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JEAN-PAUL ARON. *Les modernes*. Paris: Gallimard 1984. 318 p. ISBN 2-07-070259-6.

Les Japonais ont tout compris de la 'modernité' dans la culture française, nous dit J.-P. Aron, puisqu'ils ont rendu le titre 'Le degré zéro de l'écriture' de Roland Barthes par 'cet équivalent édifiant' (79): 'Il gèle dans la littérature.'

Aron, lui, applaudit. Il y avait déjà, depuis Mallarmé, un élan suicidaire dans la culture française (23). Entre les deux guerres mondiales, la sensibilité française entre dans 'l'ère du froid qui pénètre l'imaginaire collectif et envahit la culture' (32). En 1937, Caillois pouvait parler d'un vent froid, rigoureux, arctique etc. guettant

cette société démantelée, sénile, à demi croulante: un esprit d'examen, une incrédulité impitoyable et très irrespectueuse, aimant la force et jugeant sur la capacité de résistance... (33)

Ce thème de l'hiver et des glaces, qu'on croirait davantage approprié à chez nous, s'avère le leitmotiv de l'ouvrage, qui fait d'abord figure de journal intime, bien qu'on s'aperçoive que la rédaction finale date de 1982-1984. Qu'y trouve-t-on? Une cinquantaine de petits chapitres allant de Canguilhem à Strasbourg (1945) à l'Exposition Manet (1983) en passant par Barthes, Lacan, Foucault et Lévi-Strauss, par Budapest (1956), Mai '68 et Mitterrand à l'Elysée. On croirait à l'anecdote, tant l'A. nous parle de gens qu'il a connus et côtoyés, et on croirait à du ressentiment, tant il démasque les idoles théoriques d'un grand nombre. Il s'agit plutôt, à chaque chapitre, d'une réflexion brève mais parlante où l'A. fait paraître la froideur qui glace l'esprit de son temps. Et à chaque étape, un même constat: il fait froid, les glaces avancent, le vide se propage. Comme travail 'en surface', Aron passe en revue les facteurs qu'il juge porteurs du virus hivernal: des événements, des institutions, des figures; surtout, des figures. Quelle forme prend cette glaciation? Surtout, nous répond Aron tout au long de son livre, par l'évacuation du vécu, de la création, du sens, par ces modernes, justement, au profit de la structure, de l'apparence, de la surface.

Dans le deuxième numéro des *Temps modernes* (novembre 1945) — un titre du reste trompeur, dit Aron, puisque cette revue *achève* une histoire — Claude Lefort présente le fascisme comme un régime de représentations perverses et Aron y voit l'annonce de cette sensibilité qui sacrifiera 'les choses aux mots et la présence à l'illusion' (15), car 'c'est le système d'émission qui compte davantage que les choses émises' (*ibid.*). Idem pour *Critique*, dont le premier numéro paraît en mai 1946: 'son titre condense un programme: la substitution des discours à la création; de la théorie au vécu' (18).

Le froid se manifeste chez Lévi-Strauss comme la substitution de la théorie au réel, par exemple

dans l'application de la phonologie structurale à la réglementation archaïque des mariages qui en étouffe jusqu'à la plus petite incartade, en résorbe la zone la plus infime d'irrationalité. (40)

Lévi-Strauss s'applique-t-il des années durant à déconstruire le mythe, 'ce détecteur se transforme en guerrier matant les moindres revendications du sentiment. Le déterminisme souffle en tempête...' (41): 'L'existence de l'homme n'étant plus acceptable, rabattez-vous sur sa connaissance' (42).

Autre substitution de la théorie au réel, livrée comme anecdote: la condamnation par le bureau politique du P.C.F. du portrait de Staline réalisé en 1953 par Picasso:

En matière esthétique, comme en toute autre, le secrétaire général du parti communiste, expression démocratique, donc scientifique, de la classe ouvrière, ne saurait se tromper. (67)

Robbe-Grillet s'inscrit dans l'air glacé du temps par son traitement des phénomènes, 'les délestant de leur contenu pour ne plus retenir que la mince pellicule de leur aspect visible' (73). Il n'y a plus d'épaisseur ni de profondeur, l'objet n'a plus son sens par son rôle, mais par son étendue (74). Plus rien n'ayant de profondeur, 'finies les hypothèques douloureuses, ces croix de l'enseignement littéraire, la civilisation, l'histoire, le sujet surtout' si chères aux professeurs positivistes (75). Tout se résume à l'ascèse:

Car la présente génération technicienne se doit de résister aux sollicitations et aux indiscretions du vécu: l'abstraction lui tient lieu de paysage mental, le formalisme de moyen de communication. (79)

Le degré zéro de l'écriture de Barthes (1953) constitue pour Aron l'achèvement d'une crise du discours: depuis la Révolution, en passant par Chateaubriand et Flaubert, les textes échappent à leurs auteurs, auxquels il ne reste plus qu'à les nier, 'ce qu'opère Mallarmé, par un meurtre' (79). 'L'austérité est érigée en méthode, l'ennui promu à la dignité épistémologique' (80).

En août 1955 a lieu la Décade Heidegger à Cerisy. 'Car Heidegger est à point' (99), son chemin depuis treize ans aplani par son "angelos" Jean

Beaufret. Aron, clairement, trouve Beaufret fascinant et rafraîchissant (99 sq), mais il s'inquiète. Il reconnaît bien à Heidegger l'introduction du temps dans l'esprit occidental, sa lecture, dans l'histoire, du déracinement de l'homme, son dépassement de la simple instrumentalité (une bête noire d'Aron, on le voit maintenant) en posant la question de la technique (102 sq). Heidegger parle du sens — mais s'agit-il bien de 'sens'? 'L'être de Heidegger ... être sans chair et sans âme, sans contours et sans costume' n'a d'autre attribut 'que sa présence illuminante' (103).

Homme du monde, Michel Foucault 'n'aime pas l'homme. À en finir avec cet indiscret, il utilise la congélation' (189). Il peut alors s'occuper de choses sérieuses. Le vécu social? 'Il est mort, déclare Foucault, en vertu d'une disposition du discours' (233). Malheureusement, Aron n'en dit pas long, le situant surtout dans l'histoire générale de l'époque. Il fait un peu mieux avec Lacan, mais tout juste, le présentant comme l'exorciste de nos cauchemars du 'destin suicidaire des civilisations techniciennes ... désamorçant et endormant le vécu par un discours théorique implacable' (219). L'A. ne peut s'empêcher de parler du spectacle hebdomadaire rue d'Ulm: 'C'est que Lacan répond pleinement à la demande, lui qui proteste qu'il y va du désir de n'être jamais satisfait' (218).

En toile de fond à cette chronique du froid on trouve des considérations sur le 'clan' parisien, cet impérialiste de la culture française: 'l'Académie au XVII^e siècle, l'*Encyclopédie* au XVIII^e [il ne parle pas de la nouvelle *Encyclopédie* en préparation], la Jeune France puis les naturalistes au XIX^e, la *N.R.F.* au début du XX^e, les surréalistes vers 1925' (20). Eparpillé depuis 1945, le 'clan' se maintient néanmoins comme 'machine de guerre,' comme 'une entreprise totalitaire résolue à faire respecter sa loi' (*ibid.*). A ce 'clan' s'opposent du reste et parfois de façon intéressante les 'clercs,' entendons: les enseignants (55 sq et *passim*).

Parlant partout de froid, d'hiver et de glaces, Aron fait apparaître ce qui lui semble l'essence de l'esprit français 'moderne': le refus du vécu, du vis-queux, et la fuite vers l'accommodante stérilité de l'abstraction. Aron écrit très personnellement et sans doute plus d'un lecteur s'égarera dans les surfaces visibles et n'y verra que cela. Plaidant pour le sens, pour le vécu, pour la création, Aron nous en donne bien au contraire l'exemple, redistribuant narrativement le fond de son propos — l'hiver, le 'clan,' les personnalités et la déchéance française — dans le vécu où il l'avait trouvé ... et vécu. Tissant sa pensée, ses réflexions et son vécu dans du sens *sous* la surface du texte, il fait voir le vide inhérent au travail en surface. On croirait à une fin de cycle, en ce que la primauté de la structure sèche et nue n'admet pas de l'idée d'une étape ultérieure. Aron lui-même ne conclut pas, même s'il semble dire, l'esprit se meurt, l'esprit...

ANDRÉ ROCQUE
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WILLIAM L. HARPER and RALF MEERBOTE, eds., *Kant on Causality, Freedom, and Objectivity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984. Pp. VII + 190. US\$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1266-8); US\$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1267-6).

The essays in this collection, chiefly on Kant's Second Analogy, come from two conferences held in the Spring of 1979 in London, Ontario and Rochester, N.Y., to honour Lewis White Beck on the occasion of his retirement. The book contains contributions by Carl J. Posy, James Van Cleve, D.P. Dryer, Gordon G. Brittan jr., W.H. Walsh, Gordon Nagel, William L. Harper, and Ralf Meerbote, an introduction by the editors, and two bibliographies.

In addition to a brief summation of the work represented in the volume, the Introduction gives an immensely useful survey of recent work on the Second Analogy, including a taxonomy of interpretive efforts, principally a division into realist and various versions of subjectivist and phenomenalist readings.

It is fair to say that most interpreters take Kant to be concerned with some version of the (pairwise) 'ordering problem,' as Bennett and Harper have called it. They see him as attempting to advance a criterion for distinguishing perceptions that (correctly) represent succeeding objective events from those that successively represent aspects of stationary objects. 'Criterion' is here often taken in the tough sense it has in the sceptical and anti-sceptical literature. Lovejoy's and Strawson's criticism of Kant, so understood, is well known, and several papers in the volume advert to it. This review will deal for the most part with a single point in the realist responses of Harper ('Kant's Empirical Realism, and the Distinction between Subjective and Objective Succession'), and Dryer ('The Second Analogy') to Strawson's and similar challenges.

Kant, according to them, held that we must know at least some objective orderings 'directly,' indeed that we could not know the temporal order even of subjective states unless we first knew the order of some objective ones. 'Someone cannot know in what temporal order his own mental states follow upon one another without knowing of the temporal order of non-mental states' (Dryer 64), and 'knowledge of the temporal order of one's own past experiences requires access to some objective facts' (Harper 132).

If Kant did in fact hold this view, then he could not have wanted to formulate a *criterion* for objective succession, and if he did not do this, then Strawson's and Lovejoy's criticism would be beside the point.

It is always painful to have to reject a tightly reasoned exegesis on the grounds of mistranslation. But here this is unfortunately the case. As Bennett before him (*Kant's Analytic*, 223), Harper (though not Dryer) relies in part on a passage in B239:

Let us suppose that there is nothing antecedent to an event, upon which it must follow according to a rule. All succession of perception would then

only be in the apprehension, that is, would be merely subjective, and would never enable us to determine objectively which perceptions are those that really precede and which are those that follow.

The second sentence is ungrammatical in the German, but no acceptable emendation can suggest that *our* ability to determine succession is at issue. Rather, Kant is saying that on his supposition 'it would not be objectively determined which perceptions must precede, and which follow,' a vastly different point.

But even if this passage does not support Harper's and Dryer's claim, they can point to the Refutation of Idealism (mentioned by both), and to Section 24 of The Transcendental Deduction (mentioned by Harper). Kant says in the former that 'the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the actual things which I perceive outside me' (B275), and later on, 'We (are) unable to perceive any determination of time save through the change in outer relations (motion) relatively to the permanent in space' (B277). In the Transcendental Deduction he states that 'for all inner perceptions we must derive the determination of lengths of time or of points in time from the changes which are exhibited to us in outer things' (B156).

But what is a time-determination? In a broader sense judgments of succession would be time determinations, in a narrower sense the term would be restricted to the 'modes of time,' mentioned in the Analogies, i.e., it would cover only judgments of duration, position in the time series, and simultaneity, i.e., timing, dating, and coincidence. (cf. also Melnick, *Kant's Analogies of Experience*, 85). If we take the narrow reading, then judgments of 'mere succession' would not be time determinations. (cf. B226, where Kant implies that 'mere succession' is *not* a time relation).

If, as they must, Harper and Dryer take the broad sense of the term, one discovers that Kant offers absolutely *no argument* showing that we are unable to perceive *succession save through the change in outer relations*. Rather, he argues, in The Refutation of Idealism, that we cannot perceive *duration* except on this condition. (Since dating and coincidence require duration as the most fundamental mode of time, they become impossible too.) In the Transcendental Deduction Kant speaks specifically of 'lengths of time and points in time' as being exhibited, in the first instance, by outer things. On the subject of succession, these arguments are silent.

It stands to reason that we should interpret Kant's language so that he has an argument; in this case we should choose the narrow sense of 'time-determination.' But if we do this, then we have lost the horseshoe which looses the kingdom. The realist interpretation has lost its main textual support. We must then either accept Strawson's criticism, or allow, possibly, that the Second Analogy is not, or not primarily, concerned with the ordering problem, and that Kant's concerns are not criteriological.

Aside from this single point of agreement, Dryer and Harper's essays cover quite different ground: Dryer's tight and sober account aims at

establishing an exegesis, while Harper's essay ranges over such things as brains in vats and ganglion cells, of which it contains pictures.

One of the dangers of espousing the view that Kant was concerned with the ordering problem, and that he attempted to formulate a criterion ('sufficient reason to believe' in Beck's words), is that Van Cleve, if he puts his mind to it, will soon discover holes in one's argument. Here ('Another Volley at Kant's reply to Hume') he takes on Beck himself, dissects his response to Strawson ('A Nonsequitur of Numbing Grossness,' *Essays on Kant and Hume* [1978] 147ff.) and discovers certain equivocations that appear to vitiate Beck's argument. Van Cleve's piece shows the same critical acumen as his earlier 'Four Recent Interpretations of Kant's Second Analogy' (KS 64).

