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A.J. BAKER. *Australian Realism: The Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986. Pp. xxii + 150. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-521-32051-8.

John Anderson (1893, Scotland — 1962, Sydney), Professor of Philosophy in the University of Sydney from 1927 to 1958, is emerging in retrospect as the most important figure in the history of Australian philosophy. He did not publish much and almost anything he himself published appeared in Australia. The first and so far the major collection of his articles was edited by his friends only in 1962 (the year of his death) under the title of *Studies in Empirical Philosophy*, though smaller writings on education were later collected by D.Z. Phillips as *Education and Inquiry* (1980) and occasional papers and fragments on aesthetics were brought out by Janet Anderson et al. as *Art and Reality* (1982). But John Anderson lectured extensively, and it was through the classroom that he exerted direct and later indirect influence, affecting in various degrees such distinguished students of his as John Passmore, David M. Armstrong, Eugene Kamenka, John L. Mackie. In the 1930s to 50s Anderson was also in the centre of the controversies between 'Wittgensteinian' Melbourne and 'Andersonian' Sydney.

In his earlier book, *Anderson's Social Philosophy* (1979), A.J. Baker had dealt with Anderson's social and ethical theory and his public and political clashes. But although Anderson, a hard-hitting social critic, did not shun extra-academic debates, his entire thinking was highly systematic. In the present book Baker concentrates on this characteristic, offering an account of Anderson's thoughtfully worked-out philosophical position which he himself described as Realism, though such adjectives as 'empiricist,' 'objectivist,' 'pluralist' or even 'naturalist' would also be highly appropriate.

Anderson's Realism amounted, in the first place, to maintaining that 'whatever exists ... is a spatial and temporal situation or occurrence that is on the same level of reality as anything else that exists' (1). Thus there are no 'levels of existence' and 'degrees of truth' postulated by e.g., the British Idealists, or 'realms of value' inferred by some deontologists. Among his other contentions, Anderson was a deflationist: There are no eternal or abstract ob-

jects, no innate ideas, no separation between 'pure' universals and 'pure' particulars. Moreover, anything exists in process or flux, so that Heraclitus (one of Anderson's favourite philosophers) was the first to be right, at least in principle. Since there are no abstract entities, even mathematics and logic are essentially realist, dealing with facts or, putting it differently, with certain structures obtaining in the world. But while Anderson did not spare Ockham's razor in the sense of formulating a large number of critical arguments of his own, he also held that it is possible to have an objectivist aesthetics and an objectivist ethics. As regards the latter, he insisted on a distinction between ethics and morals: Whereas there are no objective oughts (since they are our concealed preferences and therefore 'relations'), there are objective goods and evils (as 'qualities' of some situations themselves, particularly mental situations).

Realism, for Anderson, included also a definite epistemological position: Roughly, we directly cognise situations which exist independently of the cogniser and which are infinitely complex and interacting. This meant the rejection of idealism, phenomenism, sense-data theories, the representation theory of perception, etc. It also meant rejecting the notion of consciousness as in some way substantial; being conscious is being related in a certain way. But mind, by contrast, was treated by Anderson in a naturalistic manner; though he did not go so far as to maintain, with contemporary physicalists, that mental qualities are nothing but physical processes, he was strongly suggesting, with some support from Freud, that mind is of an emotional nature. The distinction between consciousness and mind was a typical example of his insistence on the all important distinction between qualities and relations, just as he demanded relentless logical rigour in any philosophical analysis.

Baker's account is well documented by quotations from Anderson's publications and in some cases from unpublished lectures. It is underpinned by first-hand acquaintance with Anderson's oral comments (Baker was first a student, then a member of Anderson's staff), so that, as he writes, 'where necessary I have reconstructed missing views or arguments in a way I believe is consonant with his position' (xxii). Moreover, the book contains a most useful Introduction contributed by a sympathetic 'outsider,' Anthony Quinton. The overall portrait of Anderson is drawn by Baker quite effectively: Anderson was a systematically powerful and logically incisive mind, well versed in the history of philosophy, capable of and prone to express positions and oppositions in terms of the Western philosophical classics. There was also, in Quinton's words, 'an Andersonian spirit which combines business-like force and economy in tackling problems with ambitious boldness in taking on large topics and seeing them as hanging together as parts of a single intellectual exercise' (ix). It may be regrettable that Anderson occupied himself too much with local Australian (if not just Sydney) audiences; it may be regrettable that he worked in relative isolation, aware to his satisfaction of the philosophical shortcomings of many of his overseas contemporaries. Nevertheless, the result was far from parochial. He worked on universal, not transient, issues and now not only has his thought survived but is also receiving increasing though belated international recognition. Baker's book, concerned with the core of Ander-

son's philosophy, is a commendable basis and introduction to more detailed studies. It is to be hoped that some scholars will turn their attention to the voluminous sets of Anderson's lecture notes which still await editing in library archives of the University of Sydney.

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DANIEL R. BROOKS and E.O. WILEY. *Evolution as Entropy*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1986. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-226-07581-8.

This book attempts a radical reorientation of the theory of biological evolution. It should be of quite considerable interest to philosophers concerned with the nature and structure of scientific theorizing. Now, we can read to learn, or we can read to dismiss. *Evolution as Entropy* needs no more dismissals. It has been dismissed brusquely and acrimoniously in reviews appearing in several scientific journals. Nonetheless, philosophers have much to learn from it — and from the dismissals, to which I will turn in a moment.

The normal central project in evolutionary biology is to articulate or employ the theory of natural selection, perhaps defending it from current criticisms. Brooks and Wiley, in contrast, are centrally concerned with the possibility of making evolutionary taxonomy a science. They think this is possible provided that there is something very like a generative grammar of species, genera, families, etc. So the theory they provide pushes natural selection to the background and emphasizes the evolutionary process as a series of informational transformations. The implied critique of orthodox Darwinians is that they have produced an elaborate theory of micro-evolution, and a very sketchy theory of macro-evolution. The Neo-Darwinian tradition is willing to rest its primary claims to ascendancy on its success in micro-evolution, content to leave a rigorous precise account of higher taxa for later. Brooks and Wiley argue that no theory failing to account for macro-evolution centrally and directly can claim to be established firmly, no matter what its local successes at the micro level may be. Philosophers ought to be extremely interested in this debate about the criteria of theory acceptance, and its eventual outcome.

Brooks and Wiley cast a major aspect of ongoing debates about mechanism in terms of the distinction between initial conditions models and bound-

ary conditions models. The idea is that any process begins in a system having a particular conformation or structure. So, for example, the evolution of a given lineage starts from a point at which there is a very determinate package of genetic information within the genome of the lineage. This is presumably the 'stuff' upon which evolutionary processes are based. A boundary conditions approach (such as Neo-Darwinianism) takes the 'stuff' as an essentially inert 'given' and asks about the exogenous forces operating on the given stuff to produce evolutionary change. This is clearly mechanistic. An initial conditions approach asks about the dynamic possibilities inherent in the initial genome of a lineage. There may be reasons to think that the initial stuff is not inert and that change will take place independent of exogenous forces. There may be ways of explaining this change (and even predicting it, within reasonable limits) as an orderly process obeying fundamental scientific laws.

Among the major motivations behind Brooks and Wiley's choice of an initial conditions model of evolution is the already mentioned attempt to provide a generative grammar of taxonomy. The background is a long-standing debate among taxonomists about whether it's *possible* for taxonomy to be a science. What is needed, think Brooks and Wiley, is an underlying general theory from which the 'facts' of taxonomy can be derived. Now, this requirement of derivability could be an over-rigorous, and perhaps illusory one. We may remind ourselves that in no area of science are predictions derivable independent of choice of boundary conditions. In effect, Brooks and Wiley demand of a generative theory that the actual array of biota now living be derivable in every particular as 'theorems' of an underlying theory. Such a task might be highly unreasonable, and has been attacked as such by a number of critics.

Their allegiance to this unreasonable extreme obscures, it seems to me, the contribution they could make to an ultimate pluralism. It has also led to the abrupt dismissals I mentioned before. But directly across the adversarial table from Brooks and Wiley sit the totalizing ultra-Darwinians of niche-seeking adaptationism, who offer us an extreme of their own, the very mirror of the Brooks-Wiley theory. At the level of doctrinal polemicizing this looks like a war that can end only with an unconditional surrender. But when you look at the first order work done at the bench and in the field, you find that the heuristic strategies organizing research in evolutionary biology are pluralistically situated in the middle ground between the extremes. Good research design seems to be no respecter of doctrinal purity. In fact, chapters and long sections of chapters in *Evolution as Entropy* allow a pluralistic reading, despite themselves, as it were. For us, who are supposed to be post-Kuhnians, this situation is itself a laboratory where, for once, we can watch the dynamics of a scientific community *in vivo*.

A major feature of the dynamics is peremptory — even insulted and insulting — dismissal. The chief target is Brooks and Wiley's use of the concept of entropy, to which we have to turn in closing. Taking advantage of the fact that living things are dissipative structures, organized as processers of incoming energy and discharging it in a degraded form to a sink, Brooks and Wiley

set out to generalize the picture to include species as dissipative structures. The claim is that genomes are informational entities as they figure in reproduction and development, so a suitable information-related measure of entropy should be available to apply to the information a species 'shares' in consequence of its *being* a species. Brooks and Wiley provide such a concept of entropy as their major contribution. But there are many shaky inferences in this line of thought, and in the decision to call the resulting concept entropy rather than something else. Thus the project is vulnerable to the attacks it has received. The foundations for the concept of entropy, and its extension to informational formulations, are the subject of lively debate. Physicists are extremely sensitive to extensions of the concept, so we find them joining the doctrinaire Darwinists in peremptory dismissal. But I would say that the presence of the lively debate is precisely why the contribution of Brooks and Wiley *cannot* be dismissed. Brooks and Wiley's theory is far more intelligent and sophisticated than the dismissive reviews would have us believe. In coming to understand the various concepts of entropy and their relationships we're going to have to get straight the concepts of order and organization, simplicity and complexity, and information itself. Books like the one under review will be a big help in this task, a task requiring both philosophically sophisticated scientists and scientifically sophisticated philosophers.

If in order to be good ones books have to be the repositories of lapidary truth, *Evolution and Entropy* will be found wanting. On the other hand, if we can appreciate intellectual challenges that contribute to continuing productive dialogue, I have no difficulty saying that this is a good book. But this judgment is sensible only if we're willing to engage in the dialogue rather than dismiss it.

