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Editor/Directeurs:

Robert Burch
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

J. N. Kaufmann
Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec
à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec
Canada G9A 5H7

Managing Editor:
Steven Scott
Academic Printing and Publishing

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TERENCE BALL and JAMES FARR, eds. *After Marx*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. x + 287. US$37.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-25702-6); US$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-27661-6).

JON ELSTER. *Making Sense of Marx*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. xv + 556. US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-22896-4); US$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-29705-2).

ROBERT PAUL WOLFF. *Understanding Marx*. Princeton University Press 1984. Pp. x + 235. US$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07678-2); US$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02231-3).

RICHARD MILLER. *Analyzing Marx*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984. Pp. xi + 319. US$30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-06613-2); US$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-01413-2).

There is a statement of agenda — stemming from Weaver, Turing, and Prigogine — currently reverberating through the sciences. 'The enlightenment taught us how to deal with organized simplicity; the nineteenth century (Boltzman, etc.) taught us how to deal with disorganized complexity; and the task of the twentieth century is to learn how to deal with organized complexity.' Contained in this formula is an implied criticism of the orthodox social sciences: that they are built on the enlightenment model of science, and hence are inadequate to deal with the organized complexity of human society. Many serious students of Marx see him to have been trying to fulfill the 'twentieth century' agenda, the understanding of organized complexity — perhaps a century before the intellectual apparatus was available for full success.

I begin with the Ball and Farr anthology for two reasons. First, it contains work of Elster and Miller slightly antedating their books; and second, it contains articles by Ball and Farr themselves that conveniently provide a partial framework for understanding the other works. The immediate background for the anthology is G.A. Cohen's book on Marx's theory of history. Part I of the anthology, with essays by William Shaw, Elster, Miller, Phillipe Van Parijs

and James Noble, is, in fact, a series of comments and critiques of Cohen. Elster and Miller continue this project in their books and I'll discuss them in that context. Part II contains worthwhile essays by Paul Thomas, C.B. Macpherson, Alan Gilbert, and John Roemer. Thomas sets up the Reagan/Thatcher version of capitalist politics in a useful way through an analysis based largely on 'On the Jewish Question.' Macpherson has interesting things to say about equilibrium theories including what others would call 'pluralism,' and Alan Gilbert reminds us of some of the Aristotelean roots of Marx's thought.

Part III contains the articles by Ball and Farr, and a paper on Marx's methodology (or lack of it) by Terrell Carver. All should be read carefully. The thesis of Ball and Farr is modest enough on the surface: Marx wasn't a positivist. They argue to this effect very persuasively. But the illusion of modesty dissipates when we begin to spin out the consequences of the thesis. Ball and Farr have their finger on an absolutely central issue for understanding and utilizing Marx. The almost overwhelming tendency for Anglo-American writers wishing to exploit Marx is to twist, turn, snip and trim until Marx fits more or less neatly into the positivist canon. This was Cohen's tactic, and is, as we'll see, Elster's. So the resulting versions of Marx are made to be as linear, deductive, atomistic, and reductive as the text (somehow hermeneutered) will bear. Ball and Farr know that the resulting Marx is a caricature, and sketch the essentials of the most important arguments to this effect. Marx's theory is nonlinear, non-deductive, nonatomistic, and antireductive. Ball and Farr offer a purchase point for the understanding of this.

Elster brings the activity of hermeneutering classic texts to the level of fine art. He does have the decency to tell us straight off that in order to accept his reconstruction of Marx we're going to have to throw out a large part of what Marx presented, and reinterpret the rest. What we're left with is the myopic examination of those passages in which Marx provides explanations roughly restatable in a verison of social exchange theory (no surprise, given Elster's other work). That is, whatever is consistent with the linear reductive pattern of explanation available on the premise of methodological individualism is carefully lifted out, scraped off, and elaborated in Elster's own terms.

This is not to say that there aren't intelligent and perceptive discussions of particular issues here and there. And Elster provides some criticisms of Marx that will stick even outside his bizarre framework. In particular, he's very clear on Marx's misestimation of strategies available to capitalism, and the consequences of this for a contemporary assessment of Marxism as a viable political theory.

Elster's project is a paradigm of the commitment to social sciences as sciences of organized simplicity. Complexity and nonlinearity have to be suppressed in favor of the linear aggregation of individual motivation and action. But it isn't at all clear that we're stuck with the model of science in question. Miller, in fact, points out that the natural sciences themselves have learned (and are learning) to go beyond that model, thus applying themselves to the Weaver agenda. I'm sure Elster thinks he's doing both Marx and contemporary social science a service by shredding Marx's theory into fragments amorphous

enough to fit into the utilitarian orthodoxy, but to associate the resulting reduction with Marx is questionable scholarly practice.

Analyzing Marx has three parts, entitled 'Morality,' 'Power,' and 'History.' I'll begin with the third for reasons that will become apparent. Miller organizes his discussion around two themes: the question whether Marx is a technological determinist, and a critique of the standard positivist model of explanation. The two themes are connected, in that technological determinism appears more likely to conform to the positivist canon than alternatives, for it seems to provide one-dimensional 'covering laws' that can be tested simply. In addition, the Cohen theory, background, as I've said, to much recent Anglo-American work on Marx, is a version of technological determinism conforming to a positivist explanation pattern; and Miller's discussion begins from the critique of Cohen found in the Ball and Farr volume.

Miller rejects technological determinism as an account of Marx's theory, and offers in its place a mode of production theory. There are two key differences between the competing theories. (1) In the first, the explanatory base consists of the technical means of production, independent of the organization of the work force and other social components. In the second, the relations of production and the social and political apparatus surrounding them are included in the mode of production. (2) Technological determinism proposes a nomological linear causal relationship between the technological means of production and other social phenomena. The mode of production theory proposes a heuristic for digging out explanations within a densely interactive, nonlinear system of systems. Thus a technological determinism would try to articulate historical laws relating level of technology as antecedent to phenomena such as slavery or wage labor as consequents. The mode of production theory would examine the evolutionary dynamics of technical, social and political conditions mutually generative of particular historical trajectories. Transhistorical laws are not sought (Marx, after all, continually rejected them) and explanations are of a more general ground/consequent sort than the covering law model can accommodate.

Two things can be mentioned here. First, and obviously, Miller bases his reading of Marx on just those long stretches of text chucked out by Elster, yet has a fine chance of accommodating within his overall picture the texts Elster deals with. Second, settling major disputes about boundary determination is crucial for spelling out and adjudicating the differences between technological determinism and the mode of production theory as interpretations of Marx. For example, it's very difficult to handle the terms 'economic' and 'production' carefully enough to draw boundaries around the 'economy' or the 'productive process.' Or, rather, it's always very easy to draw boundaries, but hard to draw them in such a way that the shape and dynamics of the system you're studying shines forth. But as Miller shows, *definitive* boundary decisions (as opposed to *heuristic* decisions) are much more important to linear causal theories seeking overarching laws than they are to more flexible, probing strategies. For the deductive relationships required by the law-linear theories require, in turn, the definitive isolation of discrete dependent and

independent variables. Part of Marx's contribution (and Miller is quite good on this) is to suggest flexible strategies for dealing with situations where the interpenetrations of 'subsystems' make definitive isolation of variables problematic. Thus while Marx uses the word 'economist' univocally (and pejoratively), the word 'economy' is subject to constant boundary revision relative to the social system under investigation. The same is true of 'production' — as people trying to linearize Marx's views always find, much to their frustration.

By the time the third section of his book is finished, Miller has challenged and rejected virtually all the major features of the positivist philosophy of science. In addition, paradoxically, he's also undermined all the favorite fixed points of analytic philosophy. The paradox arises because his stated intention is to make Marx available to analytic philosophers — among whom, we suppose, he includes himself. Yet by the time he's done, very little of analytic philosophy remains intact. Even the clarity and rigor he attributes to analytic philosophy is problematic, for I would say (on his grounds) that analytic philosophers have never confronted with rigor and clarity the status and role of linguistic and other intuitions they constantly advert to, and have never rigorously questioned their nearly subliminal adherence to timeless 'concepts.' Why, then, does Miller swear allegiance to analytic philosophy? Well, given the seat of his tenure, maybe there's a clause in his contract enjoining him to avow his analyticity from time to time.

The substantive upshot of these last remarks can be discerned if we move back into the first two sections of his book. A nice challenge for the reader, and for Miller himself, is to ask how the material in these first sections fares when confronted with what's been learned in the last. The second section, 'Power' is a discussion of the Dahl/Bachrach-Baratz/Lukes debate on pluralism. Miller spends most of his time defending the utility of a concept of ruling class *within the terms of the dispute as they come down to him*. But his analysis in the third section *ought* to lead him to question the terms of the dispute. The pluralism that anchors *all* the contributors to the debate is, after all, explicable only on the basis of the commodification of power. Dahl considers individual choices within a fixed and given commodity space of political alternatives; Bachrach and Baratz consider the determination of the space of alternatives (agenda setting); and Lukes argues for the creation of a commodity space of real interests which are then negotiated. For the Marx emerging from Miller's third section, the framework is the source of the problem. This leads right back into the first section 'Morality,' where Miller asks what Marx's rejection of morality could mean. His answers are drawn from a discussion recognizably congenial to analytic philosophers, and shows the extent to which these discussions depend on underlying conceptions of the rational economic man as moral agent, and of solutions to moral issues as equilibrium solutions. Both conceptions are utterly problematic on grounds prepared in the third section. A particularly piquant point is reached when Miller reminds Marx that in a revolution some workers might lose their jobs.

One of the main impediments to understanding organized complexity is

what we might call the pedagogy of complexity. Most of the models we have of teaching or the presentation of material in general tend to be linear 'building' models. Marx himself was almost desperately concerned with the pedagogy of *Capital*; hence the innumerable false starts of the *Grundrisse* and the long correspondence concerning the French translation. From this point of view, *Understanding Marx* is both a remarkable model and a cautionary tale, important in both roles. For Wolff provides a linearized version of Marx's 'classical' theory of production and price. The result is as pedagogically illuminating as anything written recently in English, *and* falls into major difficulties as a consequence of the linear reduction. Along the way Wolff amply provides the Smithian and Ricardian background we all need, and effectively lays in much of what we need to know to appreciate the work of Sraffa.

Wolff proceeds by beginning with a pared down model economy of three commodities. As he ramifies this simple model he shows how Smith and Ricardo fail to answer key questions they set for themselves, and this leads directly into a discussion of Marx's contribution to the classical line of thought. The entire discussion is carried out with admirable mathematical rigor. Wolff is to be thanked for doing the hard work that philosophers generally shirk.

Instead of laying out any more details of Wolff's presentation I'll use the rest of my limited space to suggest questions arising from tensions between Wolff's linear reconstruction and the complexity Marx is trying to deal with. The classical analysis of production, as we know, turns on the labor theory of value. Wolff is very good in showing us both the motivation for this and its consequences. Marx particularly needs the labor theory of value in order to show how the socialization of labor as abstract labor power makes possible the capitalist extraction of surplus value. Now, when Wolff has completed his formal model of the price system he notes — with some surprise, it appears — that from a purely formal point of view labor has no necessary priority in the metric of value. Any commodity, or even money, can as well serve. Wolff has demonstrated this rigorously. What are we to make of it? I suggest we make of it exactly what Marx wanted us to make of it. If a social system is built in such a way that a theory of price is the measure of value, labor will be just another commodity. Then, as Wolff says, 'In order even to conceptualize the labor value of a commodity, we must abstract from the endless individuating particulars of the place, pace, skill level, style, material, and accidents of production' (144). And what is this process of abstraction? 'The concept of abstract homogeneous necessary labor is a *theoretical* concept. It is formed not by abstraction from observations, but by a process of a priori reasoning within a model of a competitive capitalist economy that is equilibrated by a system of natural prices, a single wage rate, and a uniform rate of return on the value of capital invested' (113).

And now we ask, 'What is the ideal of the capitalist economist?' and we find that it's been stated, namely, 'a competitive capitalist economy' etc. How does the capitalist achieve such an ideal? Well, primarily by reducing a lot of folks to abstract labor power. What at the level of theory is an innocent sounding abstraction is, within *history*, a devastating denigration of human beings.

But Wolff's formalization can't accomodate history. Can, for example, the capitalist achieve his ideal historically? For Marx, the answer is no. He isn't asking how a capitalist theory of price is possible. He's asking how it's *impossible*, and what will happen in the attempt to achieve it. The *illusion* of capitalist bookkeeping is possible (it's all around us, after all), and the illusion itself has dialectical consequences. But the internal strains it puts on the society as a whole make it unstable. Price is the *form* that value takes in capitalism, and realizing that form demands a totalization that Marx thinks cannot be achieved.

Another aspect of the same point can be seen as follows: Wolff's three commodity economy produces corn, iron, and bibles. Bibles differ from corn and iron in that they are not involved in the production of other commodities, says Wolff, but are pure luxury goods. Shortsighted. For in the historical process of achieving a price society, enormous amounts of discipline are required. Workers must be made to conform to their theoretical role as abstract labor. Bibles are available disciplinary devices. They *do* figure in the production of iron, but they do so nonlinearly. Precisely, their contribution is never entered into the accounts. Were it entered, it would introduce nonlinear terms into the equations of price. There are innumerable sources of such nonlinear terms. Economic societies are complex, not simple. Wolff needs something like Miller's strategies of historical explanation to move forward from where his formalism leaves him. Meanwhile, the formalism has enlightened us immensely; allowed us to see many matters more clearly.

So in summary, the required reading for the course in the understanding of organized complexity is the papers by Ball and Farr; *Understanding Marx* (entire); and the third part of *Analyzing Marx*. The rest of the readings are not without their rewards, but are optional.

CHARLES DYKE
Temple University

ERNST BLOCH. *Essays on the Philosophy of Music*. Peter Palmer, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. xlviii + 250. US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-24873-6); US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-31213-2).

The German philosopher Ernst Bloch is a major figure in the development of modern German social, political and cultural thought. His unorthodox, if not heretical, mix of Marx, messianic mysticism and German idealism in various

ways influenced and was influenced by the writings of Lukacs, Adorno, Benjamin and others. He is less well known in the English-speaking world than these figures, but interest in Bloch's writings is growing rapidly as more of his corpus is translated. The present book is Peter Palmer's translation of Bloch's writings on music originally collected and published in Germany in 1974.

Roughly one half of the book is given over to a selection from Bloch's 1918 work, *Geist der Utopie*, in which Bloch offers an account of the history of western music, the ontological significance of music and the method and goals of a philosophy of music. Subsequent essays include a discussion of the primeval emergence and detachment of the free musical note out of sacred, magical and ritualistic sounds, the corresponding opening up of the auditory field as a locus of attention and the implications of this shift for the use of the human voice in music; an analysis and defense of the music of Richard Wagner; and an attack on mathematical hermeneutics of music. The volume concludes with an entry from Bloch's major work, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (1938), which recapitulates many of the themes of the earlier selections with a greater emphasis on social and historical conditions affecting the materials, production, style and content of music.

This book is a virtual treasure house of political, musicological and cultural comment, subtle and acute critical judgments on the work of composers from Dufay to Schoenberg (with special attention to Bach, Beethoven and Wagner) and discussions of particular musical forms. Bloch's ruminative, expansive and oftentimes cryptic writing style, however, makes abstracting his philosophical position from the essays no easy matter. Basically, on Bloch's view, music is a human shaping activity whose products have an ontological significance far exceeding the delights which formal construction can elicit and far removed from the personal but adventitious associations which many listeners bring to music. But it is not the architectonics of music that carries the ontological meaning of music, *pace* the long-standing numerological interpretative tradition rooted in Pythagorean principles. Such theories are doubly wrong: they mistake acoustical phenomena for musical ones and they construe the meaning of music in a restricted, naturalistic way.

Music is rather to be understood in the context of the 'metaphysics of divination and utopia,' a metaphysics which is not explicitly elucidated or defended in this volume but which looms as a hulking presence behind everything Bloch writes. Bloch's position seems to be that behind our dreams of base passions and bygone things, we may divine an archetypical, prophetic dream of yearning and arriving, a utopian desire for that 'which does not yet exist, which is ... not to be realised on Earth.' This dream manifests itself in 'the conscious desire for what befits us,' in charity and in philosophy. It is also at the root of musical activity, whose ultimate purpose is the articulation of this 'basic mystery' (124-33). Every musical feature is seen as a cypher emblematic of the utopian dream. The dynamic qualities of scalar and melodic intervals and melody, for example, reflect and express human anticipation (199-200). Rhythm and counterpoint are 'transcendent forms' (130), which, along with

time-shaping generally in music, are means by which music 'presses into the distance' and is 'fraught with goal' (99-133). Musical forms such as the sonata and fugue also evoke aspects of the utopian dream in their own ways, as do particular musical works. At the same time, the shaping of musical material enables music to be a vehicle for personal expression of the dreams and hopes of composers and of the age and society in which it originates. Music thus has a distinctly ethical and political dimension.

This view of the expressive, social and ontological significance of music is tied to a complex reading of world history according to which the mythic world-views of pre-modern cultures have gradually receded under the pressure of a rational, scientific but 'darkened' view, leaving the modern age without a sense of the supernatural. Music, however, acting upon our inner life, presents its 'consoling song,' and puts us in touch with the 'complete openness' of the utopian dream of possibility and hope. Music is an 'inwardly utopian art,' 'the only subjective theurgy' (133-9, 207-8).

A view as wide-ranging as this raises philosophical questions only a few of which can be mentioned here. Bloch's view is essentially a revelation theory of artistic meaning which has its roots in classical antiquity. His claim that music, among the arts — indeed among all human endeavours — holds a privileged cognitive status, owes much to Boethius, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche and, most especially, Schopenhauer. Indeed, his view is almost identical structurally with the latter's. But while few would deny that the sequential and anticipatory aspects of music play an important role in musical experience, what would constitute a philosophical justification for Bloch's heady claims regarding the ontological significance of such features? In part, the determination of the *real* ontological significance of music (if there is any) will depend on the adequacy of the ontology proposed. The selections included in the present volume make a confident judgement here difficult, but Bloch's attempted wedding of historical materialism and idealism and his apparent movement from psychological to ontological speculation is sure to raise a philosophical eyebrow or two. But the question of justification becomes all the more vexing when one asserts, as both Schopenhauer and Bloch do, that music is the *only* true avenue to such knowledge, that the 'truth' of music is neither empirically verifiable nor explicable in words (113, 137).

Questions such as these return us to the matter of Bloch's difficult expressionistic, apocalyptic style. One does not find in Bloch's writing carefully-honed definitions of key technical terms. But Bloch's preferred style goes to the centre of his concept of dialectic and the relation of thought to reality. Whether this stylistic decision is self-defeating is a judgement which each reader will have to determine. There is no doubt that this is a remarkable book. But considering Bloch's book as a volume of philosophy, those who prefer a philosophical style which aspires to the goal of pristine clarity will find Bloch's writing frustrating, if not infuriating. Those who will countenance more poetic

philosophical writing rich in resonance, metaphor and ambiguity will find in Bloch a kindred spirit.

PHILIP ALPERSON
University of Louisville

DAVID COPP and J.J. MacINTOSH, eds. *New Essays in Philosophy of Mind*, Series II. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 11. Guelph, ON: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy 1985. Pp. ii + 210. Cdn$14.00. ISBN 0-919491-11-1.

The range and diversity of topics which may be brought under the rubric 'philosophy of mind' is well illustrated by the ten papers in this collection. We find studies of Hume on memory, Thomas Reid on perception, of functionalism, artificial intelligence, and the eliminative materialism of Paul and Patricia Churchland. An essay on fantasizing represents the furthest reaches of what can be called philosophy of mind; the volume then concludes by returning us to a topic that is central to the field, personal identity.

In 'The Connection Between Impressions and Ideas,' Jane McIntyre argues that Hume, given the definition of causality he adopts in the *Treatise*, cannot consistently maintain that past impressions cause present ideas. Her conclusion is of limited interest, since Hume solved this problem for us by adopting an amended definition of 'cause' in the *Enquiry*, allowing for the possibility of action at a distance.

Thomas Reid not only took the phrase 'testimony of our senses' literally, but viewed it as the expression of a true epistemology. This is the central insight presented by Keith Lehrer and John-Christian Smith ('Reid on Testimony and Perception'). Reid, they point out, took the functioning of our perceptual faculty to be 'directly analogous to that of the language faculty' (30). Their arguments in elaboration of this point are a valuable addition to Reid scholarship.

Ever since Plato discussed and rejected the idea that the soul is a 'harmony' of bodily constituents (*Phaedo* 85e *ff.*), philosophers have been returning to the theory of functionalism, and repeatedly finding it wanting. The standard anti-functionalist tactic is to point to an actual or conceivable entity which exhibits the functional property F but lacks the psychological property P which was to have been identified with F. Janet Levin ('Functionalism and the Argument from Conceivability') offers some penetrating comments on the metho-

dology of this attack. The only way to defend functionalism, she maintains, is to deny that the anti-functionalist has succeeded in clearly and distinctly conceiving an entity which has F but not P.

John Searle's 'Chinese room argument' is a recent and celebrated variation of the standard anti-functionalist tactic. Searle advanced it in an attempt to refute the claim that computers, when programmed to simulate human linguistic behaviour, literally understand what they are outputting about. Both Richard Sharvy ('Searle on Programs and Intentionality') and William Lyons ('Dennett, Functionalism, and Introspection') allow that Searle's example succeeds in showing that not *every* such computer would understand human language. Simulations are not the real thing; hence the example 'does count against Turing machine or computer functionalism' (Lyons, 63) and shows that 'the Turing test is invalid' (Sharvy, 48). But no one can rule out the possibility of writing a program which would give some future computer or robot a literal (not merely simulated) understanding of a human language (Sharvy, 53-4).

A key consideration in Searle's mind is that computers manipulate uninterpreted formal symbols which they do not and cannot understand. On the other hand, the 'intentional system' functionalism of Daniel Dennett 'describes our cognitive functions in terms of intentional items . . . which already incorporate understanding as part of their characterisation' (Lyons, 63). Lyons claims that Dennett is faced with an unpleasant dilemma. Pure or 'free-standing' functionalism ends by once again splitting off the psychological from the physical: 'the pure functionalists could be said to have invented psycho-physical lack-of-parallelism' (83). On the other hand, if Dennett succeeds in his aim of reducing intentional systems to nonintentional subsystems, and those subsystems are identified with subsystems within the human brain, 'Dennettian functionalism collapses into eliminative materialism' (76) — the very fate functionalists have been working so hard to avoid. It is hard to see why Lyons thinks the theory is doomed to collapse into *eliminative* materialism, since nothing in Dennett's program requires or predicts the total abandonment of folk psychology.

And indeed, Jeffrey Foss ('A Materialist's Misgivings About Eliminative Materialism') observes that it is impossible nowadays to find a philosopher who actually embraces eliminative materialism. The simple eliminativist position is but one extreme of a whole spectrum of possibilities (128); further along the spectrum one encounters other, more cautious philosophers — including, it turns out, Paul Churchland.

In his reply to Foss ('On the Speculative Nature of our Self Conception'), Churchland defends 'a certain methodological approach to cognitive theory, an approach that is deliberately sceptical about the integrity of folk psychology' (163). But, he adds, 'Reduction is always desirable, if you can get it. And no doubt some of folk psychology will be successfully reduced' (164). It begins to look as though all roads are leading towards a partly reductive, partly eliminative materialism; here perhaps is the most significant theme to emerge in this anthology. Churchland also offers a reply to the criticisms advanced by Bonnie Thurston and Sam Coval in 'Sensation, Theory and Meaning.' The

exchange serves to remove misunderstandings which have made it hard for many readers, not just Thurston and Coval, to appreciate Churchland's position.

