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### **Editor**

Roger A. Shiner  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Alberta  
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada  
T6G 2E5

### **Editeur associé**

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Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières  
C.P. 500  
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TABLE OF CONTENTS/TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Jeffrey Abramson, <i>Liberation and Its Limits</i> (Owen Flanagan) . . . . .	47
Hans Arens, <i>Aristotle's Theory of Language and its Traditions: Texts from 500 to 1500</i> (Jonathan Barnes) . . . . .	50
Michel Blais, <i>La logique: une introduction</i> (Jean Leroux) . . . . .	51
Jean Brun, <i>L'homme et le langage</i> (Ghyslaine Charron) . . . . .	53
Guido Calabresi, <i>Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Law</i> (Leslie Green) . . . . .	55
George di Giovanni and H.S. Harris, eds., <i>Between Kant and Hegel</i> (Joseph C. Flay) . . . . .	57
Ilham Dilman, <i>Freud and Human Nature</i> (Forrest Williams) . . . . .	59
Martin Golding, <i>Legal Reasoning</i> (Jerome E. Bickenbach) . . . . .	62
Gordon Graham, <i>Historical Explanation Reconsidered</i> (W.H. Dray) . . . . .	64
Virginia Held, <i>Rights and Goods: Justifying Social Action</i> (Alan J.M. Milne) . . . . .	66
J.F.M. Hunter, <i>Understanding Wittgenstein</i> (Lynne Rudder Baker) . . . . .	69
Douglas Kellner, <i>Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism</i> (John McMurtry) . . . . .	71
Joseph Kockelmans, <i>On the Truth of Being</i> (Charles B. Guignon) . . . . .	74
Mike W. Martin, ed., <i>Self-Deception and Self-Understanding</i> (T.S. Champlin) . . . . .	76
Francis Jeffrey Pelletier and John King-Farlow, eds., <i>New Essays on Plato</i> (Donald Zeyl) . . . . .	79
Edward Regis, Jr., <i>Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism</i> (Loren E. Lomasky) . . . . .	81
Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn, eds., <i>The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel</i> (Robert Burch) . . . . .	84
Joel C. Weinsheimer, <i>Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method</i> (Jerald Wallulis) . . . . .	86
Crispin Wright, <i>Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects</i> (Steven J. Wagner) . . . . .	89
John Yolton, <i>John Locke: An Introduction</i> (Douglas Odegard) . . . . .	91

# AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Contents of Vol. 63, No. 4; December, 1985

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## ARTICLES

**B. L. Davidson**

Belief *de re* and *de se*

**George R. Carlson**

Hume and the Moral Realists

**Toomas Karmo**

Are Singular Terms Needed for Describing  
the World?

**A. E. Pitson**

Frank Jackson and the Characterisation of Sense-Data

**P. J. Crittenden**

Sartrean Transcendence: Winning and Losing

**Michael Wreen**

Vagueness, Values, and the World/World Wedge

**Paul Weirich**

Decision Instability

## DISCUSSION

**Ellery Eells**

Weirich on Decision Instability

**Alan E. Fuchs**

Rationality and Future Desires

**C. L. Hardin**

Frank Talk About the Colours of Sense-Data

**Michael Pendlebury**

Hetherington on Possible Objects

**Don Mannison**

Meaning and Metaphor

## CRITICAL NOTICES

**Robert Elliot**

*Ecological Ethics and Politics*

by H. J. McCloskey, and

*The Ethics of Environmental Concern*

by Robin Attfield

**Kim Sterelny**

*From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science*

by S. P. Stich

## REVIEW ARTICLE

**Maurita Harney**

The Philosophy of Technology

Review of works by P. Durbin and

F. Rapp, F. Rapp, and S. Turkle

## BOOKS RECEIVED, NOTES AND NEWS, INDEX

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JEFFREY B. ABRAMSON. *Liberation and Its Limits: The Moral and Political Thought of Freud*. New York: The Free Press 1984. Pp. x + 160. US\$14.95. ISBN: 0-02-900210-9.

This is a subtle and interesting book. Abramson is a political theorist who sees Freud's work as 'perhaps the most important commentary penned on the human condition in this century' (3). One problem with taking Freud this seriously as a political thinker, of believing that his picture of human nature and civilization is true, or close to the truth, is that it is a decidedly gloomy picture. Or at least this is so on the standard reading.

Following the lead of Herbert Marcuse and Norman O. Brown — but without the leftism of the former or the romanticism of the latter — Abramson suggests not so much that the standard reading of Freud is false, as that there are possibilities for reading him as less of a pessimist, and for finding in him various suggestions for liberation from our dark, seamy, and destructive side. Abramson orients his reading of Freud from a communitarian perspective. His own view is Aristotlean in the sense that he sees human flourishing as necessarily involving deep attachments to other persons and shared projects in a community which is itself largely constituted by these attachments and shared projects. Some of the same concerns with contemporary liberalism that motivate Michael Sandel's recent *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* and Alasdair MacIntyre's more conservative, *After Virtue* are at work here.

Although the book is subtitled 'The Moral and Political Thought of Freud' the book really has three movements, each of which displays a somewhat different relation to Freud's thought. The first two chapters are meant to 'cull' an affirmative teaching regarding love and the possibility of community from Freud's views on early childhood. The third through sixth chapters provide an orthodox reading of Freud's views on the death instinct and the Oedipus complex and the problems these create. The last few chapters specify the limits of what can be culled from Freud regarding community.

Abramson's strategy is to try to establish once and for all that 'Freud is not just a latter day Hobbes' (4), and thereby avoid the conclusion that psycho-

analysis is committed to a 'profoundly anticomunity and radically individualist' picture (in this respect against Phillip Rieff who in his important book, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*, calls psychoanalysis 'the doctrine of the private man defending himself against public encroachment'). Abramson's basic point, and one also made by Hume against Hobbes, is that the state of nature is not one of individuals staged *ab initio* for a 'war of each against each' but rather it is a world of infants possessing a 'deep emotional need for the company of others, for the love and protection of the parents' (10). Abramson then tries to sketch how infantile Eros might ground not only the 'happy love' of childhood but also friendship and community in later life. He emphasizes that the dependent and prosocial condition of the child and the mutuality of its early relations with its parents provide the possibility conditions for 'shared purposes and common goals' in later life. Because Abramson makes such central use in this part of his argument of the idea that the earliest relations between parent and child are pivotal in forming the psychological capacities necessary for community in later life, he might have made profitable use of Nancy Chodorow's argument in *The Reproduction of Mothering*, the best, and most complete, neo-Freudian argument to date for this important idea.

Next, Abramson addresses the following pivotal question (which I will call 'Hume's Question,' since Hume asked something very much like it): 'The question for politics, however, is whether the more distant attachments of citizenship can retain a sufficient hold on Eros so as to provide citizens, and not just families, with any meaningful common identity, and sustained sense of being implicated in one another's aspirations.' This problem is especially worrisome from a Freudian perspective because even 'if Eros can yet empower convictions of citizenship in the modern world, it will not be an Eros taken over intact from childhood and the infant-parent tie. As the opposing force of the death instinct begins to take its toll, the infantile experience of Eros is simply "doomed to extinction"' (30).

Abramson is right, of course, that whatever glue there is to bind community in later life is not 'taken over intact' from the earliest relations. Furthermore, because the child and his parents are situated asymmetrically with respect to power, its earliest experiences are a natural source of ambivalence about both authority and group living. The parents, after all, are engaged not only in offering (and receiving) love but also in constraining the child's desires and behavior and eventually in inculcating moral and social values. But this much can be accepted without buying any distinctively Freudian doctrine. Furthermore, this set of assumptions sets no overwhelming obstacles in the way of the idea that the positive, but not unmixed, experience of family can, if properly nurtured, provide the necessary foundations for wider shared community.

But Abramson, because he accepts the orthodox view that there is a death instinct, a primal instinctual urge opposing our affiliative urges, allows exactly the obstacle to community that Freud and many commentators have seen no way around. The acceptance of the reality of the death instinct and the



thesis that sublimation, and cultural activity in general, must tap into desexualized instinctual energy lead Abramson to the conclusion that 'culture has the ironic result of unbalancing the instinctual economy of human beings in favor of aggression' (85).

Here I think Abramson is too accepting of orthodox doctrine. The truth of certain portions of Freudian theory — and his instinctual economics and the death instinct are such parts — is highly questionable, and there is a large body of philosophical and psychological literature which discusses why these features are questionable. If Abramson had called into question some of these more implausible portions of the theory he might have been less drawn back into the pessimism that he is trying to avoid, and less detained in the middle chapters from offering his affirmative vision. I don't mean to suggest that there is any mistake in emphasizing our dark side, but only that Abramson might have profitably — especially given his aims — discussed alternative hypotheses regarding the origins of this side of us.

In the last part of the book Abramson moves beyond Freud toward explicit advocacy of an Aristotelean position on the worth of friendship and community. As far as I can tell, most of the points in this section are made possible by setting aside, rather than rejecting or finding a way through, the obstructing idea of the death instinct. While Abramson acknowledges the liberating effects of self-knowledge and emphasizes the social character of the psychoanalytic experience, he explicitly rejects the view that Freud as well as some of his most perceptive commentators are drawn to, namely, that rational self-understanding of the sort gained in therapy is the upper limit on human liberation. He rightly insists that 'If we count it a virtue to have friends and to entertain special loyalties and obligations to persons and friends, then liberation of the atomized sort cannot be the finale for freedom' (130). Abramson claims that in the end, therapeutic self-understanding 'cannot illumine, much less support, the richer civic aspects of personal character — the virtues of fellow-feeling and friendship, of citizenship and allegiance to a common good. These virtues are either realized through politics or not at all' (138). I think the point is put too strongly, but the overall thrust is surely correct: the psychoanalytic ideal of therapeutic self-understanding sits apart from the self-realization ideals of communitarian political theory — but perhaps not so far from those of liberalism. Furthermore, such understanding is not sufficient for a richly realized political life. It may not even be necessary.

Despite the fact that Abramson takes Freud too seriously regarding the death instinct, this is a well-written and invariably interesting book on an important topic. The questions of whether, how, and what kinds of community are possible are the overwhelming questions of political theory, and Abramson has much to say of value for those who sense that contemporary liberal theory gives insufficient guidance in this regard.

OWEN FLANAGAN  
Duke University

HANS ARENS. *Aristotle's Theory of Language and its Tradition*. Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science series III: Studies in the History of Linguistics, vol 29. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co. 1984. Pp. v + 532. US\$60.00. ISBN 90-272-4511-8.

In the first four chapters of the *de Interpretatione* Aristotle presents his 'theory of language' — or rather, he passes a few remarks on the subject of noun, verbs, and sentences. The chapters were enormously influential and in parts controversial: they generated a mass of commentary many hundred times their own size. This is the 'theory' and the 'tradition' to which Arens' study devotes itself.

After a short introduction, the book gives a text of *Int* 16a1-17a7 together with a translation and a commentary. There follow passages, in translation and with brief annotation, from seven later commentators on *Int*: Ammonius, Boethius, Abelard, Albert the Great, Aquinas, Martin of Dacia, John of St. Thomas. These passages occupy nine tenths of the book. They have not hitherto been available in English.

The subject is fascinating, and we might have hoped for a stimulating monograph, or at any rate a useful handbook. But the book which Arens has produced is not beyond cavil. First, Arens seems unacquainted with most of the modern literature on the subject: his short bibliography is a curious hotch-potch; he appears not to know Ackrill's indispensable Clarendon edition of *Int*. Then, his grasp of philosophical issues is not always firm: illustrations of this can be found on every page of the commentary on *Int*, most impressively in some ghastly confusions over the notion of identity (28-9). (I guess that Arens was trained as a linguist; but his chosen subject requires philosophical as well as linguistic expertise.) Thirdly, as an interpreter of Aristotle he is neither acute nor sympathetic. The commentary contains little of value, and it is peppered with absurdities. According to Arens, Aristotle states that 'the onomata and rhemata are concepts' (34); later, Aristotle is burdened with the bizarre view that 'valid judgement can only be given in the present tense' (44). He has a low opinion of Aristotle's text, which, as he reads on, 'more and more resembles a collection of more or less well remembered words of the master' (49). But what is wrong is not the text of *Int* but the wit of its interpreter.

None of this would matter much if the translations were reliable; for the book is primarily an assembly of translations. It quickly appears that Arens is not fully at home in any of the languages which concern him. He is confident of his Greek, and is ready to propose emendations in the text of Aristotle (e.g., 35, 40). But his conjectures reveal weaknesses in himself rather than errors in the text. As for Latin, a translation of ten lines from the preface to Minio-Paluello's OCT of *Int* contains one bad misunderstanding and one schoolboy howler (7). Finally, English is not Arens' native tongue, and his English is not good enough for a translator. It is *extremely* good. But the demands of translation are extraordinarily great. I am thinking not so much



of the many trivial faults of grammar of idiom which, whether you find them unsightly or charming, do not mislead. I am thinking rather of the occasional passage where the vocabulary cracks or the syntax crumbles — and Arens' meaning is lost.

I have checked carefully Arens' translations of the text of *Int* and of the first few pages of Ammonius' commentary. (1) In *Int* I found no downright errors. But there are several infelicities, some of them serious. E.g., a German 'namely' makes nonsense of 16a28; at 16a19, 'a vocal form with conventional timeless meaning' is sure to be misunderstood; 'someone' for *τινος* at 16b12 is certainly wrong — but the error admits of different diagnoses. (2) In eight Greek pages of Ammonius I found, again, numerous infelicities, and also about a dozen errors. The infelicities are sometimes culpable: it will not do to have the important word *ἀποφανσις* translated in three (or perhaps four) different ways — 'enunciative <sentence>', 'proposition', 'declarative <sentence>' (and, by implication, 'statement'). The errors are sometimes disastrous: for example, at 2.8-9, 5.11, and 5.22-23 Arens has misunderstood Ammonius' syntax and produced a false sense. At 3.1 'the testimony of the divine' is certainly wrong for *τῆς μαρτυρίας τοῦ θεοῦ*, but I am unsure whether Arens' Greek or his English is to blame.

