

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editor/Directeurs:

Robert Burch

Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

Roger A. Shiner

Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

J. N. Kaufmann

Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec
à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec
Canada G9A 5H7

Managing Editor:

Steven Scott

Academic Printing and Publishing

The editors will consider for publication submitted reviews of publications that are strictly educational textbooks. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words in length, and should be sent to the appropriate editor.

Les éditeurs considéreront pour fin de publication des recensions d'ouvrages qui se présentent comme des manuels destinés à l'enseignement. Ces recensions ne doivent pas dépasser 1000 mots; elles devront être envoyées à l'éditeur respectif.

Subscription prices for a volume of ten issues:

Institutions: \$68.00 (Canada)

US\$64.00 or CDN\$78.00 (Non-Canadian)

Individuals: \$34.00 (Canada)

US\$32.00 or CDN\$44.00 (Non-Canadian)

Students: \$16.00 (Canada)

US\$18.00 or CDN\$22.00 (Non-Canadian)

Prix de l'abonnement à un volume de dix numéros:

Institutions: \$68.00 (Canada)

US\$64.00 or CDN\$78.00 (Hors-Canada)

Individus: \$34.00 (Canada)

US\$32.00 or CDN\$44.00 (Hors-Canada)

Etudiants: \$16.00 (Canada)

US\$18.00 or CDN\$22.00 (Hors-Canada)

Published ten issues yearly / dix par an numéros

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:

Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:



academic printing & publishing

P.O. Box 4834, South Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

©1986 Academic Printing and Publishing

TABLE OF CONTENTS / TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Vol. VI no. 8 October / octobre 1986

Lynne Belaief, <i>Toward a Whitebeadian Ethics</i> (George R. Lucas)	367
Dennis E. Bradford, <i>The Fundamental Ideas</i> (Yuen-Ting Lai)	369
Jonathan Dancy, <i>Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology</i> (Bruce Aune)	371
Ilham Dilman, <i>Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience</i> (A. J. Dale)	373
John Dunn, <i>Rethinking Modern Political Theory: Essays 1979-83</i> (Gregory Pycz)	375
Michael A. Fox and Leo Groarke, eds., <i>Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives</i> (Charles W. Kegley)	378
A. J. Holland, ed., <i>Philosophy and Its Historiography</i> (Carol Nicholson)	379
Don Ihde and Hugh J. Silverman, eds., <i>Descriptions</i> (Peter Smale)	381
Roman Ingarden, <i>Selected Papers in Aesthetics</i> (Stefan Morawski)	383
Allan Janik, <i>Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger</i> (Jan Zwicky)	386
Steven Lukes, <i>Marxism and Morality</i> (Derek Allen)	388
Alex C. Michalos, <i>Improving Your Reasoning</i> (D. J. Crossley)	390
C. A. Missimer, <i>Good Arguments: An Introduction to Critical Thinking</i> (D. J. Crossley)	390
Anthony O'Hear, <i>What Philosophy Is</i> (Elisabeth Boetzkes)	394
P. T. Raju, <i>Structural Depths of Indian Thought</i> (Richard Ph. Hayes)	396
Paul Ramsey, <i>The Truth of Value: A Defense of Moral and Literary Judgment</i> (F. F. Centore)	398
Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed., <i>Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology</i> (Richard Bronaugh)	400
K. H. Seubert, <i>Bare Bones Logic</i> (D. J. Crossley)	390
Tzvetan Todorov, <i>Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle</i> (Mary Bittner Wiseman)	404
Douglas N. Walton, <i>Physician-Patient Decision Making: A Study in Medical Ethics</i> (Barry Hoffmaster)	407
Jerry Weinberger, <i>Science, Faith, and Politics: Francis Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age</i> (Robert G. Colodny)	409
Willard A. Young, <i>Fallacies of Creationism</i> (William A. Rottschaefer)	411

LYNNE BELAIEF. *Toward a Whiteheadian Ethics*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1984. Pp. 208. US\$23.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-4229-8); US\$12.50 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-4230-1).

This book is a much delayed re-publication of the author's 1963 doctoral dissertation, with no apparent revisions. The dissertation, written at Columbia University under the direction of Justus Buchler and John Hermann Randall, was an historic first attempt to develop a moral philosophy based on the metaphysical system of A.N. Whitehead. Prior to Belaief's work, the absence of a systematic ethics had constituted a serious and frequently-decried lacuna in the Whiteheadian edifice, and Paul A. Schilpp's own contribution to his edited volume on Whitehead's philosophy had gone so far as to suggest that no such attempt would be meaningful.

Belaief's book must be judged against this historical background. Not only was hers the first, but in many respects it is still the best such effort to date. Nonetheless, the present volume would have been improved considerably by taking account of subsequent efforts, and specifically subsequent criticisms, such as those of the late Richard Davis. Belaief had been concerned to defend Whitehead against Schilpp's charge that the Whiteheadian subordination of ethics to aesthetics results in a purely private interest theory of no real significance for moral discourse. Belaief's exegetical response (against which Davis's complaints are primarily directed) is to attempt to exonerate Whitehead by *denying* the subordination, which requires at times some ingenious hermeneutical gymnastics.

For example, Belaief quotes one of Whitehead's few specific comments on ethics in Part IV of *Process and Reality*, where he remarks that 'the principles of morality are allied to the canons of art.' She proceeds, rather implausibly, to suggest that the context of this passage *really* shows that Whitehead did *not* regard morality as similar to art (49-53; esp. 52).

This tactic is doomed to fail. Whitehead shared with many of his contemporaries between the two World Wars the view, later championed by Wittgenstein, Ayer and Stevenson, that moral judgments are merely a sub-species of aesthetic judgments. A more profitable rejoinder to Schilpp's simplistic

charge is that Whitehead, like Dewey (and quite *unlike* either Wittgenstein or Ayer) had developed a general axiology which was normative, rather than purely a matter of private interest. Thus, while the whole issue is largely undeveloped in Whitehead's own cosmology, there is ample room to develop his axiology in conjunction with Dewey's (as Robert C. Neville later would do) into a full-blown normative moral and political theory.

Accordingly, Belaief is at her best when she abandons the sort of polemical and exegetical exercises characteristic of doctoral dissertations, and turns to the systematic and constructive development of her own moral theory grounded in a broadly-construed Whiteheadian cosmological perspective. The result is a theory of agency grounded in a broad philosophical anthropology in the style of contemporary continental philosophy, in contrast to the more tightly-reasoned, rationalistic and acultural approach characteristic of Anglo-American moral theory. The discussion centers on themes such as interconnectedness, interdependence, solidarity, and the role of decisions and actions in social settings as constituting the temporal identity of individual moral agents. There are few discussions of cases, thought experiments, or specific issues like animal rights, ecology, or abortion. There is a conspicuous absence of those two otherwise-indomitable heroes of moral discourse, Smith and Jones, alternatively devouring or enslaving one another on desert islands, surreptitiously plugging into one another's kidneys, purloining one another's organs, or hurtling at one another in defective BMTA trolley cars.

All this will doubtless seem a considerable defect to contemporary teachers and scholars in ethics, for whom such issues and cases are the principal grist for the moral mill. What Belaief offers, however, is an attempt at a theory of agency in a cultural and historical setting that at very least provides a more cogent and coherent background for more conventional approaches to moral reasoning. Belaief sees an intimate connection between the Whiteheadian notions of solidarity of events in the extensive continuum and the kind of organic inter-relatedness which constitutes the foundation of Hegelian moral and political theory. As with Sartre (and more recently, Derek Parfit), personal identity is a fragile thread, an achievement consequent upon an agent's temporal decisions and actions, which are never merely a consequence of past behavior, social conditioning, 'pure reason,' or any other biological or social determinants. Moreover, via the Whiteheadian notions of 'objectification' of events, and the Principle of Process whereby the past forever conditions the ensemble of future possibilities, an agent's actions come to exert a determinative power in the future transcending that agent's own intentions and deliberate influence. The unanticipated consequences of novelty, creativity and agent freedom are the source of tragedy in the moral vocation, of which existentialist writers (again, like Sartre) have served as profound interpreters.

Perhaps the troubling implications of the latter observation encourage Belaief toward the final sublation of the moral vocation in religious hope. Hegel saw this connection as intimate and integral; Kant finally was driven to it through what he saw as the rational but otherwise unrealizable demands of the *summum bonum*. Whitehead held that complete cosmologies must be able

to unify in a coherent way the multiple insights of aesthetic, moral and religious experience, consistent with the understanding of nature developed in the natural sciences. While there is thus ample warrant for Belaief's concluding caveat, nonetheless, in the present, wholly pluralistic and thoroughgoing naturalistic climate of opinion, the subordination of ethics to *religion* (rather than aesthetics) may prove the most difficult of her formulations to accept.

GEORGE R. LUCAS
University of Santa Clara

DENNIS E. BRADFORD. *The Fundamental Ideas*. St. Louis, MO: Warren H. Green, Inc. 1986. Pp. xi + 183. US\$17.50. ISBN 0-87527-364-5.

Two stated aims of this book are: (1) to serve as an introductory text for the undergraduate as well as the general reader with similar ability, and (2) to provide 'a conceptual framework for understanding all fundamental ideas by concentrating on those that are most fundamental' (viii). Both aims are to be fulfilled by discussing what Bradford regards as fundamental ideas.

The list of such ideas featured in the table of contents are: valuing, understanding, identity, nonexistence, existence, evidence, perceiving, imagining, conceiving, remembering, causation, change, mind and wisdom. With the exception of identity, existence and nonexistence, no philosophical rationale is given as to why these ideas are chosen rather than others. Although there is an account of fundamentality which explains why identity, existence and nonexistence should be on the list, it does not cover the other ideas. Generally speaking, the book lacks a systematic and comprehensive argument to explain in what ways some ideas are more fundamental than others. This is its chief defect, and is reflected by the absence of an introductory and a concluding section to give coherence to his list.

Regarding fundamentality, Bradford states that 'belief A is more fundamental than belief B if and only if B presupposes A' (7). He takes this to be 'a logical point' broadly conceived, to connote the nature of the human understanding, especially concerning the possibility or impossibility of one concept being understood without another. Concept P is more fundamental than concept Q if, first, in order to illuminate P, there is no need to refer to Q, and second, in order to illuminate Q, it is necessary to refer to P. One cannot understand the belief that a certain human being is wise without understanding the notion of a human being. So the notion of a human being is more fundamental than the belief that a certain human being is wise (7).

Understanding is restricted to conceiving objects correctly, which is the same as 'making correct judgments about an object' (14). Correct judgments consist in applying concepts correctly to objects (79). A concept is a principle of classification. I can understand this object I am writing on because I can classify it as a desk. To understand it is 'to conceive it as a desk, to judge that it is a desk' (14).

It is this conception of understanding that explains why according to Bradford identity is more fundamental than all the other concepts. 'All understanding depends upon an innate ability to make identity judgments.' The main reason is that the world is intelligible because in it qualities recur and individuals persist. A world lacking these features would not be understandable otherwise. Since it is indeed understandable, it means that understanding depends on the ability to pick out identicals. 'One's identical judgments are constitutive of the world' (22).

I find this account of understanding too simplistic. It is disputable whether the world is understandable for the reasons given, or that classification is the most important mental activity. Some other activities which may throw light on the understanding include formulation of theoretical problems and their solutions as well as explanation of remarkable events. Bradford's account ignores the impetus of the development of human thought in the modern period, in which different, and arguably richer and more sophisticated conceptions of the understanding have been proposed. Bradford himself mentions, but rejects without adequate consideration, the possibility of causal explanation as a means to gain insight into the working of the human understanding (152).

And herein lies a serious flaw in his approach. The flaw does not consist in his not trying to resolve the problem that there is more than one system of concepts whereby the human intellect seeks to understand the world. By his own admission, it is impossible to evaluate them from a 'supra-conceptual vantage point' (16). Rather the flaw consists in his not considering how this admission affects his thesis.

One other stated aim of the book is that of conveying 'knowledge of major aspects of the history of philosophy' (viii). Bradford is more successful here. By discoursing on each chosen idea in turn, important philosophical issues are reviewed, often with clarity and dexterity. For example, the problems of knowledge, of rational belief, and of induction are discussed during the analysis of the concept of evidence; the problem of the external world is treated in the discussion of perception; the ontological status of imaginary objects is considered during a discussion of imagining; and the transcendental ego is looked at in the chapter on mind.

The weaving together of the issues is skilfully done in spite of the apparently loose and haphazard format. Bradford does not lose sight of his account of comparative fundamentality, and does try, whenever it is feasible, to connect his discussion with it. There does exist some sort of unity to the whole enterprise even though not as much of it as one would like.

All in all, the book is worth reading. Bradford is to a certain extent successful in his presentation of a conceptual, albeit embryonic, programme of

dealing with substantial issues. In some cases his discussion of basic philosophical problems is full of insights. It is possible that some very intelligent general reader may find this a good first book on philosophy.

YUEN-TING LAI

JONATHAN DANCY. *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*. Oxford: Blackwell 1985. Pp. x + 259. US\$18.75 (paper: ISBN 0-631-13622-3).

This is an excellent critical introduction to contemporary epistemology. It is informed, well-written, and very well thought out; the author, Jonathan Dancy, is clearly a very capable philosopher with a real gift for exposition and analysis. I think it is the best available text for epistemology courses attended by advanced undergraduate philosophy majors and beginning graduate students. Dancy presents his material in a clear, orderly manner and offers in passing a helpful guide to important sources in both philosophical classics and in recent literature. His critical observations are acute, and the epistemological views that he defends are very reasonable. In addition to providing a very useful text, Dancy makes a worthwhile contribution to the subject of epistemology.