Several of the essays stay entirely clear of the criteriological issue. Carl Posy's 'Transcendental Idealism and Causality' takes Kant to embrace a special kind of radical verificationism. The piece is reminiscent in temperament, if not in detail, to Carnap's *Aufbau*, and gives a sympathetic reconstruction of the Second Analogy.

Gordon Nagel's closely argued and elegantly written 'Substance and Causality' uses the felicitous analogy of decoding rules, which both constrain and enable. The Analogies, then, are rules for the decoding of the sequence of sensory data. Nagel also establishes the dependence of the Second Analogy on the First, a point of far more than textual or expository interest, since it leads to the conclusion that 'we cannot perceive events that are not causally grounded in the permanent characteristics of matter' (107).

Gordon Brittan, in his 'Kant, Closure, and Causality' argues for the centrality of the law of inertia in Kant's conception of causality, and W.H. Walsh gives a statesman-like overview of the problems of transcendental idealism ('Kant's Transcendental Idealism'). The last paper, by Ralf Meerbote ('Kant on The Non-Determinate Character of Human Actions'), argues for a compatibilist interpretation of the Third Antimony, where the causal principle remains universal but 'at least some of the explanations that we give of free actions will turn out not to be causal' (138). This is so because Kant 'accepts the non-lawlikeness of all action-types under our model (154-the model is Davidsonian).

The volume is rounded out by a comprehensive bibliography of the literature on the Second Analogy. This, together with the overview over the field in the Editors' Introduction provides a most useful survey of work on this central chapter of *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

Finally, a list of L.W. Beck's writings reminds us once again, if indeed a reminder is necessary, of Professor Beck's preeminence, and the richness of his thought, not only as a Kant scholar, but as an interpreter of the German and European philosophical tradition. This book is a worthy tribute to his achievements.

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JOHN T. KEARNS. *Using Language: The Structures of Speech Acts*, Albany State University of New York Press (SUNY Series in Philosophy, Robert C. Neville ed.) 1984. 457 p. US\$44.50. ISBN 0-87395-808-X; pap. US\$19.50. ISBN 0-87395-809-8.

Kearns convie le lecteur à l'accompagner dans l'élaboration d'une théorie des actes de discours qui, du moins il le prétend, unifie les courants logique et analytique en philosophie du langage (7). Cette démarche se fonde sur une philosophie de l'action esquissée au premier chapitre du livre. L'auteur aborde un nombre impressionnant de sujets. En première partie (chapitres 2 à 7), il est question des actes de discours, de la référence, de la prédication, du rôle de l'expérience dans le langage, des exigences que doit satisfaire une théorie de la signification, etc... Dans une seconde partie (chapitres 8 à 14), l'auteur discute, dans le cadre d'une langue artificielle qui se présente comme un modèle pour fragments de l'anglais, de la quantification et, plus particulièrement, des pronoms. Dans un dernier chapitre, l'auteur discute rapidement divers problèmes liés aux limites de la théorie des actes de discours. S'il est légitime de publier un livre qui propose davantage une démarche qu'un produit fini, le lecteur est en droit de s'attendre à un ouvrage minimalement organisé, et jamais un auteur n'est autorisé à présenter pêle-mêle des thèses sans arguments, appuyées sur des distinctions floues et formulées dans un vocabulaire flottant. L'A. a pris cette liberté et son travail en souffre à un point tel que son intérêt philosophique devient parfois difficile à percevoir. Il avance des thèses qui me semblent parfaitement insoutenables et qui touchent des sujets fondamentaux. Ainsi, il affirme que l'on doit parler non du langage mais du système du langage (system of language) qui contient non seulement des expressions linguistiques mais des expériences possibles et actuelles. Si, comme l'A, on considère que les expériences sont individuelles, on a 'personnalisé' le système du langage et on doit conclure, comme il le fait, qu'il y en a un par locuteur (107). Cette position est un solipsisme assez radical et on peut se demander comment, dans ces conditions, les individus font pour se comprendre puisque, manifestement, ils ne partagent pas un même système de langage. La réponse de Kearns ne convainc pas: 'Even though each person has his own system of language, "massive" similarities between the different systems make communication possible' (107). Ce problème aurait mérité, à cause de son importance, au moins quelques pages de discussions, malheureusement absentes. Sa théorie de la compréhension a aussi de curieux résultats, qu'il endosse sans sourciller. Ainsi, selon cette dernière, si 'Tu es bête,' énoncé par un locuteur différent de l'allocutaire, est compris par l'allocutaire, c'est parce que ce dernier a référé à lui-même à l'aide de 'tu' et s'est prédiqué 'es bête.' L'A. pose donc qu'on peut référer à soi en utilisant 'tu,' allant ainsi à l'encontre des intuitions linguistiques de la plupart des locuteurs.

L'appareil théorique dans lequel l'auteur formule ses thèses échappe souvent au lecteur à cause de son incohérence et de son éclectisme confus. Par

exemple, à la page 13, on distingue '*purpose*' et '*goal*', qui sont utilisés comme synonymes à la page 36; à la page 28, on apprend que les actes habilitants (*enabling acts*) n'ont pas de but (*purpose*) alors qu'à la page 54 on découvre un acte habilitant qui a deux buts. Certaines notions complexes sont caractérisées d'une façon pour le moins peu éclairante: ainsi, pour la relation de représentation, on apprend que '"To use A to represent B" is to relate A to other expressions and to experience in the appropriate manner' (65). (On remarquera au passage que 'A' et 'B' sont des variables pour des objets de catégories différentes, et que l'auteur aurait eu intérêt à utiliser, dans ce cas, une lettre romaine et une lettre grecque par exemple, et non deux lettres romaines). Il en va de même de certaines autres notions abondamment utilisées par l'auteur, dont celles de disposition et d'intention. Tous ces concepts ont un passé philosophique suffisamment lourd pour mériter d'être discutés. Si, comme Kearns, on néglige de le faire, on ignore complètement les problèmes philosophiques qui leur sont associés. Il faut aussi mentionner le nombre impressionnant de thèses posées sans argumentation qui se retrouvent dans cet ouvrage: on ne saura jamais pourquoi la signification représentationnelle est rendue possible par la signification inférentielle; on ne saura jamais pourquoi certains actes de langage doivent être compris par l'allocutaire pour avoir été accomplis avec succès, alors que pour d'autres, ce n'est pas nécessaire (56), etc... A certains endroits, l'A. semble présupposer des réponses à des questions auxquelles il ne voulait pas répondre (ainsi en est-il des critères d'identité entre actes à la fin du premier chapitre et au début du second). Enfin, soulignons l'incurie du traitement de certains sujets, dont les forces illocutoires (72) et le mentalisme (158 et 166).

Si les répétitions sont bien tolérées en anglais, l'A. semble parfois dépasser les limites de l'acceptable lorsqu'il utilise douze fois '*act*' et douze fois '*purpose*' dans un paragraphe de onze lignes (28, dernier paragraphe). De même, quelques truismes fréquemment assénés, tel '*When certain component acts are combined to constitute a complex act, each component has the property of being combined with the others*' (239) rendent fort désagréable la lecture du livre de Kearns.

Mais qu'en est-il de la prétention initiale de l'auteur? Pour diverses raisons, ce dernier ne satisfait pas les attentes qu'il crée. L'absence de tout commentaire ou thèse intéressant sur les forces illocutoires fait qu'on peut mettre en doute l'existence même d'une théorie des actes de discours chez Kearns. Les actes de langage étant de forme $F(p)$ où F est une force et p un contenu propositionnel, si on néglige les forces, on laisse tomber ce qui fait l'intérêt de la théorie des actes de discours. Et, de fait, ce que 'formalise' Kearns se résume à des phrases assertives au temps présent, comme '*George owns a round barn.*' Je ne pourrai discuter l'intérêt de cet aspect du travail de l'auteur, par manque d'espace.

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NORMAN MALCOLM. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, with a Biographical Sketch by G.H. von Wright, second edition with Wittgenstein's letters to Malcolm. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. viii + 136. Cdn\$8.50: US\$5.95. Paper: ISBN 0-19-283042-2.

RUSH RHEES, ed. *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, second edition. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. xix + 236. Cdn\$11.25: US\$8.95. Paper: ISBN 0-19-287628-7.

I first read Norman Malcolm's wonderful Memoir of Wittgenstein when I began to read Wittgenstein himself, in the early 1960s. Malcolm conveys marvellously to his readers what *thinking* was for Wittgenstein; philosophical thinking and thinking about his own life and that of others, about the world and what in it matters. It was Malcolm who gave me, as I tried to learn from the things that Wittgenstein had written, a sense of what there was *to* learn from Wittgenstein, of what he had wanted his work to be. The Memoir is remarkable in the liveness of the portrait, the presence in it of a profoundly impressive man, terribly difficult and demanding, with a 'ruthless integrity,' as Malcolm puts it, 'which did not spare himself or anyone else.' Malcolm's use of telling details is one of the best features of the book. The Memoir is also remarkable in the integration in it of philosophical material. Malcolm clearly thinks that an account of the Wittgenstein he knew would be sadly incomplete if it omitted, for the sake of reaching a non-philosophical audience, any serious presentation of the sort of problems Wittgenstein was concerned with and what it was to hear him developing thoughts about them. In both editions of the Memoir, Malcolm makes extensive use of quotations from Wittgenstein's letters to him. In the new second edition, all of Wittgenstein's letters to Malcolm have been included in a new section (and the quotations in the text have been shortened). It is good to have the letters; as Malcolm says, 'they disclose the *human* qualities of Wittgenstein better than anything else could do.' The present edition, which retains, almost unchanged, von Wright's very useful biographical sketch, also includes some additional notes by Malcolm, largely on the question whether Wittgenstein was 'a religious person.' To accommodate the new material, the book has been printed in a much smaller and less elegant typeface. Wittgenstein's architectural work, Malcolm says, was 'marked by a severe exactitude in measure and proportion.' He cared about getting things right; and it is sad that the present printing does not embody the same kind of care that the first edition did. The frontispiece has also been removed, a stupid change. Malcolm comments on the expressiveness of Wittgenstein's face and hands; you could see it in the old frontispiece. Wittgenstein himself attached importance to taking in what is in a face; there was a great deal to be taken in in that photo.

Rhees's collection, which was originally published (as *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*) in 1981, contains pieces by Wittgenstein's

sister Hermine, by Fania Pascal, F.R. Leavis, John King and M. O'C. Drury, with a Postscript by Rhees. In the new paperback edition there have been added a translation of Hermine Wittgenstein's memoir (the German original is no longer included) and an Introduction by Norman Malcolm; references for quotations have been systematically provided. There is a fine photograph of Wittgenstein on the cover and a helpful index (though this runs together references to J.M. and J.N. Keynes). The appearance of the book is marred by the poor quality of the paper on which it is printed.

Malcolm's Introduction is useful in bringing out some central themes in the volume, including the importance of music and literature to Wittgenstein, his views of religion and his character as friend. Malcolm draws attention to what is the most philosophically interesting question in the book, the relation between achieving truth in one's understanding of oneself and achieving it in one's philosophical thinking. Rhees's comments, in his Postscript, on the sort of self-understanding Wittgenstein wanted are suggestive and illuminating; they have connections with the themes of Charles Taylor's discussions of self and of the relation between self-knowledge, change and delusion. (Charles Taylor, (1976), 'Responsibility for Self', Rorty, A. (ed) *The Identities of Persons* [Berkeley: University of California Press 1976] 281-99 and Taylor, 'What is Human Agency?', Mischel, T. (ed). *The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues* [Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1977] 103-35). Rhees's remarks bear directly on the 'confessions' that Wittgenstein made to various people, and that are described in Mrs. Pascal's Memoir and Drury's Conversations. Rhees also casts light on Wittgenstein's interest in Russia and his thoughts about settling there. In the course of that discussion he touches on Wittgenstein's view of membership in a communist party. It is good to have that account, especially given some recent attempts to apply Wittgenstein's remarks in *On Certainty* across the board to any mode of thought in which we attempt to reach the truth, and thus to ascribe to him a very strong view about the role of authority and the limits of questioning in any such thought. But he held that in philosophy, 'you have to be able to give up those central notions which have seemed to be what you must keep if you are to think at all. Go back and start from scratch.' The discussion Rhees reports was in 1945, but Wittgenstein's views are by no means inconsistent with *On Certainty*, provided it is not read as giving a single, general account of thought and knowledge.

Much else in the *Recollections* is of great interest: not just the events and remarks that have struck intelligent and sensitive people as revealing Wittgenstein's character, but also their attempts to find the right words to describe him. From Leavis, for example:

The trait was highly characteristic of Wittgenstein; it was something one noticed at first encounter. Arrogance? I don't think that anyone who knew him would have rested on that as a suitable word. For the trait was a manifestation of the essential quality that one couldn't be very long with him without becoming aware of — the quality of genius: an intensity of a concentration that impressed itself on one as disinterestedness. (51)

Leavis's contribution is odd, in that some things are got just right, like his comment on the contrast between Wittgenstein and Russell, and others just wrong (or so it seems), like the idea that Wittgenstein's telling Leavis to give up literary criticism was in part the result of Wittgenstein's being too easily influenced by Keynes and his fashionable set. Again, although Leavis was aware of the qualities shown in Wittgenstein's lectures, he was unable to believe Wittgenstein to have been a good teacher. He applied, in this particular case, a very narrow conception of what had to be involved in good teaching. He knew without going to a lecture that there could be no profit in it for him. This is odd, because it is a pupil of his, applying his ideas of education, who has expressed very well the profit there is for anyone in understanding the kind of teacher Wittgenstein was, what he showed of what is possible in teaching. I have in mind Fred Inglis's comments on Malcolm's description of Wittgenstein as a teacher. Inglis makes clear how 'the seriousness and harsh dedication to truth and goodness' in such teaching can reach into the lives of his pupils. (Fred Inglis. *Ideology and the Imagination* [Cambridge U.P. 1975]) Leavis did not want an understanding of philosophy (W.A. Hart. 'Dr. Leavis, 'English' and Philosophy,' *The Haltubistle Quarterly*. 6 [1977] 1-13), and that went with his not wanting to take too far his understanding of Wittgenstein.