'But Arens is a good scholar in his field. He has plainly given much thought to the compilation of his book. He has worked for laborious weeks over his translations. Surely there is something to praise here?' If there is, I have not yet found it. But as I grow older I find that my judgements on books — on other men's books — grow crustier. Perhaps this is merely the natural sourness of senescence.

JONATHAN BARNES  
Balliol College  
Oxford

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MICHEL BLAIS. *La logique. Une introduction*. Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal; Sherbrooke: Les Editions de l'Université de Sherbrooke 1985. 234 p. 17.00\$ CAN. ISBN 2-7606-0698-8.

Cet ouvrage est conçu comme manuel d'un cours d'introduction à la logique qui s'adresse à des étudiants de premier cycle provenant de différentes disciplines. L'auteur n'est donc pas préoccupé d'innover en matière de



théorie logique, mais plutôt d'offrir au public francophone un manuel de logique élémentaire qui s'inscrit plus ou moins dans la tradition américaine des Copi et Kahane.

Un chapitre d'introduction (12 p.) qui semble surtout répondre à des objectifs d'ordre pédagogique donne certains vecteurs permettant de cerner les champs d'intérêt de la logique formelle. L'image qu'on y présente de l'analyse logique est somme toute très conservatrice. En guise d'exemple: l'argument déductif demeure encore, par rapport aux arguments inductifs (l'auteur dit 'probabilistes') un 'modèle idéal vers lequel on tendrait.' Suffit de noter que toute inférence inductive  $\{A\} \vdash^i C$  est reformulable à loisir en termes d'une inférence déductive  $\{A, A \supset C\} \vdash^d C$ .

La logique des connecteurs est ensuite longuement exposée (50 p.) car beaucoup de détail est apporté à la forme que prennent les opérateurs vérifonctionnels dans la langue française. Les concepts logiques usuels (consistance, validité, implication logique, etc.) sont définis au fil d'une succession de vingt-quatre sous-chapitres (sections) où la gradation des sujets traités aurait mérité une meilleure mise en évidence. Les tables de vérité sont relativement peu utilisées par rapport à la méthode de résolution que l'on retrouve dans les *Méthodes de logique* de Quine, ce qui est tout à fait recommandable eu égard au caractère mécanique et onéreux de la première méthode.

La théorie de la quantification occupe une longueur égale dans le texte, bien qu'elle ne soit présentée qu'en partie (logique des prédicats monadiques). Ce choix de l'auteur lui permet de traiter amplement de la syllogistique à l'aide des diagrammes de Venn. Ce n'est qu'à la toute fin du chapitre que certains éléments de la syntaxe du calcul des prédicats du premier ordre sont introduits, de sorte que la formalisation d'énoncés contenant des quantifications mixtes ou multiples n'est nullement touchée — ce qui constitue à tout le moins un bris de style avec le chapitre précédent.

Suivent alors trois chapitres plus courts (*Les sophismes*, *Les arguments par analogie*, *Les dilemmes*) où l'ouvrage prend plutôt l'allure d'un manuel de logique informelle. Un dernier chapitre sur le raisonnement causal et l'induction offre, dans ce qui rappelle une certaine tradition philosophique, un ajout épistémologique à la théorie logique. Le livre contient un bon nombre d'exercices (ce point est important), ainsi qu'une liste des symboles, un index des mots clés et une bibliographie. On note aussi, malheureusement, un nombre d'anglicismes (en guise d'exemple: 'en autant que...', 'les 'évidences' d'un raisonnement, ...), mais nous ne voulons pas situer là nos propos.

L'ouvrage de Michel Blais a d'indéniables qualités pédagogiques, mais il les gagne trop aux dépens des contenus théoriques généralement associés à un cours universitaire d'introduction à la logique. Et encore, les diagrammes de Venn, s'ils permettent une certaine visualisation, ne représentent certes pas le meilleur moyen d'initier l'étudiant à la formalisation; c'est en le familiarisant avec la syntaxe proprement dite du calcul des prédicats et avec les méthodes qui ont présentement cours (on pense à celles de Gentzen ou de Smullyan) que ces objectifs sont le mieux servis. Ce livre peut cependant être utilisé à profit

dans le cadre d'un cours pré-universitaire, d'autant que les manuels français de logique informelle sont à peu près inexistantes et que peuvent être d'autre part reportés en bibliographie des thèmes comme la logique modale, la logique non classique et la logique mathématique.

JEAN LEROUX  
Université d'Ottawa

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JEAN BRUN. *L'homme et le langage* Paris: P.U.F. 1985. 254 p. 120 FF. ISBN 2013-038618-0.

Dans une première partie, l'A. situe d'abord le langage par rapport à l'originaire, puis il esquisse à grands traits les routes et les déroutes du langage ainsi que les cheminements du symbole. La deuxième partie, intitulée 'Le langage perdu,' nous fait assister aux 'naufrages' ainsi qu'aux 'enchaînements et déchaînements du langage.' Et dans la dernière partie, l'A. nous incite à entendre le 'langage qui nous parle,' c'est-à-dire le verbe poétique, le langage pathétique et finalement le Verbe incarné, le Verbe rédempteur de la pensée judéo-chrétienne. Notre question est bien de savoir ce que le lecteur apprend de vraiment philosophique dans ce discours où le récit épique l'emporte souvent sur l'analyse.

Un grand nombre de philosophes sont invoqués, de Platon à Wittgenstein en passant par Plotin, Aristote, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx, Russell, et j'en passe. Mais nous apprenons peu de choses sur la pensée de chacun, car l'A. les utilise comme repoussoirs pour défendre sa propre thèse. Pour comprendre celle-ci, il faut d'abord distinguer avec lui entre Révélation et dévoilement, entre l'interrogation *Qui suis-je?* et la question *que suis-je?*, entre le Verbe transcendant et le langage alchimiste. On est d'abord étonné de lire que 'du langage alchimique au langage scientifico-technique il y a filiation directe' (95). C'est que ces deux langages sont, selon l'A., du côté du dévoilement. Il admet que l'alchimie utilise 'des symboles ésotériques dont le dévoilement suppose une initiation alors que la science emploie des signes exotériques dont le dévoilement implique un enseignement collectivement acquis et socialement transmis,' mais il s'empresse d'ajouter que 'la science et la technique travaillent à partir d'une vision du monde qui est celle de l'alchimie' (96). Ce qui relie toutes ces entreprises, c'est le désir prométhéen de changer la condition humaine. 'De la magie, la



science et la technique ont retenu le désir de manipuler les choses et les êtres; de l'alchimie, elles retiennent le souci d'exorciser l'erreur et la faute, donc le mal' (98). L'A. nous somme littéralement de choisir entre la Révélation et le dévoilement, entre 'l'Originairé créateur, nom sacré et secret de Dieu, Mot initial, *Fiat* de tous les *fiat*' (18) et les discours profanateurs des alchimistes et des scientifiques, tous descendants de Prométhée et des constructeurs de la Tour de Babel. Le diagnostic de l'A. est sans équivoque: 'en ouvrant le livre scellé de l'*Apocalypse*, l'homme a voulu substituer à la Vérité qui le comprenait les vérités que lui-même définissait, vérités qu'il consignait sur le Livre dont il avait préalablement blanchi les pages' (246). C'est ainsi que la linguistique et le structuralisme servent d'illustration au chapitre intitulé 'les naufrages de langage' et que celui qui parle des 'enchaînements du langage' appelle à la barre A. Comte et Wittgenstein, pour les condamner sans appel, il va sans dire. L'Odyssée commence avec Aristote qui, en faisant 'glisser le problème de la participation vers celui de la prédication' et celui de la syllogistique, se fait l'ancêtre de nos 'modernes calculs logiques.' Linguistique, logique, philosophie analytique, autant d'enchaînements qui contribuent aux naufrages du langage. Bref, ou bien l'on accorde le primat à la Révélation, à l'interrogation, au Verbe incarné, alors tout va bien; ou bien on s'en remet au dévoilement, à la question 'qu'est-ce l'homme?', et l'on est enfermé dans 'une conception carcérale et auto-transcendante de la vérité.' Mais alors le verdict de l'auteur est sans merci: ainsi l'arbre cartésien et l'arbre hegelien 'ne sont que des arbres morts ou que des arbres de la mort' (252). Pour ce qui concerne les déchaînements du futurisme, de la langue zaoum, du dadaïsme et du lettrisme, l'A. n'a même pas besoin de vingt pages pour les présenter et rendre le jugement. (149-66). Ce qui exaspère Jean Brun dans le futurisme, par exemple, c'est de voir qu'aux 'célébrations du prométhéisme socio-politique et scientifique, s'ajoute le chœur des poètes et des artistes' (151).

La troisièrme partie du livre me semble de loin la meilleure. L'A. écrit à propos du verbe poétique et du langage pathétique des pages enfin sereines et même inspirées à certains moments. Elles sont bienvenues, car le lecteur commence à en avoir assez de la fureur dénonciatrice du prophète, qui fustige sans aménité tous ces petits prométhées, qu'il voit surgir de tous les horizons, tous ces constructeurs de Tour de Babel qui, à l'en croire, désirent escalader le Ciel et cherchent à se libérer 'de toute essence humaine' (107). J'avoue que l'histoire de la philosophie, des sciences et des techniques ne m'apparaît pas sous un jour aussi dramatique et que je préfère aux envolées lyriques de l'A., les analyses minutieuses des historiens de la philosophie qui ne se sentent pas tenus de parler de tout et qui s'appliquent plus à l'analyse des textes qu'aux diagnostics de survol qui jonglent avec une telle myriade d'auteurs.

GHYSLAIN CHARRON  
Université d'Ottawa



GUIDO CALABRESI. *Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law: Private Law Perspectives on a Public Law Problem*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press 1985. pp. xv + 208. US\$20.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8156-2309-7): US\$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8156-2310-0).

This book is based on Calabresi's Abrams lectures given at Syracuse University in 1982. In five related essays which do not, however, amount to a general argument, he explores how beliefs and attitudes bear on questions of civil liability in America and how public law should handle deep clashes of ideals.

He begins by suggesting that we value diversity of beliefs and attitudes even though someone must pay for it. He then considers how tort law deals with natural and social disadvantage in setting the standard of 'reasonable' behaviour departure from which renders one liable for injuries thereby caused to others (unless the victims also act unreasonably and thus are contributorily negligent). This is an objective — i.e. invariant — standard, but it is also evaluative, and in societies like ours is often sexist, racist, or class-biased. He finds that natural disadvantages and certain attitudes adhering to them are the basis of liability in an injurer, but do not prohibit a victim from recovering, and that with much ambivalence the law treats costly behaviour linked to social attitudes, especially racial ones, as unreasonable for both.

The third chapter puts beliefs in the picture. Consider the tort rule that one takes one's victim as one finds him: one is fully liable for the injuries of a thin-skulled victim of one's assault even if one had no way of knowing of his condition. Does this also hold if the victim has thin moral skin? What if one injures a Christian scientist whose injuries are aggravated by her refusal to see a doctor? What if the idiosyncratic beliefs are not religious in origin? (What if she just hates doctors?) Here, tort law tends to protect religious beliefs of victims out of concern that they not be 'emarginated' in their society, but that non-religious idiosyncratic beliefs are protected only if widely held and consistent with deep constitutional values (racist beliefs never enjoy such protection). The uneasy compromises in this area of law reflect both competing values and the unwillingness of legislatures to face tough choices between them.

He then considers some unprotected beliefs. Why can one not recover for purely psychic damages? In the criminal law context, there are familiar liberty-based arguments for not punishing self-regarding behaviour which offends others. One might think that related arguments prohibit suing for psychic damages. Instead, Calabresi is impressed by the thought that psychic injuries are real injuries (71). The prohibition on recovery of lost sentimental value is explained by the fact that the injured has best knowledge of his own psychic loss and is thus the most efficient cost-avoider. In the case of offense, he argues that it would be counter-productive to accord a right to recover where that would cause the injured to focus on both the offense and the violation of the right, thus amplifying the injury by adding an insult — the very thing we aimed to avoid (77). This is a strange move coming from one who

finds Dworkin's 'double counting' argument 'unintelligible' (71); Calabresi's argument begs the question, for feeling insulted is justified if the right is. However, his claim that law not only decides which desires to satisfy but which to encourage is quite sound.

Finally, Calabresi suggests that in *Roe v. Wade* the Supreme Court failed to reach an available compromise among ideals, and that in striking down most anti-abortion laws, it wrongly alienated a section of American society consisting disproportionately of the socially marginal. In sidestepping the 'metaphysical' issue of whether a foetus is alive, the Court dealt them a painful and dangerous insult: it declared their metaphysics not wrong but irrelevant. In holding that the foetus is not a person for the purpose of due process it implied that '*Your* metaphysics are not part of *our* constitution' (95). A more satisfactory compromise, he thinks, would have recognized the force of the right to life, even if it lost in this competition with equality between men and women, for most of us are said to feel some attraction to both values.

This is a valuable illustration of how ideals might be compromised so as to honour them even in the breach, but it has certain flaws. First, the Court rejected the metaphysics of the marginal and of the majority alike. The belief in a metaphysically neutral answer may have been self-deception or sham; but that is not shown. Second, Calabresi takes too literally the slogan, 'a right to life.' If turnips are alive can it seriously be doubted that the foetus is? But we recognize no general right of living things to go on living and our attitudes to self-defense show that even the narrower right of humans to live is quite complex. Moreover, if anti-abortionists favour the still narrower right of the human foetus to live then we would expect them to be more enthusiastic about taxation to fund ante-natal care for indigent mothers than they characteristically are. The secular clash of ideals in this controversy was probably between sexual equality and a conflicting view of the role of women in American society. The Court challenged not the metaphysics but the social theory of the marginal groups. Thus it is unlikely that a more acceptable compromise might have appealed to the shared though competing values of life and equality. The value of life was not directly in play, and the marginalized were opposed to equality.