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MICHEL DESPLAND. *The Education of Desire: Plato and the Philosophy of Religion*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1985. Pp. xiv + 394. CDN\$45.00. ISBN 0-8020-6524-4.

Few would deny, I suppose, that there is a strand in Plato's thought which could be called religious, at least insofar as he has a conception of transcendent good and the life of the soul in relation to that good. This spiritual dimension has been the subject of much discussion and interpretation. How it can

be clearly and satisfactorily wedded with the ontological and epistemological concerns which also form a central part of the Platonic philosophising is a perpetual problem for those to whom Plato still speaks. To those to whom he does not, of course, such matters are no doubt arcane philosophical trivia, or perhaps just trivia.

The present book, however, claims to be not just one more in that long line of interpretations; for it is not concerned simply with that spiritual dimension of Plato's thought, but with his Philosophy of Religion. The book is designed to show that Plato engages in philosophy of religion and that this is more central to his philosophical concerns than has hitherto been recognised.

What is meant here by philosophy of religion and how it is to be distinguished in any useful way from Plato's religious/spiritual philosophy is not altogether clear to me. This, however, may not be of any great significance, a matter of terminology only. The aspects of the book which should be of most interest to those to whom Plato does still speak are those which suggest that we can discern a continuity and development of religious thought between dialogues, such as the *Republic*, which develop Plato's account of the soul, justice and the good, and the *Laws*: a development which moves towards an account of religion, not the abandonment of the optimism of salvation for the pragmatics of government. Thus Plato:

... strives to understand the Greek religious tradition; he wants to reform it. In religious matters, as elsewhere, the philosopher wants to bring back to disturbed Athens a sound insight into the true nature of its own welfare. The assumption is that religion plays a crucial role in the transmission of paradigms of culture. The assumption remains that true piety is something that exists. But the way of true piety is to be exhibited by a discriminating look at what has traditionally passed for piety.

Such is, I contend, the nature of Plato's undertaking as a philosopher of religion. (85-6)

These are bold claims. I dare say that if Plato did turn his full gaze upon the religious traditions of his own time he would want to reform them; he did, after all, want to reform almost everything else. The crucial task for this book, however, is to show that throughout the dialogues, and not just in the two dialogues in which religion is discussed at length, Plato is engaged in this critical and sustained attempt at reformation. The author sees Plato's thought as having a 'trajectory,' suggesting a clear and definite line of argument.

Whilst recognising that there were a multiplicity of religious practices among the Greeks, the author nevertheless finds a unity sufficient to entitle him to talk of one religion. 'An intelligible order, a delicate friendship, and festivals which attune man to the divine world, these are the generalisations we are prepared to venture about Greek religious culture' (98). The relation of men to this divine world, and indeed the nature of that world, are what concern Plato. Thus the *Euthyphro* is read as being centrally concerned with the critique of conventional religion. Religion is not to be seen as just an example in the context of which the Socratic themes about ignorance and definitions are being displayed.

The *Republic* provides more in the way of critique, but also the development of the proper account of the appropriate virtues, the story of the soul, and the necessity for the form of the Good. All this gives us the epistemological background which will enable us to see the necessity for the soul to be properly ordered and oriented towards the 'divine.' The problem has always been, for even the most sympathetic reader of Plato, that the gap between the realm of the Forms and the world with which even the best of souls has for some time to deal has seemed rather wide, a chasm rather than a gap perhaps. By seeing in Plato a 'trajectory' of thought about religion the suggestion seems to be that we can see how this gap can be made to disappear. The demiurge does his work.

Despland recognises of course that Plato discusses many different issues in these texts, and that he does not explicitly connect them up for us. Nonetheless, 'casual readers, that is, innocent readers, who believe what they read, ordinarily find in Plato a coherent religious message. There is a God (and/or the gods), there is a world, and there is a self-orienting human soul open to healing divine influences but responsible for its fate. And Plato would, I think, be pleased if he were to find out that he had commonly been read in this way' (189).

One might see this book then as partly providing a justification for that 'innocent' view. Despland offers us a considerable amount of detail, and a clear sympathy for the Platonic enterprise, even though he admits that, in the end, it does not entirely succeed. However, the argument is not assisted by considerable stylistic defects. Philosophers are often wary, and quite rightly, of criticising the literary style of fellow philosophers. Nonetheless, I shall grasp this particular nettle because for this reader much of the force of the argument became lost in flourishes of rhetoric which eventually became positively irritating. So, for example, we are told

Conversational dramas with participants shuttling between mythos and logos enable Plato to weave the truest possible statement ... And there are pauses. What we call a pregnant silence, that pause in the conversation where some yet unspecified meaning seems to descend speechlessly among the participants, is said by the Greeks to be the moment when Hermes is passing. ... But Plato has an ear for transitions, passages, glimpses of the naked molusc [*sic*] that leaves its outgrown shell to ensconce itself in a new one. (198)

As well as the discussions of Plato, this book is rich with more general observations on philosophy of religion, particularly in the closing chapter (the 'Un-Platonic Postscript'), and on philosophy and its relation to religion. Much of this is very interesting, and one might wish sometimes for further elucidation of such remarks as the following: 'Philosophy opens a common path to men and women; it gives women access to a dignity that does not ape the antics of aristocratic warriors and men access to a kindness that is not the episodic one encouraged by sex' (243). Somehow the history of philosophy does

not quite bear this out; but then it might be that so far what we are wont to call philosophy is not *real* philosophy at all.

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ANTONY DUFF and NIGEL SIMMONDS, eds. *Philosophy and the Criminal Law*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag 1984. Pp. 170. DM38. ISBN 3-515-04169-9. (Also *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie*. Beiheft 19, 1984.)

Of all legal spheres, none has stronger or more perennial fascination for philosophers than that of the criminal law. For here one faces all the problems of practical philosophy, but faces them in the context of a history and tradition of elaborate thought and conceptualisation, and one in which the thinkings and conceptualisings are perhaps uniquely well documented. At the centre of the criminal law is the concept of action, as the potential topic of requirement or prohibition. Next comes the concept of responsibility: For what actions can a person be held answerable? Must actions be intended if they are to be properly the agent's very own doings? And what kinds of diseases or disabilities elide the link of agent and action, or exclude or diminish responsibility (can responsibility be diminished, or is it an all-or-nothing concept?), and on what ground do we hold people responsible anyway? Is being 'responsible' a necessary or a sufficient condition of being punishable? And what of punishment, its meaning, purpose and justification? And by this stage one is into the heart of a theory of justice. And justice brings with it not only questions of substance, but also of process. And where better to begin a consideration of processual justice than with a consideration of positive legal processes and their purported rationale and justification?

Of course, even this breathless *tour d'horizon* fails to exhaust the range of potential philosophical interest to be found in issues of the criminal law. There is much more to it than that. Still, the question might be whether the above list gets at the central questions. If it does, there is all the more to be said for Duff and Simmonds' editing of *Philosophy and the Criminal Law*, though a good deal of credit will also, doubtless, belong to the essayists whose work is edited in it. The essays were in origin the papers presented to the UK

Association for Legal and Social Philosophy at its 1983 Conference in Manchester. That their coverage is so admirable is a tribute to the Conference organisers; that they appear in a form thoroughly appropriate to the permanently printed rather than the fleetingly disputatious word is a tribute to the contributors but all the more to the editors. Taken as a whole and in parts, this is an admirable production.

What of the parts? The starter is Thorstein Eckhoff's Austin lecture on the theme of 'Justifications of Punishment,' followed with a commentary by Nicola Lacey. Eckhoff's discussion, as Lacey's critique forcefully remarks, does not take us very far beyond standard run-of-the-mill accounts of retribution as justice and deterrence as utility. But it does a good job in the line of gentle scepticism about the possibility that existing penal practices anywhere can be seriously thought to be effectually justified by reference to the standard justifications. Lacey's reply takes that insight forward by suggesting that punishment cannot be justified in and of itself in isolation, but only as part of a theory about the totality of relations between citizen and state, that is, within a comprehensive theory of political justice.

The point is well taken, and recurs with variations in other essays. Antony Duff's states his now more extensively argued thesis that criminal processes and punishments are ideally and ought to be really acts of communication between community and citizen, with punishment the legal analogue of moral blame. This supplies him with an interesting rationale for the Insanity defence, for the mentally disordered person is incapable of entering into a rational dialogue with the state or its agents. In reply to this, Martin Wasik discerns an excessive stress on cognitive rationality in Duff's paper. This may be true, yet Duff has surely done that hardest of things, viz., has introduced a new idea into the punishment debate, and indeed one which will henceforth find some place in any acceptable view.

If the cognitive is arguably overstressed in the Duff theory, one need look no farther than to Andrew Ashworth's 'Sharpening the Subjective Element in Criminal Liability' for a rectification of balances in favour of the conative. The real basis of liability, says he, lies only in what one tries to do, not in what one actually brings about. John Harris rather effectively subverts this point on the argument that the same must apply to praise; yet praise demands effective action, not just good intent. The implicit puzzle here for retributive theory, represented in this book by Hyman Gross ('Culpability and Desert') is to explain what exactly is the ill-desert which punishment is to annul. That this is a difficulty for retributivists does not, however, make their position unintelligible, as Ted Honderich urges in reply.

In its last pair of papers, by Gerry Maher and John Cottingham, the book comes back unequivocally to citizen/state questions in a discussion of the values of the criminal process and the balancing of rights and interests sometimes arguably involved therein. At a time of ever-rising crime statistics, we do have to ask how to balance rights of accused persons against the interest of persons at large in an effectual enforcement of criminal law. And surely a theory of punishment has to address these questions too.

Apart from the essays noted, the book has a neatly concise Introduction by Nigel Simmonds and an extremely useful select Bibliography at the end.

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C. STEPHEN EVANS. *Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1985. Pp. xi + 304. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-391-02737-9.

The poetic or 'aesthetic' writings of Kierkegaard, in which he wears the mask of pseudonymity, are often a stumbling-block to commentators on his thought. If we attribute to pseudonyms *his* thought, we violate his interpretive warnings. If we don't, we have before us an interesting literary-philosophical exercise in thought-experiments. Evans approaches this issue in a sensible way: he discusses Johannes Climacus' philosophy of religion and his intellectualistic analysis of the essential ingredients of Christianity while indicating, along the way, where K. agrees with his created philosopher. In his first three chapters Evans discusses K.'s method of presenting alternative possibilities of thought and existence and offers a clear overview of the spheres of existence.