Christopher Cherry's 'The Inward and the Outward: Fantasy, Reality and Satisfaction' breaks new ground in discussing how fantasy 'connects epistemologically and ethically with a person's desires and satisfactions' (177), but his conclusions on the matter are in general rather lame.

The final essay, Andrew Brennan's 'Amnesia and Psychological Continuity,' opens with the bold words, 'Perhaps surprisingly, amnesia is perfectly compatible with psychological continuity' (195), and it is a disappointment to find that Brennan has not thought of a way of saving psychological continuity in the case of 'really gross amnesias' (209) — the interesting and difficult case. It cannot be said that the editors saved the best 'til last.

MARTIN GERWIN
St. John's College
University of Manitoba

This book consists of a collection of papers on process philosophy and the relation of time to physics. Included among the contributors are Bohm, Stapp and the Nobel laureat Prigogine. The text consists of three sections: 'Historical Backgrounds,' 'Bohm, Prigogine and Process Philosophy,' and 'Philosophical Overviews.' The text also contains an introduction by Griffin, notes on the contributors and a helpful name index.

Griffin, in his 'Introduction,' notes that the experiential concept of time has three essential elements: (a) a one-way direction that is in principle irreversible; (b) categorical differences between past, present and future; and (c) a notion of constant becoming (i.e., a 'moving present'). Against this, the laws of physics typically do not provide for irreversibility (though anisotropy does come in with thermodynamics), absolute categorical differences between past, present and future, or a notion of constant becoming according to which 'the present' moves. In modern physics, according to Griffin (1), 'The so-called fundamental laws of physics are often said to require 'time' only in the very abstract sense of the t-coordinate, on which events are strung out.' The clash

between 'time' as it appears in modern physics and our so-called experiential intuitions thereof, as well as the need for a post-modern 'temporalized' physics, is a guiding theme of the text.

As a minimal requirement, physics needs a concept of 'time' adequate to do physics. In order to develop a post-modern physics in harmony with process philosophy's claims about temporality, it must be shown that the desiderata of process philosophy can be satisfied in workable physical theories; otherwise it will be difficult not to view those desiderata as mere empty metaphysical rhetoric.

Now, process philosophy does not offer quantitative irreversible laws of motion (to replace the current reversible ones), it just views irreversible laws as a desideratum. Notwithstanding this, it does not follow from the fact that the current laws of physics are reversible, that time goes backwards or that there is reverse causality (32), anymore than it follows from the fact that Einstein's field equations have many solutions, that they are all physically significant.

A.N. Prior has criticized the very idea of a 'moving present' (see 'Change in Events and Changes in Things' in *Papers on Time and Tense* OUP 1968). The idea that past, present and future are categorically different may lack physical justification since there are cosmologically significant solutions to Einstein's field equations according to which spacetime is closed but unbounded. Furthermore, if the idea is that the future, unlike the past, is somehow 'unformed' and 'open,' rather than being essentially the same as the past, then from a realist point of view such an idea cannot be reconciled with the concept of spacetime required to formulate relativity theory. Treating time as spacelike entails that past, present and future are not categorically different — they just correspond to different aspects of the spacetime ontology. That past and future are essentially different is a subjective attitude to which nothing corresponds in a spacetime theory. Spacetime certainly cannot be supplemented with the concept of a moving present. After all, what does the present move with respect to in such a theory? Certainly not time, since that is already built into the picture as a spacelike dimension along which bodies are extended! In short, it is no accident that time in process philosophy is at odds with time in modern physics.

But why should we seek a post-modern temporalized physics in the first place? Griffin gives six reasons, all of which are extrinsic to physics. First to overcome the dichotomy between physics and the humanities (26). But the relation between physics and the humanities is not a physical problem and so there is no reason to suppose that changing physics will help here. Secondly, to overcome the dichotomy between 'time' in physics and 'time' in the other sciences (26). While the problem here is not one of physics, it must be shown that the adoption of, say, biological concepts of time contributes to the sound workings of physics — and this is not demonstrated in the text. Thirdly, Griffin contends that the concept of freedom requires that the future be open (and hence be unlike the past) (28). But there are well studied grounds for supposing that this claim is inaccurate and that there is no conflict between

psychology and physics (see D. Davidson, 'Psychology as Philosophy' in Glover, ed., *Philosophy of Mind* OUP 1976). Fourthly, it is contended that modern physics has contributed to the 'ecological crisis of our time' in that it views nature as passive and as lacking aesthetic value and intrinsic worth (29). But the passing of aesthetic and moral judgements upon the world has never been the task of physics, which is an amoral (not immoral) activity. Fifthly, temporalized physics is supposed to ease the tension between science and religion (29). What tension? The laws of physics today are simply silent on religious matters, even if individual physicists are not. Finally, it is contended that modern physics has been interpreted as viewing time as being 'unreal' and that this has had a bad effect on the popular imagination (32). Again, notwithstanding some unsober expositions of quantum mechanics, (as opposed to quantum mechanics itself), relativity theory has an ontology of spacetime, and one can hardly be more committed to the reality of something than that!

Papers by Prigogine and Stapp, as well as commentaries on these and Bohm's paper are both important and interesting. Bohm himself is difficult to follow, and the fault is not always with the reader. For instance, Bohm comments on the 'free will' issue at one point (207): 'The clear perception that we are the unknown, which is beyond time, allows the mind to give time its proper value, which is limited and not supreme. This is what makes freedom possible, in the sense of realizing our true potential for participating harmoniously in universal creativity...' Again, Griffin comments on Bohm's physics (133): 'Bohm's theory has the virtue of explaining how phenomena normally called "teleportation" or "materialization and dematerialization" can occur.' Alas, this is more reminiscent of post-reality physics than anything else! Those interested in evolutionary epistemology will find the Bjelland/Gunter debate to be of interest, while Hurley's paper on Whitehead's philosophy of time is also very important.

NIALL SHANKS
University of Alberta

Political science, Gunnell argues, is effete, pretentious and profoundly alienated from its professed object: politics. Behavioral political science continues to

draw its inspiration from a bankrupt and now largely abandoned philosophy of science — positivism — which was itself removed from the actual practice of natural science. Political theory — which arose in reaction to perceived evils of behavioral political science, modernity, and liberalism — invokes the tradition of political theorizing from Plato to Marx; unfortunately, the tradition exists only in the minds of its myth-makers. Neither political science nor political theory produces anything more than metatheoretical solutions to metatheoretical problems; neither develops any substantive theory.

The root *political* causes of the alienated activity of political scientists may be traced to their estrangement from political action coupled with their continuing, arrogant desire to tell political agents what they can (behavioralists) and should (theorists) do. The root *philosophical* cause is the persisting attraction of epistemological foundationalism, when we should have learned that 'there are no metatheoretical answers to theoretical problems. The search for an indubitable realm of fact and a method for apprehending it was ... a futile quest' (155).

The arrogance of political science arises because 'It is simply assumed that good practice is knowledgeable practice (normatively and empirically), knowledgeable practice is practice informed by theory, theory is the province of political theorists who can discover the essence of rationality, and therefore they should have a role as master policy makers' (200). In fact, however, the foundations of knowledge '... are rooted in the practices of life and the theories that orient and inform them' (220). Given that '...by its very nature politics is a form of life grounded in varying degrees of lie and illusion' (221), political scientists and theorists quickly retreated to a safe, albeit confining, haven in the academy.

Gunnell's polemic spares only Wittgenstein and Kuhn. Logical positivists failed to understand natural science and social scientists engaged in sterile metatheoretical debates about the implications of positivist dogma for social science. He reserves special scorn, however, for Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin, who appeal to a mythical 'tradition' of 'great minds in conversation,' of which they are the custodians and heirs. At the core of this myth is the reification of an analytical construct, the representation of what is in fact a retrospectively and externally demarcated tradition as an actual or self-constituted tradition (cf. 95). Even Rawls, Nozick, and Dworkin pretend to continue this great tradition. Although bankrupt, the myth serves to justify the position of political scientists within the academy and as an elite with an *a priori* intellectual and moral right to influence political practice.

Substantive theory must engage in the particularity of politics. Politics concerns *conventional objects*; that is, what people do and produce. Such a theory, like any theory, can only specify a domain for locating political objects: it cannot provide a program for political theory, explain anything, constitute a method, or provide a warrant of success (cf. 219). Once we grasp this point, we can avoid the twin bugaboos of relativism and the so-called fact/value gap. In any practical context, relativism means nothing more than the absence of defined standards; 'when such standards do not exist, there is no general an-

swer to the problem and certainly no philosophical answer...'(37). The fact/value dichotomy grows out of 'metatheoretical claims about the ability of philosophy to specify transcendental domains of factual and evaluative givenness' (216). Having given up this impossible, indeed non-sensical quest, no general problem remains. Fact and value, after all, 'do not represent specific types of linguistic performance' (217).

Gunnell's avowed Wittgensteinian commitments thoroughly influence his diagnosis of the problems of contemporary political (and social) science. Perhaps his heated rhetoric stems from the fact that the patient, though judged clinically dead, seems to be thoroughly enjoying life, hence the need to describe this life as 'alienated.' His glum prognosis for substantive theory should also be noted. Only feminist political theory stands out because 'This is a mode of discourse that is about something, that is defined by an existential problem rather than a philosophical category, and that speaks to and for an actual audience' (222). However, as he never specifies the mode of discourse, authors, existential problems, or audience his claim cannot easily be assessed. Surely Rawls on the difference principle, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, Nozick on private property, and Dworkin on affirmative action address contemporary existential problems addressed to and for an actual audience. Much feminist political philosophy differs no more in kind than Nozick does from Rawls. Of course, feminist political philosophy may be going the way of all theory: 'Much of the literature is being drawn within the orbit of the usual academic authorities and the problems addressed are increasingly defined within the modes of philosophical discourse...' (222).

This raises the potentially embarrasing question of Gunnell's own mode of philosophic discourse, the existential problems, and audience. Clearly the book — published by an academic press — is addressed to academic political scientists, political theorists, and political philosophers. Some might describe his effort as 'the apotheosis of narcissism,' but Gunnell insists that 'the difficulties of political theory must be met on their own ground...[for p]olitical theory will not die as long as it maintains itself as an academic institution, and effective criticism, and change, can come only from within that institution' (7). This apology seems odd given his general theses: Why does he think he can solve a *political* problem by 'understaking a metatheoretical critique of metatheory'? (7) Like the myths he attacks, Gunnell's own work seems to lie between philosophy and politics.

Nevertheless, Gunnell's history of political science attends carefully both to the underlying issues and to detail, though his exaggerations sometimes obscure this. His discussion of philosophy of science, moreover, demonstrates a clear understanding of the deep issues Winch, Kuhn, and Feyerabend raise. The same may be said of his discussion, and trenchant criticism, of Cavell, Rorty, Taylor, Habermas, MacIntyre, Walzer and Wolin. For all its excess, the virtues of the book make it well worth reading by anyone seriously interested in contemporary social philosophy.

HANS OBERDIEK
Swarthmore College

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This book is a useful introduction to both the theoretical foundations and aspirations of AI and to actual work in the field. One excellent aspect of Haugeland's book is that it has the sort of patient tone one might expect from a sophisticated guide who has gained his own familiarity with the terrain relatively recently, and who remembers therefore where the pitfalls and tricky turns lie. What Haugeland is somewhat less good at doing, however, is helping the reader anticipate what lies ahead, drawing connections between various sections, and keeping his underlying philosophical concerns visible throughout. In the 'Introduction,' Haugeland sets himself three ambitions: 'First and foremost, to explain, clearly and with an open mind, what AI is really all about; second, to exhibit the philosophical and scientific credentials behind its enormous appeal; and finally, to take a look at what actually has and has not been accomplished' (2).

What AI is about is whether 'thinking and computing are radically the same' (2); 'the real issue is whether, in the appropriate abstract sense, we are computers ourselves' (12). GOFAI (Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence, 112) is the branch of cognitive science which embraces the computational theory of mind (CTM). According to GOFAI, it isn't that thinking is *like* a computational process in certain respects, or that thinking can be simulated on a computer (so can hurricanes) but that thinking *is* computation. Chapter 1, 'The Saga of the Modern Mind,' is devoted to clarifying this hypothesis by looking at its historical foundations in 17th century philosophy. Haugeland's reading of the historical record is somewhat idiosyncratic and a bit too surveyish even for a survey; but the chapter does succeed in articulating the grounds, if not the precise meaning, of Hobbes's famous formulation of CTM. Although Hobbes's hypothesis fit well with a materialistic metaphysic committed to mathematical description of natural processes, it raised and left unanswered the following question: If thinking just involves brain processes which result in different configurations of thought 'parcels' — which are themselves brain states with symbolic functions — where do these 'parcels' get their symbolic powers from? 'The basic question is: How can thought parcels *mean* anything?' (25) Haugeland calls this the 'mystery of original meaning' (27). Because we explain the meaning of words in terms of thoughts, we are owed an explanation of how thoughts — now conceived as computational states of the brain — intrinsically have or can acquire their symbolic powers. The mystery here is exacerbated by the 'paradox of mechanical reason' (39): a computational system which pays attention to what the thought 'parcels' being manipulated mean can't be completely mechanical 'because meanings (whatever exactly they are) don't exert physical forces' (39); on the other hand, if the system doesn't pay attention to the meanings it is not thinking — thinking rationally, after all, necessarily involves paying attention to meanings. 'In a word, if a

process or system is mechanical, it can't reason; if it reasons it can't be mechanical' (39). Because an air of mystery and paradox surrounds the fundamental hypothesis that guides GOFAI, GOFAI, if true, is true in a nontrivial way. Original meaning and mechanical reasoning need to be explained and various homunculi discharged.

The next two chapters provide a patient, but inconclusive, discussion of how this air of mystery and paradox might be dispelled. Chapter 2, 'Automatic Formal Systems,' is devoted to introducing the fundamental concepts of computer science. The idea of an interpreted automatic formal system (AFS) is explained in an illuminating manner which deepens the worries mustered in the opening chapter. For although it is easy to explain how meaning is preserved by an automatic formal system once meaning is *assigned by us*, meaning is not itself a formal property, and therefore not an original property of such a system. In Chapter 3, 'Semantics,' Haugeland puts the point this way: formal tokens live two lives, 'SYNTACTICAL LIVES in which they are meaningless markers, moved according to the rules of some self-contained game; and SEMANTIC LIVES, in which they have meanings and symbolic relations to the outside world' (100). The formalist knows that so long as the computer takes care of syntax, the semantic interpretation we assign will be carried along on a free ride. This thins the air of paradox surrounding the idea of a mechanical reasoner somewhat, but it does nothing to dispel the mystery of original meaning. Haugeland concludes the chapter with some tentative and vague conjectures as to how original meaning might be accounted for, after which he comments that the mystery 'is battered but not down' (123). I don't see that he has made a dent.

Chapter 4, 'Computer Architecture,' provides a sample of five different logical architectures: Babbage's Analytic Engine, Turing Machines, Von Neuman Machines, McCarthy's LISP, and Newell's Production Systems. This chapter is largely descriptive, and the discussion, though clear, does little to keep philosophical curiosity piqued. Indeed it is easy to lose sight of the fact that these different architectures are, within the GOFAI tradition, candidates for realistic descriptions of the architecture of *human* cognition. Haugeland does little to assess the relative merits of the different architectures he depicts from this perspective.

Chapter 5, 'Real Machines,' is essentially devoted to the Frame Problem (FP) and its ancestors: we are told about the difficulties natural language translation programs ran into because of the enormous store of background knowledge needed to understand many simple sentences; and a survey is offered of various attempts to write genuinely intelligent programs which do not need to be omniscient or to search through their entire data base before drawing conclusions, e.g., heuristic searches, micro-worlds, and stereotypes. Finally, FP itself — the problem of how intelligent systems link a piece of information in an efficent way with other pieces of information needed to understand a sentence or situation — is introduced. Haugeland's discussion of FP is illuminating and one of the high points of the book.

The final chapter, 'Real People,' is devoted, as Haugeland puts it: 'to scout-

[ing] around for omissions: phenomena that may be important to intelligence but have not been (perhaps cannot be) assimilated within the GOFAI tradition' (213). Some candidates include pragmatic sense, mental imagery, feelings, and self image. The discussion here is interesting but sketchy, provocative but not profound. We discover on the last page of the book, although it comes as no surprise, that Haugeland remains judiciously skeptical about GOFAI.

Despite its strength as an introduction to AI, there are some minor annoyances. First, although Haugeland is a good and clear writer he often lapses into a street wise, low brow style of prose that goes beyond (possibly beneath) what is down-to-earth and playful. Descartes's God, we are told, is 'nice' and it wouldn't be 'nice' for a nice God to deceive us. The principle of charity in Haugeland's hands becomes the 'Nonasininity canon: An enduring system makes sense to the extent that, as understood, it isn't making an ass of itself' (219). The distinction between real and accidental sense is introduced by having us imagine that in a far off place in our galaxy the stars trace out 'the four letters of a Anglo-Saxon vulgarism' (94). I prefer Paley's way of making the point. And even if you are less stodgy than I am, consider what students might produce on the basis of such models. Second, the book is full of gray boxes of the sort one remembers from high school mathematics books. Many of these boxes contain material which belongs in the main text (7, 11, 170); some contain helpful material which would be useful in footnotes (75, 181-2); and some are little indulgences (209-10) which albeit interesting are probably best kept to the author. In general I think these boxes interfere with reading and understanding and should not be foisted on readers with normal attention spans. Third, Haugeland obviously decided as a matter of deliberate strategy to keep philosophical jargon to a minimum. But he may have gone too far. For example, there is never a mention of intentionality or supervenience (not even in the index). These are topics about which Haugeland has written elsewhere and they are discussed in other terms throughout the book. But it is surprising and unhelpful that Haugeland does not introduce standard terminology at certain natural junctures. Since the book will be used widely in philosophy courses, Haugeland would have made both the students' and teachers' lives easier by linking his own ideas to the common intellectual currency in the field. This reticence about deploying philosophical terminology possibly explains the reaction of several of my students who thought the book to be unphilosophical (but the late and dismissive introduction of the topic of consciousness seven pages from the end also had something to do with their reaction). Despite these reservations I will continue to use this book in my philosophy of mind course as I did last semester; it is the best philosophical introduction to AI available.

OWEN FLANAGAN
Wellesley College

MARTIN HEIDEGGER. *Concepts fondamentaux*. Texte établi par Petra Jaeger et traduit de l'allemand par Pascal David. Paris: Gallimard (Collection 'Bibliothèque de Philosophie,' série 163 pp. Œuvres complètes de Martin Heidegger) 1985. 82FF. ISBN 2-07-070318-5.

Le titre donné par Heidegger à ces leçons prononcées au semestre d'été de l'année 1941 se veut délibérément provocateur. En absence de toute épithète, le lecteur ne sait trop au départ de quels 'concepts fondamentaux' il s'agit. Normalement cette expression est employée pour caractériser les divers domaines de l'étant vers lesquels se tournent les sciences particulières. Incidemment, Heidegger s'était penché dans sa période néo-kantienne, donc au nom de la théorie de la connaissance, sur 'Le concept de temps en historiographie' (1915). Aussi l'emploi non qualifié de cette expression constitue-t-il à présent une autocritique à peine voilée. Désormais Heidegger s'interroge sur les concepts fondamentaux en tant que 'concepts-de-fond' (15, 25), valables pour quelque région de l'étant que ce soit. De cette manière, il renoue évidemment avec la question de l'être.

Le fait que ce cours soit contemporain des fameuses leçons sur Nietzsche pourrait laisser supposer que Heidegger aborde la question de l'être sous l'angle d'une critique de la subjectivité des Temps Modernes. Mais il n'en est rien. Bien entendu, Heidegger ne manque jamais de rapporter son propos à la situation politique et culturelle de son époque: on retrouve dans ces pages une critique acerbe des ambitions démesurées de la physique, ainsi que de la fausse modestie de la philologie. Il va sans dire également que le nom de Nietzsche fait surface dès qu'il s'agit de définir l'époque moderne comme règne de la technique (31) et comme déploiement de la volonté de puissance (55), de même que lorsqu'il s'agit de donner l'exemple d'une traduction tendancieuse d'Anaximandre. Mais dans l'ensemble, Heidegger tient à se ménager un accès plus direct à l'être, et ce de manière autonome. C'est pourquoi d'ailleurs, en dépit de son intérêt grandissant pour Hölderlin (24, 99) et pour la parole poétique en général (Cf. le vers de Gœthe 'Sur tous les sommets / Est le repos' 50sq), il préfère s'en tenir au chemin de la méditation et se pencher sur la parole du penseur. La seconde partie des leçons est aussi consacrée à l'interprétation de la parole d'Anaximandre, alors que la première s'applique, en guise de préliminaire, à dégager la question de l'être en thématisant la différence ontologique.

La différence entre l'être et l'étant est difficile à saisir dans la mesure précise où, l'étant occupant toute la scène, l'être dans son essence a tendance à se dérober. Ou alors il est tout bonnement ramené à l'étant. Dans cette première partie, Heidegger entreprend de passer en revue les caractéristiques de l'être qui rendent celui-ci inapparent, insaisissable. Heidegger procède à l'aide de deux séries d'''idées directrices' qui se répondent point par point en ceci qu'elles forment des couples d'oppositions.

L'être est ce qu'il y a de plus vide et de plus commun.
L'être est ce qu'il y a de plus évident et de plus galvaudé.

L'être est ce qu'il y a de plus fiable et de plus ressassé.
L'être est ce qu'il y a de plus oublié et de plus contraignant.
L'être est profusion et unicité.
L'être est retrait et origine.
L'être est a-bîme et réticence.
L'être est mémoire et libération. (93)

Le lecteur aura vite fait de remarquer que la première série, consacrée aux caractéristiques négatives, comporte d'étonnants recoupements avec les premières pages d'*Être et Temps*. Certes, Heidegger n'innove pas ici en affirmant que l'être est ce qu'il y a de plus 'commun,' de plus 'général,' de plus 'universel' (cf. 53), pas plus qu'en disant qu'il est ce qu'il y a de plus 'évident,' de plus 'compréhensible' (cf. 77), ou encore de plus 'vide,' de plus 'indéterminé' (cf. 52), c'est-à-dire de plus difficile à définir. Mais par rapport à *Être et Temps*, il faut avouer que la perspective s'est considérablement déplacée. L'être a beau encore constituer de nos jours 'ce qu'il y a de plus *oublié*,' ce qui a 'sombré dans l'oubli' (89), il n'en demeure pas moins que l'être est aussi *mémoire*, selon le terme correspondant à l'oubli, dans la seconde série. Avec cette mémoire, il est fait référence à un concept d'histoire qui diffère largement du projet de la seconde partie d'*Être et Temps* visant à parcourir l'histoire de l'oubli de l'être, l'histoire de son occultation depuis Platon et Aristote. L'histoire est désormais considérée dans ce qu'elle a d'initial, d'initiatique pour ainsi dire. L'histoire intéresse pour son commencement; non pas en ce que ce début constituerait un événement à jamais révolu, mais en ce qu'il se perpétue et se renouvelle constamment comme venue à la présence de l'être.

