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Power, Gender, Value

TABLE OF CONTENTS / TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Vol. VII no. 7 July / juillet 1987

R.A. Duff, <i>Trials and Punishments</i> (Margaret R. Holmgren)	263
Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds., <i>Foundations of Social Choice Theory</i> (Reed Richter)	265
John Earman, <i>A Primer on Determinism</i> (William R. Shea)	268
David Gauthier, <i>Morals By Agreement</i> (Jan Narveson)	269
Lawrence Haworth, <i>Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics</i> (John Heil)	272
William Kluback, <i>The Idea of Humanity: Hermann Cohen's Legacy to Philosophy and Theology</i> (Martin D. Yaffe)	275
Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., <i>A Companion to Martin Heidegger's Being and Time</i> (Brett Jackson)	277
Gary Saul Morson, ed., <i>Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on His Work</i> (R.B. Rutland)	279
Gerald F. Myers, <i>William James: His Life and Thought</i> (William James Earle)	282
Terence Qualter, <i>Conflicting Political Ideas in Liberal Democracies</i> (Wendy Donner)	284
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., <i>Essays on Descartes' Meditations</i> (Robert McRae)	286
Michael Ruse, <i>Taking Darwin Seriously</i> (John Collier)	289
John Searle, <i>Minds, Brains, and Science</i> (Keith Gunderson)	292
Victor J. Seidler, <i>Kant, Respect and Injustice: The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory</i> (Carol A. Van Kirk)	294
K.S. Shrader-Frechette, <i>Risk Analysis and Scientific Method: Methodological and Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal Hazards</i> (Albert Flores)	296
W.A. Suchting, <i>Marx and Philosophy</i> (David Baxter)	298
Edith Wyschogrod, <i>Spirit in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger and Man-Made Mass Death</i> (Robert Burch)	301

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R.A. DUFF. *Trials and Punishments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986. Pp. ix + 320. US\$32.50. ISBN 0-521-30818-6.

Duff recognizes three models for the justification of punishment: (i) a purely consequentialist model, (ii) a consequentialism with side-constraints, and (iii) a retributive model, in which punishment is justified as an intrinsically appropriate response to past wrong-doing, apart from any further end. His aim is to develop a fourth model, in which punishment is justified as a logically appropriate means to a nonconsequentialist end: the moral reform of the criminal. He also argues that his analysis of punishment is continuous with an adequate understanding of the criminal law and criminal trial. The model is presented throughout as a moral ideal — an account of what criminal law, trial, and punishment would be if they were to embody a full-fledged respect for individual autonomy.

The book begins with a discussion of moral criticism and blame. Although we could view moral blame from a consequentialist perspective, as a contingently efficient method of modifying undesirable behavior, respect for autonomy demands that we regard it instead as a process of rational communication with the wrong-doer. Rather than manipulating her into changing her behavior, we should express our regard for the values she has violated and offer her reasons for accepting those values. We should also help her to understand and repent her past wrong-doing. The repentant wrong-doer may wish to undertake a penance to assist and express her understanding of what she has done, and to restore her relationships with the members of her community, whose values she has flouted.

Duff's model of the criminal trial and punishment is developed as the formal analogue of the process of moral criticism, blame, and penance. He begins with an insightful analysis of the concept of law. Law differs from mere tyranny in that law involves claims of obligation and authority, which in turn must be justified to those who are subject to them. Thus law addresses the citizen as 'a rational and responsible agent' and 'seeks her voluntary acceptance of and obedience to requirements which can themselves be justified to her' (97). He then shows that the criminal trial can best be understood in light

of these objectives. It is a rational dialogue with the criminal designed both to reach an accurate judgment on her past action and to communicate and justify that judgment to her.

A verdict of 'guilty' at the trial serves to condemn the criminal's action and constitutes a symbolic punishment. Punishment involving hard treatment may also be justified as a compulsory penance. Whereas any attempt to use punishment as a deterrent will involve manipulation rather than rational communication designed to justify the dictates of the law, punishment as compulsory penance is fully continuous with the proper aims of the criminal law and trial. It serves 'to make our communicative endeavour more effective, forcing the criminal's attention onto the implications of his crime ...' (261). Further, 'the pain or suffering which begins as a coercive attempt to attract and direct the unrepentant criminal's attention should become the penitential pain which the repentant criminal accepts for himself' (261). Although this sort of punishment is coercive, it does not require us to abandon respect for the criminal's autonomy. We are simply forcing him to do something he is obligated to do: to consider and repent his past wrong. Throughout the process, we respond to him as a rational moral agent.

Although Duff exhibits a good deal of sophistication both in arguing for his own position and in criticizing the alternatives he has recognized, further discussion would be required to make his justification of punishment persuasive. On Duff's model, the purpose of punishment is to express to the criminal our condemnation of her act and to facilitate her moral reform. Thus his position appears to be paternalistic: we punish the criminal essentially for the sake of her own moral well-being. It is true that the criminal ought to consider and repent her past wrong-doing, but it is far from clear that we have any business forcing her to do so for her own good. More specifically, it is not clear that this type of 'concern' for the criminal is compatible with a full-fledged *respect* for her as an autonomous agent in charge of her own personal development.

Duff isolates the central question here himself: 'by what right does the state take this kind of intrusive interest in the moral well-being of its citizens?' (269) He points out that the state must enforce some moral demands and that the demands embodied in the criminal law are minimal. Even if the demands of the criminal law are minimal, however, the state's coercive concern with the criminal's internal moral response to her past wrong-doing is not. He also points out that although we force the criminal to consider our reasons for condemning her conduct, she is at liberty to dissent from our judgment. We do not coerce her will. But this response fails to address the central worry: by what right do we impose hard treatment on the criminal in our attempt to bring her to accept (or reject) our judgment? Finally, Duff argues that because the dictates of the criminal law are essential to the survival and security of the community, the state must make every permissible effort to ensure that they are accepted. But he then insists that punishment must not be viewed as a means of protecting citizens from criminal harm, subject to the side-constraint that we respect the criminal's autonomy. I find his reasoning unclear at this cru-

cial juncture. Do we force the criminal to contemplate the immorality of his crime for his own sake, or to protect others from harm he may inflict in the future? And in the latter case, by what right do we assume that he will attempt to repeat his crime?

Whether or not Duff's argument is ultimately persuasive, *Trials and Punishments* is clearly an important contribution to the literature on retributive justice. It should be read by anyone seriously concerned with the problem of punishment, or, more generally, with an adequate understanding of the criminal law. It will also be worthwhile for those interested in personal or informal responses to moral wrong-doing.

MARGARET R. HOLMGREN

Iowa State University

JON ELSTER and AANUND HYLLAND, eds. *Foundations of Social Choice Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1986. Pp. 240. US\$32.50. ISBN 0-521-25735-2.

This volume of essays is enthusiastically recommended to anyone with an interest in social choice theory (SCT). A bare essential of any society is the way it structures or amalgamates the individual preferences of its citizens. In an absolute dictatorship, only the preferences of one individual count. In an ideal democracy, those of the majority count. How should preference satisfaction be amalgamated and used as a measure of social welfare? What constraints characterize an adequate voting system? Kenneth Arrow and others pioneered a formal system to deal with these and related issues, and in so doing virtually defined contemporary SCT.

The contributors to this volume include Brian Barry, Aanund Hylland, Robert E. Goodin, Jon Elster, John E. Roemer, Allan Gibbard, Donald Davidson, and Amartya Sen. The collective business of their essays is to explicate, refine, challenge, and defend the foundational underpinnings of Arrowian SCT. Elster and Hylland's introduction and Sen's lengthy epilogue-commentary identify themes and provide a perspective which nicely serves to give the collection an added coherence. Also helpful to the uninitiated is a separate overview by Hylland on the purpose and significance of SCT. It is important to emphasize that a grasp of formal SCT or logic is not necessary for an understanding of any essay. In fact much of the book can be seen as a challenge to the relevance of the formal Arrowian apparatus.

Traditional Arrowian SCT is 'welfarist,' meaning that collective social welfare is viewed strictly as a function of individual welfare (utility). Satisfaction of individual preference and respect for autonomy are priorities on this approach. Roemer ('An Historical Materialist Alternative to Welfarism') contrasts welfarism with a Marxist approach where 'self-actualization of man' is valued over autonomy. The traditional welfarist approach is woefully inadequate as a measure of a Marxian conception of social welfare, which is more concerned with a society free from corrupted preferences than the question of how to amalgamate preferences. The essay functions importantly to broaden the reader's view of the business of social choice theory.

Davidson ('Judging Interpersonal Interests') and Gibbard ('Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference, Good, and the Intrinsic Reward of Life') both challenge the traditional welfarist assumption that interpersonal comparison of preferences are meaningless (i.e., statements of the type, 'outcome x is better for [more preferred by] person i than y is for j '). Davidson argues such comparisons are meaningful as a matter of methodological necessity — our ability to attribute preferences and desires to others presupposes a basis for interpersonal comparisons. His argument is recognizably 'Davidsonian' and the reader can expect to be persuaded accordingly.

Gibbard's piece is my choice for the most important of the collection in that it grapples with the most fundamental suppositions of welfarism. Gibbard argues that our ability to make interpersonal comparisons is on par with our ability to fathom what is best for ourselves, an ability traditional welfarism assumes to be unproblematic. But Gibbard challenges the supposition that preference satisfaction is a measure of what is best for ourselves, even in the case of ideally informed preferences. In so doing, he questions whether there is a precise sense of measuring what is best for an individual. At stake here is the intelligibility of utilitarianism in the broadest sense and our notion of rational self-interest. Gibbard concludes, 'We could thus be skeptical of the meaningfulness of interpersonal comparisons of utility not because we think the experiences of others ultimately inscrutable, but because we are skeptical of there being any such thing as utility in general that could sum up the weight of good reasons even for a self-interested preference' (191).

Goodin ('Laundering Preferences') addresses the issue of which preferences count in measuring social welfare. Should sadistic or other 'dirty' preferences be fed into a social welfare function along with the rest? As Sen earlier pointed out it would seem that utility or preference rankings alone are too impoverished a basis for ranking the desirability of social states — a purported task of SCT. But Goodin argues that properly construed, preference rankings capture enough information to deal with most of the problem; e.g., meta-preferences ought to be considered. In a worthy discussion of the issue, Goodin details preference-based justifications for incorporating input and output filters on raw preferences. Missing, however, is a clear discussion of the proper scope of SCT. For example, decision theory defines a notion of rational choice quite independently of the issue of whether an agent's initial preference inputs are themselves irrational. Shouldn't the same sort of consideration apply

to SCT? It is not clear why it is necessary to pack so much into the preference rankings.

Elster ('The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory') offers a wide-ranging discussion of the relation between raw pre-political preferences, politics, social choice, and social welfare. Elster argues that Arrowian SCT confuses behavior appropriate for the market place with behavior appropriate for the public forum. A main aim of his critique of welfarist SCT is to show that preference is a 'fragile foundation' of social choice. In his epilogue, Sen claims that Elster's analysis is 'seriously flawed' in that Elster only considers SCT as applied to raw, pre-political preferences which may be selfish or irrational. Sen points out there are many uses of the formal apparatus; a social welfare function can just as easily be tailored to accept as inputs political and other-regarding preferences. Sen is certainly right, and Elster sometimes talks as if SCT does not deal with these sorts of inputs. But to be fair, Elster need not be viewed as simply ignoring other applications of SCT. While not challenging the formal applicability of SCT to these other cases, Elster may be seen as questioning the usefulness of current SCT in dealing (non-trivially) with certain accounts of social choice, e.g., Habermas's theory.

