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## **Editorial Note / Note des Editeurs**

The Editor of **C.P.R./R.C.C.P.**, Prof. Roger A. Shiner, will be away on research leave in 1984-85. The Acting Editor during this period will be Prof. Allen Carlson of the Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta. Editorial correspondence in English should be directed during this period to Prof. Carlson.

Ms. Ruth Richardson of Academic Printing and Publishing has been appointed Managing Editor.

## **Expansion / Extension**

In view of the strong support received for the idea of fuller and consistently quick reviewing, the publisher has agreed to expand the numbers of issues of **C.P.R./R.C.C.P.** published per year. We will continue to publish *one* volume per year. However, each volume will now contain *ten* issues. Issues will appear in every month of the academic winter session and in two summer months - that is, in January, February, March, April, June, August, September, October, November and December. Each issue will be a maximum of 48 pp., except for the December issue which will be a maximum of 80 pp., and will contain the Index.

We hope by this expansion **C.P.R./R.C.C.P.** will consolidate its position as the most important source for information from book reviews in North America.

## **Note des Editeurs / Editorial Note**

L'Editeur de **C.P.R./R.C.C.P.**, le professeur Roger A. Shiner, sera absent durant l'année 1984-85 pour un congé d'études. Durant cette période, le professeur Allen Carlson du Département de philosophie de l'Université d'Alberta, assumera la fonction d'éditeur. Toute correspondance concernant la partie anglaise de l'édition devra donc être envoyée au professeur Carlson.

Mme Ruth Richardson de l'Academic Printing and Publishing a été désignée Editeur administratif.

## **Extension / Expansion**

L'idée d'une plus grande et plus rapide recension ayant reçu un très solide appui, la maison d'édition a accepté d'augmenter le nombre de numéros par volume de **C.P.R./R.C.C.P.** publié chaque année. Nous continuons de publier *un* par an. Cependant, chaque volume comprendra désormais *dix* numéros. Ils paraîtront à chaque mois de la session académique d'hiver et aux deux mois durant l'été - c'est-à-dire en janvier, février, mars, avril, juin, août, septembre, octobre, novembre et décembre. Chaque numéro aura un maximum de 48 pages, sauf celui de décembre qui atteindra un maximum de 80 pages et comprendra l'Index.

Nous espérons que par cette extension **C.P.R./R.C.C.P.** pourra consolider sa position comme la plus importante source d'information de l'Amérique du Nord en matière de renseignement.

TED COHEN and PAUL GUYER (eds.), *Essays in Kant's Aesthetics*. Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press 1982. Pp. x + 323. US\$25.00.  
ISBN 0-226-11226-8.

The title of this anthology provides an accurate statement of the nature and scope of the essays included in it. By using the preposition *in*, Cohen and Guyer indicate that Kant's aesthetic theory is a sort of conceptual boundary within which the subject matter of the various essays is located. Inside this general area, we find a wide variety of approaches, methods, and concerns with which the authors of the eleven essays contained in this collection consider Kant's aesthetic theory. As a result, we have a volume that demonstrates the richness and suggestiveness of Kant's aesthetics as a field for philosophic investigation.

The essays that comprise this volume can be divided into two groups based upon the approach they take to the *Critique of Judgment*. The first group consists of essays that attempt to explicate the nature of the aesthetic theory Kant puts forward in that work. The second group consists of essays that use Kant's theory, or some feature of it, as a means of approaching some particular question in the field of aesthetics. Roughly half of the essays in the volume fall into each category.

The volume is divided into four sections based upon the subject matter of the essays that compose them. The first area is entitled, 'Pleasure, Beauty, and Judgment,' and consists of four essays. The first three — by Paul Guyer, Rolf Meerbote, and Richard E. Aquila — all attempt to understand the nature of Kant's justification of judgments of taste as put forward in the *Critique of Judgment*. The final essay of this section, written by Anthony Savile, is an example of the more thematic approach.

Guyer's essay seeks to resolve a seeming contradiction in section 9 of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* by distinguishing between a mature theory, involving a two-step process of reflection, and an earlier theory that Guyer argues Kant gives up but never fully discards. Meerbote gives a careful and scholarly analysis of the distinction between determinative and reflective

judgment that demonstrates the problematic nature of this distinction for Kant. Aquila provides a theory of aesthetic judgment that relies on the idea that pleasurable feelings can have a formal structure. Savile provides a modified Kantian account of a judgment of artistic beauty that relies upon judging that a beautiful work of art is a successful solution to a problem done in a particular artistic style.

