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AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

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theology, Rudolf Otto's concept of the numinous, and the development of his thought. The book is divided into three main parts: the first part traces the development of Otto's thought from his earliest days to his final years; the second part examines the concept of the numinous in its various forms; and the third part looks at the application of the concept to various religious traditions. The book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in the philosophy of religion, particularly those who are interested in the concept of the numinous.

PHILIP C. ALMOND. *Rudolf Otto: An Introduction to his Philosophical Theology*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 1984. Pp. x + 172. US\$23.00. ISBN 0-8078-1589-6.

The name of Rudolph Otto has become a household word in philosophy of religion. Even to beginning undergraduates, he is linked with the concept of the numinous, and though they may know no other Latin, the phrase *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* is bound to appear in their essays. As they progress in their studies they encounter Otto again as a key figure in the questions surrounding mysticism across world religions, and, finally, as a major theorist of the concept of religion itself and the relationship between religion and the religions. Yet until Almond wrote this intellectual biography, there was no recent English account of Otto which connected these various facets of his thought and set them within the context of his life.

When a book that fills such a glaring need is written with the skill, lucidity, and painstaking documentation that Almond brings to his account, it is doubly welcome. He writes briefly and to the point, and expounds the central concepts of Otto's thought in a manner which is helpful without being technical. He writes sympathetically, but does not evade apparent conflicts in Otto's thought where they occur, most importantly in the tension between the empirical and the a priori in his claims about religion, though Almond does not quite see how very pervasive a theme this tension is across all Otto's life and work.

In the first chapter, Almond gives an account of Otto's life and career. He was born in 1869 to a strictly pietistic Lutheran family, and it was his education, especially his encounter with Schleiermacher, that liberated him to seek truth wherever it might be found. During his life he undertook several major journeys to encounter other religions, and Almond writes with sensitivity of the religious experiences he had which has a direct bearing on the development of his concept of the holy. This direct experience was interpreted and placed in a rational framework which Otto developed from the Kantianism of Jakob Fries, whose thought in its bearing on Otto is cogently presented in Almond's second chapter.

Almond sees this (with some justification from Otto's own pen) as the locus of the tension between the rational and the non-rational. I suggest, however, that it would be more helpful to see it as an aspect of the tension between the empirical or experiential — which need not be non-rational — and the a priori — which need not be rational! A good deal hangs, of course, on how narrowly one defines the notion of rationality. Otto, by emphasizing the importance of the experiential and intuitive (*Abbindung*) in religious cognition was arguably trying to broaden the concept of rationality so that feeling and faith would be included within it.

This becomes evident in Almond's account of the numinous experience. As he there points out, Otto's notion of the nonrational is not primarily a description of the attitude of the subject but rather a predicate of an object which cannot be thought conceptually. That is, God is nonrational because he cannot be fully conceptualized; but a person's experience of God is not nonrational *qua experience* but only because of the nonrationality of its object. Hence experience of God must be *sui generis* and ultimately ineffable: but this is not because of the nature of the *experience*, as overzealous students of mysticism are wont to suppose, but because of the nature of the God who is its object. Almond's analysis is helpful here, though he might have drawn out its implications more fully.

In the category of the holy the tension between empirical and a priori becomes explicit. The concept of the holy arises for Otto in *sui generis* religious experience and is the source and ground of real religion. Yet cynics can easily point out that this ineffable numen quickly becomes endowed with the traditional attributes of the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition in Otto's thinking. Otto himself was aware of this, and argued for it along Kantian ethical lines: we know a priori, for instance, that the object of numinous experience must be *good*, and indeed the foundation of all values. But this is troubling: can we really rule out a priori the very possibility of a numinous experience of the demonic? And if we can — or if we say that such an experience, if it did occur, could not be the foundation of religion — then to what extent can we maintain the claim that experience is the basis of religion? Otto tries to have it both ways: a doctoral thesis remains to be written on his use of the intuition as a bridge between the a priori and the experiential; and Almond has provided some essential groundwork.

The tension emerges again in Otto's account of mysticism and its crucial role in the theology of religions. The human capacity to experience the numinous is universal, according to Otto, and from this he infers that mystical experience is everywhere the same, allowing for differences of culture and expression, and forms a core of religion on to which are grafted divergent interpretations. Otto's study of Eckhart and Sankara is intended to be an empirical illustration of this claim, and of its corollary that where they do differ (and Otto is not blind to divergences) it is because the Indian tradition is deficient in its concept of the holy. Almond fails to ask the obvious question: if the concept arises from experience, then how can such deficiency be explained? He also ignores the fact that recent detailed studies on Eckhart

and Sankara repudiate Otto's identification, and that the whole concept of a mystical core of religion is having a rather bad press in scholarly work on mysticism. But it would be unfair to blame Almond unduly for what he did not discuss when that which he did discuss is as helpful as this book.

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D.M. ARMSTRONG and NORMAN MALCOLM, *Consciousness and Causality*, Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. 222. US\$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-13212-0); Cdn\$18.75 (paper: ISBN 0-631-13433-6).

This book is one of the two published so far in Blackwell's *Great Debates in Philosophy* series (the other one being *Personal Identity* by Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne). As such, it contains two substantial position papers, the first from Norman Malcolm, the second from David Armstrong, followed by a short reply from each.

Malcolm addresses himself primarily to certain views propounded by Armstrong in his *A Materialist Theory of Mind* and all his references to Armstrong are references to that work. But as the discussion proceeds he considers positions of other prominent writers in the area as well. Much of Armstrong's paper is a direct response to Malcolm's, though it isn't merely that; we are also provided with the outline of a rather comprehensive causal theory of mind. Armstrong begins his piece by presenting his theory as a contemporary materialist rendition of a very traditional interactionism. He then goes on to defend against Malcolm's criticisms the 'inner sense' or proprioceptive model of introspection and its counters to self-intimation and introspective infallibility. This is followed up with a development of the sorts of causal and reductionist views suggested in inchoate form in *A Materialist Theory of Mind*. Dispositions and analogies with physical capacities figure heavily here in the explanation of mental states and intentionality. These familiar views are then refined and augmented to yield a version of functionalism. He finishes with an account of qualities to go with this position, arguing that there are de facto no mental qualities, just qualities of objective physical phenomena.

Of the two, I found Malcolm the more fun to read. Delightfully negative, he is a genuine malcolmtent. W.C. Fields once remarked, 'I am free of all pre-

judice. I hate everyone equally.' Malcolm, too, flicks deprecations at all and sundry, although of course Wittgenstein, who gets a lot of reverential nods throughout (albeit this time no numbered paragraphs), is excepted.

Malcolm begins his piece, letting grammar be his guide, by distinguishing between *transitive* consciousness (i.e., object-taking, as in: 'conscious of ...,' 'conscious that ...') and *intransitive* consciousness (i.e., being conscious but not of anything, which Armstrong tells us later he doesn't believe in) and then proceeds to consider what the relationship of consciousness to its objects might be — or rather, is not. Namely, it is not such as to allow of a 'logical gap between pain and awareness of pain.' (Why do these discussions always focus on pain, anyway?)

So Armstrong's notion of a 'false awareness of pain' — a possibility required by his corrigibility claims — is wrong. But this does not show that the *esse* of pain is *percipi*, for the notion of consciousness as 'inner perception' adopted by Armstrong (and also Locke and Brentano) is itself wrong — indeed, unintelligible in the light of the way we talk about pain and awareness. Nor is there room to manoeuvre by means of a reply that ordinary pain talk is inconsistent (Dennett); that's wrong too. And while we're at it, those philosophers who talk of the 'subjective,' 'qualitative,' or 'phenomenological' character of experience (Nagel, Block, Fodor, Shoemaker) are talking through their hats. Moreover Armstrong and his ilk are all confused about what notion of causality is proper to the mental. (Surprisingly, the proper notion is one which does not assume that X is the effect of Y whenever Y is the cause of X.) Then there's also a claim the plausibility of which the reader may wish to confirm for himself. Say to yourself, 'I am conscious.' Is what you said true or false? (ou) See what I mean by fun? And this is just a sampling.

Naturally Malcolm's philosophical M.O., being of a vintage heavily laced with what-can't-be-said and meaning-as-use presumptions, will not be found as persuasive as it once might have been. But, for all that, it can be quite illuminating to go through the details of Malcolm's criticisms, if only to reassure oneself that one could meet or at least circumvent them if one really wanted to. There's something to be said for nostalgia as well.

Between them the authors indulge in quite a bit of consciousness raising. Malcolm, as already noted, thinks there is intransitive consciousness. Armstrong thinks there are merely intransitive idioms but no intransitive consciousness. (His notion of intransitivity does not seem to match Malcolm's, for he takes 'he sees a horse' to be an example of an intransitive idiom.) Malcolm thinks that transitive consciousness coincides with awareness (so much the worse for the idea that one can be unconsciously aware of something, I s'pose); hence there's no intransitive awareness. Armstrong argues that we are not totally unconscious during REM sleep — there is 'minimal consciousness' then but no 'perceptual consciousness' nor 'introspective consciousness'; sleepwalkers, though, must have some perceptual consciousness to get about. (One wonders, does this mean that a conscious dog is roughly on a par with a sleepwalker, consciousness-wise?)

What is missing in all this, however, is some account of where and how understanding, judgement, propositional knowledge, and conceptualization get hooked up with consciousness, or indeed of whether they necessarily do so. Both Malcolm and Armstrong seem to take for granted the admittedly common view that (transitive) consciousness is epistemic (where I mean 'epistemic' to be suggestive of Dretske's contrast between epistemic and non-epistemic seeing). And that might just be the assumption standing in the way of progress in this area.

This book could happily be used as a text for a philosophy of mind class, whether introductory or advanced. Both writers have a clear, engaging, straightshooting style, and the exposition and criticism is accessible at various levels of philosophical ability. The issues and topics covered are representative of a major area of concern in contemporary philosophy of mind, and there is sufficient detail to allow for special emphases and tangential pursuits in accordance with diverse philosophical tastes.

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ALBERT BORGmann. *Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophic Inquiry*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1985. Pp. vii + 302. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-226-06628-2.

This book deserves credit for directing philosophic inquiry to topics of cultural and social significance in contemporary life. All too many philosophers of the English-speaking world have abandoned the task of critically examining their own civilisation — so conspicuous in the history of philosophy from Plato to contemporary French and German thinkers — in favour of disentangling verbal and logical puzzles. Borgmann analyses the chief characteristics of modern technology and their impact on human life in order to consider how the good life can be preserved and fostered within the context of a technologically based society.

Borgmann's analysis focuses on the fact that modern technology fills the world with 'devices' which we perceive and use entirely in terms of their function without knowing or caring what they are made of and how they operate. (TV sets provide entertainment, electric stoves heat; all we need to know in addition is which buttons to push.) This technology provides us with

powerful weapons to combat hunger, disease and enslavement to mindless toil; it has become the basis of industrial democracy and an important condition for the good life.

However, if technology as an end in itself comes to predominate it empties life of its meaning. Striving for more and more leisure to be filled by the consumption of more and more consumer goods it deprives us of real contact with objects and people. Borgmann contrasts this to pretechnological crafts where a feel for the material and an appreciation of individual customers, is essential, and with contacts with 'pristine nature' which camping, running, flyfishing and the like afford. Borgmann does not consider these things as alternatives to technology but as essential reminders of its limits. Technological aims such as efficiency and a high standard of living can provide the conditions but not the content of a good life.

Essentially I sympathise with Borgmann's aims and conclusions even though I have moments of doubt if we — Borgmann and I — as intellectuals, teachers and writers can really appreciate the boredom suffered and the satisfaction gained within the technological context. Unfortunately I cannot share the blurb's view of the writing as clear and forceful. I find it tiresomely dull which I attribute to two reasons in particular.

Firstly Borgmann tends to use rather abstract terms and an obscure technical vocabulary. For example, one of his key terms is deictic, but it is explained belatedly and insufficiently. The epistemological status of deictic discourse or explanation requires much more clarification than Borgmann provides. The style too is, at times peculiar, and somewhat obscure 'If such speaking comes to pass...' (86) is an example.

The second major obstacle to pleasurable reading, let alone understanding, is Borgmann's obsessive concern to tell us again and again what he has done, what he is doing and what he is going to do. A single page may contain as much as five references to earlier chapters and chapters to come. He also never tires of repeating himself and of telling us that he is doing so. On page 35 he already claims 'as I have said repeatedly' and such phrases as 'as I have said before' are truthfully but boringly inserted into numerous sentences. These cross references and repetitions together with clumsy and redundant sentences like 'Before I proceed to its explanation I need to make a point of caution,' obscure rather than clarify the line of the argument. Is Borgmann over-anxious about his capacity to communicate or was he afraid that without this embroidery there would only be an article and not a book?

It would be unfair, though, to concentrate exclusively on these stylistic failures. From many issues worth discussing I pick two. Borgmann reveals, in my opinion, some lack of political acumen when he lists (on pages 111-12) four reasons why the 'broad middle-class' fails to insist on more equality without mentioning the most obvious one, namely that ensuring equality involves the cost of constant interference with peoples' lives.

My other point concerns the evidence on which this book is based. Nominally about life in advanced technological societies, it reflects largely life in the USA and the views of American writers. Though North America

represents the largest and most advanced technological civilisation, too great a reliance on its experience may distort the picture a little. True Borgmann refers to a few Germans and Frenchmen (Heidegger, Habermas, Ellul) but one wonders if Borgmann, let alone his reader, can appreciate the work of these authors when we are not given even a glimpse of the vast literature on which they drew and to which they responded.

I do not want to end on a sour note. The book reflects the serious concerns of many people concerned with healthier, happier living, an uncontaminated environment and the strengthening of human bonds. It makes points worth endlessly repeating, namely, that affluence is not identical with a rich life, nor pleasurable consumption with happiness.

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DAVID CHARLES. *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1984. Pp. xi + 282. US\$39.50. ISBN 0-8014-1708-2.

David Charles characterizes his examination of Aristotle's philosophy of action as 'represent[ing] Aristotle's discussion as focused, where appropriate, on questions which also interest contemporary theorists, and assessing the philosophical significance of his answers by comparing them with solutions put forward today' (ix). As Charles indicates, he occasionally reaches beyond 'historical scholarship' in developing an '*Aristotelian*' account of a topic, an account 'which may be more detailed and sophisticated than Aristotle's own' (x). His aim is to present Aristotle's position on a certain issue — or an '*Aristotelian*' position, in the preceding sense of this phrase — as a viable or, indeed, preferable alternative to various contemporary positions on the issue in question. The philosophical dialogue of the book is predominantly with philosophers familiar with, and sympathetic to, contemporary analytic, English-language metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and action theory.

