dispute," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2016): 102.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 114.

²⁷ Guppy, "Water Crisis Report," 5.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

analysing how water scarcity is linked to health, poverty, food, forced migration, and violent intrastate conflict.

Water is the fundamental lifeline of all human beings: on average a person can survive three to five days without water, after which they will die.²⁹ Thus, access to clean water is an absolute necessity for human security; however, in 2017 an estimated 2.4 billion people lacked access to safe water supplies. The 2017 UNIWEH report illustrates the extent of global water scarcity: an estimated 1.8 billion people are forced to collect water from sources that are contaminated by faeces, which in turn, causes approximately 2.2 million preventable deaths per year.³⁰ Furthermore, approximately 1,000 children die per day from preventable sanitation and water related diseases.³¹ Thus, the scarcity of clean and safe water demonstrates a considerable threat to this paper's definition of human security; the reality that there are 2.2 million preventable deaths a year due to contaminated water sources clearly violates the UNDP's definition of health security and therefore, by extension, to human security as well. Moreover, water scarcity also has a detrimental impact on the proliferation of poverty, particularly in developing and non-developed states, which have predominantly agriculturally based economies. In 2017, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) reported that agriculture production constituted more than 37% of developing states' gross domestic product (GDP), illustrating that populations living within developing regions are heavily reliant upon agriculture.³² Furthermore, agriculture accounts for 70% of all water withdrawals globally and for over 90% in the majority of Least Developed Countries (LDCs).³³ Thus, the rising scarcity of water will have a significant impact in countries that economically rely upon agriculture. Moreover, the UNIWEH report states that the inefficient use of water for crop production has resulted in the salinization of 20% of the world's irrigated land area, which has ruined soils and thus reduced

²⁹ Ibid., 4

³⁰ Ibid., 2

³¹ Ibid., 5

³² World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Fund for Agricultural Development, United Nations Children's Fund and the World Food Programme, "The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017: Building resilience for peace and food security," (2017): 44.

³³ Guppy, "Water Crisis Report," 3.

economic activity.³⁴ Reinforcing these arguments is the evidence provided in a 2016 World Bank report, which states that the regions of Central Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East will see their GDP decline 6% by 2050 due to water-related impacts on agriculture, health, and incomes.³⁵ In addition decreasing economic growth, the degradation of arable farmland also threatens food security: water scarcity will limit production and decrease the availability of food.³⁶ This argument is further supported by a 2007 UNDP report, which states that water scarcity will be the major constraint to food production over the next 30 years.³⁷ Finally, water scarcity also increases the likelihood of forced migration and intrastate conflict. Thomas Homer-Dixon illustrates how water scarcity in the Philippines during the 1980s sparked mass internal migration, totalling approximately 4.3 million internal migrants.³⁸ Moreover, Homer-Dixon illustrates how this forced migration produced civil strife and insurgency. Water scarcity deprived Philippine farmers of arable land, which forced the farmers to migrate to remote hilly regions where they sought to sustain their livelihoods. However, these displaced peasants were particularly susceptible to the revolutionary ideology put forward by the communist National Democratic Front, which mobilized them into a violent revolution against the government of the Philippines.³⁹ The armed insurgency is ongoing and has resulted in an estimated 43,000 fatalities.⁴⁰ The analysis of the internal migration crisis in the Philippines during the 1980s demonstrates that water scarcity is a critical factor in instigating migration, which in turn, significantly escalates the intensity of intrastate conflicts. Thus, through these analyses, it is evident that water scarcity has a negative impact on health, poverty, food, migration, and intrastate violence, which demonstrates that the

³⁴ Ibid., 8.

³⁵ World Bank, "High and Dry: Climate Change, Water, and the Economy," 2016: vi

³⁶ Munir A. Hanjra and Ejaz Qureshi, "Global water crisis and future food security in an era of climate change," *Food Security* 35, no. 5 (2010): 365.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Rafael Reuveny, "Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict," *Political Geography* 26, no. 6 (2007): 664.

³⁹ Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999): 153.

⁴⁰ William N. Holden, "The Never Ending War in the Wounded Land: The New People's Army on Samar," *Journal of Geography and Geology* 5, no. 4 (2013): 29.

water deprivation constitutes a significant threat towards human security.

Section IV: A Nuanced Analysis of Water Scarcity's Impact on Traditional and Human Security

Whilst water scarcity poses threats to both traditional and human security, it is necessary to pursue a more nuanced approach and illustrate which theory of security is affected most by water scarcity and, in turn, deserves primary attention. Whilst traditional security focuses solely on anticipating and preparing for potential war, the human security approach places emphasis on development and humanitarian issues. This section will analyse the degree to which water deprivation threatens both traditional and human security and will then examine which security approach is most affected by water scarcity and therefore deserves primary concern in resolving cases of water scarcity.

Although water scarcity poses a threat to traditional security, as the ongoing conflict over the Nile River between Egypt, Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia demonstrates, research has illustrated that water deprivation tends to produce increased interstate cooperation rather than armed conflict. Thomas Homer-Dixon argues that interstate war due to water scarcity is rare.⁴¹ Homer-Dixon describes how, out of 412 international crises which occurred between 1918 and 1994, only seven involved water issues, and none of these seven crises involved significant violence.⁴² Homer-Dixon places significant emphasis on the context of violent conflict, claiming that resource scarcity, such as water, interacts with other political, economic, and social factors to produce migration and violence.⁴³ Water scarcity is thus an indirect source of violence and, in turn, such violence is predominantly internal rather than constituting external resource-based interstate wars. Homer-Dixon admits that water scarcity can produce interstate conflict, but only between riparian states and under a set of very specific conditions.⁴⁴ Homer-Dixon states that

⁴¹ Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, 139.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 141.

⁴³ Jeffrey H. Boutwell, George W. Rathjens and Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Change and Violent Conflict," *Scientific American* 268, no. 2 (February 1993): 45.

⁴⁴ Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, 139.

armed conflict over water between riparian states will only occur in a narrow set of circumstances: firstly, the downstream state must be highly dependent on the water for its national wellbeing, secondly the upstream state must be threatening to significantly reduce the river's flow, thirdly there must be an antagonistic history between the two states, and finally the downstream state must believe that it has greater military strength than its upstream neighbour.⁴⁵ Homer-Dixon concludes that the Nile River conflict is one of the only cases that meets these conditions: Egypt is entirely dependent on the water within the Nile River, has historically antagonistic relations with Sudan and Ethiopia, and possesses a significantly more powerful military than both Ethiopia and Sudan.⁴⁶ Thus, the Nile River constitutes one of the only regions where water scarcity has the potential to produce violent conflict. However, Homer-Dixon maintains that in most circumstances water deprivation will not initiate interstate war by itself.

Furthermore, Shlomi Dinar argues that water scarcity tends to promote interstate cooperation, rather than interstate conflict. Dinar notes that resolving water scarcity necessitates cooperation and joint efforts: Dinar states that while hydro politics has a history involving conflicts, examples of cooperation have been significantly more prevalent.⁴⁷ Dinar points to the existence of hundreds of treaties concerning the use of water for nonnavigational purposes to demonstrate that states typically pursue cooperation over shared water resources rather than initiating interstate wars.⁴⁸ For example, the 1977 *Agreement on sharing of the Ganges waters at Farakka and on augmenting its flows* established an agreement between India and Bangladesh concerning the sharing of the Ganges River.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the *Agreement on joint activities in addressing the Aral Sea⁵⁰ and the zone around the Sea crisis, improving the environment, and ensuring the social and economic development of the Aral Sea*

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Shlomi Dinar, "Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation," *SAIS Review* 22, no. 2 (2002): 236.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ *Agreement on sharing of the Ganges waters at Farakka and on augmenting its flows*, 5 November 1977, 1066 UNTS 16210 (entered into force 5 November 1977).