The three essays that comprise the second part of this book concern 'Art and Genius.' Donald W. Crawford discusses the role of creative imagination in Kant's theory of genius and shows that we can see Kant as providing an implicit answer to Plato's moral indictment of art. Timothy Gould compares Kant with Wordsworth and highlights the tension between the idea that a work of genius serves as a model for others, and therefore must be understood by them, and the idea that the work must be original, must make 'new sense.' Ingrid Stadler explores the use of formalist criticism to explicate the work of Cezanne and uses some of Kant's claims in the third *Critique* to argue against the adequacy of purely formalist criticism of Cezanne's still-lifes.

Under the heading 'Beauty, Freedom and Morality,' we find two essays. Ted Cohen explicates Kant's claim that beauty is a symbol of morality by claiming that the beautiful's characteristic of exhibiting 'purposefulness without a purpose' is a symbol of the good will. Dieter Henrich explores Schiller's development of Kant's aesthetics and shows how Schiller's thought prefigures the later systems of German Idealism.

The final section of the anthology, 'Beauty and the World,' contains an essay by Stanley Cavell and one by Jerry E. Sobel. Cavell's essay — a sort of apologetic postscript to his book on Thoreau — seeks to place Emerson in the philosophic tradition by seeing him as arguing, somewhat in the manner of Heidegger, that Kant's conception of experience in the first *Critique* is too thin, that 'moods' as well as sense experience constitute our world. Sobel considers the notion of design in Heidegger, Hume, and Kant, seeking to show that art, like religion, allows us to see the world in a certain way, a way that needs to be accepted or acknowledged and not proven.

Even such a cursory account of the contents of this volume should give an idea of the extraordinary diversity that is exemplified by the essays that comprise it. Anyone interested in either Kant or art will find a tremendous amount of suggestive material in these essays. They are of uniformly high quality and are of interest to more than the specialist. After reading this volume, one is struck both by the importance of Kant's reflections on the aesthetic and by the interest of the issues that they raise.

There is one question concerning Kant's philosophy that is suggested by a number of the essays in this volume but that is not directly confronted by any of them. That question is the relation of the aesthetic theory Kant articulates in the third *Critique* to the world-view he articulates in the first. Meerbote's investigation of the distinction between determinative and reflective judgment suggests that Kant cannot ultimately maintain it. Gould's view of a genius as 'creating sense' seems to push toward a reading of art as deter-

minative, constituting. Henrich's exploration of Schiller suggests that a full exploration of the nature of beauty must transcend the framework of Kant's philosophy. Cavell's discussion of Emerson can be interpreted as claiming that Kant's subjectivizing of the import of aesthetic judgment is arbitrary and doesn't square with our experience of the world. Finally, Sobel's account of design suggests that design is as constitutive of the world of experience as objectivity, once more calling into question Kant's insistence on the distinction between objective knowledge and aesthetic judgment.

What this suggests is that the essential Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena, with its concomitant limitation of objective knowledge to the former and relegation of morality to the latter, is inadequate to handle the phenomena of art and the aesthetic. Historically, it is true that Hegel's account of art gives art a central place, along with religion and philosophy, in the human attempt to comprehend the structure of reality. By consistently raising the question of how Kant's aesthetics fits his basic metaphysics, the essays in this volume suggest that this is no accident, but that the central claims of the third *Critique* force one to push the Critical Philosophy to the limits of its coherence. In light of this, it is unfortunate that none of the articles gives a broad assessment of the place of Kant's aesthetics in his systematic philosophy.

It is one of the virtues of this anthology that it pushes one from a variety of directions to ask just this sort of question. The essays in it make one ponder Kant's philosophy of art and respect its achievement, even if, as I suggest, they point towards some of its limitations.

Finally, it should be noted that Paul Guyer has contributed an excellent bibliography of books and articles on Kant's aesthetics. This bibliography should be a useful reference item.

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HUGH COLLINS, *Marxism and Law* in the series Marxist Introductions, gen. eds. Raymond Williams and Steven Lukes. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press 1982. Pp. viii + 159. Cdn\$25.75. ISBN 0-19-876093-0.

As an item in the edited series *Marxist Introductions*, Hugh Collins' *Marxism and Law* might be expected to provide only a general survey of the subject.