L'interprétation de la parole d'Anaximandre qui est développée dans la deuxième partie, et qui préfigure déjà le texte de 1946 'La parole d'Anaximandre' publié dans les *Chemins qui ne mènent nulle part*, comporte une critique de la métaphysique de la présence, comme présence constante. Or l'étalon sur lequel se fonde cette critique est un autre concept de présence (*Anwesung*), à savoir une conception de l'être comme venue à la présence. Le dire initial dans la parole d'Anaximandre saisit l'être comme ce qui rend possible le surgissement de l'étant ainsi que son évanouissement, par-delà toute velléité de fixation dans un présent constant. 'L'être est bien venue à la présence, mais non nécessairement constance dans la consistance appelée à durer. Est-ce à dire que la consistance est la défiguration, l'inessence monstrueuse (*Unwesen*) de la présence? Est-ce à dire que la consistance, par conséquent, prive la présence de ce qui lui est essentiel? Assurément; car γένεσις, l'entrée en présence, ne désigne pas la pure et simple présence, mais son surgissement et son éclosion. La pré*sence* est caractérisée par la γένεσις, par le surgissement. Le seul être-présent au sens d'être-sous-la main (*Vorhandenheit*) a déjà assigné une limite au déploiement de la présence, au surgissement, et ainsi abandonné le déploiement de la présence. La consistance amène l'inessence à la présence, et ôte à celle-ci la possibilité de ce qui appartient au mouvement d'entrer en présence comme surgissement et éclosion, à savoir: le retour en arrière et l'évanouissement' (146). Il devient évident que ces leçons effectuent un retour

au thème d'*Être et Temps*, mais beaucoup moins dans la perspective de la théorie des extases temporelles que dans celle de l''Introduction' de 1949 à 'Qu'est-ce que la métaphysique?' avec sa thèse selon laquelle le temps est le 'prénom' de l'être. 'Pourquoi la parole d'*Anaximandre* sur l'être parle-t-elle du temps? La réponse (implicite) en est que l'être lui-même est 'éprouvé' (*'urfahren'*) comme entrée en présence, et celle-ci comme transition du surgir au s'évanouir. L'entrée en présence est ce temps (*Weile*), et son inessence réside dans l'attardement qui aimerait insister sur une constance définitive. L'essence de l'être empêche cette limite' (156).

A la vérité, il est toujours question du Même chez Heidegger, mais selon des variantes différentes au gré des multiples recommencements. La variation que nous présentent ces *Concepts fondamentaux,* malgré sa concision, est particulièrement réussie. Et ce d'autant plus que Heidegger est servi par une excellente traduction, révisée par F. Fédier. On sent ici la préoccupation constante de donner aux expressions le plus de connotations et de consonance possible, sans pourtant jamais sombrer dans le maniérisme, si courant de nos jours dans ce genre d'entreprise. Il en résulte une version qui ne laisse rien perde de l'aisance et de l'élégance de la prose heideggerienne, et qui restitue à cette pensée toute sa vigueur.

CLAUDE PICHÉ
Université de Montréal

In this book Hendley expresses concern over the remoteness and sterility of analytical philosophy. He regards it as a particularly regrettable event when educational philosophy is divorced from practical affairs. In an effort to overcome this situation, Hendley takes the reader back to three philosophers, Dewey, Russell, and Whitehead, 'to regain a sense of the importance of applying philosophical insights to concrete educational situations' (123).

The author concludes the book with what he regards as examples of appropriate practical pursuits for modern philosophers in education. He believes that if philosophy of education is to survive in a productive and meaningful sense, philosophers need to turn their attention to analyses of important and influential modern thrusts in education. These include the analysis of the role

of the computer in education, a gender-sensitive ideal in education, the expansion of adult education, and education for peace.

In the first chapter, Hendley discusses his main motive for writing the book: that is, 'to take stock of where we are and to appreciate the value of general theory building' (11) and to pay attention to what is actually happening in the classroom. He argues convincingly that philosophy ought to include reflection upon the kind of society we wish to promote, consideration of the nature of human beings, and the taking into account of practical consequences of implementing certain aims within education. He also argues less convincingly that by reviewing the practical work done by Dewey, Russell, and Whitehead, we will find ways of improving the aims and methods of philosophy of education.

The second chapter deals with John Dewey's philosophy of education and Dewey's attempt to implement his ideas at the University of Chicago in what came to be called the Laboratory School (1896-1904). This informative and very well documented chapter is a sufficient reason in itself to commend the book to other readers. Hendley presents a balanced and honest portrayal of the difficulties and achievements of Dewey. He notes that along with other critics Dewey himself came to realize that in many respects 'the Laboratory School came far short of achieving its ideal and putting the controlling ideas into practice' (36). Hendley also presents an excellent account of administrative difficulties, financial problems, and political in-fighting that plagued Dewey's Laboratory School. Readers who work within modern university settings will be struck by a feeling of *déjà vu*.

Chapter three offers a detailed look at Bertrand Russell's Beacon Hill School. Again this section is very well researched. Hendley has taken considerable care to describe the internal operations of Beacon Hill School, which had its beginnings in 1927. He also discusses Russell's philosophic concern that education not be used as a vehicle for indoctrinating students either with the dictates of organized religion or of the state. Russell (43) was particularly wary of the philosophy of state schools which promoted extremes of 'nationalism, glorification of competition and success, worship of mechanism, love of uniformity, and contempt for individuality.' The philosophy of Beacon Hill School is epitomized in Russell's comment: 'At all ages, every question, on no matter what subject, will be answered to the best of our knowledge and ability' (45). Hendley's description of the philosophy of the school is important in helping the reader understand some of the reasons why Beacon Hill School was an object of widespread criticism. Russell's emphasis of his students' needs for unrestricted freedom and extreme individuality fueled the fires of criticism, and in time, Russell himself became both disillusioned and critical of the methods and curriculum of Beacon Hill School. Hendley's honest and open discussion of the problems at Beacon Hill School are commendable. However, the failures and difficulties in both Dewey's Laboratory School and Russell's Beacon Hill School do not provide strong examples of success in bringing practice and theory together in a way that Hendley advocates in his opening chapter.

In chapter four, Hendley discusses the work of the mathematician and philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead. Once again, the author provides careful details and excellent documentation of Whitehead's involvement in education. Whitehead taught mainly within the university environment and the practical aspects of his work tended to involve committee participation, liaison with various schools, and serving on government boards and commissions, both in U.S.A. and in Great Britain. In addition, his writings on education indicated that he was very aware of what was going on in schools. Hendley recognizes that Whitehead's 'practical' contributions were of a different nature from those of Dewey and Russell. It is to Hendley's credit that he spends considerable time in justifying his inclusion of Whitehead along with Russell and Dewey as philosophers who attempted to unite educational theory and practice in a meaningful way. As Hendley is aware, the 'practical' ideals and individuality of Whitehead were often more obscure and diffused than those of Dewey and Russell since Whitehead operated within the confines of committees and government boards along with his fellow members.

The fifth and final chapter discusses 'The Philosopher as Educator Today' (102 ff). This chapter is important to the success of the book in a number of ways. Here Hendley makes the point that he does not regard Dewey, Russell or Whitehead as holding perfected views on education. Rather, each held a concept of an ideal society and each attempted to put his theoretical views into a practical framework within a setting of education that would give expression to his ideals. Hendley is not advocating a return to the particular methods of the three philosophers discussed in the book. More importantly, he suggests that current philosophers should be more future oriented as they analyse the implications of computer education, gender and education, adult education, and peace education. One may perhaps question the choice of these four topics while others are left out, such as the study of environmental education. However, in fairness, it is unlikely that Hendley would advocate omitting any topic that has an impact on the improvement of society as a whole.

In summary, this book is informative and well-documented. It links significant educational philosophers of the past with important ideals for the future. Perhaps most important of all, it offers worthwhile suggestions for philosophers of education so that they may continue to improve their effectiveness in the analysis of education.

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GOLDWIN JAMES EMERSON
Division of Educational Policy Studies
University of Western Ontario

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The scope of this book is enormous. Howard discusses large chunks of Kant's *Critiques* and his political writings, Hegel's systematic and historical works, Marx's writings on economics and his historical essays. The list of topics is similiarly extensive, from the relationship between ontology and epistemology to the nature of ideology. There is hardly any important theoretical or political debate in 19th Century German thought that is not discussed in this book.

In a work this ambitious, there will always be a danger of losing sight of the forest for the trees. Nonetheless there is a basic thesis that unifies the work: republican institutions are most appropriate to modern societies, a fact which makes Kant, who was the first to recognize this fully, a more significant thinker than Hegel or Marx. Accordingly I shall limit my remarks to Howard's views on modernity, his arguments for republicanism, and his defense of Kant.

'Modernity' is defined by Howard in terms of its 'originary structure': 'The recurring paradoxes with which modern theory and modern politics are confronted are described here by the neologism, *originary*' (2). A structure is originary when it is set up by two poles, both of which are necessary and neither of which can be reduced to the other. This is the relationship between theory and practice ('The originary is inherently paradoxical because it is the copresence of the double demand that theory demonstrate its immanent relation to the world, and that the world express its receptivity to the theory' [3].) The relationship between genesis and normativity is another example ('An originary structure is characterized by the immanent copresence or tension of the demand to explain genesis and the imperative to legitimate normativity' [12]), as is that between the public and the private ('Private freedom and public obedience to the state depend on each other ... This structure is modern' [20]).

I do not understand how modern thinkers and political actors face the challenge to grasp these poles simultaneously more than their pre-modern counterparts did. The attempt to balance theory and practice can be found in Aristotle; Habermas' studies of social evolution teach that the tension between genesis and normative legitimation goes back to the first institutionalization of class inequalities; and the duality between private freedom and public obedience was a central theme of Augustine's *City of God*. The notion of originary structure is interesting. But whether it can serve as the central characteristic of modernity is questionable.

This notion also plays a crucial role in Howard's argument for republican institutions. The argument goes roughly as follows. We need to unite theory and practice, normativity and genesis, in an on-going process that does not reduce one to the other. At this point Howard introduces the concept of 'the political.' This is a process of open-ended public discussion. If theoretical and normative matters are part of this open-ended discussion, this may enable origi-

nary structures to be maintained. For, in on-going public discussion, it is inevitable that abstract theories and normative claims will be confronted with the specificities of particular practices and genetic processes, and that the reverse holds as well. Howard claims that such a public realm can be adequately institutionalized only within a republic, for 'its constitutional and representative structure guarantees that the Republic is open to change, public debate, and communal education. Republican institutions are a political structure that makes necessary the articulation of particular content' (261-2).

I find this, the central argument of the book, completely convincing. Structures of direct democracy, where everything is decided by plebiscite, merely sum up the private inclinations of voters; they do not further the formation of a public will. Likewise bureaucratic structures also privatize the political process. Howard is surely correct when he writes that 'the political is public, in contrast to activity in and from the private sphere' (xii).

However we cannot stop here. For even if the republican form appears superior on the abstract level, the concrete workings of representational systems in our experience would lead any rational person to cynicism. Howard mentions in this regard 'the well-known assertion that the Republic is only a formal legal cloak perpetuating social relations of domination and exploitation' (226). As far as I can tell he has two responses to this problem. The first is to introduce 'philosophy' as a *deus ex machina*: 'The difficulty can be avoided by reintroduction of the philosophical component of method. Originary philosophy depends on the existence of a world that needs philosophy as its completion' (226). This does not seem at all adequate. It wildly overestimates both the role philosophers play in society as well as the extent to which philosophy criticizes relations of domination (I am afraid philosophy far more often legitimates these relations).

A more plausible defense of the republican form is implied without being developed in the book. If the problem is institutional, the solution must be institutional as well. If the problem is that there are some institutionalizations of the republican form that are compatible with domination and exploitation, the solution must be to show that there are others which are not (or at least not to the same extent). The project now would be to develop a theory of the different varieties of the republican form and to develop principles by which they can be ranked. Howard comes close to taking up this project in the following passage: 'Capitalism is only one of the forms that civil society can adopt within the republican framework ... . That other models are also possible is seen in Hannah Arendt's repeated return to the model of a councils or self-management form of the modern polity' (227). But if we pushed in this direction we would, I believe, find ourselves going from Kant to Marx, and not the reverse direction.

This brings us to the third issue, the evaluation of Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Kant did offer profound defenses of the public realm and the republican form, and we have much to learn from his arguments today. But Kant also thought that the dissolution of feudalism would lead to a society of small scale independent producers. He was, of course, utterly wrong about this. The develop-

ment of modern market societies has led to an ever increasing concentration and centralization of economic power, as Hegel and Marx both anticipated. As a result, republican institutions today do not provide any equality of opportunity to participate in public discussion. And they involve representational systems that respond to concentrated economic power much more than to any public will articulated in open-ended public discussion. It is Hegel and, even more, Marx who can help us understand this situation, not Kant. And if it is true that Kant's theory is rich enough to be pushed in a different direction, as in Arendt's theory of councils, it is just as true that the Marxist tradition doesn't have to be pushed in this direction. It is already there. In his writings on the Paris Commune and elsewhere Marx defended a representational system of councils that captures the best insights of Kant's political views while avoiding his seriously mistaken opinions on the dynamics of market economics. While Stalinism betrayed this heritage, a tradition of authentic Marxism stemming from Rosa Luxemburg and others has kept it alive.

It is surprising that Howard, one of the world's leading scholars on the work of Rosa Luxemburg, does not note how many of Kant's passionate defenses of the importance of the public sphere echo in this Marxist tradition. Perhaps Howard's disappointment regarding the extensive failures of the left has led him unconsciously to stress the negative aspects of Marxism and downplay the positive, while doing just the reverse for Kantianism. The underlying hope here may be that ideas rejected when labelled 'Marxist' may prove acceptable if labelled 'Kantian.' Yet the fact remains that any road that leads from Marx to Kant eventually circles around.

TONY SMITH
Iowa State University

BRAD INWOOD. *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985. Pp. 348. US$29.95. ISBN 0-19-824739-7.

Since the publication of John Rist's *Stoic Philosophy* in 1969, there has been considerable interest in early Stoic philosophy. A great many books and articles have been produced, and early Stoicism has become a popular field. Inwood's book, *Ehtics and Human Action in Early Stoicism*, adds significantly to our understanding of the Stoics' theory of the psychology of action, and, in particular, their analysis of the concept of impulse (ὁρμή). I have learned a great deal from this book, and I hope that my disagreement with the interpre-

tation of particular passages may not be construed as a failure to recognize the significance of the work.

Following a discussion of 'The Aristotelian Background,' Inwood considers in chapter two 'Human Nature and the Rational Soul.' It is essentially an analysis of animal and human nature. Inwood compares a passage in Origen (H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 2.989), with a paragraph in Simplicius (von Arnim, 2.499). He argues that both passages represent a standard Stoic tradition, and that Origen reproduces this tradition more faithfully (24). Simplicius in the third division is describing activity which has its source in the practical impulse. He distinguishes the practical impulse from the rational impulse, and he goes on to specify the rational impulse by 'being active in accordance with virtue.' 'Being active in accordance with virtue' is not a 'fifth level,' as Inwood holds (24). In my opinion, the passage in Simplicius is good Stoic doctrine.

In the second chapter also, Inwood argues on the basis of a passage in Iamblichus that the soul had four powers, presentation, assent, impulse and *logos* (von Arnim, 2.826). Inwood writes: 'There is no direct and unpolemical evidence which indicates that the old Stoics, or Chrysippus more particularly, maintained that the soul had only one *dunamis*; certainly there is none which outweighs the evidence of Iamblichus, Simplicius, Arius Didymus, and Philo which has been cited' (33). There is ample evidence that the Stoics at some point adopted the theory of multiple powers, but I do not believe that Chrysippus did so. In two instances, Galen asserts that Chrysippus maintained that there was only one power of the soul (P. De Lacy, ed. & tr., *Galen on the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, V 5.38-9, VII 1.13). Certainly, Chrysippus would not have considered a term such as *logos* to be an individual quality, a word which he applied to the virtues (von Arnim, 2.826, 3.255). I agree with Inwood that the 'four powers' of Iamblichus were significant in the analysis of action, but I do not believe that they were powers (30). Inwood is right in rejecting any interpretation of Stoicism based on an extreme form of nominalism (37).

In the third chapter, Inwood discusses the practical impulse. The practical impulse, however, is not always distinguished from the rational impulse (e.g., 51, n. 53), and too little attention is paid to 'assent to the presentation.' For instance, Inwood points out that an impulse is ' "directed at" something' (51). It is true that a rational impulse is 'directed at something.' It is a movement of the mind towards one of those things pertaining to action (von Arnim, 3.169), for example, that which ought to be reasonably desired, but the practical impulse which is said to 'comprise that which is movable (von Arnim, 3.171), is directed to the action itself.

Inwood argues that a man must assent before impulse or action can occur (85), but, in so doing, he rejects Plutarch's *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 1057 A-B, a passage which states that god and the wise man produce false presentations, requiring us not to assent or yield to them, but rather to direct our impulse towards the phenomenon (85). But surely, if I am presented with the false presentation, 'The oar in the water is broken,' I may grasp the oar in

the water and take it out without giving assent to the false presentation. In such a case, however, assent to a presentation, such as, 'There is an object in the water,' is a necessary condition for the movement of the impulse.

In 'The Passions,' Inwood discusses at length a passage attributed to Chrysippus, dealing with the relaxation of pain (De Lacy, IV 7.13-6). He draws attention to several passages in which pain is defined as 'a fresh opinion regarding the presence of something bad, at which they think that it is necessary for the contraction to occur.' Inwood is particularly interested in the second half of the definition, and argues that for 'the impulse to contraction' to occur there must be assent to 'the proposition that such a contraction is appropriate' (151, cf. 144). He recognizes the sequence: opinion, assent to the proposition that such a contraction is appropriate, an impulse to the contraction, and the contraction. Inwood may not be correct in translating ἡ ἐπὶ τὴν συστολὴν ὁρμὴ (De Lacy, IV 7.14) as 'the impulse to the contraction' (149). It was translated by De Lacy, correctly I believe, as 'the conation that follows on the contraction.' (von Arnim, 3.461.)

A different interpretation is suggested by the evidence that we have for 'opinion' (δοξα). Opinion is defined as 'assent to a non-apprehensive (von Arnim, 3.548). The non-apprehensive, in turn, was a false or a true and false presentation. For example, 'This (e.g. pain) is an evil,' is a non-apprehensive which receives assent from opinion. The assent given by opinion signifies that 'it is necessary for the contraction to occur.' It bridges the gap betweem the non-apprehensive and the contraction which follows. I would, therefore, write: opinion, contraction, the movement of the impulse. If, however, all impulses were acts of assent (von Arnim, 3.171), what was the proposition which in this instance received assent? I would suggest a proposition, such as, 'This is an appropriate act.' The excessive impulse, or 'passion,' would then move in disobedience to the *logos* that formed the proposition (De Lacy, IV 2.12).

This is a good book, and one which deserves careful attention from all serious scholars interested in early Stoic philosophy.

MARGARET E. REESOR
Queen's University

Le fait que le monde existe est indépendant de notre esprit ou de notre pen-

sée, c'est seulement la manière dont il existe qui ne l'est pas. *Thinking about things* se termine à peu près en ces termes. C'est la vue qui s'offre à la fin d'un assez long périple qui se proposait d'explorer la représentation et la pensée représentative.

La démarche est faite dans une perspective phénoménologique à peu près comme l'ont laissée Sartre et Merleau-Ponty. Car si le concept d'intentionnalité est retenu comme fondamental, l'ambition husserlienne d'atteindre aux essences ou aux choses elles-mêmes est critiquée et abandonnée comme impossible. Dans ce sens, on parlera des trompeuses choses en elles-mêmes. Mais l'intentionnalité sert à élaborer un concept actif de représentation et permet ainsi à l'auteur de poursuivre son objectif. Représenter, c'est représenter quelque chose, faire qu'une chose se tienne à la place d'une autre, celle-ci n'étant pas immédiatement présente. Et cela implique trois éléments: 1. un item qui est représenté, 2. un item qui représente et 3. l'acte d'un agent par qui ou pour qui la représentation est faite ou existe et est comprise comme telle. Inspirée et guidée par ce concept de représentation, l'auteure va examiner un certain passé philosophique représenté surtout par Locke, Thomas d'Aquin et Descartes. La constatation fondamentale qui en ressort, c'est que la conception passive de la représentation exposée par Locke, i.e. la représentation comme quelque entité dans l'esprit qui représente par elle-même, est en fait la suite d'un abandon graduel d'un élément actif de la représentation dont Thomas d'Aquin tentait de rendre compte avec l'*intellect agent*. Les présentations et les discussions de cette première partie historique du livre relèvent donc un contraste marqué entre des conceptions passive et active de la représentation, découvrent des indications de sa nature fondamentalement intentionnelle et la montrent comme dirigée vers quelque item de la réalité séparée de l'esprit ou de la pensée.

Par le biais de la *signification*, la deuxième partie va poursuivre les mêmes objectifs. Ici, cependant, la discussion va s'engager avec la pensée moderne du langage, en particulier telle que développée par Saussure, Peirce, Piaget et Frege. On y fait un cheminement intéressant, bien que prévisible, vers le dédoublement du signe en signifiant et signifié, et jusqu'à la distinction entre le signifié et le référent. On va aussi retenir deux groupes de signifiants: ceux qui sont utilisés sciemment (wittingly) ou à dessein, i.e. voulus et reconnus comme signifiants par ceux qui les utilisent, et ceux qui ne sont pas utilisés sciemment (unwittingly) ou à dessein, i.e. ceux dont nous pouvons dire qu'ils fonctionnent comme des signifiants parce que *nous* pouvons voir cela, mais sans que les utilisateurs, eux, le puissent. Ces derniers signifiants sont de simples signaux, alors que les autres sont des signes ou des symboles. Le passage du signal au signe implique le désengagement, i.e. la capacité de ne pas être rivé à un ici et à un maintenant, ni à une chose qui s'y trouve. C'est le passage de la simple référence au sens et à la référence. Autrement dit: le signe ou le symbole caractérise un signifiant ou mieux l'usage d'un signifiant où la connotation est alliée à la dénotation. (Ceci sera important dans la troisième partie qui traitera des rapports de la représentation avec la réalité.) Ainsi la signification peut apparaître comme une fonction de la manière dont les sig-

nifiants sont utilisés par les agents intentionnels dans leur interaction avec le monde perçu et conçu par eux. Dire que la signification est intrinsèquement bâtie dans la structure du signifiant est dire quelque chose sur la manière dont le signifiant est utilisé. Aussi la représentation survient-elle non par la correspondance d'un à un entre des noms et des choses, mais de l'utilisation de sons, de marques, de gestes, etc., à l'intérieur d'un contexte d'actions sur le monde: d'abord par un engagement avec le monde via des actions sur lui, et plus tard par un désengagement du monde au moyen de structures conceptuelles.

La troisième et dernière partie porte sur l'*acte de représentation*. Elle aussi va se développer dans le style de la discussion. Elle tente de situer l'image par rapport à la pensée représentative, distingue les pensées qui se font avec et sans représentation et, enfin, examine le rapport de la représentation à la réalité.

Les images sont souvent comprises comme des items représentatifs positifs à la manière des idées de Locke. Mais rien ne représente quoi que ce soit par lui-même: il faut l'intervention d'un acte intentionnel qui fait tenir quelque chose à la place d'autre chose. A l'écoute de Piaget, de Sartre et de Merleau-Ponty, l'auteure va dire que l'image est une représentation active. Elle va l'interpréter comme un acte intentionnel à deux aspects. Un acte parce que l'image, à analyse, ne se révèle pas comme un objet en sus de l'objet dont elle est l'image, mais plutôt comme un mode particulier d'acte intentionnel différent de la perception qui porte, elle, directement sur l'objet. L'image mentale, dit Sartre, ne saurait être un objet pictural de la conscience qui accompagne la pensée, mais bien plus un noéma ou l'aspect sous lequel l'objet est présenté à la conscience; et les deux dimensions de cet acte peuvent être interprétées comme le rappel de caractéristiques visuelles ou sensibles de l'objet et le signifié comme composante du signe. L'image est un mode de penser par représentation, non un objet. Ce qui fait que la pensée est représentative, c'est tout juste qu'elle est dirigée vers quelque chose d'*absent*, par image ou autrement. Une importante distinction entre les actes intentionnels de percevoir et d'imager (imaging), c'est que le premier est la conscience d'un objet comme présent et le second, comme absent.