As soon as he begins his treatment of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* and then deals with essential elements in *Philosophical Fragments*, Evans shifts gears and grapples with the details of what may be called Climacus' phenomenology of the forms of religious consciousness. Of special interest is the emphasis on man as a dynamic synthesis of finitude and infinitude, the temporal and the eternal, of necessity and freedom (56). Kierkegaard's brief, but rich, unpublished essay, *Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est*, is touched upon because of its relevance for understanding the distinction between reality and ideality and the way the individual is in conscious relation between the domain of the conceptual-linguistic (the eternal) and that of immediate actuality. Evans is alert to Climacus' various uses of the term 'eternal' and culls four basic senses of it from his writings: it refers to abstract, logical possibilities, to ideal moral obligations, to God, and to man's anticipated 'eternal life.'

Although Evans is sanguine about the various uses of this central term in Climacus' writings, less sympathetic readers could point to the ambiguity that often surrounds it. Thus, for example, Climacus sometimes uses the expres-

sion 'the eternal' to refer to the ethical. This is fine if it means that ethical ideals or principles are presented as nontemporal, as universal. But the eternity *in the self* is another matter. Evans cites Climacus' claim that in subjective passion an individual is made 'infinite' in the 'eternity of imagination.' At least momentarily, the eternal can be duplicated in existence (69). But we are often unsure of *how* this duplication is supposed to be taking place. Is it by means of the concrete realization of a universal moral ideal? Is it an imaginative experience of eternity? Is it a passionate feeling of *a relation to the eternal*? Despite the clarity of his analysis of the uses of 'eternal' in Climacus' writings, Evans, in his later discussions, does not always make clear how this crucial term is used in various contexts. And conspicuously absent from his commentary on the *Philosophical Fragments* is any discussion of the paradoxical 'Moment': the reception of the influx of transcendence, the acceptance, in faith, of the Incarnation, the decisive point in an individual's life in which an historical person is committed to an historically significant eternal truth.

Evans provides a lucid account of ethical existence, describing it as a 'soul-making ethics' that is distinguished from the social ethics of Hegel and Marx. Although it is conceded that this existence is possible for a non-religious person, Evans later stresses the relation between an ethics of becoming subjective and a religious commitment. Although he, more than some other commentators on Kierkegaard, is sensitive to the presence of Socrates in Climacus' presentation of ethical existence, he does not seek support for the pre-religious nature of ethical existence in an appropriate, available place: in K.'s journals and papers. For there K. calls Socrates the 'ethical hero' and insists that in ethical being the individual projects the ideal self as the absolute. Socrates displays the intensification of subjectivity and the ironic self-criticism (a point not emphasized by Evans) that is paradigmatic of ethical existence. For this reason, one hesitates to agree with Evans that 'existence and ethical existence are synonymous' (72).

In his analyses of indirect communication (which is correctly related to Socrates' maieutic communication) and subjectivity and truth, Evans gives us a valuable and clear exposition of what Climacus means. He accurately points out that the notion of subjective truth has nothing to do with the question of propositional truth (126), but a great deal to do with existing truly or authentically. In the domain of Christianity, as Evans shows, Climacus turns this into an anti-Socratic view: subjectivity, in relation to Christian Truth, is, relatively, 'untruth.' In *Philosophical Fragments* Climacus, with Evans' approbation, argues that those who cannot grasp the absolute paradox that an eternal being (God) came into existence in time in the being of an individual, historical human being (Jesus Christ) are unable to do so because they are 'sinful' and possess what Evans calls a 'plausibility structure' that prohibits them from accepting this paradoxical truth.

Although, in general, Evans is a reliable guide through the dialectical pathways of Climacus' two major works, the exposition of, and commentary on, the *Philosophical Fragments* are sometimes disquieting. It is held, for exam-

ple, that the absolute paradox that lies at the heart of Christianity, the Incarnation, is *not* logically contradictory. But, surely, the assertion that an eternal being has come into existence in time, in history, is, from the point of view of rationality, contradictory. What is not mentioned is Climacus' clear distinction, in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, between the logical possibility of the God-idea (the hypothetical conception of the existence of an eternal being) and the absolutely paradoxical notion of a God-man. If Evans is saying that the paradox of an eternal-temporal being can be grasped qua paradox, he is right. He seems, at times, to say more than this. Thus, to refer to an earlier point, it is held by Climacus that the absolute paradox cannot be *understood* because those who seek to grasp it are in sin (and, hence, in untruth). But if Climacus' point is pushed, then his whole project of making clear what Christianity is, his dialectical distinctions between religiousness A and religiousness B, his painstaking undermining of our confidence in reason by means of dialectical, rational analyses may not be comprehensible to his (sinful) readers either. The absolute paradox *must* be a stumbling-block to any rational individual if it is to be an objective uncertainty that is passionately embraced in subjective faith. As Evans says in a few places, Climacus is an anti-Hegelian who attacks the rationalizing of faith and Christianity, the philosophical co-optation of Christianity, that is central to Hegel's negation of its religious truth and his preservation of its symbolic and philosophical meaning.

There are numerous details in Evans' study that are insightful and valuable. His discussion of immanent religious existence and its 'signs' is carefully presented. Perhaps one might quarrel with the stress upon the individual's powerlessness before God, the negation of the self in the absolute relation between the individual and God, in Climacus' description of religious existence. For, in the context, he has repeatedly emphasized the value of the subjective individual, the importance of existence as striving, the centrality of the intensification of subjectivity. But the description of religious existence appears to obliterate this hard-won selfhood. Self-annihilation and the passive embrace of suffering comes very close to the quietism that Climacus, as Evans shows, is quick to deny.

The same problem crops up in the long discussions of faith in general and Christian faith in particular. Climacus (and Kierkegaard) seems to present faith, at first, as if it were a Promethean climb up the ladder to God (his name itself means 'John the Climber'), a series of strenuous choices. But when we are brought into the circle of Christian belief, we are told (with Evans' approval) that God gives man the gift of faith, that man can only respond or not respond to this offer. In some ways Climacus, the religious outsider, the philosophical analyst and dialectician of the modalities of religious existence, is more orthodox than his creator. Evans is quite aware of the irony in Climacus' writings. But what we don't know is how far it extends. So, as Evans' sifting of his two major works clearly shows, we are dealing with a subtle and elusive philosopher who points to the existential possibility of living an ethical, a re-

ligious, and Christian life in accordance with his surprisingly detailed conceptual requirements.

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ALAN J. FRIEDMAN and CAROL J. DONLEY. *Einstein as Myth and Muse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. xi + 224. US\$39.50. ISBN 0-521-26720-X.

Around the year 1820, the poet John Keats expressed his disgust with the effect of science and technology on the English way of life in the words: 'Art is the tree of life/ ... Science the tree of death.'

The central theme of *Einstein as Myth and Muse* is that science and the arts are not unrelated, or oppositely oriented areas of human cultural activity, but that there is a very real and demonstrable relationship between science, the arts, literature and broader aspects of human culture.

In the introductory chapters the authors illustrate that many post-renaissance poets were very much influenced by the Newtonian world view and its implications in 17th and 18th century society. Quotations from Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida* are used to portray the pre-Newtonian world view in which the irregular behaviour of comets and planets can have devastating effects on the social order on earth:

...But when the planets
In evil mixture to disorder wander,
what plagues, and what portents, what mutiny
what raging of the sea, shaking of earth....
Divert and crack, rend and deracinate
The unity and married calm of states
Quite from their fixture.

After the Newtonian revolution a much more lawful universe emerges, and this lawfulness is reflected in the poetry of Donne, Pope, Keats and many others. Arthur Clough emphasizes this lawfulness in a rather negative way:

...Earth goes by chemic forces; Heaven's
A Mechanique Celeste!
And heart and mind of human kind
A watch-work like the rest.

The authors illustrate clearly that pre-twentieth century poets took very seriously the implications of science and technology for human society. In the quotations presented one sees both a glorification of science, and later, a growing distrust of the power and scope of science and technology.

In the twentieth century, Einstein's figure, more than any other modern physicist, has become established in the public mind as the symbol of a new age. The authors suggest that, after 1919, Einstein's overthrow of traditional beliefs and structures of science inspired and supported a lot of experimentation with the content and structure of the arts. The direct impact of relativity theory on the content of poetry can be seen in Robert Frost's 'Any Size We Please':

...He stretched his arms out to the dark of space
And held them absolutely parallel
In infinite appeal, then saying "Hell"
He drew them in for warmth of self-embrace,
He thought if he could have his space all-curved,
Wrapped in around itself, and self-befriended,
His science wouldn't get him so unnerved. ...

The authors' claim that the structure (or lack of structure) of modern poetry, fiction and art also owes much to the revolutions in physics is supported with quotations from the works of William Carlos Williams, Louis Zukovsky, Virginia Woolf, Lawrence Durrell, James Joyce and many others. While somewhat skeptical of a direct relation between the structure of modern physics and the concept of structure in the arts and humanities, I nevertheless was struck by the analogy between Zukovsky's point that poetic form is nothing more than the extension of poetic content and the modern scientific view that the structure of space-time is nothing but an extension of space-time's material content.

From being an intellectual and cultural hero, Einstein's image took a drastic turn in 1945, when Einstein came to represent a contemporary version of the 'Prometheus myth,' bringing atomic fire to a civilization unprepared to handle its immense powers. It's interesting to note that Berthold Brecht, for example, in the play *The Life of Galileo*, changes the whole theme of the play when he states in the introduction to the second version: 'Overnight the biography of the founder of the new system of physics read differently. The infernal effect of the great bomb placed the conflict between Galileo and the authorities in a new, sharper light.'

In Chapter 6, 'A Myth Portrayed,' the authors show in a nice way that the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy does not historically have much to do with Einstein's theoretical developments in physics. Instead of the popular version of history which interprets nuclear energy as an unforeseen and unintended consequence of special relativity, the authors show convincingly, with quotations from Ernest Rutherford (1903) and Frederick Soddy (1903), that the potential for releasing the energy of the nucleus owed its origin much more to the study of radioactivity and nuclear physics than to Ein-

stein's proof of $E = mc^2$. To quote Soddy: 'The man who puts his hand on the lever by which a parsimonious nature regulates so jealously the output of this store of energy would possess a weapon with which he could destroy the earth if he chose' (164). The authors also demonstrate that the treatment of atomic energy and atomic weapons in early fiction also relates more to experimental nuclear physics than to special relativity.