Such a survey is indeed provided, in this case from the standpoint of an ostensibly committed, if critical, interpreter. The book also has two further aims. First, it undertakes a critical re-examination some fundamental tenets of Marxism which have an important bearing on the treatment of law. For example he dismisses all 'economistic' accounts of the relation between base and superstructure, including that recently put forward by Gerald Cohen (*Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*), which, he claims, fail to supply an explanatory principle capable of linking specific developments of law to specific changes in the mode of production. Similarly he rejects the more familiar Marxist analyses of ideology and the relation of ideology to the state, preferring one derived mainly from Gramsci.

Secondly, the conclusions which emerge in the course of Collins' discussion of Marxist theory are applied to what he obviously takes to be a significant problem in the contemporary practice of Marxist politics, namely 'the failure of the radical strategy of disobedience to law' (137). He traces this failure largely to the dominance in contemporary liberal society of what he terms 'the ideology of the rule of law' and to a significant ambivalence on the part of many influential Marxists toward the rule of law as an ideal. He points out that certain Marxists (notably E. P. Thompson) have even gone so far 'as to ascribe an intrinsic value to the goal of insuring legality of government action,' although, Collins continues, 'no amount of casuistry can conceal the point that the ideology of the Rule of Law is behind the concern for legality and liberty' (144-5). It is unfortunate that Collins fails to explain more fully this distinction he employs between 'the rule of law' on one hand, and 'legality of government action' on the other, because the latter notion is central to the meaning of 'rule of law' as it occurs in most contemporary non-Marxist discussions.

The task of developing a properly Marxist attitude toward 'the ideology of the rule of law' arises from the failure of the radical strategy of disobedience to law referred to above. Collins takes this alleged failure to be the obvious starting-point for a Marxist discussion of law at the present time, but he is curiously vague about just which episodes of recent political experience exemplify the failure in question. He appears to mean above all the 'radical political movements in the 1960's, particularly in universities' (127) and not, at least not explicitly, an example which comes more readily to mind, namely the struggle between the more radical elements of the British trade union movement and the Government during the 1970's, during which defiance of the law was frequently urged as an appropriate and necessary tactic for the trade union movement. As for radical protests in the universities during the sixties, it might make a considerable difference to the analysis whether one was referring to the British, the French, or the U.S. experience; however Collins does not really specify the range of his historical reference.

In any event his conclusion is clearly stated: it is the Rule of Law itself which is the chief obstacle in the path of the development of class-consciousness (139). The Rule of Law in question is an ideal comprised of three strands of moral judgment: first, a commitment to the neutrality of the

state as between classes and interest groups; second, the sovereignty of law as determining who shall hold political power; and third, the accessibility and reliability of law for all parties (135). This ideal is said to support two further prominent features of law in modern society (meaning modern liberal democratic societies?), namely a devotion to rule-governed justice 'rather than judicial appreciations of what will serve the interests of particular groups and individuals' and 'a belief in the autonomy of legal thought' (135). Collins argues that judicial reasoning cannot be accurately described in terms of the autonomy of legal thought, as many contemporary non-Marxist theorists would have it, but rather as 'a dialogue with the background dominant ideology on the basis of the formal constraints of coherence and consistency' (136).

This last claim, that law in practice represents little more than an articulation of the dominant ideology, emerges as a central conclusion from Collins' survey of Marxist theses concerning law, (occupying four of the book's six chapters). In the process of distinguishing this conclusion from all other putatively Marxist characterizations of law and legal reasoning, and defending it as superior, Collins at times comes close to reducing it to a rather innocuous claim: that the life of the law consists of the continuous enterprise of eliminating those anomalies and inconsistencies in society's common-sense ideas of right and wrong which come to light in the attempt to enforce the rules and adjudicate conflicts.

To be sure Collins insists that everyone's common-sense ideas about right and wrong, rational and irrational choices, and even aesthetic judgments, when widely shared, should be viewed as the product of the successful propagation of a dominant ideology by agents of the ruling class. Indeed a very great deal of Collins' argument rests finally on this identification of society's common-sense ideas of right and wrong as an *ideology* in the proper Marxist sense of the term. What would justify this claim? I suspect that one is entitled to label society's common-sense ideas of right and wrong *as a whole* an 'ideology' only in the circumstance that one possesses a relatively complete *alternative* description of social action. But of course Marxism has produced no alternative description of social action which could possibly rival the detail or nuance of common sense. No mere theory could. What Marxism offers by way of an alternative to the common sense of society amounts at bottom only to a small handful of concepts (themselves parasitic upon the prevailing self-understanding of society) combined with the claim that these few concepts can be applied and re-applied without limit to generate a systematic alternative description of the whole content implied by the term 'society.' Whether this last suggestion is even coherent remains open to question (remember Davidson's problem of Alternative Conceptual Universes), and so long as it does remain an open question, so does the significance of Collins' labelling of the common sense of society as an 'ideology.'