⁵⁰ The Aral Sea was once the fourth largest lake in the world but has evaporated and currently no longer exists.

region, signed by Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in March 1993, established interstate cooperation to resolve the growing contention over the water within the Aral Sea basin.⁵¹ Thus, conflicts over water often produce peaceful interstate cooperation rather than violent conflict, which demonstrates that water scarcity does not significantly threaten traditional security.

Although water scarcity does not radically threaten traditional security, as the previous paragraphs demonstrate, water deprivation poses significant threats towards human security. Homer-Dixon illustrates how a more typical consequence of water scarcity involves the internal relocation of populations from water scarce regions, typically rural regions, into areas that have greater supplies of water.⁵² However, this internal migration threatens to produce both turmoil between migrants themselves and clashes with local groups. The arrival of environmental refugees poses burdens to the economic and resource base of the receiving region, which, promotes native emigrant contests over resources. Moreover, when water is already scarce in the receiving area the excess demand for water bears the potential of sparking civil violence over the access to water.⁵³ Furthermore, water scarcity also affects other areas of human security such as health, poverty, and food security. Whilst water scarcity tends to produce greater cooperation between states and thus avoids the prospect of interstate war, other issues related to the water deprivation continue to inflict damage upon regions that lack adequate water supplies. Water scarcity significantly impacts the proliferation of poverty: firstly, illnesses related to contaminated water sources prevent people from working, which decreases the ability of these individuals to sustain their livelihoods.⁵⁴ Moreover, in many arid regions populations are forced to travel significant distances to collect water. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that in Africa and Asia, the average distance that women and children walked to collect water was 6 kilometres and that the average weight of a full

⁵¹ *Agreement on joint activities in addressing the Aral Sea and the zone around the Sea crisis, improving the environment, and enduring the social and economic development of the Aral Sea region*, 26 March 1993 (entered into force 26 March 1993).

⁵² Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, 95.

⁵³ Reuveny, "Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict," 659.

⁵⁴ World Bank, "High and Dry: Climate Change, Water, and the Economy," 18.

water container was 40 pounds.⁵⁵ The travel distance associated with the collection of water translates to missed opportunities to work. In 2014, the UN estimated that Sub-Saharan Africa alone loses 40 billion hours per year collecting water, which is equivalent to an entire year's labour by France's labour force.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the lack of water contributes to the desertification of farmland, which renders previously arable land worthless. In Syria, severe water shortages between 2006 and 2011 resulted in the failure of 60% of Syria's crop and the loss of livelihoods for over 800,000 Syrians.⁵⁷ As a result, more than 1.5 million people migrated from rural regions within Syria to cities and camps surrounding the outskirts of major Syrian cities such as Aleppo, Damascus, and Hama.⁵⁸ Thus, although water scarcity does pose a threat towards the possibility of interstate conflict and, as a result, endanger traditional security to an extent, this paper has demonstrated that water scarcity poses a greater threat to the human security components of health, poverty, and food security.

Conclusion

As is demonstrated throughout this essay, water scarcity poses threats towards both traditional and human security. Regarding traditional security, competition over shared water resources bears the potential of producing interstate conflict. Homer-Dixon demonstrates that water scarcity in the Nile River region has the potential to spark violent conflict between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan; thus, certain states such as these, which all face water scarcity, are confronted with both human and traditional security threats in the face of water deprivation. However, whilst water scarcity has the potential to produce interstate conflict, this essay has demonstrated that states are more likely to pursue interstate cooperation in attempts to preserve peace. On the other hand, water scarcity has a significant impact on human security. It

⁵⁵ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, World Health Organization and United Nations Human Settlements Programme. "The Right to Water: Fact Sheet No. 35" (2010): 10.

⁵⁶ J.J. Gongden and Y.N. Lohdip, "Seasonal variation of the surface water quality of two dams in Plateau State, north central Nigeria," in *Water Resources Management VII*, edited by C.A Brebbia (Southampton: WIT Press, 2015): 292.

⁵⁷ Peter H. Gleick, "Water Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria," *American Meteorological Society* 6 (July 2014): 334.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

is evident that water scarcity affects each of the UNDP's seven definitional components of human security: water scarcity contributes to the destruction of arable farmland, which results in decreased food production and the loss of income and thus undermines food, economic, and environmental security. Moreover, the reality that 2.4 billion people currently do not have access to safe water sources, with 1.8 billion people being forced to drink water contaminated by faeces, poses a significant threat towards health security. Water scarcity also produces mass internal migration as rural populations migrate to urban areas, which increases competition over resources within urban areas and increases risks of civil conflict, which demonstrates that water deprivation threatens personal, community, and political security. This means that it is necessary for states to pursue policies that focus on alleviating water scarcity and ensuring access to safe water sources. One means to achieving this is through the construction of desalination plants, which remove salt and minerals from ocean water and produce water that is suitable for human consumption and for irrigation. Cape Town, for example, is currently constructing a desalination plant to combat the city's extreme water scarcity; the completion of the plant is predicted to produce an additional two million litres of fresh water per day, which will help alleviate Cape Town's current water crisis.⁵⁹ However, landlocked states must pursue other options. One such solution is the construction of dams and water management projects. The World Bank, for example, funded the Ougadougou Water Supply Project in Ougadougou, Burkina Faso, which succeeded in significantly increasing city residents' access to clean and safe potable water: between 2001 and 2016 access to drinking water in Ougadougou increased from 54% to 90%, 107,000 of the city's urban poor gained access to improved water services, and 110 local jobs were created.⁶⁰ In short, although water scarcity does pose a risk towards the traditional conception of security regarding interstate war, which must not be ignored, this paper has demonstrated that water deprivation constitutes a more significant

⁵⁹ Jenni Evans, "V&A desalination plant almost ready to roll – City of Cape Town," *News24*, March 1, 2018.

⁶⁰ Burkina Faso: Developing infrastructure and an enabling environment for sustained access to water and sanitation services for the urban poor," *World Bank*, July 28, 2017.

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threat to human security, which necessitates that water scarcity be analysed primarily through the lens of human security.

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Israeli Free Press at Stake?

Analyzing the Political Effects of Israeli Media on the Peace
Process from the Oslo Accords to the Present Day

By

Negin Saadati

In a recent poll done by a leading Israeli publication, the *Israel Hayom*, pollsters collected data from high school students about their political beliefs and opinions. The results are stunning for anyone who follows election data in the West. The results showed that “some 59% identify as right-wing, only 13% identify with the left.” Why is it that this young generation is so strongly right-wing in their opinions? Almost everywhere else in the world voting trends signal that younger voters tend to vote to the left. The children of the second intifada have only witnessed distrust and fighting between Israelis and Palestinians; they have not observed anything signalling an end to the fighting. While these political situations have affected public opinion in Israel, this explanation alone is not substantial enough when considering such a politically militant population. I will argue that Israeli media outlets have played an essential role in ensuring that a right-wing political agenda is set in Israel, to the effect that free press and journalistic integrity are at stake. To justify my argument, I will consider: when publications started becoming more conservative and for what reasons, how political movements influence people and how the press navigates people’s political decision making, and why major Israeli media outlets are partisan and not objective in their reporting. To conclude, I will outline the implications such journalism has had on the lives of Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories, and the issues they will face if there is not a change in political discourse.

Let us consider the history of the region to understand the current political climate in Israel better. Twenty-six years ago, Palestine entered peace talks with Israel facilitated by the Norwegian government under Gro Brundtland; the famous Oslo Accords were the closest Israel and Palestine have come to a peace

agreement. The events of the past twenty-five years have changed the opinions of even the most enthusiastic world leaders. Recently Gro Brundtland noted that “Now 22 years later, the tragedy is what NOT has happened.”¹ The Palestinian state has not been established and instead, Israel has blockaded Gaza and the West Bank. Brundtland added, “There is no solution except a two-state solution in which Israelis realize that Palestinians have a right to their own state.”² The change of discourse causes one to consider why the world has become so pessimistic about the notion of peace in the region. Some argue the long list of political events has caused distrust between the two nations examples such as the second intifada and the continuous settlement construction in the occupied territories makes it harder for these two groups to coexist.