Major portions of the essays by Barry, Hylland, and Sen are devoted to discussing Sen's so-called 'liberal paradox.' Sen claims that the principle that everyone has a right to decide certain issues on his own (the 'liberal principle'), contradicts the principle if everyone prefers X to Y, and they are mutually exclusive, then if X is attainable, Y ought not be chosen (the 'Pareto principle'). Barry argues that on a relevant reading of the principles, Sen has misused formalism to create a pseudoproblem. A main issue is over the exact import of a social welfare function. When preferences are fed into the function and (say) the result is that X is 'socially better' than Y, how is this relevant to the issue at hand? If a citizen has a right to choose between X and Y and he prefers X, should we conclude that X is socially better? If so, is the claim of any real importance? Sen claims that Barry and (to a lesser extent) Hylland misunderstand the issue. Hylland attaches genuine import to the problem but does not see it in the same terms as Sen. Regardless how one comes down on the issue, reading through the debate is an excellent exercise to the end of gaining insight into the foundations of social choice theory.

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JOHN EARMAN. *A Primer on Determinism*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1986. Pp. xiv + 273. US\$64.00. ISBN 90-277-2240-4.

My *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines a primer as 'an elementary schoolbook for teaching children to read; small introductory book.' Roughly three hundred pages long, this medium-size book is perhaps small compared to a college textbook in chemistry but it is definitely not aimed at children, and it presupposes more than an elementary knowledge of physics. This is not to say that it is a bad book. On the contrary, it is a very good high-level introduction to the problem of causality and determinism, but it is not the answer to the *Tao of Physics* for the starry-eyed undergraduate who is innocent of mathematics and has been led to believe that there is something mystical about quantum jumps. The very first chapter (a quixotic but fascinating quest for a proper definition of determinism) has the reader sorting out symmetries and invariances, formal systems, laws, theories, space-time, prediction, and randomness. Fortunately it ends with the comforting reminder that there is no real gain in clarity and precision by translating 'A man crossed the street' into 'There exists a man m , a street s , and a time t such that ...'. Determinism has to be seen at work, and this is what the author does with well-chosen examples in classical physics, in special and general relativistic physics, and in quantum mechanics. Karl Popper's strategy for making room for indeterminism within physical theory is effectively criticized for failing to address the basic issue of how to relate random behaviour at the macro-level with determinism at the micro-level. Readers who are more interested in general issues will find three lively chapters, respectively entitled 'Determinism and Laws of Nature,' 'Determinism and Effective Computability,' and 'Determinism and Time Symmetries' in which Earman offers a lucid appraisal of the wide variety of stances that have been taken on the issue. Two chapters bring 'chaos' and 'randomness' back into the deterministic fold, and the concluding chapter on determinism and free will is a plea for sanity and commonsense at the expense of consistency. John Earman is anything but dogmatic and if what he writes is determined, then he must have inherited pleasant and tolerant genes.

The book ends with an examination paper that is a model of the genre. I wonder how many will feel compelled to self-administer it to their philosophical selves?

WILLIAM R. SHEA
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DAVID GAUTHIER. *Morals by Agreement*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1986. Pp. xi + 367. Cdn\$59.95; US\$39.50. ISBN 0-19-824746-X.

Is morality rational? This book, the outcome of many years' development and eagerly awaited in many quarters, offers an affirmative answer of first importance. Many attempts to argue for the rationality of morals tend to develop rather special conceptions of reason (or, less usually, of morality) for the purpose. What is important about Gauthier's new book is his goal of showing this in a manner both rigorous and non-question-begging: '... our concern is to validate the conception of morality as a set of rational, impartial constraints on the pursuit of individual interest, not to defend any particular moral code. And our concern ... is to do this without incorporating into the premisses of our argument any of the moral conceptions that emerge in our conclusions' (6).

The conception of rationality adopted is simply that of acting on one's (considered) preferences — the 'maximizing' conception of rationality, a conception technically elaborated, along familiar lines, in the book. This conception of rationality, as Gauthier observes, 'possesses the virtue, among conceptions, of weakness,' along with the further virtue of being 'almost universally accepted and employed in the social sciences' (8). The weaker the premisses, the stronger the results, if they can indeed be shown to follow. That is the interest of this remarkable book, and a very great interest it is.

The book opens with a sort of Prologue on the Free Market, which Gauthier refers to as a 'morally free zone,' in which there is no need for constraints. Of course that is true only of the idealized market in which all costs are completely internal; but that is not the real world, which contains no markets in that sense. In order to have a market in the more usual sense, we must have moral constraints, prohibitions on fraud and force in particular. Most of the book then expounds and defends three main moral theorems, as we may call them: a theory of bargaining, 'Minimax Relative Concession'; a theory of compliance, 'Constrained Maximization'; and a theory of rights, the 'Lockean proviso.' A few words about each are all we will have space for here.

(1) The bargaining problem: each could settle for a certain minimum and still come away better off than before; but A's minimum is B's maximum, and A, of course, wishes to do her best. Where will they come out? Common sense tells us that they'll pretty well split the difference. So does Gauthier. The question is whether we can, and if so how we are to *prove* that that is where they'll emerge.

Gauthier's idea here is that for each partner in a cooperative undertaking, there is a minimum outcome, below which she will not cooperate, and a maximum, the best she could possibly do if each other cooperator receives his minimum, beyond which the others would not cooperate. The proposed rule is that we pick that outcome from among all the optimal distributions, which 'minimizes the maximum relative concession': each receives the greatest utility compatible with each other person foregoing as little as possible of the

available gains and still coming to an agreement. In general, this will be an equal relative concession: that is to say, the distribution will equalize the ratio of relative concessions, if that distribution is optimal.

Is this a rationally provable theorem? There are major problems. In Gauthier's proof, essential use is made of a notion of the 'equal rationality' of the bargainers. But it is unclear what is to be made of this. All of the agents in *Morals by Agreement* are 'equally rational' in the uninteresting sense that each is a rational maximizer. Equal *intelligence*, for example, is *not* part of the connotation. But since rationality is not something variable in degree that can significantly be said to be 'equal' — one either has it or not — it is clear that 'equal rationality' does not signify anything that can have the effect which the minimax relative concession principle is alleged to have, viz., to require a certain distribution of utilities, which *are* continuously variable, among a set of bargainers on the basis of their minimum and maximum claims. Nor could we credit a Gauthieran rational agent with any interest in others' rationality in any further sense, even if there were a relevant one. This part of his theory is thus highly problematic, as it stands, despite the intuitive appeal of its conclusion.

(2) Compliance. Why should we do our part in cooperation if we could get away with renegeing? Gauthier's views on this fundamental question has raised and will continue to raise much comment. The problem is that 'Morals by agreement begin from an initial presumption against morality, as a constraint on each person's pursuit of his own interest. ... He considers what he can do, but initially draws no distinction between what he may and may not do. How then does he come to acknowledge the distinction?' (8-9) The answer is provided by considerations concerning interaction with other rational agents. When we are relating ourselves to other practical agents, each making choices in the light of their independent rational reflection, what it is rational for me to do may well depend on what it is rational for the other person to do. The most interesting case is the by now familiar 'Prisoner's Dilemma' — situations in which each pursuing her maximal individual advantage will result in each coming out worse than if all had chosen some available alternative action. Persons so related, Gauthier argues, are rationally impelled to adopt a certain constraint on their pursuit of their interests. Each will adopt it provided that each is reasonably sure that most others will do so too. What we adopt is a *disposition*, that of 'Constrained Maximization.' This principle says that when we are interacting with persons whom we may reasonably presume to be cooperators, we should cooperate; if the evidence is that they are 'straight' maximizers, however, then we defect, in self-defense.

Problem: the theory of maximization looks, at least at first sight, to be act-oriented — perform act *x* at *t* if and only if *x* maximizes one's expected utility at *t*. Are we allowed to apply this theory to dispositions, as distinct from acts? The 'as distinct from' is crucial, given the standard game-theoretic assessment of Prisoners' Dilemma, according to which the rational agent will defect rather than cooperate. Gauthier's view is that an action *called for by a rational disposition* is ipso facto rational. Rationality is inherited from dispositions to acts:

It might seem that a maximizing disposition to choose would express itself in maximizing choices. But we have shown that this is not so. The essential point in our argument is that one's disposition to choose affects the situations in which one may expect to find oneself. A straightforward maximizer, who is disposed to make maximizing choices, must expect to be excluded from co-operative arrangements which he would find advantageous. A constrained maximizer may expect to be included in such arrangements. She benefits from her disposition, not in the choices she makes, but in her opportunities to choose. (183)

This pregnant passage seems to assume that we can know that our (actual) dispositions affect the dispositions of others. But the straightforward maximizer will not be excluded from the company of others if those others do not know that he is a straightforward maximizer. If you buy a used car from one of the latter, you are indeed likely to find out that he was one, and this can lead to punitive action against him. But if you buy what turns out to be fake Johnny Walker Black Label from an anonymous vendor just before you board the plane from Hong Kong to Vancouver, you are highly unlikely to detect him or to be able to do anything about it if you could. We all think that the anonymous 'scotch'-vendor is immoral; but do we really think him *irrational*? Gauthier appears to think so, but there seems room for doubt. Some would be inclined to argue, contrary to his view, that dispositions inherit the irrationality of their implications for individual actions!

(3) The 'Lockean proviso' prohibits the bettering of one's own situation via the worsening of that of others: pursuing your advantage by inflicting disadvantages on others. It is a restriction on the form of interaction. The baseline is non-interaction: my dealings with you are just if both you and I prefer our situations given the interaction to our situations in each other's absence. If I employ your capacities without your consent, I worsen your situation in order to improve mine. This the proviso forbids. If I fail to utilize my capacities, I suffer, but inflict no disadvantage on you; this it allows. Thus we derive Locke's initial exclusive right to the use of our own bodies.

Is this a 'derivation'? Gauthier says, '... The proviso, forbidding the taking of advantage, represents the weakest constraint rationally acceptable to persons who would avoid costly interaction with others, and the strongest constraint rationally acceptable to persons who would be free to benefit themselves. Thus the proviso reflects the equal rationality of persons who must constrain their natural interaction in order to enter into mutually beneficial social relationships' (227). Note the appeal to 'equal rationality' again. Yet obviously the real basis of this has to be a roughly equal ability to impose costs — the original Hobbesian premise, rather than any fancy Lockean additions. The interactions, in other words, have to have *net* costs for persons originally maximizers to adopt the disposition to refrain from them, and they are net costs not just by being costs, but by being costs outweighing the benefits derived. Only if our interactee is one who can impose costs on that order do we have reason to adopt a constraint as strong as the one proposed, weak though it is. But as Hobbes says, 'as to strength of bodie, the weakest has

strength enough to kill the strongest ...' (*Leviathan*, Ch. XIII). This seems to me the appropriate basis, rather than any dubious appeals to 'equal rationality.'

Gauthier adds some vastly intriguing chapters on 'Persons, Peoples, Generations,' 'The Ring of Gyges,' and 'The Liberal Individual' (the latter of whom not only adopts the moral constraints, but, like the Platonically good man, comes to *like* them, and also his fellows who have adopted them). There is no space for further discussion here, but the time has come simply to urge everyone with an interest in this subject to buy the book — this autumn, when the promised affordable paperback is due out — and study it with the care it deserves. It would not be easy to think of a better way to spend the time, for there is an immense amount to reflect on in this very rich and elegant treatise, the most powerful and exciting presentation of a contractarian position in recent times — e.g., more interesting and more plausible than Rawls's celebrated theory, which probably does not belong directly in the tradition anyway. Though not always easy reading, it is very readable: lucid, in its own way elegant, and always challenging. It belongs on the shelf of everyone interested in the subject.

JAN NARVESON

University of Waterloo

LAWRENCE HAWORTH. *Autonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1986. Pp. vii + 248. US\$18.95. ISBN 0-300-03569-1.

Utilitarians and libertarians differ on what is to be regarded as the basis of moral claims. Utilitarians contend that *intrinsic goods* — pleasure, perhaps, or happiness — are the source of moral obligation. Libertarians focus on *rights*. Lawrence Haworth recommends that we accord *autonomy* pride of place. The resulting conception is dubbed 'autonomism.'

Autonomism has both descriptive and normative components. Autonomy is said to be an aspect of human nature: 'autonomy is natural in something like the sense that growing hair is natural' (189). As we mature, we increase our mastery over the world around us and over ourselves as well. In so doing, we enhance our autonomy. The 'bedrock feature' of autonomy is *competence*: the capacity to 'produce intended effects, and to expand the repertoire of skills that underlies that ability' (2).