The value of a book can often be measured by the impact of the book on the reader. While often somewhat frustrated by the (perhaps necessary) brevity of some of the quotes, *Einstein as Myth and Muse* has caused me to reread plays such as Durrenmat's *The Physicists*, the poetry of Archibald MacLeish, John Keats and others, and has propelled me to the local public libraries to find the books of Robert Coover, whose *The Universal Baseball Association, Inc. J. Henry Waugh, Prop.* is judged by Friedman and Donley to be the most detailed, accurate, and knowledgeable parallel to the quantum theory.

Einstein as Myth and Muse will remain a valued part of my personal library. Undoubtedly other books on the relationship between science and the arts will be written, treating perhaps each of the topics dealt with by Friedman and Donley in greater detail, but the book will be a valuable catalyst for further reading in this area for me.

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PETER J. HADREAS. *In Place of the Flawed Diamond: An Investigation of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy*. Peter Lang: New York 1986. US\$30.00. ISBN 0-8204-0211-7.

In Place of the Flawed Diamond by Peter Hadreas is itself a gem in many of its exegetical passages, but in its overall 'setting' must be considered seriously flawed. The book has a dual focus: On the one hand, there is an attempt to delineate the movement of Merleau-Ponty's thought from his conception of 'the human order,' to the 'the body-subject,' to the 'chiasma'; and on the other hand, an attempt to argue that Merleau-Ponty mistakenly persisted in presenting 'his insights as if they were interpretations — the *Ungedacht* — of the writings of others' (8). Hadreas is at his best when he finds a correlate within literature or painting or music in order to exemplify and unravel some of Merleau-Ponty's most dense concepts, but seems misled in the overall ar-

gument of his book, and in many of the assumptions about Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre that he uses to support it.

The thesis of *In Place of the Flawed Diamond* is a strange one in terms of the philosophy being explicated. Merleau-Ponty's notion of language articulates a process by which each thinker, each writer, comes to inhabit a tradition, a world as 'sung' by a language, and insofar as that thinker succeeds in making manifest a 'new' way of thinking, it is by a 'coherent deformation' of what has come before. These notions most clearly articulated in the 1950s by Merleau-Ponty hearken back to his original insight in the early writings that all 'accidental' features of one's situation in their being 'taken up,' 'worked-through,' or 'unfolded' through action are the 'necessary' structures of perceiving, speaking, writing and acting. For Merleau-Ponty, as a philosopher, one can only think and write as 'inhabiting' a field of prior significations, making it one's own, finding this past as one's 'body' qua writer and thinker and 'twisting' it, 'deforming' it, or in other words 'gesturing' with it in such a way that it takes on one's unique 'style' which is the embodiment of one's unique understanding of the world. To attempt to show that Merleau-Ponty did not rely on his predecessors and contemporaries in the endeavor of thinking to give himself a place, a depth, out of which to write (as he himself felt), is an unacknowledged attempt to undermine not only Merleau-Ponty's self-understanding, but also Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of writing and thinking that Hadreas is attempting to explicate and support.

In addition to the overall contradiction to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy in Hadreas' thesis, more specific problems emerge in his understanding of Merleau-Ponty's use of *fundierung*, gesture, the role of time, and the reversibility of the flesh, especially in their relationship to the work of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre. As Merleau-Ponty's philosophy itself warns us in its notion of 'inhabitation' and 'coherent deformation,' if one fails to plumb the depths of the way in which a philosophy is anchored in previously articulated and inexhaustible insights, then the complete significance of the way in which this new articulation differs can't be appreciated either. In too easily, too quickly, too superficially, claiming the 'differentness' of Merleau-Ponty's vision from that of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, Hadreas obscures the force of the surprising divergences of Merleau-Ponty from within the common understandings of these philosophers.

The overall project of *In Place of the Flawed Diamond* to detail the evolution of Merleau-Ponty's thought from the conception of 'the human order' in *The Structure of Behavior*, to the 'body subject' in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, to the 'chiasma' of the *Visible and the Invisible* is well executed. This book would be useful for students or those who were unacquainted with Merleau-Ponty's work in order to get a sense of his central concepts.

In discussing Merleau-Ponty's transformation of the notion of the Gestalt in *The Structure of Behavior*, Hadreas correctly focuses on what he calls Merleau-Ponty's 'third account' of the Gestalt qua 'structure.' Hadreas deftly unpacks the sense of Gestalt as a balance of inner and outer horizon that becomes situated in the motoric/perceptual interplay unique to the human or-

der. Less convincing to readers acquainted with Husserl, and less helpful to those readers unacquainted with this tradition of thought, is Hadreas' contention that with this notion of Gestalt Merleau-Ponty has developed a notion that goes beyond the limits of Husserl's idea of intentionality. I disagree that Husserl's analyses left out a place for an appreciation of the indeterminate within the phenomenon or that Husserl's notion of intentionality can only be 'thought of as a subject/object relationship' (35) that rules out a dialectical interchange with the world. I find Robert Sokolowski's interpretations of Husserlian intentionality in his *Presence and Absence* far more compelling, and in that work a convincing case is made that Husserl did indeed conceive of 'empty intention' in its tie to indeterminacy and as central to the kind of 'dialectic' Hadreas appreciates in Merleau-Ponty's work. Hadreas asserts that the development of the dialectical ramifications of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy 'continue to be hampered by his respecting the doctrine of intentionality' (37), especially in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, until *The Visible and the Invisible*. Yet Merleau-Ponty himself diagnoses this difficulty as stemming from his having remained within the domain of the terminology of traditional dualistic philosophy, and not as a result of the notion of intentionality, and intentionality as expressed within Merleau-Ponty's unique idiom is still central to *The Visible and the Invisible*.

The section of the book explicating the 'body-subject' has several strong points. The example of the diner caught in the throes of disappointment at the lack of beef bourguignon at the four star French restaurant is a wonderful way of exemplifying the dimension of the body-subject as 'pre-personal' or as the 'anonymous one' (79) that has its distinguishable rhythm from that of the 'personal' one who can change instantaneously the intention to eat another dish yet 'the way his body has become set cannot so easily be undone' (79). The synergy of sensorial registers, activity, spatial setting, the pre-personal, and the gestural are well explicated. Certainly, one of Hadreas' keenest insights, overlooked by many other commentators, is his realization that *authenticity for Merleau-Ponty would have to involve a keeping connected to the pulse of the body-subject*, in its pre-personal dimension too (92). However, in this section Hadreas continues to make 'whipping boys' of Sartre, Heidegger and Husserl in order to bolster Merleau-Ponty: Hadreas fails to see Heidegger's appreciation of projects as ultimately 'set back into the earth' in a more primordial disclosure in *The Origin of the Work of Art* (48), overlooks Sartre's own formulation of the body in distinction to the dilemma of *reflective consciousness* (77), reduces Sartre's and Heidegger's analyses of authenticity to 'an either/or dichotomy' (90), and mistakenly attributes to Husserl the notion that the 'I can' is a phenomenon of 'a personal subject' (94).

The later part of the book will again be helpful to students in understanding Merleau-Ponty's notions of 'interrogation' and 'the flesh.' Hadreas does well to insist on seeing the 'sides of the chiasm relation are "in" one another to the extent that we cannot think one without implying the other' (152), properly detailing to the reader that the sense of 'in' being invoked here is a relation within meaning and not within space understood as a 'container'

of objects. There is a wonderful explanation of the flesh in terms of an example from Proust (148-9), and an explanation of the power of 'parole' to open a future in terms of an example of a musical composition of Luciano Berio: both examples are enlightening. However, these chapters are marred by an oversimplified rendering of Husserl as ultimately seeing a central ego which can be detached from its experience to achieve an 'overview' (124) or of Heidegger as having a mistaken 'view of time as offered in *Being and Time* which bases the present and past upon the future' (114-15). Of course, Heidegger in *Being and Time* is describing the everyday priority given to the future in inauthenticity, which certainly does not represent Heidegger's own 'view of time,' which does stress the return to 'an already acquired temporal field' (115) that Hadreas mistakenly asserts as Merleau-Ponty's unique insight.

There are many fine explanatory passages within *In Place of the Flawed Diamond*, especially when Hadreas draws upon his knowledge of the arts to offer his reader an example of Merleau-Ponty's concepts; however, the overall thesis is not convincing. It is unfortunate that Hadreas felt that Merleau-Ponty's brilliance would only shine by tarnishing that of Husserl, Sartre and Heidegger.

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BARRY HALLEN and J.O. SODIPO. *Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft: Analytic Experiments in African Philosophy*. London: Ethnographica 1986. Pp. vi + 138. US\$24.95. ISBN 0-936508-19-1.

Que voici un livre rare dans le domaine de la philosophie africaine. Il voudrait aller au-delà du débat qui, depuis bientôt trente ans, oppose en une querelle byzantine deux écoles de pensée. D'une part, les disciples de Placide Tempels, le célèbre auteur de *La Philosophie Bantoue* (1945) qui instaura la thèse selon laquelle les sociétés africaines, comme toutes les sociétés primitives, sont caractérisées par une philosophie de la force vitale qui intègre en une dialectique hiérarchique tous les royaumes des êtres: minéraux, végétaux, animaux, humains, purs esprits et la divinité. La méthode d'analyse telle que l'a généralisée Alexis Kagamé en deux ouvrages importants (*La Philosophie Bantu-Rwandaise* [1956] et *La Philosophie Bantu Comparée* [1976]) utilise, comme point de départ, une grille aristotélicienne, l'applique aux catégories lin-

guistiques d'une langue africaine et, de l'organisation linguistique qu'elle découvre, elle déduit les lignes d'une philosophie régionale. Cette méthode ne pouvait que susciter questions et problèmes dans la mesure où elle opère à partir du principe qu'une philosophie peut être implicite et collective et, ce faisant, elle tend à confondre la philosophie comme discours critique et la philosophie comme *Weltanschauung* ou conception de vie. C'est à propos de ce point précis qu'un nouveau courant depuis les années 1970, exige le renvoi à l'analyse des projets de Tempels, Kagamé et leurs disciples; et, d'autre part, discute les conditions de possibilité d'une philosophie africaine rigoureuse, critique, autocritique et explicite. L'ouvrage de P. Hountondji *Sur la philosophie africaine* (1977) illustre ce nouvel esprit.