The early 1990s presented a rare opportunity for some form of agreement between Israel and Palestine due to political conditions of the time. The Israeli government who maintained significant power until this point was witnessing the international community condemning some of its military decisions from the first intifada. With the world looking on Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, who was considered somewhat moderate, replaced Yitzhak Shamir as Prime Minister. Rabin provided a cautiously open outlook on the issue of peace in the region. Similarly, the demands of the Palestinian population were represented by Yasser Arafat, who was also open to peace talks at the time for strategic reasons.³ The Oslo Accords signalled the potential for peace in the region in the early 1990s, but by the late 1990s a sense of idealism on the matter was abandoned by most, and the peace process was left in shambles.

In Yoram Meital’s book *Peace in Tatters*, he outlines how the first Oslo Accord resulted in mutual recognition of both parties, this mutual recognition was thought to be the first steps at peace in the region by the mediators of the talks.⁴ In response to the first set of Oslo Accords, members of both the Israeli and Palestinian communities rejected the decisions that come out of the talks.

¹ Ann Wright, “Three World Leaders Speak on the Future of Israel and Palestine,” *HuffPost*, September 26, 2014.

² *Ibid.*

³ Michael Carpenter, “Historical-International,” Lecture, University of Victoria, Victoria BC, May 2018.

⁴ Yoram Meital, *Peace in Tatters: Israel, Palestine and the Middle East* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 32.

According to Meital, Benjamin Netanyahu led the Israeli opposition to these decisions by arguing that the recognition made by Rabin would lead to the division of Jerusalem and would provide Palestinians with the right of return.⁵ For the Palestinians who rejected the Oslo Accords, there was concern because Arafat renounced arm struggle for nothing, the only demand he had was for the PLO to be recognized, and that overall security in the region was to be controlled by Israel. It was during this time that Israel saw a division in public opinion between Rabin's "peace camp" and Netanyahu's "nationalist camp," and tensions began rising within the population. At the same time, segments of the Palestinian population started to feel that the Palestinian authority was a puppet of the Israeli Defense Force, the people in the occupied territories started to become influenced by groups such as Hamas.⁶ After the second round of talks ended and domestic tensions within both Israel and Palestine were heightened came the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995; this event was the climactic moment of the ongoing tensions between Israelis and Palestinians regarding the Oslo Agreements. It is during the time of the Oslo II Accord and Yitzhak Rabin's assassination that I will argue is when Palestinians and Israelis lost faith in a peace process and became more combative in their political stances.

Regarding when publications became noticeably more conservative in their editorials, I will outline that a definite shift started during the mid-1990s as a result of the failed Oslo Agreements. Although Israeli outlets were already biased in their reporting and influenced by government, the rise of Benjamin Netanyahu had a ripple effect on media in Israel and internationally. In the *Maclean's* article, "How the Killing of Yitzhak Rabin changed Israel," Nancy Macdonald considers the political impact exercised by Rabin's murderer, "Amir managed to do precisely what he'd set out to: Through the barrel of his Beretta, he also blew a hole through a peace agreement that could have forever changed Israel."⁷ In another news article, Caroline Frank of the *Jerusalem Post* provides images of extreme right political rallies that were motivated by Benjamin Netanyahu at the time.

⁵ Ibid., 35.

⁶ Ibid., 39.

⁷ Nancy Macdonald, "How the Killing of Yitzhak Rabin Changed Israel," *Maclean's*, November 5, 2015.

Frank notes that Netanyahu encouraged these sentiments and as result publications began printing anti-Oslo II pieces, such as the “Zion Square Flooded with Zion II Protestors” piece by Herb Keinon of the *Jerusalem Post* printed in October 1995. During the Oslo Accords, the country began to see a divide; Netanyahu capitalized on this, and picked up momentum via the press, once he was elected he was able to sustain his popularity through the media. Michal Hamo uses the influence of a favourite Israeli TV Show, *Live Hosted by Dan Shilon*, to contrast media portrayals of political matters in the early 1990s in comparison the late 1990s. Hamo notes that the format of *Live* was created to encourage a free flow of conversation, but in the latter part of the decade, this was replaced with a more reserved form of dialogue. She argues that

In both 1991–92 and 1996–97, *Live's* main goal was to present interesting, entertaining, and positive images of sociable talk. However, what counted as sociable talk changed – from the collective and sometimes conflictual conversational floor of the traditional Jewish-Israeli high-involvement style to a more orderly conversational floor maintaining social harmony through formality and deference to individual speaking rights in keeping with Western ways of speaking.⁸

Hamo provides quantitative data in Figure 1 from her article that displays a decrease in guest-selected topics, and an increase in the amount of time the host spoke for between the 1991-1992 and 1996-1997 seasons. She argues that the constructed conversations that were being had on *Live* in the later part of the decade, “indicate a process of increasing institutionalization.”⁹ This analysis of *Live* provides one with a good understanding of the media to which the general Israeli population is exposed, and the evolution of mass media in Israel through the avenue of television.

We can look to foreign journalism to understand international perspectives on the events in Israel and Palestine during the 1990’s. In her chapter “Journalists Covering Palestine: Old and New Perspective,” Guliana Tiripelli provides a thorough account of how international press covered the Oslo Accords before and after Rabin’s assassination. Tiripelli notes that the press often

⁸ Michal Hamo, “‘The Nation’s Living Room’: Negotiating solidarity on an Israeli talk show in the 1990s,” *Journal of Israeli History* 29, no. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*

positively portrayed the talks in the early days. The press often discussed relationship building, political transformation, and a hope for change.¹⁰ Conversely, after the stalling of the Oslo Accords, journalists began writing about Palestinians in a more sour tone. The positive subject matter from before was replaced with themes such as the rise of Hamas, human rights issues in Palestine, and the influence of neighbouring Arab countries.¹¹ Tiripelli describes how

Journalists' views about the nature of the conflict were often linked to the relations of Israeli and Palestinian societies with other countries and foreign institutions and organisations. The authoritarian nature of Arab communities was a recurrent element in the interview with American-Israeli writer and freelance journalist Judy Lash Balint.¹²

Increased negative press coverage of Palestinian culture and politics in international news provided Netanyahu cover to continue spreading conservative rhetoric in Israel and throughout the rest of the world.

Now that we understand the political culture and media of the 1990s, we must uncover how media is able to influence people to the extent that it has caused Israel youth to become increasingly nationalistic. The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin presented a moment of chaos where both Palestinians and Israelis abandoned any notions of mutual trust, and the increasing settlements in the early 2000s and the second intifada added more fuel to the fire. These moments were embedded in the minds of Israeli and Palestinian youth, providing a strong rationale when understanding why both Israelis and Palestinians have drifted further apart. When tragedies or political events are aired in the media, these events usually evoke an emotional reaction by the viewer, especially if an incident is linked to their identity. If the press reflect on an event in a certain light, it can force a sense of framing on the matter, especially to people who are not aware of the complete facts of an issue.

¹⁰ Giuliana Tiripelli, "Journalists Covering Palestine: Old and New Perspectives," In *Media and Peace in the Middle East* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 108.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹² *Ibid.*, 115.