Competence, by itself, however, mere technical knowhow, is not enough. Skills are directed toward the satisfaction of intentions and these are dependent on value systems. As children we unselfconsciously adopt the values of our parents and community. Gradually we learn to subject these to critical scrutiny. We are encouraged in this endeavor in part because it reflects the autonomy of those around us, and this is naturally valued. We attain 'normal autonomy' when we come to act on values that we endorse on the basis of our own critical scrutiny. These values may be idiosyncratic, or they may be those of our community. An agent's autonomy is assessed not by reference to particular values he accepts, but in light of the grounds of that acceptance. Autonomous agents are those whose lives exemplify what Aristotle called *self-control*.

The book's subtitle — *An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics* — reflects Haworth's concern both with the psychological character of autonomy and with its ethical standing. The first half of the book is devoted to a characterization of autonomy along the lines sketched above and to attacks on conceptions of rationality — those advanced by Skinner and by decision theorists, for instance — in which autonomy has no place. The remainder of the book comprises arguments aimed at showing that autonomy is intrinsically valuable, that it is presupposed both by utilitarianism and libertarianism, and consequently that autonomism provides a plausible basis for certain ethical claims. It is, I think, possible to agree with Haworth that autonomy or self-control is both psychologically and morally significant without thereby embracing autonomism. It is in demonstrating that the latter doctrine enjoys 'a kind of priority' in the moral realm that the book seems least satisfactory.

Haworth's initial defense of the claim that autonomy is intrinsically, not derivatively, valuable is puzzling (124-8). He offers an argument that, although 'unsound, ... nevertheless ... is of interest because it represents autonomy as a very important value and right and thus locates many of the issues that must be confronted if one is to reach a reasoned view of autonomy's importance as a norm among norms' (124). In fact the argument is even more disappointing than the admission of its unsoundness suggests. It begins with the premise: '1. Adults, owing to their developed capacity for living autonomously, are entitled to do as they will subject only to the constraint that they do not harm others' (125). The second and third premises are no less surprising: '2. Making possession of a developed capacity for living autonomously a necessary condition for enjoying a right to do as one will, subject to the no-harm constraint, involves treating that right as an entitlement to live in the way one's developed capacity contemplates' (125). '3. The value of the developed capacity for autonomy is not derivative, but is valuable as such' (126). The argument appears not merely unsound but *circular*.

Elsewhere Haworth attempts to buttress the claim that autonomy is intrinsically valuable by emphasizing its *natural* origins: 'the fact that autonomy is natural implies that our valuing it is not contingent' (189). But of course my having hair (Haworth's own example of a natural trait) or being a certain height

may or may not be things I value for their own sakes. Their naturalness seems neither here nor there.

A stronger case is made for autonomism in three chapters devoted to discussions of liberty and utility. Haworth argues that utilitarians who imagine that happiness depends on the satisfaction of desires or the having of pleasure in fact must appeal to *autonomous* desires and pleasures. An agent whose desires are manipulated, for instance, may be worse off than one whose desires are autonomous, even though both agents achieve comparable levels of satisfaction. What is important, then, is not that desires are satisfied, but that *autonomous* desires are satisfied. As Haworth recognizes, this in itself does not show that autonomism is *presupposed* by utilitarianism. Indeed, utilitarians standardly insist that not all an agent's preferences are to be counted equally. Haworth, then, needs to show 'that development of people's capacity for autonomy is an independent value which we should strive to realize as having a kind of priority to pursuit of happiness' (170). If we examine what plausibly motivates utilitarianism, he thinks, we shall see that 'it is unclear why one would attach value to satisfying wants unless it were seen as necessary in order to show respect for the persons who autonomously framed them' (176-7). That is, a plausible defense of the utilitarian contention that agents' preferences are to be respected across agents depends on a prior commitment to the value of autonomy.

A similar argument is advanced against the libertarian. Liberty is without value to agents lacking in autonomy. A plausible case can be made for the promotion of liberty only by supposing that liberty enhances autonomy: 'the value of liberty depends on the contribution which having liberty makes to people's autonomy' (169). Indeed it may be that what libertarians *really* crave is not liberty merely, but autonomy.

Autonomism obliges us to respect the autonomy of others, to allow them liberty to pursue their ends, and thereby to respect those ends as worthy of pursuit. In this regard, autonomism resembles libertarianism. In according moral status to autonomy, however, we commit ourselves to a great deal more. We are obliged not only to permit others to pursue autonomous ends but obliged, as well, positively to promote institutions that nurture and encourage the development of autonomy. In this regard, autonomism moves in the direction of utilitarianism.

Utilitarians are unlikely to be much moved by such considerations. Autonomy is either conducive to happiness or it is not. If it is, then there are straightforward utilitarian grounds available for promoting it. If it is not, then it is far from clear why we ought to promote it. Perhaps autonomy is best regarded as a constraint on preferences: a preference is reasonable for an agent only when it is autonomous.

Haworth defends autonomism chiefly by arguing that neither utilitarianism nor libertarianism can ignore autonomy. In this he succeeds. What is less clear is whether he has succeeded in showing that autonomism, in its own right, is a viable *alternative* to, say, utilitarianism. I have my doubts.

Those doubts notwithstanding, I can say that *Autonomy* is pleasantly written, engaging, thoughtful, and altogether sensible. Haworth nicely weaves together a psychological characterization of autonomy and a discussion of the significance of this notion for ethical theorizing. The book is one that can be appreciated even by those disinclined to embrace autonomism.

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WILLIAM KLUBACK. *The Idea of Humanity: Hermann Cohen's Legacy to Philosophy and Theology*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1987. Pp. viii + 304. US\$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-6043-1); US\$15.75 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-6044-X).

The Idea of Humanity is a fitting companion-piece, or even counterweight, to Thomas E. Willey's *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860-1914* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press 1978). Both books document the rise and fall of efforts to rehabilitate Kant's philosophy in German universities during the aftermath of Hegel; both, moreover, regret the meager political influence of the Neo-Kantians (men like Friedrich Albert Lange, Hermann Cohen, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Ernst Cassirer) and lament their virtual disappearance following World War I. Kluback's book, far from superfluous, supplies as it were Willey's missing element. Willey, an historian, stays close to the political horizon of the Neo-Kantians' ephemeral pre-War ascendancy. Kluback, a philosopher, assesses the controversies among the Neo-Kantians and their rivals (including Wilhelm Herrmann, Adolf von Harnack, Ernst Troeltsch, Karl Barth, Martin Heidegger, Gerhard Krueger, Friedrich Gogarten) in terms of the respective philosophical-theological positions as understood by the participants themselves.

Of these, he maintains, the greatest is Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), for Cohen alone or above all restored and reset the key-stone of the entire Kantian system — the idea of humanity. Cohen's achievement rests on his reaffirming Kant's thoroughgoing distinction, abrogated by Hegel, between the real and the rational, between what *is* and what *ought to be*, between the (empirically validated) Concept and the (rationally obligatory) Idea. Yet Cohen shunned a merely static dualism, vulnerable to Hegel's critique. Reason, for Cohen, becomes the creative source (*Ursprung*) enabling man to transform his concepts, to improve his grasp of the lawfulness inherent or latent in hu-

man experience. Ideally, then, autonomous reason both demands and fosters mankind's ongoing self-improvement — scientific, moral, and cultural. Kluback himself shares Cohen's exemplary 'commitment to the visionary power of the Idea' (12). Twentieth-century philosophy, he adds, particularly Germany's, having forsaken that commitment, should reconsider Cohen, 'if only to find again that path that is true to philosophy' (ibid.).

Cohen's putative philosophical superiority emerges through Kluback's painstaking analyses of where others differed. Windelband held, contra Cohen, that reason funds only historically conditioned judgments positing value (not, as for Cohen, scientifically warranted concepts ascertaining lawfulness); yet on that basis, Windelband labored in vain to account for the universality of mathematical physics (which was, in contrast, Cohen's epistemological starting-point). Windelband's student Rickert subsequently struggled 'to insure the scientific nature of history' (61), but ended up, Hegel-like, identifying reason with largely political ideals. Krueger criticized Cohen for not acknowledging Kant's metaphysical dependence on Christian revelation, though he overlooked Cohen's own Kantian doctrine of man's necessary correlation with God (in *Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism* [1919]). Meanwhile, Cassirer, Cohen's student, shared his teacher's connecting monotheistic religion with ethics as opposed to myth; nevertheless, his own secular humanism lacked the profundity of Cohen's Jewish monotheism, which equates religious repentance with the restoration of the individual's ethical integrity. Finally, Heidegger, who attacked Cohen's Kant-interpretation in a well-known academic confrontation with Cassirer, embraced Kant's *terminus a quo*, understood as human finitude and temporality, while abandoning Kant's *terminus ad quem*, understood (by Cohen, Cassirer, and Cassirer's student Eric Weil) as humanity's universal enhancement and progressive self-development.

Theologians who did not neglect Cohen, it seems, sadly misconstrued him. Herrmann, Cohen's Protestant colleague at Marburg, mistook the latter's refusal to melt ethics into religion (they mesh but stay separate for Cohen) as an inability to distinguish them! Harnack, more correctly perhaps, assimilated Cohen's prophetic messianism to Jesus' social gospel, but considered the latter simply an unmessianic preliminary to the asocial salvation of the individual. Troeltsch mistrusted what he called Cohen's 'inquisitorial' insistence on measuring historical progress in terms of mankind's ideal messianic task, and so succumbed to viewing history (following Wilhelm Dilthey) as a mere 'anarchy of convictions' (230). Barth, attempting to reduce Cohen's messianism to the Kierkegaardian doctrine of mankind as a sin-incurring species conceptualizable only dialectically, properly provoked Krueger's charge of obscurantism (246f.). Ultimately, Gogarten's post-Cohenian dismissal of the purportedly 'monstrous claim of the I to be the real principle of reality,' as tantamount to 'the idolatrous arrogance of the creature wishing to make himself the creator' (286f.), passed virtually unchallenged by any would-be defender of Cohen.

What made Cohen's Neo-Kantianism so widely unappreciated among both critics and heirs? Is the lack somehow traceable to Kantian philosophy itself?

Here Kluback leaves the reader unsatisfied, except maybe to deplore the circumstance. Be that as it may, Kluback appears to have written his comparative analyses as separate essays rather than as straightforward chapters, and so perhaps a revised edition might address the unresolved issue further. Indeed, revision seems mandated in light of the publisher's scandalously poor proofreading, evidently incommensurate with the importance of Kluback's subject.

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JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS, ed. *A Companion to Martin Heidegger's Being and Time*. Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America 1986. Pp. xviii + 282. US\$26.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-5196-3); US\$14.25 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-5197-1).

This anthology contains an introduction by Kockelmans, 12 articles, 7 of which have been published elsewhere, an index of names and subjects, and a bibliography of works by and on Heidegger. The anthology is a commentary on, as opposed to an exposition of, *Being and Time*. Even so, the essays are largely expository rather than critical. The anthology is not exclusively concerned with *Being and Time*, however. Nine of the articles relate themes in *Being and Time* to themes in Heidegger's earlier and later thinking (including transcripts from lecture courses). The themes of the collection include Heidegger's thinking on truth, freedom, and temporality, and his relation to Husserl.

I appreciate the attention given in the anthology to the Husserl-Heidegger relation and to the recognition that Heidegger must be read as a phenomenologist. Arguably, one has to understand Husserl to understand Heidegger. The anthology is competent not only in its understanding of Heidegger, but also in its understanding of Husserl.

I welcome continued attention on the part of the academic philosophical community to Heidegger's corpus. While I agree with Kockelmans' judgment that *Being and Time* is one of the most important philosophical works of the twentieth century, I'm sceptical of his view that there is common agreement among philosophers today regarding the eminent stature of *Being and Time*. Most English speaking professional philosophers haven't read Heidegger, and so are not likely to share Kockelmans' (and my) high regard for *Being and Time*.