Aristotle's Philosophy of Action is divided into three rather distinct parts. The first part (Chapters 1 and 2) is concerned with developing '*Aristotelian*' accounts of the identity conditions of processes and actions and of the 'intentionality' of actions. The motivation for this section is not initially obvious. What Charles has to say about '*Aristotelian*' identity conditions for processes and actions is intelligent and often interesting. But it is far from apparent that

Aristotle was concerned with any philosophical problem that such a theory of 'identity conditions' might be supposed to address. Even a reader sympathetic to Charles' scholarly and philosophical approach may find it necessary occasionally to repress the thought that it is a bit myopic to assume that any action theory worthy of the name must address the issues of the first two chapters of this book. Further motivation for this discussion does come, but not until Chapter 5. Charles' 'Aristotelian' account of process identity plays a part in the formulation of the 'non-identity theory materialism' that he ascribes to Aristotle.

The second section (Chapters 3 and 4) addresses such indisputably central topics in Aristotle's theory of action as practical wisdom, desire, belief, moral virtue, and their interrelations. Although Charles covers some well-tilled ground here, his intelligent, systematic, and thorough but compact discussion constitutes, in my view, a most helpful study of its topic. The classical problem with Aristotle's attempt to explain (voluntary, 'intentional') human actions in terms of the 'value-based reasons' of the agent is that in some cases — those of 'clear-eyed' *acrasia* — the agent apparently does *not* act in conformity with such value-based reasons. Must Aristotle then either (a) abandon the general type of explanation of human action in terms of beliefs, values, reasons, etc. or (b) maintain, with Socrates, that the acratic agent's practical reasoning has gone wrong so that he simply does not reach the conclusion '*x* is the best thing to do here and now'? Alternative (b) seems to amount to the denial of the reality of 'clear-eyed' *acrasia*.

Charles' task, in this second part, is to develop an interpretation of Aristotle's texts that constitutes an adequate and plausible *via media*. I do not have space to do justice to his very careful exposition and argumentation. Suffice it to say that central to his strategy is a distinction between the valuational and motivational elements of practical reasoning. Particularly interesting is his fusion of the motivational *causes* of action and the valuational *reasons* for action in what one might call the 'practical proposition.' The valuational reason is the 'propositional content' of such a practical proposition; the motivational causes (desire, preeminently, but cf. pp. 193-4) constitute something akin to the 'illocutionary force' or, to use Charles' own phrase, 'mode of acceptance' of the practical proposition. Consequently, in Aristotle's

theory it is because desire may have non-cognitive sources ... that clear-eyed *acrasia* can occur, and because it is a mode of accepting a proposition when one's aim is to do what is good that the *acrates* is irrational in accepting decisively a proposition which is not justified by his reasoning. (193)

The third part (Chapter 5) attempts to place Aristotle's philosophy of action within the context of a theory of explanation or 'science' and of an 'Aristotelian' materialistic metaphysics that Charles evidently believes to be, in spirit at least, Aristotle's. Like the second, central part of his book, it is full of philosophical interest, but it is less successful. The problems in Chapter Five

involve several loosely interrelated assumptions concerning causation and explanation.

- (1) A cause, in the most fundamental sense, is a change that (a) (contiguously) temporally precedes its (immediate) effect, (b) yields with 'strict universality' and 'necessitates' its effect, and (c) stands in an *a posteriori* relation (i.e., does not logically or conceptually entail) its effect.
- (2) Aristotle's notion of a 'moving' or 'efficient' *action* ('"whence" the source of change or rest'-'*to hothen hē archē tēs metabolēs ē staseōs*') basically satisfies the conception of (1).
- (3) A 'theory,' in order to be an adequate *explanatory* theory, must ultimately be based on the causal concept of (1). Thus, in principle, such an adequate theory can be formulated in terms of a set of necessary 'covering laws' which, although they are not *a priori*, admit of no exceptions. (It may be the case, however, that because of pragmatic desiderata such as perspicuity — or other considerations of the sort discussed by Charles in Chapter Five, Sections D and E — such a set of exceptionless covering laws does not constitute the 'preferred level of explanation' of the theory.)

All three of these assumptions seem to be rather casually accepted (explicitly or implicitly) by Charles and equally casually attributed to Aristotle. The evidence that Aristotle would have accepted any of them is scant; indeed, according to some recent scholarship, there is evidence to the contrary. I would maintain — but do not have space to argue — that these dubious assumptions underlie two fundamental constituents of Chapter Five of *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action*: Charles' claim that, for Aristotle, '*a priori* explanation' of action (i.e., explanation appealing to 'intentional' states of agent such as his beliefs, goals, values) 'rests on (and requires) the presence of an *a posteriori* causal explanatory story' (206); his claim that Aristotle accepts a form of 'ontological materialism' according to which 'psychological' events/states/processes and 'physical' or 'physiological' events/states/processes stand in an equivalence relation such that in an equivalence class defined by such a relation there will be a set of physical events that non-causally (i.e., 'materially') necessitates the psychological event or events in the class and such that the relata will be 'the same ... but different in essence' (221).

This book is handsomely produced and largely free from misprints and technical errors. One of the few problems of the latter variety pertains to Charles' use of the term 'necessitates' (as in 'causally necessitates' and 'materially necessitates'). He seems to use the term standardly — as connoting the *sufficiency* (in the circumstances) of the 'antecedent' process/event/state of affairs for producing the 'consequent' process/event/state of affairs. But,

curiously, he sometimes uses something of the form 'X necessitates Y' as though it connotes the *necessity* (in the circumstances) of X relative to Y. (See, for example, p. 29 and p. 200, note 4).

In making a general assessment of this book, I should like to 'divide the question' in terms of the three parts of the book that I have distinguished. The first part will be primarily of interest to those philosophers who are concerned with contemporary analytic theories of the individuation of processes, events, and actions. The second part will be of help to all who are interested in Aristotle's theory of action. The final part seems to me to be flawed as an interpretation of Aristotle. However, it challenges the reader to think very carefully both about the interpretation of Aristotle's views on some fundamental philosophical issues and about these issues themselves.

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CECILE CLOUTIER and CALVIN SEERVELD, eds. *Opuscula Aesthetica Nostra: A Volume of Essays on Aesthetics and the Arts in Canada*. Edmonton AB: Academic Printing and Publishing 1984. Pp. 206. Cdn\$16.95. ISBN 0-920980-07-4.

To celebrate the meeting of the Xth International Congress of Aesthetics in Montreal in the summer of 1984 and to introduce the host country's contributions to aesthetics, *Opuscula Aesthetica Nostra* was published under the auspices of two committees, one francophone and one bilingual. The preface speaks of 'our national endeavors,' where 'our' refers to Canada's nationhood and the 's' of 'endeavors' to the division already marked by the fact of two committees and further marked by the essays themselves. Eight are in English, twelve in French. Six of the English essays have appeared elsewhere (five in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, one after *Opuscula* went to press): they are on loan here, testimony to the allegiance of their authors as well as to the homogeneity across English speaking countries of analytic aesthetics, while nine of the French twelve are rooted in Canada and none have appeared elsewhere, in or out of Canada.

The Canadian essays are so-called because tied to Canadian art: four to arts of words: theater, poetry, feminist writing; three to arts of space: paint-

ing and architecture; two to moving arts: music and film. They express and thereby generate excitement, for they are new readings of their subject matter, readings in light of changes rung on Saussurian linguistics by the post-structural turn of the late 1960's, readings that everywhere read/see only language and change. These subject matters are: a 1983 show at the Joliet Gallery in Montreal of paintings by Jean McEven; the 1498 page *Complete Creative Works* of Surrealist writer Claude Gavreau published in 1971; the journey of the Crystal Palace in Montreal from English to French cultural context; a history of the 20 years of québécoise poetry whose latest works manifest magic and symbolism, having rediscovered childhood and 'the great North American silence.'

The list continues, for the French committee presents a panorama of the arts in Canada. The essays severally treat of the diversity of the visual arts, a diversity itself so diverse as to threaten the boundary of the concept of visual arts; two different productions, in 1971 and 1982, of Michel Tremblay's *À toi, pour toujours, ta Marie-Lou* which illustrate the decade's move from the realism and social concerns of the early 1970's to the diversified theatrical landscape of the 1980's; music and Montreal, in an essay whose refrain is 'Who are we?' the familiarity of which to the québécois explains why Quebec is well suited to further the intellectual movement whose characteristic activities are calling into question established identities and exploring other possible ways of constructing the intelligible unities of its time. The necessity of forging an identity in a period of the liberating rejection of identities imposed by an empowered other explains why feminists too are at the forefront of québécoise thought (and partially explains why 7 of the French 12 are by women and only 1 of the English 8). Two of the articles are feminist: one is about feminist writing in Quebec, the other sketches a non-phallocentric conception of the erotic.

Even though 'a great North American silence' may be heard in them, the contributions from French Canada reflect the homogeneity across French speaking cultures of structuralist/post-structuralist aesthetics. This is just to say that Canada has within her borders two schools or styles of intellectual inquiry developed along paths so different — one from Vienna through Wittgenstein, the other from Geneva through Saussure — that although they pass by many of the same places they do not meet. They do not meet in the sense that travelers along the one road take no account of what travelers along the other are doing, but they do meet in the weak sense of both being paths in Canada and being represented by the image, the *mise en abyme*, of Canada that is *Opuscula Aesthetica Nostra*; and they can meet in a fruitful way in the reader of the book who, entertaining both modes of inquiry in the same reading, can let them resonate against each other. The reader in this case is, like Canada itself, privileged to be the landscape within which a contemporary play of ideas is staged.

For example, post-structuralists have claimed that the fact that differences between what were thought to be unities invariably open up *within* them is important for undermining the unities sanctioned by the institutions of

power, sanctioned in the name of God or reality or nature or the structure of the human mind or culture. When in the United States literary theorists at Yale or Johns Hopkins do something other than Anglo-American practical criticism, they are correctly said to have imported a foreign, a French, product, and the prevalence of practical rather than (post)structural criticism is a difference *between* the United States and France. French products are not foreign in Canada, however, and when her philosophers are analysts rather than (post)structuralists, their difference is *within* Canadian aesthetics itself, in whose French wing there are the further differences that some arts declare themselves Canadian, some French Canadian, still others québécois. Each do so with right, which suggests that the very fact of Canada invites description by a language capable of capturing the simultaneous dimensions of space rather than by a language linear and one dimensional, like time, by a language spatial rather than temporal.

Commitment to a priority of the spatial over the verbal/temporal ties together these French works, in which there is, especially in the six longer articles, as much intertextual reference as textual self-identity, exemplifying the theoretical decision to rework the boundaries of received concepts in light of revolutions in thought of the century (here, the concept in play is that of the autonomous article, bounded and defined by its author's intentions). Constance Naubert-Riser in 'Jean McEwen Or the Return of Difference' displaces the paintings of McEwen from the linear, historical project in which modernist criticism had placed them to a circular project by juxtaposing all his series of paintings, letting the repetitions and resurgences of pictorial forms give the lie to the modernist aim and force the constitution of the other measure of time implied by the theory of painting implicit in his work. Similarly, against the received wisdom that the historical fact of the Bolshevik revolution dealt the death blow to the Russian avant-garde, Nicole Dubreuil-Blondin argues in 'The Undermining of Painting' that the seeds of its death were within the work, that is, in the aesthetic choices that the work reflects. In sum, the account of a body of work lies not in its historical relations but in what is not evident at first sight but is nonetheless contained within the work.

The presuppositions and implications of this view are nicely spelled out by Fernande Saint-Martin in 'Aesthetics and Topology' by way of the description of a visual language adequate to the non-Euclidean spatial projections of Malevitch, Lissitsky, and Mondrian. The language is of general interest in that it is a topology, that is, a spatial model of configurations invariant under transformations, and a semiology, that is, sense is defined as position in a qualified space (in and on thousands of other such spaces). The notion of semiological topology is rich enough to accommodate verbal language and Euclidean geometry as special cases, for space is 'a communication with the world older than thought' and is prior to the objects constructed out of it, not, as in Euclidean geometry, defined by the substantial objects it contains. Moreover, spaces themselves are constructions out of the field of energies engendered by the energy carried by the signifying material and by the activity of perception. Visual language, then, does not denote items in a visual

space but items in a linguistic space. It 'represents' while 'producing,' in the strict sense, the energetic processes tied to pre-verbal experience; these energies are both produced by and productive of signification. Spatial models produced by Malevitch and his like 'speak' the pre-verbal energies 'unsayable' by verbal language and Euclid's geometry, each of which privileges objects over energies.

Quebec's contributions to *Opuscula* 'speak' history; one hears in each essay what is new and hears it against the story of what went before. Rotate the horizontal line of history ninety degrees and the resulting vertical is the line of arguments and analyses, deep and shallow, characteristic of the English contributions. They are essays in solving or formulating or clearing the ground for solving problems. For example, the problem of how an artwork can both be self-contained and have been made to refer to a represented object is dissolved by Petra Von Morstein's defining a concept of artistic representation, a representation of the non-conceptualizable element in experience. Artworks can artistically represent non-standard experiences of the conventional ways of experiencing objects; Magritte's paintings and, Von Morstein only suggests but could argue, Wittgenstein's fragmentary remarks artistically represent 'aesthetic' experience, that is, experience of a representation about which it is impossible to decide whether it depicts its object as a particular individual or as a scheme governing the subsumption of particulars under it. By hypothesis this experience cannot be described. Some such hypothesis is deemed necessary by the supposition that were there no aesthetic experience, no experience of the way we schematize the objects of our world, there would be no epistemic access to this way and we would be forever blind to the means whereby we make intelligible the world and our experience of it.

To describe experiences representable only by art would be to bring them under a concept that could itself be made essentially ambiguous with respect to whether it represents the individuals falling under it or is representative of the standard way in which the subsumed individuals are experienced. To stop this play of mirrors it is supposed that art can represent what verbal language cannot: some post-structuralists have let the play go on, others have stopped it with the (assertion of the possibility of) spatial/artistic representation of the body's unconscious experience of space, Von Morstein with the representation of the ineluctable 'what it feels like to me to have experience E.' Here is a signal French-English difference.