Yariv Tsfati's "Hostile Media Perceptions, Presumed Media Influence, and Minority Alienation: The Case of Arabs in Israel" demonstrates the sociological and psychological reasonings behind group dynamics and notions of alienation within a population. In his abstract, he outlines that his study has demonstrated, ". . . that, over and above the effects of ideological, social, and demographic variables, hostile media perceptions and the perceived influence of media coverage affected Arabs' perceived image and consequently their social alienation."¹³ Although Tsfati is trying to describe the effects of the media on Arab feelings of alienation, I think the same psychological analysis can be applied to explain why Israelis have become more right wing in and how the media has influenced this. Tsfati outlines that framing, cultivation, and priming are the leading theories in social psychology that analyze perceptions that majority groups have of minorities.¹⁴ Tsfati uses a study by Weimann from 2000 in which he notes that following about cultivation, "According to cultivation theory, heavy television viewers who spend much of their time watching stereotyped and distorted presentations of minorities in media will come to accept such portrayals as reality."¹⁵

In a separate article which examines strategic voting, Jonathan Cohen and Yariv Tsfati consider the effects the media has on elections. The authors argue that today people rely on news to make their political decisions, especially if they are uncertain about their decision. To obtain this information, people turn to media to find out about the intentions of others or strategic voting.¹⁶ When a media outlet has a clear objective, they may place commentators on air to convince the general population that a certain candidate is a better strategic choice, which may affect the result of an election. Through data collection on the 2003 and 2006 Knesset elections, Cohen and Tsfati were able to conclude that,

Three data sets, from two election campaigns, utilizing different measures of strategic voting and conducted at various stages of the campaign, demonstrate that

¹³ Yariv Tsfati, "Hostile Media Perceptions, Presumed Media Influence, and Minority Alienation: The Case of Arabs in Israel," *Journal of Communication* 57, no. 4 (December 2007): 632.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 635.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Jonathon Cohen and Yariv Tsfati, "The Influence of Presumed Media Influence on Strategic Voting," *Communication Research* 36, no. 3 (April 2009): 360.

perceptions of media influence on others are associated with strategic voting. One can interpret this evidence as an indirect media effect on voting decisions.¹⁷

Through the lens of psychology and sociology, we can see shifts in voting habits when they have been susceptible to media, and in particular members of the Israeli population.

If one can understand that Israeli media is influential on the voter base and that Israeli society is increasingly becoming more conservative, one may question why there is a fiercely conservative message that is driven in Israeli media? To examine this question, I will consider the leading Israeli publications, and how they were created. In the first chapter of Don Caspi's *Media Decentralization*, he notes that "The mass media evidently play a crucial role in satisfying Israeli society's extraordinary thirst for information and have thereby gained a prominent position of power within the system."¹⁸ Caspi determines that the independent Hebrew newspapers that are the most influential among the general population are: the *Ha'aretz*, *Yediot Aharonot*, and *Ma'ariv*.¹⁹ In respect to the close relationship these daily newspapers and their editors have to the political establishment Caspi notes that, "In 1954 the Ministry of Justice drafted a 'Press Law' which comprised sections of the Press Ordinance and additional restrictions; for example, journalists were to obtain licenses granted by a council, whose three members were appointed by the government."²⁰ Caspi describes how that in 1981 the Knesset approved the Law for the Protection of Privacy which was argued to safeguard individual privacy; however, newspapers regarded the law as a way to stop the flow of information to the public. The Law for the Protection of Privacy places more restrictions on journalistic freedom for reporters in relation to elected officials, the law limits the what a journalist can publish relating to any person's private affairs.²¹ The most interesting argument that Caspi makes is that even the independent newspapers in Israel are very politically biased. One is example is, *The Ha'aretz's* Zalman Schocken who was once a Knesset member's son Gershon ran and owned *The Ha'aretz* for years, he was able to set the political agenda and tone

¹⁷ Ibid., 372.

¹⁸ Dan Caspi, *Media Decentralization* (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1986), 3.

¹⁹ Ibid., 9.

²⁰ Ibid., 14.

²¹ Ibid.

of the daily newspaper.²² Given the excessive government involvement in the press since the creation of Israel and throughout the twentieth century it is worth evaluating the extent to which the Israeli government has continued these practices.

Since the end of the second intifada there have been no bombings that have taken place by Palestinians in the region and as violence decreases, we continue to witness the Israeli public become harsher in their treatment of Palestinians and less obliged to consider their civil rights. In a *New York Times* article, “How Benjamin Netanyahu is Crushing Israel’s Free Press,” Ruth Margalit analyzes the 2016 Freedom House Report. Margalit identifies that the report “...downgraded Israel’s freedom of the press ranking from ‘free’ to ‘partly free.’ To anyone following Israeli news media over the past year and a half, this was hardly surprising.”²³ The Freedom House Report was especially harsh in its critique of the *Israel Hayom*, and the major publication’s ties to Benjamin Netanyahu. Margalit notes that *Israel Hayom* isn’t conservative or right-wing in the broad sense. Rather, the paper megaphones whatever is in the interest of the prime minister.²⁴ Margalit investigates the issue further than the Freedom House Report and establishes that in his first day of his fourth term, Netanyahu fired the Ministry of Communications director general and replaced the previous director general with his own previous chief of staff.²⁵ Throughout the rest of the article, Margalit illustrates how the current administration uses intimidation tactics to get the press to do what is desired by the government. Illustrating similarities to Donald Trump’s current tactics, Margalit interviewed a journalist who noted, “At some point Netanyahu realized that his battle with the media makes him very popular among his base supporters... By catering to this base, the result has been a phenomenal success for him.”²⁶

With the evidence in place to question the actions of the Israeli government concerning the press, we must consider whether there is a plausible argument that Israel’s free press is at stake. Don Caspi’s explanation of the involvement and influence of the Israeli

²² *Ibid.*, 16.

²³ Ruth Margalit, “How Benjamin Netanyahu is crushing Israel’s free press” *New York Times*, July 30, 2016.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

government in the administration and control of media outlets portrays this notion. The Freedom House ranking of Israel's freedom of press adds to this argument, the US-based non-governmental organisation is a recognized source. In her article, "So what is Free Press?", Onora O'Neill describes that for there to be a healthy environment for a free press in a country, the following five requirements are necessary. First, the population must know who is funding a political publication. Second, audiences need to know if money is being exchanged between the media and informants. Third, there needs to be an open dialogue about the political interests of the owners of media outlets. Fourth, an explicit and systematic approach for the population to correct media is necessary for a democratic society. Finally, there must be substantial evidence of the legitimacy of the information and sources on which the media reports.²⁷ Provided the information that was illuminated by Ruth Margalit, Benjamin Netanyahu's current administration does not meet all, if any, of the requirements that Onora O'Neill has presented.

In recent years Palestinians have been demonised by Israeli press and Israeli politicians; as Palestinians stay relatively peaceful in their pursuit to freedom, the Israeli public has become more conservative in their beliefs and sentiments towards Palestinians. In recent years instead of being challenged by a more centrist campaign, Benjamin Netanyahu has only been tested by an even more right-wing force, The Jewish Home Party. Recently, we have seen the move of Israel's capital to Jerusalem with the support of the Trump administration.

The move to a contentious and profoundly religious site for the major faiths of the world has alienated native Palestinian populations even more in the area. These controversial events are continuously supported by the Israeli public and represented positively in the press. In contrast to the positive portrayals of these decisions in Israel, the burden of these decisions is born by Palestinians who don't have the same resources to present their stories and struggles to a world that has always prioritized the Israeli perspective. As long as the ruling elite in Israel are not disrupted, they will continue to control media and communications to ensure a conservative agenda is set. The media will continue to

²⁷ Onora O'Neill, "So, what is a Free Press?" *The Guardian*, November 23, 2012.

work on behalf of the Israeli government to provide their political messaging to the greater public, because of political arrangements and because of the fear of reprimand. The general population will be influenced to hold onto their economic and political privileges as the media reminds them that their conservative beliefs are the political norm, and not providing Palestinians with respect and civil rights is an acceptable practice. I conclude that a swift change is required to loosen the current tight grip on the media that Israeli conservatives have in the region. A bottom-up approach at journalistic integrity is necessary for Israel, or a long-overdue and substantial transnational effort at adequately condemning the lies and misconceptions that are being spread by the Israeli government through the avenue of “independent journalism.”