Dans un avant-dernier chapitre, la pensée représentative se manifeste comme ayant la capacité de rassembler dans le présent, non seulement des traits de l'absent, mais aussi des éléments de mondes possibles; elle se manifeste également comme une pensée qui a quelque contenu connaissable par introspection (introspectible), ce contenu devant être compris comme un 'objet transcendant,' i.e. une synthèse de multiples actes intentionnels. Tout ceci permettant de distinguer la pensée représentative de la pensée qui se déploie sans représentation, c'est-à-dire celle qui est dite en générale non-humaine ou appartenant à d'autres espèces animales. L'auteure se gardant bien, du reste, de trancher la question empirique de savoir si quelque espèce animale ne serait pas douée d'une certaine pensée représentative, si incomplète ou inchoative fût-elle.

Le dernier chapitre dégage des implications métaphysiques de la représentation ainsi comprise comme s'identifiant étroitement à la pensée représenta-

tive, i.e. comme déchosifiée ou ne consistant pas en une entité mentale quelconque. Il traite, plus précisément, de ses rapports avec la réalité.

Il y a deux sens de 'réalité': (a) la réalité comme le produit de nos tentatives de décrire et de caractériser la Réalité; et (b) cette Réalité au sens d'une réalité inaccessible derrière toute perception. On pourrait dire que les positions idéaliste et réaliste résultent du fait de séparer indûment ces deux sens de 'réalité.' A l'idéalisme il faut dire qu'il n'y a pas de Réalité derrière la réalité; et au réalisme il faut répéter qu'on atteint jamais la Réalité supposée en elle-même. Car sitôt que nous pensons à la Réalité et que nous parlons d'elle, ce qui implique le désengagement du hic et du nunc nécessaire à la représentation, nous la transformons en réalité. C'est que nous la représentons toujours dans les conditions d'un signifié comme élément constitutif du signe dont ne peut se passer la pensée représentative. Et ce signifié est la synthèse de plusieurs actes représentatifs. Ainsi, dans ce signifié logent toutes les présuppositions dont nous ne pouvons jamais sortir et qui font que nous décrivons toujours le monde de notre point de vue.

Aussi l'auteure pense-t-elle que lorsqu'on adopte la méthode phénoménologique sérieusement elle conduit à un point où il faut renoncer aux 'choses en elles-mêmes,' ce que n'avait pas prévu Husserl; et cette méthode suivie avec conséquence amène aussi à considérer comme une chimère la notion d'une réalité objective des choses en elles-mêmes.

Il est appréciable que l'auteure en arrive à ces conclusions en 1985 après d'abondantes discussions avec de multiples représentants de différents courants de pensée, à l'exception bien remarquable, cependant, de l'herméneutique contemporaine. Il ne manque pas d'intérêt que la structure de préalables (Vorstruktur) de la compréhension dont faisait état Heidegger dans *Sein und Zeit* en 1927 et l'analyse du rôle des préjugés (Vorurteil) dans l'interprétation, développée par Gadamer dans *Wahrheit und Methode* en 1960, trouvent ainsi tardivement une sorte de corroboration. La pensée philosophique tendrait-elle vers des retrouvailles à la tombée de ce siècle? Ils ne s'en étonneraient pas trop ceux qui entendent dans le langage, outre les accents disparates d'un babélisme chronique, l'appel continu d'un rassemblement des choses.

FERNAND COUTURIER
Université du Québec à Montréal

J. KELLENBERGER. *The Cognitivity of Religion*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1985. Pp. x + 214. US$16.95. ISBN 0-520-05383-4.

Kellenberger's book deserves a permanent place among the rewarding works in analytical philosophy of religion. The cultural breadth shown in his discussions makes his reasoning all the more welcome. Although he might deny it, he is like someone who brilliantly follows up Ryle's gropings with Achievement Verbs in *The Concept of Mind*.

Kellenberger will make his readers appreciate still more keenly the importance of terms of epistemic achievement as means to grasp the *spirit* in which many religious beliefs are held. He uses examples of that spirit and outlook in striking ways to argue against a variety of opponents. Explicitly or not, he is on all pages trying to undercut his *non-cognitive* foes, who would deny all religious discourse any objective truth or falsity (23 f., etc.). Another major policy involves keeping religions safely acknowledged as rational, cognitive and evidentially based, without conceding any ground to what he calls the *investigative* and hypothetical approach or the '*enquiry-model*' of works like William James' 'The Will to Believe,' and John King-Farlow and W.N. Christensen's *Faith and the Life of Reason* (Kellenberger, 18-21, 45, etc.). Also, he seeks at length to prove that believers in any world religion have the means to equi-trump any card or every advocate of Freud or Nietzsche, who accuses them of self-deception and willful blindness, with a stunning *Tu quoque* (118-29, etc.). Again, he tries to defeat those like D.Z. Phillips who seem to treat the cognitivity of religious assertions as something merely relative to a form of life (27 ff.). He criticizes Phillips for identifying belief and understanding; Stuart Brown for flirting with the idea that understanding depends on belief (38-9); Kai Nielsen for not perceiving that it is quite possible to say usefully what the world could be like 'if the fundamental claims of religions were true.' It would 'be a place in which we could in reality here and now make the religious discovery' (131).

More quotations may clarify the main points further. 'The Psalmist realizes what it means, that there is a God whose presence creation bespeaks.' 'Our imagined Stravrogin's discovery ... contrasts with every kind of investigative discovery. It is, rather, a perhaps sudden, perhaps unexpected *realization* of the siginificance of the familiar. Accordingly, I shall call such a discovery a *realization-discovery*.' Such talk 'will bring forward a discovery-model of the Psalmist's experience and do justice to the discovery that, in his own eyes, he has made and makes again and again.' Without enquiry and investigation one can make or continue a discovery: 'this grounding is evidential' (107). (Calvin, Kierkegaard, Wisdom and Wittgenstein are brought to share together a whiff of Rylean salts.) The concept of *realization-discovery* makes possible a 'Third Perspective' on religions that transcends the virtues and vices of a relatively fideist and a relatively intellectualist mentality.

Criticisms: (1) It would have been quite relevant for Kellenberger to present

a brief series of points to the effect that accusing an ideologist or believer of self-deception, willful blindness, etc., is a two-edged sword. Again, attention to questions about *faith* and the *will*, of course, is necessary. But he so develops and harps on these matters as to suggest a Reaganesque taste for condemnation rather than a preference for humility and charity in judging neighbours who are not believers. (2) Despite initial concessions to moderates like John Turk Saunders, the general tone of his later and most suggestive remarks on self-deception and unbelief seems unhappy. No appropriate explanation or grounding is given for adopting such a tone. The remarks are not only reminiscent of older Procrustean homogenizings of diverse uses and senses of 'deceive' and 'self-deceivers,' but redolent of Pharisaical suggestions that all deceivings are immoral. No adequate explanation or support is given for adopting this essentialist and ill-humoured manner. (3) Kellenberger leans, unpropped by good philosophical reasons, towards prescribing only Voluntarist interpretations or reinterpretations of texts like Saint Francis Xavier's words at the end of his famous prayer: 'if I worship Thee *for Thy own sake*, grudge me not Thy everlasting beauty.' Those believers, who are more like Intellectualists and even gentle Empiricists than the Saint or our author, may use the prayer devoutly to worship God as the source and inspiration of all truth and perfection. One can be more of a truth-*seeker* who *renews* commitment than Kellenberger would approve, but still use the prayer with religious awe and devotion. A primary commitment to seeking truth and goodness just does seem to remain, whatever his words may tend at times to imply, compatible with membership in the widely inclusive family of religious institutions and viewpoints. Some crucial analogues of the 'enquiry model' do deserve a recognized position, which Kellenberger tends to forbid, both in his 'Third Perspective' and in what he would count as some genuine examples of religious living.

(4) Kellenberger published another book, *Religious Discovery and Knowledge* in 1972. There he covered much of this ground, making some similar points. The new book never mentions the earlier. The relation between them should have been stated. (5) There is at least one time-honoured sense in which the wisest believers and unbelievers can all be called '*rational*' — like a sense of 'just' that is applicable to some religionists and irreligionists alike. Following too closely Kellenberger's peculiar stress on discovery and recognition would make it unnecessarily hard to provide an account of either convincingly.

Nevertheless, this book has unusual depth and deserves to be read and kept by lovers of philosophy and religion.

JOHN KING-FARLOW
University of Alberta

LEONARD A. KENNEDY and JACK C. MARLER, eds. *Thomistic Papers II*. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies 1986. Pp. 163. US$20.95. (cloth: ISBN 0-268-01860-X); US$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-268-01859-6).

The five articles in this second volume of *Thomistic Papers* maintain the character of those in the first: they are mostly lectures given by eminent Thomists on topics in Thomistic philosophy. Laurence K. Shook (7-27) studies two previously unknown letters from Jacques Maritain to Etienne Gilson and shows how Maritain corrected some of Gilson's early interpretations of Thomas Aquinas. A second paper on Gilson by Desmond J. FitzGerald (29-58) shows how the study of the history of philosophy led Gilson to two important philosophical conclusions: the rejection of 'critical realism' (the attempt by some to adopt Cartesian and Kantian principles before working out a Thomistic realism) and the discovery of the importance of *esse* for a realist philosophy. FitzGerald's discussion of critical realism is particularly enlightening. Gilson saw early on, according to FitzGerald, that any sort of idealism taken as a philosophical starting point will preclude realism in the conclusion: 'Whoever begins as an idealist,' writes Gilson, 'will necessarily end up an idealist' (34). Thus, we should realize that the various attempts at a 'transcendental' Thomism can never end up being Thomism, since Thomism is essentially realist.

Robert J. Henle's thesis (59-83) is that American jurisprudence and government are based upon principles that are much more in accord with the tradition of natural law, of which Thomas Aquinas remains the classical exponent, than with the legal positivism of someone such as H.L.A. Hart. A problem for this thesis, which Henle himself points out (71-3), is that Thomas did not have a concept of 'subjective right,' for he would not allow rights to become absolutized, as they have in recent debates. Nevertheless, Henle argues, natural law remains the best justification for the existence of such rights.

Francis Kovach (85-132) gives a long, but not very useful, list of the probable historical sources for Thomas' arguments against the notion of action at a distance. The list merely confirms what is already welll known, that Thomas drew on many sources, Platonic, Neo-Platonic, Aristotelian, Arabic, and so on.

Finally, in the most provocative article in the volume, Joseph Owens (133-58) discusses philosophical pluralism. According to Owens, the history of philosophy is an essential part of philosophy and it reveals that philosophies are 'as individual as fingerprints. No two are entirely alike. They are at best grouped by "family resemblances" ' (139). The radical individuality of each philosophy, however, does not preclude some common ground for discussion, for we can understand another's principles, even if we cannot adopt them, and we can discuss and argue a great deal with those who share our family resemblances.

Owens wishes to draw three conclusions. First, there are many, many different ways of choosing philosophical starting points, but once chosen, 'the starting points remain sovereign. They cannot be refuted by the principles or

conclusions of any other philosophy' (141). Hence, second, we ought to be philosophical 'ecumenists': we should not try to refute other philosophers, for such is impossible, but rather to learn from them while remaining true to our own principles. Third, within our own family, we *can* refute erroneous conclusions and argue profitably about principles.

It seems to me that Owens offers two valuable insights: that the history of philosophy is an essential part of philosophy, requiring philosophical wisdom to be studied and yielding philosophical conclusions, and that the philosopher should be motivated by a desire to understand others, not by a desire to refute them. Thomists, however, might like a small qualification in the terminology, not in the substance, of Owen's argument. It is true that the principles of philosophers outside of the family cannot be *demonstratively* refuted, for as Aristotle explains in the *Posterior Analytics*, a true demonstration requires the acceptance of basic premises, and those outside of the family do not accept the basic premises of those within. Nevertheless, it must still be possible to argue *dialectically* that some principles are better than others. If we cannot establish through dialectic that our principles are correct and others' are not, we shall be forced to admit that there is no rational justification for the principles that we do hold. Those who do not share first principles cannot be demonstratively refuted, but there is still rational ground to argue dialectically that some principles are superior to others.

STEVEN BALDNER
St. Thomas More College

This handsomely produced book is a discursive summary of Plato's political writings. Klosko says 'I have not attempted to be highly original ... I have preferred to be reliable rather than new' (xii). Klosko succeeds. The story is familiar.

In the early works, Plato has an overly intellectual view of human capacities. The soul has but one part — reason — fully realizable, at least in theory, by each and all. Moral failing is error rather than incontinence. Moral reform can take place through private discourse, like the one-on-one encounters of the Socratic dialogues. But Plato, if not Socrates, recognizes (and tips the reader off in the dramatic settings of the Socratic dialogues) that something is amiss

here; the reform is not working; its mechanics and metaphysics must be wrong (chapters 3-4).

In a 'radical' departure from this model, the middle dialogues advance a new theory of a three-part soul. The theory gives an independent life to the appetites and passions. Sin is not error, it is the appetites swamping reason. Moral improvement no longer takes the form of pointing out errors and providing correct information, but rather the molding and controlling of the unruly appetites through conditioning and repression — a project requiring the full, constant and intrusive forces of a paternalistic state guided by the quasi-mystical insights of the very few into proper human ends (chapters 5-10).

But the concurrence and integration of insight and power which this state requires, if not wholly impossible, are at best highly implausible. So the late dialogues in a series of concessions to brute reality make peace with political convention and advance a second-best political agendum which finally not only recognizes the cussedness of people and things but largely consists of a blend of political arrangements from contemporary city-states. Idealism dies (chapters 11-13).

Klosko's opening chapter is a non-tacky, indeed fascinating, historical setting of Plato in the political and intellectual climate of his times. Klosko also uses historical material to good effect in the discussion of the complex political institutions espoused in *The Laws* (chapter 13). Overall, however, the book's preponderantly discursive mode will bore philosophers. The book entertains critical issues at only one point.

Toward the end of his discussion of the *Republic*, Klosko defends Plato against some charges laid by Popper (who is spoken of as a 'recent' interpreter, 149). Klosko correctly claims against Popper that *if* the program of the *Republic* is correct, it could not be realized through the piecemeal reform which Popper advocates — Plato is at least coherent in this regard (136-7). Klosko, however, is misguided in defending Plato against Popper's charge that a system of terroristic police control is to keep the population in check (149-50). Here the correct position is that the reader of the *Republic* simply doesn't known whether or not there are to be terroristic police and he doesn't know because Plato, through his literary device of having 'we, speakers and auditors' *build* the city, has systematically blocked the reader's ability to investigate the concrete institutional arrangements that would bring the Platonic city into being. This is an important but little recognized intellectual sleight-of-hand on Plato's part (on it, see Morris Davis' excellent but little noted 'Participant Observers in Platonic Cities' *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 8:4 [November 1964] 353-71).

Klosko also tries unsuccessfully to defend Plato against Popper's charge of 'racism.' The defense founders on Klosko's failure to distinguish senses of 'based on birth.' While it is true that priveleges are not doled out in the *Republic* based on *who one's parents* are (Plato admits golden parents may have brazen children), privileges are doled out based on *one's congenital characteristics* (the brazen are to be treated as brazen). Such doling is not (contra Klosko, 150) a system of merit.

Klosko correctly claims (following Vlastos) that the *Republic* employs a fair system of distribution, that people are treated impartially according to principles, but he then goes on to claim (following nearly everyone) that Plato in keeping with his (primative, pre-Kantian) times had no theory of individuals' rights in which rights follow from a person's humanity rather than his station (151). This overstates the case somewhat. For why should people be treated impartially if they are not of value as persons? Further, though impartially is admittedly a formal rather than a substantive right, the rights of modern liberal states too are almost entirely procedural rather than substantive (as recently as 1982, Canada, for instance, could write a Charter of Rights which included no substantive privacy provision) and in any case, many liberal theorists think procedural rights are the only rights there are (e.g., John Hart Ely's rights to political participation and Ronald Dworkin's rights to treatment as an equal). By the standard of formal rights, Plato is only doing half bad.

The book in its own words is 'not intended primarily for specialists' (xv). But what its intended audience and aims are is left unclear. It claims to be a contemporary counterpart to Ernest Barker's *Greek Political Theory* (1918), but fails to entertain the possibility that the era for such books may have passed. A book which is general, unoriginal and largely descriptive has only two possible worthwhile functions. It can give the *status questionis*, like *APQ*'s useful and fun genre 'Recent Work on *X*,' which clarifies current problems and gives competing live answers to them *or* it can situate the author discussed in the history of ideas. The discipline could use works of this sort on Plato, but this book fulfills neither function to any appreciable degree. My worry is that this book will find one audience — an illegitimate one. I fear pages of it will be submitted as the papers of confused or panicked undergraduates. Thanks to its unpretentious, jargon-free prose and overall unoriginal reasonableness, it may there go undetected. Teachers of Plato may wish to familiarize themselves with the book for this reason alone.

RICHARD D. MOHR
University of Illinois — Urbana

The authors of this book think that some infants with severe disabilities should be killed. This controversial stand is stated clearly in the second line of the

preface; the balance of the book is a closely reasoned argument supportive of this conclusion. All of the major issues surrounding this question are discussed, providing an excellent summary of a difficult topic.

The book begins with two well-known cases of children born with Down's Syndrome and the legal and moral questions that arose for the parents and their physicians. It continues with a detailed discussion of the nature of treatments available to severely handicapped children, focussing primarily on spina bifida. A review of medical practice demonstrates that while criteria may differ from physician to physician or place to place, there already exists a policy by which certain infants are selected for non-treatment and allowed to die. The authors point out that what counts as non-treatment also varies from case to case and place to place, resulting in everything from rapid death to prolonged suffering. The discussion shows not only that judgements are made about who lives and dies but also that the manner in which these judgements are implemented varies significantly, engendering confusion and perhaps guilt in the parents and physicians involved.

Can we distinguish between 'letting die' and 'killing'? The authors clearly state that in many cases the infant should be killed to prevent undue suffering for all involved, including the infant. What keeps us from embracing this conclusion, we are told, is our underlying acceptance of the doctrine of the sanctity of life.

This begins what is at once the strongest and weakest aspect of the argument. An anthropological study of primitive cultures and also of an advanced but rigid Japanese culture of the 18th and early 19th centuries is presented to show that infanticide is an accepted part of the culture, even for children one would consider healthy. It is interesting that in most cases it is female children who are the victims. The conclusion of this chapter suggests that historically and anthropologically *we* are the deviant culture with our insistence on the sanctity of life. This is blamed to a large extent on our Judeo-Christian roots and it is suggested that the Christian doctrine guiding our choices is really a corruption of an earlier Judaic custom that did in fact tolerate infanticide.

There are problems with this argument. It suggests, first, that since other cultures tolerate or promote infanticide and since we seem out of step, we are unjustified in holding our beliefs. Second, there is an implied but not explicitly stated argument that these other cultures justify infanticide for utilitarian reasons and not because of either cultural prejudice against females or the lack of the technological means to preserve the lives of certain children. Even if one accepts the utilitarian interpretation of these anthropological observations, as our ability to preserve life increases we may be obliged to exercise that ability fully.

The argument from anthropology is followed, however, by a considerably stronger philosophical argument. The authors conclude that 'life' in the principle of sanctity of life usually refers only to human life. Those who hold that human life is sacred usually take human in the biological sense arguing that only creatures who belong to the species *homo sapiens* have lives that

are sacred. This is 'speciesist' say the authors because it elevates a morally insignificant characteristic into something of utmost importance. What really lends the principle strength are the moral qualities of human life; that is, those qualities that define personhood. Thus, those genetically human creatures who lack the potential to realize themselves as persons may not qualify for the right to life. In fact, it is suggested that perhaps only those who have already realized themselves as persons can qualify for this right. We can argue that infants below a certain age, healthy or not, may not have the right to life. The authors suggest that if one accepts abortion as morally defensible in certain circumstances, one has already taken a big step in the direction of their position and away from the principle of the sanctity of life.

The final two chapters of the book explore the issues raised once one accepts the arguments that infants before a certain age (undefined by the authors) do not have the right to life. The first is a review of the variety of human interests affected by such decisions: the child, the family and the society. The first two are discussed in relation to quality of life for child and parents and the last in relation to the economics of supporting severely disabled persons.

The last chapter confronts the issue of who decides. The bottom line for the authors is that the parents must be allowed to make the decision as they will ultimately be responsible for the child. They acknowledge that the parents may not be emotionally prepared to make such a decision and a variety of safety nets and support systems are described including hospital committees and recommendations for legislation to protect the interests of all involved.

The suggestions are certainly practical but whether they are ethical — or even helpful to parents who must make the decisions — is still open to question. The weakest aspect of the argument is the response the authors make to the proponents of the sanctity of life based on religious grounds. These arguments are dismissed: 'The authority and objectivity of scripture as a source of moral knowledge has disappeared' (127).

The argument that to dismiss religion leaves us with an ethic based on subjective interests alone is also dismissed by referring the reader to the authors' other writings on this issue. The authors' point is essentially that ethics is a matter of consistent, rational debate, suggesting that ethics is a matter opf subjective taste provided one is at least consistent in justifying one's judgements.

While there is much to debate in the authors' argument and their justification of their position, this book is an excellent review of the topic. The style and argument invite debate and discussion and readers will find that the book will sharpen and clarify their own position.

R. PAUL N. RAINSBERRY
Canadian College of Family Physicians

Lewis has been an advocate of modal realism for nigh on two decades. In this book he again defends it, along the familiar lines that 'the price is right' (135): its theoretical benefits — its usefulness for philosophical analysis — outweigh its ontological costs, and indeed are a reason to think it true (3,4). Lewis has told us before about the benefits: philosophical analyses of modality, counterfactual dependence, intentional content, properties, universals, supervenience, materialism, and more; but never before all in one place and in a way that reveals so breathtakingly the scope and unity of his world(s)view. Nor has Lewis previously lent so much credence to the costs, in particular to the sheer implausibility of modal realism from a commonsense perspective.

It is difficult to quantify or compare such disparate costs and benefits. Despite this, Lewis almost persuades us that, costly though the realm of possibilia may be, it is a veritable Club Med, a philosopher's paradise of seductive (if otherworldly) delights. The utter cogency and skill which he brings to this sales pitch surely rank him among the great metaphysical system builders of our time. I therefore admire both book and author, though much is proffered that I cannot bring myself to accept.

Modal realism is 'the view that the world we are part of is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that we who inhabit this world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds' (vii). '*Every* way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world *is*, and absolutely every way that a part of a world could possibly be is a way that some part of some world is' (4). These other worlds *really* exist, and, though they are unlike this world of ours in not being actual, they are nevertheless 'of a kind' (2) with it. In particular, they and (many of) their inhabitants are like our world and (many of) its inhabitants in being concrete in each of four senses of 'concrete' that Lewis discerns in contemporary philosophical usage (86).

Others have urged against Lewis that the benefits of modal realism can be attained 'on the cheap,' by invoking as 'ersatz worlds,' suitable abstract and therefore actual entities to represent the various possibilities (some existing, some not). Lewis replies to several versions of this. A key point he directs against each version is that, in one way or another, it must take modality as a primitive, and therefore fails to explain modality. For instance, the brand of modal ersatzism Lewis personally rates the highest (165), 'linguistic ersatzism,' is the view that the theoretical work of possible worlds can be done by something like maximal consistent sets of sentences. But what is a *consistent* set of sentences, Lewis asks, if not one whose members, as interpreted, *could* all be true together (151)?