Dancy begins by posing three skeptical arguments that hover in the background of his subsequent discussion: the first involves Putnam's example of brains in vats, the second is an argument from error, and the third concerns certain limitations of our experience. If there are errors in the reasoning supporting these arguments, they can be exposed, possibly, by an adequate account of what knowledge is — something that Dancy undertakes in his second and third chapters, where he discusses Gettier problems and some proposed solutions to them, including the one implicit in the 'conditional theory of knowledge' recently developed by Robert Nozick. Dancy argues that this work on the concept of knowledge does not, unfortunately, refute all three of the skeptical arguments; Nozick's work does not, in particular, refute the skeptical argument from error.

Allowing that different conceptions of knowledge are possible and that rival conceptions typically involve different conceptions of epistemic justification, Dancy moves on to a thorough discussion of this latter concept. He begins with a careful examination of classical foundationalism, weighing numerous considerations bearing upon it pro and con, and considering issues connected with it such as our knowledge of other minds, Wittgenstein's

private-language argument, and the rival accounts (Kripke's and others) that Wittgenstein's argument has recently received. Although Dancy eventually rejects foundationalism in favor of a version of coherentism, he takes up this favored view of justification only after two interesting sections on historically influential conceptions of meaning, the first including a critical account of atomistic, verificationist theories, and the second covering Quine's holism and his views on translational indeterminacy.

Dancy comes to terms with coherence dialectically, by considering what coherence theorists, past and present, have said about it. The definition he favors attributes coherence to sets of beliefs, the idea being that a set is coherent 'to the extent that [its] members are mutually explanatory and consistent' (112). Though he is not fully explicit about his own conception of explanation, he seems to approve of Brand Blanshard's conception, according to which 'To explain q by appeal to p is to show why q should be true, given p. The explanation works to the extent that it shows that, given p, q must be true' (112). After a generally sympathetic exposition of the coherence theory of truth, Dancy attacks the notion of justification, saying that according to the coherence conception, 'a belief is justified to the extent to which the belief-set of which it is a member is justified' (116). But surely every belief is a member of more than one set. Dancy evidently recognizes this, for he quickly modifies his description, saying that the notion of justification is relative to individual believers and that the 'full account should be: if a's belief-set is more coherent with the belief that p as a member than without it or with any alternative, a is (or would be) justified in believing that p' (116). Dancy then concludes the central part of his exposition by observing that 'coherentists stress as a virtue of their theory that truth and justification are according to them all of a piece. The coherence of a belief-set goes to make its members justified; the coherence of a set of propositions, believed or not, goes to make its members true' (116).

Although this sort of connection ought to exist between epistemic justification and truth, Dancy's account of the coherence theory of justification and truth is excessively abstract and, to me, unconvincing. Not only does the exposition rarely descend to cases here, but little consideration is given to the question of how the totality of a person's beliefs could possibly be mutually explanatory, least of all in the Blandshardian sense in which explanation reduces to entailment. This question seems pressing because an explanation seems to have a direction, one fact explaining another, but always, for every person at every time, certain brute facts, which are unexplained explainers. (One such fact might be that males but not females have both an x and a y chromosome.) It is true that some brute facts — relatively highlevel ones — are corroborated by facts they explain, but this corroboration is at best probabilistic, something far short of entailment. And even if, as Dancy believes, there is no evidential 'given,' no observation statements whose acceptability is independent of all background theory, there is still little plausibility to the idea that such statements are, except in very special cases, *entailed* by other beliefs that one has.

The third and final part of Dancy's book is devoted to forms of knowledge — specifically, to perception, memory, induction, and a priori knowledge. These sections are all interesting and informative even when the views Dancy defends are not (as, for me, his views on perception are not) entirely convincing. My only complaints with these sections are that Dancy's discussion of induction is silent about the vitally important topic of scientific inference, or the confirmation of theories about unobservables, and that he devotes no more than thirteen pages to the epistemically fundamental topic of a priori knowledge. In spite of these complaints and the reservations I noted earlier, I still believe that Dancy's book is an excellent text and a welcome contribution to epistemology.

BRUCE AUNE

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

ILHAM DILMAN. *Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1984. Pp. 138. US\$34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-761-X); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-760-1).

I found my reading of this book to be most instructive. For the past year I had become accustomed to many of my students ascribing in their essays views to Quine contradictory to those that he had expressed in the papers which I have asked them to read and discuss. Although not unused to the misrepresentation of philosophers' views by students, I was nevertheless surprised and puzzled by the persistent repetition of several mistakes by different students. Could this book be the source of their errors? Prospective readers should not be encouraged by its title to expect a careful and illuminating discussion of Quine's views on ontology, necessity and experience. Indeed, what we get is a version of the later Wittgenstein's approach to related subjects together with insults hurled against Quine for not taking Wittgenstein's views of the matter.

If this review appears ill-tempered and ill-mannered it is because the book reviewed itself possesses these characteristics. Two quotes from the book should give the reader of this review the flavour of the book which applies 'crude,' 'barbaric,' 'philistine,' and 'grotesque,' among other epithets to either Quine or his writings. From the Preface: 'What amazes me first is that he should be able to say what he says when his references seem to suggest that he is acquainted with recent philosophical discussions in these matters, and second-

ly that he should be able to get away with it.' From the last chapter of the book — from a section labelled 'A Personal Verdict' — 'For all his rejection of "dogmas," he is tied to the apron-strings of Logical Positivism. The logical positivists, with all their crudity, were at least innovators. Quine, on the other hand, for all his innovations, is a backwoodsman. For all his appeal to our age, I do not think he has emerged from the woods. He does not represent a new dawn in philosophy, but a temporary eclipse.' Such intemperate language could be invigorating if the arguments presented in the book did indeed demolish Quine's philosophy. But there is little of sustained argument within it and such as there is is woefully misdirected.

I have indicated above that there are simple errors of misrepresentation of Quine's views in this book. Here is a selection: 'He (Quine) believes that the task of philosophy is to construct abstract theories and he, himself, proceeds accordingly' (ix); 'Quine thinks that "Tom is just" entails "Justice exists"' (67); "'There is an attribute.'" He (Quine) says that this ontological statement follows from "There are red houses, red roses, red sunsets"' (7); 'he, unlike Quine, did not embrace a nominalist view' (100). From these sentences we would learn (as my students did) that Quine is a nominalist who builds abstract theories and believes that the existence of attributes is implied by the existence of general terms in our language.

The discussion of Quine's ontological worries will illustrate Dilman's misunderstanding of Quine. According to Dilman some universals — attributes — have been thought necessary to explain how we can correctly apply the same general term to different particulars. They have been thought of as things 'over and above' the particulars which exemplify them. They have been thought of as ingredients of particulars. Now Dilman may be correct in seeing this as the traditional view of universals. Unfortunately it is not the view which Quine holds. Indeed Quine makes it very clear that *general* terms do not need any such thing as an attribute to support their use. It is the *abstract singular* term and the corresponding quantification which bring ontological problems. For we seem to have an explicit existential statement when we say that *there is something* in common to red houses and red sunsets. Whatever the thing is that we assert to exist by using such a statement is *not* asserted to exist in the explicit existential statement 'there are red houses.' Dilman pays no attention to this difference to which Quine has paid so much attention in his writings. Nor does he mention Quine's principal reason for not wanting attributes in his ontology — their lack of adequate identity conditions. From a reading of Dilman it would appear that Quine's distaste for attributes is based solely on objections to the notion of an attribute as an ingredient of a particular, which in fact plays no part in his argument against their existence whatsoever.

Dilman's views of Quine's position on ontological matters seem to bear little resemblance to Quine's actual position as stated in the relevant works. This should be compared with Dilman's apparently accurate account of Wittgenstein's view of universals which occupies 15 of the 30 pages on universals. It would have been a much better book if Dilman had paid as much attention to Quine's writings as he has done to Wittgenstein's. Unfortunately,

however, even when expounding Wittgenstein there are problems of clarity. The reader is presented with such notions as 'concept-formation,' 'grammar' and 'the weave of life,' with no explanation of what he is to understand by these terms: this reader at least longed for the clarity and lucidity of Quine after being submerged in Dilman's prose. Here is an example: '... what makes a proposition true or false lies in the same grammar as the proposition, and the proposition confronts it within that grammar.' No doubt this is understandable to those familiar with Wittgensteinian lore but does not much help those who are not.

In addition to misrepresentation and unclarity there are faults of another kind to be found in the book — the expressed belief, for example, that all the properties of a geometric figure follow from the definition of that figure, a belief which ignores the fact that the triangle has different properties in non-Euclidean geometries even though its definition remains the same.

This book, then, contains nothing of interest for the philosopher and seriously misleads students. It does, however, have something for those addicted to the snippets found at the bottom of *New Yorker* columns: '... as far as symbolic logic goes I cannot hold a candle to Quine. Here, ... he quickly leaves me out of my depth'; and (my personal favourite): 'This is the question which Quine discusses in modern clothes' — he always was a snappy dresser!

A.J. DALE
University of Hull,
U.K.

JOHN DUNN. *Rethinking Modern Political Theory: Essays 1979-83*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Pp. x + 229. US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-30130-0); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-31695-2).

A number of propositions serve to integrate the ten essays of this collection: that of the centrality of the problem of trust to political theory and political life; that of the essentially practical purpose of political philosophy and of the cogency of an epistemology and morality grounded in human experience and responsibility; and that of the need to redefine liberalism in political rather than utopian terms.

Dunn's essays are gathered into three sections. Together they set an agenda for a reconstructed and adequate political theory by clearing the deck of what Dunn argues to be the muddle and insufficient promise of contem-

porary lines of political thought. The essays are largely informed by Dunn's considerable scholarship in the work of John Locke, by his admirable grasp of the thought of Jürgen Habermas, and by the vigour of his critical style.

The three sections of Dunn's collection endeavour the following. In the first, 'Christian Natural Law and the Foundation of Liberalism,' Dunn recovers John Locke (amongst others, from C.B. Macpherson), by arguing that Locke's central concern was the establishment of a secure foundation for political trust, 'the capacity to commit oneself to fulfilling the legitimate expectations of others,' which for Dunn's Locke and for Dunn, 'is both the constitutive virtue of and the key causal precondition for, the existence of any society' (42). It is, for Dunn, the contemporary relevance of the problem of trust which serves to establish Locke's writing as worthy of our more thoughtful reconsideration. It is, as well, the insufficiency of Locke's theism, and least as a basis for a contemporary resolution of the problem of trust, that renders trust as a compelling if not the central problem for political theory. What modern human beings most fundamentally need, argues Dunn, if societies are legitimately to be sustained, are reasons for satisfying the legitimate expectations of others (in the face of the compelling power of individualized interest). What they 'enjoy' are merely sufficient causal preconditions for cooperation (state violence and socialization), at the cost of trivialized conceptions of personal agency, identity, and community.

This flaw in the contemporary world is most plainly suffered, suggests Dunn, in those countries which have seen violent, professedly Leninist, social revolutions. In the second section of his collection, Dunn offers an analysis of revolution and extant Marxist-inspired communities as models for the design of the future. Not surprisingly, he finds them, in the last instance, wanting. In the process of reviewing the works of Moore and Skocpol on revolution (Chapter 5), in considering the theoretical weakness of 'totalitarian democracy' (Chapter 6) and in assessing the prospects for an international socialist community (Chapter 7), Dunn reveals more of what he appears to take as the terms of an acceptable political theory. The first is the importance of 'causal beliefs' as determinants of the rationality of human action. Political conceptions (as they are held by citizens) both of what is politically possible and rational, serve as the key elements in the variety between and the motivation for political acts. It is this, if I follow Dunn, which establishes the link between political theory and politics and requires that political theory be essentially an active and engaged endeavour. The second is Dunn's insistence upon an account of society which recognizes in individuals, in their understanding of themselves and in their characterization by ruling theories, responsibility for action. Third is Dunn's belief that an adequate political theory be governed by a strict realism in the assessment of the consequences and potential of political action. Although, for Dunn, Marxist theory professes sensitivity to the need for a unity of theory and practice it suffers irrecoverably from theoretical weakness in the latter two of these requirements. Socialist theory, despite its apparent good fortune in the 20th century, provides, for Dunn, little promise as political theory as it lacks, in the end, 'any clear conception

of how, nationally and internationally, there could actually be a political order which permits human beings, in the wildly unequal situation in which history has left them, to cooperate together in rational mutual trust for a genuinely shared good and in an economy which is not based upon private ownership' (117).

The third and final section of the collection is the most discursive and, in many respects, most interesting. It consists of four essays, the first two of which seek to assess the state of contemporary social understanding and theory, the latter two of which critically survey contemporary theories of political value. All four draw heavily, although originally and clearly, upon Habermasian insight. For Dunn, those of us in modern society suffer, as the inescapable practitioners of amateur social theory, an ubiquitous and insidious intoxication with 'official' social theories, the extreme causality of which renders our own action largely unintelligible. There is, for Dunn, a profound gap between third person explication of action and acting, a gap unbridged by contemporary social theory and increasingly ignored (at their peril) by modern human beings. The gap can be filled only by trust, the detoxification achieved by a return to reflective prudence. The task is one, for Dunn, complicated by an extreme epistemological hubris in the 20th century philosophic (especially positivist) tradition. The prospect of a world nuclear holocaust serves as Dunn's most striking metaphor of the cost of its completion.

The last two chapters, on the futures of liberalism and political theory, consist of delightfully caustic, spirited, pointed, and poignant attacks on the current state of Anglo-American political philosophy and ethics for which it is impossible to provide a brief summary (although it makes excellent reading). From it one garners two last items on Dunn's agendum. They are: the wisdom of reconsidering and recovering the promise of utilitarian theory, and the sensibility of seeking a restatement of liberalism which, unlike the liberalism of Kantians, is driven by a recognition of the real circumstances of human life in actual regimes and which prudentially seeks middle ground.