C'est dans le contexte de ce débat qu'il faut situer l'entreprise de Hallen et Sodipo, même si le cadre que Dorothy Emmet dessine pour eux (1-4) semble étonnement sommaire et simplificateur. Ainsi, par exemple, le lien qu'elle établit entre l'ouvrage de Tempels, la revue *Présence Africaine* et le mouvement de la *Négritude* est ambigu. Il ignore des différences majeures. Deuxièmement, prétendre que Wole Soyinka donna le coup de grâce à la *Négritude*, avec son mot facile sur le tigre qui n'invoque pas sa tigritude lorsqu'il est attaqué, est, pour le moins, hasardeux, lorsqu'on est réellement attentif à l'activité intellectuelle d'un Léopold Senghor et à la reconversion critique de l'héritage de Tempels telle que l'actualisent, par exemple, A.J. Smet et l'école philosophique de Kinshasa.

L'ouvrage est divisé en trois chapitres. Le premier (15-39) explore analytiquement le principe d'irrésolution et les limites de toute traduction à la lumière de la théorie de W.V.O. Quine, selon laquelle chaque langue naturelle est, en elle-même, une théorie unique et complexe décrivant une expérience et une ontologie originales. Et, à juste titre, les auteurs insistent sur l'approximation constituée par toute traduction. Ils invoquent, à titre d'illustration, l'ouvrage d'Evans-Pritchard sur la sorcellerie chez les Azandé. Le deuxième chapitre (40-85) est un exercice critique de traduction de la distinction conceptuelle *knowledge-belief*. L'hypothèse sous-jacente est que, en une traduction de ce genre, de l'anglais au Yoruba, 'if the translator can identify the criteria governing classes of observation sentences made under the rubric of a specific alien theoretical term, a theoretical equivalent in the language of translation can be constructed that will withstand challenge and empirically prevail over other alternatives' (39). C'est là pur et élémentaire bon sens. Quant au premier objectif du chapitre — 'to demonstrate the dangers of assuming that such philosophically significant terms as "know-and-believe" in the English language have precise meaning equivalents in other particularly African languages' — il est simplement ahurissant. C'est là, en effet, enforcer une porte ouverte. Qui pourrait nier que la supposition n'aurait aucun sens même entre l'anglais *to know* et le français qui lui oppose, en effet, deux concepts (*savoir et connaître*) ou l'espagnol qui atteste une distinction similaire (*saber et conocer*). Les deux autres objectifs sont, Dieu merci, plus convaincants. D'une part, 'to engage in the concrete experiment ... in an effort to determine what practical consequences, if any, follow from the indeterminacy thesis for such exer-

cises'; et, d'autre part, 'to demonstrate and promote our own analytic approach to African philosophy by selecting for this experiment concepts that are philosophically significant in their own right' (40). L'analyse fait surgir des catégories originales qui, en Yoruba, reconduisent concrètement, à propos de la connaissance et de la croyance, des propositions différentes de leurs substituts anglais. Le dernier chapitre (86-125) tire les conclusions pratiques du chapitre deux et s'applique à cerner l'ordre de connaissance qui organise la sorcellerie. L'étude est prudente. Elle présente successivement une lecture critique de 'la sorcellerie occidentale,' une grille de la sorcellerie africaine à partir des travaux d'anthropologues et s'achève par une analyse comparative qui débouche notamment sur des évidences paresseuses: à savoir, d'abord, que les données historiques manquent qui nous permettraient de comprendre ce que fut la sorcellerie en Occident; ensuite, que la sorcellerie africaine pourrait être utilisée afin de comprendre la pratique de la sorcellerie en Occident; enfin, que le modèle africain est similaire à celui que l'Occident eut autrefois.

Que penser de cet ouvrage? Notons ce que l'entreprise a décidément de positif: une bonne exploitation de la théorie de W.V.O. Quine qui au terme de la recherche autorise les auteurs à écrire: 'African philosophy insofar as it may come to deal with the analysis of African languages (or meanings) and evaluation of the beliefs of African cultures, will not even be in a position to begin until such things have been correctly understood and translated in a determinate manner' (122). L'attention que les auteurs ont décidé d'accorder aux grilles sémantiques et conceptuelles produites par les sages africains interrogés leur permet un discours de deuxième niveau qui s'offre comme interprétation d'une tradition. Le lecteur attentif regrettera, cependant, des généralisations hâtives et, surtout, le fait que contrairement à l'ambition explicite de leur projet, les auteurs ont très vite lu ou n'ont pas lu du tout correctement les travaux de Tempels et de Kagame dont ils répètent nombre de naïvetés, notamment à propos de la sorcellerie. Et sur cette question précise il me faut dire que l'usage fait (ou, plus exactement, non fait) des excellents ouvrages de Jeanne Favret-Saada sur la sorcellerie en France est simplement étonnant.

Cela dit, l'essai de Hallen et Sodipo a des mérites réels. C'est un livre courageux qui indique une voie fructueuse en philosophie africaine. Il est bien écrit, se lit avec plaisir et donne à réfléchir.

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PHILIP KITCHER. *Vaulting Ambition*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1985. Pp. xi + 456. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-262-11109-8.

In *Vaulting Ambition*, philosopher Philip Kitcher undertakes a massive evaluation of sociobiology. He does not reject the field out of hand. In fact, he praises careful animal work, contrasting it with 'pop sociobiology,' which purveys a once-over-lightly brand of biology to the public. Indeed, he denies that there is an 'autonomous theory of the evolution of behavior. There is only the general theory of evolution' (117). Some sociobiologists claim that this theory sheds new light on human politics, morals and prospects; according to Kitcher, they are guilty of the excessive ambition of the title. Both E.O. Wilson's writings on human nature and his collaborative work with Charles Lumsden on gene-culture coevolution are extensively criticized, as is the evolutionary anthropology of Richard Alexander. Kitcher's net is wide, however, and many major researchers in evolutionary biology appear in these densely packed pages. So do their major critics.

Kitcher introduces population genetics, game theory and inclusive fitness. He shows how a variety of hapless authors have missed alternative explanations, made arbitrary assumptions, or simply done careless work. This biological expertise has served Kitcher well in his arguments against the 'scientific creationists,' and it is his major strength here. No feeble protester from the sidelines, he fights formula with formula and out-games the wildest game theorist. He disputes some common inferences from biological data (that we tamper with our species' evolutionary adaptations at our individual and collective peril, for instance, or that certain ethnographic data are best explained by strivings for reproductive success) and makes explicit assumptions and arguments that are often left implicit. This last is particularly important, since analysis is hobbled until the issues are clear. He occasionally tells us how we ought to respond to specific sociobiological claims. Some may find this annoying, but others, having groped in vain for rejoinders to their colleagues' confident declarations, will probably be grateful.

The very immersion in evolutionary theory that enables Kitcher to deal with sociobiology on its own terms may also be his major limitation. *Vaulting Ambition* offers readers a way of discarding tainted tubs of sociobiological bathwater without relinquishing their hold on neo-Darwinian theory. As an impassioned defender of that theory against creationists on one hand and overzealous sociobiologists on the other, Kitcher is perhaps disinclined to question certain of its fundamental assumptions. (Some of these assumptions, especially those associated with the nature-nurture complex, are not peculiar to evolutionary studies but are very widely held by scientists and nonscientists alike.) He characterizes the sociobiology controversy as turning on 'local issues': the proper use of tools, rather than the tools themselves (119).

Early in the book Kitcher refers to the standardized tests that were long used to decide English children's academic fate (and thus, much of their later life as well). He argues that science must be held to especially stringent stan-

dards when its implications for public life are so grave. This would seem to be the case when sociobiologists make pronouncements on war, social stratification and the relations between the sexes. Kitcher does not, however, fully examine the concepts of genetic limits and biological bases that so often inform both psychological testing and sociobiology.

Of gene-culture coevolution, he says, '[T]here is no reason *in principle* why Lumsden and Wilson should not obtain the kinds of conclusions [about "genetic limits" on behavior] they want from the kind of theory they intend to construct' (336). Kitcher correctly criticizes these authors' conclusions about developmental fixity and about the 'costs' of changing society (152). It is not clear how an improved gene-culture theory could eliminate the flaws in their project. Though it is true, furthermore, that notions of limits and costs don't require absolute genetic determinism and are 'compatible with conventional wisdom about gene-environment interaction' (28), one might wish for something better than conventional wisdom. The idea that genes impose limits (rather than participating in developmental systems whose possibilities emerge with time), helps support the misguided claims that Kitcher deplors. Significantly, limits to developmental possibilities and costs of social change do not appear on Kitcher's list of evolutionary problems (55). They derive instead from much older ideas of instinct, internal essence and natural order. The proper way to answer the developmental — and ethical — questions about limits and costs may finally be to study development and the many contexts in which it occurs, rather than investigating inclusive fitness or phylogenetic relations. As Kitcher acknowledges, the study of ontogeny may even help us reconstruct phylogenies (232).

A different sort of critique might not have opposed evolutionary to social explanations (189) or the 'role of the genes in our social behavior' to 'behavioral plasticity' (337). Its author would not have imagined 'ideal conditions, with no ecological constraints to interfere' (195), under which an animal's real dispositions would appear. It would have addressed the confusions of those who wonder, not whether sociobiologists have overlooked some clever evolutionary strategy, but whether, how and when game theory enlightens us about the way lives are actually lived. Precisely what is the nature of the understanding allegedly gained by such treatments? Kitcher shows that there is insufficient evidence for certain stories about human evolutionary history; our other critique would have told us just what counts as legitimate evidence in the first place. What, for instance, would qualify as 'good reasons for supposing the existence of genetic differences between those people who manifest the [behavioral] tendency and their ancestors who did not' (205-6)? And what would it mean for a future science of human behavior to make 'genuine use of biological insights' (ix)? But all this would have required a different book, or at least a much longer one, and Kitcher has already given us a great deal.

For the most part *Vaulting Ambition* reads very well. Given the complexity of the material, this is no small accomplishment. The reader is helped through the heavy parts with wit and clarity. Still, I finally found the persistent sarcasm a bit grating. To use a Kitcherian argument, if the points are good

ones, sarcasm adds nothing to their value, and if the points are weak, an unpleasant manner won't improve them. Most of Kitcher's points are quite strong enough to stand on their own.