Theodore Kisiel, in 'Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses,' shows how Heidegger moved from the Husserlian concept of philosophy as the fundamental science to his own view that philosophy is more original than either a science or a world-view can be (i.e. that sciences and world-views are possible only in the presence of philosophy). Philosophy is here understood as the 'event' of human transcendence out of the realm of mere things into the realm of truth. For Heidegger, the realm of truth (which is also the realm of untruth) is the realm within which beings (including those beings which are subjects) become manifest as being. There is no real disagreement with Husserl here, I might add, because, for Husserl, it is clear that the world (of beings in being) must first be constituted (rendered manifest) before it can be studied or speculated about.

Roderick Stewart, in 'Signification and Radical Subjectivity in Heidegger's *Habilitationsschrift*,' shows how in 1915-16 Heidegger assimilated a Medieval theory of signs to a Husserlian theory of intentionality, and in this way prepared the way for his later account of human existence as *Dasein* in *Being and Time*.

In 'Heidegger's "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion," 1920-21,' Thomas Sheehan shows that Heidegger's 1920 lectures on the phenomenology of religion foreshadowed later themes in *Being and Time*. Sheehan also indicates how Heidegger thinks a phenomenology of religion might proceed, though he concedes that Heidegger doesn't give us much to go on here. As well, Sheehan chronicles the evolution in Husserl's growing respect for Heidegger.

In a first-rate article, 'Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations: in Remembrance of Heidegger's Last Seminar (Rahringen, 1973),' Jacques Taminiaux explicates the relation between Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and Heidegger's *Being and Time*. In particular, Taminiaux shows that an 'essential stimulus' (Heidegger's phrase) of Heidegger's 'question of being' is found in Husserl's sixth *Logical Investigation* where Husserl distinguishes between sensuous and categorial intuition. For Husserl, the being of things (in the sense of existence or predication) is the object of a categorial intuition. So Husserl too can be said to acknowledge the ontological difference between being and beings. For both Husserl and Heidegger, then, being, and not just beings, is present to an intuition, though not to a sensory one. Hence being can be a phenomenon (perhaps *the* phenomenon, as Heidegger believes).

In 'The Origins of Heidegger's Thought,' John Sallis draws an analogy between being-towards-death and original truth. Truth and death, understood phenomenologically, are seen as being similar in that each has an ambiguous dual status as *engaging* human existence while at the same time *withdrawing* from that existence.

John Caputo in 'Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a "Hermeneutic" Phenomenology,' gives an insightful analysis of the way in which for both Husserl and Heidegger, understanding an object is possible only in conjunction with a projection of the field of meaning in which that object makes sense. In the hermeneutical sense of 'presupposition' (the horizon within which some-

thing makes sense), no discipline, including phenomenology, can be presuppositionless. Husserl would approve of this point while at the same time pointing out that 'presupposition' can also be used in an epistemic (as opposed to a hermeneutic) sense, as in his claim that phenomenology is presuppositionless.

Samuel Ijsseling, in 'Heidegger and the Destruction of Ontology,' presents a clear analysis of the three steps in Heidegger's phenomenological method: (1) The *reduction* from beings to being; (2) The *construction* of the sense of beings on the basis of an appropriation of the meaning of being; and (3) the destruction, or, as Ijsseling rightly prefers, the *deconstruction* of the implicit ontology at work in our dealings with things. Joseph Kockelmans, in 'Being-True as the Basic Determination of Being,' presents a helpful explication of the development and unity of Heidegger's thinking on truth. William Richardson, in 'Heidegger and the Quest of Freedom,' explicates Heidegger's concept of freedom and explores the possibility of a Christian appropriation of Heidegger's thought. Marion Heinz, in 'The Concept of Time in Heidegger's Early Works,' and Graeme Nicholson, in 'Ekstatic Temporality in Sein Und Zeit' present an exposition of Heidegger's account of temporality and the foundational role it plays in Heidegger's analysis of human existence. To close out the anthology, Otto Poggeler, in 'Metaphysics and Topology of Being in Heidegger,' presents an interesting and free-ranging analysis of issues in Heidegger's later thought.

As a commentary on *Being and Time*, the anthology works well. I rate it a B+ and recommend it to teachers of contemporary Continental philosophy and their graduate students. Since more than half of the articles presuppose acquaintance with Husserl's phenomenology and with Heidegger's corpus, the anthology is aimed more at the initiate than at the first time student of phenomenology.

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GARY SAUL MORSON, ed. *Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on His Works*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986. Pp. xiii + 191. US\$20.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-54132-0); US\$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-54133-9).

Interest in the Soviet semiotician, Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895-1975), continues to spread in the West. His concepts or, at least, his vocabulary (dialogy, polyphony, carnival, etc.) occur with increasing frequency in literary

criticism and cultural studies. The bulk of his work is available in most Western languages (although unilingual English readers are less well served than their French counterparts). Almost three hundred items on Bakhtin and his work have appeared in these languages since 1977 (see Clive Thomson, ed., *Le Bulletin Bakhtine/The Bakhtin Newsletter*, No. 1 [1983], No. 2 [1986]). Entire numbers of journals have been devoted to him; there have been three International Bakhtin Colloquia (Kingston, Ontario, 1983; Cagliari, Sardinia, 1985; Jerusalem, 1987). It would appear that the growth of Bakhtin's prestige and influence is as great as, perhaps greater than, that of another Continental theorist, Georg Lukács, some two or three decades ago.

The reason is not far to seek: like Lukács, Bakhtin offers a global theory of literature, indeed, of discursive practice generally; one, moreover, unlike that of the rigorously Hegelian Marxist Lukács, very much in tune with post-modernism, with its distrust of system and celebration of discontinuity and heterogeneity. 'Dialogism,' 'Carnival,' 'intertextuality' and the other fundamental categories of Bakhtin's thought are sufficiently broad and malleable to be accommodated with those of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, Althusser, Barthes, Deleuze, Baudrillard et al. in the rich ragout that is current cultural and textual theory. In fact, to a considerable extent they serve to mediate among this disparate assortment.

In *Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on His work*, Gary Saul Morson, of the Department of Slavic Languages, Northwestern University, has brought together nine essays on the Russian thinker, and two extracts from his writings. All but the preface and one essay appeared previously, from 1981 to 1985, in *Critical Inquiry*, while the extracts are to be found in full in *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (Vern W. McGee, trans., and Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, eds. [Austin: University of Texas Press 1986]). Thus, there is little that is new here for dedicated Bakhtinists. Nevertheless, it is convenient to have the *Critical Inquiry* material in one place as a coherent book.

Coherence, as the title implies, is based on the Bakhtinian principle of dialogism itself. Morson places the contributors in a dialogue with their common subject and with one another. His initial contribution, 'Who Speaks for Bakhtin?', is in dialogue form. *Moi* broadly speaking, is humanistic and existentialist in orientation, while *Elle* is scientific and structuralist. For *Moi*, Bakhtin's insistence on the subject's decentredness in utterance 'creates the tragedy of expression.' *Elle* 'see[s] no tragedy' and rejects *Moi*'s 'philosophical and theological explication of Bakhtin's ideas ... It's merely the inevitable consequences of the dynamics of speaking and writing, of communication with others' (18). Caryl Emerson writes on the relation between Bakhtin and Vygotsky, concentrating on the works published under the name of V.N. Voloshinov, *Freudianism* and *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, which stress the social and discursive origins of the individual and psychological. Susan Stewart's essay complements Emerson's, stressing (overstressing?) the difference between Bakhtin's translinguistics and the Saussurean tradition, arguing that the former goes beyond current sociolinguistic theory, theory of the sign, and of ideology. In 'Answering as Authoring,' Michael

Holquist identifies the trajectory of Bakhtin's intellectual career as a continuing refinement of the seminal concept of dialogism to a general theory of human semiosis: 'The body is seen as a system by which the individual answers the physical world: in order to do so coherently it must model its environment, track and map it, and then translate its data into a biological representation of it — the body answers the world by authoring it. Analogously, mind can be seen as a system by which the individual answers the social world ... Homeostasis is the body's mechanism for actively responding to the other, utterance is the mind's' (69). Altogether, this first group of essays reminds us how much Bakhtin has to offer, at least in the way of suggestiveness, to a number of areas in linguistics, general semiotics, philosophy of language, and the cognitive sciences.

Another group addresses aspects of Bakhtin's thought especially relevant to literary criticism and cultural studies. In 'When the Carnival Turns Bitter: Preliminary Reflections Upon the Abject Hero,' Michael André Bernstein critiques the upbeat thesis of *Rabelais and His World* while remaining within and extending the category of Carnival. Morson returns in an essay that brings Bakhtin's ideas on the novel to bear on Tolstoy, whom Bakhtin exploits as the deprived element in binary opposition with his admired Dostoevsky. Wayne Booth, in 'Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin and the Challenge of Feminist Criticism,' also uses Bakhtin against Bakhtin, noting that he failed to perceive gender as a factor in heteroglossia and historicizing his theory in terms of the Women's Movement. These contributions demonstrate Bakhtinism as a homeorhetic formation, capable of adaptation when confronted with criticism without losing shape or élan.

The middle portion of the volume, separating the two groups outlined above, is dialogic with a difference. It consists of Ken Hirshkop's 'A Response to the Forum on Mikhail Bakhtin' — the forum in question being that held by *Critical Inquiry* in 1983 that generated the bulk of the contributions — followed by Morson's 'Dialogue, Monologue, and the Social: A Reply to Ken Hirshkop.' Hirshkop hits from the left, accusing the other contributors of emasculating the radical tendencies in Bakhtin to accommodate him to the prevailing American academic liberalism. Morson strikes back from the centre and, since it's his book, has the last word. Nevertheless, the exchange makes evident another value of having the essays within a single cover in that it enables readers to focus on one developing school of Bakhtinism, and a particularly well-funded and strategically positioned one at that. Hirshkop or another should come up with a volume that presents a different Bakhtin.

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GERALD E. MYERS. *William James: His Life and Thought*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1986. Pp. xxi + 628. US\$35.00. ISBN 0-300-03417-2.

James, for the same combination of good and bad reasons that also motivates artistic and political 'rehabilitations,' is currently the focus of renewed attention, attention (more precisely) that is coming from a central, or less peripheral, place on the philosophical map. Ironically people who were there all along (e.g., members of SAAP) — like people who *always* loved Bouguereau — are likely to feel a bit shut out, and resentful, of the revival. Partly, this is because *their* style of James scholarship, eulogistic paraphrase, celebratory rehearsal, cannot survive translation to the mainstream.

Although Myers must have been 'there' working on James for a long time, and despite his having read all the Jamesians good, bad, and indifferent, he has written a masterful, mainstream account from which is absent any trace of the old hysterical/oppositional chauvinism. Indeed I cannot imagine anyone writing a more sober and patient survey of James' thought. Myers, according to his prefatory account, got interested in James via work in philosophy of mind and incidental references to James by writers like Moore and Wittgenstein: his *route in*, in other words, was properly philosophical and philosophical/historical. The same interest in, and capacity for, tracing things backward that led him to James allows him to locate James against the background of nineteenth-century psychology, and he has a good sense of the quarrels and polemics that occasioned so much of James' writing. Myers' interest in philosophy of mind also explains the space he devotes to the *Principles of Psychology*. That space is not objectively disproportionate — 9 out of 10 people I talk to with an 'interest' in these matters nominate the *Principles* as James' masterpiece. Still someone approaching James with an interest in antirealism and Dummett, for example, would have written a different book. This is only to say (and it can't be a complaint) that Myers has written only one of more than one possible, plausible, and useful books on James.

In the *Principles*, James adopts a commonsensical dualism he never quite believed in and finally abandoned in favor of the peculiar, countercommonsensical monism of radical empiricism, of 'pure experience.' One of the virtues of Myers' account is that he does not 'phenomenologize' James, does not skip over the physical, or physiological, side of the dualism. Myers realizes that, despite heavy reliance on introspection, many of James' crucial arguments and definitions are essentially neurophysiological. An example of each follows. The argument that (in James' words) 'For an identical sensation to recur it would have to occur the second time *in an unmodified brain*. But as this, strictly speaking, is a physiological impossibility, so is an unmodified feeling an impossibility' (quoted and discussed by Myers, 70). The definition of 'sensation' as (in Myers' words) 'the immediate psychic effect of a nerve process' (126). Whether either the argument or the definition works is open to question; their deployment, in any case, illustrates the 'mixed' conceptual/argumentative texture of the *Principles* and James' tendency, even in 1890 and before,

to try to hammer together in a single theory everything known from any source, a tendency which develops, in later James, into a Harman-like 'inference-to-the-best-explanation' view of inquiry.