Roger Shiner argues for a view of art and the mind according to which expression is an exploration of emotion and an artwork a form of human emotion. This view dissolves the problem of how to decide between theories on which expression in art refers beyond the work and those on which it refers to the work's surface, i.e., between Romanticism and Formalism; for it entails that the opposition is spurious, based as it is on a mistaken model of the mind. Peter McCormick breaches one alleged opposition between artwork and world by articulating a conception of literary works as functional entities that support inferences by a community of readers to warranted moral beliefs

about human action. Relating art not to experience, emotion, or action, but to nature, Allen Carlson argues against the view that there are objective aesthetic judgments about art but not about nature by providing an account of judgments about nature analogous to Kendall Walton's account (in 'Categories of Art') of judgments about art, where natural history and science serve as analogues to art history and criticism, determining respectively what art objects and natural objects are. He argues further that one's ethical attitudes toward nature will be better founded if based on objective rather than on relative aesthetic judgments about nature, and there are, therefore, ethical reasons for breaching this artwork/world opposition. Within a more circumscribed field there are articles on the role of the performer of music according to Eduard Hanslick, the role of art in Kant's ethical hermeneutics, and the question of whether the Enlightenment, for example, actually existed as an historical period.

Finally, and this is the first essay in the book, Francis Sparshott writes a stunning piece, 'What Works of Art Are: Notes Toward a Homespun Ontology,' a string of numbered paragraphs, from 1 to 4.3, passing 3.4131411211 on the way, that begins with the postulate 'Let "onta"' be a general term for anything of which anything may be truly predicated' and ends with a statement of the aim of the inquiry that has just ended. It is not to simplify notions or to locate works of art on a conceptual map, but 'to advance an understanding of the ways in which locations are not to be fixed and notions must be left ambiguous' (21). This last figures as part of a reply to the objection that the concept of a work of art is so open as to resist definition, an objection whose post-structural version is that any concept can be made open by being recontextualized and ought to be so liberated from the contexts privileged by the institutions of power. Sparshott's answer that 'insofar as someone means something by what he says, he imposes an ad hoc closure on even the most gapingly open concepts' (20) follows from the ontology that first posits the existence of people and later of their performances — performances are what works of art are and they are constituted out of systems of *intentions*. Now if one believes that what can be intended is crucially a function of what history and language make possible and what is actually intended on any occasion of speech is a function of subterranean energies that surface under the name 'desire,' then it is hard to give such pride of place to intentions. But Sparshott beautifully conveys a sense of the place whose pride intention is when he writes: 'We must learn to find our way among the ever-open alternatives as we might carry something fragile or spillable through a jostling crowd' (21). The jostling crowd of alternative meaning-imposing theories is precisely the crowd through which French post-structuralists are trying to find their way, and fragile intentions must be carried lightly, for they cannot bear the weight of a world of meaning, even a world of their making. English and French seem not so far apart here.

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JOHN GRAY. *Hayek on Liberty* Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press 1984.
Pp. x + 230. Cdn\$48.75. ISBN 0-631-14159-6.

This book opens with a rather grandiose claim: that Hayek has developed a system of ideas as ambitious as the systems of Mill and Marx, but less vulnerable to criticism 'because it is grounded on a philosophically defensible view of the scope and limits of human reason' (viii). To prove his point Gray sets out to uncover the epistemological foundations underlying Hayek's social and political theories. Hayek's distinctive philosophical outlook derives from an interpretation of Kant's theory of knowledge already visible in his early student elaborations and fully developed in *The Sensory Order* (1952). From pure epistemological premises that determine the scope and limitations of human reason Hayek systematically derives the principles of a social theory supportive of a regime of liberty. The invulnerability and integrity of his system is thus preserved, according to Gray, by postulates 'which are as metaphysically neutral, and as uncommitted to specific conceptions of the good life, as he can reasonably make them' (8).

Gray discerns two moments in Hayek's Kantianism. The first is his recognisable Kantian view that our cognitive faculty, in being denied access to things in themselves, is responsible for organizing the manifold of experience. Our knowledge does not depend on pure, uninterpreted sensations. The order we find in the world, therefore, can only emanate from the mind's organizing activity. In pursuing the sceptical implications of this position, Hayek goes on to postulate the impossibility of an external standpoint which could provide objective support for globalized criticisms or constructive policies. With this Hayek's Kantianism embraces a pragmatic concern which, Gray recognizes, would be hard for Kant to accept. Our knowledge is governed by rules that remain inarticulate and beyond the grasp of our critical faculties. Human knowledge, embodied in rules of action and perception, can only be practical or tacit knowledge. Practical knowledge, entailing the impossibility of a rational critique of our social institutions and the need to abide by our traditions and prejudices, constitutes the central claim of Hayek's epistemology.

Practical knowledge yields the notion of spontaneous order, the core of Hayek's social theory. Ant-hills, galaxies, prices, law and morality can all be explained as self-organizing systems which no directing intelligence has brought about. Constructivist attempts to interfere with the natural development of human institutions (typically, the central planning policies of socialism) are epistemologically impossible and practically disastrous. Given its value-free nature, though, the notion of spontaneous order does not of itself support individual freedom. Aware that an un-restricted economic approach leads to Prisoner's Dilemma situations — 'the maleficent side of spontaneous order in its invisible-hand aspect,' Gray admits (121) — Hayek envisages the rule of law as the ultimate means to curb the state's natural tendency to legislate ex tempore, the stepping-stone to statism and totalitarianism.

Once juridical structures are in place, individual liberty can avoid predatory zero-sum exchanges and engage in peaceful market competition. Hayek dismisses the authoritarian connotation of the notion of order. The spontaneous arrangements he envisages rule out hierarchical lines of command and obedience.

This book's programmatic theme, that 'Hayek's work is to be viewed and understood as a whole' (116), rests on the possibility of bringing the notions of practical knowledge and spontaneous order together. It seems to me though, that Gray's holistic programme remains unfulfilled.

1. Hayek's notion of practical knowledge postulates our inability to formulate all the rules which govern our action. As this is not entailed by Hayek's Kantian epistemology (it conceals a constructivist potential), Hayek's whole epistemological effort is inconclusive. The notion of practical knowledge loses its systematic moorings and thus ceases to be a philosophically defensible view of the limits of human reason. It can be defended only as a polemical notion or as a cogent empirical generalization, very much as Burke supports his views on prejudice. Beyond this one may question Hayek's Kantian limitation of critical reason. A metaphysically neutral and uncommitted stance from which to determine the fact and nature of those limitations seems to me to be unavailable. A limited reason as such cannot give assurances that its limitations, and the closure of rational critical avenues, are non-arbitrary; for it is not an immanent, non-synoptic critique of reason that can set the limits of its critical use. Building a fence implies some knowledge of what lies beyond.

2. Gray's efforts to circumvent the illiberal consequences of the notion of spontaneous order seem to me to be unsuccessful. First of all, it is not *a priori* true that socialism generates statism and ultimately totalitarianism. Apart from the definitional difficulties surrounding the notion of totalitarianism, there is evidence today that socialist experiences (Allende's Chile, Yugoslavia) need not be totalitarian or undemocratic. Secondly, contrary to Gray's claim, Hayek seems ready to accept the development of hierarchical structures within spontaneous orders. The natural selection between rule-following groups necessarily will place the successful ones on top, generating a naturally spontaneous relation of subordination. At no point does Hayek dismiss this elitist consequence. Finally, the tendency of spontaneous orders to devolve into Prisoner's Dilemma situations is not solved once juridical structures are put in place. By Hayek's own definition, a juridical structure can only be a spontaneous order, making it a part of the problem and not of the solution.

It seems to me that Gray's problems are Hayek's problems. In spite of his unquestionably brilliant effort to make systematic sense of a complex and diverse body of thought, Gray has not succeeded in surmounting the philosophical shortcomings of Hayek's position.

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ALISON M. JAGGAR. *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*. Totowa, NJ: Roman and Allanhead 1983. Pp. vii + 408. US\$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7108-0596-9) US\$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7108-0653-1).

There are many different approaches to feminism extant today. Jaggar uses four broad categories to distinguish among them, tracing each form through the political theory she sees at its roots. By exploring various questions from the perspectives of liberal feminism, traditional Marxism, radical feminism and socialist feminism, Jaggar demonstrates the richness and complexity of current trends in feminist thought.

This is a theme she has been pursuing for years, but unlike the anthology, *Feminist Frameworks; Alternative Theoretical Accounts of the Relations Between Women and Men*, co-edited with Paula S. Rothenberg (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, second edition, 1984), here she develops her ideas in some 400 pages of her own densely packed writing. She examines the theoretical and political differences among these four broad approaches to feminist thought, always being careful to inform the reader of her own theoretical preferences (socialist feminist) and critical views.

Such a thorough philosophic review of the theories serves as an important critique of much feminist literature, but also of much of political philosophy generally. By demonstrating the weaknesses of the usual forms of liberalism and Marxism at incorporating feminist concerns and criticisms, she provides a strong challenge to each as an acceptable political theory.

Marxists and liberals would not all agree with her characterization of their thought, however. Just as feminist thought is not monolithic and uniform, but comes in various distinct styles, so too liberalism and Marxism are rich political traditions, and quite elusive when one attempts to pin them down. As a result, the criticism sometimes focuses on general liberal or Marxist stereotypes rather than specific authors. For instance, Jaggar repeatedly accuses liberal feminism of a determination to divide mental from physical realms and then valuing only the former. I think this is an unfair characterization of liberal feminism. Most liberal feminists explicitly reject this analysis, and I can think of none who embrace it. Marxist feminism is never really addressed, for the discussion of Marxism is explicitly in terms of 'traditional Marxism.' But there are many feminists who consider themselves Marxist feminists, not socialist feminist (a much more open-ended conception). It would have been helpful, and more in keeping with the structure of the book, if Jaggar had discussed these authors; they agree that traditional Marxism needs modification to accommodate feminist criticism, and their efforts in this direction deserve acknowledgement.

I have the most difficulty, however, with her discussion of radical feminism, probably because it is the approach I most fancy myself. She has used the category essentially as a catch all for authors that are feminist, and radical, and do not fit readily into any of the other approaches. In fact, I think that something more coherent has evolved in the last few years to stand as

radical feminism. She includes four distinct sorts of approaches under the category of radical feminism, but at least two do not really belong there. The first is the androgyny ideal. Androgyny has long been a matter of interest and concern for all feminists, but it is not a specifically radical feminist concern. In fact, radical feminists have tended to explicitly reject the notion of androgyny as an ideal. It is primarily liberal and socialist feminists that continue to toy with androgyny as a specific goal of feminism. Hence, it seems quite surprising to find Jaggar's criticisms of androgyny being used as grounds for rejecting radical feminism. The second approach she categorizes as radical feminism is that spelled out by Shulamith Firestone in *The Dialectic of Sex*. This book was published in 1970 and has been widely read, and rejected, by feminists ever since. It is indeed a radical book, but it did not begin any movement in feminism. It has been an important book in the debate, but it does not represent a widely held position and hence should be treated as an anomaly and not a central tenet of radical feminist theory.

It is only the third version of radical feminism she reviews which seems properly categorized there. (I see the fourth as a special variation of the third.) This category is characterized as including the theorists who explicitly define themselves as gyno-centered. They value women, their biology, their experience, their culture, their nature. Their theories may or may not explicitly reject male perceptions and values. But this is not the central element of radical feminism. What is distinctive about radical feminism is its view that sexual oppression is the fundamental problem. It underlies all forms of discrimination women experience, and it is more deeply entrenched than any other sort of social oppression, including that based on class or race. Jaggar acknowledges this element of radical feminism but does not focus on it, because she has chosen to examine the theories on the basis of their view of human nature before examining their political commitments.

In choosing to structure the book around a review of each tradition's view of human nature and the nature of women, Jaggar has created some serious structural problems for herself. Since that is the first question by which she examines each tradition, she must define the theories in terms of their view of human nature. But it does not seem that this is the central question by which these political theories distinguish themselves from one another.

Of course, it is an extremely ambitious and somewhat tenuous task to try to distinguish among various approaches to feminism on any single basis, since the various approaches have a way of sliding about and resisting any final neat differentiation. Qualifications and modifications make all distinctions seem rather artificial. But since they are primarily political theories, it would seem far more promising to try to draw distinctions on the basis of political criteria, such as those Jaggar identifies in chapter two as central to any political theory: its vision of the social ideal, its view of the existing society, and its strategy for getting from the existing state to the ideal. Her point is that a theory's view of human nature is also a political question; that seems true, but it is not the political question that distinguishes among these variations of feminism.

Relying on the more elusive question of the theory's view of human nature and of the role of sex or gender as the principal ground for distinction is far more problematic, since this is a question that cannot be readily answered for radical feminism or for socialist feminism. Hence, it proves extremely difficult, and ultimately unsatisfying, for her to distinguish between radical feminism and socialist feminism. Often it seems that she simply assigns to radical feminism the elements of feminism she dislikes, and reserves for socialist feminism the ones she prefers. In fact, one of the most frustrating aspects of the book is that her criticisms of well-defined theories are often quite powerful, but when the reader reaches the positive theory Jaggar wishes to endorse, socialist feminism, the theory becomes quite vague and amorphous.

Such vagueness is unavoidable, however, for the theory is just developing and much detail remains to be filled in. Jaggar has produced a very valuable book in providing such a comprehensive and systematic review of current feminist thought. She cannot be held responsible for the rapid shifting of ground now occurring in the field as new approaches are developed.

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JOSEPH J. LEVY et HENRI COHEN, dir., *Darwin après Darwin*, Québec, Presses de l'Université du Québec 1984, 220p. Cdn\$17.95. ISBN 2-7605-0358-5.

Ce livre, publié sous la direction de deux professeurs du département de sexologie de l'Université du Québec à Montréal, regroupe des textes y ayant été présentés (sauf un) lors d'une journée d'étude multidisciplinaire tenue en décembre 1982. Ils proviennent de spécialistes de diverses disciplines: psychologie, sexologie, biologie, sociologie, sciences de la terre, sciences religieuses, urbanisme et philosophie.