As a whole the book exhibits several of the vices and virtues often noticed in contemporary British academic Marxism. The intellectual style strongly suggests an empirical, critical, indeed sceptical mind at work, and the author

appears most comfortable with a largely analytic approach to his task, carefully scrutinizing large generalizations, taking much care with definitions, and adding frequent qualifications. This empirical, analytic temper contributes much of value to the work.

At the same time the work appears relentlessly committed to the truth, moral importance, or simply importance of the Marxist viewpoint; a commitment of which the reader is frequently reminded both intentionally, and unintentionally perhaps as when some generalization which has been rather carefully qualified in the text gets reiterated later in much cruder terms and minus the qualifications.

It is the sources of this commitment which fare least well in the author's style of argument. One welcomes the appearance of some passion on the academic landscape; only in this case one is left with a sense of obscurity surrounding the object of passion. What does 'Marxism' represent to the author that it should so engage his interest? Collins' attempt to define what he means by 'Marxism' at the outset is easily the weakest part of the book. He there alludes to the existence of a host of Marxist schools, 'all with their own distinctive contributions,' and concludes that Marxism cannot be identified with the entire collection of such schools due to the problem of incorporating an excess of contradictory insights. He also declines to identify Marxism with the doctrines of Karl Marx, on the ground that this standard would prove to be 'unsatisfactorily narrow.' Failing anything else he offers a 'tentative' definition of the tradition in terms of two unifying elements: a common methodology for deciphering the meaning of history and a prediction that the destiny of mankind lies in a Communist society. What finally emerges from this discussion strikes this reader as an unlikely object of passionate commitment, intellectual or other.

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JACQUES ELLUL, *La subversion du christianisme*. Collection Empreintes. Paris: Seuil 1984, 249 p. 85 FF. ISBN 2-02-006684-X.

Ce livre commence par un constat: '*Il n'y a pas de Révélation connaissable hors de la vie et du témoignage de ceux qui la portent*'. C'est la vie des chrétiens qui atteste de qui est Dieu, et quel est le sens de cette révélation ... Si

le chrétien n'est pas conforme dans sa vie à sa vérité, il n'y a plus de vérité. Et c'est pourquoi les accusateurs du XVIII<sup>e</sup> et du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècles ont eu pleinement raison de remonter de la pratique de l'Eglise à la fausseté de la révélation elle-même' (13). Tout au long de son livre, l'auteur montre comment et pourquoi il y eut subversion et corruption du christianisme. Celui-ci fut victime de son propre succès. De proclamation prophétique, il est devenu religion de cohésion sociale récupérée par le pouvoir (chapitre II). Il commença par refuser le sacré et ses affabulations, mais il fut bientôt envahi par les croyances, les superstitions et le besoin de merveilleux des populations qu'il conquérait 'en masse' (chapitre III). Il est essentiellement le contraire d'une loi morale mais la nécessité de guider des masses, la prolifération des hérésies et les débordements orgiaستiques auxquels les hérésies donnèrent parfois lieu, ont amené l'Eglise sur la voie du moralisme (chapitre IV). L'influence de l'Islam et la volonté de faire mieux que ce rival vont pousser l'Eglise plus loin encore: la parole de Dieu qui ne peut être accaparée ou figée, qui appelle la liberté à l'invention et à la contestation de tout code établi, voudra se consacrer dans un droit, une politique, des croisades ou des guerres saintes (chapitre V). Une fois tentée par ces grands moyens, l'Eglise en usera et en abusera, elle se mettra à légiférer et à condamner (chapitre VI). Or le mal ne se nomme-t-il pas puissances et dominations (chapitre IX)?

Si le christianisme s'égare ainsi, ce n'est pas accidentellement, c'est que sa mission est impossible, c'est qu'il s'oppose aux aspirations humaines. Il désacralise le monde. Il est inorganisable, il compte sur l'amour ou la grâce dont on ne peut s'assurer. Il n'offre aucun moyen assuré de justification, il fait fi du pouvoir et glorifie la faiblesse (chapitre VIII). Après l'exposé d'un tel point de vue, qui rappelle celui de Dostoïevski dans la scène du Grand Inquisiteur, l'auteur conclut son livre (chapitre X) en envisageant l'Eglise sous un autre jour. Celle-ci transgresse la parole de Dieu en s'instituant, en s'organisant, en établissant une morale mais 'on ne peut se passer ni d'organisation, ni d'institution, ni d'éthique' (245). Il faut donc les accepter mais pourvoir aussi les refuser dans un second temps, comme le Christ lui-même le fit. Il faut transgresser les transgressions inévitables de l'Eglise. Pour cela, il n'y a pas de recette mais le croyant peut compter sur l'Esprit Saint. L'Eglise est constituée par le dépassement de ses propres égarements et trahisons.