Where Myers is more patient than I would be, I sense a certain scholasticism of the seminar room: things are discussed because they are in the text or in the thinker and their own terms are accorded — what strikes the less polite as — slightly long-winded courtesy. So the virtues and vices of introspection and of what can and cannot be determined through its use are well and lengthily discussed, but the question of whether introspection can be a species of observation and a real source of knowledge does not come up. It is true that James didn't face this question; still, Myers might have faced it for him.

I have much the same — mildly ambivalent — feeling about the discussion of sensation. James saw himself as the champion of sensations against all the rationalisms that treated them as cognitive poor relations. Indeed, as Myers tells us, 'James seems always to have supposed ... that the innermost nature of reality is discovered through acquaintance with the details of sensation' (86). It is doubtful whether 'innermost nature of reality' can be given a scientific/objective as opposed to a rhetorical/religious signification and equally doubtful whether the definition of 'sensation' does anything more than encode a preference for immediacy — as if we could trace a straight neural line from a sense organ to a local explosion of sensory experience in the brain. If this *is* a neurophysiological myth, then the whole discussion of what can and can't be and is and isn't sensed takes on the unreal air of *l'art pour l'art* academicism. For example, there is much on the topic of nativism, the view — embraced by James — that sensation is aboriginally spatial, but after sufficient indulgence, Myers inserts the following perfectly sensible, but retroactively vastly deflationary, remark: 'The correct picture brings back into view the person who judges where things are. The complicated learning process that enables us to correlate sight and touch at the same place must be emphasized; this process involves movement, making allowances for error, and recalling how appearances can deceive and does not define space-perceptions as occurring entirely at the level of sensation' (135).

There are many other places I should enjoy fighting a bit with Myers or James, but many expository and explanatory excellences to appreciate; and I want to emphasize that no area of James' thought is neglected. The book begins with a genial assemblage of — mostly familiar — biographical material. James was neurotic, self-absorbed, and plagued with illnesses, psychosomatic and other; but he was not such a bad brother, husband, or father. His advice to his son, Henry III, 'Never *grumble*. The grumbling habit grows like a weed ...' is as useful as it is hard to follow, yet James was right to grumble about the 'Harvard indifference' which consists in 'listlessness, apathy, dawdling, sauntering, the smoking of cigarettes and living on small sarcasms.' James once brought Helen Keller an ostrich feather, a characteristically thoughtful

and inventive gesture. Myers' study ends with 131 pages of notes which contain all sorts of interesting, and often amusing, comments and quotations.

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TERENCE QUALTER. *Conflicting Political Ideas in Liberal Democracies*. Toronto: Methuen 1986. Pp. ix + 294. CDN\$16.95. ISBN 0-458-99080-9.

Qualter's central theme is that introductory students of politics need to understand the philosophical and ideological foundations of liberal democratic societies. His starting point is that liberal democracies accommodate a variety of conflicting moral and political theories and ideologies. While this work is of interest to the philosopher, Qualter is not as successful in some of the philosophical aspects of his project as I had hoped.

His initial classification of relevant theories sets the stage for some later troubles. The landscape he presents is impoverished and confusing and excludes many contemporary theories. Teleological natural law theories accept a natural theological design in the political world. They postulate universal, eternal and absolute values. In presenting natural law theories this way, Qualter seems to rule out current natural law theories based on non-theological concepts of rationality. And in presenting these as teleological theories, he leaves no place in his scheme for the spectrum of deontological theories, including non-natural law rights theories. He constructs a separate category for utilitarianism, but it is the paradigm contemporary teleological theory. His discussion of utilitarianism presents problems. He restricts his attention to Benthamite utilitarianism, and concludes that 'few today would seriously admit to being labelled utilitarians, for as a psychological-moral theory it is thoroughly discredited' (16). This will come as news to the utilitarian philosophers who populate a respectable part of the current landscape. Qualter's discussion is again significant for what it leaves out: Mill and modern preference utilitarians. Finally, historicist theories such as Marxism look at societies and their values in relation to 'universal laws of historical change' (17).

Other chapters also lay groundwork. One of the strengths of this book is Qualter's interweaving of historical and philosophical analysis of the concepts and perspectives. Individualist and organic conceptions of the state conflict. The individualist view is based on competitive, egoistic, acquisitive individuals who lack natural social feelings but who must learn to cooperate. Their

state is founded on a social contract traced to Locke and Hobbes. Qualter traces the organic view of the state, which puts foremost the collective or society rather than the individual, to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and T.H. Green. This state has a moral purpose, 'to provide an environment in which individuals can realize their full potentiality as moral beings' (39). It emphasizes cooperation and collective action and leads to the welfare state.

The chapter on the nature of rights is unsatisfying, for Qualter argues for a simple relativism which is almost universally rejected by moral philosophers. The only two alternatives he offers are rights founded on absolute universal natural law or relative rights. Natural law is based on rationality, but the discussion wavers between treating rationality as the ordinary human faculty or as an intuitively based faculty. Qualter too glibly rejects the role of ordinary reason in grounding rights objectively and thus reverts to relativism because of moral disagreement. Such disagreement is notorious for its frequent unwarranted use in relativist arguments. He reveals an inadequate grasp of the range of philosophical argumentation available for a rational justification of moral standards.

Qualter reaches relativism partly by prematurely rejecting the possibility of an adequate rational grounding and partly by a straightforward unsound argument. 'If the concepts of natural law and natural right are to have any meaning, they ought to...be eternal, and they ought to be universal. But, as a matter of historical fact, we can find no principle that has been accepted unaltered through all ages' (54). Since in fact different societies accept different principles, there are no universal and eternal moral principles. But from the thesis of cultural relativism (that different societies in fact have different moral codes), ethical relativism (that what is right or wrong varies from society to society) does not follow. It could be that there is one universal moral code and some societies are mistaken. Or it could be that all societies accept the same ultimate moral code which is manifested in different particular moral rules because of different social circumstances. Qualter overlooks these latter two possibilities which are not in conflict with absolutism.

Other chapters take up more particular issues. The right to freedom of expression and its limits are illustrated in the debate over censorship. Qualter gives an overview of the tensions between negative and positive conceptions of liberty. Historically the concept of negative liberty has meant the absence of legal constraints, but in the nineteenth century it became clear that the lack of compulsion is not enough to ensure freedom. Negative liberty, historically linked with economic laissez-faire, had disastrous consequences of extreme inequality and poverty. Positive liberty requires the state to intervene to create conditions to expand liberty and fight poverty. Qualter covers the ground of conflicting notions of equality, equality of condition and of opportunity, and of conflicts between equality and liberty. The battle between these last two is one of the great battles of liberalism.

Democracy faces the problem of the liberty of the minority or the 'tyranny of the majority.' Here the issue is how to respect the democratic machinery and will of the majority while guarding minority rights. Qualter discusses the

basis of consent in democracies and the reasons for civil disobedience. On the question of the justification for property rights, the Lockean argument is that property is based on expending labour. The argument that each individual owns his/her own labour turns labour into a commodity which can be sold for wages and leads into the Marxist critique of capitalism based on alienation of labour. Qualter contrasts Marxists and utopian socialists who propose cooperative communities with property commonly owned as an alternative to revolution.

The interesting concluding chapters look at the competing ideologies of liberalism, conservatism (toryism) and socialism. Here the discussion sorts out the different strands of these ideologies, analysing the connections and tensions among them that may link proponents of different ideologies on policy who disagree on principles, and vice versa. All this is nicely put in historical context so we understand the forces that gave rise to these world views.

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AMÉLIE OKSENBERG RORTY, ed. *Essays on Descartes' Meditations*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1986. Pp. xii + 535. US\$11.95. ISBN 0-520-05496-2.

This study of Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy* contains twenty-two generally superb essays which follow closely the sequence of subjects in the six Meditations, and serve to bring out in a most striking fashion the different levels of method at work in Descartes' text. This review mentions only a few.

In the first essay Amélie Oksenberg Rorty uses the pattern of classical meditations to reveal the structure of Descartes' *Meditations*, the six days of the latter corresponding to the generally standard six stages of traditional meditations. Of course Descartes never admitted that he was following the traditional steps, but Rorty remarks, 'There are solid clues for reading the composition of the work: there are in fact too many. The work we see when we use some of these clues is quite different from the work we see when we follow others. Did Descartes do this deliberately?' (18) If so it would appear, then, that his reputed deviousness is integral to his method.

L. Aryeh Kosman in the second essay, 'The Naive Narrator: Meditations in Descartes' *Meditations*,' looks at meditation as a literary form, a narrative in which we can distinguish between the story which is told and the discourse

by which it is told, and correspondingly between the narrator in the story, who doesn't know yet what is to come, and Descartes the author of the story, who knows it all already. But in the end the *Meditations* turns out to be Descartes' own meditation, and he wants no readers 'except those who are willing to meditate seriously with me.' One of Kosman's points is that Descartes' aims are achieved by meditation, not by philosophical demonstration. It is interesting, therefore, to note that in his Dedication to the Dean and Doctors of the Sacred Faculty of Theology in Paris the *Meditations* are advanced entirely as demonstrations and Descartes puts great emphasis on their being 'demonstrations,' while in the Preface to the Reader which follows they are advanced as 'meditations' in which the reader is invited to join. No doubt Descartes had no illusions that the Dean and Doctors would join him in meditating. Gary Hatfield in 'The Senses and the Fleshless Eye: the *Meditations* as Cognitive Exercises' takes up the question of the special role assigned to argument in the *Meditations*. For him Descartes' anti-Aristotelian revolution could be expressed in the dictum, 'Nothing is accepted from the senses that was not first in the intellect' (46). It is meditation which provides the spiritual exercise for freeing the intellect from domination by the senses and it is this which determines the part played by discursive argument.

Although works of religious meditation may make use of argument, their purpose is not to present a continuous argument that compels by force of logic; they serve as guidebooks to prepare the soul for illumination from above or within. Similarly Descartes' *Meditations* are not so much a continuous argument as a set of instructions for uncovering the truths that lie immanent in the intellect. Not that there are *no* arguments in the *Meditations*; the language of argument is interspersed through the work. But some conclusions seem to arrive out of nowhere, without discursive argument.... (47f)

Scepticism too performs a methodological role in the *Meditations*, an exercise of the mind for freeing it from subjection to the senses. Both Hatfield and Daniel Garber in his '*Semel in vita*: The Scientific Background to Descartes' *Meditations*' are concerned with this function of scepticism; both cite Descartes' reply to Hobbes that the essential function of scepticism was 'to accustom the reader's mind to consider intelligible objects and to distinguish them from corporeal things — and to this end such doubts are indispensable.' In the Synopsis Descartes says of the first Meditation that it prepares us for a very easy way to accustom our mind to detach itself from the senses. The importance of this exercise, according to both authors, is to combat an Aristotelian epistemology, and for Garber this in turn was important for providing science with wholly new foundations. He quotes from Descartes' letter to Mersenne, 28 January 1641, 'I may tell you between ourselves, that these six *Meditations* contain the entire foundations for my physics. But it is not necessary to say so, if you please, since that might make it harder for those who favour Aristotle to approve them. I hope that those who read them will gradually accustom themselves to my principles and recognize the truth in them before they notice that they destroy those of Aristotle.'

This passage is quoted also in David R. Lachterman's '*Objectum Purae Matheseos: Mathematical Construction and the Passage from Essence to Existence*,' and it prompts the question to what extent dissimulation was used by Descartes as a philosophical method. That it was used as such is shown very convincingly by Lachterman and also by Michael Williams in 'Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt.' Lachterman's study is concerned to show that the *Meditations* 'gains in philosophical substance when we try to excavate or reconstruct the "subtext" it veils' (436). For Michael Williams there is dissimulation in the way Descartes presents the doubts which are directed at all his former beliefs, as if those doubts are innocent of any of the metaphysical ideas which are later to be established by the resolution of those doubts.