L'article de Jacques Beaugrand, 'Modèles de dominance et théorie de l'évolution,' est le seul traitant principalement d'éthologie. L'auteur y donne huit caractéristiques de l'établissement de la dominance dont une est particulièrement intéressante. La dominance sociale (structure hiérarchique) est établie suite à des duels ou à un tournoi entre membres du groupe, or, 'l'ordre d'occurrence des duels ou leur séquence lors d'un tournoi conduisant à l'établissement d'une hiérarchie est fondamental' (127). Ceci, qui fait penser

au paradoxe de Condorcet, découle, en partie, du fait que l'expérience sociale antérieure est un facteur majeur déterminant l'issue d'un duel, '... le fait d'avoir bénéficié d'une expérience de dominance quelques heures avant une rencontre augmente la probabilité de dominer à nouveau [et inversement]' (120). Beaugrand omet toutefois de mentionner que si tel est le cas, cela limite l'utilisation pouvant être faite de la probabilité pour X de dominer Y comme 'proxy' du degré d'adaptation relatif de X et de Y. L'auteur montre quand même les autres difficultés d'un tel rapprochement et souligne avec justesse que néanmoins, 'cette première approximation est intuitivement valable pour suggérer des développements théoriques' (130). Il conclut en rendant compte des 'avantages' de la dominance et donc de sa plausibilité à l'intérieur du cadre constitué par la sélection naturelle de façon classique bien qu'on se trouve à la frontière entre la sélection individuelle et la sélection de groupe.

L'article de Robert Nadeau, 'Problèmes philosophiques actuels du darwinisme,' constitue un très bon compte-rendu de la problématique entourant l'interaction des critères de démarcation et de l'évaluation devant être faite de la valeur des différentes formes du darwinisme. Nadeau choisit comme premier protagoniste Popper. Pour ce dernier, le néo-darwinisme est fondamentalement non testable, non prédictif, *ad hoc* et non nomologique. On serait par conséquent malvenu de le qualifier de scientifique. Puis, entre en jeu la question du 'covering law': l'explication par 'covering law' est-elle nécessaire, et si oui, le néo-darwinisme dispose-t-il de ce type d'explication? Nadeau souligne avec raison qu'il s'agit de voir clair dans ce que le néo-darwinisme affirme réellement. Une fois ceci établi, on voit que ces critiques perdent beaucoup de leur force. D'ailleurs, Popper lui-même est très peu à l'aise sur le terrain de la biologie. Tout tourne ici autour de la question de la disponibilité de l'information (sur les conditions initiales, sur les mutations, etc.). Cela est important, parce que finalement le critère de falsifiabilité en est justement un où l'information disponible est déterminante. Les disciplines ayant des 'carences' à ce niveau ont tendance à tomber dans ce que Katouzian nomme le 'story telling.' Nadeau aborde ensuite la question de l'objet de la biologie: ne serait-il qu'un phénomène unique? Dans un tel cas, aurait-on affaire à une 'science provinciale' ou encore, comme J.J.C. Smart le pense de l'écologie des populations, ne serait-on pas en dehors du domaine de la science? Nadeau conclut qu'une fois tout bien pesé, il faut se méfier des conclusions hâtives. D'ailleurs on retrouve dans ce dernier débat certains préjugés issus de l'influence déterminante des théories physiques sur le développement de l'épistémologie.

Serge Robert, dans 'L'héritage de Darwin dans la science contemporaine: la crise du programme de recherche darwinien,' brosse un portrait de l'évolution du programme de recherche darwinien à partir de sept thèses de Darwin. Une telle entreprise est toujours sujette à caution, étant donné l'absence de critère de rationalité instantané ainsi que l'évaluation nécessairement teintée des diverses sous-composantes d'un programme de recherche, des chercheurs pouvant articuler différemment les mêmes thèses. L'auteur considère que le programme néo-darwinien n'a pas modifié le 'hard core' du darwinisme

original puisqu'il a constitué en (1) l'opérationnalisation de thèses darwinien-nes, et, (2) le rejet de l'hérédité intermédiaire et de l'hérédité des caractères acquis qui faisaient partie de la ceinture protectrice du programme de Darwin.

L'auteur aborde ensuite les étapes du développement du néo-darwinisme en soulignant, à juste titre, les apports récents aux théories classiques (pléiotropie, neutralisme, sélection dépendante et indépendante de la densité de la population, etc.). Robert, considérant ces apports comme des 'contestations,' juge que le programme est l'objet d'une crise profonde quoiqu'il ne soit pas falsifié. Il souligne avec raison que '... chaque chercheur, à partir des limites de ses recherches spécialisées, ne s'oppose à la tradition darwinienne que sur un point précis, ce qui l'autorise de son point de vue à continuer à se considérer comme darwinien' (190). Etant donné cette situation, l'évaluation globale est, certes, difficile. Celle de Robert fait appel à trois remises en question du 'hard core': (1) la présence de processus concurrents à la sélection naturelle (écologiques ou biogéographiques); (2) la présence de processus concurrents au niveau génétique (la sélection naturelle aurait moins de 'prise'); (3) l'abandon par les ponctualistes de l'hypothèse gradualiste. Pour notre part, nous hésiterions à les qualifier de remises en question du 'hard core.' Dans le premier cas, il faut noter que la présence de processus concurrents à ces niveaux ne remet pas en question la valeur de la sélection naturelle, mais son importance dans la dynamique globale des populations. D'ailleurs on retrouve de tels processus chez Darwin (en particulier au niveau écologique, dans une forme du principe d'exclusion compétitive). Dans le troisième cas, il faut noter que Gould a admis qu'on trouve certaines séquences graduelles au niveau paléontologique, et que, de toute façon, le gradualisme était une hypothèse auxiliaire déjà abandonnée par T.H. Huxley, et que sa remise en question vise plutôt l'attitude dogmatique de certains néo-darwiniens que le noyau même de la théorie. Le deuxième cas relevé par Robert pourrait aussi, avec plus de difficulté toutefois, être contourné de la même façon que le premier.

L'évaluation de ces trois remises en question comme étant des remises en question du 'hard core' néo-darwinien n'est donc pas évidente quoique défendable. Une critique plus fondamentale du noyau nous semble être celle de Gould, Lewontin, et, dans une certaine mesure, d'Oster et Wilson, sur l'utilisation de modèles d'optimisation. Celle-ci pourrait éventuellement entraîner l'effritement du noyau du programme néo-darwinien, de l'écologie des populations et de l'écologie des systèmes, et même du noyau de l'économique (micro et macro). Car, comme se plaisent à le souligner ces auteurs, si l'analyse par modèle d'optimisation est un puissant outil heuristique, elle constitue aussi dans les disciplines souffrant d'incapacité intrinsèque au niveau de l'obtention des informations requises (conditions initiales, variations des variables exogènes, ...) un puissant instrument immunisateur, créateur *ad nauseam* d'hypothèses *ad hoc* salvatrices. Cet aspect est également relevé par Claude Saint-Denis et Philip Ehrensaft dans l'article 'le néo-darwinisme dans

les sciences sociales' où ils traitent de la sociobiologie, en reprenant les principaux points de vue de Thuillier, et de la micro-économique.

L'article de Olivier Soubeyran, 'L'environnement, Darwin et la géographie' propose une thèse hardie: Darwin aurait réduit au minimum l'influence de l'environnement et aurait ainsi provoqué une isolation de la géographie. Le darwinisme serait structuré horizontalement, à partir d'une sociologie minimale et d'un rapport organisme-organisme plutôt qu'un rapport organisme-milieu, qui pourtant occupait une place importante dans l'Esquisse de 1842. Soubeyran y voit l'influence de Malthus. Cet article soulève des questions intéressantes, et l'auteur y défend plusieurs idées assez nouvelles.

Des articles plus courts abordent d'autres thèmes: 'Darwin géologue' (Yvon Pageau), 'Darwin: fin d'une cosmologie religieuse et début d'une science du religieux' (Louis Rousseau), 'La place de la sélection sexuelle' (André Bergeron et Joseph Levy), 'Le néo-darwinisme: mythes et réalités' (Douglas Boucher). On y retrouve aussi une bonne introduction de Henri Cohen. L'ouvrage contient des articles intéressants et diversifiés qui reflètent les multiples problématiques soulevées par le darwinisme.

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JEAN-FRANCOIS MALHERBE, *Epistémologies Anglo-Saxonnes*, Namur, Presses Universitaires de Namur, Presses Universitaires de France, 1981, 206 p., (avec bibliographie, index et table analytique). ISBN 1-87037-074-1.

Dédicacé à Jean Ladrière 'discret et prévenant enseigne de la pensée en chemin' (7), cet ouvrage tire origine de cours dispensés en 1973 et 1975 aux étudiants en philosophie des Facultés Universitaires de Namur ainsi qu'à ceux de l'Université de Paris VII. Il est composé, à l'exception du chapitre IX qui est inédit, d'études antérieures déjà connues, certaines étant cependant moins accessibles que d'autres, soit sept articles publiés dans la *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* entre 1973 et 1981, un Mémoire de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de Louvain datant de 1972, et enfin le texte d'un séminaire de philosophie des sciences biomédicales publié pour diffusion restreinte en 1978 par le Centre de Philosophie des Sciences de Louvain-la-Neuve. Retouchés ou réécrits, les textes ici réunis conservent leur allure délibérée

d'ouvrage d'introduction et leur orientation pédagogique. On s'explique mal cependant que cette révision n'ait pas amené l'auteur à approfondir quelque peu les questions importantes ou, à tout le moins, à éliminer les redites. Cela dit, le livre est bien construit, facile d'accès, et nul doute qu'il constituera pour les débutants en philosophie ou les non-spécialistes un instrument relativement efficace et populaire pour s'initier à moindre frais aux questions complexes de l'épistémologie contemporaine. Reste à savoir si ce qu'ils y apprendront les outillera adéquatement. Or, si le livre n'est pas complètement dépourvu d'intérêt, il ne saurait cependant recevoir tout le crédit qu'il aurait pu mériter.

S'il s'agit bien d'épistémologie, comme on va maintenant le découvrir, on ne voit pas pourquoi l'auteur a insisté, après avoir intelligemment opté pour en marquer l'essentielle diversité dans le titre de son livre, pour accoler à ce mot mis au pluriel l'épithète un peu trompeuse d' 'anglo-saxonnes.' Va pour Russell, Austin, Strawson, Searle, Quine et Rescher, mais plus difficilement pour Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein et Popper, malgré que ces trois derniers philosophes aient fait carrière en pays de langue anglaise, puisqu'ils ont écrit, sinon tous, du moins plusieurs de leurs textes importants en allemand. C'est une erreur historique que d'assimiler automatiquement, comme plusieurs le font encore, ce qu'ils appellent, en faisant fi des différences marquées entre les diverses phases de ce courant aussi bien qu'entre ses différentes figures, *philosophie positiviste* et *philosophie anglo-saxonne*: car, l'empirisme (le positivisme) logique doit plutôt être considéré comme une philosophie allemande d'origine.

Cela dit, Jean-François Malherbe appartient pour sa part à cette nouvelle génération de philosophes belges comprenant, entre autres, Hottois et Meyer, (Malherbe est né en 1950), eux qui ont Parret pour aîné et qui suivent la génération à laquelle appartient Paul Gochet (né en 1932). Son livre est composé de trois parties distinctes comportant chacune trois chapitres. En première partie, nous retracons 'La quête du langage parfait,' d'abord avec un premier chapitre consacré à G. Frege au cours duquel la distinction entre sens et référence des propositions se trouve cernée, puis avec un second sur B. Russell exposant pour l'essentiel le contenu de 'On Denoting', et enfin un troisième chapitre qui présente les vues de R. Carnap, avec références curatives à l'*Aufbau* ainsi qu'à la *Syntaxe logique*. Malheureusement, certains des objectifs explicitement visés par l'auteur, et poursuivis plus particulièrement dans ce troisième chapitre, ne sont pas atteints: entre autres choses, celui ou celle qui s'attend à trouver ici, tel qu'annoncé, référence aux textes discutés par Malherbe et disponibles en traduction française n'apprendra pas (57, n.25) qu'il en existe une de 'The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language' ('Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache,' publié originellement à Leipzig dans *Erkenntnis* vol. 2, 1932, pp. 219-241, a été traduit en français par le général Ernest Vouillemin sous le titre 'La Science et la métaphysique devant l'analyse logique du langage' et publié avec une introduction de Marcel Boll à Paris, chez Hermann et Cie, 1934, dans la collection Actualités scientifiques et industrielles, no. 172). Il ou

elle ne verra probablement pas non plus que, quand il s'exprime en mode formel, Malherbe devrait écrire le 'cinq' de la phrase 'Cinq [sic] n'est pas un nom-de-chose, mais un nom-de-nombre' (64) entre guillemets, coquille malencontreuse s'il s'en trouve dans ce genre de phrase et pour laquelle l'éditeur a autant sinon plus de responsabilité que l'auteur. Du reste, la conclusion du même chapitre est hâtive et ne paraîtra pas bien étayée puisque rien jusque-là ne permettait de penser 'que l'échec du positivisme viennois est significatif de l'irréductible résistance du langage ordinaire à l'encontre des essais visant à le logifier, à le purifier de ses imprécisions, de ses ambiguïtés et, finalement, de la subjectivité des locuteurs.' (66)

La deuxième partie examine ce que Malherbe appelle 'Le renversement du logicisme.' Mais alors que ce terme a un sens technique très précis dans la littérature spécialisée, puisqu'on nomme ainsi la thèse de la réductibilité des concepts mathématiques aux concepts de la logique, thèse soutenue par Frege et Russell en particulier, 'logicisme' s'entend ici assez bizarrement comme la 'doctrine philosophique qui accorde à la logique une place prépondérante' (67). Les chapitres IV et V sont employés à présenter les 'premier' et 'second' Wittgenstein: on y suit d'abord, de manière assez détaillée, le déploiement du *Tractatus*, et si la chose est en général bien faite, on regrettera néanmoins d'y trouver le nom de Fiegl (sic:75), on déplorera l'orthographe adoptée pour nous parler du 'principe d'extentionnalité' (77), et on sursautera enfin devant l'affirmation suivant laquelle Popper fut non seulement antipositiviste mais explicitement anti-empiriste (78). Le Wittgenstein des *Investigations* est correctement mais très succinctement présenté. Cependant, tout le monde n'appréciera peut-être pas l'échange imaginé entre Newton et le Petit Prince (107 et s.), surtout au vu de la relative banalité du message de Saint-Exupéry selon Malherbe selon lequel 'le jeu de langage le plus authentiquement humain est celui du Petit Prince et non celui des grandes personnes' (109). Le sixième chapitre articule en une synthèse bien menée les principales avancées théoriques de J.L. Austin, P.F. Strawson et J.R. Searle, passant en revue la distinction entre phrase et énoncé, la notion d'acte de langage et le réaménagement de la théorie de la référence dont nous sommes redevables aux deux derniers. Mais le prétendu rejet de ce 'logicisme', qui semble plaire à notre auteur et le rejoindre dans l'une de ses motivations philosophiques importantes, vient d'une lecture tronquée de l'histoire récente des doctrines épistémologiques. Car s'il est exact de dire que le second Wittgenstein est plus loin de la logique formelle que ne l'était le premier, il importe néanmoins de voir que le développement de la philosophie du langage ordinaire ne mène pas tout droit à un rejet du traitement formel du langage commun. Certes, la chose semble vraie des travaux d'Austin, mais elle l'est déjà moins avec ceux de Searle, compte tenu que ceux-ci mènent à ceux de Vanderveken en logique illocutoire. Un peu plus d'intérêt pour la logique eut empêché Malherbe de parler du 'si ... alors' comme du 'signe matériel d'implication' (129), tout comme un peu plus d'attention portée au style l'eut amené à renoncer à utiliser le verbe 'asserter' (130) ou encore à dire de quelqu'un qu'il a 'posé une assertion fausse' (133). On dira que tout cela n'est que peccadilles, mais peut-être les petites erreurs

en sont-elles de grosses dans un livre sans prétention et qui, au demeurant, s'adresse d'abord à un public de lecteurs moins avertis.