Malcolm, in the Introduction to *Recollections*, calls Wittgenstein a heroic figure in our present age. These two books, in all their detail, give the sense of that description.

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ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, FRED D. MILLER, JR, and JEFFREY PAUL, eds.
Human Rights. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1984.
Pp. 175. Cdn\$16.25; US\$11.50. ISBN 0-631-13699-1.

'In attacking utilitarianism, one is inclined to appeal to individual rights, which mere considerations of social utility cannot justify us in overriding. But rights themselves need to be justified somehow, and how other than by appeal to the human interests their recognition promotes and protects ...?' This well-known rhetorical question posed by Thomas Scanlon could have served well as an opening quotation for this volume. *Human Rights* is a

stimulating and wide-ranging collection of thirteen essays almost all of which address the issues suggested by Scanlon's question. These issues are most explicit in three essays which present anti-utilitarian rights doctrines and three essays which seek some sort of accommodation between rights and utilitarian-like principles.

Alan Gewirth's 'The Epistemology of Human Rights' is a clear representation of the foundational argument found in previous essays and in his *Reason and Morality*. The central question, of course, for this argument is whether the right sort of judgments can plausibly be said to be implicit in 'the normative structure of action' so that 'when these judgments are subjected to certain morally neutral rational requirements, they entail [Gewirth's] supreme moral principle.' Gewirth maintains that: (i) on the occasion of any free and purposive action, its agent can be described as 'saying or thinking' that his goal is good; (ii) it follows that each free and purposive action involves a general endorsement, by the relevant agent, of his possession of the 'proximate necessary conditions of action' (freedom and wellbeing); (iii) it follows, from such an endorsement, that each agent asserts, 'I have rights to freedom and well-being'; and (iv) each such agent must grant, as a matter of logical consistency, that every other agent has a like right to freedom and well-being.

Criticisms of this Gewirthian argument appear throughout *Human Rights*. Arthur Danto, in his commentary, is especially critical of Gewirth's move from what Danto calls the first-person perspective to the third-person perspective. That my attainment of E is a good-for-me hardly implies that my attainment of E is a good-for-others or a good-simpliciter. But one must believe in such an implication if one argues, as Gewirth does, that my implicit endorsement of E necessarily involves my claiming that others should ('must') act favorably towards my attainment of E.

While Gewirth centers his argument on the value-like 'normative structure of action,' Lomasky's innovative essay, 'Personal Projects as the Foundation for Basic Rights,' addresses the structure of 'project pursuit' and the personal (i.e., first-person perspective) value of each 'project pursuit.' The more forceful and convincing first half of Lomasky's essay emphasizes the antagonism between the intrusiveness of any utilitarian-type ethic and the existence of a community of individuals, constituting themselves as the persons they are, by means of their separate long-term choices, goals, and strategies and the commitments and idiosyncratic values embodied in those choices, goals and strategies. Project pursuit is the structure of personal identity. So, if personal identity is valued, any ethic which, in its impersonalism, denies sanctity to personal goals and commitments must be rejected.

But does this get one beyond a realm of enlightened egoists? Rights, after all, represent interpersonal principles by which one individual can place moral demands upon others. Having perhaps made room for basic rights by denying voracious impersonalism, the trick is now to generate interpersonal principles which do not rely on value impersonalism. If there are many foci of value, each an equally ultimate pursuit of personal projects, it does seem

appropriate that the basic interpersonal principles be ones which offer moral protection to individuals in their separate (or cooperative) pursuit of projects. As Lomasky says, '... an ethic incorporating basic rights has the *shape* of an account sensitive to the importance of project pursuit.' But translating this geometric intuition into a convincing argument is a difficult task — one that Lomasky grapples with in the latter part of his essay.

David Kelley's concern in 'Life, Liberty and Property,' is what morally undergirds property rights (as they are identified by 'classical liberals' and 'libertarians'). He attacks libertarian arguments which seek to vindicate rights to holdings in terms of a more basic right to liberty. The familiar theme, developed with ingenuity and insight, is that liberty itself is not a value-neutral notion. Rather liberty must be defined in terms of the non-violation of rights as specified by some antecedent theory of rights — including property rights. Scanlonite questions emerge, however, with respect to what is intended to underlie Kelley's proposed moral right to (acquire and hold) property. Is it a *right* to life, a *right* to engage productively in 'continuous, connected activity, in the service of a plan, over lengthy periods of time,' or is it the *values* of life, happiness, etc. which are '...the ends to which the system of private property is a means?'

Of the essays which explicitly seek accommodation between an impersonalist teleological theory of value and affirmations of anti-teleological human rights, John Gray's 'Indirect Utility and Fundamental Rights,' is the most eager to pull the deontic rabbit out of the consequentialist hat. Gray's thesis is that utilitarianism as a theory of value deserves and needs to be saved from utilitarianism as a direct guide to human action. Gray argues persuasively that utilitarian calculation is corrosive of the institutions, rules, habits, settled expectations and sentiments which facilitate beneficial cooperation among people; it is 'self-defeating.' To achieve such utility-enhancing cooperation what is most needed is something like a dedication to Hume's 'Three fundamental laws of nature, that of the stability of possessions, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises.'

But can utilitarianism's need for principled constraints against itself *create* such constraints? As a devotee of utilitarian values I may wish that everyone be truly bound to certain constraining principles. But don't I still know that if, in truth, I can enhance aggregate utility by secretly violated those principles, I should? And don't all intelligent devotees of utilitarianism know this and know that all others know it and so on? It seems that these constraining principles cannot be useful fictions if they are known to be fictions and known to be known to be.

Allan Gibbard's 'Utilitarianism and Human Rights' is, in large part, a reply to this type of objection. Gibbard maintains that, 'A rational utilitarian will foster in himself and others those attitudes, habits, and ways of deliberating the fostering of which he thinks conducive to the general happiness...' Such fostering is apt to be collectively successful partially because 'one can adopt a principle on the basis of the utility of advocating it.' In matters of commitment to principle sincerity can be achieved '...by adjusting one's beliefs to

what one wants to assert...' To say that sincerity can be so achieved is to say, I think, that certain moral fictions will be useful because we will be able sincerely to take them as non-fictions; as moral truths. If I have the position right, it approaches the depressing doctrine that what will save us and utilitarianism from utilitarianism is our capacity for self-delusion.

Finally, in 'Moderating Rights,' Richard Flathman seems to propose a type of rule-utilitarian accommodation of the Rawls-Searle genre. We (all of us?) are participants in the practice of rights and thus we (all of us?) are subject to this practice's constitutive rules. Our subjection to these rules give rights a degree of independence from, e.g., considerations of general utility just as, according to Flathman, our subjection to the rules of the political authority game binds us, to some extent, to honor that authority independently of considerations of utility (or rights?). But how much moral weight do practices have for their (how willing?) participants? And, if this moral weight is due simply to commitment to whatever practices flourish and not to their independently assessed moral worth, how often must we abide by evil practices?

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TOM REGAN. *The Case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1983. Pp. xvii + 425. US\$24.95. ISBN 0-520-05905-7.

No current philosophical writer has taken a greater interest in this issue than Tom Regan, who now, in *The Case for Animal Rights* presents most fully his case for a strong panoply of rights for animals. The argument is direct and cumulative, starting with the case for animals' psychological standing, proceeding through various critical and methodological chapters, and leading up to a final chapter in which Regan draws his conclusions: that vegetarianism is obligatory, hunting and trapping wrong, and virtually no use of animals permissible in scientific experimentation. These are radical conclusions; if Regan is right, then most of us are in for a terrific alteration in various aspects of our lifestyle. It aims at both a philosophical and a lay audience, but philosophers are given full due in point of methodological rigor; this is Regan's deepest thought on the subject, and it deserves our attention.

The first three chapters argue that considerations of welfare, of well- or

ill-being, do literally apply to animals — which hardly needs proof to most of us. But in the process, Regan makes very strong claims for animals: viz., that they have 'Perception, memory, desire, belief, self-consciousness, intention, a sense of the future — these are among the leading attributes of the mental life of normal mammalian animals aged one or more.' (81) This is surely misleading unless matters of degree are ignored. Take the evidence, noted by Regan, that even chimpanzees 'do not have the ability for language acquisition equal to that of young children' (14). To most of us, that's important, but to him it doesn't seem to matter. Why not? Mainly, because he thinks we attribute full and nonderivative rights to imbeciles; hence animals should have them too. Is this persuasive?

In Chapter Four Regan articulates his methodology. A number of criteria are laid down for making an 'ideal moral judgment': Conceptual clarity, information, rationality, impartiality, and 'coolness.' Beyond this, we are given four criteria for appraising proposed moral principles: consistency, adequacy of scope, precision, and — most controversial, as Regan says — conformity to our intuitions. These may seem innocuous; but they must be handled with care. Take consistency, for example. 'If to cause suffering is wrong, then it is wrong no matter who is made to suffer' (129). How could we disagree with that? *If* suffering, just as such, is indeed wrong, it of course follows logically that it is wrong in all cases. But *is* it wrong in that way? Down through the ages, no end of people have held that 'causing suffering,' just like that, is *not* wrong, although causing suffering to selected humans, notably fellow members of one's tribe, family, or some other favored group, certainly is. These people, I take it, simply reject the claim that suffering is *as such* wrong. And many philosophers would also question the thesis. Sheer logic won't decide this. So the claim that someone who agrees that causing suffering to some (humans, say) is wrong but not wrong when done to animals is being inconsistent is not self-evident. But Regan, I think, thinks it is.

What about appeals to 'intuition'? Regan means, of course, reflective intuition, à la Sidgwick, Ross, and Rawls, rather than sheer seat-of-the-pants pronouncements. Even so, there is a classic objection: what do we do when different persons' intuitions conflict? Regan has a manifestly inadequate reply: the objection, he says, 'fails to recognize the difference between a principle's *being* valid for all and our *knowing* that it is. When we have subjected an ethical principle to the tests of consistency, scope, precision, and conformity with our reflective intuitions, and when we have done this while making a conscientious effort to make an ideal moral judgment, we have done all we can reasonably be required to do to be in a position to justify that the principle is binding on all moral agents.' (139) To require a claim to absolute certainty would be unreasonable, no doubt. But this is to obfuscate the issue rather than solve the problem. The problem is that if appeal to intuition is to be a test for the truth (or rational acceptability if you prefer) of a proposed moral principle, then it is a test such that two mutually contrary proposed moral principles could each pass it. It's intuition as a test of truth, not of certainty, that is shown insufficient by this possibility. Once we allow that men

of good will can come to opposed conclusions, we have as good as admitted that appeals to good will *aren't enough*, if what we are looking for is the truth. But truth is what's in question here! We clearly need something further: a test of the reasonableness of any given intuition. For this we need, ultimately, a theory of what morality is about, and thus of what makes a given fact relevant to a moral claim. Manifestly that has not been shown when all we know is that two people who disagree both have a very clear, strong, and sincere belief that each is in the right. And needless to say, we cannot accept as the basis for public policy — such as is obviously implicit in Regan's claim that this founds principles 'binding on all moral agents' — that some fraction of the populace has a strong intuition. Nor is any such strong foundational theory proposed in the book.

In chapter Five, Regan draws a distinction between 'moral agents' and 'moral patients,' and discusses a set of views about our duties to the latter — 'creatures such as animals and small children' — according to which we have only 'indirect' duties to them. These views are characterized as holding that such duties are really owed to other beings than the animals/infants themselves. This is misleading. Suppose I have promised you that I will take care of your child if you die suddenly. You do so, and here is the child on my hands. Do I not owe *that child* my love, concern, and attention, even though the reason is that I made a promise to you, rather than to it? The distinction, in other words, is really a distinction in the fundamental *grounds* of our duties rather than their *objects*, and it is misleading to characterize them in a way that invites confusion on this head. We must not let ourselves be steamrolled into the assumption that patients are to be catered to *as such*. But having intuited that needs or wants have intrinsic moral strength no matter whose they are, Regan feels free to criticize other theories for not sufficiently recognizing this! Not much of a 'case,' if one is speaking to the unconverted.

This is the central issue: what duties, if any, do we have to patients qua patients, and why. In Chapter 7 (Justice and Equality), Regan introduces his heaviest theoretical weapon, the notion of 'inherent value.' He denounces theories holding that individuals are 'mere receptacles' of what has intrinsic value (say, pleasure or pain): that 'They have no value of their own; what has value is what they contain' (205). Opposed to this, we are told, is the idea that individuals have 'inherent value,' which is (1) *incommensurate* with other values, and in particular, (2) 'not reducible to the intrinsic values of an individual's experiences' (235). Inherent value is a property such that possessors of it can only be equal in that respect: it is not, apparently, capable of variation in degree. Any given thing either has it or doesn't. And if it does, it has (for instance) rights; if not, not. Just why all this should be so, and how one would establish that something has such value, are matters about which Regan is less than satisfactory. But anyway, the main question is why we should think that moral patients have it just because moral agents do (supposing they do). The argument goes thus (239, my redaction):

- 1) Moral agents have Inherent Value.
- 2) It is in virtue of that value that we have the duty not to harm them.
- 3) (Some of) the harms we can do to them (and which are morally prohibited by [2]) are just like the harms we can do to animals.
- 4) We have a direct duty not to inflict those harms on those animals.

Therefore,

- 5) those animals also have Inherent Value.

The conclusion just doesn't follow. There is no *logical* reason why the ground for prohibiting harm to individuals with inherent value couldn't be *different* from the grounds for prohibiting the same harm to other individuals who don't have it. The claim that it is 'arbitrary' to do so is either just another of Regan's many intuitions, or if meant as a logical claim is just false. Take the case of the health-insured patient, Brown, to whom Doctor Crowne *owes* an operation, even though Brown's need for it is identical to that of Albert, who is not covered by insurance. It obviously *can* be the case that one person can have a right to the very same patient-affecting thing that another person, identical qua patient, does *not* have a right to (or, if he does, does on different grounds). Of course there are other possibilities, but the point is that Regan has not eliminated, nor even considered, this one, or any other. Besides which, all of the premises are disputable anyway.