The more usual view of Cartesian dissimulation is that it was wholly prudential, not a philosophical method, and this is the view of Louis E. Loeb in his 'Is There Radical Dissimulation in Descartes' *Meditations*?' He argues that the doubt of Meditation III is a complete sham, and he works out a Cartesian epistemology based on a hierarchically ordered set of cognitive faculties and requiring no divine guarantee of the truth of the clearly and distinctly perceived. It is very satisfactorily worked out. At the same time one must object that the divine deception of Meditation I is not just concerned with sense perception and the existence of material things; it is also concerned with 'truths so clear (*perspicuus*)' as $2 + 3 = 5$. It is with this doubt, indeed, that the deceiver makes his first appearance and it is included along with the doubt of material things as resting on reasons 'which are very powerful and maturely considered.' If in Meditation III this mathematical doubt now rests on grounds that are 'very slight and metaphysical' it is because in the meantime the general rule of the truth of the clearly and distinctly perceived has been derived from the *cogito*. Descartes has committed himself by the doubts of Meditation I to get rid, in all honest dealings with his readers, of the deceiver in simple mathematics, rather than to be playing the deceiver himself with the Dean and doctors of the faculty of theology, as Loeb would claim.

E.M. Curley's essay, 'Analysis in the *Meditations*: The Quest for Clear and Distinct Ideas,' takes notice of Descartes' assertion that in his *Meditations* he has used only analysis, not the method of synthesis used by the geometers. Curley conceives of analysis as a dialectical method of discovery, Platonic in character, which begins with a conjecture, is then argued against, then revised, and then the three stages repeated indefinitely until further objection finally becomes impossible. He shows how the principal concepts of Descartes' metaphysics are explained and arrived at by this method, contrasting this with the formal definitions of the same concepts, the concepts which come first when the metaphysics is rendered *more geometrico*, or by the synthetic method. Frederick F. Schmitt ('Why was Descartes a Foundationalist?') distinguishes between two orders of knowledge. The distinction is found in the passage in the fifth Meditation in which Descartes says, '*That an atheist can know clearly that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles*, I do not deny, I merely affirm that, on the other hand, such knowledge (*cognitionem*) on his part cannot constitute true science (*scientiam*), because no

knowledge (*cognitio*) that can be rendered doubtful should be called science (*scientia*).’ The atheist has first-order knowledge but not second-order knowledge. What he lacks is the principle that all clear and distinct perception is true, a principle which is extrapolated from the first principle of Descartes’ metaphysics, and which removes doubt. According to the standard version of Descartes’ foundationalism he was committed to deducing all knowledge from intuited propositions, but with this two-orders version Schmitt argues that Descartes is not so committed, although he thought he was, and why he thought so Schmitt seeks to answer. Descartes can indeed allow for hypotheses as first-order knowledge, and Schmitt points to several instances of the use of the hypothetico-deductive method in the body of the *Meditations*.

It is evident that the methods used in the *Meditations* are not those of the solitary meditator, who purports to be addressing only himself, but of a philosopher in the public forum intent upon achieving a revolution in science against the reigning Aristotelians, and using every device and stratagem to bring it off before his readers realize what has happened: the subtle guidance of their meditations with him, the fictitious and innocent first-person narration, a scepticism which, like the meditation, insinuates a Cartesian epistemology, dissimulation (though not in any evil sense), and an analysis which will make his doctrines as much the readers’ own as if they had themselves discovered it. This volume is a signal contribution to a ‘Discourse on Descartes’ Method.’

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MICHAEL RUSE. *Taking Darwin Seriously*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1986. Pp. xvi + 303. Cdn\$56.25; US\$24.95. ISBN 0-631-14145-6.

This book examines the foundations of epistemology and ethics from an evolutionary perspective. It contains a description of evolutionary theory, including a discussion of human evolution, critiques of previous work in evolutionary epistemology and ethics, and a new Darwinian basis for epistemology and ethics which supposedly avoids the problems of earlier attempts.

Ruse’s basic thesis is that our epistemic and ethical capabilities result from developmental processes governed by so-called ‘epigenetic rules’ (143) encoded in our genes. Epigenetic rules are analogous to the ‘deep structure’ of Chomskian syntax; they constrain our possible thought and behaviour in the same

way that deep structure constrains the surface structure of a natural language. Our genetic heritage is produced by evolution, whose main mechanism Ruse presumes to be natural selection. Because natural selection selects for success in producing progeny, the epigenetic rules which govern our epistemic and ethical capabilities must enhance survival and reproduction. This requirement can place limits or biases on our reasoning capabilities which can affect our judgments of truth and value.

Using the theory of natural selection together with some observations (and speculations) about human evolutionary biology, Ruse draws some general conclusions about our epistemic and ethical capabilities. In particular, he concludes that our capabilities are those of the type of creature we have evolved to be, not those constrained only by our being rational or moral agents. Ethics and epistemology, says Ruse, do not have a objective basis common to all possible rational creatures, as Kant would have it, but depend on our particular nature as it results from evolution. Evolutionary epistemology and ethics are Humean, and have no ultimate justification.

The book contains six chapters. The first discusses evolution in general, while the fourth deals specifically with human evolution. Ruse breaks his discussion of evolution into the sub-topics of the fact of evolution, its path, and its mechanism. He argues convincingly that the fact of evolution, and particularly human evolution, is established beyond reasonable doubt. There are open questions about the path of evolution (though much is known), and disputes about the mechanism of evolution. Ruse discusses some of these issues, but opts for gradual evolution through natural selection, as understood by modern genetics. The chapter on human evolution also contains discussions of the evolution of culture and the biology of language. The latter provides some of the strongest evidence for genetic constraints on human cognitive capabilities. This chapter also introduces the important concept of epigenetic rules (143-7).

Chapters Two and Three deal with previous attempts at evolutionary epistemology and ethics. Ruse points out that prior evolutionary epistemologies try to establish an analogy between biological evolution and the growth of knowledge. He argues that this analogy is ultimately untenable, although it can provide useful insight. The central problem with the analogy is that evolution is not goal-directed, but science is (Ruse doesn't consider other forms of human epistemic activity). The variations selected in evolution occur at random, whereas scientific investigation is consciously directed towards discovering the truth. Ruse also suggests that evolution and science differ in that science usually incorporates parts of old theories, whereas old life-forms just become extinct. The scrap-heap of bad ideas is so large, however, that I am unconvinced of this point. Other differences, however, make the overall strength of the analogy tenuous.

Ruse begins the chapter on ethics with a brief general discussion of morality. He distinguishes between substantival ethics and meta-ethics, and mentions two broad meta-ethical positions: objectivism and moral scepticism. The ethical objectivist believes that there is an ultimate justification of moral views, whereas the sceptic denies this, though he need not deny substantive ethics.

Ruse's main objection to previous attempts at evolutionary ethics is that they violate Hume's injunction that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is' by trying to justify ethics on evolutionary grounds. The chapter on ethics ends with a critique of E.O. Wilson's views on morality, in which Ruse finds the seed of a satisfactory evolutionary ethics.

Ruse's positive views on epistemology and ethics are in line with the sceptical argument I sketched above. In epistemology, Ruse's scepticism is radical, denying the possibility of justification of even logic and mathematics. There is no good reason, Ruse argues, for thinking that our conceptual capabilities can describe the world as it really is. Capacities constrained by the need for survival may allow us to determine the truth, but this is surely not necessary. Given this, we are entitled to adopt a common sense realism, but should remain Humean sceptics. Ruse also concludes that we should be metaphysical anti-realists, but I couldn't follow his argument.

Not surprisingly, Ruse also argues for ethical scepticism. He does not doubt that creatures like us have a determinate morality, but he doubts that it has any objective justification. He states that Darwinism would lead us to expect the evolution of moral feelings or intuitions in human beings, since this would increase fitness in our sort of animal. He also argues that the resulting morality is an acceptable moral system. (After all, it ought to fit our moral intuitions!) The chapter includes a very mischievous argument that we should expect, on Darwinian grounds, that we should find it very hard to accept that our moral system is not objective, since belief in its objectivity increases its power over us. Thus '[t]he apparent objectivity of] morality is a collective illusion foisted on us by our genes' (253).

Ruse has thrown down the gauntlet to objectivists. An objectivist might primly argue that although knowledge and morality might have a Darwinian origin, that does not prove that they are not objective. The mere possibility of objectivity is pretty close to vacuous, though. The objectivist who accepts the fact of evolution must show not only that Ruse's arguments against objectivity are untenable, but also that the possibility of objective knowledge and ethics is to be expected. Otherwise, the objectivist is just not taking Darwin seriously.

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JOHN SEARLE. *Minds, Brains, and Science*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1985. Pp. 112. US\$4.95. ISBN 0-674-57633-0.

This book consists of Searle's 1984 Reith Lectures which, as the Introduction tells us, are the first to be given by a philosopher since Bertrand Russell began the series in 1948. They are supposed to build on the lecturer's previous work as well as contain new and original material. Searle's series succeeds in both respects. In lucid pugnacious prose he addresses the major problems in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology. The chapter headings are: One — The Mind-Body Problem; Two — Can Computers Think?; Three — Cognitive Science; Four — The Structure of Action; Five — Prospects for the Social Sciences, and Six — The Freedom of the Will.

According to Searle the mind-body problem derives from four 'real features' of our mental lives: consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, and mental causation. Mental phenomena just are features of the brain. The mind and the brain interact in a non-dualistic manner. Minds are both caused by and realised in physical systems susceptible to a micro-analysis in the same way that the surface or macro-elements of water, its liquidity, for example, are caused by yet realized in the interactions between H_2O molecules at the micro-level. This model enables us to see how 'naive physicalism' — the view that 'all that exists in the world are physical particles with their properties and relations' — can be made compatible with 'naive mentalism' — the view that there really are conscious, intentional, subjective, causally efficacious, mental states.

Chapter Two — Can Computers Think? is a succinct replay of Searle's well-known and hotly debated 'Minds, Brains, and Programs' (*Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 3 [1980] 417-24). The target is strong artificial intelligence (AI) or the view that digital computers either now do or will be able to think by virtue of their programs. His metaphysical moral is: AI programs consist of nothing more than computations defined over purely formal (syntactic) elements. Syntax is meaning-free. Thinking isn't. You can't get semantics from syntax, so you can't get thinking from a computer program, contrary to what the proponents of strong AI claim. An irony which Searle attributes to their enterprise is that it is designed to be anti-dualistic, yet ends up with a view of the mind as essentially unrelated to the causal powers of the brain.

Chapter Three is a challenging mini-critique of 'cognitivism' — the view that psychology should concern itself with discovering and unravelling computational-type information processes which supposedly mediate between our intentional conscious states and other neurophysiological events in the brain. Searle believes there is slender evidence to support the hypothesis that an intermediate level of information-processing is required to explain human purposive behavior. The way in which computers can be said to follow rules when they carry out computations, and the way in which human beings can be said to be following rules when the actual meaning or content of a rule is guiding their behavior, have been unfortunately conflated. Only the latter is a psychological type of rule following. The former is a non-psychological

kind — a simple carrying out of formal procedures. Many things we (and pocket calculators!) do may not have computational answers, since what is being done is being done directly in the hardware. Our ability to see, for example, or learn a language, may simply take place in the brain with no computational or mental level underlying those competencies.

Chapters Four and Five deal respectively with the structure of action and prospects for the social sciences, and supplemented with Searle's outline of the mind-body relationship in Chapter One comprise the most constructive parts of the book. An admirable and surprising amount of detailed argument attends his account of the mental and physical aspects of action (six principles convincingly elaborated within less than fourteen short pages). The focus is on what he calls intentional causation — the mind bringing about the very state of affairs it has been thinking about. Largely because of the intentional aspects of human behavior, Searle is sceptical of the idea that the social sciences are awaiting some Newtonian-type laws to provide them with explanatory, predictive power.