La troisième partie de l'ouvrage veut manifestement nous amener à jeter un regard sur cette philosophie prétendument libére des entraves du positivisme et de son attitude 'logifiante.' Assez paradoxalement, elle s'intitule 'Vers une logique de la systématisation cognitive' et elle concerne trois auteurs réputés entre autres pour leur contribution à la logique contemporaine: comme on sait, Popper s'est énormément intéressé à la déduction et s'est même permis d'amorcer un développement en sémantique probabiliste qui aura des suites remarquables dans les travaux d'Hugues Leblanc entre autres; Rescher a commencé sa carrière avec ouvrages consacrés à la logique arabe; et quant à la contribution de Quine à la logique, nul n'osera contester qu'elle fut exemplaire à plus d'un titre. Mais ça n'est pas là ce qui intéresse Malherbe. Le chapitre VII se donne pour objectif d'exposer le rationalisme critique de Popper, son réfutationisme, sa critique des thèses carnapiennes et son concept de corroboration. Quelque peu obsédé par son parti pris central, Malherbe pense avoir montré, contre Popper, que 'ce dont ne peut rendre compte le rationalisme critique, c'est que quelque chose d'autre que la pure logique intervient dans les procédures qui règlent le développement des connaissances scientifiques.' (155) Popper qui, depuis plus de cinquante ans maintenant, met l'accent en épistémologie sur une *logique de situation*, n'en a sûrement jamais douté. Malherbe eut-il été moins abusé par son préjugé qu'il aurait pu s'occuper à des choses plus importantes, et, par exemple, prendre la peine d'expliquer ce qui fonde Popper de prétendre qu' 'il est logiquement impossible que la philosophie soit, comme le voulait Carnap, la syntaxe logique de la science unifiée' (140), argument apparemment appuyé sur les travaux de Tarski et de Gödel: un simple coup d'oeil à la réplique de Carnap (cf. *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*, P.A. Schilpp ed., La Salle, 111., The Library of Living Philosophers vol XI, 1963, p. 880) fait voir que Popper commet ici une bourde tellement grosse que Carnap ne prend que quinze lignes pour remettre les choses à leur place: à quoi bon, dès lors, ramener un argument poppérien absolument nul et non avenu? Et un travail plus minutieux l'eut amené à indiquer que l'ouvrage *Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis* (145, n. 17) n'est pas de Mme Sandra Harding mais constitue plutôt un collectif dont elle a dirigé la publication. Le chapitre VIII présente pour sa part la 'théorie quinéenne' (157) — suivant l'usage terminologique inorthodoxe de Paul Gochet dans *Quine en perspective*. Quiconque a lu cet excellent livre verra tout de suite que Malherbe suit de très près l'analyse de Gochet. Mais évidemment, Malherbe tourne les coins ronds. Il a le don de dire incorrectement des choses vraies, par exemple: 'Elle (la thèse de la sous-détermination des théories) affirme, en effet, que si nous disposons [sic] de toutes les observations possibles, nous ne serions pas encore assurés qu'il n'existe qu'une seule théorie capable de les systématiser.' (164). De plus, il semble prendre un malin plaisir à mal orthographier le jargon technique ('extentionnalité' (167) cette fois-ci avec deux n). Il se permet enfin de passer sous silence des informations essentielles pour le lecteur visé, comme celle de

l'existence en traduction française du texte de Quine intitulé 'The scope and language of science,' traduction que l'on retrouve dans l'anthologie de Pierre Jacob pourtant signalée dans la bibliographie. Quant au chapitre IX, il fait fond sur 'la systématisation cognitive,' concept mis en place par Nicholas Rescher en 1979 mais qui se trouve présenté ici de manière beaucoup trop rapide pour que la chose soit réellement utile à qui que ce soit. Fidèle à son habitude, Malherbe ne signale pas où il était le plus naturel de le faire (180, n. 13) l'existence de la traduction française du texte quinien certainement le plus connu et cité 'Two Dogmas...' (mais il se reprend dans la bibliographie, p. 194), pas plus que celle de *Erkenntnis und Interesse* de J. Habermas (185, n. 20).

Tout compte fait, on ne peut s'empêcher de reprocher à Jean-François Malherbe les nombreuses simplifications que comportent ses analyses, le manque de minutie de plusieurs de ses informations bibliographiques, et surtout le manque de rigueur de maintes affirmations, comme quand il soutient que 'la dénotation est une relation sémantique dont le terme est en référent' (31, n.7) sans avoir identifié l'autre terme ou les autres termes de cette relation comme s'il n'y en avait pas, ou simplement l'apparente nonchalance avec laquelle il s'exprime, quand, par exemple, parlant de l'étendue de la classe des énoncés empiriques qui supportent une hypothèse scientifique donnée, il en vient à parler de l'«étendue» du contenu de ces mêmes hypothèses (140). Par contre, on lui saura gré d'avoir dénoncé (92, n.1) la très mauvaise traduction des *Investigations* par Klossowski (Paris, Gallimard, 1961), aussi bien que les inexplicables coupures du texte de la traduction française de *The Open Society* (193). Ne nous le cachons pas cependant, on aurait pu s'attendre à davantage: Jean-François Malherbe aurait dû retravailler beaucoup plus ses divers textes et articles préalablement publiés pour en faire sortir un livre plus soigné et moins superficiel. Dans ce livre expéditif, les rares remarques critiques sont adressées à Paul Gochet, lecteur de Quine, plutôt qu'aux philosophes étudiés eux-mêmes. Certes, Malherbe eut une bonne intention car, contrairement aux mauvaises habitudes contractées par d'autres chez les éditeurs français, il ajoute un index. Cet index se veut même, parfois, un glossaire puisqu'il est censé renvoyer 'pour les différents auteurs étudiés, aux définitions et principales occurrences des termes techniques utilisés le plus couramment par ceux-ci.'(12) Comment comprendre alors qu' 'analytique' y soit défini ainsi: 'se dit d'une proposition où l'attribut est nécessairement compris dans le sujet. S'oppose à synthétique.' (197)? Valait-il vraiment la peine d'exposer les analyses de Carnap ainsi que les critiques de Quine concernant la distinction entre l'analytique et le synthétique pour en revenir banalement à la dichotomie kantienne? On s'en doute, le reste est le plus souvent à l'avenant (voir en particulier les prétendues définitions d'«axiome» ou encore d'«empirisme»). Si bien que, il faut le constater, tout accessible qu'il soit, cet ouvrage n'est pas suffisamment adéquat pour constituer l'étude introductory qu'il aurait voulu être.

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CHARLES J. McCACKEN. *Malebranche and British Philosophy*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. xiv + 349. Cdn\$71.25. ISBN 0-19-824664-1.

It is about time some one wrote on this subject. Since Ralph Church's *A Study of Malebranche* (London 1931), and A.A. Luce's *Berkeley and Malebranche* (Oxford 1934), it has been evident that many of the views of the leading 18th century British philosophers looked like views of Malebranche, and were, at least in part, derived from Malebranche's writings. Major works of Father Malebranche were translated into English at the end of the 17th century, and not printed again in a new translation until a couple of years ago. Some historians of philosophy have mentioned Malebranche as the last of the Continental rationists and a significant influence on Berkeley and Hume, but in the Anglo-American world Malebranche has remained a minor side figure in the development of Cartesianism, not worthy of examination in his own right. Some recent analytic historians of philosophy have run across some of his views, and acted as if they had found a hitherto unknown philosopher worthy of further investigation.

Of course the French always knew better. Malebranche has been one of the major figures in their tradition. His complete works, edited by André Robinet, appeared in twenty volumes between 1958 and 1968. A street in the Latin Quarter has been named for him. Texts of his major works have been available all along, and many important studies of the man, his writings and his influence have been written in France, Germany, Italy and America. What has been lacking is a detailed systematic study of Malebranche's historical impact and influence on the English speaking world. McCracken ably fills this need, covering everything from the first signs of knowledge and interest in Malebranche's views from the time his works appeared, through the 18th century, covering up to Thomas Reid and his disciples. McCracken has also added an interesting appendix on 'Malebranche in Colonial America.'

After starting with an introductory picture of how excited people at the time were both on the Continent and in England with Malebranche's theory, McCracken begins in earnest, first setting forth a 90 page exposition of the philosophy of Malebranche, and then considerations of British philosophers who reacted to, or were influenced by Malebranche, from John Locke to Thomas Reid and his followers.

As McCracken observes near the end of his study, 'British philosophy is sometimes supposed to resemble British geography in its insularity.' (314) This was not true in the Middle Ages nor in the Renaissance and the 17th century. Italian Platonism influenced English Platonism. Montaigne influenced Bacon. Descartes and Gassendi's ideas were known to Hobbes, Locke and Newton. And, apart from Malebranche, the cross-fertilization across the English Channel went on throughout the 18th century. Bayle was studied by most British thinkers, and Locke was important to the *philosophes*. This process has gone on up to the present with the impact of Wittgenstein and the

Vienna Circle on English philosophy, and the impact of various English movements on the Continent up to the present moment. Hence there should be no surprise in McCracken's thesis, and his material, especially since Malebranche, with his Platonized and Augustinian version of certain Cartesian views, had a theory that would appeal to the still surviving Platonic tradition in England. John Norris, Thomas Taylor and Arthur Collier, each in his own way, advanced Malebranchian views. Taylor translated Malbranche's *Recherche de la Vérité* and *Traité de la Nature et de la grâce* into English in 1694. Collier followed out some of Malebranche's ideas in both their English and French forms into a theory of immaterialism. Malebranche's popularity in England was such that Joseph Addison said in 1700 that 'I visited the Père Malbranche, who has a particular Esteem for the English Nation, where I believe he has more admirers than in his own' (quoted on p. 2.).

Though Malebranche was a Catholic theologian, he was easily taken to heart by Anglican clergymen from Norris to Berkeley. Locke was so impressed by the importance of Malebranche's views, that he planned to add a chapter to a new edition of the *Essay* refuting him. The refutation however was only published posthumously in 1706.

McCracken carefully examines Locke's answer both to Malebranche and to Norris' exposition of Malebranche. Leibniz was sufficiently aroused by Locke's answer that he wrote his own 'Remarks on Malbranche's Opinion that we See All Things in God, with Reference to Locke's Examination of It.' Locke's answer deserves serious consideration to see how Locke's empiricism differs so completely from Malebranche's rationalism, and yet how Locke's views were modified in the face of occasionalism and Malebranche's formulation.

Turning from the opposition, McCracken gives us a detailed exposition of the theories of Norris, Taylor and Collier, who popularized Malebranche's views in England and probably made them so important for Berkeley. The section on Collier is also important in making clear that Collier's immaterialism and Berkeley's could, and most likely did develop independently, though they were both presented to the public at almost the same time. Collier and Berkeley had similar sources in Malebranche, Bayle and Norris.

The most interesting chapters of the book are on Berkeley, Hume and Reid, each of whom made no secret of their debt to the French Oratorian. Berkeley was labelled the Irish Malebranche, and the 'Malebranchiste de bonne foi.' The influence of Malebranche on the young Berkeley is most evident in his *Philosophical Commentaries*. Yet Berkeley was at great pains to insist that his immaterialist system was not just that of 'seeing all things in God.' McCracken argues that Berkeley pressed Malebranche's points to a more radical conclusion, denying any material world, and insisting on the efficacy of finite spirits or powers, independent of the absolute unlimited power of God. Some of the irresolvable difficulties in Berkeley's views, come, according to McCracken, from the fusing of Malebranchian views with Berkeley's own conceptions of ideas, spirits and God, and Berkeley's daring originality.

Hume indicated his *Treatise*, Book I, was to be understood in terms of Malebranche's *Recherche*, Berkeley's *Principles*, Bayle's *Dictionary*, and Descartes' *Meditations*. The influence of Malebranche is clearest, of course, with regard to Hume's analysis of causation. McCracken shows how Malebranche's theological explanation of causality got transformed into a psychological theory in Hume's hands. Hume and Malebranche were alien thinkers, yet many central points in Hume's analysis are close to those of Malebranche. Hume's naturalism then transforms Malebranche's Augustinian theology and theosophy into something the Oratorian would never have dreamed of.

Reid saw Malebranche as having given the most minute examination of the powers of the human mind, better than any one before him. Malebranche had seen the fateful pitfalls in the ways of ideas, and had proposed a new theory of perception. Reid, using some of Malebranche's solution, had proposed his own common sense realism. McCracken ably compares and contrasts Reid and Malebranche. Because of Reid, Malebranche continued to be studied in Scotland into the middle of the 19th century.

The brief appendix on Colonial American knowledge of Malebranche provides interesting material, especially on Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Edwards.

McCracken's study is much needed, and is very well done. Berkeley, Hume and Reid scholars may quarrel with him about some of his interpretations of these authors, in which he has stressed perhaps more Malebranchian themes than have hitherto been recognized. I would argue that there are other possible sources of some of these Malebranchisms, in Bayle (who is often discussed by McCracken), in Bishop Huet and other sceptical writers. This will be a most useful work for all of those interested in 18th century English philosophy, and hopefully, will help overcome some of the insularity in interpreting its development.