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Electoral Reform in New Zealand

Effects on Accountability, Efficacy, and Minority Representation

Paarth Mittal

Introduction

In the 1980s, dissatisfaction in New Zealand with National and Labour, the two major “status quo” governing parties, drove voters to replace their Single-Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system with a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) formula in the referenda of 1992 and 1993¹. Reasons for public dissatisfaction with politics in New Zealand included: unpopular social/economic reforms not mentioned during campaign; decreasing accountability of elected politicians and parties to voters; under-representation of smaller parties and social groups in parliament, and; low government responsiveness². Throughout the essay, varied empirical sources to demonstrate and analyze arguments are used, such as: election and referendum data from New Zealand, surveys about voters’ attitudes, demographic data about representation in the New Zealand House of Representatives, and scholarly articles which explain the political history of New Zealand prior to electoral reform.

To begin, this essay defines and explains the following concepts: liberal democracy, Single-Member Plurality (SMP), Mixed-Member Proportionality (MMP), accountability, and efficacy. Subsequently, the political history of New Zealand, which lead to the transition to MMP, is described. In the following sections, this paper argues that electoral reform has strengthened democracy in New Zealand by facilitating accountability, efficacy, and minority representation. Firstly, accountability has improved because legislative turnover for Members of Parliament (MPs) has increased. Secondly, voters’ perceptions about efficacy have

¹ Janine Hayward, “Anger and Constraint? New Zealand’s Electoral Politics 1992 to 2014,” *Representation* 51, no. 2 (2015): 205-217, doi: 10.1080/00344893.2015.1063536; Stephen Ingle, “Electoral Reform in New Zealand: The Implications for Westminster Systems,” *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 1, no. 4 (1995): 76-92, doi: 10.1080/13572339508420451; Takayuki Sakamoto, “Explaining Electoral Reform: Japan Versus Italy and New Zealand,” *Party Politics* 5, no. 4 (1999): 419-438, doi: 10.1177/1354068899005004001.

² Hayward, “New Zealand’s Electoral Politics 1992 to 2014,” 207.

improved because turnout, alongside trust for governments and political institutions, have increased with electoral reform. Lastly, minority representation has increased because a greater number of female, Maori, Asian, and ‘minor party’ Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected under MMP.

Concepts

This section defines and explains the following concepts: liberal democracy, Single-Member Plurality (SMP), Mixed-Member Proportionality (MMP), accountability, and efficacy. New Zealand is considered a liberal democracy because its uncodified Constitution gives all individuals fundamental civil and political rights (e.g. minority rights, freedom of expression); holds free, fair and regular elections with universal suffrage; and ensures the independence of the judiciary³. Until 1996, the liberal democratic state of New Zealand used the SMP electoral system (also known as ‘First-Past-The-Post’ or ‘FPTP’)⁴. In the SMP system, voters have one representative for their electoral district, and the ‘winner’ is the candidate receiving the highest number of votes (plurality) but not necessarily 50 percent plus one⁵.

However, in the referenda of 1992 and 1993, New Zealanders voted to replace SMP with MMP, an electoral system in which there are two votes: one for a constituency representative, determined through SMP; and one for a preferred party, calculated through Proportional Representation or ‘PR’. The ‘party vote’ determines the total number of seats each party receives on a nationwide basis in proportion to votes won⁶. It also determines the number of ‘top-up’ or ‘additional’ MPs needed for each party to make its seat share proportional to its national vote share. Those MPs are selected by their position on a ranked list created by party

³ New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, New Zealand House of Representatives, 42nd Parliament. (1990). Retrieved from:

<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0109/latest/whole.html#DLM224794>

⁴ Jack Vowles, “Electoral System Change, Generations, Competitiveness and Turnout in New Zealand, 1963–2005,” *British Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 4 (2010): 875, doi:10.1017/S0007123409990342.

⁵ Rod Hague, Martin Harrop, & John McCormick. *Political Science: A Comparative Introduction*, 8th ed. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillian, 2016), 271.

⁶ Hayward, “New Zealand’s Electoral Politics 1992 to 2014,” 208; Vowles, “Generations, Competitiveness and Turnout,” 876.

executives, which is also known as a “Closed List”⁷. In Mark Philp’s article “Delimiting Democratic Accountability”, American political scientist James Fearon defines accountability as the process involving representatives acting on behalf of citizens, and citizens being empowered by the “formal institutional or... informal rules” to “sanction or reward”⁸ representatives for their performance or actions. This paper particularly focuses on vertical accountability, which involves citizens being able to reward or punish elected officials for their actions during regularly-held elections⁹. Another concept to consider in the discussion around electoral reform is ‘efficacy’, which can be defined as the idea or feeling among citizens that they are capable of engaging in politics and that they can yield preferred outcomes¹⁰. Other scholars, such as Jeffrey Karp and Susan Banducci, define efficacy as “the feeling that one’s vote is potentially decisive.”¹¹

Political History of New Zealand (1978-1996)

In the 1980s, electoral reform entered the political agenda when the New Zealand Labour Party had announced that it would create a Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, when elected to office¹². Labour made that promise as a response to the fact that it lost both the 1978 and 1981 New Zealand general elections despite receiving higher vote shares than its right-of-centre opponent, the National Party¹³. The Commission commenced its report in 1986 and unanimously recommended that New Zealand adopt an MMP system for electing governments¹⁴. However, the under-representation and disproportionality of SMP were not the main ‘agitators’ that had motivated the public to support the transition to a different system. Rather, declining popularity of the two major

⁷ Hayward, “New Zealand’s Electoral Politics 1992 to 2014,” 208.

⁸ Mark Philp, “Delimiting Democratic Accountability,” *Political Studies* 57, no. 1 (2009): 29, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00720.x.

⁹ Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Delegative democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (1994): 61, doi:10.1353/jod.1994.0010.

¹⁰ Willy Jou, “Public Opinion and Electoral System Preference in New Zealand: A Longitudinal Study,” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 51, no. 4 (2013): 529, doi:10.1080/14662043.2013.841003

¹¹ Jeffrey A. Karp & Susan A. Banducci, “Political Efficacy and Participation in Twenty-Seven Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political Behaviour,” *British Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 2 (2008): 311, doi: 10.1017/S0007123408000161.

¹² Ingle, “The Implications for Westminster Systems,” 77-78.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid, 78.

parties — triggered by ‘radical’ economic liberalization, the deregulation of markets and privatization of state services (such as health care), initiated by Labour ministries (1984-1987, and 1987-1990) while sustained by the National Party — played a significant role in increasing the public demand for electoral reform¹⁵. This was problematically enacted by both parties with little voter participation. Such can be witnessed by the lack of vocalization of its economic liberalization and state-restructuring policies in the party’s 1984 and 1987 election manifestos¹⁶. Further, the conservative, stability-oriented National party did not pursue a “consolidation programme” — which was vocalized in its 1990 election manifesto — during its 1990-1993 majority government¹⁷. Rather, as Stephen Ingle points out, “National introduced drastic cuts to welfare, the means testing of health, higher education and... the continued means testing of superannuation”¹⁸. Hence, it could be argued that broken electoral promises and arrogance from single-party majority governments were key drivers behind New Zealanders pushing for electoral reform.

As a response to the unaccountability and unpopular policies of National and Labour majority governments, voters ‘punished’ those two parties in three powerful ways. Firstly, voters cancelled their memberships in the major parties. Kiwi scholars Richard Mulgan and Barry Gustafson estimate that party membership declined by 80 percent or higher¹⁹. Secondly, a greater portion of New Zealanders voted for smaller parties, such as the New Zealand First and left-wing Alliance parties²⁰. This is demonstrated by 1990-1993 electoral data, which shows that that small parties’ combined vote share increased from 17.7 percent to 30 percent²¹. Such data is relevant because it shows that voter preference for third parties had increased on the same year as the 1993 referendum on electoral reform. Thirdly, the 1992 and 1993 referenda brought in a higher voter preference towards electoral

¹⁵ Ibid; Sakamoto, “Japan Versus Italy and New Zealand,” 423.