These thoughtful and lively essays leave much undone. Although it may be relevant to the nature of their conflicts, there is no analysis of the differences between the beliefs, attitudes, and ideals of the title (attitudes have an affective dimension, and ideals a prescriptive structure). And the closest we get to a moral theory is Calabresi's undogmatic economic analysis of law and the perfectly sound admonition to be open about the tragic choices we must face. This is one of those interesting books to which philosophers will more often turn for its rich fund of provocative examples than for general arguments.

LESLIE GREEN  
York University



GEORGE DI GIOVANNI and H.S. HARRIS, trans. and annot. *Between Kant and Hegel. Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*. SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies. Albany: State University of New York Press 1985. Pp. 407. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-984-1); US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-983-3).

For most philosophers today, the radical turn from Kant to Hegel is understood rather vaguely, if at all, in terms of Fichte and Schelling. Other 'minor' philosophers are sometimes noted, but such references usually offer no firm idea of the real issues involved in the turn. This leaves the great difference between Kant and the German Idealism which followed him essentially a mystery; for one has simply to accept, *as a first step*, the difference between the program of the Critiques and that of the speculative idealism of Fichte. The consequence is that while Kant and his insights are generally accessible and form some part of our contemporary philosophical discussions, this is not true for the most part in Hegel's case; for while Kant derived his problem from Hume and the epistemological tradition (which latter is relatively well understood by us), Hegel emerged from this 'gap' which occurs between Kant and Fichte.

*Between Kant and Hegel* is an anthology which makes a significant contribution to the task of filling in this gap and thus of making Hegel more accessible; for the theme which unifies the content is that of the debate between critical philosophy and skepticism which was triggered by attempts to explain Kant. The selections from the debate, furthermore, have been made here with an eye to Hegel's eventual participation in it. On the basis of a clear understanding of Kant's project and the debates *it* generated, we are subsequently offered access to Hegel.

The book is divided into two parts. Di Giovanni provides the introductory essay, translation, and notes for the first part, containing excerpts from the writings of Karl Reinhold, G.E. Schulze, Solomon Maimon, and J.S. Beck. Fichte's critical review of Schulze's *Aenesidemus* is included as well. Part Two contains Harris' introductory essay, and his translation (with accompanying notes) of four articles from the Hegel-Schelling *Critical Journal of Philosophy*. There is, finally, an extensive bibliography, both from the original literature of the time and from later secondary literature, and an extremely useful index for whose preparation, apparently, much care was taken.

In the Preface Harris and Di Giovanni sketch the course of thought from (1) Reinhold's attempt to 'further' the Kantian philosophy by means of a discussion of the 'facts of consciousness' which were 'implicit' in Kant and which would give philosophy its scientific basis, through (2) Schulze's skeptical criticism of Reinhold and Kant in *Aenesidemus* and Maimon's and Beck's 'defenses' of critical philosophy, to (3) Fichte's and Schelling's reformulations of the nature of these 'facts of consciousness' and Hegel's discussions in *The Critical Journal*.



Di Giovanni demonstrates that the actual 'turn' occurred in a philosopher who was simply trying to be a good Kantian, namely Reinhold; for it was the latter who set the problems for the debates between skepticism and critical philosophy by postulating *representation* as the basic fact of consciousness, a fact from which are to be derived both subject and objects as those 'things' to which representation refers. This is the crucial step; for the in-itself (whether as the thing or as the self) thus becomes only a reference necessitated by representation, which latter is not the foundation of all. In this way Reinhold and those who participated with him in the debate, were led step by step away from Kant; for Reinhold had 'in effect reduced objective consciousness to a reflective modification of self-consciousness — a move that Kant himself had always avoided' (18). The question was no longer that of the relation between thing-in-itself and consciousness as with Kant and the previous epistemological tradition, but that of the relation between what is explicit in consciousness and what is 'unconsciously' there as implicit in the 'basic fact' of the representation, the focus of attention eventually for the idealists. The stage was now set for the exploration of the ego as just this implicit, central fact to be intuited and made explicit.

This not only moved us away from Kant's own project in the *Critiques*, but also set the stage for Hegel. Harris shows in his essay and translations that in the *Journal* Hegel began to develop his mature view of the history of philosophy as one philosophy (a historical-philosophical dialogue). Hegel saw himself as called upon by the debate to focus on the question of how, from the ordinary standpoint of consciousness and in the face of 'the variety of *unfixed* forms that the 'standpoint of consciousness' assumed among the more intelligent disciples of the sage of Königsberg,' one can achieve the proper standpoint (256). In so conceiving his task, Hegel 'moved from [a beginning point within] the fixed standpoint of "speculation" [where he had stood with Schelling], and set himself to write the ideal history of the "experience of consciousness" as it climbs the ladder to that standpoint' (256). That is to say, in order to clarify this debate which had arisen out of Kant, and in order thus to ground philosophy properly, 'Hegel abandoned the intuitive standpoint of the Identity Philosophy [which he at first shared with Schelling on the basis of an intuition of the basic ego to be explicated], and adopted the "standpoint of consciousness" (i.e., of Kant, Reinhold and Fichte) as the necessary starting point of philosophical inquiry; ... the overcoming of this standpoint became, in the *Phenomenology*, the necessary critical preamble to proper (i.e., metaphysical) logic' (259). The move from Kant's transcendental standpoint grounded in the problems deriving from the epistemological tradition, to the speculative standpoint grounded in the problems deriving from the critical philosophy of Kant, was completed in Hegel's *Phenomenology*.

A brief review cannot do justice to this volume. Harris and Di Giovanni offer convincing arguments for the general thesis in their masterful essays and in the selections from *The Critical Journal* and the writings of Reinhold and the others. The translations are excellent and very readable, and the notes ap-

pended throughout are extremely helpful. This book is to be highly recommended.

JOSEPH C. FLAY  
Pennsylvania State University

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ILHAM DILMAN. *Freud and Human Nature*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1983. Pp. viii + 207. Cdn\$42.75; US\$24.95. ISBN 0-631-13373-9.

Ilham Dilman advances a set of psychological theses which, I believe, may be fairly summarised as follows: (a) Sexuality is not only the pursuit of selfish pleasure, although it may sometimes be more than that, but is also 'a fundamental dimension of human relationships, a mode of affectivity in which human beings seek contact with each other' (38). Love may thus have an identity independent of sexual desire (90), an inherent connection with generosity, from which its creative character then flows (87); (b) Genuine morality, in contrast to mere conformity to externally originated threats and fears, does exist, and is not, therefore, a purely negative or reactive phenomenon; morality can be positive, an expression of autonomy and mature responsibility (passim; esp. Ch.2, Sec.2). The 'motive force' or 'energy' of conscience is not merely aggressive, even though anger may well be involved, but is 'the subject's concern for moral values in which he believes' (115). The anger is thereby 'subordinate to love and moral concern' (115); (c) Human beings are not essentially selfish and aggressive. That human culture be solely repressive of human nature is not, therefore, inevitable (131). Even our selfish and aggressive impulses may constitute points of entry into the society, in which they may become transformed in quality, and to which individuals can make their free and positive contributions as their more sociable inclinations receive encouragement and become actualised (Ch. 6, passim); (d) The concept of individual development has several meanings: biological development, the development of a talent, the development of relations between individuals, and emotional development (Ch. 7). The last (presumably the main arena of depth psychology) is in a non-sectarian sense a moral process, for 'emotional development means acquiring autonomy, independence and authenticity, and these concepts are moral concepts — though in a broad rather than a narrowly partisan sense' (162); (e) Maturity is a necessary, but



not a sufficient, condition for compassionate, self-disciplined action. 'A person can be mature, relatively speaking, and morally mediocre' (197), whereas compassionate, ethical conduct involves 'a genuine will to the good [that I believe] makes its appearance very early in childhood' (197).

Surely this is Socrates in opposition to Callicles (viz., 91-2), Dilman in opposition to Freud. Whereas Freud's psychology is known to be hedonistic, deterministic, negative about moral motivation, and Hobbesian about the relation of individual desire to social organization, Dilman's conception, while accepting many of Freud's theses as partially correct, insists as well on the positive possibilities of morality, the role of higher motives, the reality of free choice, and the sociability of humankind. He may be said, if you will, to be as optimistic, teleological, and traditionally humanistic, as Freud is said to be pessimistic, mechanistic, and radically reductionist. For want of a better term, Dilman may be located in the tradition, as old as Greek philosophy and as current as Maslow, Fromm, and other post-Freudian psychologists, of 'classical-spiritual humanism.' Indeed, Dilman's criticisms of Freud strike at the essentials:

I criticize Freud's hedonistic conception of sexuality and his quasi-mechanistic view of its "components" and their "organization," the way he represented the relation between love and sexuality, and between sexuality and the whole person, the kind of universality he attributed to the Oedipus complex, his negative conception of morality as a repressive force, his identification of conscience with the super-ego, the way he opposed human nature and culture, and the terms in which he thought about them, his biological conception of human development through the stages of the transformation of the libido, and his exclusive emphasis on the defensive role of character. (2)

An anti-Freudian book, therefore? Wrong! To my constant surprise, I found Dilman not only arguing for the view of human nature sketched earlier, but claiming to discover his own view secreted within Freud's psychology. That this is a most surprising claim, Dilman himself concedes: 'The popular, and perhaps orthodox, view is that when all this has been criticized Freud is left with no leg on which to stand' (2). Surely, one must concur in this prediction (provided the criticisms can be made to stick). But Dilman in fact thinks otherwise: 'My view in this book is that, on the contrary, a critique of all this [see above] will clear the way to an appreciation of Freud's real contribution' (2). If successful, this would indeed be an interpretive tour de force.

The interested reader is urged to determine for himself or herself whether or not Dilman brings it off. I do not think he does; in fact, I find the conception of human nature and society that Dilman claims to extract from Freud's psychology about as non-Freudian as anything could be.

One can hardly presume to challenge an entire essay in a brief review. In the space available, therefore, let me only note the means by which Dilman attempts to secure his thesis. For one thing, Dilman claims that Freud himself often made assertions that were shallow compared to his real view. For exam-



ple: Dilman quotes from *The Future of an Illusion* Freud's words about how delightful life would be if, in the absence of cultural prohibitions, one could fornicate, kill, and appropriate at will, and then comments, 'This comes from what is shallow and superficial in Freud. I think it would be a mistake to bring down his contribution to the level of this passage and others like it in Freud's writings' (129). The chapter, by the way, concludes on this remark, without further discussion. Second, Dilman contends that what generally pass as correct readings of Freud's main theses are themselves shallow misinterpretations, even though such readings are based on some of Freud's most categorical and frequently reiterated assertions. For example, acknowledging that Freud is usually taken to have equated morality with repression, and the sense of guilt with early, internalised fear of punishment, Dilman contends, nevertheless, that Freud 'knew better' (38). If Dilman is right, there have been few supporters, or even critics, of what Freud really meant to say. Third, Dilman alleges that Freud was misled into extreme psychological positions because of 'philosophical confusions.' 'The idea of (hedonism) as "inevitable"... [is] "philosophical froth."' It is not an essential part of what he had to say' (3). Fourth, Dilman cites equivocations and hesitations in Freud's works. Finally, Dilman notes Freud's own susceptibility to moral shock.

In my judgement, the 'real Freud' invoked as Freudian support for Dilman's conception of human nature sketched earlier remains at the end of the book as implausible as ever. Dilman's claim that his own psychology was in any sense Freud's, his allegation of superficiality against most interpreters of Freud, and his dismissal of numerous categorical assertions by Freud as shallow and unrepresentative, are about as believable as that Hobbes was really a Lockean, or that *The Prince* could be a model for Bishop Butler. The citing of equivocations in Freud's works seems like grasping at straws, since no major theoretician — particularly on so parlous a topic as the human psyche — proceeds unequivocally, Cartesian-style, from one clarity to another. The charge of 'philosophical confusion,' on the subject of determinism, for example (11), may suggest that Freud's philosophical formulation of determinism could bear refinement, but surely does not authorize one to re-read the psychological thesis in a non-deterministic spirit — unless, of course, one is bound upon making an indeterminist of Freud (which is to beg the issue). Finally, Freud's moral shock at the suggestion of visiting a prostitute (39) need not, as Dilman assumes, contradict Freud's theses on sexuality and morality at all, but would appear to be very good grist for Freud's mill. Dilman's own psychological view is intrinsically interesting, with its ethical and quasi-spiritual elements, but the claim to have found it in Freud seems to me to bend Freud out of all recognizable shape.

FORREST WILLIAMS  
University of Colorado at Boulder

MARTIN P. GOLDING. *Legal Reasoning*. New York: Borzoi Books (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.) 1984. Pp. vii + 157. US\$15.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-394-33575-4); US\$7.00 (paper: ISBN 0-394-33191-5).

This, like the other volumes in this new Borzoi Books series, has been designed as a supplementary text for undergraduate courses in the philosophy of law. The scope of *Legal Reasoning* is modest, but as an introductory text it is well-crafted and should do its job well. Each chapter begins with a short, pithy and clear exposition of basic notions and concludes with a collection of relevant materials — selections from classic (though not recent) pieces by American jurists and carefully edited excerpts from sixteen legal cases. The cases especially offer a non-technical yet realistic glimpse of legal reasoning in action. Interspersed are pertinent questions which serve to integrate the text with the materials.

There are three chapters. In the first Golding focuses on the challenge — usually credited to the American Realists of the 20's and 30's — that judicial reasoning is merely a collection of rationalizations serving to disguise psychological, moral or political predispositions, biases which are the actual reasons for the decision reached. Drawing on the familiar distinction between contexts of discovery and of justification, Golding argues that even if we grant the worst about what actually motivates judges, nonetheless the reasons and arguments that are put on paper are public, accessible and, with the proper tools to hand, criticisable. In the second chapter Golding creatively uses legal materials to review the distinctions between validity and soundness, deductive and non-deductive modes of reasoning, and practical and theoretical arguments. Golding aims to show similarities and differences between reasoning in the legal context and elsewhere. In this way he gives us styles of argument which, if not unique to legal reasoning, are characteristic of it. For example, Golding points to the phenomenon of the practical *reductio ad absurdum* argument, where the absurdity noted is not logical inconsistency but rather some incompatibility with common sense or the unstated goals of adjudication and law. In the last chapter Golding considers in some detail what is usually taken to be the principal differentia of legal reasoning, namely the use of argument by analogy against the background of the doctrine of precedent and the principle of *stare decisis*.