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IZCHAK MILLER. *Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1984. Pp. xiii + 205. US\$22.50 ISBN 0-262-13189-7.

As well as being, as the title indicates, a straightforward study of Husserl's views on perception and temporal awareness, this book is something of an *apologia* for the phenomenologist's way of prosecuting philosophy. Miller

speaks briefly to the advantages of the phenomenological approach in the final chapter, after having shown it profitably at work in the preceding seven. He succeeds in producing a book that should be of considerable interest to non-phenomenologist philosophers — using a minimum of Husserlian technical jargon, giving helpful footnotes to terminology of importance for understanding phenomenology but not central to an understanding of the specific issues dealt with here, referring to well known 'analytic' sources when it facilitates understanding, formalizing the results of his analyses, and giving a very meaty and helpful overview of the kind of philosophical reflection, and its purpose, that is peculiar to phenomenology. It will be of interest to professional philosophers wanting a clear and responsible introduction to this philosophical perspective, to phenomenologists wanting a deeper understanding of Husserl's views on perception and temporal awareness, and indeed to anyone with a serious interest in those concepts.

Miller is well aware of the danger of claiming to give the correct account of Husserl's position on anything, given the incredible bulk of Husserl's production, his continuous philosophical growth, his dauntingly convoluted style, and his regrettable reluctance to spare posterity his unsuccessful research notes. Miller acknowledges from the outset that his is only one of a number of possible readings of the relevant texts. He succeeds easily, I think, in showing that his reading is viable, and that it yields an account of perception and of related concepts that is consistent, fairly well filled out and, if not simply true, among the best of those presently available to us.

The following is a coarse summary of a very subtle book. Chapter One sets the framework by explicating the concept of intentionality, the root concept of phenomenology. The positions of Brentano and Meinong on the relational character of intentionality, on whether perception of the physical world is direct, and on 'existence' as a logical predicate provide a foil for Husserl's views. Miller argues that if we understand Husserl's notion of intentionality in a way consistent with the Dagfinn Follesdal analysis of noema (wherein 'noema' is understood as much like 'meaning' — *Sinn* — in Frege's semantic theory), we can construct a theory of intentionality free of the defects of the theories of Brentano and Meinong.

The second chapter presents Husserl's analysis of perceptual intentionality as distinct from a form of judgment. The distinction is worked out in terms of the different logical forms of the noematic *Sinne*- the noematic *Sinn* of a perceptual act is a singular meaning (understood along the lines of an individual concept in Alonzo Church's logic), whereas that of a judgment is a proposition. A perceptive analysis of judgments which 'contain' perceptual experience provides the foundation for an analysis of the concept of experience, and for a certain disassociation of experiential and judgmental acts. This is developed in detail in the third chapter, and issues a canonical formulation of a first person perceptual act description. Much else is accomplished along the way: a.) we get a careful study of the phenomenon of misperception (which introduces the consideration that temporality may be ingredient in perceptual experience); b.) there is a strong argument for there being an in-

dexical element in any perceptual act, without which we cannot explain misperception and illusion; c.) there is an account of indexical multiplicity, which is necessary to explain perception of groups. This latter point paves the way for a discussion of the implications of the fact that perception of any X is *in situ* and this conditions the nature of perceptual experience.

The fourth chapter builds on the discovery that temporal awareness is necessary for understanding that a multiplicity of perceptual acts has an identical object. Protention and retention, the primary subordinate concepts in the concept of temporal awareness, are finely analyzed and related to the Husserlian notion of horizon. 'Horizon' covers the network of recollections and expectations at work in perceptual experience. Nowhere is Miller more subtle and intricate than here in his discussion of the congruence (a notion of semantic entailment which he borrows from Jerrold Katz) of the noematic *Sinne* associated with these patterns of recollections and expectations. He concludes this part of the study by extending his canonical formulation of first person perceptual act descriptions to incorporate the idea that the (purported) object of such acts is experienced as *enduring* at the moment when the act occurs.

The second half of the study builds on this suggestion that neither intentionality generally, nor perception specifically, can be adequately understood without taking into account their temporal character. In Chapter Five Brentano is again used as a foil against which subsequently to view — rather, to reconstruct — Husserl's position on temporal awareness. This, because Husserl's rejection of Brentano's account conditioned his own. The sixth chapter focuses on Husserl's crucial example — the experience of perceiving a melody. This is analyzed with reference to what is only superficially a more simple case — the experience of perceiving a tone. Here, in correlation with the position developed in the third and fourth chapters (where he analyzed the structure of a temporally extended act in which an object is continuously experienced as being 'the same'), Miller inquires into the structure of an experience of a *process* which is temporally extended beyond the present moment. This results in the schematization of the description of a perceptual act in which a melody is heard. It is an excellent sample of well wrought phenomenological work. The description schematized is not complete (in phenomenology, fully adequate description is best seen as a regulative ideal, rather than as a reality), nor is it perfect (the crucial description of the constitution of a tone is not entirely convincing). It is nonetheless very good description.

The following chapter, Chapter Seven, lays out the idea of temporal awareness of the passage of events. 'Retention' and 'protention' come in for even closer study. This provides the foundation for a later discussion of how the same elements that are at work in our awareness of the changing temporal perspectives of external events are at work in our sense of the continuity of our own acts. Ultimately they play a crucial role in constituting our sense of personal identity. Here and elsewhere Miller calls attention to the fact that all these descriptions are descriptions of *phenomenological* facts, i.e., of the

features which characterize our *sense* of moving through time and of commerceing with objects that endure in time. They are metaphysically neutral, saying nothing whatever about what is 'really' the case.

The penultimate chapter concerns the idea of the specious present. Its evolution is traced out of Wundt through W. Stern and Adolf Grunbaum (who attempts to rehabilitate the James/Whitehead version,) and it ends with C.D. Broad, whose position seems to Miller to be the most tenable. Husserl's position is shown to bear certain similarities to Broad's but to be superior to it, particularly in virtue of grounding what Broad merely presupposes — that whatever is presently sensed stretches back behind the present moment.

The final chapter is devoted mainly to a very clear and compact presentation of the nature of phenomenology and of its method of reflective observation. It concludes by claiming, against a very common misunderstanding of the nature of phenomenological idealism, that it is indeed an idealist standpoint, but a purely epistemological one completely devoid of metaphysical commitments. Husserl came to regret his use of 'transcendental idealism,' precisely because it invites such misunderstanding. This point is hardly new but it is well to make it again. Phenomenology's methodological acsesis of ontological considerations has many distinct advantages. The approach ought to recommend itself to, e.g., those presently engaged in the realist/anti-realist debate. Husserl offers quite compelling reasons for systematically avoiding such controversies.

In sum, this is an admirable book. The only philosophers whom it might fail to impress might be those phenomenologists who disagree that this approach to Husserl (an approach common to Follesdal, D.W. Smith, R. McIntyre, H. Dreyfus, et al) yields a highly coherent and useful reading of Husserl, albeit not the only one.

The only thing that I would like to have seen added to the book would be a discussion of the role that textual exegesis plays in the practice of phenomenology. Both Miller and Husserl use such exegesis to superb effect apparently without compromising a theory of method which seems to exclude it.

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RICHARD NORMAN. *The Moral Philosophers — An Introduction to Ethics*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. 257. (Cloth: ISBN 0-19-875060-9); Cdn\$14.25 (paper: ISBN 0-19-875059-5).

This is an historical introduction to ethics but not, Norman says, a history of ethics. The book is divided into three parts. Under 'The Ancients' he discusses Plato and Aristotle, under 'The Moderns' Hume, Kant, Mill and Bradley, and under 'Contemporary Themes' Marxism, psychoanalysis and, much more briefly, such recent contributors to academic moral philosophy as Stevenson, Hare and Foot. The Ancients and The Moderns are linked by a chapter on the problem of egoism and altruism, which provides a recurrent theme in the book. Plato and Aristotle are represented as 'moral egoists.' Neither of course reduces the virtues to self-interest 'in any straightforward and obvious sense,' but in that they recommend the virtuous life ultimately on the grounds that such a life is the most rewarding and fulfilling kind of life, their moral theories have an unduly self-centred emphasis. This is to be explained largely by their failure to develop a satisfactory account of 'the role of social relations in the life of the individual.' When we come to The Moderns, this same deficiency is found to be pervasive. Because of the Christian context within which they write, Hume, Kant and Mill are advocates of the ethics of altruism, but, Norman convincingly argues, their impoverished treatment of the social dimension of human life leaves them without sufficient resources to defend their altruistic ethics.

A proper appreciation of the significance for ethics of social relations has to await the Hegelian ethics of self-realization. The chapter on Hegelian ethics is in fact devoted mainly to Bradley, Hegel's own philosophy being deemed too formidable an undertaking for the beginner. The term 'self-realization' may suggest the same sort of 'moral egoism' for which Plato and Aristotle were criticized, but Norman points out that for Bradley the self to be realized is a self to which relations to others are *internal*. Only if my relations to others are 'a part of my own identity' can genuinely disinterested concern for others be exhibited as rational. Thus while Mill, for example, has to argue (fallaciously) from egoism to altruism, the Hegelian is able to show that the very dichotomy between egoism and altruism is misconceived.

Norman is by no means an uncritical admirer of Hegelian ethics of social relations. One concern is that if moral notions are inescapably rooted in a network of loyalties and commitments to *particular* others, there may be no way of extending them to the 'universal humanitarianism' of a Kant or a Mill. In the concluding chapter it is however suggested that given a Bradleyan conception of self, an argument from consistency can take us as far in the direction of universal morality as we need to go.

A second worry about Hegelian ethics of social relations and self-realization is that when actual social relations are 'defective or corrupt' genuine self-realization will not be achieved by entering into them. Bradley himself seeks to resolve the difficulty by appeal to religious notions, but Norman prefers instead to search for conditions for genuine self-realization from a naturalistic standpoint. It is largely in pursuit of these that Marxism and psychoanalysis are explored. These movements of thought introduce elements necessary for a satisfactory theory of human needs and interests which are absent from traditional moral philosophy.

The main components of Norman's naturalistic ethics are then social relations and needs. He insists on the irreducibility of each category to the other. Moral demands can arise from *actual* social relations, whether or not these are the best kind of social relations for the realization of the good life, and so conflict may be inescapable. Norman however thinks that the resolution of such 'incommensurable conflicts' is a process more of *discovery* than arbitrary decision. The thought is not much explored, but it is in this way that Norman would hope to hold onto a tenuous objectivity in face of the diverse social and psychological elements which should properly go into our moral judgements.

Richard Norman's book is written with freshness and clarity. His accounts of the authors he deals with are, where I am qualified to judge, sensitive and fair. His criticisms of them are succinct, cohesive and lively. And they are always constructive. Although the book is described as 'an introduction to ethics' it should be of value to advanced students of the subject as well as to beginners.

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DEREK PARFIT. *Reasons and Persons*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. xv + 543. Cdn\$49.95. ISBN 0-19-824615-3.

Everyone familiar with the recent course of Anglo-American moral philosophy appreciates just how much Derek Parfit has contributed to it. Yet prior to 1984 a list of his publications would have mentioned only some dozen or so essays. How could a philosopher with such a relatively scant output have been so influential? Part of the answer is supplied by the quality of these essays, whose characteristic analytical acuity has been justly celebrated. But much of Parfit's influence has travelled along less public routes. For years he allocated a great deal of his time to appraising work in progress submitted to him by other philosophers, while soliciting similar scrutiny of his own drafts. Participants in this *samiszdat* network soon learned to admire the high standard both of his criticisms and of his unpublished work. They also came to realize just how little of his material was in the public domain.

With the appearance of *Reasons and Persons* Parfit's underground corpus has become accessible to everyone. The topics of the book are the topics of

the earlier essays — rationality, personal identity, consequentialism, and future generations — but Parfit's handling of them has been improved in two important respects. Each topic, considered in isolation, has now been given much fuller and more satisfactory treatment than before. Both as a record of Parfit's views on these matters and as an approximation to the truth about them the book has rendered the essays obsolete. (They will, of course, retain historical interest as stages of development.) In addition, the book fills in connections among these topics which were either nonexistent or underdeveloped in the earlier essays. Indeed, one of the most impressive accomplishments of *Reasons and Persons* is the way in which it plots the relations of attraction and repulsion among the various positions possible on the issues it addresses. In this respect, although the book defends no particular moral methodology, it provides a nice instance of the practice of reflective equilibrium.

In virtue of both its length and the density of its argumentation *Reasons and Persons* imposes a considerable burden on the reader. Compared to the great treatises in moral philosophy, such as Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics* for which Parfit has great respect and with which his own work has many affinities, the range of this book is really quite narrow. Like a small-scale map of a limited domain, what it lacks in scope it delivers in intricacy of detail. A good mind applied to these issues for a decade or so will, of course, uncover many of their complexities. As if this were not enough, however, the finished product shows every sign of having been subjected during composition to intense critical scrutiny by the members of Parfit's philosophical underground. When you add to this mixture a nearly obsessive determination to address every imaginable objection and explore every possible alternative the result is likely to daunt the most dedicated student of the field.

The reader's task is not made lighter by a style whose transparency has been achieved by stripping it of all the ornamentation and filler which ordinarily allow us to relax our concentration from time to time. Ceaselessly, relentlessly, Parfit just keeps pouring the arguments on. He does, however, offer one concession to our attention span. The main text, which is divided into four parts and twenty chapters, is further subdivided into 154 bite-size sections. Since exposure to more than thirty pages of this book at one stretch can induce acute intellectual disorientation and numbness, I suggest that readers take full advantage of these natural breaks. If the book is parcelled out over a few days (or weeks) then it is possible to keep both the large picture and the fine details in view at the same time.

A book of this length and density is, perforce, difficult even to summarize in a short review. Parfit's overall project is to compare the merits of some competing normative theories — both theories of rationality and theories of morality. The contenders in the first category are the Self-interest Theory (which tells me that I always have most reason to do what would best promote my own interest), the Present-aim Theory (which tells me that I always have most reason to do what I most want to do at that time), and Morality (which tells me that I always have most reason to do what would be morally

best). Parfit's arguments here attack the Self-interest Theory and defend the Present-aim Theory. He first asks whether the Self-interest Theory is self-defeating. After distinguishing between being directly and indirectly self-defeating, Parfit concludes that while the Self-interest Theory is self-defeating in both ways, this is not a defect in it and thus no reason to reject it.