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JOHN LLEWELYN. *Beyond Metaphysics? The Hermeneutic Circle in Contemporary Continental Philosophy*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1985. Pp. 256. US\$21.95. ISBN 0-391-03115-5.

In his *Beyond Metaphysics?*, John Llewelyn has presented more than another assault on the Queen of the Sciences; he has provided a survey of a formidable array of interlocking themes running throughout that contemporary collocation of modes and methods that is called 'Continental Philosophy.' The point of unity is, of course, the issue of surmounting metaphysics. But, since the problem of the nature of what is to be overcome, and what strategies are, in consequence, fit for the task, is as elusive as it is decisive, Llewelyn perforce handles the matter problematically, allowing the divergent currents, through their flux and flow, to define, as much as they are defined by, the central issue. The basic organization of the text is supplied by a sequential consideration of positions attached to the lodestars of the European firmament: Heidegger, Husserl, Sartre, Bachelard, Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty, Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Ricoeur, Levinas and Derrida. Thus, the emergent themes are not at first Llewelyn's; they become his only in the reflective appropriation which constitutes the putative fiber of the book. The latter, admittedly, is spun very fine. But there is propriety in this: When dealing with a large intellectual panorama one's own argument should neither dazzle nor bind, but only call attention to what is already constellated. If the effect is to encourage thinking in the perpetual interrogative, this too is intended: The warning is already there, in the question mark in the title.

But now I must say just the opposite. Though of self-professedly merely expository interest, the whole demeanor of the book, including its prominent question mark, is critically removed from the main theme by a tone of British standoffishness, the effect of which is a kind of anglicised 'philosophising with a hammer' that cannot help but portend a skeptic's eye. Now surely some distancing is the inevitable consequence of so ambitious an undertaking. For one

thing, problems that cluster around the question of metaphysics, and strategies for its dissolution, are so discontinuous from one framework to the next that any effort to unify them is necessarily grandly synoptic, hence interpretive. Still Llewelyn is preternaturally silent when it comes to the precise nature of his leading theme. Indeed, this fact, especially when contrasted with Llewelyn's otherwise remarkably direct style, must be counted as part of the cutting edge of an emergent critique running sidelong against the genuine effort at sympathetic understanding.

What Llewelyn has done is, I think, something significantly more than a wide-ranging study of dubious thematic unity; instead, considered positively, he has managed obliquely to demonstrate the unity of motive within a discontinuity of motif within the major strands in the fabric of post-modernism. Now any search for an Ariadne's Thread through such a maze would have to begin by taking the terrain on its own terms. So, exegetically, it matters not so much what metaphysics 'in itself' might be as what it is taken for. Similarly with the individual positions now configured within the tradition: The question of their intrinsic purport or import takes second place to the question of how they are now viewed by people in the know.

One setting out to study Husserl, for example, would do well to know that the current wisdom has it that a residual but unshakeable 'essentialism' running throughout his phenomenology, and tied to its central method of 'reduction,' undermines from the start those other strains of his thought which, like the influential '*Lebenswelt*' can be used as rallying-points against metaphysics. Equally, one can hardly understand the course of French thought without appreciating the 'metaphysical' foibles of Sartre's dialectical inversions. Not even the radical economism of the later (Marxist) Sartre makes possible an escape from a kind of hypostatized solitude of the subject; but the legacy that this dilemma has left has been decisive as an occasion for centering concern on the conditions which render possible the shattering of self-possession through the heterogeneous factors of communication and interaction. Thus motivated are Merleau-Ponty's renewed interest in semiology, the revitalization of Saussure's diacritical theory of language, and Lévi-Straussian structuralist anthropology.

Llewelyn's exposition forces these positions back upon their point of departure, highlighting the still nagging question of the more definite nature of what is to be superseded — metaphysics. The discussion shows that, again and again, the other thinkers refer to Heidegger's work on the matter, generally without showing how their approaches arise specifically from the Heideggerian background. This puts considerable emphasis upon Llewelyn's own Heidegger analysis. But here we do have difficulties. For Llewelyn fashions his presentation around the questionable presumption that it is Heidegger's early 'fundamental ontology' that forms the crux of the attack on metaphysics, whereas Heidegger's explicit anti-metaphysical turn came only after he ceased calling his work either fundamental or ontological, and the 'turn' itself was in large measure motivated by Heidegger's perception of the metaphysicallity of his earlier position. While one need not take Heidegger's self-evaluation as the last word,

and there are grounds in the subsequent tradition, especially Levinas, for preferring the earlier over the later Heidegger, what is inescapable is that the more radical and deepcutting analysis of Llewelyn's theme comes in the later. Moreover, even Levinas, for whom *Being and Time* was most significant, confirms this point, for his rejection-by-extension of Heidegger's ontology, leading to his unique meontological ethicism, is once again done *in the name of metaphysics*, suggesting that any 'overcoming' of this enterprise would have to condemn itself to wander in the deserts of Heidegger's later thought exclusively. Does Llewelyn too wish to avoid this fate, with the same implications? How, in any case, might we find a more positive basis for exploring the crisis of metaphysics? This we are not told. It may, however, be to Llewelyn's great merit to have shown that the central enigma has not been resolved: He leaves the tradition as he finds it — groping after the elusive theme in terms of which it may count itself a tradition, and a bit skittish about its last word on the metaphysics it no longer wishes to be.

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MIKE W. MARTIN. *Self-Deception and Morality*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 1986. Pp. x + 177. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-7006-0297-6.

In his memoirs, *Inside the Third Reich*, Albert Speer tells us how he avoided inquiries that would have made him aware of the holocaust: 'I did not investigate — for I did not want to know what was happening.' Most of us do something like this some of the time. To explain or excuse wrong-doing, to evade or diminish responsibility, it is natural to invoke the notion of self-deception.

However, this notion has seemed obscure if not impossible to many philosophers. Hence recent literature is preoccupied with the paradoxes that self-deception poses for epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Professor Martin offers a shift of emphasis. He sets out to explore 'the rich moral traditions wherein self deception is understood to be a major thread in unravelling what it is to be a responsible human being.' The author reminds us that we need to enrich our comprehension of self-deception — not just as to what it is and why we engage in it — but as to 'what it implies from the moral point of view.'

Martin's 'working analysis' of self-deception is sometimes formulated as 'the purposeful or intentional evasion of fully acknowledging something to

oneself'; other times, as 'the evasion of self-acknowledgment.' The question whether self-deception is always, or ever, bad is left open. The analysis is also designed to emphasise the purposeful forms of self-deception involving actions open to moral appraisal rather than the 'narrow emphasis on the formation of false beliefs.' It is also meant to acknowledge the diversity of motives for self-deception. Five strategies or acts of deceiving oneself are described: wilful ignorance, systematic ignoring, emotional detachment, self-pretense, rationalization.

Then Martin proceeds to describe and discuss four 'moral traditions' through which we are inclined to regard self-deception. The *Inner Hypocrisy Tradition* views self-deception as a 'derivative wrong': either it leads to immorality or it fosters dispositions which are likely to lead to immorality. Either way it is wrong in proportion to the immorality involved. Butler and Kant are cited as major representatives of this tradition. The *Authenticity Tradition* views self-deception as the primary or only wrong. It condemns all self-deception, not just self-deception about wrong-doing. Sartre in particular and existentialists in general are taken to be proponents of this perspective. The *Moral Ambiguity Tradition* views self-deception as always morally vague, ambiguous and uncertain. It stresses the presence of unconscious influences, environmental constraints and social pressures as formative of self-deception. Its partisans are said to be Freud, Fingarette and Haight. The *Vital Lies Tradition* highlights the frequently beneficial, healthy and benign features of self-deception. It emphasises the role of self-deception as a valuable coping technique promoting vital human needs such as self-regard, self-improvement, hope, love and friendship. The listed advocates of this view are Schiller, O'Neill, Ibsen and Otto Rank. The latter gives a poignant expression of this tradition: 'With the truth one cannot live. To be able to live, one needs illusions. This constantly effective process of self-deceiving, pretending, is no psychopathological mechanism, but the essence of [human] reality.'

Martin's approach in discussing these traditions is to balance our craving for generality with a heightened sensitivity to differences. He acknowledges the importance of the considerations fuelling these moral traditions concerning self-deception while he resists dogmatism, intolerance, oversimplification and the inclination of moral philosophers to read particular moral judgments off a theoretical formula. Here is a taste of his critical remarks. Against the complacent moralizing of the *Inner Hypocrisy* and *Authenticity* traditions, Martin points out that self-deception need not be wrong. It may spring from what is good and may have good consequences. Nor can self-deception be the only wrong; for it can only be understood if a background of values other than integrity and honesty is also presupposed. Contra the *Moral Ambiguity Tradition*, he cites cases where self-deception is unambiguously blameworthy. He proceeds to restrict the appeal of the *Vital Lies Tradition* by sketching ways of having the benefits of self-deception without a betrayal of rationality. Here he has perceptive remarks about the nature and role of hope, faith and self-expression.

Martin concludes by cautioning us against hasty ascriptions of self-deception. To invoke self-deception in a dispute concerning fundamental moral principles or interpretations of life is to misuse it. In such cases 'self-deception' becomes a mere polemical weapon in the service of intolerance and dogmatism. Accuracy is possible only by moving from sweeping general claims about collective self-deception to the examination of particular individuals.

And now for some brief comments:

1. The two formulae for self-deception are not equivalent. The evasion of self-acknowledgement seems to involve a rather large target, viz., an unflattering self-conception. But Martin himself points to little self-deceptions where what is occurring is not something on a grand scale. If the object of the evasion is some particular truth, then the claim made elsewhere that belief formation is not nuclear to self-deception becomes less convincing. Again, to characterize self-deception in terms of self-acknowledgement is somewhat of an *obscurum per obscurius*. For the idea of self-acknowledgement is no less opaque than the idea of self-deception.

2. Concerning Butler as a representative of the *Inner Hypocrisy* tradition, his often noticed 'sweet reasonableness' does not square with his strident condemnation of self-deception. Could it be that Butler regards self-deception *not* as a 'derivative wrong' but as wrong in itself? Consider the good Bishop's words: 'If people be wicked, they had better of the two be so from the common vicious passions without such refinements, than from this deep and calm source of delusion, which undermines the whole principle of good ... and corrupts conscience which is the guide of life' (Butler, Sermon X, *On Self-Deceit*). This strong claim about the immorality of self-deceit is more in line with the tone and scale of condemnation.