If modal realism explains modality whereas modal ersatzism does not, that marks a significant difference in their relative theoretical benefits. But *does* modal realism explain modality? Apparently only if it does not, in the process, appeal to any primitive modal notions. Let us see. The modal realist's explica-

tion of modality consists of such familiar-sounding claims as that it is possible that Kathy is rich just in case for some world Kathy is rich; and necessarily yuppies are smug just in case in all worlds yuppies are smug. The explication of modality thus depends essentially on the appeal to a plurality of worlds. What, then, are these worlds? Every way a world *could possibly* be is a way that some world is. But (contrary to recent reports from deep inside Meinong's jungle) no way that a world *could not possibly* be is a way that some world is. All and only the *possible* worlds exist. And which ones are they? Lewis fails to provide a general answer to this question, and the partial answer he does provide, in terms of a 'principle of recombination' of parts of *possible* worlds, is not free of unexplicated modalities. The principle in question is roughly that (a duplicate of) anything *can* coexist (or fail to coexist) with (a duplicate of) anything else, in any arrangements, *permitted* by shape and size, and provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions (85-92). There is primitive modality to spare here. In this respect, at least, modal realism and modal ersatzism seem to be on a par, *contra* Lewis.

Modal realism *per se* leaves many questions unanswered about the relations among worlds and parts of worlds. Lewis is justly famous for his further view that each world is 'isolated' from the others. No part of any world is also a part of any other world — worlds do not overlap — and no part bears any spatiotemporal or causal relations to parts of other worlds. At best, an individual will have 'counterparts' in other worlds, individuals distinct from it, to which it bears suitable relations of resemblance (variable across worlds).

One could be a kind of modal realist but not a counterpart theorist. One could, for instance, believe in other concrete worlds 'of a kind' with this world, indeed inhabited just by the very individuals of this world, rearranged or (nonessentially) changed. If *all* other possible worlds were taken to be composed *just* of the furniture of this world, this would amount to a 'weak actualist' interpretation of modal realism. Lewis attributes three theses to common sense: (1) that everything is actual; (2) that actuality consists of everything that is spatiotemporally related to us, and nothing more (give or take some abstract entities); and (3) that possibilities are not parts of actuality, but alternatives to it (99). Lewis calls (1) and (2) together 'metaphysical actualism.' He accepts (2) and (3) but rejects (1). But weak actualism also rejects (1), since it postulates nonactual worlds. Indeed it rejects (2) as well, since it implies that parts of other worlds will be spatiotemporally related to us. Weak actualism could, however, lay claim to being a species of actualism by virtue of the following theses: (1)' that every individual is actual; and (2)' that actuality consists of things spatiotemporally related to us, but just insofar as they have certain properties and spatiotemporal arrangements and not others. Modal realism, so construed, may not ultimately be defensible. The point here is rather that isolationism implies that there are *no* nonactual worlds like the nonactual worlds of the weak actualist. It is not the concreteness attributed to other possibilities, but this denial that actuality ever makes any contribution to them, that places a special ontological and explanatory burden on Lewis' worlds.

Like modal realism, isolationism is defended by appeal to its theoretical

benefits. These include steering clear of 'the problem of accidental intrinsics' (201): the problem of how, as overlap apparently permits, an individual could inhabit two worlds and simultaneously have contrary nonessential but intrinsic properties. Now clearly isolationists do avoid this problem. But note that it only arises in the first place for modal realists. *Given* modal realism, we can steer clear of the problem of accidental intrinsics by adopting counterpart theory. But the problem need not have arisen at all if we had not supposed in the first place that, e.g., Bill's possibly being guilty involves someone's really being guilty, whether Bill or one of his counterparts.

Lewis is also an 'antihaecceitist.' 'If two worlds differ in what they represent *de re* concerning some individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way, I shall call that a *haecceitistic difference*. *Haecceitism* ... is the doctrine that there are at least some such cases of haecceistic difference between worlds' (221). Antihaecceitism thus concerns worlds, and amounts just to an insistance that, having fixed the distribution of qualities across a world, we have thereby also fixed the distribution of individuals. As Lewis notes, antihaecceitists can still deny the identity of indiscernible individuals (224), and can still affirm the existence of nonqualitative properties or 'thisnesses' distinguishing individuals (225).

Haecceitism is rejected by Lewis, in the face of intuitively compelling possible haecceitistic differences (227), because it is incompatible with modal realism *when combined with counterpart theory*. 'There is no way to make sense of a nonqualitative counterpart relation' (230). Yet both modal realism with overlap and versions of modal ersatzism are congenial to haecceitism (228, 235 ff.). So according to Lewis we ought to be counterpart theorists if we are modal realists. But then we have to be antihaecceitists, too. The sheer momentum of the system seems to be taking over at this juncture. The engine of considered judgement is being stalled, if not hauled, by the boxcars of systematicity.

PHILIP P. HANSON
Simon Fraser University

EARL R. MACCORMAC. *A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1985. Pp. x + 254. US$22.50. ISBN 0-262-13212-5.

MacCormac tries to steer a middle course between two opposing poles: what I shall call the Classical view, which regards metaphor as nothing but a form of linguistic expression whose cognitive content is reducible to literal terms,

and the Romantic view, which sees metaphor as a pervasive, irreducible principle of cognition that underlies all thought and language. From Romanticism he takes his central tenet — that metaphors exist as underlying cognitive processes, and not merely as linguistic entities. MacCormac is far more closely aligned, however, with the Classical orientation, because he insists (contra Romanticism) that the literal forms a rock-bottom core of objective meaning, in terms of which metaphor operates. 'The existence of literal language as distinct from metaphors offers a common objective standpoint from which to judge the meaning and the partial truth of metaphors' (3).

Thus, MacCormac actually defends a very traditional view in which literal language gives us our foundational tie to the objective world, and metaphor is a device for conceptual creativity and change that depends on, and yet transforms, this literal base. The middle chapters elaborate this view by calling upon and modifying empirical work drawn from cognitive science of the 1970s. A revised 'semantic feature' view of meaning is adopted to describe how metaphors can create new meaning. The meaning of a word is described as a 'fuzzy set' of semantic markers, each of which can be ranked with respect to its centrality to the meaning of the term. When typically unassociated words are metaphorically combined, some of the juxtaposed markers will be compatible, others will be contradictory, and many will hang together with differing degrees of tension. Metaphors are creative when hitherto unconceived combinations of markers emerge as meaningful. By utilizing a four-valued logic, MacCormac hopes to avoid simple contradiction between many of the markers for the terms of the metaphor. Instead of being merely either true or false, metaphors involve a continuum of values ranging from contradiction (false), to creative tension (diaphor), to similarities (epiphor), to shared features (true). Consequently, MacCormac rejects any simplistic true/false dichotomy for metaphor, stresses its crucial role in the evolution of knowledge, and defends a fallibilist position regarding the creative operation of metaphor as a force for linguistic, conceptual, and cultural change.

MacCormac deserves praise for adding to the growing evidence that metaphor is a cognitive process that permeates much of human understanding, reasoning, and communication. He also recognizes the importance of empirical research (in linguistics, psychology, physiology, etc.) for any adequate treatment. As a result, he often surveys relevant empirical work and tries to compose his own combination of the best aspects of each competing theory. One notable failure, however, is his attempt to harmonize his fuzzy-set view of semantic markers with Rosch's account of prototypical categorization. He notes that Rosch objects to componential analyses of semantic categories (of which his modified fuzzy-set theory is a version), and then claims that the two views are actually compatible, since 'Rosch's task and mine are different, for she wants to describe how categories emerge in cultures and I wish to reconstruct rationally a process by which individuals can comprehend metaphors' (97). But this gambit won't suffice — MacCormac wants to explain how we make sense of metaphors, but any such account must involve cognitively real processes, and it must be compatible with what we know about human

categorization and structures of understanding. So, he can't simply claim that Rosch's research on prototypical categorization isn't relevant.

This treatment of Rosch is symptomatic of a major problem with MacCormac's epistemological orientation in general. There is a deep and pervasive tension that runs throughout the book, a tension between an evolutionary and fallibilist epistemology, on the one hand, and a foundationalist commitment, on the other. The foundationalist strain consists in the view that 'the literal offers an Archimedian point for objectivity in knowledge' (227). This ultimate literal grounding is supposed to provide the means for combating what Mac-Cormac perceives to be relativistic implications of a Romantic stress on the pervasiveness of metaphor. If our entire conceptual network is shot through with underlying metaphorical structures, then (so the argument goes) nothing is fixed, and there is no objective tie to reality.

But this is a bad argument, on two counts: first, the 'literal' isn't ontologically absolute, and, second, it doesn't follow that the basicness of metaphorical understanding undermines objectivity. Regarding the first point, MacCormac himself mounts anti-foundationalist polemics throughout his study. For example, he correctly argues that the physical and bodily aspects of our experience provide no ultimate ties to objective reality, because even something as basic as spatial orientation has a cultural component and may be mediated by metaphorical concepts (67). He later urges an evolutionary epistemology in which '[a]ll forms of language mediate between [or interrelate] biological evolution and cultural evolution in the sense that language is an instrument for human survival ...' (148). And his multi-valued logic is intended to counteract the simplistic notion that every declarative utterance must either fit or not fit the world in some straightforward manner.

Consequently, if all our experience is always conceptually mediated to some extent, then there can be no Archimedian point that grounds our knowledge structures. Contrary to MacCormac's view, the literal is not an absolute foundational core of meaning, but rather consists of conventionally stabilized meaning that emerges tentatively in the ongoing evolution of human knowledge and understanding.

Fortunately, this view needn't lead to an 'anything goes' relativism. On the contrary, we can formulate a perfectly good notion of objectivity in terms of the stability across contexts of various concepts and propositions that have survived continued questioning and scrutiny. Understood in this sense, 'the literal' can be intimately tied to basic metaphorical concepts that underlie much of our conceptual system. This entails that we must take seriously the notion of metaphor as a pervasive cognitive process, and not merely as a localized process for intermittent conceptual change. MacCormac's orientation remains stubbornly Classicist in its refusal to embrace the ubiquity of metaphorical understanding.

MARK JOHNSON
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

DOUGLAS MACLEAN, ed. *Values at Risk*. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield 1986. Pp. ix + 169. US$28.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7414-2); US$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7415-0).

This volume of eight essays, and a useful introduction by the editor, grew out of a series of meetings by the contributors at the Centre for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland. The focus in this collection is the imposition of risk by new technologies, and the use of cost-benefit analyses in the assessment of risk. The general area, the intersection of moral theory and technology, is surveyed in this and two sister volumes in the same series, *To Breathe Freely*, edited by Mary Gibson, and *Energy and the Future*, also edited by MacLean.

The problems in applied ethics are nested; the student is forced to work outwards, from the presentation of novel situations introduced by technological advancements, to more general considerations of justice, equity, consent, and authority, as well as the typical meta-ethical concerns of the deontic and consequentialist positions. For the policy analyst, however, armed with cost-benefit and risk-analysis techniques, the problem is to *quantify* the impact of a new technology. What is at stake in this volume are the social and philosophical values that, either implicitly or explicitly, enter into this calculus of policy choices.

Leonard and Zeckhauser, both economists, argue (not surprisingly) for the adequacy of risk-cost benefit analysis (RCBA), that is both rational and efficient, as well as neutral (though not value free). Here risk is assumed to be a market commodity, 'not different in principle from other commodities, such as park services, public transit, or housing' (33). Their argument is a pragmatic one, forced upon us by the centralized nature of policy decisions in the face of technologically imposed risk. The remainder of the volume serves as a response to these pragmatic arguments.

MacLean's contribution (after an introduction, and introductory chapter) focusses on two problems of risk assessment: the distribution of risk, and the attempt to quantify what he calls 'sacred' values. Equity in risk suffers from the ambiguous nature of distribution. We may spread risks geographically, demographically, temporally, or some combination of these. Assumptions of equitable distribution in one dimension may violate equity in others. Sacred values, such as human life, are argued to have their orgins in symbols and rituals, and are thus dependent on social context. They are also complex, not easily disentagled from other important values, and perhaps even internally inconsistent. They are neither easy to quantify, nor easy to ignore. MacLean correctly concludes that the task of policy-makers is not solely the proscription of risk or the preservation of safety, but also includes the expression of these sacred social values.

Baier's essay, with its excellent discussion of Mill, and the 'right to rescue,' as well as her beautifully fine-grained analysis of risk and consent, raises the level of debate to a more abstract and theoretical plane. As such, it might

well have been placed earlier in this collection, along with MacLean's first introductory essay 'Risk and Consent.' Both of these efforts demonstrate the philosophical depth of arguments surrounding RCBA, from Baier's attempt to collapse the traditional distinction between positive and negative rights and duties, to MacLean's discussion of models of rationality implicit in theories of consent.

While MacLean allows for the use of RCBA with what he calls modest, rather than ambitious, goals, Gibbard attempts a defense of a modified RCBA. Gibbard argues that since common sense estimates of risk are often inconsistent, the best way to rationalize them is by adoption of a risk-cost-benefit analysis. He offers one based not on utility or preference maximization, but rather upon 'expected total intrinsic reward.' While Gibbard admits that the concept of intrinsic reward is problematic, its elucidation here as the goal of policy decisions makes clear that 'what must be said about risk-cost-benefit analysis, then, depends on the central problem of ethical theory: how questions of ultimate ends are to be addressed' (100-1).

These three essays, along with the contribution by Hacking, are perhaps the best in the text. They clearly reveal the philosophical strings attached to policy decisions surrounding the impact of technology and the imposition of risk.

Two of the remaining three essays add little to this discussion. Thompson, a cultural anthropologist, claims (perhaps rightly) that the assessment of risk is not a physical measure, but rather a description of a society or culture. Where other analyses led to broader moral and philosophical questions, Thompson's shop talk leads only to cultural relativism. That cultures differ over the acceptability of certain risks is not news, and why they do so will not tell us whether these risks are acceptable.

Sen's results about the nature of rights employs an interesting but idiosyncratic view that is, unfortunately, argued elsewhere. On his view, rights, especially the right to take risks, are to be counted among the intrinsically valuable commodities, and not just as means to these ends. Sen presupposes, but does not provide, a metric by which these sometimes conflicting rights can be weighed.

A more positive contribution is Hacking's 'Culpable Ignorance of Interference Effects.' Hacking outlines a particular variety of culpable ignorance, different in kind from ignorance of side effects, and not amenable to the probability calculus of cost-benefit analyses. Again, underneath this cogent and convincing line of argument lie more fundamental and not uncontroversial philosophical theses, but here they are in the philosophy of science and metaphysics, rather than morals. Though these, too, are argued for elsewhere, their mention provides the reader with some insight and direction into these more general areas.

In sum, this is a useful collection of essays and issues. However, as noted

above, the reader must be prepared to go quite beyond the discussion presented here if she is to reach the bottom of these problems.

JONATHAN KATZ
Waterloo, Ontario

HENRI MALDINEY. *Art et existence* (Publié avec le concours du Centre National des Lettres). Paris: Klincksieck (Collection d'esthétique, dir. par M. Dufrenne) 1985. 244 Pp. ISBN 2-86563-106-0.

L'œuvre d'art est extatique: elle ex-iste, elle se tient hors de ce qu'on croit son contenant: ouvrage ou chose objectivement perçus et promus à une valeur artistique dont ils seraient les réceptacles. Viser dans une œuvre un objet, c'est la désapproprier de son propre pour ne pas endurer l'expression de son incommensurable être-là: 'or une œuvre d'art est *le là* de sa propre ouverture' (8). Existant en précession de soi, l'œuvre contredit à toute positivité, à toute tentative de déterminer son être dans la forme de l'objectité. Il s'agira donc, en ces six textes concentriques où les mêmes thèmes s'approfondissent et s'illustrent, 'de dire ce qu'est la présence de l'œuvre d'art dans ce qu'elle a d'absolument propre et qui est son être même: sa façon d'être *le là*' (8). L'œuvre à faire n'est pas d'abord un étant dans le monde à investir esthétiquement: 'La poïétique de l'œuvre transcende toute intentionnalité conceptive ou technique ... . L'être d'une œuvre d'art est à la fois un procès dont elle-même, s'advenant, est le lieu (diathèse de moyen) et le procès de son apparaître dans l'Ouvert (diathèse d'actif)' (9). La relation entre le support objectif de l'œuvre et l'apport de valeur ou de signification est une question d'incidence interne qui permet de décider de la présence ou de l'absence d'art dans l'œuvre. La mise en œuvre des moyens de celle-ci n'est pas agencement de simples constituants, mais intégration par la forme, cette 'unité de puissance — et déprésence — qui fait qu'une œuvre est en pouvoir de soi et s'advient en propre, selon son style' (14). Non point forme idéale à incorporer à une matière déterminée, non point portion d'étendue, contour ou figure, la forme est le lieu de recontre d'elle-même et de l'espace qu'elle instaure à l'avant de soi pour s'y produire: ouverture à l'espace et ouverture de l'espace, genèse, forme qui devient: 'le vouloir de la forme' est une exigence originellement contemporaine de l'existence: celle de former des formes à même lesquelles s'ouvre et s'exprime le *là* d'une présence. La formation d'une forme a lieu dans l'espace qu'elle instaure: elle est formation d'un pli d'espace où celui-ci tout entier s'ar-

ticule. Son autogenèse est un automouvement de l'espace se transformant en... lui-même. C'est la définition du rythme' (15).

Dès lors, ayant partie liée avec l'impérialisme scientifique qui détermine comme objectité l'être de toute présence, l'esthétique contemporaine dominante, pas plus que l'esthétique traditionnelle, n'accède à la forme-en-devenir ni à l'être-œuvre. La sémiotique de l'art, par exemple, pour comprendre Cézanne, voudra dévoiler le 'code cézannien.' Mais Cézanne n'a-t-il pas dénoncé le code comme artifice responsable de l'inauthenticité de l'art? Et sa peinture n'est-elle pas, en dehors de tout code, 'l'évévenent-avènement' d'un monde senti amené à l'existence? La sémiotique de l'art rebrousse l'œuvre en objet, la forme en signe: mais constituer l'œuvre en objet, n'est-ce pas abolir son 'mode de donation propre' et occulter 'le sens de l'être que c'est, par essence, sa tâche de révéler' (28)? Impuissante à intégrer l'événement, qu'elle ne sert qu'à introduire dans un système, la sémiotique 'est incapable, par essence, de rendre compte de l'œuvre d'art' (32).

Dès lors, la création artistique ne pourra non plus s'expliquer simplement à partir de ses commencements. Elle ne se comprend qu'en relation à son origine: l'angoisse, le chaos, le néant, le zéro des formes, le Rien, le vertige où l'étant s'abîme: 'Quand sous l'effet de l'exigence de l'œuvre, tout l'étant s'engloutit avec tous ses signes, l'artiste est mis en demeure de s'abîmer dans la faille ou de risquer le saut qui la franchira. Ce saut qualitatif ... 'consiste dans *le passage infini du signe à la forme'* (40), du monde ressenti à l'œuvre, sous l'impulsion du rythme 'dont l'acte propre est de former la forme en abolissant le signe' (47).

Dès lors, il n'y a pas non plus de psychologie de l'art, les interprétations psychologiques ou psychanalytiques de l'activité artistique n'étant que métaphores, transferts d'un ordre à un autre. Il existe pourtant une correspondance précise entre l'articulation stylistique des œuvres et la dramatique de l'existence, correspondance que l'auteur met en évidence, grâce à 'l'analyse du destin' fondée par Léopold Szondi, dans le cas de l'art psychotique de Sylvain Fusco, dans celui de l'esthétique de l'*Einfühlung* et de l'esthétique de l'abstraction, puis dans celui de l'art chinois sous les Sung. Cette même analyse du destin lui permet ensuite d'interpréter l'itinéraire de deux grands créateurs dont l'idée de destin hante les œuvres: Nietzsche et Hölderlin.

Intitulé 'L'art et le rien,' l'avant-dernier texte renoue avec la thématique de l'être de l'œuvre d'art. Point de départ: la peinture chinoise. 'Issue du vide, ouverte au vide, une peinture chinoise réalise la co(m)-mutation totale de l'aller et du retour dans une simultanéité rythmique, où les aspects concrets de l'œuvre se trouvent fondés en réalité. La pensée qui lui est immanente pense l'Être à partir du rien. En cela, l'art chinois est un paradigme historique et intempestif où s'exemplifie l'essence de l'art. Il permet de reconnaître l'unique principe de distinction entre le propre et l'impropre, qui vaut pour toutes les œuvres se réclamant de l'art. Ce que l'art est originairement, l'œuvre nous l'apprend originairement dans le déploiement de son apparaître. Une œuvre d'art fonde la surprise qu'elle apporte' (180). Or si le vide est essentiel à l'art, il doit être décelable en dehors de la peinture chinoise. La démonstration se

poursuit donc avec l'architecture, la sculpture, le peinture et, dans le dernier texte, avec la poésie d'André du Bouchet. 'Une œuvre d'art existe en propre, en ce que l'événement de son avènement fonde l'espace et le temps de son ouverture. Du visible, elle rend visible son invisible. Le miracle de l'être et de l'apparaître a en elle son efficace et la révélation de son secret. Cette révélation n'est pas un état de choses, un aspect particulier de l'étant. Absolument autre que lui, elle se pro-duit dans la patence sans nom... que nous nommons le Rien' (212).

L''essence,' l''existence,' le 'propre,' le 'là'...: une métaphysique de la présence articulée à une ontologie du Rien scandent ici l'écoute de l'œuvre d'art. Inutile d'insister sur le fait que les autres types d'approche sont disqualifiés sans procès, 'la' sémiotique de l'art, par exemple, n'ayant pour toute envergure que celle d'un article de l'*Encyclopedia Universalis*. Inutile, également, de se demander comment le rejet de toute positivité peut s'accommoder d'une définition biologique de la forme (von Weizsäcker), de notions empruntées à la linguistique guillaumienne ou du modèle szondien de l'analyse du destin. L'ouverture de ces textes d'Henri Maldiney relève en fait d'un autre espace, d'un espace très voisin de celui de l'œuvre d'art elle-même, et elle invite le lecteur à reconnaître dans l'art une activité fondamentale de l'esprit humain, une démarche originale dont la philosophie chinoise a peut-être mieux perçu l'essence que la pensée occidentale, les intuitions les plus pertinentes de celle-ci se trouvant éclairées et enrichies par celle-là.

GUY BOUCHARD
Université Laval

Matilal's book is an essay both on the philosophy of perception and on the history of the philosophy of perception, where the historical locus is classical Indian philosophy. His form of presentation of classical Indian philosophy stands in contrast with the prevalent form of presentation in which cut-and-paste historical reportage is punctuated with the names of persons, doctrines, and concepts of the Indian philosophers' closest Western relatives. Matilal philosophizes about perception, thereby setting a stage onto which are introduced classical Indian philosophers who talk not only with one another

but also with Western philosophers, including such contemporary thinkers as Dummett and Strawson, to whom the book is dedicated. This book demands of the author facility in the philosophy of perception as well as expertise in the history of Indian philosophy. It can be highly recommended both to philosophers seeking a philosophically intelligible introduction to classical Indian philosophy of perception and to scholars of Indian philosophy seeking a philosophically intelligent treatment of many of the exegetically controversial issues in the field.

The issues in Indian philosophy of perception are recognizable, if not familiar, to anyone conversant with Western philosophy of perception. For Indian and Western philosophers alike, the problems of perception fall under the rubric of epistemology (Chapter 1) and the central problem of epistemology is the problem of scepticism (Chapter 2) whose classical locus is the fact of illusion (Chapter 4). In contemporary Anglo-American epistemology the key term is the noun 'knowledge.' It is a mass noun and its verbal stem 'know' is a factive, stative verb. In classical Indian epistemology, the key term is 'pramāṇa' ('epistemic cognition'). It is a count noun and its verbal stem 'pramā,' though factive, expresses an achievement, instead of a state or an activity. (The Latin ancestor of 'knowledge' is 'cognitio' which is a count noun, whose stem, in the relevant sense, is factive and expresses an achievement.) The contrast between the English and Sanskrit verbs is comparable to the contrast between the English verb 'know' (as in 'I know that God exists') and the English verb 'realise' (as in 'I realise that God exists'). Thus, while such a difference in basic terms can lead to a divergence in the sets of epistemological problems treated, the overlap can remain quite substantial. It is easy to see, for example, that Gettier's problem for knowledge has its analog for epistemic cognition (pramāṇa) (Chapter 4).