Chapter Six on The Freedom of the Will is a modest yet haunting admission that we remain perplexed as to how an abiding sense of freedom can be made compatible with a universe built out of quarks, et al.

There is a general tension between the last chapter and some of Searle's preceding positive theses. (I thank Alan Musgrave for helping me see this.) What physics tells us about systems of elements at the fundamental micro-physical level looms large in our worries about not really being free in any sense that matters. At the same time we are advised to seek models of explanation for human action which are not in the tow of the paradigms from physics (e.g. Newtonian laws of mind and society). But if our model(s) for explanation of human intentional action are not to be forced into the mold(s) of explanations in physics, why should goings-on at the micro-level trouble our libertarian longings? On the other hand, Searle might be read as candidly acknowledging a kind of antinomy here.

Not unrelated to these general queries is a more specific one: what is there to convince us that mental states are *macro*-properties of the brain? What is it about the feeling of a headache, or the visual experience of redness, or the thought that this review is being submitted rather late, that serves to categorize them as *macro*-anythings? Can we triangulate *either* our own conscious, subjective, and often times intentional, mental states, *or* those of others, in anything like the way we can triangulate the liquidity that resides in and is caused by H₂O molecules? I think not. But if not, can we trust Searle's (rather pivotal) model of the mind-body relationship? I find it a compelling model in many ways, but in its current form it seems to me seriously incomplete.

Physicalism against the fashions, might be the most flattering way to summarize this book. Its lack of flirtation with any kind of eliminative materialism, strong artificial intelligence, or functionalism, infuse its hard-hitting themes with not only endearing, but to my mind, enduring qualities: a kind of robust,

untortured, and non-technical commonsensical posture which is likely to seem plausible long after various current and frighteningly popular 'research programs' have either transmogrified or simply bitten the dust.

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VICTOR J. SEIDLER. *Kant, Respect and Injustice: The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory*. Agincourt, ON and New York: Methuen 1986. Pp. 288. Cdn\$45.00; US\$29.95. ISBN 0-7102-0426-4.

This book is essentially a Marxist critique of Kantian moral philosophy. As such, one would expect it to attack Kant for espousing the related concepts of autonomy, equality, freedom, rationalism and individualism with respect morality and for more or less ignoring the social realities which may stand in the way of realizing these ideals. One's expectations are not disappointed by Seidler's book, although one is disappointed by the poor execution of his project. The book is highly repetitive, and so many of Seidler's sentences begin with 'This' that the reader becomes quickly more concerned with Seidler's unimaginative style than with his equally unimaginative, and often erroneous, theses. In the B edition Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Norman Kemp Smith, trans. [London: Macmillan Press 1929], xlv), Kant warns against the dangers of picking a sentence or passage here and there and trying to understand his system in terms of these rather than working through it as a whole. Unfortunately, Seidler seems to do just this in trying to show how Kant's thought lies at the center of liberal moral theory. A brief discussion of Seidler's view that Kant's bequest to us is an impoverished sense of self — a theme which lies at the heart of Seidler's criticisms of Kant — will illustrate the shortcomings of Seidler's scholarship.

Seidler wants to argue that Kant is able to establish his moral theory only at the cost of abstracting moral agents from their emotions and desires, from their everyday lives and activities. He correctly points out that Kant viewed people from a two-fold perspective — as beings within the 'system of nature' and as beings capable of standing outside and surveying this 'system of nature' by means of a rational faculty. But this is not to say that Kant 'denies any dignity to our earthly lives, to our social relations' (31), nor is it to say that 'we cannot *trust* our emotions, feelings, wants and desires' (38). As Seidler himself notes, Kant's view is:

Man is a being of needs, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, and to this extent his reason certainly has an inescapable responsibility from the side of his sensuous nature to attend to its interests and to form practical maxims with a view to the happiness of this and, where possible, of a future life. (*Critique of Practical Reason*, Lewis White Beck, trans. [New York: Bobbs-Merrill 1956], 61)

Kant does, in this passage, go on to argue that reason enables people to look beyond the immediate gratification of their 'sensuous nature[s]' but this is hardly a passage to support the claim that '[w]ithin a Kantian tradition we cannot accept our needs and desires, our emotions and feelings as aspects of our humanity' (Seidler, 40). Contrary to Seidler, Kant maintains:

To provide oneself with such comforts as are necessary merely to enjoy life (to take care of one's body, but not to the point of effeminacy) is a duty to oneself. The contrary of this is to deprive oneself of the essential pleasures of life, whether from avarice (of the slavish kind) or from exaggerated (fanatical) discipline of one's natural inclinations. Both of these are opposed to man's duty to himself. (*The Doctrine of Virtue*, Mary J. Gregor, trans. [Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press 1964], 451)

Seidler, it seems, is here repeating what Beck numbers as the fifth common, but mistaken, view of Kant's ethical theory: 'Kant's ethics is one-sided because he despised the emotions' ('Translator's Introduction,' *Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals* [New York: Bobbs-Merrill 1959], xviii).

Another aspect of Kant's moral theory that gives Seidler trouble is Kant's oft-repeated statement that people are to be treated as ends and not as means. Seidler attempts to minimize remarks of this nature in two ways. First, Seidler falls back on his view that Kant had little regard for people as beings with sensuous natures. According to Seidler, since Kant thought only disembodied rationality was worthy of respect, Seidler maintains that the respect Kant advocates is not a respect for people as such but a respect merely for their rationality. This, Seidler thinks, enabled Kant to ignore the unjust social realities in which many people function. Second, Seidler advances the bizarre notion that Kant was forced 'to assume that people, in some sense, *choose* to renounce their freedom' (87), that positions of subordination, with their concomitant lack of respect, a lack which is seemingly justifiable (Seidler would have Kant say), are 'freely chosen' (131). Seidler bases this interpretation on one sentence in *The Doctrine of Virtue* in which Kant says that a 'bondsmen' who 'freely consents to submit to [slavery], counting on his master's beneficence, commits the supreme rejection of his own humanity ...' (453). But Kant is not here excusing us from treating subordinates as ends because they 'choose' their position of subordination. In fact, to even talk about 'subordination' and 'structured dependency' as if it were given a green light by Kant is to discuss Kant anachronistically. Kant does assume that people have the ability to live more or less economically independent lives. Today, after witnessing the rise of industrialization and the enormous growth of the world population, we might question Kant's assumption of economic freedom as a possibility for all. But it was not unreasonable or 'blind' for Kant to do so. Furthermore,

Kant does recognize inequities within his own economic system, and he attributes the unjust distribution of wealth to people drawing to themselves 'a greater share of the world's wealth than [their] neighbor[s] ...' (*Lectures on Ethics*, Louis Infield, trans. [New York: Harper & Row 1963], 194). But so far as I know, Kant never hints that the poor are less worthy of respect and dignity than the rich. Nor does Kant's hypothetical remark about the 'bondsman' commit him to the view that the poor are poor because they choose their poverty. In short, Seidler here seems to be confusing Kant with Ronald Reagan.

As the history of Kant scholarship shows, by judiciously selecting some passages and systematically ignoring others, one can turn Kant into an advocate of virtually any tradition one chooses. Seidler's book is just one more example of how easy it is to misconstrue Kant's message in moral philosophy.

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K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE. *Risk Analysis and Scientific Method: Methodological and Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal Hazards*. Boston: D. Reidel 1985. Pp. 220. US\$19.50. ISBN 90-277-1845-8.

Why have we not done better in managing our technological risks? One answer may be that the seriousness of many risks may not be fully appreciated due to the misuse of risk assessment techniques. In this carefully researched and intelligently argued companion to *Science Policy, Ethics and Economic Methodology* (D. Reidel 1985), K.S. Shrader-Frechette again brings critical attention to an examination of the basic methods of risk analysis, viz., those techniques that aid in the determination of an acceptable level of risk. Here, the focus is on the method of revealed preferences, one of the most widely used methods of risk evaluation. This method of risk evaluation uses existing risk acceptance decisions as revealed in current risk abatement practices as a comparative basis for evaluating the acceptability of a new risk. The purpose of the present work is a philosophical analysis of some of the most critical ethical and epistemological assumptions implicit in the method of revealed preferences that can distort the assessment of risk and lead to poor public policy decisions regarding the acceptability of risk and the management of hazardous technologies.

For example, many leading exponents of the use of revealed preferences assume that the cost per life saved should not vary from one risk to another

and that the favored policy regulating risk ought to be one which saves the greatest number of lives for the least amount of money. Rational consistency and equity, they claim, would require spending the same amount of money for the same level of risk abatement regardless of the risks involved. The problem is that the desire for fairness that is at the base of these assumptions, what Shrader-Frechette calls 'the commensurability presupposition,' ignores the fact that risks are frequently dissimilar, with consequences affecting people's interests in radically different ways. Moreover, valuing people's lives the same across different risk reduction programs does not inevitably guarantee equality of protection. If human life is valued the same whether we are, for example, controlling auto risks or radiation risks, the result for exposure to each would not be the same simply because medical differences between people may place some of those suffering radiation exposure at a substantially greater risk than an equal auto hazard. The intelligent use of examples such as this helps to illustrate that there are compelling reasons for rejecting these assumptions, especially when the risk situation under evaluation is a relatively 'hard' case with few well-understood consequences.

Similarly, while it is widely assumed that a double standard for regulating worker risk as opposed to public risk is appropriate because workers consent to and receive compensation for the greater risks they bear, Shrader-Frechette challenges this assumption on the grounds that a voluntary choice of occupation does not morally guarantee that a particular level of occupational risk is acceptable. The assumption of 'the compensating wage differential' as a basis for tolerating a double standard for worker and public safety errs precisely because it confuses market demands with standards of ethical acceptability. The result is that workers may be unfairly burdened by risks society as a whole would not regard as acceptable if revealed risk preferences were ethically weighted.

There is also implicit in the use of revealed preferences the view — known as the probability-threshold view — that some amount of risk is always tolerable and that this suitably defines a level of risk that can be regarded as insignificant or as equal to zero. For example, the authors of the Rasmussen Report on nuclear reactor safety assumed that a nuclear accident with a probability of a fatality equal to 10^{-6} or lower is considered negligible.' It is also frequently assumed — the linearity assumption — that the actual probability of a fatality is directly related to the cost of abatement, such that risks with a greater probability ought to be attended to before smaller risks. By means of careful analysis, Shrader-Frechette convincingly argues that the reliance on revealed preferences errs in assuming that the probability magnitude of a risk is a sufficient basis for determining the acceptability of a given risk. Not only is this overly simplistic but it is false, as well, and 'ought to be replaced with more sophisticated methodological and ethical analyses of the conditions necessary and sufficient for judging a risk to be acceptable' (200).

And what might a more sophisticated approach look like? In an appeal to the spirit of Thomas Jefferson, Shrader-Frechette concludes that we need to develop risk assessment techniques that are more democratic and effectively

express the will of the people. Two suggestions that may meet this demand are 'the technology tribunal' and the use of *weighted* risk assessments.

The technology tribunal, similar in some respects to the science court idea advanced in the late 70s, recognizes the need to move away from the expert-dominated conception of risk analysis and bring to bear the values and opinions of a suitably informed public, in an adversarial process that permits the democratic balancing of competing views. Such citizen participation in the risk evaluation process would hopefully lead to policy decisions that adequately represent social and ethical values previously ignored. Likewise, following the common practice in economic theory that permits 'discounting' expected utilities due to inflation, for instance, we might further narrow the gap between the public's perception of risk and expert opinion by weighting risks, costs, and benefits according to a variety of commonly recognized ethical criteria, thereby discounting different risks relative to the perceived impact had on equity, compensatory justice, privacy, voluntariness, etc. While no claim is made as to the ultimate success of these approaches, the hope is that the resulting policy decisions regarding the acceptability of risk will be more in line with the ideal of a full and fair evaluation of societal risk.