I have left little room to provide the reader with an adjudication of the work. In my judgement, it is a difficult work of value both to official and amateur social theorists. Its critical force, although faltering somewhat in its critique of the left, is nonetheless considerable. It is written with a refreshing, provocative and largely sustained energy and sense of political engagement. Its disappointments lie in the fact that it provides an agendum more than a theory, and in the fact that it leaves undeveloped the more practical consequence of too great a faith in the search for middle ground.

GREGORY PYRCZ
Acadia University

MICHAEL A. FOX and LEO GROARKE, eds. *Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives*. New York: Peter Lang Publ. 1985. Pp. 278. US\$23.00. ISBN 0-8204-0209-5.

The academic world and intelligent readers everywhere are flooded with discussions of nuclear war. This book merits study on several counts. It is well-organized. It contains almost universally first-rate essays by respected scholars on 'Nuclear Delusions,' 'The Individual and the State,' 'The Environment,' 'Conceptual and Psychological Dilemmas,' and 'The Pursuit of Peace.' Designed obviously for textbook use as well as general readership, each of the five above-named parts contains a list of questions identifying issues worth pondering and discussing, and leads the reader to analyze and evaluate the claims made in the preceding essays. There is a nine page bibliography and an index.

The editors, associate and assistant professors of philosophy, have identified the central issues and, recognizing that any anthology is likely to be uneven in quality, they have chosen their material well. Properly they open with John Sommerville's essay which claims that a nuclear 'war' is omnicide, not war at all, really, because it is 'as qualitatively different from war as death is from disease' (4). William Gay disagrees, and editor Groarke believes it is possible to find a middle way. By the time I had pondered the twenty-three remaining essays, however, I sadly agreed with Sommerville's judgment. It was Hans Bethe who warned us that we might win an arms race but that it is crazy to think of winning a nuclear war.

Addressing the issue of the individual and the state, Richard Wasserstrom writes incisively on the immorality of nuclear war and Kai Nielsen likewise on 'Doing the Morally Unthinkable.' The problems of the environment are adeptly handled in Part III, as are the conceptual and psychological dilemmas in Part IV.

What are anguished, troubled, and confused citizens to do in the pursuit of peace? In a well-designed concluding part, four essays address this question and each is followed by a critical commentary, e.g., Groarke's 'Nuclear Arms Control: Eluding the Prisoner's Dilemma' is followed by a fine piece by Richard Werner on 'The Deadly Logic of Deterrence.'

A book as ambitious and wide-ranging as this, which stresses philosophical issues, would have even greater value, I believe, if it had included some of the moving classical statements of philosophers, e.g., Kant on Perpetual Peace, William James on the moral equivalent of war, and any number of Albert Einstein's superb judgments. It also might have taken note of the profound ethical issues in nuclear research such as the ones dramatized in the film 'The Day After Trinity.' This fine volume, along with the many parallel books pouring from the press, testifies to the fact that these are times which terrify all intelligent people and they desperately need any help the philosophical community can give. Clarification, yes, but that is far from enough.

CHARLES W. KEGLEY

Outstanding Professor of Philosophy, Associate Editor: *USA Today*

A.J. HOLLAND, ed. *Philosophy and Its Historiography*. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel 1985. US\$49.00. ISBN 90-277-1945-4.

Recently a number of Anglo-American philosophers have begun to pay more serious attention than most in the analytic tradition to the history and historiography of their own discipline. This new movement has been both encouraged and furthered by the interdisciplinary conference of philosophers and historians at the University of Lancaster in September 1983, which formed the basis of this provocative collection of previously unpublished essays. In organization and aim it may be compared with *Philosophy in History*, a series of lectures delivered at Johns Hopkins University during 1982-83. Both books attempt to raise the historiographical self-consciousness of philosophers, beginning with general reflections on the relation between philosophy and history and concluding with more detailed studies of particular periods and texts.

Part I of *Philosophy, Its History and Historiography* consists of discussions of past and present views of the history of philosophy with special attention to Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Parts II and III focus on the 17th and 18th centuries, including essays on Occultism, Descartes, Cartesian science, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, Kant, and Reid. A comment that M.A. Stewart makes in his essay on Hume can justly be applied to the book as a whole: 'There are lessons here for anyone who still thinks philosophical argument exists in a timeless vacuum' (256).

One traditional and still widely held view of philosophy is that it involves solving (or dissolving) many of the same problems which concerned previous philosophers beginning with the ancient Greeks. Philosophers analyze the language and logical structure of arguments to determine whether they are valid or invalid and whether their premises are true or false. Tending to assume that key terms such as 'reason' and 'experience' have invariant meanings, they interpret philosophers according to current understandings of these categories (e.g. Descartes is classified as a 'rationalist' and Hume as an 'empiricist'). These techniques are employed to point out previous mistakes due to superstition, scientific inaccuracy, and logical or linguistic confusion and to construct new arguments which avoid the errors of the past. The division of labor between philosophy and the history of ideas is conceived as quite sharp, since historians study what beliefs were held by whom at a particular time and place, while philosophers discover the appropriate criteria of meaning, rationality, and truth by which all past and present beliefs should be evaluated.

This conception of the role of philosophy and its way of reading past philosophers is challenged in many of the essays, which provide abundant evidence from the religious, scientific, social and political context to show that the methods of analytic philosophy have resulted in serious errors of interpretation. For example, 'reason' in the 17th century did not have its present philosophical sense of the capacity to grasp *a priori* as opposed to empirical truths. The term was opposed rather to 'faith' or 'imagination' and was used much more broadly to mean the power to organize knowledge derived from

experience. Thus Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz were not 'rationalists' in the sense of believing that all knowledge could be deduced from *a priori* axioms, and the usual interpretations of Bacon, Locke and Hume also require substantial revision. In other essays the historical approach reveals that many philosophers and scientists during the 17th century were heavily influenced by occultism and that no orthodox view of scientific methodology was established until relatively late in the 18th. It becomes clear after the distortions and caricatures in the standard commentaries have been corrected that the philosophical problems of this period were no more identical to current issues than were the meanings of terms, and the solutions often appear to be more subtle, imaginative and coherent than has usually been supposed.

These arguments make a strong case for abandoning the ahistorical method of evaluating philosophers of the past, but even more provocative questions are raised about its adequacy for philosophizing in the present. Jonathan Rée claims that 'integral histories,' which may be no more than myths serving to support currently fashionable doctrines, have exerted a powerful and often unconscious influence on the self-image of philosophers of all times. The idea that all previous philosophies are errors from which our present perspective enables us to escape is not a discovery made by Hume or Kant, and more recently the deconstructionists, but rather an illusion which has been a rather common occupational hazard of philosophers at least since the Middle Ages. Rorty's charge that foundationalism has led philosophy astray since Descartes, and his proposal to replace epistemology with hermeneutics, may be seen as simply a new version of what Rée calls the 'supreme fiction' of philosophy.

M.R. Ayers criticizes Rorty for deriving an *a priori* history of philosophy from his eclectic version of neo-idealism, which is made plausible only by appeal to simplistic interpretations of Descartes and other modern philosophers. He argues that Rorty's lack of openness toward the possibility of learning from history and recent historical scholarship has unnecessarily narrowed his view of epistemology. Mary Hesse, while sympathetic to Rorty's proposal to abandon foundationalism, points out that his conception of what philosophy should become lacks the dimension of critical self-consciousness about the complex relation between knowledge and social power. She takes the position that, if philosophy is interpreted as involving 'relative and local reflections on the knowledge-industries of its time,' rather than as the search for the perennial foundations of knowledge, hermeneutics has had (and continues to have) a more important role than his notion of 'edifying philosophy' allows.

Rorty himself points out that 'the self-image of a philosopher ... depends almost entirely upon how he sees the history of philosophy ..., upon which figures he imitates, and which episodes and movements he disregards. So a new account of the history of philosophy is a challenge which cannot be ignored (*Consequences of Pragmatism*). *Philosophy, Its History and Historiography* presents a serious challenge to philosophers who think of themselves as engaged in an ahistorical enterprise, but it also contains suggestions for rethinking the role of philosophy in such a way that it becomes far more in-

teresting and relevant to historians, scientists, literary critics, teachers, and all reflective people.

CAROL NICHOLSON
Rider College
Lawrenceville, NJ

DON IHDE and HUGH J. SILVERMAN, eds. *Descriptions*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1985. Pp. xv + 300. US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-075-7); US\$19.50 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-076-5).

Descriptions is a collection of 21 papers which were originally delivered to the meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy from 1981 to 1983. The papers are organized under six headings: Theory of Phenomenological Description, Phenomena of Time, Phenomenology and the Artful, Phenomenology and the Sciences, Phenomenology and the Social, and Continental Philosophies in the University. They address current phenomenological interests in a way that goes well beyond traditional Husserlian reductions (Natanson, 2). The tone of the whole anthology is one of 'application' rather than of analytical criticism. '...A theory of transcendental descriptions is needed...[T]here are three reasons...one is exculpatory, a second is contemplative and a third is polemical' (R. Sokolowski, 14-15). '...[A]mbiguity of the "descriptive" in phenomenology arises out of the difference between an essentially methodological interpretation of the reduction and a more nearly 'existential reading' (Natanson, 11).

Indeed the most interesting reading in the book comes from themes like nostalgia, 'ethics' in architecture, epistemology and academic free expression. For example, in dealing with time, the past is kept in 'place' (E.S. Casey, 46) and we must keep our mind in context (or place) as well as keeping the past in mind (E.S. Casey, 54). The *attitude* toward the past is a guide post for a phenomenological description. When we are nostalgic we are trying to bring 'distance' near or to make the absent 'other' present (J. Philips, 71). We yearn to return to an experience of community (E.B. Daniels, 77), but nostalgia is a fantasy about what is now lost, a dream-like state with altered space and time (E.B. Daniels, 84 & 87). The phenomenological reduction enables us to understand that these personal, psychological and, if you will, existential issues can help the philosopher to 'describe' this concept which has been clouded by long standing assumptions of objectivity. Keeping the past in mind is not

entirely active or passive, according to Edward Casey. We do remember without recollection (e.g. dancing) (45), but remembering in full detail requires a context. This mindful activity shows us that mind and place are modulations of our being-in-the-world (50). 'Place holds on to what time scatters' (D. Wood, 62). From another standpoint, nostalgia, at one time identified with homesickness, an entirely personal experience, is rather the recognition of actual events which are irrecoverable (J. Philips, 66). This truth about the dynamics of remembering is a clue to the authenticity of any particular remembrance. But nostalgia can be so personalized that its message warps our personal historical perspective. After all, '...accepting the unreality of [a] relationship would mean giving up an image of [one]self' (J. Philips, 69).

Freedom in academic expression is reassessed. The university should stress '...critical awareness and responsible self-direction effecting a release of the soul from submission to the popular obvious' (E.G. Ballard, 270). The 'arts' liberate because they are interdependent; without the sawmill and sawyer, the cabinet maker would be idle (E.G. Ballard, 260). We develop crucial value systems in dialogue, not in the splendid isolation of sceptical philosophical excesses. 'The foundations of knowledge have been recentered outside of consciousness' (D.L. Thompson, 289). For Foucault, the individual subject was more like an instrument than an autonomous free instigator of scientific discourse (D.L. Thompson, 291). Of course, the individual must search for the truth through his or her own institutions and *publically* express or teach the conclusions (D.L. Thompson, 292-293). The distinctions between true facts understood directly (intuitively) and meaning and interpretation *and* evaluation will help us to see why few if any have recently traced changing structures to 'individual creativity' (D.L. Thompson, 293) rather than to objective consensus.

More traditional themes for the phenomenological 'description' are far from ignored. Various authors criticize key concepts from the phenomenological literature of Heidegger, Sartre, Husserl and others. P. Caw argues that Sartre had a horror of the 'inner life' (142). The 'subject' cannot be the name of the 'objective given' (141). 'We' are always concerned with 'my' subject (141). 'Sartre's idea of an absolute prepersonal consciousness seems to me to be a pure mystification' (145). We must be able to 'read' the representations of the world we live in (148). Abstract disconnection may lead to psychological imbalance. Should the goal of a 'life of meaning' replace the old unresolved question of the 'meaning of life' (150)?

Joseph Rouse questions Heidegger's 'presence-at-hand' as it applies to 'scientific fact' (200). Rouse emphasizes an existential, phenomenological analysis. 'Science...discovers not the present-at-hand, but new ways (that is, new contexts) in which things around us can be ready-to-hand' (203). The scientific world is understood against a background of how things are *currently valued* (J. Rouse 204 & 206). Mildred Bakan uses Heidegger to show that political philosophy develops amongst people and not in grand, academic isolation (227). The political sphere of life clears 'space' showing us, that is, Dasein,

who we are — unique persons (228). With Heidegger, she believes we are in care of a common world (234).

Husserl takes an epistemological perspective with an attendant rationalist morality (G.E. Overvold, 250). But, any question as to whether A is of more value than B arises in some specific context (254). Rationality does not, itself, legislate that something or other *is* actually valued (255). For Overvold, this suggests that moral problems cannot be described comprehensively, short of the full context.

These are only a sample of the excellent discussions found in this book. However, the subtle relation between topics that are oriented to existential life problems and those that are critiques of key philosophical concepts (but derived from understanding their applicaiton to existential-phenomenological descriptions) demonstrates the consistent thread of analysis found throughout the collection. For those who are not familiar with the technical meaning of key notions like Dasein, presence-at-hand and self-and-world, the discussions will seem to beg the question. In fact, subtle amplification, modification and provocative rejection of old standard bearers is found in these pages. I gather that the society's meetings were meant to be an on-going dialogue about solutions to philosophical problems in the world of the participants. That lively optimism is found in the pages of *Descriptions*.