The Indian epistemological vocabulary is decidedly mentalistic. Anyone familiar with Husserl's *Logical Investigations* or with pre-modern Western philosophy will not find it alien, though. The vocabulary, in its unregimented state, permits one to refer to things (artha), cognitions (jñāna) — either as acts or results of acts — and objects of cognition (jñāna-viṣaya); it also permits one to say that things cause cognitions, or that a cognition is veridical if the object of cognition is the cause of the cognition. This vocabulary, appropriately regimented, leads to the usual array of theories of truth, stated in mentalistic terms: correspondence theory, coherence theory, and pragmatic theory (Chapter 6). It also leads to the usual array of theories of perception: phenomenalism, representationalism, and direct realism (Chapter 7).

Our Indian philosophical cousins had other familiar worries. How much of perception is purely perceptual? Can there be perception without conception? In particular, how much epistemological significance is to be assigned to a concept-free perception? (Chapter 10) What is the relation between inference and perception, on the one hand, and part and whole, on the other? Does one see a part and infer therefrom the whole, or does one simply see the whole? (Chapter 8) And what is the nature of the reflexivity of cognition

itself? Is a cognition aware of itself or does it take another one to be aware of it? (Chapter 5)

The foregoing issues are supplemented by a brief outline of the nature of Indian philosophical argumentation (Chapter 3) and by a sketch of how the various views on perception fit with the respective ontologies (Chapters 11 and 12). As comprehensive as the book is, the author has omitted one very important issue, namely, the problem of non-perception (anupalabdhi) — how does one know that a cow, for example, is not in the room? This issue, widely treated by Indian philosophers, is hardly noticed by Western philosophers. For this reason, its discussion would have been an especially valuable addition to the book.

There is no question that Matilal's book is an important contribution to historical scholarship on Indian philosophy and to the small, but growing literature aimed at bringing serious classical Indian philosophy to the philosophically serious. Yet it is precisely this importance which makes it all the more lamentable that the index is so woefully incomplete. Very few of the key philosophical terms appear in the index, be they the English renditions of the Sanskrit terms which are provided parenthetically throughout the book, or the Sanskrit terms themselves. This makes it very difficult for the newcomer to Indian philosophy to return to discussions earlier in the book to get help with discussions later in the book; and it makes it very difficult for the scholar of Indian philosophy to dig out Matilal's views on specific topics of interest to him. In spite of this defect, *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge* is strongly recommended.

BRENDAN S. GILLON
American Institute of Indian Studies
Deccan College, Pune, India

The overall quality of the papers in this collection is remarkably high, and the best are very good indeed. The book consists of three parts, entitled 'Evolution,' 'Creation,' and 'Evolution and Creation.'

Ernan McMullin's 'Introduction' is one of the most exciting and informative essays in the history of ideas that I have come across. It is difficult to know whether to admire more this author's teasing out of the main issues in his histor-

ical survey (11-37), or his frank and clear setting-out of the problems which a Christian evolutionist must face (38). As McMullin sees the matter, Augustine in much of his exegesis relied on the admirable principle that 'when there is a conflict between the literal reading of a passage in Scripture and a well-established truth about the world, we must take this as a mandate to search for a metaphorical reading of Scripture' (11); the very different maxim which is too liable to be confused with this, that a literal interpretation of Scripture is always to be maintained when the contradictory cannot be demonstrated, has, on the contrary, done great harm in the relations between science and the Christian religion.

Francisco Ayala's paper, on recent successes of and challenges to the theory of evolution, is technical and difficult for the non-scientific reader, but well worth perseverance. I was particularly intrigued by his discussion of the recent controversy as to whether evolution could have come about by a mere accumulation of small changes, or whether it must have happened in relatively abrupt steps. The author's conclusions are irenical and compromising; that 'the known processes of microevolution can ... account for macroevolutionary change, even when this occurs according to the punctualist model — that is, at fast rates concentrated in geologically brief time intervals' (88). John Leslie's paper confirms the opinion I had already formed of its author, as one of the masters of contemporary philosophical prose; each of his quirkily elegant sentences stretches the muscles of the reader's mind. He argues powerfully that the 'fine tuning' of the basic laws of the cosmos towards the production of life is the basis of a sound argument *either* for multiple universes *or* for design. 'It is the razor edge on which life had to balance if our entire universe was not to be permanently lifeless, which provides the main evidence for many universes or for God' (102). Leslie is wittily contemptuous of the quite common view that, since we are here to observe the universe, our presence here as observers cannot constitute a problem (105). The bearing of questions about evolution and creation on fundamental problems of natural purpose and natural theology is examined by Phillip Sloan. He proceeds to disentangle the various strands of Darwin's thinking on these matters, and traces their origin in earlier writers (132-41), especially Buffon and Hume. He shows how Darwin gradually abandoned 'the concept of "perfect" adaptation of organisms by a wise, selecting "nature",' and substituted for it 'the post-Malthusian view of organic beings as forced into situations of purely relative adaptation by the struggle for existence' (139). Modern developments in biology have corroborated this tendency in Darwin himself; but in place of his vague reliance on the dynamic vitality of nature, 'the deeper understanding of energetic relationships holding between chemical and solar energy input and the biosynthetic activities of organisms has provided a quantifiable physical account of this underlying dynamism' (142). However, this author insists that order is not the real issue in the Christian doctrine of creation; it is rather that anything exists at all. Hence criticism based on the lack of need for a divine ordering principle are in his view beside the point.

Dianne Bergant and Carroll Stuhlmueller, in the following paper, read the

biblical account of divine creation in a manner clean contrary to this, as a matter of the imposition of order upon chaos (153). Tracing this conception through the Old Testament, they suggest that it 'helped to sustain the basic theology of Israel as God's chosen people,' and enabled the 'theology of the covenant to survive severe testing,' for example at the times of the Exile and of the Maccabean revolt, 'and to reach outward to include the salvation of all the world' (172). David Kelsey examines the meaning and the justification of the doctrine maintained by most Christian communities, that the world is created *ex nihilo*. Plainly, to affirm belief in creation is not, as it were, merely to attest to a cold fact; it is also existentially to involve oneself. Such existential involvement, while it could apparently not strictly speaking be *falsified*, might appear more and more *infelicitous* due to the course of events to a person or to a community — perhaps 'as a result of a deep revulsion at moral horrors like the Holocaust or ... at physical suffering caused by persistent starvation and disease' (192). William Alston's essay is an attempt to clarify what could be meant by God acting in the world, where such action is conceived as distinct from God's overall creation and preservation of things. How can we take some particular occurrence to be an act of God, when such a strong case is to be made for saying that absolutely everything that happens in the world is God's doing (198-9)? 'Even if everything that happens is carrying out the divine purpose, it is only seldom that we have, or think we have, some insight into what that is. It is these cases that we take, in a preeminent sense, to be acts of God' (217).

In an essay on how Christians can get the best out of evolution, James Ross asks whether human beings can both have evolved and be capable of life forever with God. He argues with elaborate ingenuity that they can, noting with approval that evolutionary theory tends to lead us away from dualistic accounts of human beings, with the soul as the real self, the body as a disposable shell (223). He concludes that while 'humans are emergent beings, essentially embodied and inspirited, that cannot exist except subsistently in material systems of a certain complexity,' yet they 'can exist forever in favorable material conditions that do not have to resemble the conditions of their emergence or origin except insofar as is absolutely necessary so as to sustain their characteristic activity' (233). A searching analysis of Edward O. Wilson's reductive evolutionist account of religion and morality is undertaken by William H. Austin. According to Wilson, sociobiology can discredit religious beliefs by explaining them as 'enabling mechanisms for survival' (254); what is now required is a poetic embodiment for scientific materialism which will make it capable of engaging people's loyalties (253). Austin is not very sanguine about Wilson's conviction 'that we can rather easily do without security and ingroup identity if we have a stirring vision and the exaltation of discovery' (270).

Nicholas Lash discusses the relation between evolutionary accounts of human origins and the Christian belief in redemption. He stresses that the second and third chapters of Genesis contrast things as they are not with things as they were, but rather with things as they might and should be. An undue degree of intellectual confidence seems improper for the Christian; 'it is only

in hope that the world of our experience can be discovered to be God's good creation' (284). The volume ends very suitably with an account of Teilhard de Chardin, 'surely one of the most fascinating people in the intellectual history of the twentieth century' (290). Christopher Mooney sketches Teilhard's fundamental intention as a thinker, and the manner in which he carried it out.

In fine, this is a remarkable volume, very strongly to be recommended. I have found but one misprint, on page 271 (towards the end of note 9).

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HUGO MEYNELL
University of Calgary
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FLOYD MERRELL. *Deconstruction Reframed*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press 1985. Pp. xi + 261. US$18.50. ISBN 0-911198-72-5.

In trying to bring together large and important bodies of information from disparate fields, it is easy to sacrifice depth of understanding for breadth of vision. Unfortunately, Floyd Merrell's ambitious book falls directly into this trap. Merrell attempts to 'reframe' deconstruction by demonstrating 'that it is but part of a larger Western World intellectual movement' (ix) that undermines our traditional metaphysical and epistemological systems. One can be quite sympathetic with this general position, however, without accepting Merrell's further claim that such a 'reframing' weakens the deconstructive project because Jacques Derrida, et al., are attacking a philosophical tradition that is 'now *passé* in many quarters' (86). Western metaphysics may be '*passé*' at Purdue, but it is certainly alive and well in most of the prestigious philosophical journals, at a great many major universities, and perhaps most importantly, in our second- and third-rung institutions of higher learning and in the popular consciousness. In fact, it is just this persistence of an out-moded way of doing philosophy that makes Merrell's work interesting: it becomes part of the deconstructive project itself by showing the many fields in which this metaphysics is no longer tenable.

Not only does Merrell's basic thesis in this book have a prima facie plausibility, but his account of it is generally well presented. Even a person who was relatively familiar with the fields he discusses might learn from some of his examples and explanations. He begins by clarifying certain key terms in the deconstructive lexicon — *différance*, trace, mediacy, and play — and relates them to Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotics, effectively working out in more detail some hints about the significance of Peirce from Derrida's *Of Gram-*

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matology. He then relates the basic concepts to certain implications of recent intellectual developments such as the Heisenberg principle in physics, Gödel's proof in logic, and 'conventionalist' philosophies of science, to show that the 'metaphysics of presence' no longer governs thinking in these areas. Finally, he ties all of these themes back to the work of Samuel Beckett, whom he offers as a sort of example of the deconstructive consciousness.

However, the broad scope of this effort at 'reframing' deconstruction often leads Merrell into trouble. His discussion of Gödel's incompleteness theorem, for instance, seems to involve a basic confusion. What Gödel established is that no system of logic can be both complete and consistent, that is, any complete system must have an inconsistency that is necessary to prove some of its theorems and any consistent system will have some theorems which cannot be proven within that system. In deconstruction, this principle means that any text that offers itself as 'complete,' such as Kant or Hegel, will always have some inconsistency, a place where the argument relies on an essential ambiguity. On the other hand, there are 'open' texts, such as Blanchot or Mallarmé, which may or may not have an inconsistency, but which are interesting becauce of their incompleteness. Deconstructive texts will generally fall in the second group. Merrell, however, seems to think that Gödel proved that *all* systems/texts must be inconsistent (200), so deconstructive texts themselves will be inconsistent, and hence deconstructible, not merely as a practical matter, with which Derrida would agree, but as a matter of logic. To my mind, this criticism involves a misunderstanding of Gödel.

Similarly, Merrell raises the now familiar point that deconstruction cannot be 'scientific' because it is not falsifiable, since all texts are known in advance to be deconstructible (74-7). While acknowledging that Derrida, et al., may not intend to be 'scientific,' Merrell relies on Sir Karl Popper's work in making this criticism. However, he also discusses the work of Paul Feyerabend, who mounts a major attack on Popper's theory, but Merrell never refutes Feyerabend or offers us any reason for accepting Popper's theory as a valid criticism of deconstruction, given the problems Feyerabend raises. Nor does Merrell address the clear analogy between Popper's 'World 3' and the thesis of Edmund Husserl's *The Origin of Geometry*, to which Derrida wrote a critical introduction, in his attempt to include Popper's work within the deconstructive project (129-37).

The cases of Gödel and Popper, among others, show one limit of taking on too much. It is extremely difficult to be an expert in deconstruction and phenomenology and logic and the philosophy of science all at once. Even when all the surface details are correct, few authors who attempt such a synthesis can help ignoring the deeper aspects of the various ideas under discussion. Thus Merrell often relegates the thinkers in the continental philosophical tradition on whose work Derrida's is based to the footnotes of his book: Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Husserl, and Heidegger make only brief appearances in the text itself. What might Freud make of Peirce's concept of pre-verbal 'Firstness'? And does that suggest a link between Firstness and 'the mystic writing pad' of which Derrida might be fully aware? Similarly, if one claims that

phenomenology has an insufficiently abstract concept of intersubjectivity (129), is it entirely fair, or entirely wise, to ignore Heidegger? Merrell notes that 'Derrida stresses the dangers of overlooking contexts' (2), but the project of 'reframing' deconstruction seems forced, if only by constraints of time and space, to 'def(r)ame' deconstruction as well, taking it out of its philosophical context to 'reframe' it in what is in many ways an alien philosophical tradition.

There are other problems with the book. Merrell is occasionally factually inaccurate: Derrida may be tempted by, but does not endorse, Artaud's search for an algebraic language (118), for instance, and 'radical empiricism' is not the same as either phenomenology *or* phenomenalism (146). The typographical errors are not unusually numerous, but too many of them interfere with the reader's understanding of the text. The index is incomplete, and not all the references are listed. While I am inclined to attribute Merrell's problems with some of his material to a good faith attempt to do too much, these technical errors seem to reflect a disturbing carelessness on someone's part.

NANCY J. HOLLAND
Hamline University

W.J.T. Mitchell's *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology* attempts to make liberal and Marxist critics partners rather than rivals in the appropriation of their textual heritage. Part One is a set of sometimes elliptical short essays that try to wean us from the idea that images are a privileged semiotic form in the sense that a picture can give us a true account of the world. Wittgenstein is the presiding spirit here. The opening chapter of Part Two sets forth Nelson Goodman's theory of verbal and pictorial signs, which avoids what Mitchell believes are the weaknesses of the classical account and becomes the theoretical foundation for the essays which follow. In these Mitchell analyses theories about images and texts (iconic and verbal signs) in which one or the other is made dominant, and tries to show how this dominance is rooted in 'the battles of sexes, nations, and religious traditions since the Enlightenment' (3). The theorists examined are Gombrich, Lessing and Edmund Burke. In the final section Mitchell focuses on the idea of ideological analysis itself, i.e., on the form of his own interpretations, and tries to open a dialogue between the iconoclasm of the Marxist project and the liberalism that upholds the authenticity of prac-

tices (in this case pure theory) which the Marxist sees as ideological screens that mask and advance values and interests.

Part One begins with a brief account of what 'image' has meant. Mitchell presents a Wittgenstein critique of the mental image which wittily and persuasively shows how the image of the mind as imprinted wax or a blank sheet governs and distorts thinking about imagery itself by supporting the idea that certain kinds of signs (pictures) are 'natural' while others (words) are conventional. Mitchell wants us to abandon this common view and believe instead that 'the pictures which reside in our language, whether they are projected in the mind's eye or on paper, are artificial, conventional signs no less than the propositions with which they are associated' (26).

This section is persuasive. But serious doubts arise in the historical chapters. Mitchell's general assumption, for which he does not argue, is that a strong adherence to one side or the other in the image-text battle is *prima facie* evidence that the writer is trying to 'enforce and screen off ... [his or her] values and interests' (154) under the guise of offering a value-free, i.e., a purely or merely, theoretical analysis of the relationship of images and texts. Mitchell claims that this is part of the whole cultural process by which canons are formed and certain kinds of work are privileged: 'Since these regulative principles generally advertise themselves as nothing more than natural, necessary, or literal ways of talking about the arts, the disclosure of their figurative basis may help us to reconstruct what Fredric Jameson would call the "political unconscious" that sets them in motion and determines their form' (103).

What might persuade one to believe that a theorist's beliefs (even assuming them to be erroneous) are causally (or perhaps structurally) tied to other beliefs? For some, of course, persuasion is not needed. To assert that Gombrich's belief that perspective is a superior method of rendering the world is tied to his belief in the superiority of liberal capitalism is easy enough to do and it scores points with members of one's team, but it ought not to convince anyone else. It has a kind of intellectual shock value (the violent yoking of apparently unrelated things) and it appeals to anti-capitalist sentiment, but it evades rather than confronts ideas.

Mitchell follows this strategy when he argues that Lessing's belief that poetry and painting are distinct (in principle) is structurally connected to his political views.

> Lessing's metaphoric borders between the spatial and temporal arts have their literal analogue in the cultural map of Europe he draws in *Laocoon*. The argument is structured ... as a 'tournament played by a European team.' Since Lessing criticizes all ... national representives for failing to observe the borders of the arts, it is tempting to see his position as that of an enlightened internationalist, regulating the contest from an impartial position. But a closer look reveals Lessing's partisanship: it is the French with their 'false delicacy,' their 'difficulte vaincue,' and their frigid neoclassicism who blur the genres by making poetry conform to the cold beauties and unities of classical painting and sculpture. (105)

The argument completely ignores the fact that for Lessing the ultimate aim

of both painting and poetry is the same, and even that, as David Wellbery (*Lessing's Laocoon: Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason* [Cambridge, 1984]) has shown, poetry is the use of language which aspires to the condition of a natural sign, which is what painting already is. Mitchell opens the chapter on *Laocoon* by saying that Lessing does not 'turn to the venerable distinction between 'natural' and 'arbitrary' signs (95), but that is exactly where Lessing begins, even if he does not end there. Such simplification and selectivity is precisely what is wrong with ideological analysis; it uses a few details (and no comparisons with other writers) as the foundation for an argument which is supposed to reveal the hidden values and interests that determine a theoretical position.

Mitchell's book is admirable insofar as it pursues the project of detaching us from the belief that our conceptual habits are natural. But this effort must be clearly and decisively distinguished from the moralism that is intrinsic to the Marxist enterprise of ideological criticism. The discovery that perspective and economic man are not universals, but complex structures of thought which we have built, must be detached from the belief that capitalism is a bad (or good) thing and will go away (or be improved) if it is shown to be a human invention. Ideological analysis re-introduces the moralism that the liberal tradition tries to avoid in this kind of intellectual project, and, paradoxically, returns us to the very idea of the 'natural' (for what else but 'nature' endorses the moral judgements?) that Mitchell (in his liberal incarnation) was intent on undermining. The determination that a social system is deeply and irremediably unjust has nothing to do with the issues raised in this book. The partnership that Mitchell envisions cannot work, for liberal intellectual commitments and ideological analysis are deeply opposed, at least when it comes to the interpretation of texts or images.

ROGER SEAMON
Dept. of English
University of British Columbia

This study is, to my knowledge, the first to offer such clear, detailed, and straightforward exposition and analysis of Newman's thought on assent (in-

cluding a chapter by chapter analysis of his *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*) in combination with an evaluative discussion which successfully breaks out of Newman's own idiom and challenges the presuppositions underlying his project. Though not an admirer, the author is 'convinced of the importance and originality of the project' (2); the study is, therefore, a refreshing addition to the literature, offering sympathetic disagreement rather than either the cynical dismissal or naive adulation too often found.

Following an engaging introduction to 'Newman's Philosophical Project,' the chapters cover in detail the major elements of the project. Chapter II examines and offers sustained criticism of Newman's contrast between two 'modes of apprehension' — 'real' and 'notional.' Chapter III, 'Religious Beliefs as "Real",' provides a critique of Newman's view of the relation between morality and religious belief (focussing on the argument from conscience and the problem of relativism).

The author turns then in Chapter IV to Newman's second objective in the *Grammar*; the legitimation of unconditional acceptance of concrete propositions. Although conceding that this effort is more 'insightful' (99) than the first, he mounts a full-scale attack on what Newman saw as the heart of that second part. He rejects Newman's denial of 'degrees of assent,' concluding that, with its all-or-nothing implication, it attempts to bar us from 'believing' many things we should and do believe with less than total confidence, and/or commits us to 'believing' with total confidence those things we cannot absolutely deny. The argument is weakened, however, by the use the author makes of the term 'believe' because Newman's substantive point is that there are two modes of accepting conclusions — one conditional, dependent (explicitly relying on its reasons), and the other unconditional, independent ('as if resting in itself'). In the sense of 'belief' to which the author appeals so often, Newman is talking about two ways of believing — his point is that unconditional acceptance is not legitimate *only* in cases of demonstrative propositions, but can be legitimate in those particular cases where the reasons put the conclusion 'beyond reasonable doubt'; moreover, unconditional acceptance need not rule out consideration of counter-evidence and the recognition that abandonment of the assent might later be warranted. A separation of Newman's philosophical project from his theological applications allows a more generous appreciation of his achievement while it admits that the theological extrapolation might fail.

Chapter V, 'Formal and Informal Inference,' claims that Newman's argument for a form of inference 'that is non-verbal, cannot be analyzed in terms of rules, and varies with the nature and circumstances of the particular case' (146) fails to do justice to the analyzability of non-deductive reasoning; it reduces to the view that informal inference is 'mysteriously incomprehensible' (157), and such a view is morally irresponsible (159).

Chapter VI, 'The Illative Sense,' suggests that Newman's discussions of informal (or natural) inference and of the illative sense 'do not quite fit together' (163). It highlights the strain between Newman's claims that the illative sense at once informs inference and yet is the bridge between inference and assent.

He argues ultimately in Chapter VII that Newman 'misuses' the idea of illative sense, yet he concludes here (172) that if his interpretation of the illative judgment as involving the perception-like validation of one's inferences is correct, 'then Newman has solved his personal paradox and supported his claim that the believer's *certitude* (and not just his conclusion) can be reasonable and justified even though it ultimately rests on mere probabilities.' Since the 'active recognition' that is certitude is conceded not to be an extrinsic bridging of a gap by a leap of will, it is unclear why he later concludes that 'most of the major theses in the *Grammar* are false, and most of its major arguments unsound' (196), and that 'much of what [it] teaches is harmful as well as false' (201).

The value of this book lies in its ability to put Newman's discussions in a fresh light, and thus point in fruitful directions for rethinking, even when one disagrees with the author's evaluations. The exposition of Newman's points is remarkably clear, with a serious attempt at 'respectful consideration' and an admirable effort to undermine naive criticisms of Newman. These are important virtues, and because of them readers familiar with Newman's thought can actually manage to see things for themselves (the uninitiated, however, may well be unduly intimidated by what looks like an overwhelming case against Newman). Often I was brought to the point of seeing something going on in Newman's discussion in a way I had not appreciated before — without necessarily agreeing with the author's own assessment. Although he is correct that 'valuing Newman's general approach does not require one to ignore his philosophical mistakes' (196), he occasionally falls into the opposite injustice of focussing on terminological issues to the exclusion of substantive insights. However, his arguments do warrant a fresh consideration of the tension (or inconsistency) between (1) Newman's allegiance to legitimating the belief of the unlearned masses and his acknowledgement of what was compelling in Lockean/Humean empiricism, (2) his emphasis on the use of reasoning to check the imagination and affections and on the importance of right character to guarantee right reasoning, and (3) his understanding of strength of belief in terms of 'real' apprehension and in terms of rational argument.

There is much that Newmanists need to heed in this work, much that is usefully clarified. I recommend it heartily, hoping that readers will try to be as fair to this study as it has tried to be fair to Newman.