There are other arguments a-plenty, but the nub of Regan's case is that our intuitions, carefully considered, require us to extend the notion of rights to animals. I don't think he's shown this, nor is it clear that he possibly could, since most people think his conclusions highly unintuitive! The case for genuine *rights*, enforceable by law as well as conscience, is woefully inadequate. Until a good theoretical case can be made on behalf of animals, then, I, at any rate, will continue to eat meat in good conscience.

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RICHARD RORTY, J.B. SCHNEEWIND and QUENTIN SKINNER, eds. *Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. xii + 403. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-25352-7); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-27330-7).

This volume contains both case studies in the history of philosophy and more general essays on the philosophy of the historiography of philosophy. Although the former are competent, scholarly and occasionally controversial, without the latter they would constitute simply an eclectic ensemble without any unifying principle. The volume as a whole, therefore, must be judged primarily on the success with which the general essays explore, illuminate and foster interest in the rationale, the methods or even the possibility of any meaningful historiography of philosophy.

Unfortunately, although the project is commendable, the result is disappointing. Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner content themselves with platitudes: that no rigorous distinction is possible between intellectual history and the history of philosophy (a point Rorty seems to forget in his own essay where he distinguishes between intellectual history as a kind of Actonian warehouse and doxography as an out-of-date grocery list); that antiquarianism (studying historical positions for their own sake within their own contexts) and anachronism (resurrecting historical figures as 'atemporal resources' for contemporary problems) are both meaningless abstractions. The individual contributions are for the most part just as unenlightening. Some may stress the primacy of the internal dynamic in philosophic traditions (Schneewind) and others the larger historical context in broadening our understanding of concepts (Skinner) and others the differences in depth-meanings of concepts (Burnyeat). But there is little real divergence from a sane, even if superficial, middle-of-the-road course. Even when MacIntyre insists on the difference between he and Taylor on the similarity of the two branches of history, both are actually maintaining that philosophy — like or unlike science — finds its unifying principle in its development. In short, everyone seems to subscribe to the necessity of some kind of Hegelian dialectical triad — perhaps of rational reconstruction, historical reconstruction and *Geistesgeschichte* (Rorty).

There is not much in all of this that could not have been arrived at simply by taking the discussions of historiography, from Herodotus and Thucydides to Hegel and Dilthey, and applying them to the 'special' field of the history of philosophy. In fact, a few extremely interesting points might have been added.

One of the recurrent themes of this volume is that philosophy is 'essential-ly' or 'inherently' historical — although this is variously interpreted. Taylor, for example, attempts to formulate a theory of absolute historicism for the history of philosophy. Although much of what he says about philosophy and its role in socio-historical development is of interest, his main thesis concerning the relationship between philosophy and its historiography is surely both philosophically and historically erroneous. Taylor suggests that reconstruc-

ting the original problem constellation that was the impetus for the acceptance of any contemporary philosophical model — reliving its birth pangs, perhaps — is absolutely essential to 'doing philosophy.' Certainly, such a reconstruction will further our understanding of what now exists; it may also function heuristically to disabuse us of our obsession with the uniqueness of our current model and to strengthen our resolve to break the tyrannical grasp of an interpretational scheme. Nevertheless, knowledge of the origins of a model alone cannot *propel* us to a philosophical change. Indeed, the opposite would probably result.

The turbulence that resulted in the adoption of the model was symptomatic of a past crisis in the suppositional substructure. It can scarcely be a repetition of that crisis that now incites us to replace the model. If it were, we would, in all likelihood, opt for a model identical to the one that was originally adopted. But, as Collingwood observes, we cannot live in the philosophical past. The problems that now face the model are different problems, resulting from different tensions within a belief system. It might be added that if we were not now uneasy with the model, we would not even think of looking back in history for hints as to how to replace it. It is all well and good to follow an absolute historicism in which philosophy *is equated with* history and the history of philosophy *is equated with* the philosophy of history. It would be well to remember also Hegel's distinction between history and historiography: a distinction that adds another dimension to absolute historicism. We are not simply students of history, we are also part of history. As such we cannot escape 'the confidence of the philosophizing ego'; our projects 'can only be fulfilled in the present, never in the past' (Lepénies).

Historically, Kant, Collingwood and Wittgenstein all proposed novel models to solve their pressing dilemmas: not one of them was inspired by a resurrection of the original discord. Inspiration, if such it ever was, came through contemplating the sciences or through observing something as trivial as the Albert Memorial or a football game.

A final comment in this vein is in order regarding the reason why this collection was made and why it is worth reading. Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner as well as others rightly criticize the Anglo-American analytic movement for the distressing condition of the history of philosophy in recent years. In its infancy that movement denied its parentage ... was happy to believe that there was no philosophy before 1913. When the history of philosophy — if such it may be called — was 'rediscovered' by the likes of Strawson and Bennett, how it was abused. Plato and Descartes, Hume and Kant were not fellow-adventurers, they were mere stalking-horses for linguistic analysis. Little wonder that the philosophic canon was perpetuated more by departmental examinations than by any genuine interest or need. The canon had become an out-of-date grocery list — a mere doxography. Only one previously intoxicated by the spirit of the Oxbridge masters could awaken from his dogmatic slumber with the opinion that Kuhn was one of 'the major philosophers of this century' (Hacking). The heady days of youth are over; the wrinkles are

beginning to show. Some, of course, were not bowled over by the revolution; others are recovering from it.

But let us not protest too much. In its youth analytical philosophy was full of 'the confidence of the philosophizing ego'; it was not studying history — it did not need to, it was history.

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LEROY S. ROUNER, ed. *On Nature*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1984. Pp. xvi + 188. US\$20.95. ISBN 0-268-01499-X.

On Nature, volume six in the Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion, continues a tradition of inviting major figures to address a critical area of interest. (Previous themes have included religious pluralism, religion and ethics, transcendence and the sacred, myth and symbol.) These eleven original essays, all first given in an annual lecture series at Boston University, focus on the concept of nature. They are beads on a string, with no relationship to each other except their broad theme, which, it turns out, includes human nature and thus culture, as well as nature's God, if there is one, so that little is excluded. The essays are generally short, often speculative, always stimulating. The dominant theme, according to the promise of the book jacket, is integrating scientific and religious views of nature.

Disavowing religion, W.V. Quine opens the series arguing for an economical natural realism where philosophy is part of natural science. 'Science is fallible, but scientific evidence is all we have to go on' (25). Stephen Toulmin hopes for a post-modern return of cosmology so that humans can again feel at home in a coherent and meaningful universe. He detects two trends moving this way, a 'green' one based in ecology and a 'white' one rooted in psychotherapy. As remarkable as anything in either of the two essays is how strongly these eminent philosophers of science differ in their style and outlook.

Huston Smith sets out to defeat Darwinism, disliking it because evolutionism implies our 'Small Origins' in 'head-on opposition' to all the 'Great Origins' (43-4) that have characterized classical religious theories of Earth and its humans. Smith proves as effective as anyone in the volume in meeting scientists on their own ground. He may be a gentleman and a scholar when

dealing with foreign faiths, as is evident in the charity of *The Religions of Man*. But he is also able without mercy to hit a theory in its weak underbelly and pulls no punches in his attack on Darwinism. By this third essay one is impressed with how probing (and vigorous) the argument can get in defense of religion, this time by one originally an Orientalist, in contrast to the careful logic with which non-religious naturalism was defended in Quine's essay. All the same, I would prefer to say that Darwinism is an incomplete theory rather than an erroneous one; it needs to be superseded rather than defeated, somewhat as Einstein replaced Newton. Whatever the best terminology or approach, Smith puts Darwinism to rigorous testing.

Dorion Sagan and Lynn Margulis, defending the Gaia hypothesis, do not so much yearn for Great Origins in Smith's transcendent sense as for a Great Mother Earth. They hold that Earth is a living organism and that this can be established scientifically. They reach some far-fetched conclusions. Gaia, 'an Earth that in some sense feels and responds' (71), is 'primarily a microbial phenomenon,' existing before the advent of higher forms of life; and when animals and humans come they 'are essentially collections of interacting microbes' (70). Humans are of 'relative unimportance' (73), dwarfed before the majesty and power of Gaia. For example, humans lobbying in Congress or mismanaging the Environmental Protection Agency are 'nothing more or less than part of Gaian feedback cycles' (72). That seems like holism with a vengeance, coupled with reductionism with a vengeance.

Carl Ruck examines nature in ancient Greek religions, with an emphasis on how hallucinogens (which he calls 'entheogens,' drugs that produce visions of gods within) affected the Greek view. Robert A.F. Thurman, an ordained *bhikṣu*, thinks that Buddhism steers a middle path between nature and culture, which for him is the same as the mother-father harmony. This is symbolized in 'Mother *Śūnyatā*' and 'Father compassion' (*karuṇā*) (104-5), in Buddha's mother, Queen Māyā, Mother Nature, and his father-king, Sudhodhana, with his power in civilization, and also by placing the *Samgha* monasteries in the suburbs between the city and the wilderness. Buddhists find nature to be first evil; then empty (*śūnyā*), that is, natureless; then good; then inconceivable. Tu Wei-Ming argues that the Chinese vision of nature was not cyclic, not spiral, not linear, but transformational. Nature is organismic process, a 'vital force' creating an all enfolding harmony. These three cross-cultural essays on nature move in such esoteric and bygone worlds that, whatever their academic or historical merits, they are of little relevance for solving current conceptual problems about the nature of nature.

Jürgen Moltmann develops the idea that nature is to be the human home. Nature is not merely (as Marxists think) an object of labor but a place of residence. Moltmann is not interested in spontaneous or wild nature, nor (as was Toulmin) in cosmology; he wants nature reshaped to human needs simultaneously with a society attuned to its earthen environment. The result will be what he calls 'a humanization of nature' and 'the naturalization of humanity' (141). J.N. Findlay deplores the 'miserable views of materiality' (146) that have been characteristic of the Western classical past. Matter is,

Findlay thinks, an admirable foil for mind, yet also 'the glory of material objects is that they simply *are*, and simply are what they are, and neither think about anything nor care about it' (151). Nevertheless Findlay soon tires of the admirable 'invariance of Matter' (149) and finds the absence of life elsewhere in the solar system puzzling and 'embittering' (151) since 'the center of all things is plainly spiritual rather than material' (152).

Charles Hartshorne, in a fine essay that seems out of context here, vigorously argues with Robert Nozick over whether God adds to the meaning of life. John Bennett, in another excellent essay hardly concerned with nature, reviews changing accounts of good and evil in society across the twentieth century, ending with an analysis of the nuclear threat.

Most of these authors, Smith and Toulmin excluded, do not seem able or inclined to address very directly the major conceptual issues for religion raised by scientific discoveries about nature; issues such as evolution, randomness, origins of life, creation, astronomical or microscopic nature, the anthropic principle, sociobiological control of society and behavior, value in ecosystems, etc., despite the promise on the jacket. They typically address rather more imaginatively (in both good and bad senses) issues of matter and spirit. The result is a wide-ranging, sometimes impressive, but also loose collection.

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BRIAN SKYRMS. *Pragmatics and Empiricism*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1984. Pp. xi + 143. US\$16.95. ISBN 0-300-03174-2.

In this book Skyrms pursues a somewhat philosophically up-dated version of a programme he attributes to de Finetti:

De Finetti is the kind of positivist who doesn't believe in chance — who regards the whole idea as metaphysical excess baggage — but still wants to give an account of the kind of Bayesian reasoning referred to in the last paragraph. [See the fourth paragraph of this review for an example.] He gives such an account by proving a famous representation theorem. In essence, this shows that one who has degrees of belief which exhibit a certain symmetry behaves as if he believes in chances and is uncertain as to what the correct chance distribution is. For de Finetti, this demonstrates

that belief in the reality of chances is a difference that makes no difference; chances are, for him, simply an artifact of the representation theorem.

Skyrms takes de Finetti's results to constitute 'a certain kind of philosophical reduction' of chance to rational degree of belief. The question is, what kind? After a brief review of the history of various proposed forms of reduction, he seems to settle on what he calls 'pragmatic empiricism' as the philosophical foundations of the reduction. This foundation has one main cornerstone, a definition of empirical significance: '... a hypothesis whose assumption does not influence the credibility of any evidential statement is not empirically meaningful' (14-15), where 'influence' is determined via Bayes' Theorem. According to this criterion some statements about chance are empirically significant, e.g., 'that the chance of heads is $1/2$ ', but others are not, e.g., 'that chances are really 'out there' and not supervenient on manifest properties'. (18) The real job of de Finetti's theorem is to separate out the significant from the non-significant components.

In Chapter 2 Skyrms proceeds to give a brief review of the foundations of Bayesian decision theory including a pitch for higher order degrees of belief. The philosophical heart of the book is in Chapter 3. This is the place where he develops de Finetti's idea and various generalizations of it. Despite its easy informality of presentation, it is a difficult chapter for anyone not comfortable with recent work in theoretical statistics.

Skyrms introduces the material of Chapter 3 by considering how different ways of conceiving of objective probabilities leads to different results. There are two hypotheses concerning the chances of a given coin turning up heads, $1/3$ or $2/3$, and an epistemic (degree of belief) probability of $1/2$ for each hypothesis. The overall degree of belief (prior to additional evidence) = $[1/2 (1/3) + 1/2 (2/3)] = 1/2$ that a toss will yield a head. If we now toss the coin once and get a head, this information makes it a bit more likely that the $2/3$ hypothesis is true, so the degree of belief that the next toss will be a head (conditional on the preceding one being a head) is slightly *higher* than the prior, $.5$. This is so even though the tosses are independent. But now, says Skyrms, suppose we think of the objective probabilities as frequencies. If we *knew* that the frequency of getting a head in a finite sequence is $.5$, say, the epistemic likelihood of getting a head conditional on the previous toss being a head is slightly *less* than the prior $.5$.