Ce livre est une réflexion sur la liberté des enfants de Dieu et, d'autre part, sur leur Eglise et leur tradition qui sont à la fois le produit, la condition et souvent le contraire de la liberté des enfants de Dieu. L'auteur est particulièrement informé et brillant quand il s'agit de tracer des perspectives historiques. J'aurais souhaité cependant que ses arguments soient plus documentés et plus serrés lorsqu'il traite des relations du christianisme avec l'Islam, le moralisme et la politique, car c'est à ces sujets qu'il est probablement le plus original. L'auteur adopte parfois un ton pamphlétaire qui ne convient ni à sa sagesse ni à la grandeur de son propos. Au sujet de la théologie de la Libération, il annonce à quelques reprises qu'il la rejette comme une théorie de plus. Mais plus loin, dans une note (237), il l'approuve en tant que pratique adaptée à la situa-

tion où elle se développe. Puisque la théologie de la Libération se définit elle-même comme une pratique située dans une histoire: on comprend mal pourquoi l'auteur la critique si sévèrement.

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J.C.B. GOSLING and C.C.W. TAYLOR, *The Greeks On Pleasure*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982. Pp. vi + 497. ISBN 0-19-824666-8.

This is a very rewarding book that will be consulted by researchers for some time to come. It is also of independent interest to philosophers interested in the concept of pleasure. The key contrasts drawn by the authors are of systematic as well as historical interest. The book covers the development of treatments of pleasure from the Pre-Socratic period through the Hellenistic philosophers.

In surveying the treatment of pleasure through the Pre-Socratic literature, Gosling and Taylor develop a very useful distinction between a 'didactic' conception of pleasure and what they call the 'physiological' conception. The latter is the regaining of the proper balance among the constituents of a human. It would be better to rename the second conception as the 'constitutive' conception, since — as the authors rightly remark — 'the physical-nonphysical dichotomy was not sharply formulated in that period' (18). Furthermore, one should distinguish between the constitutive notion and what we might call the notion of felt pleasure. It is this second notion that figures prominently in the didactic literature.

These distinctions give us an objective as well as a subjective notion of pleasure, and allow us to see either of these as having normative roles. Tracing this variety of conceptions through the Pre-Socratics helps us greatly in understanding these early attempts at ethics and psychology. It gives us also a much richer framework for raising questions about hedonistic elements in Plato's philosophy. Here are some of the relevant questions. Is constitutive pleasure a (the) good? Is felt pleasure a (the) good? If some pleasures are to be avoided, how are these linked to the objective, constitutive, notion of pleasure? Does felt pleasure have sources other than the restitution of proper balance? If so, are some of the sources harmful states of a human? What happens to these distinctions when we see in Plato the emergence of the body-soul distinction?

It is impossible within the confines of this review to comment on all of the points raised by the author's detailed survey of Plato on pleasure. But as a general remark, one can complain that Gosling and Taylor do not make full use of the interesting distinctions that they themselves develop in the early part of the book.

Based on some texts of the *Protagoras* the authors saddle Socrates with hedonism (47). The evidence for this interpretation is not very convincing. There are well known grounds for not wanting to attribute to Socrates positive philosophical theories. Thus this, by itself, makes one reluctant to construe Socrates in this manner. Furthermore, in assessing the claim one should make full use of the distinctions introduced. If Socrates thought that constitutive pleasure was the good, he would have had to hold a theory about human constitution, and it is quite clear that he held no such view. Thus the hedonistic interpretation would have to construe him as holding that felt pleasure was the good. But apart from the disputed *Protagoras* there is no evidence for this. Furthermore, the tenor of the arguments in the *Crito* and the *Apology* are definitely not hedonistic. Gosling and Taylor remark that the arguments in these two dialogues are not anti-hedonistic, and that one could accept the arguments while maintaining some form of hedonism (63). Compatibility is, however, a rather weak ground for the ascription of a view. One need not go out of one's way at every occasion to push aside every view that one does not hold. We must, moreover, examine what is meant by 'anti-hedonism'? Socrates might very well have assented to the claim that the feeling arising out of the restoration of balance in human constitution was good, or that felt pleasure, everything else being equal, was a good thing, without being a hedonist in a philosophically significant sense.