PETER SMALE
Acadia University

ROMAN INGARDEN. *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*. Peter McCormick, ed. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press 1985. Pp. 288. US\$59.95. ISBN 0-8132-0603-0.

Ingarden's recent vogue in the Anglo-Saxon world signifies a dissatisfaction there with the predominating trend of analytical philosophy. It is also the outcome of a genuine admiration for Ingarden's aesthetic theory, which is of more than historical significance. Other continental philosophers who have written on aesthetics (e.g., Lukács, Adorno) are more familiar to English-speaking philosophers, and have had their own promoters and commentators, different from those of Ingarden and phenomenological aesthetics. Leaving aside nostalgic attitudes, it would be useful to inquire into the vicissitudes of Ingarden's early reception in the English-speaking countries. McCormick makes a valuable contribution here by supplying the readers of this volume with an

extensive bibliography, including works by Ingarden that have appeared in German, English and French, as well as a list of secondary works concerning Ingarden's philosophical and aesthetic ideas.

This selection of Ingarden's papers on aesthetics was drawn from already existing translations. It gives sufficient insight into the main problems dealt with by Ingarden in this area. In his Introduction (14), McCormick writes that the papers can be divided into three groups: those dealing with general aspects of Ingarden's theory, i.e. with what constitutes his philosophical and specifically phenomenological aesthetics; with detailed aspects — on the structure of the literary work and its cognition, artistic and aesthetic values, aesthetic experience and objects; and finally, those dealing with metaphysical problems — on truth in literature and the physicalistic theory of language. I am inclined to question this arrangement of the papers. Perhaps a division into aesthetic and theoretical-literary considerations would have been more to the point, and I dare suggest, more compatible with the editor's own intentions.

Taken at face value, the editor's introduction is a highly accurate guide for anyone who would like to initiate an understanding of Ingarden by studying this collection of texts. McCormick succinctly and instructively explains the philosophical background of Ingarden's aesthetic theory; he handles well the fundamental concepts and theses embraced by Ingarden's two early major works (*The Literary Work of Art* and *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*); he warns against confusing the phenomenological vocabulary of 'transmitting' and 'receiving' with the information and communication models of art; and he touches upon Ingarden's preoccupation with categorical structures and the typology of different kinds of objects (which have in turn a direct bearing upon Ingarden's investigations into the distinction between the artistic and aesthetic object and the identification of various structures and modes of existence of works of art).

McCormick follows closely the line plotted by Ingarden's ideas, elaborating and reinterpreting them. I should like instead to pose a few questions that would result from a more critical path. By philosophical aesthetics we are obliged to understand the ontological, phenomenological, gnoseological and metaphysical involvements of any research in this field; yet does this not risk our being entrapped exclusively in the very approach which was pursued by Ingarden, and that consequently we must render and elucidate the essential notions and seminal procedures of aesthetic inquiry within the context that Ingarden made feasible and concretized in the second essay of this collection? It is noteworthy that already in the first essay the distinction between the aesthetic object and the work of art, the demand for a multi-directed phenomenological analysis, its program of investigation indicate that Ingarden already had clearly in mind what he himself would practise and hoped others would continue. How should we then account for Ingarden's twice-emphasized qualification that he was far from excluding the significance of diverse methodologies? Anyone asking about the function of art in human life in another way would still be an aesthetic philosopher; however, since all problems listed are explicitly or tacitly interdependent, tolerance for the 'other way' would appear

to be a noble but, alas, empty formulation. What about the student who attacks the question of art's ideological impact, or does not inquire into the mode of the existence of the work of art, treating this subject as one of secondary importance? Will such a person not come automatically under the established restrictions and be placed into a pigeon-hole of those researchers devoid of philosophical capacities? Still another question: If empirical, historically-oriented observation is not only supported by, but primarily founded upon, philosophical reflection, then there are serious doubts whether any empirically conducted study, whatever it might seem to reveal, deserves to be called aesthetics.

In general, my objections to Ingarden centre around the corpus of premises, abounding with phenomenological *a priori*, that he dogmatically accepts. If there is no other aesthetics but a philosophically engaged one, and aesthetic controversies are simply manifest or disguised philosophical debates, with which premises I entirely agree, then we would have to judge Ingarden's contribution to aesthetics on the merits of his peculiar phenomenological approach. I refer to his midway position between Kant and Heidegger; his substantialization of the modes of consciousness in the spectrum of various objects, oscillating between epistemology and ontology and dealing primarily with formal entities; his preference for the already constituted instead of the acts of constitution; his ultimate intention to reveal the *arché* that compose the world's unity and coherence; and his acknowledgement of extra verbal communication. It would be absurd to enter into a discussion of Ingarden's aesthetics — the assumptions concerning the artistic and aesthetic objects, aesthetic experience, so-called truth of literary judgments, etc. — without first considering critically Ingarden's ontology. E.g., his thesis on metaphysical facets that, as I see it, remains at odds with his major emphasis on the ontological procedures concerning the pure possibilities of being.

Whether one agrees or not with Ingarden's theory, one is compelled to admire his ingenious philosophical mind, the perceptiveness of axiological subtleties, the exuberant richness of his ideas and the consistency of his investigations. Since I myself was first stimulated by Ingarden to reconsider aesthetic questions, I am well able to appreciate the attraction and incentives produced by this collection. Yet a number of thorny questions have to be put before all scholars who venture to develop Ingarden's aesthetic philosophy: Is phenomenology applicable to the 'anti-art' of our day? Can it do justice to the current anti-aesthetic trend, which appears hardly comprehensible within the framework of his philosophical inventory? Even with reference to traditionally comprehended aesthetic phenomena, is not Ingarden's conception tied so closely to the artistic sacrum that it appears powerless when facing the invasion of mass culture and of art in its popularized version?

Whatever answers we expect and obtain, the study of Ingarden will certainly open new vistas and force one to clarify his or her own standpoint. We

can only be grateful to McCormick for bringing forth this volume, and would greet warmly any similar endeavours in future.

Stefan Morawski
Institute of Art History and Theory,
Polish Academy of Sciences & Letters
Warsaw, Poland

ALLAN JANIK. *Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger*. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1985. Pp. 161. US\$18.50. ISBN 90-6203-667-8.

The spirit which informs this book is one I greatly admire. Janik cites with approval the view that philosophy should not aim 'to provide a theory of ultimate reality or to secure "foundations" for the sciences, but to provide an internal critique of the "absolute presuppositions" of intellectual enterprises' (56). He is also sympathetic to the view that philosophy is not 'the exclusive domain of a professional academic discipline' (57), and believes that the philosopher's task is 'essentially historical' (57) in that understanding the presuppositions of an intellectual enterprise requires understanding the circumstances in which the presuppositions originated. As an approach to Wittgenstein, it is more likely than most to bear fruit.

On the other hand, a book concerned in large measure with the philosophy of Wittgenstein, in which the words 'philosophy' and 'Wittgenstein' are misspelt (20, 118) should give one pause. Certainly, the attention to detail which characterizes Wittgenstein's own work is everywhere lacking. The text is riddled with misspelling, grammatical errors, and stylistic infelicities which frequently lead to conceptual obscurity. (The top of p. 118 provides the most striking example.) A number of arguments are underwritten by highly questionable claims (e.g., '...his critics' positions are clearly superior to his...[because] they do not entail unacceptable ontological commitments to an "unconscious" or such-like entity' [74]) or contain implicit fallacies (e.g., that having Marxists for friends is relevant to having one's work 'seen in relation to' Marx's [137-138]). Thumbnail sketches of two of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* views — that the world is propositional in nature (33), and that the impossibility of metalanguages arises from the fact that 'the self' limits them just as it limits object languages (89) — strike me as fundamentally wrong and based on a misunderstanding of the essence of the picture theory of meaning. Finally, despite his emphasis on critique, Janik remains oddly insensitive to

the degree to which some of his own (less than fully articulated) presuppositions skew his readings. The essay attacking J.C. Nyíri's account of Wittgenstein's conservatism is particularly bad, informed less by a desire to do justice to Wittgenstein's thought than by Janik's refusal to entertain the suggestion that his hero may have been other than a good Marxist. It is a tissue of weak arguments, badly presented.

Thus, although I would very much like to report that the book is excellent, I cannot. It is thorough, but not rigorous; interesting, but not compelling.

Its thoroughness resides in the number of figures, both contemporary and historical, whose work is mentioned in connection with the book's leading characters. But it is really only secondary literature which is considered in depth. With regard to Wittgenstein, Weininger, and Viennese cultural criticism in general, the essays are explicitly programmatic. Essays 3, 5, 6, and 7 are negative critiques of, respectively, William Johnston's concept of Austrian cultural criticism, Albert W. Levi's account of the sources of Wittgenstein's ethics (the 'guilty homosexuality' thesis), Jacques LeRider's reading of Weininger in *Le Cas Otto Weininger: Racines de l'antiféminisme et de l'antisémitisme*, and Nyíri's characterization of Wittgenstein's conservatism. Essay 8 is an essentially favourable critique of David Rubinstein's book, *Marx and Wittgenstein: Social Praxis and Social Explanation*. Essay 1 aims to clarify the notion of historiography incorporated in Janik's own previous book, *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, by explaining how he came to collaborate with the book's co-author, Stephen Toulmin, in the first place. Although they do not attempt anything positive beyond the delineation of a framework for philosophically satisfying accounts of these various subjects, these essays do provoke a number of fascinating questions. What, exactly, is intellectually disreputable about psychobiography? Is paternalism preferable to patriarchalism? In a given writer's selection of problems, how can the differences among temperament, cultural environment, and intellectual history be systematically discerned? What are the consequences for the history of ideas if they cannot?

Essays 2 and 4, on the other hand, do advance positive theses: the former that our understanding of many points in the *Tractatus* is improved by seeing them as the utterances of a Schopenhauerian, the latter that the connection between logic and ethics in the *Tractatus* becomes clearer if taken as the view of a Weiningerian. The phrasing here is important. On the basis of interesting parallels between the views of Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer, and Wittgenstein and Weininger, Janik is not claiming to be able to illuminate Wittgenstein's views; rather, on the basis of the parallels, plus evidence that Wittgenstein read both Schopenhauer and Weininger with approval, Janik is attempting to establish that Wittgenstein was in some way a *disciple* of both Schopenhauer and Weininger. This minimizes Wittgenstein's genius and points to a general problem with the book.

Although Janik claims in the introduction that the essays are unified by their concern 'with the question of how environment generates philosophy' (2), it becomes clear that this characterization is not narrow enough. What Janik's use indicates he means by 'environment' is 'books (by other thinkers)

with which the philosopher in question is familiar.' The idea that Wittgenstein might have been reacting independently to cultural or personal experiences and then articulating his reactions in terms that echo, mirror, or are borrowed from other writers does not seem to have occurred to Janik. Or, to the extent that it has, it has been rejected as the demon psychobiography. I do not wish to suggest that Janik may not be right in suggesting that many of Wittgenstein's central thoughts were simply rearticulations of other writers'; but his own case would be made much stronger if he had considered, and responded to, the obvious alternative.

In short, a very appropriate summary of Janik's work is provided by his own criticism of Nyíri (127): '...it should be clear that there is a risk in approaching Wittgenstein as [he] does. To be sure, [he] is subtle enough to avoid any outright claims which cannot be documented and, indeed, the parallels he presents us with are often both trenchant and enlightening; but, at the same time, he writes in such a way as to invite us to draw the inference that Wittgenstein was in some sense "influenced" by these thinkers.' When it is not at all clear that he was.

JAN ZWICKY

University of Waterloo

STEVEN LUKES. *Marxism and Morality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985. Pp. xi + 163. US\$15.95. ISBN 0-19-876101-5.

Intended as 'a contribution to socialist free-thinking,' this book is primarily concerned with the theoretical views of marxism about morality and secondarily with the moral record of marxism in practice and the relation between the record and the theory.

Marxism's approach to moral questions has been in the main unreflective. This is indicated, Lukes believes, by the 'paradox' that marxism is both anti-moral and moral. On the one hand, it opposes moralizing and regards morality as ideology in a pejorative sense. On the other hand, marxist writings team with moral judgments and are inspired by a desire for a better world that 'it is hard not to see as moral.' But Lukes argues that the paradox can be resolved by distinguishing between the morality of *Recht* (whose domain includes justice, rights, fairness and obligation) and the morality of emancipation. Marxism condemns the former as inherently ideological but adopts the latter as its own.

Recht morality is ideological because it claims to offer objective, non-partisan principles, when in fact its function is to protect the existing order. Marxists therefore believe that its principles have no rationally compelling force. Moreover *Recht* propagates the view that the conditions which give rise to it (limited resources and limited sympathies, hence conflicting claims) are inherent in human life. But for marxists this too is an ideological illusion. The conditions of *Recht* are specific to class societies. Once emancipation from these conditions becomes possible, the morality of emancipation dictates bringing into being a world in which *Recht* morality is unnecessary.

Marx and Engels did not provide a detailed account of this world because they were averse to utopian theorizing. Yet their own thought is utopian, and so there is a 'sub-paradox' in their attitude to morality. But it too can be resolved, by recognizing that Marx and Engels incorporated the visions of utopian socialists into their vision of emancipation while opposing utopian *blueprints* on the ground that they laid claim to knowledge that could not be had now.