The book is comprehensive and well-written, and its value as an introductory text is enhanced by the wealth of legal examples employed. One may have qualms about Golding's optimism about the degree to which the common law, in Lord Mansfield's famous words, 'works itself pure' over time. And those with a Realist or leftist bent will surely object to the implicit suggestion that it is possible to interpret legal arguments without considering the ideological forces which animate and make sense of them. Yet, these concerns are perhaps more properly expressed in the classroom than in a supplementary text such as this.

What cannot be so easily ignored are the effects of a philosophical pre-



judice about the nature of reasoning which is with the reader from the first page to the last. Common to most analytic philosophers, for whom natural science is the paradigm of knowledge and deduction the standard of reasoning, Golding throughout operates on the assumption that one can only have faith in one's arguments if they are deductive in form, or else can be 'reconstructed' by the addition of premisses and qualifications to take that form. Holding up deductive validity as the only true standard of argumentative conclusiveness is bound to cause problems when attention is turned to cases of applied reasoning, such as legal argument from analogy. One is faced either with the prospect that all of such non-demonstrative reasoning is irrational, or else that the job of the interpreter is to 'deductify' the reasoning. Golding is committed to rejecting the first alternative, so he dutifully reconstructs legal arguments from analogy so that they fit the deductive mould. Yet, as Golding is well aware, there is a problem with this tact: when we add premisses and modify conclusions in order to make legal arguments deductive in form, it remains clear that we have no greater reason for regarding the premisses added or the qualifications made as correct than we would for thinking that the original non-deductive argument conclusively proved its conclusion.

Golding's proposed solution to this problem — a problem created by the prejudice in favour of deduction in the first place — is hardly satisfactory. Golding argues that it is possible to view legal arguments from analogy as conclusive, although neither deductive nor helpfully reconstructible, because they are normative and practical arguments and as such their conclusiveness merely reflects back on the judge's own sense of commitment to the result. But this comes dangerously close to contradicting his earlier claim that legal arguments, viewed within the context of justification, are objective and publicly scrutinizable pieces of reasoning — reasoning that can be assessed by neutral standards of logical adequacy. One can imagine the student putting down the book wondering whether legal reasoning is really reasoning at all and debating whether all those rude things the Realists said about the 'logic' of judicial decisions might be true after all.

Plainly, the analytic philosopher's reverence for deductive reasoning has led Golding astray. Rather than try to alter legal reasoning to fit the required models of deductive purity, Golding ought to have taken a closer look at the passage from John Wisdom's 'Gods' which he quotes and rejects. Wisdom's discussion of legal and other forms of applied reasoning — the reasoning we all engage in when we are not doing mathematics — reveals that such reasoning is not deductive demonstration and is not any the less rational, or conclusive, for not being so. Applied reasoning demands a contextual interpretation, and viewed within its proper setting, applied reasoning displays its logic, as it displays the sense of proof, and of conclusiveness, that is appropriate to the subject matter. Golding is, of course, aware of the contextual nature of legal reasoning, but wedded to the deductive model, he does not give that feature of legal reasoning its proper due. Fully contextualized, interpretations of legal reasoning simply do not open up the prospect that all of



this apparently reasoned discourse is just so much deductive fallacy. Sensitive to the context of legal, or other forms of applied reasoning, one will soon appreciate the work that it does, and does conclusively.

JEROME E. BICKENBACH  
Queen's University

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GORDON GRAHAM. *Historical Explanation Reconsidered*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1983. Pp. ix + 82. US\$19.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-08-02895-7); US\$12.00 (paper: ISBN 0-08-028478-7).

The title of this slim volume naturally suggests that its subject is the long-standing debate over the acceptability of the so-called covering law theory of explanation in history. In fact, although it occasionally comments on aspects of that debate, its central question, one which Graham believes the debate to have obscured, is less whether the explanations historians offer display, or should display, a single logical structure (he is inclined to agree with those who say not) than whether any of them deserve to be called 'historical' explanation. In the end he disarmingly concedes that the answer to this question may not be of any great philosophical importance. He nevertheless manages to make it seem odd, to say the least, that so many who have taken part in the covering law controversy have shuttled back and forth so unthinkingly between talking about explanation in history and about historical explanation.

Not that all have done so. Morton White, for example, at a very early stage of the controversy, explored the possibility that the use of specifically historical terms might reasonably be made the criterion of specifically historical explanation. Graham agrees with White, perhaps too easily, that there are no such terms. Some consideration of the thesis propounded by Walsh and others that historians make past events intelligible by 'colligating' them under concepts especially invented for the purpose, like 'Renaissance' or 'Victorian,' might have been useful here. Graham also rejects what he takes to be the implicit claim of idealist philosophers like Collingwood that historical explanation (although this term is not generally used by them) is to be defined in terms of concern with a unique subject matter: human affairs. Historical explanations are also given in natural history, he argues; nor is all study of the human past historical. More recent attempts to give a clear and

useful sense to the idea of specifically historical explanation, like Rescher's contention that historians characteristically explain in terms of generalizations which are spatio-temporally limited, he also discounts on the ground that such explanations are given in other fields as well. And, more controversially, he insists that there is in any case no fundamental difference between these and the full-blown covering law or 'scientific' explanations with which they are commonly contrasted.

Graham's own proposal is that we recognize as distinctively historical those explanations that seek to make events understandable by referring to their histories, where by the latter is meant any past event or events alleged to have been necessary for what occurred. Against the objection that such a criterion would make *all* explanations in history historical, Graham replies that it would at any rate rule out those which cite conditions simultaneous with the event to be explained and explanations of regularities rather than of singular events, both of which kinds, he holds, find a place within as well as beyond historical studies. One might still, I think, complain that he excessively trivializes the notion by his employment of such an extraordinarily thin sense of 'history,' as well as rather arbitrarily distancing it from anything we would normally understand by a claim to have explained a certain thing historically. For Graham, the latter consideration should be a relevant one since, as he puts it, he wants to reach a 'reflective equilibrium between mere description of actual usage and mere prescription of an allegedly desirable use, mistakes which, in the present connection, he ascribes respectively to Patrick Gardiner and to C.G. Hempel among others. Part of his position here is that there is no 'entrenched' use of the term 'historical explanation' in ordinary speech. In fact, I think he might have looked a bit harder for some examples in which explanations were called 'historical,' and sometimes with emphasis, to make a point.

Graham's book is lucidly written, well-organized and engagingly modest. One of its strengths is its general treatment of the difficulty of taking either a purely descriptive or a purely prescriptive approach to the problem of philosophical definition: each approach, it is plausibly argued, leads inexorably to the other. Less persuasive, I think, is Graham's determination to reach an acceptable univocal sense of 'historical explanation' formulable in terms of something like necessary and sufficient conditions to be satisfied. The possibility that not one but a family of contrasts is legitimately signaled by this term, historical versus theoretical (his own preference) being only one of them, is ruled out from the start. There are also occasional oddities of interpretation. The limited historical 'laws' pointed to by Rescher and others seem to be incorrectly represented (37) as normative, and thus similar to principles of action; the 'rational' model of explanation (again p. 37) is interpreted without argument as deductive, which is just what its critics have generally complained it doesn't try to be; and we are told (26), implausibly that a difference between Popper and Hempel on the nature of historical ex-



planation is that Popper, but not Hempel, believes that 'wholly particularized, nameable events' can be nomologically explained. These, however, are mere details which scarcely disturb the overall thrust of Graham's argument.

WILLIAM H. DRAY  
University of Ottawa

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VIRGINIA HELD. *Rights and Goods: Justifying Social Action*. New York: The Free Press 1984. Pp. vii + 313 US\$22.95. ISBN 0-02-914710-7.

Held conceives of her book as a contribution to moral inquiry. Such inquiry is normative as her subtitle *Justifying Social Action* suggests. It is an inquiry into the principles which justify action in the various domains of social life. She distinguishes between two kinds of moral theory. The first is 'ideal' theory, of which Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* is an example. The second is 'partial compliance' theory and it is this which is the aim of normative moral inquiry. Ideal theory articulates and elucidates the moral principles of an ideal society: In Rawls' work the principles of justice in a perfectly just society. Partial compliance theory articulates and elucidates moral principles for application here and now: i.e. in existing social domains with all their imperfections. To think out the principles of codes of professional ethics, for instance in law or education, is to engage in partial compliance theory. The actual situations in which such codes have to be implemented are far from ideal. According to Held, partial compliance theory has the merit of practical relevance. Unlike ideal theory, it provides guides to action in the real world and cannot be dismissed as having no application to the messy conditions in which actual life is lived.

Moral inquiry requires a division of labour. Different moral principles are applicable in different social domains. Unlike ideal theory, partial compliance theory is not a single system but comprises a number of distinct although compatible theories. Held contends that such theories must be tested by moral experience, such testing being analogous to although not identical with the testing of scientific hypotheses by observation and experiment. By 'moral' experience, she means personal experience as a moral agent in public office, in a profession, in family life, or in some other social role. In the absence of relevant first-hand moral experience, recourse can be made to the reports of such experience in biographies or other records. To the question

'What differentiates morality from other guides to conduct such as law, custom and religion?', Held's answer, if I understand her, is this. Morality consists of the principles upon which free rational agents — i.e., agents capable of choice — can and should act. It is these principles which make trust possible, and trust is essential for social life. Moral inquiry is then an inquiry into the various principles which make trust possible between free rational agents in the different domains of social life, and which justify action in those domains.

Held devotes the first five chapters of her book to expounding and defending her ideas about moral inquiry and moral theory. Of the remaining ten, nine are devoted to developing partial compliance theories for the main domains of social life in Western society today. In the last chapter, she returns to the nature of moral inquiry. She singles out seven distinct domains: those of law, politics, economics, the family, culture, the environment and international relations. Property is considered in connection with the economic domain, freedom of expression in connection with culture and our responsibility to future generations in connection with the environment. A major thesis underlying her discussion of the domains of law and of politics is that social action in the domain of law must be justified on deontological grounds, while such justification in the political domain should be teleological. It is this distinction between the deontological and the teleological which is the basis for the book's title: *Rights and Goods*. The concepts of rights is deontological; that of goods or intrinsic values is teleological. She also makes use of the idea of human rights which according to her, are the rights to life, to justice and to equal liberty. But as the adjective 'human' suggests, respect for these rights is morally required in all social domains. They are possessed by every human being as a free rational agent and ought to be respected at all times and in all places.

The seven social domains which Held selects for moral inquiry are presented by her as embodying the institutions and values of contemporary North American society. That society is part of the wider Western tradition of culture and civilisation, but, although she does not mention it, the Western is only one among a number of such traditions. Others include the Islamic, the Hindu and the Buddhist. Whether there is a distinctively Communist tradition is debatable. Communism originated in Western thought and there is a case for regarding it as a Western heresy. But that cannot be pursued here. Starting as it does with things as they are, partial compliance theory must presumably accept as a fact the moral diversity generated by the different traditions. On the face of it, Held is conducting moral inquiry within the Western tradition, and the partial compliance theories she arrives at have application only within that tradition. Her discussion of the family and of relations between the sexes has no application within the Islamic tradition in which the extended family and the institution of *Purdah* are of key importance. Muslims must work out their own partial compliance theory for the domain of family life in terms of the ideas, beliefs and values which are central in the Islamic tradition.

But I do not think Held would accept such relativism. Her emphasis upon



human rights, including her avowal of sympathy for the spirit although not the letter of the U.N. Declaration, her conception of moral agents as free and rational and her occasional references to the unjust treatment of women in the West let alone elsewhere, suggest that she would find the prescribed relations between the sexes in the Islamic tradition and especially the institution of Purdah, morally defective, or at least morally unenlightened. Underlying her conception of moral inquiry and partial compliance theory is a general moral position best described as rational humanism. De facto rational humanism has become widespread in the Western tradition today, although its de jure position is still nominally Judaeo-Christian. But de facto rational humanism is far from being widespread in the Islamic tradition. Its presence and influence in other traditions is a matter for empirical inquiry. Although she does not acknowledge it, Held is faced with a choice. Either she must maintain that rational humanism is the most enlightened moral position and the less it is influential in any tradition the less morally enlightened that tradition, or she must accept the relativism I have provisionally ascribed to her and concede that moral inquiry and partial compliance theory must be confined within the framework of a particular tradition of culture and civilisation.

I would expect her to choose the first alternative. That rational humanism is the most enlightened moral position might be defended on the grounds that it incorporates the most informed understanding of the human situation. It is compatible with religious faith, although not with any form of compulsory religious affiliation. The issues connected with moral diversity and the existence of different traditions of culture and civilisation should have been directly confronted in the early chapters in which Held explains and defends her idea of moral inquiry and partial compliance theory. By confining her discussion to the contrast between ideal and partial compliance theory, she leaves undone an important part of what she needs to do. The moral principles of an ideal society, if they are to be intelligible, must have their roots in some tradition of culture and civilisation, which in the case of Rawls is the Western. But this having been said, what she has written is a valuable contribution to critical moral thinking. While her treatment of the seven social domains is necessarily brief, she has wise and perceptive things to say about each of them. Her book deserves to be read not only by professional philosophers and their students but by the wider educated public.

A.J.M. MILNE  
(*Department of Politics*)  
University of Durham

J.F.M. HUNTER. *Understanding Wittgenstein: Studies of Philosophical Investigations*. New York: Columbia University Press (for Edinburgh University Press) 1985. Pp. xiii + 248. US\$30.00. ISBN 0-85224-497-5.