The point of these examples, I take it, is that the way our epistemic probabilities change over time depends on what mixtures of objective probabilities we are dealing with. So it looks as if belief in objective probabilities does make a difference. However, if we make certain assumptions, (The assumptions are that we assume *countable additivity of probability, an infinite sequence of trials, and exchangeability of probability distributions*. The latter property is possessed by a distribution when the probability value remains invariant under finite permutations of the trials.) de Finetti's theorem establishes that the sum of differences between these kinds of mixtures and between these kinds of mixtures and exchangeable degrees of belief has itself

a degree of belief zero. 'De Finetti regards this as a way of dispensing with metaphysically dubious properties. With regard to our degree-of-belief probabilities, the postulation of propensities pulls no weight' (44).

Much of the rest of the chapter consists in discussions of ways of generalizing these results to, among other things, stochastic process, particularly Markov chains. This generalization centers around a characterization of the 'physical probabilities' of which the degrees of belief are to be mixtures:

I *Invariance* A possible physical probability measure should be invariant with respect to [a transformation] T.

II *Resiliency* A possible physical probability measure should be such that it is not possible to move to a 'truer' physical probability by conditionalizing on a further specification of *projectible experimental factors*.

The idea behind II is that the probability measure should not change for repetition of essentially the same experiment. This gives rise to II'. Skyrms now defines a notion of *objective resiliency*. This property is had by a measure satisfying I and II'. The key (representation) theorem to be proved is this:

R Every probability invariant with respect to T has a unique representation as a mixture of probabilities that are objectively resilient with respect to T.

This connects up with frequencies as follows:

...let P be the probability measure representing your degrees of belief. Let T be a transformation which leaves your degrees of belief invariant. It determines your conception of a repetition of the same experiment and your notion of projectibility and your notion of chance. Then the limiting relative frequencies under repetition of the experiment will almost surely (with respect to your degrees of belief) converge to one of your chance distributions. *By virtue of a symmetry in your degrees of belief you must act as if you believe in objectively resilient chances to which you believe relative frequencies will converge.*

With this background machinery in hand, Skyrms proceeds to use the notion of objective chance to develop an account of decision making (Ch. 4) and conditionals (Ch. 5). Though Skyrms does want to reduce objective notions of probability to epistemic notions, the notion of objective chance plays a crucial role in his formulation of these accounts and for these purposes he treats objective chance as a given.

One of the recent issues in decision theory concerns the relative merits of 'Causal' vs 'Evidential' Decision Theory. A standard test case designed to

bring out the shortcomings of the latter involves the supposition that though smoking is highly correlated with cancer, both are symptoms of an inherited tendency. Assuming that one likes to smoke and since smoking will not cause cancer (though it serves as a sign that one will likely get it), it seems reasonable to smoke. If we take the conditional probability of getting cancer given S to be high and the conditional probability of getting cancer given \bar{S} to be low, Bayesian decision theory yields the result that the subjective expected utility (SEU of $\bar{S} > SEU$ of S and so advises that we not smoke.

Causal decision theorists rely on subjunctive conditionals rather than conditional probabilities. This difference allows them to assign the same probability to getting cancer both for action S and \bar{S} and so allows them to assign a higher SEU to S rather than \bar{S} . A position alternative to either of these is to relativize the probability assignments to a partition of the class of smokers into the class of those that have the inherited cancer tendency and those that do not. Relative to each such partition the objective chance of getting cancer is the same whether we consider smokers or non-smokers, so in each of the members of this exhaustive partition, the action with highest SEU is: Smoke. Most simply put this is the position Skyrms seems to occupy. His formal account of utility maximization unfolds in two stages. First he defines a notion of *objective expected utility* relative to a state (partition) of the world; K :

$$U_K(A): \sum_i \text{Chance}_{K,A}(C_i) \text{Utility}_K(A \& C_i)$$

This notion is then subjectivized to yield the definition of expected utility:

$$U(A): \neq \sum_j \text{Degree of belief}(K_j) \sum_i \text{Chance}_{K,A}(C_i) U_K(A \& C_i)$$

where the first two elements represent the mixture of objective chances C_j weighted by degrees of belief in K_j (70). The effect of applying the decision rule to Newcomb's case is the two box solution. In general because of the relativization to relevant partitions Skyrms' decision rule has the same outcome as standard applications of dominance reasoning.

In the remainder of the chapter Skyrms attacks various competing versions of non-causal decision theory focusing especially on Eells' 'metatrickle' defense and Jeffrey's recent 'ratificationism.'

In the last chapter, Skyrms develops his account of conditionals. The emphasis on objective chances and partitions is retained here. The basic idea is that given a set of possible chances and a weighting of those chances, we calculate a value for the conditional, *If p then q* called the *Basic Assertability Value* as follows:

$$\sum_j pr_j(b^p_j) pr_i(q \text{ given } p \& b^p_j)$$

where $pr_j(b^p_j)$ represents the degree of belief in the j th partition in the set of partitions associated with the proposition p and $pr_i(q \text{ given } p \& b^p_j)$ represents the objective chance of q conditional on p and b^p_j . Skyrms claims

to be able to derive many of the standard account of conditionals, e.g., those of Adams, Stalnaker and Lewis as special cases of his own. He then shows how various versions of causal decision theory employing subjunctive conditionals are equivalent on his account of conditionals to the version of causal decision theory developed in the preceding chapter.

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BARRY STROUD. *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. xv + 277. Cdn\$48.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-824730-3); Cdn\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-824761-3).

Barry Stroud's most recent book is a marvel of philosophical reasoning which reminds us of the power of the arguments which can be given for 'the sceptical philosophical view that we can know nothing about the world around us' (viii) and the weakness of standard philosophical responses to them. In his opening chapter he explicates and develops the philosophical scepticism of Descartes' *Meditation* I. In subsequent chapters he develops, defends, but ultimately finds lacking, refutations and dissolutions of philosophical scepticism by Austin, Moore, Kant, Carnap, Quine, Stanley Cavell and Thompson Clarke. Each is a tour de force of subtle philosophical analysis. Stroud is not much concerned with placing these authors or their writings in their historical context. Yet his sympathetic account of what they did say and could have said makes us understand the virtues and limits of the approaches he takes them to represent in a way in which no history of sceptical ideas, however enlightening, can.

Stroud's sceptic asks himself, 'Among all the things I believe to be true, what amounts to knowledge and what does not?' (2). He chooses a situation which, *by his lights and the lights of all who claim to know*, is representative of the best possible position we can be in for knowing things about the world, e.g., that of Descartes when he considers whether he knows on the basis of his senses (s) that he is sitting by a fire holding a piece of paper in his hand. By concluding that even in such a situation it is impossible to know, he may conclude that it is impossible to know in other best possible positions as well as worse positions, so long as the case considered is 'truly representative' (10). He is led to his general negative assessment of his beliefs because he thinks (a)

in order to know *s* he must know (*-Ds*) that he is not dreaming that he is sitting by the fire etc. and also (b) he cannot know *-Ds*. (a) is supposed to be an instance of 'a general procedure we recognize ... in making and assessing knowledge claims in everyday and scientific life' (31), viz. that in order to know that *p*, one must first (i.e., independently of any inference from alleged knowledge that *p*) know the falsity of all those things we know to be incompatible with our knowing that *p*. (b) supposedly follows from the thesis of the epistemic priority of appearances, viz. we must have reasons for objective beliefs like *s* or *-Ds* which are reasons about how we are appeared to, but not vice versa, together with the thesis of the underdetermination of reality by experience, viz. the experiences we have in a representative best possible case are compatible with *Ds* as well as *s*.

The philosophical sceptic, Stroud thinks, tries to ask a general question about whether and how anything is known from a peculiar 'external' perspective so that his questions are not answered simply by appeal to everyday agreed on practices of deciding whether or how something is known — the 'internal' standpoint. Stroud argues that if the sceptic succeeds in raising 'a problem about how knowledge is possible,' scepticism is 'the only answer.' Stroud is unconvinced that the only intelligible questions about knowledge are 'internal' questions. Much of the significance of scepticism for Stroud consists in understanding what the sceptic's problem is and what is at stake for our conception of ourselves in relation to the world around us.

Austin objects that everyday practice shows that in order to know that *p* one must know the falsity only of those alternatives which one has some special reason for thinking might obtain (in the circumstances). Other alternatives, like the dream possibility, are irrelevant. Since 'the only notion of knowledge we have is embodied in those ... practices' (31), the sceptic whose argument depends on (a) fails to raise a coherent question 'about everyday or scientific knowledge ... at all' (42). Stroud decisively shows that Austin is wrong, and concludes that Austin gives a condition for the appropriateness of a knowledge attribution, not one for its truth. (Stroud's examples are consistent with insisting that relevant alternatives include only those which someone or other has reason to believe might obtain and so excluding the dream possibility.) Stroud is less convincing in rejecting Clarke's contention that in the 'plain' sense which ordinary claims to knowledge express, any alternative possibility which must be known to be false must be a possibility which it is possible for someone to know obtain, a condition failed by the dream possibility in the 'philosophical' sense in which it is employed in the sceptic's argument. Stroud simply responds that it certainly 'seems possible and intelligible' (273) to anyone like himself going through the sceptic's reasoning that one be dreaming even though no one knows or could know it, and that one thereby coherently raises an intelligible question about 'plain' knowledge. The sceptic thereby reveals that he thinks of the world as an objective reality of some sort and conceives of knowledge as some sort of objective relation between a knower and the world. Unfortunately, Stroud never really brings his contrasts between the sceptic and opponents like Austin and

Clarke together into a focussed account of objectivity so that we can clearly understand what it would cost us not to think of ourselves in *that* sort of relationship to the world.

Stroud rightly thinks Moore's celebrated proof of an external world and refutation of scepticism fails *just* because the sceptic's denial of knowledge 'is the outcome of an investigation into the basis of all the knowledge we think we can have about the world' (110) and the often good ordinary practice of refuting a general denial of knowledge ('it is not known ...') with a particular counter-example ('I know ...') fails when the denial is based on an alleged deficiency in the way the alleged knowledge is arrived at. He then finds himself 'forced to conclude either that Moore's assertions of knowledge are not true or that they do not even contradict philosophical scepticism' (127). Stroud either is invalidly inferring from the failure of Moore's refutation — an epistemological or dialectical defect — that Moore's argument is unsound — a semantic defect — or is implicitly assuming that Moore, in the face of the sceptic's arguments, can't know unless he knows how he knows. Do students on reading Meditation I cease to know anything just because they do not know (yet) how to respond? Why isn't it enough that it be possible to give an adequate response?

Stroud thinks one must show how knowledge is possible in a way which undermines the coherence of the sceptic's reasoning. In a penetrating discussion of Carnap, he argues that, since the very persuasiveness of the sceptic's reasoning threatens the plausibility of verificationism, any dismissal of the problem of scepticism as an untestable and thus meaningless pseudo-issue requires independently finding fault with the sceptic's argument. Cavell suggests that any case the sceptic considers must be a case of a concrete claim entered into in specific conditions in order for a negative assessment of it to apply to other *claims*, but no negative assessment of a particular claim made in a specific context making it the specific claim it is could represent our general epistemic situation. Stroud rightly objects that epistemic positions in which no claim is made can be assessed and that Cavell must show specifically why the negative assessment the sceptic reaches cannot be generalized.

Kant's 'proof' of the incoherence of scepticism, on the other hand, rests on showing the incoherence of the epistemic priority of appearances. A 'transcendental' (non-empirical, non-internal) investigation into the conditions making knowledge possible reveals that knowledge of how things appear requires the possibility of non-inferential knowledge of how things are. Stroud argues that Kant can guarantee a knowable distinction between subject-dependent experience and objective reality only if he can show that we supply the conditions of knowledge, which depends on showing that in some ('transcendental') sense what we know are appearances ('transcendental idealism'). Yet the transcendental ideality of objects can be established only by a transcendental inquiry. Any attempt to establish the possibility of such an investigation into the conditions making knowledge possible, Stroud says, seems circular.

Kant's neglect in saying precisely what the guaranteed criteria are does

not trouble Stroud since Kant's main point is to reject the contention that on each occasion 'we must independently determine whether there is a reality corresponding to our experiences' (146). This is irrelevant since Kant must believe there is a *coherent* distinction — applied inferentially *or not* — between reality and illusion. Is there? Murky a priori arguments in defence of unarticulated criteria will always fail to convince. Once articulated, playful sceptics can try to show the absurdities of trying to judge coherently in accordance with them. (How much ostrich-like disregard for conflict within and between persons is masked by philosophers' glib use of 'our,' as in 'our norms,' 'our criteria' etc., in epistemology as much as in social theory?) Stroud simply assumes throughout his book that the cognitive norms and practices which constitute the 'internal' institution of knowledge are coherent or can be made so in a rational, non-arbitrary way. Thus he doesn't seriously discuss the sceptical possibility, suggested by Hume in *Treatise* I, iv, Goodman, and even Kant in the *Antinomies*, that Reason is internally incoherent, or the connection between it and scepticism based on the dream possibility. (The latter, after all, *does* derive from procedures we 'recognize ... in making and assessing knowledge claims ... in everyday life' [31]. So why isn't it a species of the former?)

Why must the sceptic's opponent show the doctrine of the priority of appearances to be incoherent rather than simply unlicensed? Surely, if the sceptic is right, the doctrine's acceptability can't rest on its success in explaining how knowledge is possible! Is there no alternative? Stroud strangely neglects the many alternatives in the literature of contemporary epistemology. By embracing a coherence theory, a perceptual taking criterion, or simply by denying that in order for *f* to make one justified in believing *p*, one must be justified in believing *f* and that if *f*, then *p*, (*a*) becomes innocuous. If alternatives can have the result that (and thus 'explain' how) we know *s* or *-Ds*, what reason does anyone have for accepting the sceptic's premise, even if it is coherent? Stroud may wonder what such contemporary 'theories' do (viii). Why don't they make sense of our epistemic practice and, if coherent, show, at the least, that there is no good reason for denying what the sceptic denies? Isn't that enough?