There is a further puzzle: though they regard *Recht* morality as ideological, Marx and Engels occasionally seem to condemn the injustices of capitalism. It has, of course, been a matter of intense debate whether Marx did think that capitalism was unjust. Lukes's position on this issue is ingenious. He believes that Marx offers 'a multi-perspectival analysis in which capitalism's self-justifications are portrayed, undermined from within, and criticized from without, and then both justification and criticism are in turn criticized from a standpoint that is held to be beyond justice.'

Not surprisingly, in view of this last perspective, Marx did not take rights seriously. Rather he treated the rights proclaimed by bourgeois society simply as symptomatic of the egoism and contradictions of bourgeois life. They corresponded to a pre-human condition that must be transcended, and in the ideal society of the future they would not be needed as guarantors of freedom.

Freedom consists in 'the non-constraining of the realization of agents' purposes.' Different conceptions of freedom interpret this concept of freedom differently. In a masterly discussion, Lukes charts a number of the available options, and argues that marxism offers a conception of freedom, and of the constraints upon it, that is 'far deeper and richer than negative and classical liberal views.'

For Marx, alienation is the opposite of freedom. Human emancipation is emancipation from alienation and consists in the free development of individualities in a real community. But, as Lukes carefully demonstrates, this vision of emancipation raises a host of questions. For example: How is the free development of individualities to be coordinated? What *kind* of unity do free individuals attain? Will there not be conflicts of interest even in a marxist community and hence (as Lukes emphatically believes) a need for principles of justice? Hobbled by its anti-utopianism, the marxist tradition has not confronted such questions. As a result, its 'vision of emancipation remains an ill-defined, and thus indefensible, social and political goal.'

But this has not stopped marxists from heatedly debating the question of

means, as Lukes makes evident by quoting extensively from 20th-century communist literature. However, he claims, marxists have for the most part avoided the question of means and ends as an issue of principle.

The structure of marxist thought about the means and ends of action — and, more generally, about morality — is apparent nevertheless: it is 'a form of consequentialism that is long-range and perfectionist.' Lukes calls this the central claim of his book. His assessment of marxist consequentialism is harsh: he believes that it is 'irrational' because it fails both to clarify the long-term consequences by which alternative courses of action are to be judged and to make comparative assessments of the alternatives themselves. Moreover the theory is 'morally blind' because it regards injustices not as such but as obstacles or means to emancipation. However marxism's view of morality is also 'extraordinarily penetrating' — on account of its conception of freedom and its critique of *Recht* morality.

This is an extremely able book, wide-ranging in its references and acute in its assessments. But I think that Lukes does not succeed in resolving the paradox he finds in marxism's attitude to morality because, while he shows that for marxists *Recht* morality is ideological, he does not show that marxists have the right to regard 'their own' morality of emancipation as *non*-ideological. Moreover he takes no account of the recent arguments by Allen Wood and Richard Miller to the effect that Marx's ultimate evaluative perspective is not a *moral* perspective. On Lukes's generous construal of 'morality,' Marx's doctrine of emancipation clearly counts as a morality. But Lukes does not consider the possibility that Marx did not simply reject *Recht* morality but (as Miller argues) rejected certain features of morality *per se* and therefore could not consistently have endorsed a *morality* of emancipation.

DEREK ALLEN

University of Toronto

ALEX C. MICHALOS. *Improving your Reasoning*, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1986. Pp. xii + 129. US\$15.95. ISBN: 0-13-453465-4.

C.A. MISSIMER. *Good Arguments: An Introduction to Critical Thinking*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1986. Pp. xii + 210. US\$16.95. ISBN: 0-13-360249-4.

K.H. SEUBERT. *Bare Bones Logic*. Lanham, MD, and London: University Press of America 1986. Pp. xi + 148. ISBN: 0-8191-5182-3.

A text for critical thinking classes must do a number of things. First, the central features of arguments, fallacies and the like must be adequately covered. Here accuracy and precision are of final importance so that students have a reliable source for review of basic material. Second, thoughtful discussions of difficult points that might become stumbling-blocks, such as material implication, are required. The same holds for various uses of language or questions about certain of the common fallacies. Third, the text must show a sensitivity to natural language and to the difficulties of analyzing and evaluating arguments or purported arguments in natural prose. The ability to extract an argument from a piece of ordinary English is probably the most difficult task the student faces. Finally, the text must be accessible to the student. A clear writing style helps but orderly, systematic presentation of material is essential.

Seubert's *Bare Bones Logic* deals almost exclusively with the Aristotelian logic, taking the reader through such standard topics as the syllogism, immediate inferences, the square of opposition, and Venn diagrams. A short chapter is devoted to the usual fallacies. The last fifth of the book introduces propositional logic, including truth tables and formal proofs of validity.

Unfortunately this text is not acceptable by any standard. It would create numerous difficulties for students: explanations are often unclear or misleading because they are too simplistic or inaccurate; poor examples are frequent; and technical terms are introduced either without explanation or far in advance of the explanation provided in the text. Translations of ordinary English statements into standard form categorical propositions are a special source of frustration. 'To err is human' is interpreted as 'All error is human' (17) (which is *not* intended by the author as a confirmation of the claim). On the next page, 'Only logicians will pass the exam,' is interpreted as 'All logicians will pass the exam' which, again, is simply wrong. There *are* examples which intend 'Only S is P' to mean not only 'All P is S' but also 'All S is P' but, at least in the absence of a special context suggesting otherwise, this is not one of them. Some problems appear to result from muddling epistemic and logical issues or from careless handling of the distinction between truth and validity. The latter is never treated properly and it is dismaying to see phrases such as 'false argument' (7) or 'invalid *Modus Ponens*' (8).

Seubert also has an inordinate love of rules, yet seldom discusses the intent or rationale of a rule presented. For example, the reader is told that '((p.q) . (r v s))' makes no sense because 'you cannot use two sets of parentheses together' (107). Of course, one can have rules about brackets and braces and provide good reasons for them. But the reader is owed an explanation and will not necessarily take the above example as 'making no sense.' Moreover, this rule is introduced just after the reader is told that 'there are no specific rules as to where and how one punctuates.' Ironically, on the next page Seubert omits a set of braces with the result that the formal expression of the constructive dilemma really *doesn't* make sense.

Finally, Seubert makes a number of outrageous claims: for example, 'deduction moves from universals to particulars' (8); 'deductions follow the pattern,

All S is P, Some S is P' (10); 'conjunctive propositions combine two categorical propositions' (16). It is also mildly irritating to encounter cumbersome passages and spellings such as 'tolens,' 'Scot,' and 'Waverly' that should have been caught by the publisher's proof-reader.

By contrast, Michalos's *Improving Your Reasoning* largely satisfies the requirements for a good critical thinking text. It is well organized, attempts to be as accurate and precise as the particular items under discussion allow and is accessible to the beginner. After an initial chapter on deduction, induction and validity, the book spends its remaining seven chapters on informal fallacies. This edition is virtually the same as the first edition published in 1970. Apart from one paragraph expanded for clarity (12), an historical note about interpreting universal categorical propositions as hypotheticals (13) and a caveat that an example may now and again occur that could arguably be taken as illustrating more than one type of error (26), all the changes from the first edition are either minor stylistic alterations or replacements of specific expressions and examples that might be construed as sexist or racist. With these exceptions, the exercises provided are identical in both editions. If you know what Michalos did in the earlier edition, you are already familiar with this one.

The groupings of the fallacies are useful and the discussions generally have a good tone, such that the reader frequently feels that the author is not only presenting material but is thinking and reasoning along with the reader. Occasionally the fallacies are given a rather machine-gun delivery, but continuing attention to the general groupings ameliorates this somewhat. There are only a couple of complaints to be made about the book. First, some of the topics could do with fuller discussion. For example, no space is devoted to the question of when exactly an appeal to authority may be legitimate, although the fact that one can misrepresent 'the claims of some reputable authority' (45) indirectly acknowledges such cases.

Second, the initial discussion of deduction and induction ought to have been redone for the sake of clarity. The claim that an 'argument whose conclusion is supposed, alleged, or claimed to be certain relative to its premises is called *deductive*' (4) is likely to confuse some students, especially when coupled with the statement a few paragraphs later that even if a conclusion does not follow from its premises with complete certainty 'we would say that the argument is deductive' (4). This section invites confusion over the distinction between psychological processes (inference) and logical relationships between statements (entailment or inductive cogency).

While Michalos's book has many good features it still looks and reads like an informal logic text with the emphasis on the presentation of material. By contrast, Missimer's *Good Arguments* is quite different and exciting, attempting to work through the reasoning processes and critical skills necessary to presenting and evaluating arguments. *Good Arguments* really is about critical thinking.

The book's main premise is that there are some features of constructing arguments and of critical analysis that are more important than others because they come into play most of the time. Missimer focuses on twelve basic ele-

ments: definition and distinction, issue, conclusion, reasons, alternative arguments, evidence, truth, consistency, warranted inference, assumptions, implications and prescription.

By the end of the first half of the book the basic twelve have been introduced and the fundamental characteristics of arguments, several key points about critical assessment and the fuller context in which arguments take place have been discussed. The second half works on further evaluative considerations, fallacies and complex arguments. The book has exercises and review questions and, greatly to its credit, introduces natural prose passages for analysis and evaluation. Some of these are presented on a split page with the prose passage on one side and the author's critical analysis on the other.

As a pictorial aid to the student Missimer employs an analogy between the structure of arguments and the structure of houses, represented by drawings in the text. Reasons support conclusions as walls support a roof. An argument rests on assumptions as a house sits on a foundation. This analogy is less intuitive for a valid deductive argument with false premises and one must get past the unfortunate fact that we formally write arguments with the conclusion at the bottom, after the premises, while the 'house' has the conclusion on top, as its roof. However, in general, the analogy seems helpful. One very important feature of the book, which the house analogy draws out, is its attempt to locate arguments in a larger context. Arguments center on an *issue*, frequently have implicit *assumptions* and their conclusions often carry *implications* for other beliefs or indicate *prescriptions* for action. (Here are four of the twelve basic items.)

There are some points that one could expect to be debated and places where Missimer has not expressed himself as felicitously as he might. But this is a text that should be considered seriously. It tries hard to illustrate how important fairness, thoroughness, precision and carefulness are to critical thinking. It is largely accurate. It has a sensitivity to natural language and tackles lengthy natural prose passages. And it directs the reader's attention not only to the basic features of an argument itself but also to the argument's embedding context. Some instructors might feel it would best be used in conjunction with another short book (such as Wesley Salmon's *Logic*), that more formally covers topics such as the syllogism, the propositional logic, and relations. Yet it does stand on its own and, if one's course demanded it, the more formal elements could be treated in class by the instructor or by a couple of pages of handouts. Students will follow Missimer's discussions easily and will appreciate his humour and conversational style.

D.J. CROSSLEY
University of Saskatchewan

ANTHONY O'HEAR. *What Philosophy Is*. New York: Humanities Press 1985. Pp. 320. US\$32.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-391-03354-9); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-391-03355-7).

What Philosophy Is, by Anthony O'Hear, attempts 'to introduce philosophy to those with little or no background in the subject, and also to those already embarked on some course of philosophical study' (Preface). It is a comprehensive introduction to the standard questions of philosophical importance, not from any partisan perspective but from the standpoint of the current *status questionis* of each issue covered. If there is a recurring theme reflecting the viewpoint of the author, it is that even philosophers do not have the key to an uninterpreted reality or a wholesale questioning of a system of beliefs — but this is hardly an idiosyncratic view! O'Hear hopes, in the Preface, to show that philosophical issues can be 'of interest and importance to any reflective person,' and he succeeds admirably in presenting philosophy as a vital and self-correcting discipline, while nevertheless giving a fair account of its limitations.

O'Hear divides the three hundred pages of text into only five chapters: 'Metaphysics,' 'Epistemology,' 'Logic and Language,' 'Human Beings,' and 'Ethics and Politics.' These chapters, in turn, are divided into readable sections, each of which takes up a particular aspect of the chapter's theme — for example, 'Human Beings' is divided into 'The Mind,' 'Freedom of Action,' and 'Personal Identity.' In each section, the relevant philosophical questions are traced through the significant stages of their development to their contemporary treatment, with emphasis on the latter. The discussions are fair and well-documented, with references to primary sources in the footnotes and to further readings in the bibliography.

There is a comfortable progression from section to section and from chapter to chapter. Indeed, the great virtue of the book is the author's effort to achieve continuity by explicitly reintroducing certain themes in different contexts — for example, essentialism is discussed in the section on identity and individuation, under 'Metaphysics,' and reintroduced in the discussion of general terms in 'Logic and Language,' with a parenthetical reference to the previous discussion. This serves to illustrate the interdependence of diverse areas of philosophical inquiry, as well as giving a sense of 'what philosophy is,' a matter which, despite the title of the book, is demonstrated rather than discussed!

The only exception to the commendable continuity O'Hear achieves in the book is the section on logic. This begins, promisingly enough, with the comment that the value of logic to philosophy is in helping us distinguish between good and bad arguments, but plunges quickly into a discussion of formal logic, only to end with the rather plaintive (but honest) comment that the logical analysis of language is seen by some as 'inappropriate to the complexities and nuances of even the simplest everyday talk' (154)! The uninitiated reader will doubtless agree, and will benefit little from the inclusion of this section. Given that the practice (at least in North American universities) is to separate the

teaching of logic from the general introduction to philosophy, perhaps this section could have been omitted. To do so, of course, would be to abandon the comprehensiveness that is obviously one of the goals of the book, for an account of twentieth century philosophy without some reference to the ascendancy of logic would be seriously incomplete.