What reasons are there, then, for rejecting it? Parfit offers two. The first trades on the nature of the opposition between the Self-interest Theory and its two rivals. Both the Present-aim Theory and Morality dispute the central contention of the Self-interest theory, namely that any other desire I might have would be less rational than the desire to promote my own interest. Parfit contends that some other desires I might have — such as the desire to promote the interests of others even at some cost to my own — would be no less rational than the desire to promote my own interest. In order to avoid this criticism the Self-interest Theorist must maintain (contrary to Morality) that reasons are relative to persons, while also maintaining (contrary to the Present-aim Theory) that they are not relative to times. The Self-interest Theory is thus a hybrid which is exposed to attack from both of its pure rivals. Parfit argues that it cannot survive that joint attack. He argues further that the defeat of the Self-interest Theory is the victory of the Present-aim Theory, which even moral theorists should accept.

The other reason for rejecting the Self-interest Theory also concerns the temporal neutrality to which it is committed. The Self-interest Theory claims that it is irrational for me not to be equally concerned about all the parts of my future. Parfit defends the Reductionist View of personal identity which centres on relations of psychological connectedness and continuity. He also argues that in certain special cases in which these relations hold between a future person and me there is no right answer to the question whether this person is identical to me, and further that what should matter to me in such cases is the holding of the relations rather than the question of identity. If these relations are what should matter to me then it will not be irrational for me to be less concerned about the more remote parts of my future with which I am presently less strongly connected. But then temporal neutrality cannot be a requirement of rationality, contrary to the Self-interest Theory.

Meanwhile, on the side of moral theories Parfit focusses both on the rivalry between Consequentialism and Common-Sense Morality and on the rivalry among the various forms of Consequentialism. Consequentialist theories are distinguished as a class by their agent-neutrality. Once again the first issue to settle is whether such theories are self-defeating. Parfit argues that, like the Self-interest Theory, Consequentialism is indirectly self-defeating but this is no defect in it. On the other hand, being directly self-defeating, which is no defect in a theory of individual rationality, would be a defect in a moral theory. While agent-neutral moralities cannot be directly self-defeating, agent-relative moralities can. Thus Common-Sense Morality, which is partly agent-relative, is damagingly self-defeating. At the end of this discussion Parfit sketches a possible rapprochement between Consequen-

tialism and Common-Sense Morality which is designed to correct for the different sorts of self-defeatingness of which each is susceptible.

In a well-known earlier essay, Parfit tried to plot the affinities between theories of personal identity and moral theories. He returns to this issue in *Reasons and Persons* at the end of his treatment of personal identity. The effect of the Reductionist View is to make both the unity of a single life and the separateness of different lives less deep. Parfit argues that its acceptance should therefore alter both the scope and the weight which we assign to distributive principles. It will expand the scope of these principles by applying them not only to whole lives but also to the parts of a life. In this respect it will make the principles more important, thus weakening the case for the purely aggregative form of Consequentialism, namely Utilitarianism. But it will also reduce the weight of the principles by reducing the significance of the boundaries between lives. In this respect it will strengthen the case for Utilitarianism. Parfit concludes that the net effect of accepting the Reductionist View is to render Utilitarianism more plausible. This does not, however, constitute a decisive case in favour of the theory.

As a final test of adequacy for forms of Consequentialism Parfit applies them to population problems. Distinguishing among three different varieties of population problem, Parfit urges that we should accept a moral theory only if it yields no highly counterintuitive solutions to any of these problems. Parfit calls the theory which satisfies this requirement Theory X. He then tries out various candidates for Theory X, showing that each of them handles at least one kind of problem ineptly. At the end of the discussion Parfit continues to believe that there is a Theory X, though he has been unable to locate it.

This brief overview can do little to convey either the complexity of the several issues addressed in this book or the intricacy of their interconnections. How well has Parfit handled this daunting tangle of problems? In my opinion, better than anyone else in the field. Indeed, on some of the smaller questions I believe that he has said the final word. Surely, for example, no philosopher will any longer venture to defend the Social Discount Rate or the Share-of-the-Total View about the consequences of actions. The larger questions are beyond the power of any philosopher, however persistent and acute, to settle decisively. In most cases Parfit claims to have done no more than make a case in favour of one view over another, and in some he claims only to have made a case in favour of suspending judgment. However, on all of these issues it can be fairly said that any future treatment of them which takes no account of Parfit's work can safely be ignored.

Unfortunately the text is marred by several misprints, and a major discontinuity at pp. 193-4. However, neither these defects nor the more substantive burdens which the book imposes on the reader, should deter anyone in the field from acquiring it.

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RICHARD SCHMITT. *Alienation and Class*. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenckman Publishing 1983. Pp. xi + 230. US\$18.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87073-497-0); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87073-498-9).

The basic thesis of *Alienation and Class* may be stated quite simply. Alienation is a modern phenomenon. It is 'the unnecessary blocking of human fulfillment by a social order which allows wide play to individual liberty while depriving its members of the power to make full use of these same liberties' (ix). An adequate account of such a thesis, Richard Schmitt tells us, would fulfill four tasks: a) propose ways of coping with alienation; b) provide a correct diagnosis of the causes of alienation; c) help readers to articulate their own experience of alienation; d) acquaint readers with the large variety of forms in which others experience it (viii). Though the implications Schmitt draws from his account are radical, e.g., the necessity of overcoming capitalist society, this is not the shrill book of an ideologue. On the contrary, it is a rather personal book, one with a modest, even quiet, tone.

The strength of Schmitt's book lies in his response to the third and fourth tasks. At great length through the second, third and fourth chapters he lays out three central forms of alienation: lack of self, loneliness, and meaninglessness. The thrust of these chapters is not so much to contend with other analyses of alienation but to provide a convincing description of various forms of alienation. It is impossible to characterize briefly the richness and suggestiveness of Schmitt's account in these pages. Among the various particular forms of alienation he discusses are the lack of self-identity, fragmentation, specialization, isolation, stereotyping, and boredom. These are contrasted with other experiences, conditions and values such as separateness, intimacy, privacy, community, and freedom. Schmitt's account is both valuable for its insights, as well as provocative in a number of its details. It should serve others well as a jumping-off place for reflection on their own experiences.

Schmitt's handling of the first two tasks he notes is more questionable. Indeed, the task of proposing ways of coping with alienation is fulfilled only very briefly and vaguely. It consists largely of rather general suggestions such as that one should take responsibility for one's own life, avoid deceiving oneself, and seek to change the class nature of society. Though worker control and the elimination of the market are mentioned, the role of unions or various revolutionary groups is not. In short, Schmitt's proposals are more ends to be sought, rather than ways or means for satisfactorily dealing with alienation. Schmitt says he seeks to 'weld the historical approach of the Marxist tradition with the self-understanding of the Existentialists' (xi). It is clear that the existentialist part of Schmitt's Marxist-Existentialist union comes to the fore here.

More problematic, however, is Schmitt's account of the nature and causes of alienation. Alienation arises, Schmitt contends, not because various human needs or individual life goals remain unfulfilled but because of conflicts and tensions in modern, market society. This is signalled in the very definition of alienation: the social order allows wide play to individual liberty while depriving its members of the power to make full use of these same liberties

(ix). In brief, capitalist society extends to individuals great freedoms while at the same time withdrawing from those individuals the power to realize such freedoms. Individuals have acquired liberties to act on their own, yet they must sell themselves according to the market by which they are rendered virtually powerless. As such, individuals experience an unnecessary blockage of their own fulfillment.

Now if fulfillment requires having the powers and abilities to exercise historically developed freedoms, it becomes crucial to know what those liberties are and what their relation to human fulfillment is. If such liberties are the traditional ones, they include the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, to own property, etc. But surely given Schmitt's view that alienation arises due to capitalist society he cannot rest content simply with advocating that individuals have the powers and abilities to exercise these freedoms, since it is the exercise of these freedoms, e.g., individuals right to private property, which has led us into capitalist society and the alienation Schmitt describes in the first place. Further, Schmitt gives us no account of the relation of such traditional liberties and human fulfillment. Inasmuch as Schmitt attempts to give a modified Marxist account of alienation and contemporary society, and since Marx seems to be dubious of bourgeois freedoms and rights, it would seem appropriate to address this relation. The worry is that if human fulfillment is not *wholly* captured by that condition to which individuals would come if they had the power to exercise these traditional freedoms, then Schmitt cannot simply characterize current alienation as due to conflicts between traditional freedoms and the market. This could have negative implications for his analysis of the class and market basis of alienation. Finally, Schmitt does not address the question as to when human fulfillment is *unnecessarily* blocked. It is clear that there are such cases. But how are we to recognize them? Indeed, if capitalism is a necessary stage in the development of socialism, then might Schmitt's own account imply, contrary to what he holds, that there is no current alienation since all human fulfillment is *necessarily* blocked?

In conclusion, I would note that Schenkman ought to be ashamed of itself for the job it has done in producing this book. There are many pages in which there are lines which appear to underline the text and in which the text blurs off into the margins. On page 113 there is a line without print followed by a reproduction of the preceding line. The 'top' of page 153 occurs at the middle of the page. Whole pages appeared to have been patched and taped together before being photocopied. Surely this book deserved better attention from its publisher! Hopefully its readers will give it the attention it deserves.

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R.W. SHARPLES, trans. Alexander Aphrodisias' *On Fate*. London: Duckworth 1983. Pp. ix + 310. £24 (cloth: ISBN 0-7156-1589-0); (paper: ISBN 0-7156-1739-7).

Besides being a welcome addition to classical scholarship, this volume is a genuine contribution to philosophical studies either on Alexander himself or on the freedom-determinism debate. In most cases of text-translation editions, a reviewer's concern is directed primarily to the work of the translator or editor and not to the merits of the original text. It seems appropriate to follow this pattern in the present case and thus the following considerations are aimed at providing potential readers/purchasers of the work a picture of the layout of the book and the merits of its various features.

The bulk of the work consists of a translation of the *Peri Hermeneias (De Fato)* of Alexander. This is supplemented by translations of excerpts from the *De Anima libri mantissa* (XXII-XXV), some *Quaestiones* (II,4; II,5; III,13), and some very short selections from Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*. The selections we find in the mantissa are treatments of Fate, luck (*tyche*) and 'what depends on us' (*to eph' hemin*). It is this latter issue which is dealt with in the *Quaestiones*, while the short selections from the *Topics* (comprising little over a page) contain brief references to various aspects of the controversy. All of these texts are produced in the original and translated; the translations precede the Greek texts which are located in the second half of the book. Textual critical notes, the bibliography, and indices follow the texts themselves. The Greek text is photographically reproduced from the I. Bruns' edition in the *Supplementum Aristotelicum*, vol. 2 in the *CIAG*. However, the text of the *Topics* commentary is simply printed from a Greek typescript of the passages, creating thereby a slightly uneven quality in the text section. The text of the Bruns' edition is unaltered save for the asterisks appearing occasionally in the margins; these mark a reference to the critical notes where the author indicates his choice of an alternate Greek reading (either of his own or another scholar's proposing). An improved Greek text with a running English translation on facing pages would have been preferable, but the cost of this must have been prohibitive. Cost was probably also the determining factor in the production of the critical textual notes — all of them are typewritten in Greek and accompanied by the editorial Latin remarks in Roman script. The bibliography which follows the critical notes is a good one including both ancient and contemporary authors and in this latter grouping are cited some of the previous writings of Sharples on this topic and related ones. There are two indices, one giving the cited passages and the other, a general index, including both subjects and authors. The first half of the book contains a lengthy introduction, a synopsis of the text, the translation of the texts, and a chapter by chapter commentary on the text. No doubt these are the sections which will be of most interest to philosophers and it is here that the value of the publication for English speaking (and reading) philosophers essentially lies.

The introduction deals with the historical dimensions of the problem of 'determinism and responsibility' both in Alexander and in the writers prior to him. Sharples shows a good knowledge of secondary literature on the Hellenistic period and gives extensive footnote documentation which will be helpful to a reader interested in pursuing points raised in the book. There is, however, not much discussion of the authenticity of the texts themselves. Sharples does express doubt about the texts other than the *De Fato*, but the reader may feel that some consideration of the authorship of the *De Fato* itself is well warranted. The suspicion that the text might not be original is only an *a priori* one — it seems not to match the quality of some of the other works attributed to Alexander. The argumentation is frequently redundant, e.g., appeal is made repeatedly to the pragmatic problems arising for the determinist. Moreover, the more complex logical and metaphysical issues that arise in connection with the 'determinism-responsibility' problem seemed to be ignored. Now this may be explained by the fact that the book was addressed to Roman emperors who most likely would not be sensitive to these more abstract issues. Nonetheless, at least some comments about this aspect of authorship would be helpful.

In the commentary itself the author's notes highlight the historical aspects of the points raised in the text and his utilization of some distinctions from contemporary analytic philosophy (e.g., hard-determinist, soft-determinist) in presenting Alexander's own doctrine is genuinely helpful. However, he does not utilize the present discussion as much as he profitably could. If one compares his explorations to those of Sorabji in *Necessity, Cause, and Blame* (a work which Sharples regrets appeared too late to be integrated into his own remarks), this becomes evident. Perhaps in the end this hardly matters, since Alexander's text does not contain a really profound analysis. The historical notes clarify Alexander's argumentation against the backdrop of the Stoic developments in the problem and thus show how Aristotle's position fares in a determinist universe quite different from the one envisioned by the Stagirite in the 4th century B.C.

The translation itself is well-done; by considering various alternate readings, Sharples usually comes up with a text that he then translates into readable English. There are, however, a few points at which a different translation or phrasing would be preferable. For instance, on page 49, line 31, he renders the Greek as, 'the finding of the treasure happened as the [accidental] end of that [action].' However, a rendering of the Greek term '*ekeinou*' as 'of that other man' would make better sense of the contrast to the treasure seeker mentioned earlier in the sentence and it would also eliminate the dubious bracketed insertions. This would yield, 'the finding of the treasure, as it was the end of the other man, happens to the one acting for the sake of something else.' Occasionally good English style is needlessly violated as on p. 93, l.15-17 where both a relative and personal pronoun function as the same object. The author's use of brackets can lead to confusion, for these are used sometimes to indicate his insertion of a phrase to make the translation more comprehensible (68), sometimes to indicate that the Greek term

translated is itself bracketed in the critical text (197, text p. 191, I.2). Sharples seems to indicate a distinction between *tīnos* and *tinōs* at 167.26 but both appear as *tinōs* in his note. This may be a typographical error. There are other typographical errors as well. 'Responsibility' occurs repeatedly (10, 22, 55); 'persue' instead of 'peruse' (42); 'gives' instead of 'given' (147). On the whole, however, the work is a fine achievement; a few errors in a work of this complexity are not surprising. One can only hope that the academic financial scene will improve so that books of this sort will acquire a more unified printed appearance.