In sum this is an informative and thoughtful book that brings philosophical analysis into the crucial arena of public policy, demonstrating the importance of ethical values in the determination of safety. It should be of considerable use to scholars and policy-makers concerned with improving risk analysis techniques and anyone interested in clarity about the issues.

ALBERT FLORES

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W.A. SUCHTING. *Marx and Philosophy*. New York: New York University Press 1986. Pp. xx + 133. US\$35.00. ISBN 0-8147-7852-6.

Marx and Philosophy is an interesting and provocative attempt to illustrate the fundamental conceptual inadequacies Marxists locate within traditional epistemologies. This book seeks to elaborate an alternative conception of the knowledge process that is implicit in the structure of the Marxian world-view.

Suchting suggests that the root of mainstream epistemology lies in the 'subject/object couple' (8). Close examination reveals that this couple is at the bottom of the classical distinction between 'materialism' and 'idealism.' The difference, that is, which exists between these opposing conceptions of reali-

ty lies precisely in the explanatory emphasis that they place on one or other pole of this couple. All forms of materialism are characterized by the ontological priority accorded to the object of knowledge. The object of knowledge is conceived as existing independently of any knowing subject, and is vouchsafed to the latter in a 'direct unmediated way' (8). Idealism, on the other hand, reverses this priority and awards explanatory primacy to the constituting activity of the subject.

The inadequacy of this approach is evidenced, Suchting argues, when traditional epistemology seeks to establish guarantees or criterias for the truth of knowledge claims. Here a dilemma arises, for either the putative claim to knowledge must itself be conceived as not requiring any further warrant or, alternatively, further criteria must be believed to be necessary. If the former 'dogmatic' approach is adopted, then the criteria for knowledge are simply established without any further justification. If the latter approach is taken then either the knowledge claim must have some final justifying criteria (and hence reduces itself again to a dogmatic claim) or there can be no ultimate justifying criteria. This results in the 'sceptical' conclusion that some statements or claims exist which are simply incapable of justification or guarantee. 'In general,' Suchting claims, 'the great historical systems are more or less complex combinations of dogmatism and scepticism' (10).

Suchting then shows how Marx elaborates an 'activist' epistemology which is founded in the priority he accords human labour in acting on and transforming the world. This epistemology involves a conceptual reformulation of the subject/object couple such that these terms are no longer constituted *prior* to theoretical practice but rather only achieve epistemic significance *within* that practice, as determinant moments of it. In this view the object of knowledge is worked upon in accordance with certain intentional human aims and becomes a 'humanized object' (12). At the same time, the individual subject of the labour process develops sensory capacities that are capable of receiving and understanding these new objective characteristics. 'The subject,' Suchting writes, 'becomes naturalized' (13).

If knowledge claims take place within a specific practice or process of production, there can be, Suchting argues, no ultimate 'foundations' or 'groundings' for such claims. Certainly some knowledge can be conceived as a necessary condition for further claims; however, fundamentally, each particular knowledge claim can only be evaluated within the framework of its ability to handle specific, concrete problems. 'Thus *change* is not merely accidental but rather an essential feature of the knowledge-situation, for it is only thus that the strengths and weaknesses of cognitive claims can be judged' (35).

The concept of a 'theoretical practice' is modeled on the same threefold distinction which permits us to analyse the structure of an 'economic practice.' Ordered with respect to 'increasing concreteness' (20) we have, first, a 'labour process' which is 'essentially the production of use-values' (21). This process is constituted by three 'factors of production,' that is, '(1) the pre-existing raw materials that are transformed in the process; (2) the tools or instruments which are used to transform (1); and (3) the labour-power which

applies (2) to (1)' (20). We also find, '(4) the plan according to which the process proceeds' (20), and 'technical relations of production' which define the set of relations between these factors 'within the constraints of the natural objective necessities of the process of production itself' (20).

In addition to the labour process we have, secondly, a 'production process' which is formed by a determinate set of social relations of production. These relations are 'relations of control over the factors of production (and hence over the product) by agents of production' (20). According to Suchting, and here he opposes such Marxologists as G.A. Cohen, it is the action of *both* the social and technical relations of production which combine the factors of production into a specific set of productive forces. Finally, there is a 'mode of production' which 'in the widest sense' embeds these productive forces 'within a system of political and ideological relations' (21). The production process is to be understood within the context of a particular form of state and within 'the ways in which people experience their real conditions of existence and as theorizations of these ways' (21).

Suchting further suggests that the entire process of theoretical production is itself 'embedded' within the structure of a particular economic mode of production. This is important, for the embedding mode is conceived as setting limits to, for example, the type of scientific instrumentation available in the labour process of a theoretical practice and, indeed, to the direction of scientific and theoretical enquiry itself (here Suchting cites the development of agricultural chemistry in the nineteenth century).

Finally, Suchting believes that Marxists are justified in arguing for the primacy of material practices in regard to the explanation of social life (what he terms 'social materialism' [76]) because of the superiority of the 'cognitive consequences' (66) of this approach over that of idealism. Generally speaking, because 'every consistent idealism is ultimately either a theism or some sort of solipsism' (66), idealism tends to generate unnecessary 'complications and mysteries' (66) which have in turn been used to 'maintain old forms of human oppression or to initiate new ones' (69). (Here, unfortunately, Suchting offers us no example.) While idealism is thus viewed as being inconsistent with the emancipatory interests of the working class, social materialism, on the other hand, not only provides a unifying conceptual framework for the generation of knowledge claims, but it also constitutes the 'ethico-political' (69) foundation for the positive enhancement of the project of human liberation.

The key to Suchting's formulation of the Marxian notion of epistemology lies, centrally, in the concept of practice. It is therefore a disappointment to the reader of this book that his explanation of the theoretical structure of a practice is not more developed.

Suchting's approach places excessive emphasis on the 'superstructural' (that is, ideological and political) framework within which the production of knowledge is conceived to take place. While consideration of the role knowledge plays in the struggle for human emancipation cannot be ignored it is, crucially, approaches of this kind which fail to explain *why* the Marxian

concept of theoretical practice is necessarily immune from the dogmatism and scepticism which infects traditional accounts of epistemology.

In focusing on the justificatory framework provided by the superstructure, Suchting draws attention away from a more fundamental level of enquiry whose emphasis would solve this problem. Marx's criterion of a knowledge claim rests on its ability to materially alter the world in accordance with the demands of human need. This follows from his general understanding of the social process which is rooted in the analysis of how a society's productive forces (of which 'scientific knowledge' is a constitutive element) function to produce and reproduce the structure of human life. It is, in other words, only a close and detailed study of the mode of development of a society's productive forces which will reveal the distinctively material and social foundations of the Marxist concept of epistemology. Suchting fails to heed Marx's tirelessly reiterated warning that it is *only* through the medium of the material foundations of society that human interaction and understanding in the world is to be adequately conceived.

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EDITH WYSCHOGROD: *Spirit in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger and Man-Made Mass Death*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1985. Pp. xvi + 247. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-300-03322-2.

When, in the 'Preface' to the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel says that the task of philosophy is to comprehend 'what is' because 'what is' is reason, his claim is not without precedent. But that philosophy, so regarded, 'is its own time grasped in thought,' is a revolutionary assertion on his part. The way to philosophic truth, which hitherto had been to escape from the cave of history to the realm of eternity, becomes with Hegel the 'recollection' of reason's essential (self-) realization *in* history. No longer a timeless possibility of abstract thought, Hegelian philosophy follows upon the actuality of the rational as a specific historical condition. Yet it also presumes to transcend this conditionedness insofar as the 'time is ripe' for the final speculative synthesis of historical reality and realised truth.

In relating 'specific historical matters to speculative concerns' (xi), Wyschogrod's inquiry into the meaning of 'man-made mass death' is a legitimate heir to the Hegelian project. 'What is living in the philosophy of Hegel,

what speaks to us as fresh and vital, is ... his recognition that the structure of Reason does not somehow float above historical experience' (65). This recognition provides the methodological direction. 'Rather than building a *cordon sanitaire* around ... our particular historical circumstances, we are free to use concrete data as access routes to a transcendental framework ... I do not use this strategy to justify my claims empirically but rather to bring into view a form of life, a region of being' (xi). Albeit Hegelian in inspiration, this strategy differs from the letter of Hegel in three decisive respects: i) Whereas Hegel's express purpose is systematic and comprehensive, the speculative synthesis ruling out in principle any future philosophical interpretations of history, Wyschogrod's is tentative and open-ended. 'I do not hope to find such a [transcendental] framework if we mean by it something eternal and immutable, [but] ... to locate a new historically conditioned a priori by considering the logical and ontological structure exhibited by man-made mass death in our century' (xi). ii) With Hegel, the 'historically conditioned a priori' is the concrete realization of universal reason that governs empirical events with the 'rational' necessity of an immanent providence. For Wyschogrod, it is 'the actual contextual grid shaping our experiences,' yet one that '... is itself subject to change if historical forces radically undermine it' (62). Such forces, however, are not the 'rule of reason' whose 'cunning' is to work through the contingent, but forces inherent in the very interplay of experience and contextual grid, having a compelling sense but no inexorable telos. iii) Hegel's actuality of the rational leaves no room for empirical events that could express something philosophically 'new' and world-historically significant, and hence no room for man-made mass death as anything but a relapse into tribalism or barbarism. For Wyschogrod, the 'death event' constitutes 'a new horizon ... vastly different from what we have historically inherited' (1). This is not to deny past instances of mass death and genocide. 'What is unprecedented in the new phenomenon is that the *means* of annihilation are the result of systematic rational calculation, and scale is reckoned in terms of the compression of time in which destruction is delivered,' along with 'the ever-present danger of the irreversible null-point, the destruction of all human life' (x).

Wyschogrod's main thesis, then, is not simply that the events of this century have 'once and for all established the radical incommensurability of reason and history' (65), but that the 'death event,' epitomized in the names "Hiroshima" and "Auschwitz", 'has given rise to a new transcendental framework that has altered 'the meaning of self, time and language' (ix). Her claim is that Western philosophy has generally understood selfhood and mortality in terms of what she calls the 'authenticity paradigm,' i.e., a schema in which the self is viewed chiefly as a 'cognition monad' whose way of facing its own death 'determines the value ascribed to it' (215, xii, 3). Yet the 'logic' of the death event, mirroring in society and history the formal structure of Zeno's paradoxes (xii), both overturns this paradigm, reducing it *in extremis* to 'self-parody,' and presages a new framework. 'Zeno's paradoxes are the algorithm for [a] new type of depersonalization in which ... persons become units in an inexhaustible reservoir of similar units,' in which 'language exhibits a cynical

doubling of meaning' (215), and in which ordinary time becomes the 'bad eternity' of indifferently more and more, though invested with a sense of unfulfillable urgency (100-3). By virtue of its scale, however, this 'logic' so disrupts our accustomed references that it draws attention to its opposite, i.e., to a self 'which rests on the primacy of the interpersonal sphere' (xiii), to the irenic function of language as 'a calling forth of the other into community' (208), and to the temporally integrated relational fields of *social* transactions.

In the poetry of Rilke, Wyschogrod shows 'that, beginning with the events of World War I, there is a strong tendency toward recognizing the impact of man-made mass death' (xii). Through a lengthy discussion of Hegel, she develops his critique of abstract 'understanding,' shows how the 'forces of negation lead to the implementation of the death event,' and how Hegel 'opens up a model for a transactional self' (xii). The discussion of Heidegger, although appreciative of his insights into the meaning of being as technology, is critical of the primacy he seems to grant 'things' over 'persons.'

One might question Wyschogrod's presentation: that the Rilke explication could be less obtruse for the non-initiate, that the long rehearsals of the Hegelian and Heideggerian positions could be better integrated into the main topic. One might also question the argument: that in rejecting the authenticity paradigm, it gives short shrift to Hegel's account of Stoicism (125) and Heidegger's discussions of 'solicitude' and 'resoluteness.' More importantly, one might question whether the argument obscures important differences between the 'death world' (i.e. the concentration camp as an institutional form) and other dimensions of the death event. These hesitations notwithstanding, anyone concerned to 'grasp our time in thought' will find this an original, insightful and challenging work.

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