Perhaps the difficulty with the logic section stems from an underlying difficulty with the directedness of the book. O'Hear intends to address both the interested layperson with no background and presumably no guidance, as well as the student of philosophy. Can this be done successfully and productively in one book? For the interested layperson, in places the material is so dense as to be inaccessible without help (for example, the section on contemporary philosophy of language, despite O'Hear's success in showing the logical pattern of its development, becomes quite technical). For the student of philosophy, on the other hand, the level of difficulty is just about right; but the book is so comprehensive that, if supplemented with the study of primary writings as it should be, it would cover far more material than could possibly be dealt with in the average term or semester. An instructor can, of course, be selective, and with the use of O'Hear's references and bibliography to complement them, sections of the book could provide the framework for a balanced and contemporary introduction to philosophy.

What Philosophy Is is written in a rapid and even style. No words are wasted, which doubtless contributes to the impression that philosophy is exciting and on the move (a plus with students). Nevertheless, O'Hear is guilty of a few stylistic sins. There is the occasional extremely long sentence, like this one from the closing pages of 'Human Beings' (252).

Accepting that human personhood and self-consciousness are intimately tied to both one's existence as an animal with definite limits in space and time and one's consciousness of that existence would not only explain the pervasive idea that, despite the speculations of Locke and Parfit, bodily continuity is central to identity and selfhood, but would also provide some backing for the views on the interpretation of the language of others canvassed several times in the previous chapter, as well as for the idea, to be considered in the next chapter, that human beings have certain naturally given limits on their needs and desires that cannot be changed by free choice, either individually or collectively.

Even the experienced philosopher has to do a mental juggling act to hold these pieces together!

Although he usually speaks of 'persons' or 'human beings,' O'Hear occasionally falls into sexist language too, as in the opening sentence to 'Ethics and Politics,' which reads, 'In this chapter we will consider the basis of moral judgments and the nature of the ties that bind men together in societies' (254)! Have not women always been regarded as the cement of society?

Apart from these lapses, *What Philosophy Is* is well-written. O'Hear displays a broad and detailed knowledge of traditional and contemporary philosophy and I heartily recommend his book, with the aforementioned qualifications, to the instructor of neophytes, to more advanced students who

want a concise overview of some current philosophical issue, and to any 'lay-person' who is 'interested' enough to do some pretty hard work!

ELISABETH BOETZKES
University of Alberta

P. T. RAJU. *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1985. Pp. xxxi + 599. US\$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-139-7); US\$24.50 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-140-0).

Raju's stated purpose in this book is to give 'a comparative, critical, and constructive estimate of the schools' of philosophy as they developed in the Asian subcontinent (ix). Although there is one chapter on contemporary Indian and Pakistani philosophy, the work is chiefly devoted to the systems of thought that evolved from about the sixth century BCE until about the tenth century CE. This period has been well covered in several other histories of Indian philosophy, such as those by Dasgupta, Frauwallner, Hiriyanna, Warder and Zimmer. But Raju's aim has been to present Indian thought in the same manner in which J.E. Erdmann and W. Windelband presented the history of Western thought (xi). In fact Raju intends his book 'to be a counterpart in Indian thought to W. Windelband's two volumes of *History of Philosophy* in western thought,' written with an aim to providing a 'textbook for M.A. and other postgraduate students of philosophy' (xxviii).

The book comprises an introduction, seventeen chapters, each devoted to a particular school of thought in classical India, a glossary of Sanskrit philosophical terms, an extensive bibliography and an index. Each chapter contains a brief introduction to the place of the school under discussion within the context of Indian thought, followed by sections on the school's epistemology, metaphysics and ideals for the conduct of life. Each chapter ends with Raju's 'general estimate and constructive comment' on the school. The first chapter outlines the ideas of the Upaniṣads, and subsequent chapters deal with the Mīmāṃsā school the materialists, the jains, the Buddhists, the Nyāya logicians, the Vaiśeṣika metaphysicians, the Sāṅkhya metaphysicians, and the yoga school. The next five chapters deal with the Vedānta schools of Upaniṣadic exegesis. The antepenultimate chapter outlines the philosophy of the *Bhagavadgītā*. The penultimate chapter contains sketches of the thought of several modern intellectuals and religious leaders (few of whom would be accounted philosophers in any but the broadest sense of the word), viz., S. Rad-

hakrishnan, Sri Aurobindo, Rabindranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, Jiddu Krishnamurti, Bhagavan Das and Mohammand Iqbal. The final chapter contains Raju's assessment of Indian philosophy taken as a whole. The plan of the whole book is explained by Raju in his preface, where he notes that the principle of organization is 'neither the importance of the systems nor chronology, but a balanced presentation of Indian philosophy' (xxiii).

Just how balanced Raju's presentation appears to be would depend upon the reader's own philosophical predispositions. Certainly one way in which the book fails rather seriously to be balanced is in the amount of space it devotes to the various schools of philosophy. The entire history of Buddhist philosophy is, for example, treated in forty-six pages, despite the rich diversity of philosophical stances taken by individual Buddhist thinkers over the course of the millennium and a half that Buddhism was an important factor in India's intellectual milieu. But fifty-six pages are devoted to the single Vedāntin philosopher Śaṅkara, whose lifespan was just over thirty years and whose literary career was scarcely more than a decade long. While Śaṅkara is undoubtedly one of classical India's best known philosophers, it is questionable whether his fame rests solely on his philosophical merit. Entire chapters are also dedicated to other Vedāntin philosophers, *viz.*, Rāmānuja and Madhva, despite the fact that these authors display relatively little originality and scarcely do more than reiterate the arguments of their predecessors from other schools in an attempt to secure the orthodoxy of their Upaniṣadic scriptural exegesis. It is not only in the amount of space that Raju devotes to his various subjects that he shows his bias for Śaṅkara's version of Vedānta. In his general estimates and constructive comments, too, the author is rather more apologetic than his claim of having striven for a balanced presentation would lead one to expect. In his estimate of Buddhism, for example, Raju concentrates much of his investigation on examining 'whether the grand conceptual and dialectical developments made out of the original simple truths taught by the Buddha, in spite of the admiration they evoke, can all be absolutely true' (173). In his estimation of Śaṅkara, by contrast, Raju sets out to dispel some of the misconceptions westerners often have of Śaṅkara's Nondualism (Advaita), saying 'It is unfortunate that, although the Advaita of Śaṅkara enjoys the highest prestige among traditional philosophies, it is regarded as acosmism, negativism, illusionism, super-duper monism, etc., in different philosophical and religious circles of the West....If the western or the eastern reader wants philosophical justification, intellectually presented, for the view that our being...is rooted in the Being of God or the Supreme Spirit..., he can find the best in Śaṅkara's Advaita' (408-9). To anyone lacking a strong presentiment for Nondualist Vedānta, Raju's book may appear one-sided. And to anyone hoping to see a sustained treatment, suitable for graduate students, of such important philosophers as Nāgārjuna, Bhartṛhari, Gauḍapāda, Uddyotakara, Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Dignāga, Kumāṛila, Dharmakīrti, Akalaṅka, Udayana, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, and Gaṅgeśa — any one of whom was arguably as philosophically astute, and many of whom were as influential, as Śaṅkara — the book will surely be a disappointment. A rough analogy to Raju's book in Western

philosophy might be a history that devoted several chapters to Aquinas and his successors while giving only a chapter each to all the ancient Greeks, the Hellenistic philosophers, the Jewish philosophers, and the thinkers after the time of Descartes.

Despite its biases, Raju's history of Indian philosophy does have one advantage that very few other such histories can claim: it is written by a philosopher rather than by a philologist or an Indologist. Raju is far more sensitive to real philosophical issues than most historians of Indian thought have been. He makes frequent comparisons of Indian to Western philosophers and provides the reader with a number of thought-provoking observations. In the absence of a companion volume containing well-translated samples of writings by Indian philosophers, Raju's work might not make a very good textbook for postgraduate courses in philosophy, but it would certainly be suitable for an upper level undergraduate course in Vedānta philosophy or in religious studies.

RICHARD Ph. HAYES
University of Toronto

PAUL RAMSEY. *The Truth of Value: A Defense of Moral and Literary Judgment*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1985. Pp. viii + 139. US\$12.95. ISBN 0-391-03058-2.

Ramsey is sure that there is something rotten in Denmark, but he does not seem to be able to find the exact location of the Copenhagen fish market. He pretty well completely misses such things as the philosophical notion of the analogy of being, the difference between a separation and a distinction, the real distinction between essence and existence, and other such notions which might have helped him overcome the philosophical problems involved in his passionate, articulate, and witty reaction to the widespread influence of reductionism (monism) in modern morals and aesthetic theory. Instead, in a manner reminiscent of Thomas Reid's Common-Sense Philosophy, G.E. Moore, and the reaction against reductionism in psychology of the 'Existential' or 'Third Way' psychologists such as Rollo May, Ramsey uses a vast array of information, drawn largely from the universal experiences of ordinary human beings, to show that the reductionistic approach to both moral values and artistic criticism is not only misleading and inappropriate in part but basically and fundamentally perverse, wrongheaded, and self-contradictory as a whole.

The work is subdivided into twelve short chapters of varying lengths (chapter 6 is only a half page long). Ramsey, who is a noted Shakespearean scholar and poet, takes the reader through a series of observations and arguments designed to establish the fact that in matters of morals and the arts, truth, goodness, and beauty are *not* solely in the eye of the beholder. Contra Hume, who thought he had made a great discovery when he figured out, in a manner parallel to the way secondary sense qualities such as sound, color, heat, and so on are only in the sentient subject, that vice and virtue are not in objects themselves but only in the human subject who encounters objects, Ramsey finds that truth, goodness, and value are in the real world of real objects and real, extramental actions. We may not be able to know exactly and immediately in all cases just what is the true and the good in each and every case and situation, but this in no way works against the overpowering and obvious fact of all human experience that truth and goodness are indeed out there in the real world and not simply in us. We do not invent value. We experience it in an empirical way.

Much of Ramsey's work is devoted to exposing the inner incoherence of the skeptical and subjectivist positions. Much more is devoted to illustrating the truth of his own position based upon ordinary language and testimony (often unwilling) provided by other thinkers. According to ordinary, natural, unphilosophically perverted human experience, claims Ramsey, there is in truth no radical and irreconcilable division between fact and value, the is and the ought, the purely natural and the subjectively human, and the objective and the subjective in nature.

The chief problem with all such approaches to reality is that the very structuring of such a dichotomy is artificial and unnatural in the first place. In the real world of actual human experience there is no such thing as a purely naturalistic standpoint. No statement, or even thought, about the real world can be purely descriptive. The obvious fact of experience is that *all* discourse rests upon the presumed reality of values, either moral or literary or both.

This is true even for those who vainly try to deny it. Even Hume, despite his cleverness and genuine literary ability, could not escape this state of affairs. Hume had a personal *purpose* in writing, and he thought he did it *better* than others. Wherever an end exists, even if not explicitly recognized, and a hierarchy of good, better, and best is to be found, there is the presumption of value. And such things occur everywhere and at all times. The whole context of human talk is to talk about valuations. According to Ramsey, 'That is what discourse is and does: it realizes values of various kinds, self-expression, fulfillment of a personal motive to realize some good for oneself, to speak truth (a good), to communicate to other people (that is, to commune with them, a good), whatever. Language is motivated and human, which is to say immersed in value, presuming value, value-laden, value-seeking, value-realizing' (34). Even if skepticism, absolute relativism, and complete subjectivism were true, we would never be able to tell anyone about it. Not even ourselves!

The heart of Ramsey's thesis is that humans are as much moral animals as they are rational and feeling animals. These functions cannot be isolated

from each other in real human beings. Contrary to what Hume thought, the practical consequences of his attempted dichotomy would (or would not) produce, his not-so-great speculative discovery has in fact produced far-reaching and serious consequences for everyone in society. The results in terms of private and public morals have been devastating. Selfishness and egoism now reign supreme, and the right to privacy has been carried to a ridiculous extreme.

So what are value, truth, and goodness? Ramsey really cannot say, at least not in a way which would satisfy the academic fanatic with over-active definition glands. Those who are sitting on their hands while waiting for univocal definitions are going to be inactive for a long time.

However, such terms are in fact understood by everyone, including the analytic-minded. Note the way they insist that such terms *should* be defined. The author proposes that terms such as value, truth, and goodness are basic terms which cannot and need not be defined in any way other than by example. This is after all pedagogy at its best; it's how real life teaches real people.

Ramsey has certainly made some good points in a very direct, punchy, and fresh fashion. One might, however, want to question some of his logic. For instance, can we really say that statements which logically lead to a true statement must also be true (33-4)? Mulroney is a Canadian PM. Therefore, all circus clowns are Canadian PMs and Mulroney is a circus clown? Nevertheless, this is a work which could be of great interest to all those inclined towards ordinary language philosophy, aesthetics, and natural law ethics.

F.F. CENTORE
St. Jerome's College
University of Waterloo

FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, ed. *Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. 426. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-25555-4); US\$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-27554-7).

This is a collection of seventeen pieces, all but one published elsewhere. It is useful to have these works intact and together in one place, even though they would not be difficult to obtain separately. At the end of the volume there is a bibliography that includes mention of about 27 books, a dozen or so U.S. Supreme Court opinions (and not the oft-cited Georgia case *Pavevich v. New England Life Insurance*), mention of a few novels and short stories, and over

three score articles mostly from law or philosophy journals. It is interesting to discover (from examining authors' references throughout) that philosophers have written about privacy only in the last couple of decades. Prosser, e.g., cites many articles appearing between 1912 and 1960 but nothing I recognize as from philosophy.