¹⁶ Hayward, “New Zealand’s Electoral Politics 1992 to 2014,” 207.

¹⁷ Ingle, “The Implications for Westminster Systems,” 79.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Cited in Ingle, “The Implications for Westminster Systems,” 80.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Susan Banducci, Todd Donovan, & Jeffrey Karp, “Proportional Representation and Attitudes about Politics: Results from New Zealand.” *Electoral Studies* 18, no. 4 (1999): 537. doi:10.1016/S0261-3794(99)00019-0

reform²². Though both Labour and National were opposed to reform, National felt it necessary to hold a referendum because following this promise was necessary to maintain its legitimacy — as it broke several electoral pledges — and it saw Labour’s abandonment of this pledge as an advantageous opportunity to gain support²³. The anti-reformers focused their campaign efforts on attacking MMP, and less on defending SMP, while the pro-MMP side successfully mobilized public anger about decreasing accountability of government, parties and politicians to voters²⁴. Hence, in the indicative and non-binding 1992 referendum, 55 percent of the electorate voted, with 85 percent voting for reform in the first question, and 70 percent voting for MMP in the second question²⁵. However, in the 1993 referendum, which was binding and concurrent with 1993 general election, 85 percent of the electorate voted. This referendum showed an electorate response of 54 percent voting in favour of MMP²⁶. Public demand for a third referendum was low, as voter dissatisfaction about the state of New Zealand governance and politics had declined following 1996²⁷. However, the National party followed through with its electoral promise of conducting another referendum on electoral reform in 2011, which would again be concurrent with that General Election²⁸. When asked to choose between MMP or changing to an alternative electoral system, such as FPTP or Single Transferable Vote, 56 percent of all electors voted to keep MMP²⁹.

Following 1996, New Zealand has witnessed a strengthening of its democracy because MMP promotes accountability, efficacy, and representation of minorities and smaller political parties.

Legislative Accountability- Turnover in MMP

Firstly, MMP facilitates accountability because legislative turnover for MPs has increased in New Zealand. However,

²² Ingle, “The Implications for Westminster Systems,” 76-92.

²³ Ibid, 80.

²⁴ Hayward, “New Zealand’s Electoral Politics 1992 to 2014,” 207; Ingle, “The Implications for Westminster Systems,” 81-82.

²⁵ Hayward, “New Zealand’s Electoral Politics 1992 to 2014,” 208; Ingle, “The Implications for Westminster Systems,” 80-81.

²⁶ Hayward, “New Zealand’s Electoral Politics 1992 to 2014,” 208.

²⁷ Ibid, 211.

²⁸ Ibid, 209-210.

²⁹ Ibid, 210.

opponents of PR argue that electorate MPs provide direct accountability because they support and respond more to the “median” and “unorganised” voters and less to “unpopular interest groups”³⁰. PR opponents also argue that party-list MPs are primarily accountable to party officials and special interest lobbyists; hence, they are supposedly less accountable to voters as they simply need to be loyal to their party to retain their seats³¹. Conversely, proponents of the “responsible party government” theory argue that parties use their lists to improve accountability by rewarding competence and broadening “electoral appeal”, such as by placing women and special interest candidates higher, and also by punishing members for misbehaviour, such as with lower placements³². Based on empirical data from the New Zealand (NZ) Electoral Commission regarding the 1946-2014 elections, the total turnover of MPs has increased from 16.5 percent in 1993 (the last SMP election), to 32.3 percent in 1996 (as cited in Vowles 2015, 286). Further, from 1996 onwards, the turnover successfully remained in the 19-30 percent range³³. However, data from pre-1993 elections indicates that under SMP, Member of Parliament (MP) turnover typically occurred within the 10-25 percent range, for example at 15 percent in 1996 and 25 percent in 1984³⁴. The higher legislative turnover levels under MMP demonstrate that vertical accountability has not declined in New Zealand while under the system. This is because while a considerable portion — roughly 40 percent — of MPs are chosen through party-lists, they can still be removed from office.

Moreover, vertical accountability has improved because when a larger vote shift between parties occurs, it corresponds to larger changes in seat counts (known as ‘high vote volatility’). This is in opposite to SMP, where small vote shifts between parties easily correspond to large changes in seat counts (known as ‘low vote volatility’). For example, the average vote volatility is 16 percent with SMP, whereas it approximately 23.8 percent under

³⁰ Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, “Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented,” *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 1 (1986): 89-106 (URL in references); Jack Vowles, “Legislative Accountability in a Mixed-Member System.” *Australian Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2 (2015): 279-280, doi:10.1080/10361146.2015.1009417.

³¹ Vowles, “Legislative Accountability,” 280.

³² Vowles, “Legislative Accountability,” 281-282.

³³ *Ibid.*, 286.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

MMP³⁵. Therefore, vertical accountability in New Zealand has been enhanced through the stronger ability of voters to reward or punish elected legislators is stronger. Under MMP, if fewer New Zealanders vote for certain parties, those parties receive a lower number of seats. The extent to which small vote shifts in SMP districts contribute to large seat shifts (“manufactured majority”) in Parliament has also been reduced³⁶. This improves accountability because it reduces the possibility of a single party receiving a majority government without 50 percent plus one of the popular vote.

A related aspect of accountability that is enhanced by greater turnover in New Zealand is the higher rates in MP electoral defeat. Under SMP, MP turnover, as a result of defeat, typically occurred at a 2-15 percent range. For example, defeat-induced turnover was 2.5 percent in 1963 and 1966, 8.8 percent in 1946 and 1949, and 10.3 percent in 1978³⁷. Conversely, while with exceptions, under MMP, the percentage of MPs defeated lies in the 15-20 percent range, such as with the rates of 18.2 percent in 1996 and 16.5 percent in 2008³⁸. According to data from the NZ Electoral Commission, the percentage of list MPs defeated increased from 16.4 percent in 1999 to 39.2 percent in 2005³⁹. Conversely, the defeat percentage of electorate MPs has risen and fallen under MMP elections, being at 20 percent in 1999, 6 percent in 2002, 18.8 percent in 2005, and 5.8 percent in 2011⁴⁰. Such data discredits the anti-PR argument that list MPs are ‘unaccountable’, as it displays that the portion of list MPs defeated is comparatively higher than that of defeated electorate MPs. As Jack Vowles states, “[t]hrough parties, voters affect the electoral chances of list MPs, and list MPs are more likely to suffer defeat if their party is in retreat”⁴¹. Simply put, New Zealanders can hold legislators accountable by rewarding or punishing parties on either vote for the actions of their members.

Similarly, there are several ‘intra-party’ (within party) mechanisms that are used to ensure that legislators are held

³⁵ Ibid, 287.

³⁶ Vowles, “Legislative Accountability,” 288.

³⁷ Ibid, 286.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid, 287.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid, 293-294.

accountable. A notable example would be the MMP party-list selection process. Under MMP, parties have incentives to represent the broader electorate by attracting a variety of ‘median’, minority and ‘special interest’ voters, and placing them higher on their lists⁴². One example of this is when female and ethnic minority candidates have a higher possibility of being elected as list MPs, compared to male and European ethnicity candidates⁴³. This can potentially incentivize parties to respond to and accommodate a wider range of voters, as opposed to merely responding to male voters in the dominant ethnicity. Another notable example would be that parties can punish their members for misbehaviour, disloyalty or corruption. Though a minor factor behind legislative turnover in New Zealand, parties do this by either calling on that member to resign and/or letting them remain in Parliament without re-selecting them for electorate and/or list candidacy⁴⁴. To provide depth, Jack Vowles compares 10 cases of ‘misbehaving’ MPs from 2007-2014⁴⁵. Of the total, eight misbehaved and the other two were either ‘disloyal’ or disagreed with party policy. Among all eight that misbehaved, eight were List MPs (such as Darren Hughes of the Labour Party, in 2011) and two were electorate MPs. Out of the total 10 MPs, five resigned, four remained until the next election, and one was not re-selected⁴⁶. Although 10 cases do not represent the whole picture, they suggest the following: it is difficult for parties to literally ‘throw out’ MPs from parliament, misbehaving list MPs are removed more easily in the aftermath, and ousted list MPs have difficulty finding legitimacy (as independents do not easily gather support).⁴⁷

Efficacy- Voters’ Attitudes and Trust for Political Institutions

Secondly, MMP has enhanced efficacy because voters’ attitudes about government and trust for political institutions, alongside turnout, have greatly improved. Based on data from the New Zealand (NZ) Election Study (1990, 1993, 1996), attitudes

⁴² Vowles, “Legislative Accountability,” 281.