In contrast to Hunter's earlier *Essays After Wittgenstein* (1973), which offers his own development of themes that concerned Wittgenstein, *Understanding Wittgenstein* focuses in detail on particular passages, and suggests and evaluates various lines of interpretation. Each of the twenty-seven chapters, which range in length from four to twenty pages, deals specifically with a paragraph or a group of paragraphs from the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wittgenstein said that the work of the philosopher is to assemble reminders for a particular purpose, and much of Hunter's new book consists of just such reminders. Hunter not only cites textual evidence for his interpretations, but also offers a useful array of examples. For example, one may know what water is without knowing the difference between watering horses and watering milk, or between crying and eyes watering. However, Hunter sometimes overexplains his reminders as he does when he gives an elaborate description of differences between 'He understands English' and 'He salutes officers' (157).

Hunter makes a number of sensible points. His discussion of 'says' and 'means,' which he takes to illustrate a procedure of pairing two grammars, is helpful (206-7). Or again: Hunter usefully gathers passages suggesting that Wittgenstein is a behaviorist, then argues that he is not. And Hunter's comments on a false picture of psychological states at the end are illuminating. Still, throughout, he uses vocabulary — like that of essential and nonessential properties — uncharacteristic of Wittgenstein.

The book reads as if an intelligent person sat down to puzzle out the *Investigations* on his own. Hunter gives no evidence of acquaintance with the controversies attending Wittgenstein scholarship; for example, he mentions the so-called private language argument only once, and then only to say that it is *not* 'the unifying thread in the sections of the *Philosophical Investigations* dealing with pain' (127).

I have two main criticisms. First, Hunter gives too much attention to obviously obtuse interpretations before finally rejecting them. This flaw is a result, I think, of the way that Hunter aims to lead the reader along, down to the end of the blindest of alleys, in order to share the philosophical discovery. For example, he quotes the famous beetle-in-the-box passage (*PI*, par. 293) without the crucial last sentence, and proceeds to discuss various interpretations; after the discussion, he brings in the last sentence as if to say, 'Here's something else to consider,' and delivers the interpretation he favors. (98-104).

Second, and more important, many of his interpretations seem somewhat superficial or flatfooted. Consider two of Hunter's discussions — the one of par. 185 and the one of par. 296 (and par. 304). Hunter's discussion of par 185 illustrates the liability of his procedure of ignoring everything else writ-



ten on Wittgenstein. Par. 185 depicts a student who continues a series by adding 2 past 1000 and writes '1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.' Hunter, who refers to the example as 'this most curious and bewildering example,' discusses this paragraph at a level that has been rendered superfluous by Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Hunter says: 'Characteristically, there is no specification of what the general problem is in the stretch of the *Philosophical Investigations* in which this passage occurs ...' (78). Whether Kripke's interpretation is right or not, we no longer have to grope around trying to find a problem to attribute to Wittgenstein in the passage.

What Hunter does say is that here Wittgenstein's 'main point is that a rule does not itself spell out what to do — we must learn how to apply it — and if there were rules telling us how to apply the rule, the application of these rules would not be contained in them, but would have to be learned' (79). That Hunter does not see the depth of Wittgenstein's concern is indicated by his taking it as unproblematic that 9, 19, and 29 uniquely identify a natural number series whose next member is 39. Hunter's whole discussion is skewed by his assumption that Wittgenstein is asking what a 'harried mathematics instructor' should do if he were actually to encounter such a 'deviant student,' one who perhaps lacked our 'happy genetic adaptation.' Although Hunter does not dismiss Wittgenstein's example as 'merely a fine point of pedagogical practice,' he (mis)locates 'its importance ... in what it may show about the nature of mathematical competence' (81).

With regard to par. 296, Hunter says, 'If there is any suspicion remaining that Wittgenstein denies that there is pain as well as pain-behavior, it is put to rest in par. 304, where he says there could be no greater difference than that between pain-behavior accompanied and not accompanied by pain' (106-7). The relevant part of par. 304 is this: "'But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behavior accompanied by pain and pain-behavior without any pain?'" — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? In light Wittgenstein's use of an interlocutor, this should not be construed as anything as straightforward (and pedestrian) as a claim.

Moreover, Hunter interprets Wittgenstein as retaining an 'object and name' model of sensation words, just not 'the typical one.' If I understand Wittgenstein correctly — especially in par. 304 — he wants to dispel the grammatical illusion which leads us to suppose that the purpose of an expression of pain is to convey a thought about pain. This illusion is abetted by misconstruing the grammar of the expression of pain on *any* model of 'object and name,' it is not just some particular version of the model that is defective. Also, Hunter rides roughshod over the first-person/third-person distinction when he takes Wittgenstein's question in par. 296 — 'Only whom are you informing of this [that "there is *something ... accompanying my cry of pain*"]', and on what occasion?' — as if the question concerned *third-person* utterances of 'He is in pain.'

Finally, I should say a word about Hunter's presentation. Hunter tends to advance the various possible interpretations and the supporting evidence for them in lists — (1), (2), (3); (a), (b), (c); (i), (ii), (iii) and so on. He ends up with

lists within lists, somewhat in the style of lecture notes. As a result, his is a book more to be consulted when one is puzzled about particular passages, rather than a book to be read straight through.

*Understanding Wittgenstein* is not an introduction to Wittgenstein, but rather a companion to the *Investigations*; it will be of most use to beginners who find themselves baffled by the *Investigations*.

LYNNE RUDDER BAKER  
Middlebury College

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DOUGLAS KELLNER. *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1985. Pp. x + 505. US\$38.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-520-05176-9); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-520-05295-1).

Herbert Marcuse is most famous for his theoretical mentorship of the student New Left in the late 1960's, whose actions in the universities sparked a world-wide movement against U.S. armed intervention in Vietnam and, more generally, a near revolutionary repudiation of the repressive kitsch and consumerism of capitalist civilization itself. But Marcuse's critical presence in Western thought runs deeper and broader than this extraordinary influence on the most significant social upheaval in the West since 1945. His purely scholarly credentials as synthesizer of Marx and Freud, radical interpreter of Hegel, leading critical voice of the Frankfurt school, pathbreaking philosopher of art and, above all, sociocultural analyst and visionary of striking erudition and range, make him one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century.

Yet Marcuse has had precious little attention paid to his work by contemporary departmental philosophy. We can consult, for example, the touchstone *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and find not even a cross-reference to Marcuse. Moreover his most definitive books, *Eros and Civilization* and *One-Dimensional Man*, are seldom studied in philosophy courses, though their originality and critical substance is not less than, say, Robert Nozick's apologetics for the protection of unlimited wealth or John Rawls' ponderous elaboration of liberal abstractions, which have together dominated social and political philosophy curricula for a decade. It is often suggested that Marcuse's work is neglected because of its 'prolix' or 'convoluted' style, but a familiarity with the Heideggerian phenomenology in which he was trained,



which is now widely adored despite a turgid circumlocution that makes Marcuse seem tersely direct in comparison, makes it difficult to accept that it is Marcuse's style which has discouraged philosophical interest in his work. Marcuse's work is more likely a philosophical casualty of the 'New Right' backlash against social criticism which has been gathering momentum since the underclass upheavals and U.S. defeat in Vietnam over a decade ago: a social reaction which has the capital base of the foundations, the publishers, the mass media and the increasingly business-oriented Universities to bear its agenda, and against which Marcuse's mature corpus once stood as a dangerously influential adversary.

It is thus a delight to see Douglas Kellner's *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism* give the systematic scholarly attention to Marcuse's life oeuvre that it deserves. Kellner does not seek the 'crisis of Marxism' in the sociohistorical circumstances in which it and Marcuse's thought is located, and in this sense is, typically, a study of Marxism without the 'base' Marx insisted upon as necessary to understand any ideological struggle. But it is nonetheless a remarkably detailed and immersively informed account of Marcuse's philosophical contexts and development, and an invaluable sourcebook for anyone interested in Marcuse's life and thought. No academic library can responsibly be without it, if only for its rich resources as an intellectual biography of a major thinker of our century. I would think too that most individuals seriously interested in Marxian philosophy, certainly anyone interested in neo-Marxian, continental Marxian or contemporary radical philosophy, would find it recurrently useful to have on their shelves.

Kellner's study is a sort of theoretical documentary: a highly specific and historically framed account of the intellectual roots, principal positions and developments of Marcuse's thought. What Kellner's book exceptionally provides, as well, is reports of actual conversations with Marcuse himself on responses to his work. It is a continually refreshing experience to find the subject of the study himself rejoining criticisms of his work: answering concerns about his elitism (he says 'provocation'); his apparent changes of direction (he says 'emphasis'); and his utopianism (he says refusal to 'betray' the humanly and technically realizable). The book is full of these encounters in conversation, media interviews and reports, public declarations and private correspondence. At the same time, the main substance of Marcuse's scholarly books is kept at the center of the exposition. In all, I cannot easily remember reading a more conscientious and lovingly detailed exploration of an intellectual life than Kellner produces. It is a thoroughly meticulous and painstaking scholarly work.

It is impossible to cover the book's full range of material in review, not only because it is so detailed, but because it is *essentially* detailed; an extraordinarily elaborated inventory of the trees (and the value of this should not be underestimated), but missing the shape of the forest. In the end, no integrating philosophical argument or pattern is excavated to join and explain the constituent pieces of Marcuse's many-sided work. The work slips from

one point to the next, each clear and of interest, but never bearing down to a sufficiently developed argument to comprehend in depth or to grapple with.

This explanatory fragmentation not only dogs the preponderantly expository substance of Kellner's book, but also the perfunctory criticisms he gives of Marcuse's theories and ideas. His judgements come in solemn short statements interspersed through the work, and strike little more deeply than conventional fault-finding (e.g., 190-6). Sometimes Kellner's criticisms seem mere Cold War reflexes, as in his frequent reprovals of Marcuse for his Soviet 'apologetics' (e.g., 201, 224ff, 312ff): a repeated rebuke that seems merely ridiculous to a non-American student of Marcuse, and hardly less so with the evidence Kellner adverts to (the critical *Soviet Marxism*).

For Marxian scholars, the most challenging position presented in the book is Marcuse's assertion that the proletariat is no longer qualified to be history's 'revolutionary subject' (e.g., 302-17). Warning against 'fetishizing the class concept' and the 'fetishism of the proletariat,' he argues that 'today the industrial working class is not the radical negation of capitalist society' (too integrated into it by consumerism), nor 'the universal class' (too focussed on high wages for metropolitan white-male unions to the exclusion of minorities, women, and social issues). Nor, he continues, can the proletariat any longer claim to have 'a monopoly on exploitation' (The third-world's peasants and other underclasses are plainly far worse off and more repressed). Moreover, he continues, the proletariat does not possess the 'revolutionary consciousness' of other classes and blocs who are more cognitively equipped (intellectuals and students), or politically aware and enraged (liberation movements in Latin America, Africa and the East), or socially concerned (the women's, environment and disarmament movements). A new 'revolutionary subject' must be recognized, contends Marcuse, to catch up with a world that has vastly changed since Marx's day, and that requires a correspondingly developed concept of transformative agency if capitalism is to be effectively confronted and superceded. This is the nub of Marcuse's invitation to orthodox Marxism to theoretically retool, and here as elsewhere Kellner documents the basic constituents of his position. But again here, a more sociological than philosophical presentation of ideas (very much in the style of T.B. Bottomore's *Frankfurt School*) leaves the argument description-specific, and its conceptual bearings and axes unplumbed.

Questions thus arise which Kellner does not consider. Is the general principle of profit extraction from wage and salary earners for the benefit of a small minority of capital owners any less the 'essential form' of society now than in Marx's day? Is there a need for a more generalized notion of the working class that would unify rather than polarize insights within Marcuse's tradition? Or, again, is there a need to deepen and elaborate Marx's base-superstructure theoretical connections rather than lose these relationships of grounding and determination in cultural critique? These questions do not arise in Kellner's study, though Marcuse's work certainly provokes them for a philosopher addressing the Marxian problematic, and though the title words of Kellner's book, 'The Crisis of Marxism,' suggest just such an engagement.



But this is not a book that explores answers, nor even questions. It is, rather, a superb theoretical catalogue, a rich storehouse of ideas of one of the most brilliant thinkers of our time.

JOHN McMURTRY  
University of Guelph

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JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS. *On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1984. Pp. xii + 338. US\$24.95. ISBN 0-253-34245-7.

Heidegger's later writings have long been an enigma even to those most sympathetic to his thought. On the one hand, they contain those brilliant diagnoses of technology and metaphysics that set the standard for a new wave of critique. Yet, on the other hand, their single-minded goal of thinking 'the question concerning the meaning of Being' after the closure of metaphysics seems bound for total obscurity. A study devoted to this corpus by one of America's foremost Heidegger authorities is therefore greeted with excitement. Kockelmans' painstaking analyses are the fruit of a life-time of scholarship. With unerring insight he pinpoints the crucial themes in Heidegger's essays of 1935 to 1965, and he gathers together the materials that must be confronted by future Heidegger scholars.

What characterizes the later Heidegger is that, 'in the relation between Being and *Dasein* [human existence], he gives priority to Being, contrary to what had been the case in *Being and Time*' (ix). This is the notorious 'turn' in Heidegger's thought away from phenomenological and transcendental anthropocentrism toward a view in which humans are seen as the 'shepherds of Being.' Kockelmans sees the turn as occurring in Heidegger's essay 'On the Essence of Truth' (1943) where truth is interpreted as an event of revealing and concealing (*a-lētheia* translated as 'unhiddenness') which is brought about by Being itself. Being's self-disclosing is prior to humans, and it makes our notion of truth as correspondence or correctness possible. But because the truth of Being includes in itself a self-concealing, there is in Being a 'mystery' that goes beyond our mastery and control. We sink into error to the extent that we 'forget the mystery,' that is, we forget that Being is always more than what we can make into an object of our representing.

The essay on truth brings out the central feature that Kockelmans finds in the later Heidegger. Despite the fact that Heidegger writes essays called 'The Thing' and 'The Question Concerning the Thing,' he is 'never concerned with beings or things' (x). For Being is not a collection of things; instead, it is an event which opens a clearing for things and in which we participate more or less authentically. Taking the concept of truth as his key, Kockelmans examines such Heideggerian themes as thinking, Being, the ontological difference, the fourfold, God, language, art, poetry, science, technology, ethics, and politics. Each of these themes brings out humanity's dependence on and indebtedness to the happening of Being.