It seems less suitable in a review of an anthology to comment upon the value of individual pieces (especially when these are largely well-known already) than to address the impression the collection itself makes, as a book read from beginning to end. So omitting the first four readings (which lay some background), the articles first appeared in 1960, 1964, 1968, 1971, 1970, 1978, 1975, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1984. What, according to the implicit structure of this book, has developed in the field of privacy? Indeed such a progression even inspires one to ask whether there has been any progress.

After his good introductory essay, the editor begins with anthropologist Robert F. Murphy. Males of the Taureg peoples of North Africa wear veils (while the women do not) because maintaining social distance, especially in 'settings of ambivalence and ambiguity,' is useful in defining and protecting their more demanding social roles. (Mirror sun glasses, he notes, do the same work here.) Of privacy, the suggestion is that human nature and its social roles require (logically) some element of distancing between persons. Alan Westin, in a next selection, from his book *Privacy and Freedom*, comments on the literature about privacy in the animal world, the primitive world, and the modern human. Its attractions are universal. His main interest, however, is in privacy as a protection against external intrusion, especially in 'the struggle to limit surveillance by authorities.' The final foundational essay is the seminal Warren and Brandeis's 'The Right to Privacy' published in 1980. Devoted to showing that the existing common law has an implicit basis for a tort called 'invasion of privacy,' the exact worry of Warren and Brandeis was not official surveillance but that 'gossip had become a trade.' They urged an explicit ground of action against yellow journalists based on the right to privacy biased one's 'inviolate personality.'

William Prosser, in 'Privacy,' written in 1960, rejected this essentialism of personality in favor of a nominalism; he suggests that case law reveals four 'only loosely related torts' (intrusion, disclosure, false light, and appropriation) covered by 'a single word supplied by Warren and Brandeis.' Against this, Edward J. Bloustein responded in 1964 seeking to find the 'essence of the wrong.' Bloustein maintains that courts have honored the singular interest that Warren and Brandeis revealed in human dignity and individuality. Furthermore, the judicial protection of privacy carries into non-tort cases, e.g., on unreasonable search and seizure. And it is the same unique value that (until recently in the U.S., one must note) protected personnel against the use of polygraphs by governments and corporations.

Charles Fried in 'Privacy,' 1968, developed the issue of official surveillance further by imagining total electronic monitoring of persons on parole or probation. Why does this seem wrong? Such devices deprive the individual of an essential aspect of dignity. Privacy is a thing given up (as 'capital') in a trust-

ing relationship and retained in its opposite. Fried would find that Prosser's analysis gives to privacy no intrinsic significance. Focused on trust (and also love, respect, and friendship), Fried's essay, it seems to me, develops an essentialist theory of privacy and so is in the Warren-Brandeis tradition. And yet it also breaks new ground, by analysing privacy as a value beyond its protective aspect.

Stanley I. Benn, in 'Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons,' 1971, elaborates a thesis in the same tradition. He, in fact, distinguishes two questions with two answers, arguing first that there is a moral presumption in favor of acting *in private if one chooses* and second that there are certain 'ideals of life' that require privacy as such, e.g., the Kantian ideal of the autonomous person. Operating in the background, in both answers, is always the concept of respect for the person, 'as one engaged on a kind of self-creative enterprise.' Following Westin and Fried, Stanley Benn sees privacy as a protective or immunity right, yet, like Fried, he gives it a more positive characteristic related to personal development. Two essays by Robert S. Gerstein ('Privacy and Self-incrimination' [1970] and 'Intimacy and Privacy' [1978]) developed both these aspects of privacy: the protective and the more positive. Dignity is again in the backdrop. Forced (not voluntary) self-accusation violates it. Invasions into intimate activities, where the perspective of the observer is innately destructive, is also violative. The assumption would seem to be that these intimate activities develop human personhood — a moral good or right.

The essay by Judith Thomson, 'The Right to Privacy' (1975), was another nominalist critique of the immunity theory, with implicit indifference to the personhood thesis. Those rights that have come to be named 'rights of privacy' are all derivative from other independent rights, e.g., in property or in not being harmed. Whatever explains the essentialist search (she does not comment) 'there is no need to find the that-which-is-in-common to all rights in the right to privacy cluster...' The next two essays in the volume seek to answer Thomson's challenge. James Rachels ('Why Privacy is Important' [1975]) returns to Fried's theme of how one moulds one's various personal relationships through the controlled distribution of intimate information. That fact will not yield to an analysis in terms of rights independent of privacy. The essay by Jeffrey H. Reiman ('Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood' [1976]) is a critical reaction to both Thomson and Rachels-Fried, and a reinforcement of Benn's approach. 'The right to privacy is the right to the existence of a social practice which makes it possible for me to think of this existence as *mine*.' Going deeper than Thomson on property and eschewing Rachels's (and Fried's) orientation which seems to make a market in personal information, Reiman seeks to develop more fully the interest of an inviolate personality 'in becoming, being, and remaining a person.' Limits on official surveillance are expressly implied.

The special contribution of Richard Wasserstrom in 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions' (1978) is in reflecting upon the relation of the notion that there are 'private kinds of things' to certain attitudes, especially 'countercultural.' Privacy may, indeed, serve aspects of existing social prac-

tice that are undesirable, rendering us more vulnerable and less spontaneous than we need be. Wasserstrom, like Reiman, questions the market orientation to privacy. But in the next essay, Richard Posner, 'An Economic Theory of Privacy' (1978), takes up the market approach expressly. Here the interest in privacy is said to be solely instrumental to the production of utility. Posner finds that the common law had developed privacy rules (probably unconsciously) directed to that economic end, but he is unable to understand why there has been the recent proliferation of sunshine statutes. On the economic approach these enactments are 'mysterious' and 'perverse.' He does not consider what other values besides utility must be operating.

The penultimate essay is by Ruth Gavison, 'Privacy and the Limits of the Law' (1980). It is an omnibus piece that summarizes and definitely advances the inquiry. As a neutral concept privacy is composed of 'secrecy, anonymity, and solitude'; against this, there is 'information-gathering, attention, and physical access.' She explicitly rejects Bloustein's view that 'all invasions [of privacy] are violations of human dignity' by observing that 'there are ways to offend dignity and personality that have nothing to do with privacy.' (One should note that this reply actually rebuts the different theory that all violations of human dignity are invasions of privacy.) Now should one be committed to privacy? While she finds various values operating (e.g., pluralism, mental health, creativity), her theory is essentialist. 'Privacy has as much coherence and attractiveness as other values to which we have made a clear commitment, such as liberty.' The final essay is written by the editor, 'Privacy and Intimate Information' (1984). Here Schoeman seeks to state the essential thing about privacy, without being merely 'reactive to an imperfect social world.' In a more positive vein then, privacy marks out something of greater moral significance than an immunity. 'Self-disclosure' tells the other that one places a high value on the information given. Having contexts in which this act is appropriate and also inappropriate allows for the development, it would seem, of the self in its several modes. Thus the concern with privacy reflects a respect for persons as persons and a belief that one's worth is not entirely to be found in one's use for the ends of others.

What, then, has developed in the theory of privacy? This progression of work reveals, it seems to me, a renewed interest in the theory of human nature. Philosophical work upon other contested ethical concepts, e.g., justice, freedom, or equality, has not been drawn in that direction. Perhaps the recent interest in privacy yields more to that omission than to the perpetual fear of an oppressive state. In that, there is progress.

RICHARD BRONAUGH
University of Western Ontario

TZVETAN TODOROV. *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984. Pp. xiii + 132. US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1290-0); US\$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1291-9).

When we look at the typography of Todorov's book, we see that a dialogue of sorts is in progress: plain text alternates with italic; Todorov's words are plain, Bakhtin's italic. Seeing this, we might think that Todorov is situating himself with respect to Bakhtin in such a way as to exemplify the dialogical principle in the book under review. Bakhtin, champion of the utterance, of the speech act rather than the rule of language, of the cacaphony of voices that is history and society, of the heterogeneity of the voices, of their various intonations, of the novel whose discourse most nearly captures or mimes the human context that his contemporary compatriot Roman Jakobson, for one, would ignore, holds that interpretation is a matter of *responsive understanding*. Accordingly, the reader might reasonably expect to enter as a player, understandingly responding to Todorov's understanding response to those things to which Bakhtin's writings are themselves understanding responses. Such, however, is not the case.

In brief, Todorov tends to locate Bakhtin with respect to the human sciences, including linguistics, stylistics, and poetics, whereas Bakhtin is highly critical of the abstracting reductivism of scientific formalism and, hence, of the very possibility of a science of language as Saussure conceived it. The question to be put to *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* is a delicate one difficult of answer: is Bakhtin's thought close enough to that of the scientists of language to be contrasted profitably with it, or is its difference lost by being shown in their light?

I take Todorov's bias to be given in the first sentence of the introduction to the book, where he notes that Bakhtin could be praised as the most important Soviet thinker in the *human sciences* and as this century's greatest *theoretician* of literature and, further, that these sciences and literature are connected in needing each other. The literary theorist must go outside literature 'to other areas,' and it is clear that the areas Todorov has in mind are the human sciences, specialization in which 'perhaps,' '(who knows?)' requires an interest in literature. I think Todorov has it backwards: the areas to which Bakhtin would have the literary theorist turn are precisely those that had not been theorized, the popular, the folk, the raucous, the carnivalesque, or the elements in them that resist mastery; and the sciences 'need' the novel more than the literary theorist needs them.

Still in the introduction, we meet this trio: the *utterance*, whose most neglected, if not most important, feature is *dialogism*, which is best exemplified by the *novel*, where the brief discussion of each shows Todorov's hand in a somewhat different way. The *utterance* is, correctly, said to be Bakhtin's privileged object of investigation, but it is identified as the product of the interaction between individual expression and abstract grammatical form, the objects of stylistic criticism and structural linguistics, respectively, or between

the context of utterance and grammatical form. 'Individual expression' and 'context of utterance' are used interchangeably. This does not mislead someone who knows that for Bakhtin contexts are other voices, which are, perforce, expressive. For the reader unfamiliar with Bakhtin, however, to whom contexts are apt to be mute conditions, it is at best misleading in this way to mask the voice behind the individual expression. For what occupies Bakhtin is the timbre, the life, the intonation of the voice, even though no single voice expresses the individuality of a single speaker. This new object, born of a speech act and the laws of language, is to be studied by a new science, *translinguistics*.

Dialogism is introduced as the *intertextual* dimension of the utterance. 'Intertextuality' was defined by Julia Kristeva as the transposition of one sign system into another. Signifying practices are fields of transpositions of various signifying systems, fields within which such systems are exchanged and permuted with the result that the 'place' of enunciations and their denoted 'objects,' all indexed to sign systems, are repositioned. The 'places' and 'objects' of speech are, then, not single or complete. We are given here Bakhtin through Kristeva, and when told that all discourse is in dialogue with past and future discourses on the same subject and that a single voice 'can make itself heard only by blending into the complex choir of other voices already in place,' we hear Todorov singing in tune with her and with the science of semiotics. One of Bakhtin's points is precisely that there is no such thing as a single voice, a single speaker: each speaker is plural and incomplete, himself dialogical, himself a 'complex choir of other voices,' and what Todorov *does* in distributing the words of Bakhtin, Kristeva, and Todorov through a single space comports with this. But what he *says* misleads: when two voices blend, they may sound as one, and there is no dialogism here. The difference, the otherness, of the other voices disappears, Bakhtin might say, only if we close our ears; for it is there. Cultures and human beings alike are *beterologous*, constituted by irreducibly diverse types of discourse, where discourse is in Bakhtin's words 'language in its concrete and living totality,' 'utterance.' To say, as Todorov does, that the human being is irreducibly heterogeneous is to say nothing that would surprise anyone minimally versed in Western thought. Bakhtin coined 'heterology' so that he could surprise.

The last of the trio we meet in the introduction is the *novel*. Homologous with history, culture, and human being in its containing different discourses, none reducible to the others, the novel is a monad accessible to inquiry. Bakhtin studied it in relation to other literary genres and to its subgenres and did at least two detailed studies of novelists (*Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* and *Rabelais and his World*). In the grip of a classifying fever, Todorov conveys little sense of the richness of the concept, however, but rather tells us that Bakhtin worked out a stylistic of the genre to which he later added a structural thematics, adding up to a 'poetics of the utterance.' Todorov thus situates Bakhtin with respect to the human sciences: whether this highlights or masks Bakhtin's difference, his newness, will depend in large part on what else by and about Bakhtin the reader has read.

The book under review inhabits the discourse of semiotics and as such ex-

cludes other discourses Bakhtin would incorporate; yet it might be thought to be the sort of 'reading against' or dialogue that lets difference appear, and this despite Todorov's saying at the end of the introduction: 'I have refrained from entering into a dialogue with Bakhtin: the first voice must be heard before the dialogue can begin.' For he claims to have entered Bakhtin's texts by applying the dialogical principle to them, saying of his book: 'I can't quite assert that this text is really my own.' 'I would like...to present Bakhtin's ideas by constructing a kind of montage, halfway between anthology and commentary, where my sentences would not be quite my own.' The reader begins to spin because she has been led to think that she is going to get Bakhtin 'neat,' but she stops herself by supposing Todorov to be alluding here to the inevitable repositioning of the place and the object of utterance that occurs when one signifying system is transposed into another. Todorov as the place of 'his' utterances and Bakhtin's texts as their object are distributed along different lines of force, their unity fractured. Todorov's words and Bakhtin's texts are, in the new signifying field specified by their confrontation, different from what they were before, and Bakhtin 'neat' just is, in this context, Bakhtin shot through with Todorov. Was Todorov being ingenuous when he said that he will not enter into dialogue *with* Bakhtin? Or was he dramatizing the fact that the dialogue is already *within* Bakhtin/Todorov?