Stroud argues that Quine's naturalized epistemology cannot provide the enlightened alternative to scepticism it aspires to. In the case of others, I can both hold that their beliefs are projections from sensory data and explain how they got them right, since I can know, independently of my attributions of beliefs to them, what the world is like. In my own case, Stroud contends, I cannot be in a similar position to explain how knowledge is possible, so long as I hold all my beliefs to be projections from sensory data. I agree. Should Quine make his holistic views on justification take precedence over his naturalistic project of explaining how 'theory' related to 'evidence'? Perhaps then he can avoid Stroud's charge that he blatantly disregards the sceptic's *reductio* in contending that the sceptic overreacts to science-inspired doubt by rejecting science. Science shows *Ds* to be compatible with our sensory experience, but also, in most cases, to be not as good an explanation of it as

others. Thus any rejection of science would be unwarranted, given everything we believe. If these coherentist moves are unsatisfying, Stroud should address them and their relevance to scepticism directly.

Stroud begins with the 'hope to bring into question our very understanding of what a philosophical theory of knowledge is supposed to be' (viii). He succeeds magnificently even if he offers 'nothing definitive about what a philosophical theory is' (ix). His book should be read by any philosopher expressing opinions on scepticism.

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JACQUES TAMINIAUX. *Dialectic and Difference: Finitude in Modern Thought*, trad. et réd. par James Decker et Robert Grease. Atlantic Highlands, N.J. / London: Humanities Press MacMillan Press 1985. Pp. xiv + 177. ISBN 0-391-03113-9

Avant d'évoquer les mérites propres du livre de Taminiaux il convient d'abord, puisque nous avons affaire ici à un recueil de traductions destiné au monde anglo-saxon, d'en examiner l'importance stratégique. Le recueil *Dialectic and Difference* est publié dans la collection intitulée 'Contemporary Studies in Philosophy and the Human Sciences'. Les éditeurs définissent le rôle de cette nouvelle collection de la façon suivante: 'It constitutes a response to the emergence in England and America of widespread interest in the domains, intersections, and limits of questions arising from the human sciences within a climate inspired chiefly by Continental thought. Although primarily philosophical in orientation, the series cuts across the boundaries of traditional disciplines and will include volumes in such areas as phenomenology, structuralism, semiotics, post-structuralism, critical theory, hermeneutics, and contemporary cultural (literary and artistic) criticism' (ii). Pour une oreille française, il est étonnant de constater qu'on nous présente ici comme périphériques par rapport à la philosophie des disciplines qui en France et en Allemagne sont pour la plupart d'emblée considérées comme philosophiques. Pourtant, afin de justifier cette extension du champ de la philosophie, les éditeurs américains se voient pour leur part obligés d'associer celle-ci aux sciences humaines. Ceci tient au fait que jusqu'à présent la philosophie aux Etats-Unis et en Angleterre a été définie de façon unilatérale

comme philosophie analytique, si bien par exemple qu'en raison de la structure institutionnelle des universités, l'introduction de courants de pensée dite continentale doit passer le plus souvent par les départements de sciences humaines et de littérature. Il n'en demeure pas moins cependant que ce qui est visé par cette collection, c'est une ouverture du domaine de la philosophie en vue de la rendre perméable aux courants de pensée européens, et ceci non plus uniquement d'une façon marginale. Or dans la mesure où depuis quelques années une brèche est en train d'être pratiquée de l'intérieur même de la forteresse de la philosophie analytique, dans la mesure plus précisément où Rorty et Putnam tentent d'entamer une discussion sinon avec les auteurs du moins sur les thèmes de la philosophie continentale, il faut avouer que la conjoncture dans laquelle vient s'inscrire le livre de Taminiaux est particulièrement favorable, si tant est que celui-ci peut contribuer d'une manière positive au débat.

Contrairement au recueil français *Le regard et l'excédent* (La Haye: M. Nijhoff 1977) qui rassemblait la plupart des articles réunis ici, l'A. a choisi cette fois d'atténuer la référence husserlienne — en fait le titre renvoyait à la *Wesensschau* et au *Ueberschuss des Recherches logiques* — en choisissant de faire du petit texte '*Dialectic and Difference*' la pièce maîtresse du recueil anglais, qui comporte au total huit articles. L'accent est déplacé dès lors du côté de Hegel et de Heidegger. La dialectique fait référence à l'autoaccomplissement de l'esprit absolu alors que la différence conduit directement au thème central de la pensée de Heidegger: la différence ontologique. A lire cet article de 1970, on remarque pourtant une chose curieuse. Il ne s'agit pas ici d'un article substantiel reposant sur un ensemble de développements; la confrontation concrète entre Hegel et Heidegger aura plutôt lieu dans '*Finitude and the Absolute: Remarks on Hegel and Heidegger as Interpreters of Kant.*' Au contraire, l'A. se contente d'examiner brièvement la simple possibilité d'un 'dialogue' (80-81) entre les deux pensées peut-être les plus irréconciliables qui soient. L'article a donc une portée à la fois méthodologique et philosophique. Taminiaux analyse les conditions selon lesquelles un rapport philosophique, un rapport pensant peut être institué face à l'histoire de la philosophie et aux grandes oeuvres de la tradition. Il nous indique indirectement sa propre façon de procéder dans les autres contributions du recueil lorsqu'il endosse la thèse heideggerienne de la 'répétition,' telle qu'elle apparaît dans *Kant et le problème de la métaphysique*:

'A work of thought, inasmuch as it is a work of language, only provides an opening onto the unconcealment of beings, and thereby of Being itself, through a certain violence, an antagonism, which is the act of the work only because it is initially the act of unconcealment itself. Irruption into the unsaid, step toward the unthought, manifestation of the non-manifested — the work of thought, inasmuch as it is a work of language, is indissociable from a violence toward the said, the thought, the manifested. As such, the work is a risk and maintains itself in the risk; therein lies its dwelling place' (82).

Les œuvres philosophiques ne méritent d'être interrogées que si elles donnent à penser. Or elles ne pourront jamais interpeller les générations ultérieures si elles sont considérées comme étant une fois pour toutes en parfaite 'coïncidence' (80) avec elles-mêmes, si elles forment un tout clos sur lui-même. Ce thème de l'impossibilité d'une coïncidence, d'une identité à soi-même de l'œuvre philosophique, est d'ailleurs repris dans '*Phenomenology in Merleau-Ponty's Late Work*'. Pour Merleau-Ponty, il importe d'éviter deux écueils en histoire de la philosophie: 1) la coïncidence d'une pensée avec elle-même au prix d'un dépassement (*surmounting*, *Aufhebung*, 120) des autres pensées, 2) la coïncidence interne d'une œuvre isolée telle qu'envisagée par une approche historisante. Dans le premier cas, l'histoire est livrée à une simple subjectivation (119) comme par exemple chez Hegel qui récupère dans son système toutes les œuvres passées comme autant de jalons menant à sa propre pensée. Récupération ici est synonyme de réduction. Dans le second cas, on assiste à un processus d'objectivation (119) pour lequel Merleau-Ponty donne l'exemple de l'historien de la philosophie M. Gueroult. Pour ce dernier, chaque philosophie est 'an architecture offering a structured group of defined answers to defined questions, which, in principle, can be exhaustively inventoried' (120). Quand on songe au contexte nord-américain vers lequel se tourne *Dialectic and Difference*, il faut espérer que les deux attitudes condamnées par Merleau-Ponty et à sa suite par Taminiaux sauront se reconnaître et entamer un processus d'autocritique. On songe pour une part à l'attitude arrogante du paradigme régnant qui s'empresse d'étouffer les œuvres de la tradition métaphysique sous prétexte qu'elles ne sont dues qu'à des maladies du langage. On songe d'autre part à l'attitude respectueuse et idolâtre d'une *phenomenological research* marginalisée, qui pour assurer sa survie neutralise les œuvres par un réflexe d'antiquaire. C'est à ces deux destinataires que s'adresse *Dialectic and Difference*.

Le plus bel exemple d'une mise en rapport questionnante de deux philosophes nous est donné dans '*Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations: In Remembrance of Heidegger's Last Seminar*.' Ce n'est pas un hasard si cet article mené de main de maître retrace précisément l'inflexion donnée par Heidegger à la phénoménologie de Husserl: Taminiaux y dégage en définitive la perspective qui sera dominante dans toutes les autres contributions de ce recueil. En effet, c'est une thèse heideggerienne qui guide toute l'étude '*Marx, Art, and Truth*' dans la mesure où le principe de la 'practical production' (44) de l'homme par la travail se situe encore de plain-pied dans le prolongement du *cogito* cartésien et de la métaphysique occidentale. C'est encore la perspective heideggerienne qui domine dans '*Hegel and Hobbes*' en ce que la philosophie politique de Hegel fait fi de l'individu et de la facticité de sa mort propre (34). On retrouve enfin dans '*Experience, Expression, and Form in Merleau-Ponty's Itinerary*' une critique de la conscience pure et muette qui prend appui chez Derrida et, par ricochet, chez le Heidegger de *Achèvement vers la parole*.

Il est à noter que le recueil se termine sur trois textes consacrés à Merleau-Ponty, dont les deux premiers ont déjà été mentionnés. Cette disposition

obéit certes à un autre impératif qu'à l'ordonnance chronologique des auteurs traités. En fait, le dernier texte '*Merleau-Ponty. From Dialectic to Hyper-dialectic*' nous reconduit au titre du recueil, dans lequel il ne faut pas voir qu'une opposition. En dépit de ses errances et de ses aventures, Merleau-Ponty est resté fidèle jusqu'à la fin au thème de la dialectique, pour autant que celle-ci coïncide avec son sens étymologique: 'to welcome the difference' (171). Sans doute Taminiaux veut-il payer par là un tribut à celui qui fut son maître au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre. Sans doute aussi veut-il prouver que la phénoménologie de Husserl, à la faveur de son éclatement, renvoie moins à un acquis, à une réalité, qu'à un champ de possibilités, comme l'avait bien vu Heidegger.

Même si l'A. se situe délibérément dans le prolongement de la pensée de Heidegger, il n'a rien d'un épigone servile qui se confine à une attitude mimétique. Au contraire, on cherche en vain l'emphase prétentieuse et les envolées poétiques chez Taminiaux, de sorte que Decker et Grease ont eu la partie belle pour donner une traduction littérale et facilement accessible de ces textes. Cela ne veut pas dire par ailleurs que l'A. aborde les œuvres philosophiques en philologue à la recherche de détails et de curiosités. Si détails il y a, ils sont à chaque fois au service d'un enjeu qui rejoint les motifs centraux des auteurs traités. Ceci explique peut-être pourquoi, à une exception près (114 n. 8), l'A. n'a pas jugé bon de mettre à jour ses références bibliographiques à la lumière des leçons de Heidegger par exemple sur Kant et sur Hegel récemment publiées. Après tout, il faut laisser place au non-dit, si l'œuvre doit être encore en mesure de nous parler.

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LUDWIG von MISES, *L'action humaine*, Traité d'économie. Traduit de l'américain par Raoul Audoin. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (Collection 'Libre échange') 1985. xi + 942 p. 200FF, Cdn\$43.00. ISBN 2-13-038598-2

Le livre de Ludwig Edler (titre de la noblesse autrichienne) von Mises, traduit d'après sa 3e édition de 1966, est en quelque sorte un classique. Cependant, ce qualificatif n'est pas tant mérité pour la contribution originale à la théorie économique proprement dite que pour la prodigieuse synthèse qu'offre le livre non seulement des acquis conceptuels depuis les classiques, les

utilitaires et les marginalistes, mais aussi des problèmes épistémologiques et méthodologiques propres à la science économique, des principes d'économie politique et de philosophie sociale tout court. Il s'agit d'une véritable somme, aussi bien d'idées brillantes (notamment la tentative d'incorporer la théorie économique dans une théorie générale du choix, la conception originale de la monnaie et des phénomènes de l'intérêt), que d'affirmations naïves ou triviales, de préjugés ou de dogmes véhiculés par la pensée économique. C'est dans ce témoignage que réside l'intérêt principal du livre qui, en fait, intègre les idées clés de plusieurs publications antérieures de l'auteur.

Le livre est divisé en sept parties d'importance inégale. Dans les deux premières parties, portant sur 'L'agir humain' et 'L'agir dans le cadre de la société,' v.M. expose sa praxéologie (qui n'est pas à confondre avec celle de Kotarbinski). Elle se présente comme un ensemble de vérités conceptuelles concernant toute situation de choix; l'économie comme 'catallactique' (l'étude de l'échange sur la base de monnaie) en constitue la partie la plus importante. Les notions clés de cette théorie générale de l'action et les intuitions principales au sujet du choix, de l'ordonnement des moyens vers une fin, de la satisfaction des besoins, des préférences etc., sont empruntées à la psychologie populaire; mais les principes concernant la conception téléologique de l'action s'opposent aux postulats d'une psychologie empirique et à une conception causale de l'action. Les règles méthodologiques s'appliquant à la praxéologie et aux sciences humaines en général sont inspirées du dualisme, devenu classique, qui oppose la causalité à la téléologie, la régularité à l'unicité des événements historiques, la quantité à la qualité, la probabilité fréquentielle à la probabilité casuelle, l'explication à la compréhension. S'y ajoute le principe de l'individualisme méthodologique qui cependant postule plutôt un singularisme ontologique: on ne peut attribuer des actions qu'à des personnes singulières; des groupes et des collectifs n'ont pas d'existence. Mais qu'en est-il de l'action qui consiste à élire un président? Un individu seul ne peut élire un président. Ce ne peut être que l'action d'un groupe, éventualité impossible à considérer dans le cadre de l'individualisme méthodologique que propose v.M.