At the outset Kockelmans tells us that, because it is 'virtually impossible for us to relate critically' to Heidegger, his procedure will be to provide 'simple paraphrase' and surveys of the development of 'basic ideas' in Heidegger's thought (x-xi). This method helps the reader place such dark notions as 'earth,' 'difference,' 'mystery,' 'destiny,' 'presencing' and 'the holy' within the whole of Heidegger's thought. Kockelmans' paraphrases and surveys are at their best in the second half of the book where he focuses on the fourfold, art, language, poetry, science, and technology. The commentary, which generally presupposes a prior knowledge of Heidegger, will be of limited use to those seeking a smooth entry into the texts. For those who already know Heidegger but are baffled by the talk of 'Being,' it might be worthwhile to skip the first four chapters and begin with the discussion of art where the going gets easier.

In the long run, however, the study is somewhat disappointing. Like earlier interpreters, Kockelmans tends to remain trapped in the closed circuits of Heideggerian jargon, providing few examples or plain-language elucidations to clarify the texts. His mild-mannered disagreements with other specialists about fine points of textual interpretation leave laymen in the dark about what is at stake in the debate. The commentary could have focused the issues by showing the motivation for Heidegger's 'turn' in his dialogue with his predecessors (especially Schelling and Nietzsche). Moreover, Kockelmans' study ignores the tremendous impact Heidegger has had on a new generation of philosophers (for example, Gadamer, Derrida, and Rorty) who have used and abused his writings.

The method of simply paraphrasing the texts ends up mimicking rather than clarifying some of the most puzzling dimensions of later Heidegger's works. In his 'anti-humanist' thought, Heidegger often personified Being, portraying it as an agent to which humans respond. Kockelmans echoes this tendency toward personification. Being, he tells us, is 'that which hides itself when it grants itself' (48). 'Being casts its eye on man (appeal), and *Dasein* catches Being's eye in turn (response)' (59). 'Being sends and grants itself,' (60) although 'man is endangered by Being's sending-itself' (241) in the age of technology. Meanwhile, 'Being is still waiting for the time when it will again become thought-provoking ...' (35). To be sure, this is what Heidegger says, but it cries out for some line of interpretation if it is to make sense. Various interpretive frameworks might be proposed. For instance, a Rilkean nature



romanticism could provide a conceptual basis for radical ecologists; a Foucaultian conception of transpersonal cultural forces generating a background of intelligibility might show how Heidegger's thought connects with current decenterings of the subject; or a process-theological panentheism similar to that found in Heidegger's lectures on Schelling might show the relevance of Heidegger to current issues in theology. What is sorely lacking in Kockelmans is any framework for articulating Heidegger's thought in a way that could make it accessible. In such formulations as, 'for Heidegger, Being is not God ... Rather, it is the totality of all meaning,' (33) little has been clarified.

The source of the problems in elucidating Heidegger's talk of Being is identified in Kockelmans' fine discussion of the role of technology in closing off our ability to think about Being. Technicity 'hides and prevents us from catching sight of the true constellation of Being and man' (239), with the result that 'we do not hear and see the deepest mystery of Being' (249). Technology 'puts the world in order, while in fact this ordering eliminates all true order and hierarchy, in that it subjects everything to the uniformity of production' (236). These reflections on technology are clearly and powerfully expressed, and they cast light on why Heidegger's struggle to retrieve a forgotten sense of Being is so difficult. But as long as we are left in the dark about what the 'true order,' the 'deepest mystery,' and the 'genuine event' are, Heidegger's attempt to think the truth of Being is easily exposed to Derri-dean derision.

CHARLES GUIGNON  
University of Vermont

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MIKE W. MARTIN, ed. *Self-Deception and Self-Understanding: New Essays in Philosophy and Psychology*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1985. Pp. x + 316. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-7006-0264-X.

This is a collection of eleven previously unpublished essays, in four parts, each part having a brief introduction by the editor; there is also a longer general introduction by the editor. Six essays (one co-authored) are by philosophers; five essays (three co-authored) are by psychologists. The theme of Part I is the role of self-deception in excuse making; Part II looks at self-deception as a way of bolstering our good opinion of ourselves against unflat-

tering reality; Part III asks whether self-deception is always a morally bad thing or always irrational; Part IV asks if self-deception is logically impossible, and if so, what do we really mean by the phrase. The philosophers who have contributed are Béla Szabados, Herbert Fingarette, John King-Farlow in collaboration with Richard Bosley, Robert Audi, M.R. Haight, and David Kipp.

Someone puzzled by the idea of self-deception, wanting to know how the self-deceiver could be both agent and victim of his own deception all at the same time, will have to read a long way in this book before he finds food for thought — as far as p. 143, to be precise. But then he is in for a treat. Szabados's 'The Self, Its Passions and Self-Deception,' to which I shall return, is an outstandingly good piece in which the shortcomings in a lot of contemporary scepticism about the possibility of self-deception (dominant in this collection) are brilliantly exposed. Up to this point, the rewards for the reader seeking a more thoughtful response to the paradox are few. The contributors who precede Szabados, with the exception of Fingarette, are all psychologists. C.R. Snyder defines self-deception as holding two conflicting, self-referential beliefs (35); that self-deception is not always a harmful thing is, he thinks, shown by the case of the pathologically shy person who deceived himself into believing that everyone feels uneasy at parties and so felt better about his own shyness. Daniel T. Gilbert and Joel Cooper claim to have found experimental evidence of the mechanism involved in self-deception; we arrange for the information we receive and process about ourselves to be distorted, paying more attention to what flatters our good opinion of ourselves than to what conflicts with it. Timothy D. Wilson makes a different suggestion; a preconscious filter determines what enters consciousness and the filter may reject for reasons other than that a stimulus is threatening. Self-deception arises when we fail to recognize an attitude or desire as our own. According to Ben Zion Chanowitz and Ellen J. Langer, a person is not a consistent, unified self; he is composed of many 'social selves', each leading its separate life unknown to the other unless the protective barriers crumble. 'Self-deception' is a misleading way to describe the relationships between such selves. When not denying the existence of self-deception on the grounds that the self-deceiver, as deceiver, has to know the truth of which, as deceived, he must be ignorant, the less hostile among the psychologists are defining self-deception in such loose ways that any kind of lack of insight into oneself is treated by them as self-deception.

Fingarette's 'Alcoholism and Self-Deception' is more rewarding but it is rather slight. He argues that, contrary to medical and popular opinion, alcoholism is not a disease and that alcoholics who think they are suffering from a disease are deceiving themselves and thus making it more difficult for them to control their drinking. Self-deception, I thought, was no more than a peg on which to hang his only briefly sketched main argument.

Szabados examines and rejects recent arguments in favour of scepticism about the existence of self-deception, to be found, for example, in Haight's recent *A Study of Self-Deception*. Szabados points out that, as these essays



testify, many who deny the existence of self-deception ('heretics' he calls them) hold a 'conspiracy theory' of self-deception. They are so sure that no one can deceive himself that they feel obliged to explain the widespread use of this, to their minds, self-contradictory phrase. Their explanation is that we describe ourselves as deceiving ourselves in order to confuse those sitting in judgment on us. As the deceivers we say we are, we are admitting our guilt; but, as the victims of deception we complain of being, we continue to protest our innocence. This ruse is supposed to throw our judges into uncertainty and so we gain an advantage. Szabados questions the plausibility of this explanation. The sceptics say that self-deception is merely a metaphor, that it is really wishful thinking or weakness of will. Szabados challenges this frequently repeated assertion by distinguishing carefully between self-deception and other things. The key point is that the self-deceiver, unlike the wishful thinker or the simply weak-willed, manipulates evidence at the level of inference and engages in rationalizations; he creates a deceptive appearance of his own devising; that is, it is his own rationalizations which deceive him as to where the truth lies.

Five essays follow — the balance now tipped in favour of philosophy — all but one being by philosophers, including one by Haight herself. The exception is the psychologist Kenneth J. Gergen who argues that, although logic forbids self-deception, the social function of such language is to permit 'responsible irresponsibility'. For Audi, if Jane, who unconsciously knows she is afraid of public speaking, sincerely says she is not and avoids public speaking but is better at it when she cannot avoid it, then self-deception is not always irrational. If, as King-Farlow and Bosley suggest, Dreyfus saved himself from going mad on Devil's Island by deceiving himself that he would soon be released, self-deception is not necessarily a bad thing. It is too little or too much of anything that is bad and there is a mean to be had in self-deception too. Haight presents Lorelei Lee in Anita Loos' *Gentlemen Prefer Blondes* as typical of self-deception — really, we are left in no doubt, Lorelei is a scheming little minx. Haight would have us apply this moral to all self-deceivers. According to Kipp, the idea that self-deception actually occurs gets its credibility from a weakened notion of belief fostered by the impossible demands of Christian belief in heaven, and of socialist utopianism. Belief is reduced to acting as if you believed; it is in this sense that the self-deceiver 'believes' the opposite of what he knows to be the case. All except King-Farlow and Bosley hold much the same view, and for much the same reasons, namely, that there is no such thing as literal self-deception because that would require the self-deceiver to know or believe something and its opposite at the same time. No one is sensitive to, or actually responds to, Szabados's criticisms of this initially very persuasive, but philosophically unsophisticated position.

The book does not fill the need for an edited collection of already published material on the paradox of self-deception. It does, however, contain the first comprehensive bibliography of that literature. It is odd that there are no representatives of the solution to the sceptic's difficulties which the

editor himself clearly favours (19), namely, comparison with other reflexives, such as teaching oneself something. The paradox of self-deception might then appear more tractable as only one of a large family of reflexive-related paradoxes.

T.S. CHAMPLIN  
University of Hull

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FRANCIS JEFFRY PELLETIER & JOHN KING-FARLOW, eds. *New Essays on Plato*. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume IX. Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press (for the Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, Guelph, ON) 1983. Pp. 183. Cdn\$13.00. ISBN 0-919491-09-X.

Six of the nine essays in this collection are devoted to issues in Plato's metaphysics and epistemology. The three others, which precede them, take up issues in his political philosophy, ethics and aesthetics.

In a fresh contribution to a hoary debate J.M.E. Moravcsik ('Plato and Pericles on Freedom and Politics') compares Thucydides's Funeral Oration to the *Republic* to conclude that because 'those who are ruled [in Plato's ideal *polis*] would submit voluntarily to his "government by experts,"... Plato's political thought simply does not fit the currently fashionable democracy vs. authoritarianism dichotomy' (14). Richard D. Parry ('The Craft of Justice') argues convincingly (against T. Irwin and others) that the Craft Analogy of the early dialogues is not dropped in the *Republic*. Instead *Rep. IV* solves a problem left unsolved in Socratic ethics. The craft is here given a specific goal or object: 'The object of justice *cum* wisdom is specified as the health of the soul understood as a kind of order' (27). And Elizabeth Belfiore ('Plato's Greatest Accusation Against Poetry') carefully elucidates Plato's complaint against what he takes to be the insidiousness of imitative poetry.

In what is arguably the best essay in the collection ('Belief, Knowledge and Learning in Plato's Middle Dialogues') Michael Morgan sets himself the task of exonerating Plato from the charge that in the *Republic* learning (the transition from belief to knowledge) is impossible, since that dialogue, unlike the *Meno*, differentiates between the objects of belief and those of



knowledge. Morgan finds in διάνοια the bridge between belief and knowledge. διάνοια is described as 'bi-polar belief,' and involves both sensible objects and characteristics, and Forms. One who has διάνοια has come to realize that no sensible is what F is, and has thus progressed beyond belief. At the same time he has come to realize that only the F is what F is, but does not as yet have the cognitive grasp of the F required for knowledge. Drawing on Plato's discussion of the mathematical sciences in *Rep. VII*, Morgan characterizes διάνοια as being 'about' sensibles and 'for the sake of' Forms (88,89). The account is textually well grounded and offers an interesting and important solution to a thorny problem.

Jane S. Zembaty ('Plato's *Timaeus*: Mass Terms, Sortal Terms and Identity Through Time in the Phenomenal World') takes exception to the view that in the notoriously controversial passage at *Tim.* 48e-52d the Receptacle is introduced as the only thing which may properly be called 'this,' while all phenomena may only be called 'the such and such.' She finds evidence in the *Tim.* which accommodates the modern distinction between mass terms ('air,' 'fire,' etc.) and sortals ('man,' 'horse') and their correspondingly different identity criteria, so as to conclude that Plato allows or would have allowed 'this' ascriptions to sortals. Her interpretation seems hard to square, with the text, however. The phrase at 49e6 (of which Z. takes no special notice), 'καὶ ἅπαν ὅσονπερ ἄν ἔχῃ γένεσιν' clearly includes *all* phenomena within the scope of Plato's prohibition.

In an interesting paper, 'Timaeus 48e-52d and the Third Man Argument,' William J. Prior gives an account of the same text, by which he intends to show that the tripartite ontology of the *Timaeus* provides Plato's metaphysics with the resources to stand firm against the Third Man regresses of the *Parmenides*. The *Timaeus* ontology rules out self-predication in the sense required by the regresses (141), since phenomena and their properties are spatial whereas Forms are non-spatial and thus cannot have spatial properties. As 'παράδειγματα' Forms are not exemplars (which would imply self-predication), but patterns (which would not) (140, n.26), and moreover 'not every case of "resemblance" in Plato involves the sharing of a property' (140 and n. 27). What is new in this account is not its rejection of self-predication and its construal of paradeigmatism, but its use of the *Timaeus* ontology to support those moves.

Mark L. McPherran ('Plato's *Parmenides* Theory of Relations') finds in the 'worst difficulty' argument of the *Parmenides* the materials for a theory of relations which, he claims, completes that of the *Phaedo*. The *Parmenides* passage clearly requires 'immanent characters' to play a role in such a theory, but it is a matter of some controversy whether the *Phaedo* accommodates such characters on an ontological par with Forms and sensibles. McPherran acknowledges this, but fails to defend his view that it does. Moreover, given that in the *Parm.* it is Parmenides who as critic of the Theory of Forms provides the materials for the theory, to what extent is one justified in accepting it as *Plato's* theory of relations? Some questions about Plato's purposes in this part of the dialogue appear to be begged.