In the body of the book, where the arabic numbering begins, there are neither parallel independent texts that 'speak to' each other nor words distributed throughout a new signifying field, but rather short quotations from Bakhtin that alternate with Todorov's remarks. In abounding with these quotations, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* exemplifies the view that discourse is indirect, everything always already having been said, and in saying: 'my name could be added to the pseudonyms (sic)...used by Bakhtin,' Todorov puts into question the authority of the book. The book itself, however, is a craftsmanlike laying out of Bakhtin's contributions to four areas divided thematically by Todorov into epistemology, translinguistics, history of literature, and philosophical anthropology. Todorov is an able expositor and a veteran player in the series, 'Theory and History of Literature,' of which this book is Volume 13. Volume 1 is his *Introduction to Poetics*. He introduces the reader to a voice in which one can hear, if she listens aright, other contemporary voices, strains of which we have not been accustomed to hear; in particular, strains of the voice of Wittgenstein sound in the speech of Bakhtin.

MARY BITTNER WISEMAN
Brooklyn College and The Graduate Center
City University of New York

DOUGLAS N. WALTON. *Physician-Patient Decision Making: A Study in Medical Ethics*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1985. Pp. xv + 265. US\$35.00. ISBN 0-313-24888-5.

Question: What is the easiest way for a philosopher to write a book on medical ethics? Answer: Exploit the 'applied philosophy' perception of the field to recapitulate your previous work. That essentially is what Walton has done, and the result is predictably disappointing.

The 'philosophical' question that inaugurates this book is, 'What is medical treatment?' Walton's answer is 'intelligently planned and directed activity' (xi). Who might ever have thought otherwise? Not even the harshest critics of the medical profession, for they challenge the goals animating the practice of medicine, not its planned and directed nature. Walton believes, though, that explicating the notion of treatment as action provides 'the best understanding of the philosophical basis of medicine as a practical art' (xi). His investigation has a moral dimension as well because the model of medical treatment constructed 'is meant to be a normative model of how doctors and patients *should* conduct themselves in matters of treatment' (xii). The unity of the enterprise is forced, however, so that the book oscillates unsteadily between its philosophical theory and its ethical theory of medical treatment.

Chapter 1 begins with the 'principal contention' that medical treatment is an intentional action (4). But because the treatment is medical, it can be fully defined only in relation to the medical profession, and that requires an examination of the physician-patient relationship. Analyzing these two notions yields Walton's definition of medical treatment: 'an act by a physician... brought about with the intention to benefit the health of a person by some procedure or management' (27). Chapter 2 points out that medical treatment involves two people and goes on to address the issue of moral and legal responsibility for treatment, primarily through criticism of a contractual model. Understanding the philosophical basis of treatment as intentional action then requires excursions into action theory and practical reasoning. The next chapter explains what an action is and what a plan is. The reader learns that actions are 'often highly complex and variable' and 'may be differently described for different purposes' (59). Practical reasoning then is discussed through synopses of Aristotle, Anscombe, and von Wright on practical inference and of satisficing and optimizing as models of decision making.

Part Two critically examines the distinction between killing and allowing to die and the problem of side effects and contains a helpful discussion of the principle of double effect. Part Three considers the nature of practical ethics and the implications of practical reasoning as a method of rational decision making for ethical theory. A practical reasoning approach exposes the 'incompleteness' of both absolutism and consequentialism — neither can handle the tension between rules and circumstances. While sympathetic to the moral significance of circumstances, Walton nonetheless argues that the intentional termination of life is absolutely prohibited for the familiar reasons that the decision

is final, irreversible, and fraught with uncertainty. But appealing to the special features of this decision does not show how a practical reasoning approach manages the general rules-circumstances conflict better than traditional ethical theories. Dialogue is recommended as a method of resolving disagreements between patient and physician, with more hope than anything else. In fact, the outcome appears less important than the process: 'regardless of who turns out to triumph..., the game may be quite satisfactory and informative for both parties if their positions are more fully articulated by the dialogue.' (225).

Walton's ethical theory therefore does not handle a central problem in medical ethics, how conflicts of values between patient and physician are to be resolved. Practical reasoning tests and refines the values an individual holds while that individual is translating them into intentions and actions. But a patient and physician beginning with different values and using the same method of practical reasoning can arrive at different conclusions (232-4). Moreover, Walton's test for the moral and legal acceptability of treatment, which he regards as supported by his philosophical analysis, is simply the prevailing standard in the law of negligence — 'the customary or accepted practice of the physicians in the appropriate field of specialty for the type of treatment in question' (236). Walton discusses legal cases in a variety of contexts, but, incredibly, most are culled from a work published in 1968, and the ones Walton favours are at least fifty years old.

The philosophical theory extracted from the analysis of treatment is only accidentally about medicine. Walton's example of washing one's car serves as well as anything from medicine to illustrate theoretical points, and the account that results does not illuminate anything special about medical treatment. In this respect, the title of the book is a misnomer.

The book is frustrating to read. It is poorly organized, across chapters and within chapters. For instance, a contractual model of the physician-patient relationship is discussed in at least three chapters. To make matters worse, Walton laboriously criticizes a version of this model — contracting for a successful outcome of treatment — that is implausible, has no basis in contract law, and has not been advocated by anyone in medical ethics. Another example is Walton's initial insistence that the goal of treatment is curing or healing (6-7). If so, doctors do little treating because they do little curing or healing. Only much later is treatment distinguished from curing and healing (211-12). Transitions too often are abrupt or non-existent so that one frequently wonders why a topic is being discussed. In Chapter 5, for instance, which is about 'Dialogue and Practical Inquiry,' there are, *inter alia*, sections on the 'Pragmatics of Practical Inference,' 'Expert Medical Testimony as Evidence,' 'Mutual Understandings and Dialogues,' 'Aristotle's Model of Treatment as Production,' and 'Non-Treatment Decisions.' The overall plan seems to be dictated more by what Walton has read and written than by any compelling unity of theme or progression of argument. Summaries of the views of others are used much too extensively. Reading 'according to _____,' 'as _____, points out,' and '_____ notes' quickly becomes tedious. The overall style is rambling, repetitious, and enervating. Where was the editor?

For what audience was this book written? It contains too much summary and too little novel argumentation to interest philosophers. Doctors would find the philosophical discussions opaque and regard what they do comprehend as a prolonged and probably unnecessary defense of banal conclusions that are too general to be practically useful. There are, fortunately, better things to read in medical ethics.

BARRY HOFFMASTER

University of Western Ontario

JERRY WEINBERGER. *Science, Faith, and Politics: Francis Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1985. Pp. 336. US\$32.50. ISBN 0-8014-1817-8.

In this learned, idiosyncratic and old fashioned book, Weinberger seeks to reestablish the centrality of Bacon's philosophy for the modern world. 'To illuminate the most pressing problem of the modern age: What may loosely be called the problem of technology.'

That sounds straightforward enough, but there is a hidden agenda in the purpose of this book that complicates the enterprise and ultimately defeats it: the a priori judgment 'that scientific rationalism separates eternal being from becoming with the effect that everything divine becomes objectively knowable, while the objectively knowable becomes the basis of the means for human will. We are estranged from an awesome god because science makes the divine all too human and familiar.' Now Weinberger here is quoting not from Bacon but from Heidegger, and it is most doubtful that the intent of a 16th century Elizabethan can be understood if we shine on his work the skeptical light of a 20th century philosopher.

By careful and painful exegesis of the texts, in the manner of the 19th century German scholars, Weinberger hopes to establish Bacon's links with the ancient utopians and his relevance for our age — made hideous by nuclear fallouts and secular, sectarian passions. Concentrating on *Advancement of Learning* and with slight attention to *New Atlantis*, he seeks to establish similarities and differences not only with the classical world (Greece to Rome) but also with Bacon's contemporary, Machiavelli. Weinberger burrows into the ancient sources with an extraordinary erudition and zeal. He distills, separates, compares and translates. This is *explication de texte* with a vengeance. But he is a mole digging in the dark where one needs the flight of eagles. Wein-

berger ignores the *historical* Lord Chancellor, the prophetic thinker with one foot in the high Middle Ages, but with his eyes set on distant horizons.

It is important to show, as the author does, that Bacon was aware of the irreducible tension between a fallen human nature and the fruits of human knowledge. But this was the man who argued that religion like science was to be judged by its fruits. His life was set in a period of religious furies and emerging political tempests that were heralds of the Puritan Revolution beyond the curve of his time.

This was the man who (in Farrington's paraphrase) denounced Aristotle as a wretched sophist, his logic a mound of madness, his metaphysics a superstructure of cobwebs erected on a small foundation; a man for whom Plato was a dogmatic theologian.

It was said of Bacon by his monarch, James I, that 'he writes philosophy like a Lord Chancellor.' Yet posterity remembers him as he who said 'the pursuit of truth in science is inseparable from the improvement of the human lot.'

Because Weinberger deals with history like a philosopher, the historical Bacon is entombed in enigma and paradox. The reason for this is that *explicitation de texte* without careful reference to other and more seminal parts of Bacon's *opera* will simply not reveal his intent. In Weinberger's study we learn of Bacon's similarity and difference with his ancient predecessors. What is needed is some consideration of his debt to his contemporaries. Bacon was a diligent reader of the technical works of his time, the manuals of metallurgists, porcelain makers, etc. It was from these that he developed a new vision of how to investigate nature and to elevate the art of invention to a sublime position among human potentialities. It was this aspect of his work that led the founders of the Royal Society to consider Francis Bacon their patron saint. There is hardly more than obscure allusions to all of this in Weinberger's study. Bacon was a lucid writer but he comes alive for us only if we see him in the context of his time. Then in Loren Eiseley's phrase, the Lord Chancellor Bacon becomes 'the man who saw through time.'

ROBERT G. COLODNY
University of Pittsburgh

WILLARD A. YOUNG. *Fallacies of Creationism*. Calgary, AB: Detselig Enterprises Limited 1985. Pp. 302. Cdn\$21.95. ISBN 0-920490-53-0.

No matter what one thinks of scientific creationism, it has certainly put some of the 'old verve' into the discussions of origins. Although most philosophers interested in such issues would tend to agree that such discussions have been and are being carried on in a much more fruitful manner by others than the proponents of scientific creationism, and that it is too bad that so much time has to be wasted fighting old and fruitless battles, nevertheless, I think that scientific creationism at least provides us with the occasion to think through again and present in an intelligible fashion many issues of philosophical significance. We are reminded both that enough progress has been made on some of these issues so as to make scientific creationism an implausible position, and that such fundamental issues as the nature of science, religion and morality and their interrelationships are far from being settled.

Willard Young, a Canadian physicist and researcher, has taken on the scientific creationists in this clearly written volume, and although both philosophers of science and of religion will, I believe, find this work lacking in the kind of philosophical sophistication about science and religion they rightly admire and promote, other aspects of Young's work should prove helpful to both philosophers and theologians.

Young divides his work into three parts. In the first part, he provides a brief sketch of the historical factors leading to religious fundamentalism in the United States. He also gives a detailed and informative survey of creationist institutions and proponents in Canada and the United States, as well as an outline of some of their efforts to promote creationism in the classroom by influencing text-book selection and their attempts by legislative means to have scientific creationism given 'equal time' with evolutionary theory in science classes in the public schools. In addition, Young traces, in the creationist literature, some of their profound misgivings about what they consider to be the very negative moral and political consequences of the materialistic philosophy of evolutionism. For those unacquainted with creationist views and activities, the first part is an informative introduction both to a movement that may seem startling, frightening and repugnant and to views about science, religion, morality and how they have been and ought to be related, which may appear to be very wrong. Young provides some of the factual material, but neither the philosophical nor theological analyses, needed to address these challenges of scientific creationism.

Part Two, the briefest, only some twenty-four pages, is a too short history of the development of Darwinian evolutionary theory. Most philosophers will know most of the history presented. For laypersons, it will be helpful but more would have been better. Surprisingly, Young does not say very much about the *content* of Darwin's theory.

In Part Three, Young comes to the scientific heart of the matter. What is creation science? What is evolutionary theory? What support is there for each?

What are the creationists' scientific objections to evolutionary theory, and how good are they?

Young devotes chapters to the nature of current evolutionary theory and to theories of the origin of life. The latter is a mini-course in biochemistry and molecular biology for beginners. He shows that creationists' attempts to use the second law of thermodynamics to prove the impossibility of evolution are utterly unsound and that their application of probability theory to demonstrate the extreme unlikelihood of the emergence of living forms from non-living materials is naive and biologically uninformed. He also makes clear that creationist attacks on both the fossil evidence for evolution and the methods of determining the age of the earth and the universe have no merit. Young concludes with a brief survey of the paleontological and anthropological evidence for the evolutionary origins of the human species.

Young is seeking to convince the educated layperson who might be fooled by all its scientific trappings that underneath scientific creationism lies fundamentalist religion. He is reasonably successful in this endeavour. Scientists, however, will probably neither learn much new science nor find the kinds of clarification of the nature of science and religion that can be brought to bear on the former by a philosopher of science and on the latter by either philosopher of religion or theologian. Philosophers and theologians, on the other hand, may learn some science but be dissatisfied with Young's discussions of science and religion. On those scores, I recommend strongly Philip Kitcher's *Abusing Science: The Case Against Creationism*, for a brilliant summary of a current philosophical view of the nature of science. Ian Barbour's *Issues in Science and Religion*, though covering much more than the issues of creation and evolution, remains, in my mind, the best current religiously sophisticated discussion of that issue. Yet, one shouldn't expect everything from one volume. Young's work is part of what must be an interdisciplinary effort to seek the truth as best we can about origins.

WILLIAM A. ROTTSCHAEFER

Lewis and Clark College