3. Martin seems to reject the idea of 'collective self-deception.' Its ascription sets up barriers of prejudice and prevents understanding alternative cultural traditions. But this is too quick. Could it not be that a scheme of concepts and ways of thinking amounts to a false ideology? The scheme is flattering or comforting to us but there is lots of evidence against it. We don't do anything about it because of laziness, fear, not wishing to rock the boat ... or whatever. When Martin says that 'One of the greatest frustrations of the applied ethicist is dealing with people who shut their minds to entire areas of moral concern ... ranging from world hunger to women's rights to the dangers of nuclear deterrence,' isn't collective self-deception usefully invoked?

Indeed, I suggest that good philosophy helps us puncture our collective (as well as individual) self-deceptions, while bad philosophy tends to facilitate them.

Mike Martin's book is fine philosophy: It punctures our 'collective self-deceptions' about our doctrinaire moral assessments of self-deceivers. There is not even a hint of the arrogance of the 'moral expert' playing with the difficulties in people's lives. The book enriches our understanding of ourselves and others.

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NATHAN SALMON. *Frege's Puzzle*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1986. Pp. xi + 194. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-262-19246-2.

Nathan Salmon's book *Frege's Puzzle* is a defense of a version of the direct reference theory of language against the objections to such a theory first raised by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Salmon concentrates on Frege's concerns (hence the title) over the epistemic or doxastic relations that obtain or fail to obtain between subjects and the 'information content' of certain sentences (i.e., roughly, the propositions expressed by the sentences in a given context). First, Salmon carefully presents the theory that he defends. He next analyzes the objection as Frege presented it and then presents in some detail a more recent version of the objection (what he calls 'The New Frege Puzzle'). In the last two chapters of the book he offers a solution to the objections and compares a Fregean theory to his own direct reference theory. There are three appendices; the first deals with Kripke's puzzle about belief, the second with questions concerning analyticity and *a priori*, and the third is a semantics of the view of singular propositions that Salmon defends in the book.

Since space does not permit me to go over all of the issues that Salmon raises, I shall concentrate on what I take to be the major contribution of this book to the vast literature on this topic. The new version of Frege's puzzle can be presented using the following two sentences:

- (1) Smith believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening.
- (2) Smith believes that Phosphorus is visible in the evening.

On the theory of direct reference that Salmon defends, what he calls the 'modified naive theory,' the content of the displayed sentence in (1) is identical to the content of the displayed sentence in (2). This fact seems to imply that if (1) is true, then (2) is true. Yet, we can have strong evidence that (1) is true and (2) is *false* in a circumstance where Smith points to Venus in the morning and says 'There is Phosphorus. Phosphorus is never visible in the evening' and later in the year Smith points to Venus in the evening and says 'There is Hesperus. It's visible only in the evening.' Hence, we are faced with a puzzle.

Salmon's resolution of this puzzle is one of the major (if not the major) points of the book. To understand Salmon's resolution of the puzzle we must first understand Salmon's analysis of belief statements of the form of (1) and (2). One believes a certain proposition *p* by grasping *p* in a certain way *x* and by having the disposition to assent to *p* when understood in way *x*. Thus, a belief is an existential generalization of a three-place relation between believers, propositions, and ways of viewing or grasping propositions. The analysis of (1) and (2) is

(1*) $(\exists x)$ (Smith grasps that Hesperus is visible in the evening by means of *x* & BEL(Smith, that Hesperus is visible in the evening, *x*))

(2*) $(\exists x)$ (Smith grasps *that Phosphorus is visible in the evening* by means of x & $BEL(\text{Smith, that Phosphorus is visible in the evening, } x)$)

where 'BEL' represents the three place believing or assenting relation. One can apprehend a proposition in one way and also apprehend the same proposition in a different way. Smith grasps the proposition *that Hesperus is visible in the evening* in two different ways. Let us say that Smith grasps the proposition in a Hes-way and in a Phos-way.

Salmon resolves the puzzle by noting that our intuition that (2) is false is based on the fact that Smith does not (outwardly) assent to the displayed sentence in (2). The reason that Smith does not assent to the displayed sentence in (2) is that when Smith understands the sentence he grasps the content of the sentence in the Phos-way and Smith does not (inwardly) assent to the proposition in that way. However, strictly speaking, since (2*) is true, (2) is true.

Although there may be a difference between (1) and (2) in pragmatic content (i.e., the information that is pragmatically imparted to someone upon hearing or reading [1] or [2]), there is no difference in the semantic content between (1) and (2). The difficulty I have with Salmon's resolution of the puzzle is that (1) and (2) are both said to be true even in the circumstances described. Given the evidence we have concerning Smith's beliefs this seems too strong a conclusion. Although Smith assents to the displayed sentence in (1), he rejects the displayed sentence in (2). Why not say that (1) and (2) are both *false*, instead of claiming they are both true? In fact, neither claim seems very plausible. What we want is a way to distinguish the truth values of (1) and (2) without rejecting the claim that the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' both directly refer to Venus in (1) and (2).

Salmon does provide us with the means to distinguish between the truth values of (1) and (2) by noting that believing involves a three place relation (i.e., BEL), but for reasons that are not completely clear to me he does not use the three place relation to make the distinction. Instead, he uses BEL to explain why we *want* to distinguish the truth values of (1) and (2). I am sympathetic to Salmon's obviously strong desire to keep the semantics tidy and pure and not introduce into the semantics 'ways' (or something similar) of grasping propositions. Still, even Salmon agrees that an analysis of belief involves the ternary relation BEL. If we need a ternary relation in any case why not distinguish the truth values of (1) and (2) by means of the ternary relation's third relatum? That is, rather than analyzing belief as an existential generalization of a ternary relation (as Salmon does), why not treat belief as a *particular* instance of the ternary relation? Of course, the logic of belief would be more complex and some way of distinguishing 'ways' of grasping propositions relative to sentences and contexts would have to be found, but Salmon has not convinced me that such an approach is not feasible. We can say that (1) is true because Smith does stand in the BEL relation to the proposition in the Hes-way, whereas (2) is false because Smith does not stand in the BEL relation to the proposition in the Phos-way.

Salmon's book is clearly written and well organized and is worth reading

for anyone interested in the philosophy of language. It does not, however, provide a review of recent alternative solutions to various versions of Frege's puzzle, nor does it provide a solution to Russell's concern over empty names which some philosophers, e.g. Plantinga, take to be the strongest objection against a theory of the sort that Salmon defends. While more discussion of alternative positions and a discussion of the problem of empty names would have increased the value of the book, what Salmon does do, he does very well. Salmon provides the most detailed discussion and analysis of Frege's puzzle that I am aware of and his chapter on the modified naive theory contains a number of interesting suggestions concerning any semantical theory involving direct reference.

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YRJÖ SEPÄNMAA. *The Beauty of Environment*. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedekatemia 1986. Pp. xi + 184. US\$20.00. ISBN 951-41-0523-0.

Sepänmaa asks us to treat this book as a model of normative environmental aesthetics inspired by ecology. Despite being largely descriptive and discus- sional, it is intended to be an axiological model.

The model consists of three sections. In *Points of Departure* the environ- ment is defined as 'all of the observer's external world: the natural ... cultural ... and constructed environment' (17). Environmental aesthetics is concerned with the real world understood preliminarily as our milieu; art-aesthetics is directed at the fictitious world of the arts; border disputes are taken up later. The real-fiction distinction is ontological and will allow the model to be nor- mative rather than descriptive. Environmental aesthetics is situated alongside the research traditions of beauty, art and metacriticism in aesthetics and takes as its point of departure the philosophy of beauty.

The bulk of the model lies in its second section which is divided between Ontology and Metacriticism. A general ontology of aesthetic objects yields works of art, which are fundamental; untouched nature and the cultural environment, which are presented as a second paradigm equal to the first; and the combination of art and environment is a borderline paradigm. Each paradigm has its own exemplary cases which have heuristic value. While the third paradigm is parasitic on the first, the first is not a host for the second since 'the environment is ontologically a different kind of aesthetic object than

a work of art (excepting architecture and the works of art that deal with the real environment)' (78). Sepänmaa maintains that the environment is an independent but complementary paradigm with its own aesthetic objects and perceptions. A balance must be struck between the use of the art analogy and the knowledge of the natural and cultural sciences, since by themselves neither is sufficient for understanding the beauty of the environment. In his methodical contrast of art and environment from the points of view of the creation of aesthetic objects, the nature of the object and the observer's relation to it (51-78), radical differences emerge which are articulated by the real-fiction distinction. Unfortunately, the articulator receives scant attention.

The statement that 'the environment is in itself that which is' (59) is necessarily true and more helpful than it should be in defining the real: what is simply is because it is not made, although it may be altered a little by man even in its purest forms. The variety of objects which environmental aesthetics is said to treat are inappropriately delimited by the real-fiction distinction since only untouched nature is real. Real environments are the objects of the environment paradigm and are seen in a moral context, unlike art which is amoral (68).

As metacriticism, the task of environmental aesthetics 'is the theoretical control of the description, interpretation and evaluation of the environment' (79). Since depictions of the environment are interpretations that influence our understanding and normally include aesthetic elements, aesthetic environmental criticism should provide norms for competent and appropriate appreciation in accordance with ecological principles. The goal is 'the maximization of the *appropriate* aesthetic value' (117) of the environment in agreement with norms derived from nature. Ecological-aesthetical norms do not guarantee beauty but create the preconditions for it: 'Ecology provides the norm to which concepts of beauty must conform' (136).

Sepänmaa's ecological-environmental aesthetics is about nature and it is only by stretching ecological principles that it may be said to apply to the cultural environment. Ecology and its so-called laws are elastic if they are loosely connected with the work of naturalists, planners and scientists, as we find in this model. What image of ecology should aestheticians adopt? Ecology is called to aesthetics as a panacea which makes correct aesthetic judgments of nature possible and provides conditions for the maximization of the appropriate aesthetic value of natural objects. As a branch of biology and a quantitative science of prediction and control, ecology can assist in defining and maximizing aesthetic capital. But in doing so it is just what Sepänmaa doesn't want it to be: a resourcist, anthropocentric framework for managing natural resources. Sepänmaa recognizes that the maximization of aesthetic objects without ecology leads to aestheticism, but overlooks the consequences of such maximization with ecology. He thinks that 'human culture has no privilege to change conditions in accordance with the special requirements of the human species' (133), but ecology exercises that privilege because that is its imperative.