The final two essays in the collection address the issue of whether the epistemology of the *Philebus* implies or requires the dualistic ontology of the canonical Theory of Forms. Richard Mohr ('Philebus 55c-62a and Revisionism') questions a case for the negative argued by Roger A. Shiner in his book, *Knowledge and Reality in Plato's Philebus*. Shiner replies to Mohr's objections and those of others in 'Knowledge in *Philebus* 55c-62a: A Response.' The issue is too complex to take up here; at any rate, it testifies to the hardness of the controversy concerning Plato's 'development.' Neither 'unitarians' nor 'revisionists' seem to be giving up their case.

The volume appears to have been given minimal editing. There is neither editorial introduction, bibliography nor index.

DONALD J. ZEYL  
University of Rhode Island

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EDWARD REGIS, Jr., ed. *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984. Pp. vi + 268. US\$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-70691-5); US\$12.50 (paper: ISBN 0-226-70692-3).

With the publication of this reader, Alan Gewirth is placed in the distinguished company of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. (*Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of A Theory of Justice*, Norman Daniels, ed., 1974; *Reading Nozick: Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, Jeffrey Paul, ed., 1981.) In some respects, Gewirth certainly belongs. In *Reason and Morality* (1978) he presents a systematic and meticulously crafted theory of moral rights that necessarily commands the attention of all who labor in the vineyard. Neither the sheer sweep and power of the work nor its acute analytical thoroughness are in doubt and, predictably, it has engendered a spate of responses.

On the other hand, reactions elicited by *Reason and Morality* have differed markedly from those that followed in the wake of Rawls and Nozick. Each of the latter two has gathered extended professional criticism, but also advocates, enthusiasts, and hangers-on. There must, by now, be hundreds of Rawlsians who have issued demurrals concerning some wrinkle of the difference principle or the original position or the conception of reflective equilibrium but who yet are easily identified as carrying on a research program anchored in *A Theory of Justice*. And Nozick has, almost single-handedly, rendered libertarianism respectable — or, at least, not to be ig-



nored. To an extent unprecedented since Moore's *Principia Ethica*, Rawls and Nozick have attracted the attention of professionals in disciplines external to philosophy. Even the much-invoked but infrequently-sighted 'intelligent layman' seems to have caught some of the excitement.

The case with Gewirth is different. The now extensive Gewirth literature fastens almost exclusively on the central argument to rights, the conclusion to which is Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). Respondents differ amongst themselves as to precisely where and how it breaks down, but the proposition that it *does* indeed fail enjoys near unanimity. Nor has it been much embraced as a *useful* failure; there is, as best I can tell, no stream of Gewirthians eager to suggest alternative routes to the PGC. *Reason and Morality* receives, to be sure, admiration for its manifest philosophical virtues. But it functions mostly as an occasion for virtuoso performances by philosophical dissectionists. Gewirth's edifice imposes, but it is perceived to be a mile high and only a foot across. Once a strut is removed it topples — irrevocably.

This volume affords a welcome opportunity for reexamination. Regis has assembled a strong cast of contributors to write a dozen original essays on different aspects of the Gewirthian corpus. *Reason and Morality* contains much more than the derivation of the PGC, and Regis is determined to bring the remainder into better view. The goal is laudable but fulfilled only in part. Eric Mack offers an incisive critique of Gewirth on the negative causal responsibility of persons who decline to come to the rescue of others. James Hill has useful things to say about the status of 'marginal agents' (e.g., fetuses, animals), and Douglas Den Uyl and Tibor Machan criticize from a libertarian perspective Gewirth's attachment to the 'supportive state.' The other nine essays though deal in whole or part with the winding road to the PGC. Whatever their ostensible point of departure, the destination is much the same. For example, Jesse Kalin supplies a spirited and, to my mind, convincing defense of ethical egoism against Gewirth's attempts at refutation. Egoism survives though only if Gewirth has slipped at an early stage of the progression to the PGC. Unsurprisingly, Kalin claims to have detected such a flaw. W.D. Hudson offers a somewhat guarded 'no' to the title question of 'The Is-Ought Problem Resolved?' But whether the problem has been resolved reduces to the question of whether the derivation of the PGC from the bare fact of agency is valid. So it's off to the races again.

Collections of new pieces have certain advantages over recycled material. Freshness itself is one, presence of a directive editorial design another. Quality assurance, however, becomes chancier. One or two pieces included in *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism* might just have well remained unwritten. The remainder display at least competence. Whether they offer a significant contribution to Gewirth scholarship is another matter. R.M. Hare provides a characteristically tidy and well-crafted essay, taking aim like most of the others at the derivation of the PGC. Having identified what he takes to be a disabling equivocation on 'rights,' he then proceeds to sketch his preferred view of moral reasoning. The product is creditable, but it is far more Hare

than Gewirth. Renford Bambrough finds Gewirth's foundationalism suspect and suggests an alternative. Readers of Bambrough's *Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge* will be able to guess its shape. Kai Nielsen states himself to be 'Against Ethical Rationalism,' finding in Gewirth no adequate retort to the amoralist who neither claims rights for himself nor recognizes them in others. Nielsen's objection is not exactly novel, but it is made well enough. Then it is made again, rephrased, displayed from another direction and, finally, cushioned with two appendices. What could have been neatly stated in five pages balloons to twenty-five.

My candidate for most lustrous essay in the collection is Marcus Singer's 'Gewirth's Ethical Monism.' Singer elegantly skewers Gewirth's attempts to apply the PGC in practice, arguing that the unique decisions alleged to issue from the supreme principle are instead egregiously gerrymandered. Gewirth's method has often been compared to Kant's. Here another basis for comparison emerges: illustrative cases that come up lame.

Also well worth reading is Jan Narveson's 'Negative and Positive Rights in Gewirth's *Reason and Morality*,' Narveson more or less plays Hobbes to Gewirth's Kant, substituting for apodictic necessity gritty cost-benefit considerations. On Narveson's construction, negative rights possess a more solid grounding in self-interested reasoning than do positive rights. The upshot is a quasi-libertarian way of thinking about rights.

In the concluding 63 pages of text (followed by a bibliography of Gewirth's publications and an index of names and topics) Gewirth has his say. It is not the first occasion on which he has addressed himself to critics, but is nonetheless valuable. One gains a renewed appreciation of Gewirth's considerable analytical strengths. Mostly he defends positions previously assumed, but his response to Mack involves a significant modification of the statement in *Reason and Morality*. Gewirth's eye for the diffuse or imprecise is sharp, and many of his counter-thrusts are telling. Only in the response to Hill does he appear simply to miss the point. More disappointing than that though is his decision to respond to the several critics of the PGC by repeating verbatim several steps of the canonical argument. Presumably he takes it to be valid and maximally clear as it stands; what else to do then but redeploy it? Such sticking to one's philosophical guns is not, however, likely to alter any preexisting convictions. Here the record seems stuck in one groove, the playing of which becomes tiresome.

Is *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism* to be the occasion for a significant reappraisal? Probably not. The essays meet reasonably high standards but none opens up terrain previously unexplored. The editor's attempt to steer attention away from the derivation of the PGC to other aspects of Gewirth's work meets only limited success. Most telling is that none of the twelve pieces can be characterized as *constructive* attempts to build on foundations erected by Gewirth. Both Gewirth and his critics seem to agree that the edifice either stands as presented in *Reason and Morality* or else falls, utterly and conclusively. I question the verdict. Gewirth's conception of the inherent normative structure of action and his deployment of the *dialectically necessary*



*method* are theoretically fecund. It is by no means obvious that they cannot survive if transplanted to richer ground. For example, if the bare fact of agency is too skeletal a foundation for rights, perhaps a richer philosophical anthropology could make the move seem less a rabbit pulled out of a hat. Gewirth quite properly eschews such considerations, but it is unfortunate that his interlocutors are entirely content to take him at his word.

LOREN E. LOMASKY

University of Minnesota, Duluth

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PAUL A. SCHILPP and LEWIS E. HAHN eds. *The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel. The Library of Living Philosophers*. Vol. XVII. La Salle, IL: Open Court 1984. Pp. xviii + 624. US\$39.95. ISBN 0-87548-369-0.

Both by circumstance and resolve, Gabriel Marcel did not number among those whom Kant once characterized ironically as *Denker vom Gewerbe*, 'professional thinkers.' He was never a university professor; he expounded no Marcelean 'system;' he held his dramatic works in equal esteem with his philosophical writings; and he wished above all to be 'a composer entirely dedicated to music' (76). A *Library of Living Philosophers* volume on his thought is thus inescapably an ambiguous project. The unique format of this series (autobiography, critical essays and replies) doubtless accords better with Marcel's own Socratism and his commitment to the spontaneity and openness of thought, than would a collection of dogmatic expositions and critiques. But critical essays, bound as they are to the fixity of writing, inevitably entail a closure, transforming 'mysteries' into 'problems,' compartmentalizing, dissecting and reducing to propositional form, turning the living thought into a static 'doctrine' and the man into a 'philosopher.' The result is a fundamental tension in this volume between Socratic openness and scholarly closure.

The critical essays are thus appropriately prefaced by a reflective portrait, E.M. Coiran's 'Gabriel Marcel: Notes for a Character Sketch.' Against the bias toward closure, Coiran recalls the profoundly dialogical impulse that motivates Marcel's philosophical writings, and the deep-rooted musical, literary and theological sensibilities that inform his life's work. 'Philosophers who have drawn so near the ineffable,' he writes, 'are prone to regret being neither musicians nor poets nor mystics and to regard their lot as a loss. For-

tunately for them, not all philosophers attain this level of clear-sightedness, but those who come close inject into their works a soul-rending feeling that redeems and humanizes their philosophy' (76-7). A resonance with this 'feeling,' more than any scholarly expertise, provides the best guide to Marcel and a counterbalance to the subsequent essays.

Existential concerns are most evident in Marcel's own 'Autobiographical Essay.' Instead of a conventional philosophical stock-taking or an history of his thoughts and works, Marcel offers a collection of personal reminiscences drawn from the full range of his experience. Although organized chronologically, these constitute, so to speak, *une recherche du côté de chez Marcel*, in which those things that catch in memory, the private recollections of times and places, of people, travels and incidents, serve as points from which to 'untangle' the 'skein' of the life (4). The result is by far the most intimate and personal autobiography yet to appear in the 'Living Philosophers' series (xv). But this too reveals the ambiguity of the volume. One might well expect from an 'intellectual autobiography' an account of the public life and works, in this case, a reflective discussion by Marcel of his motivations, intentions and accomplishments as philosopher and dramatist. After all, it is the public accomplishments which justify the volume in the first place. To the extent that such matters are pushed into the background, Marcel's essay seems almost *too* intimate and personal, irrelevant because of its very communicativeness. For Marcel, however, it is 'the plane of the intimate which ... is supreme' (4), sustaining and animating the public accomplishments; and he could not reverse this order of priority without believing his own convictions. But such a reversal seems necessary to carry his personal recollections beyond the merely particular.

This reflects a more general difficulty. Although openly critical of existentialism, at least of the sort 'founded upon anxiety' (49, 180), Marcel shares the existentialist aversion to thinking divorced from life. His 'philosophy is largely an uncoordinated variety of efforts to explore, understand, and elucidate the reality of personal experience' (245). As such, it 'is grounded upon commitment (*engagement*)' as that which '... provides the only possibility of breaking through the "invisible barrier" separating the theoretical thinker from the world and of making genuine, direct contact with reality (179)'. Yet this requires a caveat. For however much thinking is rooted essentially in the immediacy of existential involvements, its status *as philosophy* depends upon its ability to pass beyond what is merely existential into the realm of speculative discourse. It must render faithfully the experience from which it emerges, yet discriminate the universal and constant in this matrix from the fleeting and idiosyncratic. And this is a requirement not just of Marcel's thought, but of existential philosophy as such.

Part II of this volume contains twenty-two 'descriptive and critical' essays that examine, clarify and develop various central issues in Marcel's writings. Some of the essays are classificatory or comparative in nature, assessing for example Marcel's status as a 'phenomenologist' or a 'radical empiricist,' or juxtaposing his thoughts on a particular question with those of Sartre or



Merleau Ponty or Ortega. The majority, however, are thematic, focusing upon a specific topic (e.g., being, availability, mystery, personhood) and exploring the Marcelean 'position.'

By and large, the interpretations and evaluations are sympathetic, many having been written by friends, colleagues or former students, (e.g., Charles Hartshorne, Paul Ricoeur, John E. Smith). Marcel responds in kind, with little of the sharpness or enmity otherwise common in philosophical debates. The result is more like a commemoration or *Festschrift* than a radical challenge or critique. Nonetheless, in a way that broad-axe polemics and 'refutations' could not, these exchanges serve to deepen and enrich Marcel's project, and to carry our understanding of the issues further. Students of Marcel, and those who share his philosophical concerns, will thus find this volume an helpful source, as well as a useful addition to the relatively small philosophical literature available on Marcel in English.

Continuing a practice begun with the Blanshard volume, the editors have placed Marcel's replies immediately after each essay, making for easy reference. Appended is a complete bibliography of Marcel's writings.

ROBERT BURCH  
University of Alberta

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JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER. *Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1985. Pp. xiii + 278. US\$20.00. ISBN 0-300-03320-6.

Joel C. Weinsheimer has written a very good and useful commentary to the major opus of Hans-Georg Gadamer. *Wahrheit und Methode* was the definitive and comprehensive statement of Gadamer's conception of philosophical hermeneutics and none of his writings before or since its publication in 1960 has matched it in importance. Unfortunately *Truth and Method*, the English translation, did not appear until 1975 and lacked an extensive appendage of translator footnotes so needed to explain Gadamer's technical vocabulary. In addition most recent discussions of Gadamer in English have not given an exposition of philosophical hermeneutics in its own terms, but have sought to distinguish it sharply from the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas (Thomas McCarthy) or to integrate it with the tradition of American pragmatism (Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein). Weinsheimer's

commentary, appearing a full twenty-five years after the German original, is the first English book devoted solely to the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer and an excellent aid to a difficult and sometimes obscure translation.