Les propos méthodologiques sont complétés dans la 3e partie qui traite du 'Calcul économique.' v.M. y défend le caractère aprioristique des postulats de la praxéologie et de la catallactique. Aucune expérience ne peut contredire la validité de ces principes, eux-mêmes obtenus par simple réflexion sur la nature de l'action (36-8, 909). La catallactique est une sorte de 'arm-chair economics,' une construction a priori, comme le pensaient les fondateurs de l'École autrichienne, Menger et Wieser dont Schumpeter, Böhm-Bawerk, von Hayek et von Mises sont les fidèles disciples. (Contrairement à son frère Richard qui fut membre actif du Groupe de Berlin affilié au mouvement de l'empirisme logique, Ludwig v.M. fut un anti-empiriste déclaré). Il s'agit dans cette perspective de rejoindre à partir de ce qui est impliqué dans les concepts d'action de production (travail), d'échange (catallaxie) et de consommation (satisfaction de besoins), l'ensemble des phénomènes du marché libre. Cette 'déduction' est accomplie dans la 4e partie qui couvre la moitié du livre. v.M.

y expose, sous forme de traité, les principes sous-jacents aux règles de jeu régissant le marché, les mécanismes de formation de prix, la monnaie comme condition de possibilité de tout calcul économique. La conception 'métalliste' de la monnaie reprise du premier livre de v.M., *Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel* [1912], est une contribution originale, comme d'ailleurs les considérations sur le facteur temps et l'origine de l'intérêt qui, selon la théorie de Böhm-Bawerk, n'est pas le prix payé pour les services du capital, mais la compensation devant résulter de la dépréciation subie par les biens futurs comparés aux biens présents (552), donc comme un rapport entre prix. Cette partie se termine par des sections consacrées au crédit, à l'inflation, au caractère cyclique des activités économiques, au travail et aux salaires, à la rente et à la nature des intérêts économiques conflictuels, mais harmonieux s'ils sont 'bien compris.'

Le traité d'économie de v.M. se présente sans ambages comme une apologie, voire une exaltation de l'économie de marché non entravée (lire: du système capitaliste) et de ses 'fondements': si chacun maximise ses avantages, sans être contrarié par autre chose que la concurrence, tous les besoins sont au mieux satisfaits. Malheureusement v.M. n'a pas eu l'occasion de s'instruire par la théorie des jeux et l'exemple du dilemme des prisonniers pour au moins se poser la question si le point où se rencontrent des 'coopérants' antagonistes représente nécessairement un optimum et si l'optimum est automatiquement satisfait. Il peut donc continuer à penser naïvement que 'si les principes de l'économie de marché étaient reconnus par tous les peuples du monde, il n'y aurait aucune raison de faire la guerre' (298), il n'y aurait pas d'exploitation (331), il n'y aurait pas de chômage (628). Mais il y aurait des inégalités de fortune et de revenu, les inégalités n'étant pas seulement héréditaires, mais une nécessité du système (304); 'son élimination détruirait complètement l'économie de marché' (885). Mais nous savons que tout cela n'est 'vrai' que par construction a priori, en quelque sorte par décret. On s'étonne seulement que ce soit sur une telle base que v.M. ait voulu édifier son réquisitoire et sa diatribe vitriolique dirigés contre des ennemis, les écoles historiciste et institutionnaliste allemandes, la *Sozialpolitik* et *Volkswirtschaft* de Hindenburg et, surtout, contre tout ce qui sent, de proche ou de loin, le socialisme, le marxisme et le communisme, généralement associés au bolchévisme, au fascisme et au totalitarisme. Finalement toute forme d'interventionnisme (par la fiscalité, la manipulation de la structure des prix, de la monnaie et du crédit, par la nationalisation) est rejetée comme absolument néfaste à la recherche de l'optimum.

C'est dans la sixième partie que v.M. fait la 'démonstration' qui l'a rendu célèbre — et qui a sans doute motivé la traduction de ce livre tant attendue par Jacques Rueff —, et qui tente d'établir que dans une économie socialiste le calcul économique, l'utilisation d'une méthode rationnelle de 'pricing,' donc la rationalité économique sont impossibles (739sq), que le système capitaliste est né parce qu'il est le meilleur, et qu'il est le meilleur, parce qu'il est né, c'est-à-dire qu'il est le fruit de l'évolution (281). Si v.M. n'avait pas catégoriquement rejeté les mathématiques comme non-pertinentes pour le calcul

économique (cf. chap. XVI, 5. (396), 'La méthode mathématique ... est une méthode entièrement fautive' peut-on y lire), — et sans doute les mathématiques étaient-elles trop innocentes pour être mises au service de l'apologie du capitalisme —, il aurait compris qu'il est possible, à propos d'un problème d'allocation des ressources, de l'exprimer en langage mathématique aussi bien dans l'optique de la planification parfaite que dans celle de la concurrence parfaite. S'il y a pour v.M. supériorité du système capitaliste, cela n'est pas inhérent à l'analyse économique du problème en question. Il faut par conséquent chercher d'autres raisons pour le privilège accordé au capitalisme. On les trouve dans les préjugés doctrinaires de l'auteur. L'opposition entre économie de marché libre et économie planifiée réside dans le fait que dans le premier, chaque individu fait *son* plan et exerce, en tant que consommateur, sa souveraineté, dont l'étendue est cependant limitée par la dimension du portefeuille; dans le second c'est un décideur suprême qui fait le plan et cela constitue la fin de la souveraineté et de la démocratie économique. Au fond c'est la vertu de la démocratie qui garantit la meilleure satisfaction possible des besoins, même si la majorité devait préférer des salles de cinéma à des logements convenables ou des friandises aux soins dentaires (cf. l'allusion à la remarque de Harold Laski (769) dont v.M. reconnaît pourtant le 'point de vue plus élevé'). Les autres raisons pour la préférence du système capitaliste reposent sur la psychologie populaire au sujet du motif de la recherche du profit, de la nature du travail (représentant toujours une désutilité), du sacrifice consenti pour l'entrepreneur capitaliste.

La traduction du livre me paraît bien faite. A tout le moins est-elle très fidèle à l'original qu'elle suit jusque dans la lourdeur du style et le choix des expressions excentriques de l'auteur. Parfois on pousse la littéralité à la limite, en traduisant par exemple 'piece of land' par 'pièce de terre' à la place de 'parcelle' ou 'lopin de terre.' Le traducteur a ajouté une 'table des aperçus complémentaires' insérée dans les chapitres et a scindé l'index en index des noms d'auteurs et index thématique (modifié et adapté).

Il n'est pas certain que cette traduction réussisse à faire resurgir chez les lecteurs francophones le spectre du socialisme et de l'interventionnisme que v.M. avait agité. Mais souhaitons qu'il leur fasse comprendre que cette forme de néolibéralisme apparaît aujourd'hui plus dogmatique que jamais.

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DOUGLAS N. WALTON. *Arguer's Position: A Pragmatic Study of Ad Hominem Attack, Criticism, Refutation, and Fallacy*. Westwood, Conn.: Greenwood Press 1985. Pp. xvi + 301. US\$45.00. ISBN 0-313-24439-1.

This book is an exploration of a number of themes in practical argumentation, with particular focus on the circumstantial ad hominem. This species of argument, traditionally regarded as fallacious, occurs when one person charges another with not practising what he preaches. Walton contends, after sustained reflection, that the circumstantial ad hominem is not always fallacious. It is sometimes an appropriate and forceful critical strategy which shows an arguer to be pragmatically inconsistent in his position and shifts the burden of proof in debate or discussion from his opponent to him.

The circumstantial ad hominem has its natural place in dialectical logic where there are two persons in critical discussion, and where the attention of each is as much on the position of the other as on the substantive issue as such. Dialectical aspects are too often ignored, Walton urges. A theory may be dialectical and yet preserve its normative character, for rules can be specified and guidelines given as to what upsets a position and which statements should be acceptable within the terms of a position.

The circumstantial ad hominem rests on allegations of pragmatic inconsistency. A person recommends that one thing, X, should be done and yet does something else, Y. The charge is that he is inconsistent. To demonstrate this, one must demonstrate that doing Y is a way of supporting not-X, or of not supporting X. Thus, if a hunter criticized by an animal lover for killing animals, replies that the animal lover does, after all, eat meat, he must show that the animal lover, by eating meat, participates in a killing of animals which is relevantly similar to that pursued by hunters. There can be many subtleties in argumentation here, as issues of means and ends, direct and indirect support, acts and omissions, and alternative descriptions of actions arise. Walton develops a species of relatedness logic and includes a technical discussion of the logic of action statements in attempts to show that such issues can be handled from within logic. However, at several points he admits that judgments will have to be made depending on agents' plans and intentions, and that each case will, at base, have to be judged on its merits. Personally, I was not convinced that the technical apparatus introduced would serve to resolve the intricate issues arising.

Walton notes that, in tandem with his own exploration of the circumstantial ad hominem, several recent writers have noted that the abusive ad hominem is not always fallacious. In contexts where the reliability of advice is at issue, for instance, to reason from a person's bad record in the past to the unlikelihood of his present advice being satisfactory is perfectly sensible. Walton also notes that there are occasional borderline cases where the ad hominem is not quite either abusive or circumstantial; he cites a hilarious remark by Pierre Trudeau from *Hansard* to illustrate this point. On the whole, however, he misses the opportunity to relate his own account to re-

cent accounts of authority and abusive ad hominem. Another disappointment is a failure on Walton's part to explore the notion of burden of proof, which he uses significantly. A successful allegation of pragmatic inconsistency will, he says, shift the burden of proof in a dialogue. This seems correct, but Walton does not explain why such a shift should occur, or just what it means.

Perhaps in keeping with Walton's desire to systematize and, if possible, formalize as many of the relations of informal logic as possible, there is a curious avoidance of the role in argumentation of persons as such and their attitudes to each other. Emphasizing the dialectical aspect of argumentation, Walton urges that we cannot understand arguments by focusing solely on the relations between those propositions which constitute the premises and conclusion. Walton cites with approval a suggestion of mine that a pragmatically inconsistent arguer undermines his own credibility. He does not explore this further, however. It seems to me that what happens here is that the audience loses respect for the arguer and will not accept premises, principles, or conclusions from that arguer because of this lack of respect. This would seem to be a case of personal response affecting cognitive response. Surely the reason logical tradition has taught that *tu quoque* is a fallacy is due to an underlying belief that such an influence is, at root, irrational. When credibility is affected by a successful charge of pragmatic inconsistency, just how is it affected? And should it be thus affected? I found no direct answer to these questions in Walton's account.

Walton includes several extremely interesting case studies and examples. One is a piece on media ethics, alleging that journalists set higher standards for public servants than they are willing to abide by themselves. Another is a review of a book by anti-psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, saying that Szasz is hypocritical in continuing to teach psychiatry while writing, over a twenty year period, that there is no such thing as mental illness. These essays are reprinted in full as Appendices. They are fascinating and plausible illustrations of the issues Walton treats. So too is an attack, not printed in full, by a Dr. Christy on a philosopher, Allen Buchanan, whose credibility as a critic of the ethical judgments of some medical practitioners seems to be devastatingly undermined by the suggestion that he is a theoretician in quest of more power. Other lively examples come from the *Informal Logic Newsletter*, Canada's *Hansard*, and several textbooks. They liven up the sometimes turgid and repetitious philosophical prose and show the practical significance of the issues Walton explores.

The book discusses many other themes, not mentioned here. Those interested in practical argumentation and informal logic will find it well worth reading.

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PATRICIA H. WERHANE. *Persons, Rights, and Corporations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1985. Pp. ix + 175. US\$12.95. ISBN 0-13-660341-6.

At the very beginning of the 'Introduction' to her recent book, *Persons, Rights, and Corporations*, Patricia H. Werhane says that her book will be almost exclusively 'an analysis of the modern business corporation and its ethical relationships with its employees' (1). Werhane suggests that such an analysis will therefore entail both the development of a clear-cut concept of the corporation and the establishment and defense of employee rights. She makes it evident at the start of the text, and throughout, that in her judgment discussions of the nature of the corporation and of the moral rights of employees must serve as necessary philosophical propaedeutics to any dialogue in business and in business ethics.

Werhane attempts in this book to make sense out of the many complex interrelationships between corporations and their constituents, including their claims one against the other, by approaching such inter-relationships and claims through an evaluation of moral rights. The 'Introduction' to the text is appropriately a cohesive, rather comprehensive and well-organized analysis of the nature of moral rights.

Werhane admits readily that there are numerous other legitimate approaches to evaluating employee and organizational concerns. However given this fact, and even given all of the difficulties and limitations which adhere to any rights-oriented ethical analysis, she contends with justification, 'that an analysis of employees and corporations through the notion of moral rights is essential to an understanding of the injustices in our present economic arrangement and offers some positive suggestion for the future of a fair economic system'(4).

At the end of the 'Introduction,' having asked us to grant the tentative thesis that every person has equal moral rights, she raises again the question which will serve as a guiding thread throughout the book, namely, 'Can one equally defend both employer and employee claims to the respect and exercise of rights without harming either party?' (26). An answer to this question will of course involve a discussion of the nature of the corporation, its rights and responsibilities (Part I) and a discussion of employees regarding these same issues (Part II).

Part I begins with a very useful and inclusive survey of several theories about the nature of the corporation which theories describe it variously as being a moral person, an aggregate, an economic machine, an organism or a social institution. All of these conceptions of the corporation, Werhane argues, fall short of recognizing the actual ontological nature of the corporation as a unique collective. It is this understanding of the corporation as a collective and intentional system that serves as the ground from which Werhane suggests that what she calls 'secondary moral agency' may be ascribed to such organizations (Chapter 2).