⁴³ Fiona Barker and Hilde Coffé, “Representing Diversity in Mixed Electoral Systems: The Case of New Zealand,” *Parliamentary Affairs* 71, no. 3 (2018): 603-632, doi: 10.1093/pa/gsx073.

⁴⁴ Vowles, “Legislative Accountability,” 292-293.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Vowles, “Legislative Accountability,” 292-293.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 293.

about voting between 1990 and 1996 changed in the following ways: the number of responses agreeing with “voting is important even if it makes no difference to who wins” increased from 75.6 percent to 81.4 percent; belief in citizens’ duty to vote increased from 70.5 percent to 83.9 percent; and the percentage of those who “considered not voting” decreased from 14.2 percent to 7.6 percent⁴⁸. Additionally, data from the NZ Election Study highlighted that voters’ trust in government from 1993 to 1996 changed in the following ways: the proportion who agreed that “government is run by a few big interests” decreased from 68 percent to 58 percent, those agreeing that “most MPs are out of touch with the rest of the country” decreased from 64 percent to 56 percent, and those agreeing that “politicians and public servants do not care about what people think” declined from 68 percent to 60 percent⁴⁹. Similarly, that same study indicates the following developments in voters’ attitudes about efficacy from 1993 to 1996: the respondents agreeing that “[their] vote really counts” increased from 80 percent to 92 percent, and those agreeing that “they don’t have any say in what government does” decreased from 64 percent to 60 percent⁵⁰. Demonstrated by this data is that New Zealand citizens have gained a more positive view of their government and political processes. They feel more competent as citizens because they believe that the new system gives them a stronger voice in their state’s decision-making. More importantly, it shows that efficacy has improved because a greater portion of New Zealanders feel that their vote makes a difference to the overall results and that their concerns and interests carry weight in politics.

Moreover, another plausible factor behind greater efficacy could be that political minorities excluded under the previous SMP electoral system now feel like they have stronger voice under MMP. Data from the NZ Election Study regarding 1993-1996 elections indicates that minor party supporters have developed higher perceptions about democracy, when they transitioned to

⁴⁸ As cited in Jeffrey Karp & Susan Banducci, “The Impact of Proportional Representation on Turnout: Evidence from New Zealand.” *Australian Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 3 (1999): 368, doi: 10.1023/A:1011826902795

⁴⁹ As cited in Banducci et al., “Proportional Representation and Attitudes about Politics,” 542.

⁵⁰ Banducci et al., “Proportional Representation and Attitudes about Politics,” 542.

MMP⁵¹. For instance, small party voters' perceptions about voting improved in the following ways: the portion of respondents who believe that 'their vote counts' increased from 77 percent to 91.6 percent, and those agreeing that 'voting is important' increased from 88 percent to 90.9 percent. Additionally, their attitudes about political institutions developed as such: the respondents agreeing that "MPs are out of touch" decreased from 72.2 percent to 65 percent; and those expressing that "politicians do not care" declined from 76.8 percent to 70.4 percent⁵². Further evidence for previously excluded groups gaining efficacy would be that 91 percent of left-leaning citizens who did not vote under SMP, alongside 98 percent of left-leaning citizens who did vote under SMP, indicated that they were more likely to vote under PR⁵³. This also applies to post-1996 elections (1999, 2002, 2005, 2008), with the following groups expressing majority (in this case, more than 60 percent) support for MMP over FPTP: small party supporters, left-leaning ideologues, people most satisfied with complexity of politics, and those with high external efficacy⁵⁴.

Furthermore, New Zealand has witnessed an increase in turnout since it adopted MMP in 1996. For example, in 1993, 78 percent of the eligible electorate (85 percent of enrolled electorate) voted, compared to 81 percent of eligible electorate (88 percent of enrolled electorate) in 1996⁵⁵. However, since the transition, voter turnouts have been volatile with significant declines. In New Zealand, turnout decreased to 71.7 percent in 2002, slightly recovered to 76.1 percent in 2005, and fell to 74.7 percent in 2008⁵⁶. Nevertheless, this can be attributed to the fact that liberal-democratic OECD countries are experiencing a downward trend in voter turnout⁵⁷. Furthermore, turnout decreases as electorate boundaries get redistributed, younger generations are less likely to vote than older generations, and voters have less incentive to vote in uncompetitive SMP electorates⁵⁸. However, as Vowles points

⁵¹ As cited in Banducci et al., "Proportional Representation and Attitudes about Politics," 545.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Jou, "Public Opinion and Electoral System Preference in New Zealand," 524-548; Karp & Banducci, "Impact of Proportional Representation on Turnout," 374-375.

⁵⁴ Jou, "Public Opinion and Electoral System Preference in New Zealand," 538.

⁵⁵ Karp & Banducci, "Impact of Proportional Representation on Turnout," 368; Vowles, "Generations, Competitiveness, and Turnout," 879.

⁵⁶ Vowles, "Generations, Competitiveness, and Turnout," 879.

⁵⁷ Karp & Banducci, "Impact of Proportional Representation on Turnout," 363-377.

⁵⁸ Vowles, "Generations, Competitiveness, and Turnout," 875-895.

out, “[n]ational competition for the... party vote has partly offset this disincentive to vote in uncompetitive electorates”⁵⁹. In summary, people may be more motivated to vote on the national list (PR) vote under MMP, as it is more competitive and provides greater choice between parties. One possible reason for this is that as MMP increases national competition between parties, local party associations mobilize voters less because constituency candidates have less incentive — and incur greater costs — when trying to ‘get out the vote’⁶⁰. Another reason for this is that as the district magnitude — or number of representatives elected for one area — increases, there is a lower likelihood of voters calculating whether their vote will ‘matter’ in seat-allocation⁶¹. This links back to evidence showing that voters have become favourable towards democratic institutions since electoral reform, because they believe that their votes ‘count’ under MMP.⁶²

Representation of Women, Minorities, & Small Parties

Lastly, MMP has strengthened democracy because women, ethnic minorities, and supporters of small parties have gained more representation in the New Zealand House of Representatives. Currently, the New Zealand parliament has 121 seats in total; out of those, there are 71 electorate seats and 50 list seats⁶³. The 50 list seats exist not only to serve the function of proportionality, but they also have a vital role of ensuring that the social diversity of New Zealand is reflected in parliament. Based on data from the NZ Electoral Commission, the total parliamentary representation of women increased from 21.2 percent in 1993 to 33.1 percent in 2005; in 2005, which can be attributed to the 46.2 percent of list MPs consisting of women candidates⁶⁴. Additionally, MMP has enhanced the Indigenous Maori representation. Although a fixed number of Maori seats (five at the time but varies by Maori

⁵⁹ Ibid, 892.

⁶⁰ Vowles, “Generations, Competitiveness, and Turnout,” 877.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Banducci et al., “Proportional Representation and Attitudes about Politics,” 533-555.

⁶³ Vowles, “Legislative Accountability,” 282.