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IRVING SINGER. *The Nature of Love*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1985. Vol. 1 *Plato to Luther*. Pp. xiii + 381. US\$20.00 (ISBN 0-226-76094-4); Vol. 2 *Courtly and Romantic*. Pp. xv + 513. US\$25.00 (ISBN 0-226-76096-0).

Irving Singer's three-volume study of philosophies of love from the ancients to the present is now two-thirds completed. There is little doubt that it is already the most comprehensive and learned survey of the subject in English. It is also very readable — gracefully composed, genially imaginative and intelligent and encyclopedically well-informed. But it has significant weaknesses. It is almost exclusively Western in its knowledge and orientation, though purporting to be a work on philosophy of love as such. It is wholly ideological in its concern, indifferent throughout to the evolutionary and sociohistorical facts and powers within which the turbulent reality of personal love has occurred over 2500 years. And, finally, it so avoids exposing the undergirding principles of traditional romantic and religious love — for example, its patriarchal structure and presuppositions — that one could be forgiven for thinking that Singer is philosophically disconnected from the real world.

Singer's first volume begins with the thesis that his entire work implicitly or explicitly holds to throughout — that the 'source of love is not God or the libido [or any other objective cause]: it is rather ideas about love' (xii). 'In being primarily bestowal and only secondarily appraisal, love is never elicited by the object in the sense that desire or approbation is ... When love happens, it happens as a new creation of value ...' (13). 'Love [is] above all an artifact of

the human imagination' (22). 'That love might be a way of bestowing value upon the object, taking an interest in it regardless of how good or bad it may be — this conception is as foreign to Aristotle as to Plato' (90). This theme is followed in volumes 1 and 2 as an explanatory as well as normative touchstone for Singer, in particular in his long sections on Shakespeare and Stendhal, and is the basic unifying idea of his study.

Singer is, however, much longer on explanation and exposition than hypothesis and original generalization. The greatest virtue of his two-volume work is its range of imaginative and lucid interpretation of what others have said about love. At the risk of a list, I report here in sequence the main thinkers and topics he covers in his two books. Volume 1 Part I The Concept of Love (Freud and Santayana) Part II Love in the Ancient World (Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Ovid, Lucretius); and Part III: Religious Love in the Middle Ages (Augustine, Aquinas, Gregory of Nyssa, St. Bernard, Richard of St. Victor and detours on Hindu philia and Old Testament nomos, all within an overall type-schema of eros, philia, nomos and agape). Volume 2 Part 1: Humanism in the Middle Ages (Courtly Love, the Troubadours, Andreas Capellanus, Heloise and Abelard); Part II: From Courtly to Romantic (Petrarch, Dante, Neoplatonism, Shakespeare, Puritanism); Part III: Types of Romantic Love (Rousseau, de Sade, Stendhal, Kant, Hegel, Shelley, Byron, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Wagner).

This outline does not cover the full scope of Singer's treatment. Other thinkers whose works he refers to with considerable acquaintance are Paul, St. John of the Cross, Donne, Ficino, Descartes, Racine and Spinoza.

Despite this great scope of treatment, Singer leaves vast gaps in his exposition by his Eurocentric focus. There is nothing or almost nothing here of the enormous and richly variegated Hindu tradition on the subject, the Islamic Sufis whose core ideas could hardly be more germane to Singer's enterprise, the Tantric and Kundalini schools (both Buddhist and non-Buddhist) which are of central and international relevance to the topic of love, and the 2500 year-old Chinese tradition of *jen* which may be both more influential and interesting than the Christian love tradition upon which Singer lavishes his attention. Indeed Singer's two volumes are so ethnocentric in their survey of the great literature on love that one might laugh out loud at their general pretence were not this culture-blind habit of thought so deeply ensconced in Western philosophy in general. One might also criticize the somewhat mysterious absence of even major Western writers like Blake, Marx and Nietzsche from Singer's survey, which is supposed to go to the twentieth century. Perhaps these great thinker's very iconoclastic positions on the Western culture of love explains their absence in a work which is so generally lily-white in temper. Notwithstanding this patterned omission in Singer's work, one has to pay tribute to the unusual breadth of philosophical learning and exposition it manages across a largely uncharted territory. It is rather like a first major exploration of accepted paths in what has been by and large a philosophically dark continent.

On the technical level, there are a number of arguments in Singer's long excursion which call for critical response. He is a history-of-ideas thinker whose rich learning in the Western mainstream of thought is not matched by logical rigour. In particular, he never tests his major thesis as to the ultimately subjectivist nature of love with any good counter-argument. Those who might believe, for example, that phrases referring to love like 'chemistry,' or '*made a mistake about*', indicate its objective nature, often against the subject's valuation of the desired one, will find little or nothing in Singer's account to rebut their position. He simply never faces squarely up to arguments against his subjectivist hypothesis. Indeed when confronted with the familiar naturalist variation, say, in the works of Lucretius and Ovid, Singer is given to extravagant non-sequiturs: for example, inferring from Lucretius's bodily explanations of sentiment a 'wish for self-annihilation' (V. 1, 140); or deducing from Ovid's claim that people love the sexually stimulating, the consequent that 'all human actions are base' (144). Readers may also wonder at his unargued claim that 'de Sade's ideas were indeed inspired by Rousseau's' (V. 2, 344) and his contention that 'everything in Rousseau falls apart' if one rejects nature 'as the perfect illustration of divine goodness' (345). At times, Singer can be extraordinarily tendentious and misleading in his treatment of those who find a naturalist basis to love.

On the other hand, Singer is more often balanced and illuminating. Some of his generalizations are deeply suggestive. Consider his themal comment: 'If we think of the Judaeo-Christian God as an infinite extension of man's creativity and then relate creativity to the act of loving, we begin to appreciate the revolution that Christianity effected' (V. 1, 162). Yet note here how Singer has centrally appropriated a Blakean idea, shorn it of its source, and declined any mention of more irreligious Blakean ideas of love — such as his talk of the 'marriage hearse.' Even at his best, there is in Singer's exposition a certain pontifical *bauteur* with his material, which places him at an ivory-tower distance from the hard facts of his subject. Still, in all, there are rewards in this sweeping method — a fluent breadth of engagement, an often lyrical absorption in presentation, and a nineteenth-century confidence of range. The product is worth the costs, despite the somewhat effete idealist patina Singer tends to draw over the robust subject he explores.

It is worth noting in conclusion that in almost 1000 pages of disquisition on the ideological history of love, Singer never once discusses the patriarchal domination of women (where, under pure paterfamilias, the husband held the wife as slave with the right of life and death over her), the proprietary structure of love relations (where the marriage contract traditionally employs the language of property conveyance, 'to have and hold'), nor the reproductive function of sexuality and union (where perhaps the most significant sociohistorical purpose and effect of love is to be found).

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EMILIE ZUM BRUNN et ALAIN DE LIBERA. *Maître Eckhart. Métaphysique du Verbe et théologie négative*. Préface de M.-D. Chenu, Paris: Beauchesne, (Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie, Nouvelle Série, 42), 1984, 252 p. 150FF. ISBN 2-7010-1072-1.

Malgré l'attrait qu'ils exercent sur les esprits les plus divers et malgré les recherches nombreuses qui leur ont été consacrées depuis une trentaine d'années, les textes de Maître Eckhart recèlent encore bien des énigmes. Sur l'intention profonde qui les porte, cependant, il n'y a plus de doute, même s'il arrive encore qu'on les utilise pour montrer la persistance en Occident d'une tradition païenne, opposée au christianisme, et qui serait la 'vraie religion de l'Europe' (Alain de Benoist, *Comment peut-on être païen?* Paris, 1981, p. 241) Il est maintenant communément admis que les textes du maître rhénan sont l'œuvre d'une âme dévorée de l'amour de Dieu, cherchant dans la métaphysique les conditions d'une spiritualité radicale, l'œuvre par conséquent d'une pensée neuve et relativement originale, qui se caractérise par l'unité d'une mystique ardente et d'une métaphysique rigoureuse.

Mais quelle métaphysique a paru à Maître Eckart la plus à même de justifier son expérience spirituelle? On n'a pas de peine à observer dans son œuvre deux tendances apparemment contradictoires: l'une, ontologique, s'inscrit dans la lignée des 'métaphysiques de l'Exode' et s'inspire surtout d'Albert le Grand et de Thomas d'Aquin; l'autre, non-ontologique, négative, se rapprochant du radicalisme de l'hénologie, s'inscrit dans la tradition de la théologie apophatique et s'inspire de Proclus, du Pseudo-Denys et d'Erigène. La première tendance traduit une confiance illimitée dans l'intellect; c'est par lui que s'opère le retour de l'âme à Dieu; la seconde manifeste au contraire la conviction qu'il faut dépasser la connaissance de l'intellect et la détermination qu'elle implique vers la connaissance inconnaissante et inconnue de Dieu. Comment interpréter cette dualité d'orientation chez le maître thuringien: duplicité, inconsistance, oscillation, rupture épistémologique? C'est ce qu'il reste aux études eckhartiennes de chercher à clarifier.

Le livre d'E. Zum Brunn et A. de Libera, qui sont co-éditeurs de l'œuvre latine de Maître Eckhart en voie de publication au Cerf, n'a pas pour but premier de résoudre ce problème. Il s'attaque à une tâche plus fondamentale: montrer 'de quelle manière l'intention de Maître Eckhart s'accomplit, de quel univers de thèmes, de lieux et de doctrines elle se dégage, de quelle valeur sont ses continuités et de quelle force ses ruptures' (29). Mais, par ce biais, nos deux auteurs réussissent, à mon avis, à apporter une lumière nouvelle sur ce que l'on a appelé 'les oscillations' du discours du thuringien. De trois façons.

D'abord en mettant fort bien en lumière que le propos fondamental du maître rhénan a été la double naissance de Dieu dans l'âme et de l'âme en Dieu. 'A celui qui me demanderait: pourquoi prions-nous, pourquoi jeûnons-nous, disait Maître Eckhart dans un sermon (Pr. 38, cité p. 29), pourquoi accomplissons-nous toutes nos œuvres, pourquoi sommes-nous baptisés, pourquoi Dieu s'est-il fait homme — ce qui fut le plus sublime? Je dirais: c'est pour que Dieu naîsse dans l'âme et que l'âme naîsse en Dieu. C'est pour cela que toute l'Écriture est écrite, c'est pour cela que Dieu a créé le monde et

toute la nature angélique: afin que Dieu naisse en l'âme et que l'âme naisse en Dieu.' Il n'y a pas, dans l'enseignement et dans la prédication du maître dominicain, d'autre but que ce but divin qui préside sans cesse à la création, à la révélation, à l'Incarnation. Ce qui cherche à se dire dans son discours, qu'il soit latin ou allemand, spéculatif ou pastoral, c'est toujours, selon la formule empruntée par nos auteurs à F. Brunner, une 'mystique de Noël,' dont le centre est moins la mort et la résurrection du Christ que sa naissance en tout homme (154).

Puis, en deuxième lieu, en faisant comprendre, grâce à une analyse pénétrante des textes, que la seule métaphysique jugée chrétienne par Maître Eckhart est celle qui se trouve impliquée dans le fait de l'Incarnation, la métaphysique du Verbe. Il y a deux métaphysiques chez Eckhart. D'abord d'une métaphysique de l'Exode,' qui correspond à la révélation du Dieu-être, que la logique de l'analogie permet d'exposer. Mais cette métaphysique n'est pas encore une métaphysique véritablement chrétienne; elle ne permet pas de lever l'opposition du fini et de l'infini. 'La véritable métaphysique chrétienne, celle qui parachève et dépasse la métaphysique de l'Exode, est donc celle que nous apporte le Christ lui-même: c'est une métaphysique du Verbe, qui correspond au retour de la créature, à sa régénération dans le Christ' (72-73).

Enfin, le livre de Zum Brunn et de Libera explique le passage du discours eckhartien de l'intellectualisme au non-savoir autrement que par son oscillation entre deux métaphysiques ou entre le besoin de l'ontologie et l'attrait de l'hénologie. À la source de la rupture avec l'intellectualisme des premières œuvres, il faut voir surtout la découverte par le maître dominicain que l'intellect n'est pas la réalité ultime de l'âme et que la vraie connaissance de Dieu doit être attribuée à l'essence de l'âme, à l'*abditum mentis*, qu'il considère 'comme un abîme ou un désert correspondant à celui du fond divin' (184). Découverte à laquelle conduit la recherche d'une spiritualité nourrie par la contemplation de la naissance de Dieu dans l'âme et de l'âme en Dieu. Car c'est seulement par le retour de l'âme à son essence que s'actualise et se révèle l'unité du fond de l'âme avec le fond divin. 'Savoir s'anéantir, tel est le secret de l'homme qui n'a rien, ne veut rien, ne sait rien: ne pas intervenir dans l'œuvre divine qui s'opère en lui, à l'égard de laquelle il se tient totalement disponible, vide, "dédevenu" de façon à ne plus être cet unique obstacle à la naissance que nous sommes à nous-mêmes' (194).

Le livre de Zum Brunn et de Libera, issu d'un travail mené en Sorbonne, au *Centre d'Etudes des Religions du Livre*, est austère. Il réclame de son lecteur autre chose qu'une vague curiosité. Celui qui l'aborde avec un peu d'intérêt pour le mysticisme spéculatif du début du XIVème siècle et pour ses manières de réaliser l'alliance du langage métaphysique et du discours mystique ne sera pas déçu. Il y trouvera une excellente interprétation de l'ensemble de l'œuvre du maître dominicain condamné en 1329 et, grâce à la remarquable érudition des deux auteurs, il sera mieux à même de lire Eckhart dans son contexte et de mesurer la place de sa philosophie dans l'histoire de la pensée médiévale.

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