M. JAMIE FERREIRA
Departments of Religious Studies and of Philosophy
University of Virginia

BRYAN G. NORTON, ed. *The Preservation of Species*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1986. Pp. xi + 305. US$29.50. ISBN 0-691-08389-4.

Interest in biological conservation remains strong, evidenced by a United States Congressional Study conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment, by the World Conservation Strategy Conference held in Ottawa, by conferences sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution, the New York Zoological Society, and the religious pilgrimage to Assisi. The anthology by a group at the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland is timely and significant.

Preservation of Species is easily the best of the philosophical and policy-oriented efforts to justify conservation. In Part I a conservation biologist (Thomas E. Lovejoy), a paleontological biologist (Geerat J. Vermeij), and a social scientist (Stephen R. Kellert) describe the problem. What species are vanishing and why? Do people care? Part II asks what policy should prescribe. An economist (Alan Randall) asks whether species can be valued economically. Four philosophers (Bryan G. Norton, J. Baird Callicott, Elliot Sober, and Donald H. Regan) ask about values carried by species. In Part III an ecologist (Lawrence B. Slobodkin), an environmental lawyer (Terry L. Leitzell), and a wildlife manager (Robert L. Carlton) turn to management strategies.

The result is a stimulating colloquy that no one seriously interested in endangered species can afford to ignore, strikingly illustrating how so-called 'applied philosophy' also requires exploring theoretical issues. Ethics applied outside traditional boundaries must often be conceptually radical. This is a ground-breaking work. Its strengths are its innovative nature, the diverse group of participants, their many seminal insights, and the leadership of Bryan Norton who, in his sectional introductions and epilogue, pulls together a group that would otherwise easily fragment.

Three areas of incompleteness are worth notice: one scientific, one moral, one philosophical.

(1) Scientifically, there is no discussion of what a species is. Do species even exist? Every good taxonomist has made and unmade several of them. Darwin concluded that species is a term 'arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience' (*Origin of Species*, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 108). These authors seem to regard species as sets or classes, yet as having historical reality worth preserving. But if species is a mapping device embedded in the theories of classifiers, then preserving species is like preserving contour lines.

Betula uber, Virginia's round-leaf birch, with high fences recently built around all known specimens, was long considered a only a subspecies or mutation, until M.L. Fernald pronounced it a species. Ornithologists recently reassessed the Mexican duck, *Anas diazi*, and lumped it with the mallard, *A. platyrhynchos*, as subspecies *diazi*. U.S. Fish and Wildlife authorities took it off the endangered species list partly as a result.

Despite such judgment calls, most biologists have felt that species (differing from genera, families, orders, classes) have objective historical reality, and

that preserving them is more like preserving mountains and canyons than like preserving contour lines or convenient sets. To warrant preservation, species need to be discrete entities in time and space. But one will get little help on this issue here.

(2) Morally, these panelists regard the forces bringing extinction as humane forces that overshoot their mark. Extinction is a spillover when well-intended 'development interests ... charge forward to improve the economy and to raise standards of living' (243), an unforeseen tragedy of the commons.

This is not the whole truth. These are forces of exploitation not only in the economist's positive sense, but in the philosopher's negative sense. Forces of evil grafted on to power in high places will, and do, exploit persons as readily as species. These authors do not tangle with issues of justice in international markets, with profiteering, with elements in capitalism that escalate desires and consumption, that capture poor people economically and suck a wealth of resources out of them. Resource economists are seldom philosophical enough about good and evil in social structures. The philosophers here could listen to tough-minded theologians of liberation, who know that reason alone is insufficient to dislodge well-protected vested self-interest.

Species are often being destroyed because powerful elites refuse needed social reforms, sacrificed in a smokescreen of rhetoric about development that leaves underclasses as poor as ever. Beside a hard-hitting article like Val and Richard Routley's 'World Rainforest Destruction — The Social Factors' (*The Ecologist* 12 [1982], 4-22), these analysts do not fully face what it means to speak the truth to power.

(3) Philosophically, 'all the authors ... shy away from value wholly independent of human sources' (78). That claim is too 'difficult to interpret and defend' (275). Yet they grope and stumble to preserve species for lofty reasons and simultaneously to preserve subjectivity in value theory. 'The existence of value depends somehow on the existence of fairly sophisticated consciousness.' 'The cheetah's speed is good, but it is not good in itself. It needs to be known by a (human) subject who can know it and take pleasure in it in a sophisticated way. The cheetah does not value his speed in the required way' (Regan, 196, 215-16).

The closest approach to intrinsic value is what Callicott revealingly calls a 'truncated sense' that 'retains only half its traditional meaning' (143). 'The *source* of all value is human consciousness, but it by no means follows that the *locus* of all value is consciousness itself. ... An intrinsically valuable thing on this reading is valuable *for* its own sake, *for* itself, but it is not valuable *in* itself' (142-3). 'Value is, as it were, projected onto natural objects or events by the subjective feelings of observers. If all consciousness were annihilated at a stroke, ... only impassive phenomena would remain' (156).

Norton insists that the question means nothing for policy. 'It seems more important to understand the ways in which nonhuman species contribute to human values than to decide whether any particular value is best labeled as "intrinsic" (272). 'It is therefore immaterial whether the value of ecosystems

is regarded as intrinsic or as instrumental. This is one point at which an interesting philosophical debate does not affect managerial choices' (279).

That is perhaps an expedient approach on the floor of a legislature or in a bureaucrat's office; but is it logically and psychologically true? If no value exists except as hooked into human consciousness, anthropocentrism will sooner or later seep into our rationale, our affection, and our policy. The truth will out: species have no value except via human consciousness.

If one must skirt the language of intrinsic value, what humans desire to protect is best summed up by reverence for life. But these biologists and philosophers, daunted by science and contemporary value theory, never quite have the courage to say this. Explicitly shied from here, reverence for life underlies most of the widespread citizen support for the Endangered Species Act and tacitly underpins even these experts' concern for species.

Indeed, it is with species that anthropogenic value seems most strained. A species is the preservation of biological identity across millions of years (not a conveniently chosen class), and to invoke human consciousness as the source of this value may first seem rational but later invites *hubris*. In this sense the first inadequacy noted is related to the third; having insufficiently examined what a species is, these experts value species insufficiently. The 'preservation of species,' to play with the title, has been going on since Precambrian times, via extinction and respeciation; what a species does is preserve itself, through instantiation in individuals, as long as a fit environment persists. Until humans can preserve species in alliance with this nonanthropic preservation of species, their values will run shallow of what they seek to preserve.

These criticisms aside, this is one of those too few books that make philosophy vital in public life.

HOLMES ROLSTON, III
Colorado State University

Few philosophers rival Joseph Butler's obsession with clarity or commitment to common-sense. Penelhum does so in both respects, while compellingly showing the relevance of Butler's central ideas to contemporary debates. This balanced and incisive book is indispensable reading for Butler scholars, but

it is also an insightful contribution to general ethics and philosophy of religion.

Bishop Butler sharply rejected theistic ethics which regard moral concepts as vacuous without God or which treat moral truths as unrecognizable without divine commands. Penelhum can thus separate his exposition and assessment of the ethics into part one of the book, 'The Advocate for Virtue,' and of the religious thought into part two, 'The Apologist.' These titles emphasize something Penelhum frequently reminds us of: Butler is a *practical* thinker whose central aim is to increase clarity and insight, as well as to evoke concern and commitment in moral, religious, and prudent living.

Greater space in the book is devoted to Butler's philosophy of religion, since it needs to be freed from its historical context, unlike the ethics which is remarkably approachable in contemporary terms. Butler was preoccupied with arguing against the deists who in the 18th century asserted one or all of these theses: after creating the world God saw fit to have no further personal involvement in it, or God offers no moral guidance to us, or gives no divine revelations of any sort, or does not offer us personal immortality (100). Penelhum shows that Butler's rejoinder is plausible and interesting, and yields insights transferable to wider issues.

In this dispute, however, Butler takes for granted that God exists. Of what use can his thought be for a critical, post-Humean, approach to religion? Penelhum presses this question throughout, concluding that Butler 'has to be judged as a defensive apologist who does not make Christian claims likely, but shows how they can accommodate the agreed realities that obtain in our world' (182). That is, Butler's worth lies in his extensive contribution to rendering the Christian world view internally coherent and consistent with empirical fact (even post-Darwinian fact).

Penelhum joins Butler in urging us to assess that world view in comprehensive, holistic, terms as one general perspective competing with others, rather than to rest the case for Christianity on piecemeal defenses of specific dogmas (199ff.). In doing so we are also urged to be sensitive to what Penelhum calls the Parity Argument: 'the claim that religious skepticism is the result of the application to religion of a degree of rigour that we do not demand elsewhere' (110).

Penelhum declines to give a full discussion of the ethics of belief, even though it is clearly crucial in assessing Butler's intriguing twin emphasis on intellectual honesty and the assurance of God's existence. But he gives an illuminating assessment of Butler's views on human probation, that is, God's test of our moral and intellectual virtue. Like Pascal, Butler can plausibly believe that God made the evidence about His existence 'unclear and full of difficulty' (197), so as to warrant only probabilistic judgments about it. There is a good foundation for a theodicy in response to the problem of evil, but Butler is often inconsistent in his remarks that reasonable people must be theists and Christians.

It is argued that Butler establishes only the logical possibility of life after death, not its probability as he intended. There is an interesting discussion of the parallels between reincarnation and resurection doctrines (122-6). There

is also a fresh argument to make sense of resurrection in response to the 'Replica Objection' which says ordinary criteria for personal identity are logically insufficient to justify identification of a resurrected being with its predecessor, rather than viewing it as a mere replica of the predecessor (145). And there is a careful sorting out of Butler's insightful criticisms of Locke's theory of personal identity from his fruitless immaterialist metaphysics.

Overall, strong support is given for Penelhum's high estimate of Butler's philosophy of religion as 'second in English only to that of Hume' (vii). Equally strong is Penelhum's case for the importance of Butler's ethical theory. I know of no better concise expositions of the subtleties of Butler's doctrines of the authority of conscience, the naturalness of virtue, the relationship of conscience to self-love, the relationships of both to benevolence, and the refutation of psychological egoism and psychological hedonism.

A plausible defense is given of Butler's acceptance of mixed motives for virtue (with self-love, benevolence or specific passions, and the naturalness of virtue reinforcing the motive of duty for duty's sake), contrary to the objections raised by Kant and Pritchard. There is also a refutation of Nicholas Sturgeon's thesis, according to which Butler incoherently assumes that conscience bases its approvals and disapprovals on the naturalness and unnaturalness of actions (i.e., their conformity with or violation of our nature and in particular our consciences), rather than conscience having independent grounds for its pronouncements which are then used to define naturalness and unnaturalness. (Cf. my 'Defense of the Rights of Conscience in Butler's Ethics,' *Philosophy Research Archives*, 1977.)

Penelhum decided not to offer detailed discussions of Butler's analyses of many specific moral virtues and emotions, and of concepts such as forgiveness, resentment, self-deception, and freedom. This is unfortunate. His rationale is that while these analyses are insightful, they are 'secondary to his [Butler's] central objectives' (vii). Yet by Penelhum's own account, Butler's central objectives are practical ones, and these topics are as important as any others for gaining the kind of practical understanding of the life of virtue that Butler insists we need. Here Penelhum misses an opportunity to explore more fully Butler's relevance, both methodologically and in result, to contemporary applied ethics and virtue ethics.

Especially regrettable, in my view, is the omission of a full discussion of self-deception. Not only is Butler the most insightful pre-twentieth-century writer to emphasize the moral dimensions of self-deceit, but his general ethical doctrines cannot be understood if we neglect his discussions of the topic (to which he devotes two of the *15 Sermons*: 'Upon the Character of Balaam' and 'Upon Self-Deceit'). Self-deception about general vices and specific acts of wrongdoing constitutes 'inner hypocrisy' which 'corrupts conscience' in a manner that must be weighed in connection with all his claims about conscience, especially his claim that conscience is a reliable 'inner guide' to moral and religious virtue. This omission is also regrettable because Penelhum earli-

er wrote one of the classics in the literature of self-deception ('Pleasure and Falsity').

MIKE W. MARTIN
Chapman College

CLAUDE PICHÉ. *Das Ideal: Ein Problem der Kantischen Ideenlehre*. Bonn: Bouvier (Conscientia, Studien zur Bewusstseinsphilosophie, Band 12) 1984. 181 p. ISBN 3-416-01736-6.

Le but principal de cet ouvrage est d'examiner de plus près 'l'essence de la raison comme faculté productive des idées' telle qu'elle apparaît dans la dialectique transcendantale de la *Critique de la raison pure* de Kant (Préface, 8). L'introduction précise que 'l'investigation part de la présupposition que le dessein propre de Kant dans l'appropriation de la doctrine des idées et de la doctrine platonicienne des deux mondes qui y est reliée, trouve son expression la meilleure dans la thématique de l'idéal' (9). Partant d'une 'exposition de la structure des idées de la raison pure' (10), l'auteur entend élargir le débat vers un traitement systématique de la thématique de l'idéal dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre de Kant (critique, éthique, esthétique).

Cette thèse de doctorat, menée à l'Université de Heidelberg sous la direction des professeurs Dieter Henrich et Peter Bieri — ce qui est déjà une fort bonne recommandation — se divisera donc en trois chapitres: I. L'idéal transcendantal, II. Les idéaux de la philosophie pratique et III. L'idéal de la beauté.

C'est avant tout un travail d'exégèse et de clarification de la démarche kantienne. Le premier chapitre sur l'idéal transcendantal dégage fort bien (section A) les points forts et les points faibles dans le parallèle établi par Kant lui-même entre la déduction métaphysique des concepts purs de l'entendement et celle des idées de la raison, c'est-à-dire entre les catégories et les idées d'une part et les formes logiques auxquelles elles correspondent d'autre part. Il appert ainsi que les idées transcendantales ont leur siège dans la raison à titre de *conclusions* à partir de principes, et non en tant que *formes* de la pensée, comme c'est le cas pour les concepts de l'entendement. Le processus de pensée qui engendre les idées n'est pas pure invention (Erdichtung), mais procède d'une nécessité de la raison elle-même et entraîne ainsi naturellement la semblance (chein) du vrai, c'est-à-dire la supposition illusoire de l'existence d'un objet correspondant.

Quel est l'objet des idées transcendantales? L'auteur fait d'abord remar-

quer (B) que les antinomies de la raison qui en résultent ne se situent pas dans la simple opposition logique de la contradiction, l'un niant ce que l'autre affirme, mais constituent des jugements *contratrie opposita*, l'un posant le *contraire* de l'autre, contraignant ainsi la pensée à faire un choix. Pour échapper à ce dilemme, on est amené à examiner le substrat des prédicats antinomiques des quatre idées cosmologiques, i.e. le concept de MONDE défini comme l'absolue totalité des phénomènes. Ce concept n'est *qu'une idée*, selon Kant, c'est-à-dire qu'il est irréalisable au sens où 'l'appréhension du divers des apparences ne peut jamais lui être adéquate' (49). Ou encore que sa représentation comme tout concret par la faculté imaginative est impossible (50). L'opposition entre, d'une part, la nécessité transcendantale de poser comme entière la série des conditions d'un conditionné et, du coup, de poser l'inconditionné lui-même, et le fait que, d'autre part, la chaîne des conditions n'est donnée dans l'ordre empirique de l'appréhension sensible que comme *tâche* à effectuer (aufgegeben) successivement dans le temps, trahit le caractère contradictoire du concept de monde qui sous-tend les antinomies de la raison (50-1). Ce concept est vide de contenu (ein Unding) et ne peut donc servir de sujet à aucune prédication.

Quant aux antinomies dites dynamiques, celles qui affirment à la fois la légalité et la liberté, la contingence et l'être nécessaire, leurs énoncés contraires peuvent se maintenir simultanément aussi longtemps qu'on n'introduit pas subrepticement la liberté et l'être nécessaire dans l'immanence de l'ordre sensible comme le fait une certaine métaphysique dogmatique (52-4). Non seulement les antinomies se trouvent-elles ainsi levées, mais Kant a réussi à rendre compte de la mécanique de leur fonctionnement. Le monde comme totalité de toutes les apparences est une construction de la raison, voire une représentation 'fictive' (eingebildet) qui n'a aucun référent sensible. Il semble bien que ce soit un point original de la thèse de Claude Piché d'avoir démontré la constitution particulière de l'idée cosmologique, comme contradictoire en soi et dont l'objet, le concept de monde, dépend pour sa réalisation des conditions de la puissance imaginative (et reproductive) sensible (57, n. 92). Tel est le sens des deux sections suivantes sur la genèse de l'idée psychologique et de l'idée théologique.

L'idée cosmologique, le Je en tant que simple forme de la connaissance et condition de tout penser, s'obtient par abstraction de toutes les caractéristiques particulières de la subjectivité empiriquement fournies par le sens interne. Tout objet étant pour Kant d'origine empirique, l'abstraction Je ne peut avoir le statut d'objet ni, par conséquent, se voir appliquer les catégories de l'entendement. La fiction consiste justement alors à lui attribuer le concept pur de substance (dépourvue ici de tout accident), c'est-à-dire à l'hypostasier. Le sujet pensant développe ainsi par abstraction la conscience d'une 'existence possible séparée (abgesondert)' au-delà de 'l'existence empiriquement déterminée' propre à l'âme (64-8), et cela en vertu d'une fiction de la raison. Ce qui n'est qu'une condition logique du penser devient un *objet*, non empirique par définition, mais à propos duquel on croit paradoxalement pouvoir faire un usage légitime des catégories qui n'ont pourtant d'autre objet possible que

les données de l'expérience sensible. On ne peut connaître a priori un objet qui ne soit pas empirique, puisqu'on n'aurait rien à lui attribuer. le Je transcendantal comme objet de la psychologie rationnelle s'obtient donc par une sorte de violence exercée sur cet objet du sens interne qu'est l'âme (75).

L'idée théologique, elle, a ceci de particulier et d'unique que son concept est celui d'une chose intégralement déterminée en elle-même et qu'il représente un individu, l'*ens realissimum* contenant en lui la totalité de tous les prédicats positifs possibles et dont toutes les réalités finies ne sont que des limitations, à la manière dont les diverses figures spatiales s'obtiennent par un découpage de l'espace infini (79-80). Dieu serait le 'sujet transcendantal' de toutes les limitations. Kant se pose la quesiton de savoir si cet étant particulier n'est pas tout simplement identique au concept de monde en tant que totalité de tout ce qui est (80, n. 130), ce qui nous ramènerait au panthéisme de Spinoza. Pour contourner cette impasse on en viendra historiquement à considérer l'étant suprême plutôt comme fondement de toutes réalités, tout ce qui existe n'en étant que les conséquences et se situant du même coup à un autre palier. Mais il s'avère alors que ce fondement reste indéterminable en lui-même et que les seuls prédicats qu'on puisse lui attribuer: unité, simplicité, parfaite suffisance et éternité, ne peuvent recevoir aucun secours de l'expérience et demeurent par conséquent sans signification. Du reste, même les choses auxquelles correspond ce fondement ne sont elles-mêmes saisies que dans un concept transcendantal i.e. non empirique. La subreption consiste ici à vouloir appliquer l'exigence rationnelle de détermination intérgale à *toute réalité* (omnitudo reatitatis), ce qui est un concept transcendantal, alors qu'elle ne peut avoir de prise que sur les objets 'en autant qu'ils peuvent m'être donnés.' Ici ce n'est pas seulement dans la mineure du syllogisme que s'opère la substitution qui est à l'origine de la semblance, mais déjà dans la majeure, dès qu'on veut faire un usage transcendant de la 'représentation de la somme totale de toute réalité.' Alors que les idées cosmologiques et psychologiques partaient de l'expérience pour la quitter ensuite en vertu d'une subreption au niveau de la mineure de l'argument, l'idée théologique prend le nom d'*idéal* parce qu'elle représente le premier pas de la raison pure *en dehors* du monde sensible en transposant l'exigence de détermination intégrale au monde des choses en soi (90).

La conclusion de cette section (B) du livre sur l'objet des idées transcendantales se trouve en réalité au début de la section suivante (C) où l'on rejoint du même coup le thème central de la thèse qui est bien l'IDEAL: 'L'idée théologique est donc la seule idée transcendantale qui remplit la condition structurelle d'un idéal absolument ... L'idéal transcendantal est un produit de la pure raison où l'idée est poursuivie jusqu'à la constitution d'un objet qui lui corresponde. Ce produit ne doit cependant pas être une fiction arbitraire de la raison, car une telle puissance... doit avoir son but déterminé' (91). En quel sens l'idéal réalise-t-il un but de la raison, autrement dit, quelle est la fonction de l'idéal transcendantal, telle est la question posée dans la section C qui clôt le premier chapitre.

Si l'idéal transcendantal ne coïncide pas tout simplement avec la totalité

du réel (omnitudo realitatis), mais qu'on le pose comme fondement, alors 'il peut tout au plus, eu égard à la totalité de ses 'conséquences entières' jouer un rôle du fait qu'en tant que principe unitaire, il permet d'embrasser du regard la complétude potentielle des réalités dérivées' (93). Mais cette tâche de la détermination intégrale n'épuise pas la fonction de l'être suprême comme fondement ontologique de la théologie. L'idéal comme fondement unique et identique doit garantir la parenté (affinité) de tout le possible et l'unification du divers qui en dérive (94-5). Par analogie avec la fonction synthétique de l'entendement par rapport à la diversité sensible, le principe unificateur de toutes choses doit se trouver dans une intelligence. L'idéal est donc le fruit d'une démarche interne de la raison dans sa fonction régulatrice de l'expérience, sauf qu'une subreption intervient encore une fois dans le fait de transposer cette fonction dans un être suprême pour fonder l'affinité et l'unité réelles du divers *en soi*. Or, on sait qu'aucun objet empirique ne correspond à l'idée d'une unité systématique parfaite.

Pour compléter ce chapitre qui comprend plus de la moitié de toute la thèse, il reste donc pour son auteur à situer la fonction de l'idéal dans la finalité intrinsèque de la raison pure qui vise d'abord l'unité systématique de l'expérience. La référence à l'idéal transcendantal sert à l'accomplissement de cette visée comme outil dans l'usage régulateur de la raison, mais son objet doit demeurer précisément un être de raison (une pure idée), non reconnu comme réel, pour éviter encore une fois le piège de la semblance dialectique. L'idée transcendantale demeure un principe heuristique permettant l'investigation de la nature *comme si* un tel fondement de son unité systématique était à l'œuvre en elle. L'auteur montre par une analyse serrée des textes (105-9) que le fondement idéal opère chez Kant à la manière d'un schème qui fait le point entre l'idée comme règle de la détermination intégrale d'un objet et l'exposition de la finalité à l'œuvre au niveau de l'expérience. L'idéal fournit la mesure indispensable dans l'application de l'idée transcendantale eu égard à sa fonction régulatrice. Explicitement chez Kant: 'Tout comme l'idée donne la *règle*, ainsi sert-il dans un tel cas de *prototype* (Urbild) de la détermination intégrale de la reproduction (Nachbild)' (108). 'Un tel prototype s'appelle un idéal quand le concept par lequel il est déterminé est une idée. Il sert de mesure pour l'applicaiton de l'idée à des cas particuliers' (109).

L'auteur analyse ensuite avec Kant la raison pour laquelle on n'arrive pas à s'en tenir à l'idéal transcendantal comme à un simple quelque chose qui soit le fondement ontologique inconnu de l'unité du monde (concept déiste), mais qu'on doive lui attribuer le prédicat de l'intelligence (concept théiste), encore que ce prédicat n'affecte que sa relation au monde en tant que celui-ci est conçu comme son *effet*. En réalité, c'est la finalité posée dans l'ordre naturel qui contraint à faire ce dernier pas et à concevoir la disposition du monde comme étant l'objet d'une intention, satisfaisant ainsi l'intérêt spéculatif de la raison qui requiert l'interprétation *téléologique* de l'unité systématique de la nature.