Sepänmaa needs naturalists and not ecologists to suggest the ethical limits

of human actions and recognize that 'animals and plants, and perhaps even natural formations too, also have their rights, which must not be injured' (187). He does have allies and presents several rewarding insights into the work of Finnish naturalists, but ecology is not a continuation of their work and ethos. A Janus-faced ecology is perhaps better than no ecology at all, but a critical reflection on its emergence and fundamental ambivalence toward the very values which Sepänmaa attempts to derive from it and impart to environmental aesthetics is absent.

In the final section of the model we find that an active aesthetician investigates the criteria and value assumptions upon which depictions of nature are based and evaluates them with a view to ranking, reconciling and even regulating competing interests. Although Sepänmaa believes that aesthetic education in the appreciation of nature and efforts in legal aesthetics need to be undertaken, the fact that 'the aesthetic criticism of the environment is only just being formed' (145) makes these onerous tasks. However, since environmental aesthetics is intimately connected with preservation, steps must be taken. The model issued by Sepänmaa is noble but based on the work of as many villains as reformers.

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J.G. SLATER, ed. *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 8*. London: George Allen & Unwin 1986. Pp. xl + 418. US\$60.00. ISBN 0-04-920074-7.

This is a collection of Russell's essays and papers written from 1914 to 1919, when Russell was finished with *Principia Mathematica* and had abandoned his *Theory of Knowledge* (*Collected Papers*, Vol. 7). During this period he was working on his attempt to found physics on a phenomenalist basis, and was reworking his logical atomism in light of Wittgenstein's criticisms and his reading of the pragmatists. This was also a time when Russell was no longer devoting all his energies to technical philosophy, but was involved in anti-war work and was for part of this time even in prison. Given that during much of this period he was preoccupied with anti-war work, it is surprising how much philosophy he did.

Almost everything in this volume has been published previously, the exception being some manuscript notes written during 1918. Of the previously

published papers, several are quite accessible; some can be found in *Mysticism and Logic* and others in *Logic and Knowledge*, but they occur here with valuable annotations. The others are long out of print or buried in dated journals. Particularly of interest in this category are the reviews Russell wrote. These reviews, together with the manuscript notes, are the most valuable part of this book, and will be of interest not just to Russell scholars, but to anyone interested in the development of philosophy (particularly epistemology) in the first part of this century.

From the reviews and manuscript notes in this volume it is clear that Russell took the work of his contemporaries, both in philosophy and in psychology, quite seriously. Russell was developing the neutral monism and the accompanying theory of judgment presented in his 'On Propositions' (included in this volume) and *The Analysis of Mind*, and was interested in works in psychology which were relevant to this inquiry. In this regard, there is a list included as an appendix entitled 'Philosophical Books Read in Prison,' which includes Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and a long list of European and American works on psychology. It is unfortunate that Russell's written reactions are confined to only a few of these works.

Russell's discussion of James in this volume is far more sympathetic than his earlier articles on James's theory of truth, which are more widely known as they are reprinted in *Philosophical Essays*. Readers who have thought that Russell's understanding of the pragmatists was superficial would do well to pay close attention to Russell's discussions of James and Dewey in this volume. Particularly of interest is the discussion of James in 'On Propositions' and the rather long review of Dewey's *Essays in Experimental Logic*, where Russell discusses sympathetically Dewey's criticism of the notion of the given in experience.

The change in Russell's views during this period can best be illustrated by a reading of such previous works as *The Problems of Philosophy* and 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,' and then contrasting them with the articles on causation, physics and matter in the first section of this volume, and 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' and 'On Propositions' in later sections. Russell put aside his development of the theory of judgment to concentrate on the constructivist phenomenalism that is absent in his earlier works. His use of the theory of descriptions to construct the objects of ordinary life is developed in the papers here and in *Our Knowledge of the External World*. This constructivism continues in most of his later works. Toward the end of the period covered by this volume, Russell returned to the problems of judgment which were left with the unfinished *Theory of Knowledge*. These problems are mentioned, but not solved in 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,' and a new attempt was made to solve them in 'On Propositions.' Some of this last paper is repeated in *The Analysis of Mind*, but this paper goes into greater detail with regard to the proposed analysis of judgment.

The account of meaning given in 'On Propositions,' with words meaning images which refer to objects, is in sharp contrast with the semantic monism

characteristic of Russell's writings from 1905 to 1912. The new account of judgment, which builds on this account of meaning, involves a complex of images, called an image-proposition, as the content of a judgment, and a fact to which this corresponds, as the objective of the judgment. The theory presented here bears a superficial relation to that given in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, in that the thinking subject is no longer a term in a judging relation, but there is instead a fact correlated with another fact. Here the similarity ends: Russell's image-propositions are dependent for their meaning on the meanings of their components (297) and Russell's attempts to explain the way an image-proposition and a fact correspond are very un-Wittgensteinian (302-3).

'On Propositions' also shows the influence of James on Russell's thought, particularly with regard to the supposition of a judging ego, which played a central role in all of Russell's previous theories of judgment, and which Russell eliminates from the analysis here. Some of Russell's own reasons for moving in this direction (and therefore to neutral monism) are given in the manuscript notes published here for the first time.

This book is put together very well, with valuable appendices, annotations and textual notes. Russell wrote exceptionally well, and it is a pleasure to read these papers.

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LLOYD H. STEFFEN. *Self-Deception and the Common Life*. New York: Peter Lang 1986. Pp. x + 405. US\$45.40. ISBN 0-98204-0243-5.

This study seeks to advance an understanding of self-deception (SD) that enables us to see the sense and correctness of a theological employment. The initial claims are that 'SD' is literally meaningful; that we describe and diagnose a fact about a person's intrapsychic behaviour when we say that he is self-deceived; that this is manifest in public behaviour. Ordinary language analysis, the fact of common life and experimental psychology are said to univocally support these claims. 'SD' is 'an intentionally enacted, belief misleading project' where the two parties are not two persons but 'a reflexively conceived intrapsychic relation between opposing desires, intentions, wishes, beliefs and so on.'

'SD' is investigated from three points of view. *Philosophical psychologists* find 'SD' paradoxical because they mistakenly assume that a person is unitary

and consciousness is transparent. The proposed theories are all too narrow. *Cognitivists* overemphasise knowledge and belief at the expense of purposive features. *Action theorists* exaggerate the voluntary nature of SD and neglect cognitive components. Partisans of the *Translation Model* think that 'SD' can be reduced to other non-problematic concepts. This is said to beg the question. For it denies that 'persons are capable of contradictory beliefs and can engage in activities designed to cover up the best, most reasonable interpretation of their actions.'

Then Steffen proposes his own 'synthetic emotional perception' account of SD: that phenomenon which is made possible by our 'uniquely human capacity for perceiving the very object we deny seeing because we don't want to see.' The author's criteria for 'SD' are: contradictory beliefs held simultaneously; one of these has to be unconscious; and 'the action which establishes which belief is unconscious and which is not, is a voluntary and motivated act.'

Next comes a discussion of the moral point of view. SD cannot be always immoral, if it occasionally contributes to the well-being of the community. So Steffen argues for a 'morally neutral' account. SD can accompany moral or immoral acts. Hence it can be extracted and the evaluations must really depend on something else. While morally neutral, SD is said to involve 'prudential akrasia': it violates the prudential duty of self-honesty.

And now to the religious point of view. Here the overriding interest is in the 'existential strain of Christian reflection.' The religious sphere is governed by our 'ultimate commitment and the God-relation.' The meaning of SD here is that one misleads one's own beliefs about the truth of the God-relation. 'A theological self-deceiver disrelates himself to God.' This takes the form of non-belief or disbelief. Both are said to indicate sin. Two aspects of theological SD are discussed: sin as pride and sin as despair. In any event, to accuse someone of sin is to accuse him of theological SD: of the purposive misevaluation of one's own identity before God. The sinner thinks of himself as a unified, coherent, self-sufficient ego when he is really conflicted, contradictory and insufficient. This exaltation of the self is nothing less than the desire to be God. The author concludes that religious faith is the best strategem for overcoming SD. If one surrenders oneself to God, one's motives for deceiving oneself might be said to have been surrendered too.

The book is well-researched and provocative. It aims to be a contribution to theology but it does not read like it. Steffen's conception of theology is like Rorty's conception of Philosophy:

Doing theology today requires conversation with other voices. In this study, the voice of the psychologist, the linguistic, and analytic philosopher, the ethicist, the literary artist, and the theologian will be heard. The theologian has much to learn from conversation with other disciplines and perspectives, but also much to contribute.

I dare to converse but only briefly. (a) Does Steffen's picture of the self as contradictory and pervaded by intrapsychic disorder help us to understand SD? All we are left with are forms of mental pathology like split personality!

And this is somewhat remote from the 'literal meaning' of 'SD.' (b) Sometimes the author speaks as if philosophers sceptical about 'SD' are 'denying the facts.' Are they not better read as recommending that the agreed upon facts be redescribed in non-problematic language? (c) At one point a concern is expressed that such a 'translation' would rob SD of its moral dimension. But given the author's 'morally neutral' account, should he not welcome this consequence? (d) Concerning the 'synthetic' account of SD: I guess I am an organic sort of person. For I do not see how 'perceiving the very object we deny seeing because we do not want to see' is an improvement over 'He likes to believe it but deep down inside he knows it's false.' (e) *Apropos* the religious sphere: Are nonbelievers and disbelievers necessarily (theological) self-deceivers from the Christian point of view? This claim seems to be secured by stipulation! For in this realm the criteria for truth, evidence and 'the most reasonable interpretation' are so radically contested that such a general ascription of SD is neither descriptive nor diagnostic. Here SD is used as a polemical weapon. Atheists who make this charge against theists are *also* guilty of this abuse. (f) In any event, why take 'theological SD' as paradigmatic in the religious sphere? Kierkegaard, who is said to have inspired Steffen's study, considers cases where a person (or a whole community) professes to be Christian, yet their practices belie this. (g) By the way, is faith panacea or more like a constant struggle?

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