Her position is quite interesting. She claims that while a corporation only

functions as a result of individual, primary actions, the actions of the collective are not always easily reducible to or merely redescribable in terms of individual actions and choices. The corporation is therefore 'more than' an aggregate or an association given the fact that it functions as a 'unit' which paradoxically depends upon and is never fully distinct from the individual constituents it employs. The upshot of this is that unlike moral persons, corporations are only capable of secondary action and therefore, not being morally autonomous, can only be viewed as 'secondary moral agents.' Such a claim, while seeming to limit the responsibilities of the corporation, really does nothing more than focus and help to more sharply define them. As Werhane points out, 'corporations, like persons, are and should be held morally responsible for actions within their control when, all things considered, they could have acted otherwise' (59).

A very significant consequence follows from the attribution of secondary moral agency to the corporation. The modern business corporation must be said to possess and be allowed to exercise secondary moral rights to freedom and autonomy, which rights entail correlative moral obligations to customers, to employees and to society as a whole. In her concluding remarks to Part I of the book Werhane warns that corporate freedom from coercive regulation will only be possible when corporations acknowledge their responsibilities as secondary moral agents and voluntarily recognize the legitimate rights claims of their constituents.

In Part II Werhane turns her attention from the moral status of corporations to the moral status of corporate employees (Chapter 4). Against several theories which deny the existence of employee rights, the author claims, and throughout this portion of the book argues convincingly, that employees indeed *have* moral rights in the workplace. Such rights, which evolve from or are natural correlatives of employer demands for employee responsibility, loyalty and respect, include the right to due process, to freedom, to privacy, to worker safety, and to information in the workplace.

Chapter 5 addresses the theoretical question of the responsibilities of employees in relation to their rights while chapters 6 and 7 are essentially attempts to give content to the specific moral rights of employees listed above. Chapter 8 is devoted primarily to the argument that employees have a *prima facie* right, rather than a basic moral right to their job, namely a right not to be fired without due process.

The concluding Chapter, entitled, 'Institutionalizing Moral Agency in Corporations' is in many ways the most interesting and perhaps the most creative in the text. It is here that Werhane attempts to make concrete suggestions as to how corporations might begin to operate such that they at once protect their own legitimate rights claims while respecting those of its employees. It is in this last section of the book that Werhane faces this difficult question raised early on in her text on what in business amounts to the most fundamental level, that of the workaday world of the modern business corporation.

Rather than suggesting 'macro' reforms in the economic system, Werhane

offers several innovative suggestions for reforms on the 'micro' level which she feels would promote moral conduct in corporations. She in fact suggests changes in the structure of the corporation itself. These suggested changes include the imposition of both external constraints like the social audit and internal reforms like the development of public methods for disclosure of corporate activities, reforms in the memberships, duties and responsibilities of boards of directors, and the establishment of in-home ethics training programs.

The central focus of this last chapter is Werhane's development of a model for restructuring the corporation which she argues would encourage corporate moral activity. The 'corporate-constituent model,' as opposed to 'top down' models, would promote a high degree of moral participation by employees. This model for reconstruction will effect a more organic structure in the organization. It will also 'flatten out the hierarchical power structure,' break up the bureaucracy and involve more people in the actual decisions and workings of the corporation. Such increased constituent participation and responsibility, Werhane rightly observes, can only enhance the moral character of the institution.

All of the strengths of *Persons, Rights, and Corporations* are really too numerous to mention. However noteworthy among them are a clear and tightly argued thesis, superb organization and research, and philosophically astute yet business-smart, concrete suggestions for addressing ethical problems in the relationships between corporations and their constituents. The book contains an index and two interesting Appendices, one dealing with due process in the workplace and one which is a sample of a Bill of Rights for employees and employers. These are especially useful for teaching purposes.

Weaknesses in the book are few. Werhane's only significant omission, which she herself owns up to, is that of an extended treatment of the rights, powers, and moral responsibilities of one very important corporate constituent, the stockholder. Werhane's modest claim early on in the book to narrowly focus her analysis on the corporation in its inter-relationships with its employees excuses her to some extent from not addressing the many difficult ethical problems that abound in the relationships between the corporation and its owners. She rightly locates the arena of battle for these ethical problems as one involving the right and consequent responsibilities of ownership (stock ownership); however she doesn't develop this line of thought. This criticism of the book is actually more a regret that Werhane had not tried her fine philosophical, analytical sensibilities on this important area of concern in business and in business ethics.

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PAUL ZIFF. *Epistemic Analysis: A Coherence Theory of Knowledge*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1984. Pp. x + 203. ISBN: 90-277-1751-6.

Ziff's venture into epistemology is, as one would expect, often engaging and provocative; but it is also unsystematic, frequently sketchy, and ultimately unsatisfying. Despite its subtitle, the book does not really offer a developed epistemological theory. What is presented is rather a loose connection of remarks on assorted epistemological topics (mainly on the conception of knowledge itself), on the use of various epistemic locutions in 'Standard North Eastern American English' (SNEAE), and on a variety of other loosely related topics. Despite occasional gibes at 'epistemologists,' there is little reference to the epistemological literature or to most of the standard epistemological issues.

The argumentative style of the book relies heavily, and to a degree which is unusual in very recent philosophy, on appeals to ordinary linguistic usage; indeed, the flavor of the discussion bears at times a remarkably close resemblance to the writings of J.L. Austin (whom Ziff cites in a footnote as a major influence). Thus we are told that Russell's conception of 'knowledge by acquaintance' is objectionable because it is 'utterly bizarre' in SNEAE to claim to have *knowledge* of, for example, a color which one has just experienced for the first time (57). Similarly, it is argued on basically linguistic grounds that belief is not one of the conditions for knowledge; for example: 'One says "He knew at a glance that she was dead," but one does not say "He believed at a glance that she was dead"' (94-5). Readers who are unsympathetic to ordinary language philosophy are likely to find many of Ziff's arguments quite unconvincing.

In what follows, I will consider the two main unifying themes of the work: (i) the claim that knowledge of any sort essentially involves an increase in *coherence*; and (ii) Ziff's rather idiosyncratic account of propositional knowledge.

(i) Despite its ubiquity in epistemological discussion, the concept of coherence is notoriously vague and obscure. But Ziff's discussion seems if anything to increase that obscurity rather than to lessen it. He tells us that coherence has to do with 'logical structure' and stresses the central role of 'the logical principle of identity.' But this principle, never adequately formulated, is interpreted in remarkably diverse ways: sometimes it seems to have to do with the members of a group or series standing in the same relation to one another, while at other points what is at issue is our ability to identify, i.e., pick out, an item of some sort (thus the discourse of a person who mumbles is said to be incoherent because we cannot identify his words [45]).

More seriously still, it is unclear even what the relation of coherence are supposed to be. Coherence is usually taken to be an internal relation among the elements of a person's system of beliefs or cognitive states. Ziff, however, denies as we have seen that knowledge involves belief

(91-5) and does not suggest any other species of cognitive state as a substitute, thus making it doubtful whether on his view there is anything like a cognitive system to which coherence can apply. In some places, he cites the relation of 'conformance' between a true statement and its mind-external truth conditions as an instance of coherence, though the sense in which external, non-conceptual truth conditions, as opposed to descriptions thereof, can stand in *logical* relations is quite obscure.

In any case, Ziff's central claim is that knowing always constitutes an increase in coherence. This thesis is offered as a general account of the meaning of 'know,' one which is supposed to be the common ground between propositional knowledge, i.e., knowing how to do something, and knowing a person or place or thing. But the attempt to extend the concept of coherence to these disparate sorts of cases renders both the concept and its relation to knowledge even more vague and unhelpful. For example, we are told that knowledge in the sense of being acquainted with someone involves an increase in coherence because (a) one can only be acquainted with what actually exists, and (b) existent things are more coherent than non-existent ones (because their existence involves a complex structure of detail which the non-existent does not possess) (126). And learning how to do something is said to increase coherence because it is 'a process in which matters are unified, organized and coordinated' (129). It is hard to see that these two uses of coherence have anything in common beyond the vague idea of some sort of system or structure. Ziff admits that his account of the meaning of 'know' in terms of coherence is 'relatively abstract' (122). My concern is whether an account which would encompass the two foregoing sorts of cases together with the case of propositional knowledge next to be discussed is not so abstract as to be essentially empty.

(ii) According to Ziff, the knowledge that p is the case requires the satisfaction of the following two conditions: (a) p must be true, and (b) the would-be knower must be 'in a position such that, in that position, any possibility of one's being in error with respect to the truth of p may safely be discounted' (119-20).

One problem with this account is the absence of any requirement that the would-be knower believe or think that p . It seems possible that a person could be in a position of the sort indicated and still, perhaps irrationally, fail to accept p — or even accept not p — and it is implausible to ascribe knowledge to such a person. As already noted, Ziff rejects the standard belief condition for knowledge, but the grounds offered there provide no reason for denying that some condition of this kind is required.

A more serious problem is that the crucial second condition is quite obscure: what does it mean to be in a position of the sort indicated? One's first inclination is to treat the condition as something like an evidence or justification condition. But not only does Ziff deny that either evidence or justification is a condition for knowledge (95-101, 188-9), he takes the falsity of p as showing conclusively that the person was not in such a 'safe position' in relation to p (113), which would not be so for any plausible justifica-

tion or evidence condition. If the requirement of being in a 'safe position' is not, however, a matter of the person's evidence or justification, or indeed of anything which would be compatible with the falsehood of *p*, what then does it amount to? Ziff seems to regard the meaning of this requirement as somehow obvious, but I am unable to extrapolate any clear interpretation from the surrounding discussion (which includes an inconclusive account of how to decide when a position is 'safe').

The point just discussed is typical of the curiously elusive quality of the book: seemingly crucial questions are dealt with very indirectly if at all, while tangential matters are sometimes considered at great length. Moreover, the reader is frequently given no clear account of how the topics discussed are supposed to fit together. If assessed by its own standard of coherence, Ziff's book cannot be adjudged a success.

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CLARK ZUMBACH. *The Transcendent Science: Kant's Conception of Biological Methodology*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 1984. Pp. xii + 165. Cloth U.S.\$32.00. ISBN 90-247-2904-1.

This work is undoubtedly a revision of Zumbach's dissertation: 'The Lawlessness of Living Things: Kant's Conception of Organismic Activity' (Rutgers, 1980). At least this assumption helps to explain (although it does not excuse) the neglect of works that have been done on Kant and teleology and/or Kant and Biology since that time. One might reasonably expect references to several later works to be included in a book published in 1984. With two exceptions, the only references to items dated 1980 and later are in the 'Appendix,' which makes no substantive contribution to the argument of the book. The two exceptions are to two of Zumbach's own articles, published in 1981 and 1984. Curiously enough, no mention is made of another Zumbach article: 'Kant's Argument for the Autonomy of Biology' (*Nature and System*, 1981). This latter title would have been a better title for the book.

Zumbach focuses primarily on the *Critique of Judgment*, and more narrowly on Part Two of that work, the 'Critique of Teleological Judgment.' The comments on biology which occur in this section have not been the object of as much commentary as have most other aspects of Kant's work, as the author himself mentions (ix-x). But more work has been done on Kant's doc-

trine of teleology than is recognized here. In addition to the current material already mentioned, there are major omissions among earlier works. For example, two that should not have been ignored are: Silvestro Marcucci, *Aspetti epistemologici della finalità in Kant* (Firenze, 1972); and István Herman, *Kant's Teleologie* (Budapest, 1972). In reviewing the former work, Werkmeister considered it to be perhaps the definitive treatment of this aspect of Kant's thought.

Zumbach does lay out carefully all the elements required to understand how and why Kant refuses to accept the notion that biological organisms can be properly understood in terms of mechanical causal relations alone. The slow and careful style was my primary reason, originally, for assuming that the work was first done as a dissertation. But for this same reason, the exposition is clear and the argumentation is sound. In terms of its structure, therefore, the book accomplishes what it set out to do — in the narrow sense.

The work, however, seems only a fragment of some broader project. Throughout the work, reference is made to contemporary publications on theory of science and scientific method. The various individual elements of Kant's thought are thus related to conceptions of the biological organism in our own period. But these elements are only brought together to provide Kant's ultimate position in the last few pages of the final chapter. And, of course, it is *after* the complete understanding of Kant's position is provided that it can be compared with, and challenged by, more recent theories. Something of this sort would have made a genuine contribution to the topic, and provided an appropriate conclusion to the book. Instead we have an Appendix on 'Leibniz and the Second Analogy,' which would have been more suitably published as an independent article.

A second deficiency is the lack of any deep appreciation of the significance of teleological judgment for the Critical Philosophy as a whole. This should not be understood to mean that Kant's other works are not cited. They are — but not in such a way that we gain confidence in the author's grasp of the material. For example, in Chapter Two, 'The Kantian endeavor,' Zumbach mentions the subject's 'innate intellectual need' to view matters as part of an interconnected whole; and our 'innate interest in viewing things as interconnected' (39). This is hardly strong enough language to express Kant's position that the unity of experience is a logical condition for its very possibility. When, therefore, we find that teleological judgment is an essential condition for the possibility of grasping certain aspects of experience, the issue cannot be seen as simply one more interesting facet of Kant's thought. Rather, it becomes the key to an integrated conception of Kant's Transcendental Philosophy as a whole. Thus, even if Zumbach wants to deal only with Kant's biological methodology, it is inappropriate to neglect the ultimate significance of what his analysis may bring to light. Zumbach seems unaware of the implications of his conclusions. Especially since writers such as Marcucci and Hermann have already shown how teleology broadens the interpretation of Kant's thought, it is no longer appropriate to focus on the issue in so narrow a manner. In effect, therefore, Zumbach's work must be

seen as incomplete, both with respect to the current scene in biology, and with respect to the role of teleological judgment in Kant's system as a whole. Finally, the book is marred by a number of inaccurate references, grammatical errors and misprints. These flaws make the work less useful as a text, or as a dependable guide for the student than it might otherwise have been.

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