Une fois bien fixé le sens de l'unique idéal transcendantal dans la *Critique de la raison pure*, l'auteur peut consacrer une seconde partie de son étude à l'examen des idéaux de la raison pratique: le bien suprême (A), la béatitude

comme idéal de la puissance imaginative (B), enfin, les idéaux de la loi morale, sainteté et sagesse (C).

Le bien suprême ne porte pas le nom d'*idéal* dans la *Critique de la raison pratique*. Il en a pourtant toutes les caractéristiques: il comprend tout l'objet du vouloir moral, dont la condition *originaire* est la moralité et l'accomplissement *parfait* de la béatitude, ce qui le rapproche de l'idéal ontologique. Ce dernier avait ceci de particulier qu'il pouvait être entièrement déterminé, i.e. qu'un objet complet pouvait lui correspondre, mais en tant que produit de la pure raison. Or Kant se résigne mal à ce que le bien suprême, objet de la moralité, soit un idéal en ce sens, c'est-à-dire qu'il n'ait aucune réalité objective: 'Parce que la loi morale, comme un fait de la raison, commande de façon inconditionnelle... la réalité de la fin ultime de tout être moral ne doit être sujette à aucun doute... Dans le cas du bien suprême, la possibilité *réelle* dans le monde empirique d'une béatitude proportionnée au mérite... doit être hors de doute, à tout le moins d'un point de vue pratique' (126). Sans préjudice de ce qui vient d'être dit, l'auteur examine ensuite les passages où Kant parle pourtant du bien suprême comme d'un 'idéal de la pure raison.' Il s'agit dans tout ces cas de renforcer l'idéal de la raison pratique contre les accusations de rêverie ou d'anthropomorphisme, ce qui amène Kant à insister davantage sur les conditions de la moralité que sur l'idéal de la béatitude: 'Le concept théologique est proprement celui-là seulement qui est érigé en accord avec les exigences de la moralité. Pour être juste,le concept doit absolument provenir d'une raison éclairée' (128), celle qui s'est procuré elle-même ses propres critères. L'idéal reçoit alors un rôle positif comme schème infaillible approprié aux exigences d'une raison autonome.

Quant au concept de béatitude, il demeure une 'idée' transcendante du fait qu'il est axé sur une totalité, celle du maximum de bien-être, bien que sa réalisation dépende de conditions empiriques. En cela il se rapproche de l'idée cosmologique et se bute à la même impossibilité de son effectuation concrète. La béatitude n'est pas un concept déterminé qui puisse indiquer à priori chaque cas concret de son application, ni déterminer de façon univoque l'action à accomplir qui dépend plutôt de prescriptions empiriques non reliées à une idée générale, quand elles ne sont pas contradictoires entre elles. L'idée de la béatitude est inatteignable non en raison de la disparité entre la pureté de l'idée et le monde sensible, mais du fait que le but poursuivi dépend essentiellement de conditions empiriques et que son objet est indéfinissable en principe. Le monde sensible ne permet pas une représentation du maximum de bien-être.

Dans les deux sections suivantes (C et D), l'auteur examine les idéaux moraux de la sainteté, de la sagesse et de la vertu. Sauf pour le rapport particulièrement intéressant établi entre sainteté et vertu, ces discussions assurent davantage l'exhaustivité de l'étude plutôt qu'elles n'en modifient la thèse centrale. Nous les omettrons dans ce compte-rendu déjà trop long.

Ce que l'on peut retirer de l'ensemble de ce second chapitre sur l'idéal de la philosophie pratique, c'est la cohérence et la rigueur avec lesquelles Kant, à travers des usages variés, manie le concept d'idéal indispensable à l'exécu-

tion d'une idée dont il est le schème en tant qu'il représente son objet possible. Il s'avère, dès lors, si j'ai bien compris, que le concept d'idéal, grâce à l'usage que Kant en fait, pourrait servir de critère fondamental pour distinguer la *Critique de la raison pure* de la *Critique de la raison pratique* au sein même de leur continuité. C'est dans la même ligne de pensée que s'oriente le troisième et dernier chapitre sur l'idéal de la beauté.

Selon l'auteur, l'esthétique est le domaine où le thème de l'idéal a proprement son origine. Or, 'il n'y a pas de règle objective du bon goût. Le jugement esthétique ne repose pas sur un concept déterminé parce que le prédicat d'un tel jugement est un sentiment de plaisir ou de déplaisir qui, contrairement à un concept déterminé, ne peut livrer expressément la règle de son application' (162). La nécessité d'un tel jugement est, selon Kant 'exemplaire' et sa généralité ne peut s'illustrer autrement que par un exemple. Cet exemple le plus parfait fonctionnerait comme critère et l'*idéal* de la beauté ainsi conçu jouerait le rôle de norme suprême. Par ailleurs, on ne dispose d'aucun principe permettant de déterminer intégralement *a priori* les traits de ce modèle idéal, qui (1) doit être un modèle *sensible*, et (2) être l'objet d'une idée (163). Le problème se trouve ainsi posé: 'Comment Kant médiatise-t-il dans ce cas la sensibilité et l'idée intellectuelle?' Cette démonstration occupe les sections A et B du troisième chapitre.

L'idée esthétique (A) 'normale' est une représentation singulière de la puissance imaginaire empruntée à l'expérience (au monde sensible) et non donnée a priori. Elle ne peut donc produire un maximum. C'est la 'normalité' ou grandeur moyenne, dont on écarte tous les traits négatifs, qui remplace ici l'idée parfaite, mais qu'aucun individu de l'espèce ne peut atteindre totalement. Kant l'appelle un 'idéal' pour autant qu'elle peut servir de mesure, mais c'est pas un idéal véritable puisque celui-ci est conçu comme objet d'une idée de la raison. La 'moyenne' des perceptions empiriques prend la place du maximum et ne peut donc tenir lieu de règle. Aussi est-ce avec beaucoup de réserves que Kant parle ici d'idéal.

Pour accéder à l'idéal proprement dit, la beauté doit être reliée à une idée de la raison (B), celle des fins essentielles de l'être humain. Pour cela, il faut trouver un sol commun à l'idée normale et à l'idée de raison. Comment l'idée de raison peut-elle contribuer à la constitution de l'idéal sensible, c'est-à-dire opérer comme principe de jugement de la forme sensible? Les fins de l'humanité en tant qu'idées ne sont susceptibles d'aucune représentation sensible, mais elles peuvent avoir un effet dans l'ordre du phénomène. Sur la base de citations isolées où Kant parle de 'l'expression visible d'idées morales,' ou postule que 'la nature exprime à l'extérieur les proportions de l'intérieur,' l'auteur conclut qu''on peut difficilement interpréter l'idéal de la beauté autrement que comme une révélation directe de la perfection morale dans la forme extérieure de l'être humain' (169). 'L'idée normale de l'être humain ne représente pas plus que ce qu'on peut emprunter à l'expérience par comparaison de plusieurs exemplaires de l'espèce... tandis que le maximum requis par l'idéal est donné exclusivement par les idées de la raison pratique' (169).

En conclusion, nous pouvons dire que Claude Piché a fait un effort d'en-

vergure pour introduire de l'ordre et de la clarté dans la problématique kantienne de l'idéal, qu'il y a réussi admirablement et que ce livre peut rendre un grand service aussi bien au chercheur qu'au professeur de philosophie à qui la pensée de Kant pose encore des problèmes. Bien que j'aie dû souvent tourner les coins un peu rondement, ce qui m'est apparu avec évidence, c'est que le thème idéal, combiné avec celui de la finitude humaine, représente un thème privilégié pour une saisie nouvelle de l'unité de l'œuvre de Kant dans son ensemble.

<div align="right">
LAURENT GIROUX
Université de Sherbrooke
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NICHOLAS RESCHER. *The Riddle of Existence: An Essay in Idealistic Metaphysics.* Landam, MD: University of America Press 1985. Pp. 112. US$19.50 (cloth: ISBN: 0-8191-4127-5); US$8.75 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-4128-3).

The title of this book suggests its task: to answer the question, 'Why does a world exist?' The subtitle somewhat misleadingly suggests the type of answer given, since the book contains an 'idealistic metaphysics' in only a very limited sense. Rescher defends a *conceptual* idealism, in which mind-invoking categories are used to explain nature, while rejecting every form of *ontological* idealism, according to which mind would really be somehow prior to matter.

Rescher approaches the riddle of why the world exists by surveying the various possible answers and choosing the least problematic one. He rejects rejectionism (the question is improper), mystification (the question is unanswerable), necessitarianism (the world's existence is logically necessary), and especially the theological answer (the world exists because God created it). Less problematic is said to be the nomological approach: something exists because there are protolaws that rule out a totally empty world. These protolaws constitute a 'nomic field' which is independent of and prior to any and all actual things and brings about the emergence of an actual world out of a merely possible one.

This notion of 'nomological causation' requires us to abandon the 'deeply rooted prejudice' that all causation is rooted in existing things, that agency requires an agent, and hence the 'hoary dogma' that *ex nihilo nihil fit* (22, 27, 29). Indeed, that prejudice precludes a global explanation of all existing things. A central defect of the theological answer is that it explains the exis-

tence of the world in terms of another actual thing, God, thus leaving the existence of actuality as such unexplained (6, 67-8).

Of course, explaining existence in terms of laws raises another question: why do just these protolaws obtain, instead of other logically possible ones? Rescher proposes an axiological answer: these laws obtain because they allow for the greatest possible realization of value. Rescher strongly distinguishes his 'teleology of value' from a 'teleology of purpose,' since a purpose must be some agent's purpose, and that would lead us back to an external creator or at least a world soul (49, 57, 62). Hence, while endorsing the idealistic conviction that existence depends on value, he rejects the usual idealistic conviction that a purposive agent is needed to mediate between the two.

But if there be no cosmic mind that creates or informs matter on the basis of a desire to realize values, why should those protolaws that allow for the best possible world obtain? Rescher responds: 'because that itself is for the best' (69). In other words, an explanation based on value can be ultimate and hence avoid an infinite regress (54, 62). This position is said to be superior to purposive teleology because value is self-explanatory, whereas purpose, most idealist opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, is not (58, 59, 61, 67, 69).

But *how* can values be effective, if there be no valuing, purposive mind to render them so? This objection is first said to be based on the untenable assumption that all reasons must be grounded in actual things (65-7). But an answer is then given — the same finalistic answer: 'Values have the explanatory role they have because that is for the best' (68).

Rescher's position seems to be based on the dual conviction that mind is not fundamental in the nature of things, but that we can only give an intelligible explanation of the world in terms of categories, such as possibilities and values, that cannot be understood apart from mind (73-7). Hence he defends a conceptual or explanatory idealism while rejecting every form of ontological idealism (76). Although his main target is theological or causal idealism (God created the world), he also rejects constitutive (the world is a mind) and compositional (panpsychistic) idealism. My main question about this limited idealism is: how can an explanation based on mind-invoking categories be thought to be a *genuine* explanation if reality is so understood that these *mind-invoking categories could not conceivably have played a causal role?*

In fact, there is some ambiguity as to exactly what Rescher is advocating. Sometimes he seems to be saying that laws and values really exert causal force of a teleological sort (44, 62, 63). At other times he seems to be making a strong distinction between the *explanatory order*, in which values play a role, and the *order of generative causality*, where the efficient causality of matter alone rules: values in reality play no teleological causal role, although the world's character is 'as if' they did (44, 59, 66, 71, 79-80).

I share Rescher's formal commitments: to push our desire for explanations as far as possible (19, 38), to see science and metaphysics as parts of a seamless unity of inquiry (99), to choose the least problematic of available options (although I do not see evidence in this book that he has really considered 'all available alternatives' [24], e.g., the one I prefer), and to develop a fully

naturalistic position, in which all supernaturalism is rejected (although I see no reason why a world soul, as distinct from an external creator, need be called 'supernatural' [57]). However, his attack on the notion that all reasons must be grounded in actual things has done nothing to loosen its grip on me. Accordingly, I cannot understand how disembodied laws and disembodied values can exert any kind of influence apart from evaluating, purposive actualities capable of incorporating them and influencing others on the basis of this incorporation. Hence I cannot agree that Rescher's substantive proposal is less problematic than all other available options. In fact, since he does not even attempt to explain how values can be effective on non-valuing things, his teleological assertions seem to be examples of the mystification he means to reject. Or, if he is saying that values really play no role but that we must explain things as if they do, he is offering a dualism of explanation and ontology which seems to violate the unified account he desires.

Rescher's dualism between causal and explantory categories seems closely related to a belief that a scientific approach counts against any form of ontological idealism (14-15, 22, 44, 60, 64, 81). I believe a way out of this unsatisfactory dualism could be found if Rescher would extend further his astute observations on the distinction between science as such and currently unfashionable ideas in scientific circles (50-2). There is nothing in science as such that rules out the idea that experience is fundamental in the nature of things. In fact there is some evidence in recent science, especially when taken in conjunction with philosophical considerations, that counts in favor of this idea.

<div align="right">
DAVID RAY GRIFFIN
Center for Process Studies
School of Theology at Claremont
</div>

JEAN-JACQUES WUNENBURGER. *Sigmund Freud.* Editions Balland 1985. 248 p. ISBN 2-7158-0543-8.

Cette étude présente un aperçu général de l'œuvre de Freud. L'aperçu est précédé d'une courte biographie de Freud et d'un tableau de l'époque qui a préparé son œuvre' il est suivi d'une histoire de la pensée freudienne jusqu'à nos jours.

La présentation est celle d'une introduction au freudisme: les chapitres sont divisés en courtes sections qui en facilitent la lecture et, à la fin de chacun,

un choix de textes tirés du corpus freudien permet au lecteur un contact plus immédiat avec la pensée de Freud. L'auteur a choisi d'exposer la pensée freudienne en citant abondamment les œuvres du Maître, mais en évitant systématiquement toute référence à ses commentateurs et en se mettant à l'écart 'des modes et des écoles.' L'intention est excellente de vouloir mettre en valeur la pensée de Freud sans l'alourdir de discussions d'écoles; mais, peut-être par souci de simplification, l'auteur nous a paru céder à la facilité d'un commentaire qui, apparemment proche du texte, en bloque parfois la compréhension au lieu de l'aider.

L'auteur, dès le début, situe l'œuvre de Freud au sein des grands courants du XIXe siècle: 'La pensée et l'œuvre de Sigmund Freud se situent en fait à la croisée de deux convictions maîtresses de la modernité, qui ont mûri tout au long du XIXe siècle: l'une optimiste, selon laquelle la raison scientifique et la volonté de puissance technique vont permettre l'avènement d'une ère de bonheur et de justice pour l'humanité; l'autre, pessimiste et romantique, selon laquelle l'enfantement d'un monde nouveau doit se payer de pénibles souffrances' (13). Il nous présente, en rapport avec l'œuvre, les principaux événements significatifs de la vie du fondateur de la psychanalyse. Par mégarde, l'auteur signale (26) que les conférences données au Massachusetts en 1909 ont été publiées en 1916, sous le titre d'*Introduction à la psychanalyse*.

De façon succincte et intéressante, l'auteur fait un rappel historique des auteurs et des moments qui ont marqué Freud, des différentes écoles cliniques antérieures à la psychanalyse, ainsi que des orientations dominantes des idées contemporaines. Il conclut ainsi: 'L'œuvre de Freud trouve donc son élan dans une décantation et un dépassement de quatre traditions préalables: l'épistémologie scientiste, les philosophies de l'inconscient, la sexologie et la psychiatrie dérivée des phénomènes de la suggestion' (83).

La partie principale est constituée par la présentation même de l'œuvre de Freud. En six chapitres, l'auteur aborde une série de thèmes fondamentaux de la psychanalyse. Il nous a paru, cependant, difficile de saisir le fil qui oriente, dans son ensemble, la compréhension qu'a l'auteur de l'œuvre freudienne.

Le chapitre I expose la situation épistémologique particulière du freudisme, suspendue à une équivoque 'suscitée par la double affiliation au modèle des sciences naturelles — modèle fondateur — et au modèle herméneutique — l'interprétation servant de modèle opératoire, expérimental et clinique comme dans les sciences historiques' (92). Le principe général de la coordination des deux modèles est énoncé: 'la situation clinique qui permet de pénétrer dans l'intimité de ces cas personnels constitue le point de départ d'hypothèses théoriques explicatives, de même que les spéculations hypothétiques sur la logique du psychisme doivent être sans cesse corroborées par les observations des malades' (96). Cette situation épistémologique n'est cependant pas approfondie, et l'auteur passe à d'autres sujets plus ou moins reliés au problème qui paraissait d'abord central. Mentionnons que le texte des *Etudes sur l'hystérie*, cité à la page 107 et attribué à Freud, appartient en réalité à Breuer. Il nous semble également que certaines affirmations catégoriques ne correspondent pas à des situation que Freud considéreraient comme typiques. Ainsi, 'le

transfert débouche généralement sur un dénouement brutal de la cure, après lequel le patient est renvoyé au vertige de sa liberté, plus ou moins endossable' (117).

Suit un chapitre sur l'art d'interpréter les rêves. On chercherait en vain, dans ce chapitre, un essai sur l'art d'interpréter; l'auteur est plutôt intéressé à situer globalement le type d'interprétation analytique par rapport à d'autres types et à présenter rapidement une théorie du travail du rêve. Dans le traitement du désir du rêve, on ne sait pas bien le sens de ce terme, puisque le désir n'est pas présenté comme sexuel, et cela d'autant plus que les rêves d'enfants sont présentés comme ce qui confirme la théorie du désir. Or, il s'agit de rêver de faim ou de soif, mais non de rêves à contenu sexuel. Et pourtant, l'auteur conclut que 'le psychisme se trouve profondément coupé en un ensemble inconscient constitué de désirs refoulés, et différentes strates psychiques occupées par leurs substituts' (156). Pour Freud, y a-t-il refoulement d'autres désirs que sexuels?

Or, le chapitre III porte précisément sur la sexualité. Tout d'abord, l'auteur semble lier la conception que Freud se fait de la sexualité à des préjugés inhérents à sa personnalité. Il y revient à plusieurs reprises dans ce chapitre. 'Aucune autre partie de la psychanalyse n'est à ce point conditionnée par des facteurs autobiographiques et même sociologiques, et la théorie sexuelle porte toujours en creux les inévitables préjugés — ou refoulements — de son auteur' (178). Quelques pages plus loin: 'La psychanalyse n'est peut-être pas sans rapport avec l'angoisse éprouvée par Freud lui-même devant la sexualité' (180). Ou encore: 'La contribution de Freud à l'intelligibilité d'une logique sexuelle n'est-elle pas minée par l'adoption d'une idéologie phallocratique ...?' (211). Enfin, lorsqu'il parle du lien entre la sexualité et la violence, par lequel il commence son exposé, il se réfère encore aux préjugés: 'L'hypothèse des violences sexuelles contre les enfants a au moins le mérite d'éclaircir l'environnement dans lequel Freud place la sexualité' (182). L'auteur expose les principaux points de la théorie sexuelle et suit le développement de la sexualité à travers les différents stades. Sur la genèse de la sexualité, l'auteur explore très peu la notion importante de l'étayage, et il identifie, rapidement et sans examen, l'auto-érotisme et le narcissime. Il avance également la thèse, à première vue surprenante, selon laquelle 'la plasticité du désir provient en fait moins du seul inachèvement nerveux de l'enfant que de sa nature bisexuelle' (194).

Le chapitre IV porte sur la métapsychologie. Une certaine confusion émerge du fait que l'auteur ne distingue pas suffisamment les différents moments de la topique ou de la théorie des pulsions. Le principe fondamental de la psychanalyse est le principe de constance; il est identifié au principe de plaisir, puis au principe de Nirvâna, sans que l'on sache comment la recherche de la constance peut en même temps être la recherche de la suppression de toute excitation (236-8). Lorsque l'auteur nous dit que '*dès* les *Trois Essais sur la théorie de la sexualité*, il (Freud) distingue de la *libido* objectale une *libido* du moi' (242), il faudrait savoir que ce passage constitue une addition tardive au texte original. L'auteur semble soutenir que Freud a longtemps confondu le moi avec la conscience (255). Pourtant, dès le temps du *Projet*, il est clair

que le moi est distingué explicitement de la conscience. Nous rencontrons, ici encore, la tendance à rendre compte des théories en se référant à des éléments biographiques. Par exemple, tout le développement de Freud sur le point de vue économique 'atteste combien il s'est rapproché de la pensée libérale, et demeure en fin de compte méfiant à l'égard des conceptions socialistes et surtout marxistes' (234). Ou encore, parlant de la dernière métapsychologie, 'd'essence conservatrice,' l'auteur conclut: 'L'incessant contact avec les souffrances des névrosés a donc amené Freud, au soir de sa vie, à jeter un ultime regard désabusé sur la condition humaine' (261).

Le chapitre V porte sur l'intéressant problème du langage. L'auteur met l'accent sur l'importance du langage dans la rencontre analytique, sur la mise en récit du matériel analytique, tant de la part du patient que de celle du thérapeute. Mais il y a plus. Le langage lui-même est investi de libido: 'Des récits du rêve aux discours de l'analyste pendant le transfert, tout n'est que parole possédée et rituel d'exorcisme' (280). La passion narratrice s'imposerait même aux exposés métapsychologiques, si bien que 'le freudisme absorbe la strate d'investigation scientifique dans une sorte de fonction fabulatrice, de création mytho-poétique qui deviennent autant d'atouts pour asseoir le prestige de la psychanalyse' (ibid.). La parole analytique évoluerait donc dans une sphère magique. Aussi aurait-il une parenté très grande entre la sphère du discours analytique et celle du discours poétique. Le langage devient si omniprésent en psychanalyse que, pour l'auteur, 'il semble bien que celui-ci (le langage) constitue le véritable objet et instrument de sa psychologie des profondeurs' (273). Selon lui, 'l'orientation spécifique de la psychanalyse par rapport aux procédures voisines de la psychologie scientifique ou de la clinique psychiatrique est souvent trop exclusivement rapportée à ses hypothèses sur la sexualité refoulée, sur le conflit intra-psychique; ne résiderait-il pas plutôt dans le choix du langage comme révélation de l'inconscient et comme mode d'action sur le psychisme?' (274). N'y a-t-il pas ici un croisement de deux statuts du langage? Selon le premier, le langage serait l'objet même de la psychanalyse et, dans cette mesure, il délogerait la pulsion sexuelle comme objet privilégié. Selon le second, le langage serait un instrument privilégié d'analyse. Cependant, dans cette direction, le langage qui s'impose serait celui de l'art, si bien que 'Freud ne peut, au fond de lui, s'empêcher de penser que seul l'art est à même de dépasser les tourments de l'imaginaire névrotique' (305). Pourtant, après avoir affirmé que l'imagination 'se découvre, à travers son action créatrice, comme l'instrument suprême de la connaissance de soi' (305), l'auteur rappelle que, pour Freud, l'imagination n'est pas créatrice, qu'elle demeure rivée au passé, et qu'elle 'laisse chacun, névrosé, homme normal ou artiste, seul avec lui-même, condamné une fois pour toutes au miroir brisé de Narcisse' (306).

Dans le chapitre VI, l'auteur montre comment le modèle individuel de la psychanalyse s'élargit en une discipline qui englobe la morale, la religion et l'ensemble de la culture.

Enfin, dans un dernier temps, se déroule l'histoire complexe de la psychanalyse jusqu'à nos jours, avec ses chefs de file, ses écoles, ses conflits et ses schismes, et aussi l'étrange pouvoir qu'elle a acquise sur les hommes d'aujourd'hui.

JULIEN NAUD
Université du Québec
à Trois-Rivières.

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