Weinsheimer, a professor of English, states in the Preface that his 'modest and ambitious' purpose is 'to offer a detailed, comprehensive, and noncontroversial exposition of *Truth and Method* in a form accessible to the nonspecialist reader' (x). This statement of purpose and his professional background could lead the philosophical reader to expect a commentary of only superficial philosophical interest. However this is emphatically not the case, as Weinsheimer displays an impressive knowledge of art, history, and, above all, modern German philosophy. In fact, the book is helpful to specialists in all these fields and is especially rewarding to the philosophical specialist with a prior background in Gadamer, Heidegger, Ricoeur, or some other hermeneutical thinker.

The introduction is misleadingly labelled as such, since it is more accurately an attempt to update the title and a major theme of Gadamer's book with the contemporary discussion in the philosophy of science. Although many commentators, including Ricoeur, have been inclined to interpret the title ironically or dichotomously, viz. 'Truth or Method,' Weinsheimer makes a loyal attempt to defend the conjunction in *Truth and Method*. Moreover he finds that developments in the post-positivistic philosophy of science indicate that the 'method' of science contains important aspects of hermeneutical 'truth.' Thus whereas Gadamer wrote in *Truth and Method* that method 'is everywhere one and the same, and only displays itself in an exemplary manner in the natural sciences' (9), Weinsheimer points to Kuhn, Lakatos, and Toulmin as establishing the pluralism of scientific methods and to Michael Polanyi as demonstrating the important role of tacit, personal knowledge in the scientific community. Nevertheless the import of these developments is subject to a great deal of debate and I was not persuaded by Weinsheimer's attempt at conciliation. Polanyi is hardly a 'mainstream' philosopher of science and assertions made by some philosophers of science that, for example, science does not concern itself with truth, are strenuously disputed by others whom Weinsheimer does not mention. Although the conciliatory stance of Weinsheimer and others such as Rorty, Bernstein, and Mary Hesse is a potentially attractive option for philosophical hermeneutics, the oppositional stance of Charles Taylor in his *Philosophical Papers* also has much to be said for it and is, in my opinion, in closer alliance with Gadamer's thought.

The remaining parts of the book form the commentary proper and are divided into three chapters corresponding to the three major parts of *Truth and Method*. In each chapter Weinsheimer does an excellent job of describing the process of hermeneutical understanding that is common to art, history and language. Gadamer conceives of interpretation as being initiated not by us, but by what we wish to understand. In Heidegger's formula, 'Die Sprache spricht,' we are addressed by the work of art, the historical text, or even the



underlying phenomenon of language. As a result, our effort to understand is a response to an event which is not outside us but to which we belong. We are caught up in effective history of which we are a part and its transmission occurs beyond our willing and doing. Weinsheimer clarifies in detail the crucial notion of tradition that is the surrounding context for all hermeneutical understanding. He also makes plausible perhaps Gadamer's most controversial thesis, that all understanding is at the same time application. The meaning of the artwork or text, the content of a conversation have always to be worked out in the present and this working out, according to Gadamer, always carries with it the possibility of the disclosure of truth that affects our lives. Thus to be conscious of effective history is for Gadamer to be open to its application to the present.

Among the three chapters, the second is the most important and the most highly recommended. In the second part of *Truth and Method* Gadamer distinguishes his conception of hermeneutics from those of Schleiermacher and Dilthey and expounds in greatest detail on his central notions. In the first section of his second chapter, Weinsheimer gives an accurate presentation of Schleiermacher and Dilthey and a helpful contrast of their views with Gadamer. In the next sections on 'Prejudice as a Condition of Truth' and 'Understanding as Applying,' he provides a very useful exposition of such terms as 'effective history,' 'tradition,' 'belongingness,' and 'truth.' Especially these sections of the chapter should be read by anyone seeking a familiarity with Gadamer's hermeneutics. For the specialist who has some expertise in German they could even provide the impulse to undertake the daunting task of reading *Wahrheit und Methode* in the original. In any case, they and other parts of Weinsheimer's commentary help elucidate a translation that is neither particularly accessible to the novice nor particularly illuminating to the expert. *Gadamer's Hermeneutics* is to be highly recommended, in great part because it compensates for the deficiencies in the translation it is meant to accompany. Weinsheimer has achieved his purpose of offering a commentary to *Truth and Method* that is detailed and comprehensive, although the material of the commentary is anything but noncontroversial.

JERALD WALLULIS  
University of South Carolina

CRISPIN WRIGHT. *Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects*. New York: Pergamon Press 1983. Pp. xxi + 193. US\$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-08-030352-8); US\$15.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-08-025726-7). Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press (for Aberdeen University Press) 1983. US\$24.50 (cloth): US\$17.00 (paper).

Wright (W.) reconstructs and comments on Frege's *Grundlagen* (GL). His approach is heavily indebted to Dummett, Geach, and Wiggins.

W. wishes to defend a Fregean Platonism and logicism. But the discussion of logicism is thin: W. ignores serious questions about logical cognition and its relation to arithmetic, and about the boundaries of logic. Thus I will confine myself to ontology. Here I disagree with W. both on Frege interpretation and substance. But having set out positive accounts elsewhere (*Pacific Phil. Quarterly*, 7/1982, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 1/1983), I will simply raise some questions.

First, a summary: W. takes the truth of the usual arithmetical theorems for granted, dismissing formalism and fictionalism. He is principally concerned with two theses: that number is a sortal concept (the S-thesis) and that numbers are objects (the O-thesis). These, for W. define Fregean Platonism. According to the S-thesis, number is like 'cat,' not 'yellow thing': it involves 'a notion of *identity* for the things which fall under it' (2). To understand 'cat' is to understand when a cat seen now is the same as one seen earlier. Further, the question how many cats satisfy a certain condition always has a good sense if the condition itself does. Nonsortal concepts fail these tests (2-3). W. defends the S-thesis against empiricist doubts about abstract concepts and against charges of indeterminate identity between numbers and Roman conquerors or different sequences of sets. Turning to the O-thesis, *object* is a logical/linguistic category for Frege. Thus, W. argues that ontological categories are fundamentally linguistic — they do not reflect language-independent aspects of reality. The O-thesis is then defended (and quite well) against nonreferential construals of number terms.

W. is superficial on sortality, showing no sense of the difficulties involved. E.g., does the question, How many yellow things there are on my desk?, really 'lack a good sense'? Sometimes there are definitely none; now, over a hundred. Do I really lack criteria for identity among yellow things (3)? I can perfectly well tell a lemon skin from a part of its surface. The analysis of *sortal* is much more problematic than W. supposes. All the more reason not to apply this notion to the philosophy of number, where it does no work. The sortal-nonsortal distinction is relevant to concepts of spatially or temporally extended objects and seems closely linked to problems about ostensive reference. Since numbers are abstract, the same issues cannot arise. And the issues that concern W. are unrelated to sortality. E.g., empiricists are not *particularly* skeptical about abstract *sortal* concepts. Nor is the 'Caesar' problem happily seen as one about sortality. It concerns relations between numbers and intuitively different entities, but the differences between 'cat' and 'yellow thing' have nothing to do with relations of yellow things (or cats) to



those that don't seem yellow (or feline). And if 'number' should somehow be more like 'yellow thing' than 'cat,' we could still want to know whether Caesar is a number. So W. seems wrong about the nature and significance of the Caesar problem.

W.'s solution to the problem (114) is, incidentally, doubtful in a historically interesting way. Although riddled with technical difficulties, its general intent is clear: persons are not numbers because we could not reasonably suppose that any number words stand for them. Or: because the concepts we apply to numbers are not those we apply to persons. That is *roughly* how Descartes tried to prove dualism: from our ability to doubt that minds are bodies, and from the disjointness of psychological from geometrical concepts. This failed. W. does not explain why his own strategy is better.

In contrast, W. understands the O-thesis well. But that thesis itself appears heroic. The claim that numbers are referents of singular terms requires, first, an interlinguistic ('transcendent') notion of singular term. It will lack interest if it is tied to our language of the moment. Yet W. offers no hope here (64). Suppose, however, that the category of singular terms is indeed transcendent. We would still need a metaphysical correlate to the singular-general distinction. If *object* is a genuine ontological category, then some entities, apparently, must be designated by singular terms alone, others only by predicates. Frege consequently affirmed the theory of concept and object. But it led straight to the paradox of the concept horse, which seems a sufficient condemnation, in spite of W.'s defense (18-24).

Yet something may be salvageable. The difficulty lies in maintaining that some entities can't be denoted by singular terms; there is no obvious paradox in holding that some things can't be the referents of predicates. Postulating a class of such things would thus provide a logical/linguistic notion of objecthood. It would have an ontological correlate in the notion of a particular (on one traditional conception). Particulars are opposed to universals. The former comprise ordinary concrete things but also, e.g., sets, souls, and geometrical objects. The latter might themselves come in levels, but all are alike, and unlike the particulars, in being the referents of predicates (in some languages). An appropriate O-thesis would then be that numbers are objects in this sense. This idea certainly needs work — e.g., why can't predicates refer to the objects? But it retains some Fregean flavor while avoiding immediate inconsistency. It may thus be worth exploring as an alternative to W.'s position.

Anyway, the viability of an O-thesis is crucial to W. For the S-thesis is best abandoned. If no sense can be made of objecthood, then what remains of W.'s position is just this (14,24): there are numbers because the axioms of arithmetic are true and require a 'standard' construal. This is indeed a powerful argument, but Benacerraf already gave it ('Mathematical Truth,' *Journal of Philosophy*, 1973). And it is not particularly Fregean.

Although W.'s prose could be more succinct and his argumentation more perspicuous, he is generally clear. There are many good points and interesting arguments. A drawback is the total absence of historical perspective

(which also makes the book unsuitable for introductory teaching). I recommend it for readers with good backgrounds in Frege and in the current philosophies of mathematics and language.

STEVEN J. WAGNER

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

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JOHN YOLTON. *John Locke: An Introduction*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1985. Pp. xii + 162. Cdn\$43.75: US\$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-13376-3): Cdn\$16.95: US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-14062-X)

Yolton intends this brief book on Locke's overall philosophy for the student and general reader. It is mainly an exposition, with careful attention being paid to the historical setting. But in some ways it has more things to say to the expert than to the general reader.

One of its central themes is that for Locke a person is a morally responsible agent who appropriates actions by means of consciousness (Ch.1). This conception motivates the distinction between persons and cartesian souls in the *Essay* and it provides the ideal which governs moral education in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*. It also allows Locke to conceive of property as the extension of an appropriating consciousness in his political writings and to justify political constraint accordingly. The conception thus manages to tie a number of works nicely together.

A moral agent must acquire an understanding of right and wrong through the exercise of reason and here Yolton's account discloses a reasonably familiar problem without really solving it (Ch. 2). Although Locke thinks that we can in theory master an ethical geometry, he never indicates what its axioms are. The only candidates he suggests are conceptual truths, not substantive principles. Yolton tries to fill this gap by compiling a list of moral rules which can be gleaned from various writings (47-50). But they lack the universality and necessity required for knowledge and must be treated in the end as products of God's will. The conception of a rational moral agent at that point becomes the conception of an agent who must rely heavily on revelation.

As a result the discussion of Locke on religion in Ch. 4 takes on an added significance. Yolton shows how Locke tries to keep religion within the bounds of reason by subjecting any proposition that something is a revealed truth to rational scrutiny. Yolton is critical of this view, however, maintain-



ing that Locke fails to provide criteria for vetting putative revelations. He is also critical of Locke's attempt to create room for miracles, suggesting that miracles may simply turn out to be an expression of our ignorance and not a sign of God's agency. Both criticisms are important and will challenge specialists to explore Locke's position more thoroughly.

Another tension neatly identified by Yolton emerges in the overlap among theories of education, knowledge, religion, and government. The function of moral education is to develop rational agents who, after a period of socialization, accept the customs of well-ordered society as a matter of reason. Yet if reason cannot do the job by itself and must be supplemented by revelation, the case for religious toleration becomes relevant. In that event, the ideals of rightful authority and legitimate freedom are potentially at odds; and the conflict is exaggerated by the importance Locke assigns to political liberty. Yolton's brief attempt to develop a Lockean resolution of the tension (52-3) serves more to highlight the problem than to solve it.

Yolton thinks that Locke is a minimalist in religion and in metaphysics, someone who refuses to be committed to many of the views traditional at the time (Ch. 4 and 5). But Locke may not be quite as untraditional as Yolton makes him out to be. For example, he says that in the exchange with Stillingfleet Locke only gradually concedes the point that substances exist and that he rarely makes use of the traditional concept in his account of persons or knowledge (103). But in the *Correspondence* Locke is pointing out things which he actually held in the *Essay*, not grudgingly conceding points in the face of Stillingfleet's arguments. And, although the comment is well taken that the rest of Locke's theoretical position has no need for mysterious substances, this probably is because the things he takes to be technical substances are really something quite different. The fact that he concedes to tradition more than he needs does not mean that he doesn't really make the concession.

Yolton's account of Locke's theories of mind (Ch. 6) and perception (Ch. 7) doesn't add much to what he has said in earlier commentaries. There is a useful discussion of the extent to which the mind is active in perception (133-5) and some helpful remarks about the empirical origins of difficult concepts such as existence and power (135-8). The interpretation of Locke as an anti-representationalist concerning perception is developed briefly in Ch. 7, but without any attempt to answer arguments for opposing interpretations.

The chief strength of the book is its attempt to give a unified account which encompasses the full spectrum of Locke's writings and remains sensitive to their historical context. The chief weakness is its attempt to carry out the project in such a short space, forcing the argument to be more suggestive than complete at many points. As a result, the book probably will be more useful to advanced scholars in indicating areas for further inquiry than it will be to its intended audience. In that capacity, it is well worth reading.

DOUGLAS ODEGARD  
University of Guelph