⁶⁴ Stephen Church & Elizabeth McLeay, “The Parliamentary Review of MMP in New Zealand,” *Representation* 39, no. 4 (2003): 246, doi:10.1080/00344890308523231; Jack Vowles, Susan Banducci & Jeffrey Karp, “Forecasting and Evaluating the Consequences of Electoral Change in New Zealand.” *Acta Politica* 41, no. 3 (2006): 274, doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500159.

enrollment) were set aside under SMP, that has increased. For instance, Maori representation rose from a 5-7 percent range in SMP elections, to a 13-17 percent range in MMP elections (1996-present). Further, since adopting MMP, Maori people typically comprise 13-20 percent of all list MPs⁶⁵. Meanwhile, New Zealanders of Pasifika and Asian heritage have also seen an increase in representation. Pasifika representation had remained stagnant at 2.5 percent between 1993-2005 and increased to 6.6 percent in 2014; and the proportion of Asian MPs increased from 0 percent (pre-MMP adoption) to 4.1 percent in 2014⁶⁶. These rises in representation display how MMP has strengthened democracy in New Zealand as social groups that were underrepresented under SMP were able to gain a significant rise in parliamentary representation after the transition. Moreover, the high proportions of minority MPs occupying list seats displays that parties take advantage of the centralized nomination processes of lists to ensure that candidates not gaining nomination at electorate level, such as Maori and female candidates, have the ability to be selected⁶⁷. Additionally, these factors have positive implications for accountability because they can possibly make parties more responsive to the interests and needs of those in minority groups. For example, various scholars argue that left-wing parties, such as the Greens, have higher representation of ethnic minorities — compared to right-wing parties — because they are able to attract more ethnic minority voters by pursuing ‘pro-immigration’, inequality-focused, and ‘minority-friendly’ policies⁶⁸. When minority groups have more political representation, it reduces the possibility of what Thomas Jefferson describes as “tyranny of the majority”, whereby 51 percent of the population can trump the rights the minority, and it facilitates protection to those marginalized groups through legislative representation.⁶⁹

In addition to heightened minority representation, MMP has strengthened democracy in New Zealand through minor parties and their supporters gaining more electoral representation. Prior to

⁶⁵ Barker & Coffé, "Representing Diversity in Mixed Electoral Systems," 612; Vowles et al., "Consequences of Electoral Change in New Zealand," 274.

⁶⁶ Barker & Coffé, "Representing Diversity in Mixed Electoral Systems," 612; Vowles et al., "Consequences of Electoral Change in New Zealand," 274.

⁶⁷ Barker & Coffé, "Representing Diversity in Mixed Electoral Systems," 603.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 605.

⁶⁹ Ralph Summy, "Comparative Political Biography: Jayaprakash Narayan and Thomas Jefferson." *Biography* 6, no. 3 (1983): 229, doi:10.1353/bio.2010.0705.

the implementation of MMP, the New Zealand political landscape was dominated by the two centre-right National and centre-left Labour parties. In the last SMP election (1993), the two strongest minor parties, namely the centrist New Zealand First and left-of-centre Alliance, received 8.4 percent and 18.2 percent of the votes, however, only received 2 percent of the seats⁷⁰. Because MMP ensures that parties' seat shares closely reflect their vote shares, New Zealand has witnessed an increase in the number of parties since adoption. In the first MMP election (1996), all minor parties (e.g. NZ First, Alliance, right-wing ACT) combined accounted for 38 percent of the party vote and 32 percent of all seats. In that election, National won 34 percent of the party vote and formed a coalition government with NZ First⁷¹. In 1999, support for NZ First dropped, causing the centre-right majority to be lost and enabling Labour and Alliance to form a centre-left coalition government with narrow (two-seat majority) support from the newly-emerged left-wing environmentalist Green Party - the Greens won six list seats and one electorate seat⁷². A recent example would be the 2017 election, where Labour and NZ First formed a minority coalition government (55 seats out of 120) which relies on support through a "confidence and supply" agreement with eight Green MPs, and National leader Bill English (receiving 44 percent of the vote and 56 seats) accepted defeat on the basis that his party will become the "largest opposition" of New Zealand⁷³. The examples from 1996 and onwards are relevant because they show that as New Zealand reformed its electoral system, its political landscape has also transformed. This is because as smaller parties receive more votes—and as a result, more seats—they hold the 'balance of power' and decides which party or parties govern the state.

By increasing the number of parties in parliament, democracy is strengthened not simply because a wider range of

⁷⁰ Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, "The New Zealand Electoral Referendum and General Election of 1993," *Electoral Studies* 13, no. 3 (1994): 247, doi:10.1016/0261-3794(94)90022-1.

⁷¹ Banducci et al., "Proportional Representation and Attitudes about Politics," 538.

⁷² Jeffrey Karp and Shaun Bowler, "Coalition Government and Satisfaction with Democracy: An Analysis of New Zealand's Reaction to Proportional Representation," *European Journal of Political Research* 40, no. 1 (2001): 71, doi:10.1023/A:1011826902795.

⁷³ Claire Phipps, "Jacinda Ardern is next Prime Minister of New Zealand, Winston Peters confirms – as it happened," *The Guardian*, October 19, 2017. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com>.

perspectives is represented. Rather, because it also enhances electoral accountability, efficacy, and minority representation. Scholars such as Geoffrey Palmer have pointed out that before MMP was implemented, the powers of the New Zealand government were “unbridled” through the simultaneous effects of a non-existent ‘fundamental law’, a unicameral parliamentary system, lack of limits on the powers of its Head of Government, and an SMP which enabled single-party majority governments with less than 50 percent of votes to hold office and control decision-making⁷⁴. MMP can resolve that issue through its mechanical characteristics which favour multi-party coalitions — or ‘confidence-and-supply’ agreements — whereby smaller parties hold the larger governing party accountable, rather than single-party domination. Efficacy is enhanced because supporters of minor and left-leaning parties have gained confidence in their vote being effective, thereby giving them more of an incentive to vote under MMP⁷⁵. A strong multi-party system can also improve minority representation because certain parties, especially those on the left, such as the Green party, who emphasize equality and pursue pro-minority/immigrant policies, tend to have more female and minority MPs compared to right-wing parties.⁷⁶

Conclusion

In conclusion, electoral reform has strengthened democracy in New Zealand because accountability, efficacy and representation of women and minorities have improved. Firstly, MMP has enhanced accountability in New Zealand through legislative turnover being increased significantly under the system, especially for list MPs, compared to when under SMP. This can be evidenced by the fact that vote volatility is higher, as the influence of small vote shifts in a select few SMP electoral districts has been reduced. Greater choice of political parties enhanced by the characteristics of the MMP system is another factor behind higher

⁷⁴ Geoffrey Palmer, *Unbridled Power? An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution and Government*. (Wellington: Oxford University Press, 1979), Retrieved from Social Science Research Network website: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2314691>; Vowles et al., “Consequences of Electoral Change in New Zealand,” 268.

⁷⁵ Banducci et al., “Proportional Representation and Attitudes about Politics,” 533-555; Jou, “Public Opinion and Electoral System Preference in New Zealand,” 524-548.

⁷⁶ Barker & Coffé, “Representing Diversity in Mixed Electoral Systems,” 605.

vote volatility. Moreover, MMP has improved efficacy as satisfaction with a new electoral formula has shown to have improved voters' trust in government and politics, as well as encouraged more citizens, such as small party supporters and leftists, to feel like their vote matters and that their concerns hold importance in politics. Lastly, MMP has increased the representation of women and social minorities in parliament by political parties using their 'closed' party lists to ensure that candidates from previously underrepresented groups, such as women and the Indigenous Maori, are selected. Supporters of minor parties have also gained stronger representation in the political landscape. In summary, implementing electoral reform has the potential to strengthen democracy in liberal-democratic states because a larger amount of voters are represented in the political system and the powers of government are potentially subject to greater 'checks and balances'.

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