One can make sense of the *Protagoras* without attributing hedonism to Socrates. For here Socrates argues for ethical theses about courage, virtue, etc. without an elaborate theory of human nature. One can see the arguments as making use of pleasure in a hypothetical way. They show that Socrates can make his claims good even on this, 'minimalist' assumption. This view recommends itself especially since, as Gosling and Taylor point out (79), in this dialogue there is no explicit soul-body distinction.

As we turn to the *Phaedo*, we see the soul-body distinction introduced explicitly. Plato also holds in this dialogue that the body is in various ways a hindrance to the soul. Thus it is plausible to ascribe to Plato the view that bodily pleasures even in the constitutive sense are not good, since the restoration of health to the body will strengthen that which is in the way of our best part. Plato could hold some form of hedonism in the *Phaedo* if he had there a theory about the psychic ingredients of a human and their proper balance. But no such view is found in this dialogue. And to say that someone could accept everything that the *Phaedo* says and still hold some form of hedonism is a bad reason for ascribing this view to Plato.

In the *Republic* Plato does develop a theory about the basic ingredients of the soul and a view about proper psychic balance. According to this view, the soul is in a state of harmony when 'reason rules.' On the basis of this theory one

can see the possibility of a constitutive theory of pleasure, with special importance assigned to the pleasures of the mind. (The authors remark, p. 105, that the 'physiological' notion is extended in this dialogue; we had occasion already to point out why this is an infelicitous way of expressing the matter.) It follows, then, from the doctrine of the *Republic* that some constitutive pleasures are bad since their source is the replenishment of parts of a person that interfere with the functioning of our best part, and that some constitutive pleasures, namely the intellectual ones, are good, since they accompany the restoration of the proper balance of the best part of a human. If by hedonism we mean the view that pleasure, or some form of it, is the good, then the *Republic* does not contain hedonistic doctrines. It does, of course, contain the view that the realization of the highest good will be accompanied by certain types of pleasures. At this point one might wonder what follows for felt pleasure in general. Since enjoyments are specified by Plato in terms of their objects or sources, there is no basis in the Platonic theory for positing some felt quality that remains constant across different types of enjoyments. Hence it should be also the case that questions about quantitative comparisons of felt pleasure, e.g., between the intellectual and bodily enjoyments, make no sense in this framework. It would be a good exercise to go through the dialogue and see if this consequence is kept in view consistently.

Gosling and Taylor raise the question (122-5) how Plato is to accommodate both the pleasure of replenishing the human constituents and the maintaining of the constituents and the right balance. This should not be a worry, given that the pleasure in question will be for Plato intellectual pleasure. The proper working of the mind requires continuous searching and discovery. Thus in this case the maintenance requires continuous replenishing. In the intellectual life of perpetual discovery one cannot separate replenishment from maintenance.

Finally a word about the vexed arguments in Bk. IX. One might read these as showing that the just life is the best even on grounds that Thrasymachus and Glaucon would accept (103). But such a reading does not explain why the results of Bk. IV are brought to bear on these arguments. Thus a more plausible alternative is to construe the arguments as showing how with the help of the theory of Bk. IV we can specify the main types of forms of life, and how — on reflexion — one can see the Platonically correct one emerging as the one humans would choose.

In one of the later dialogues, the *Philebus*, Plato gives a more extensive treatment of the different kinds of pleasures. The ethical focus shifts, since Plato no longer confines himself to the articulation of the good soul but explains also the ingredients and structure of the good life. This allows yet another extension of the constitutive model. Some of the details of the more articulate treatment are well covered by the authors (137, 139). One can accept much of what they say without agreeing with them that here Plato 'had given up the view that one can use pleasure to guide one's calculations' (141), for — as we saw — it is doubtful that this is a view he ever held. Chapter 10 contains a useful overview on Plato's views on pleasure.

Having covered some of the material in this book on Plato in some detail, a few brief remarks will be made about the other parts of this work. The section on Aristotle starts with raising the question of how the material on pleasure in Bk VII of *NE* is related to the material in Bk X of the same work. There is an interesting summary of the two passages on pp. 199-202. Gosling and Taylor then proceed to lay out a view of the late G.E.L. Owen according to which the two texts represent two different views of Aristotle. A large part of the section on Aristotle (204-54) is spent on raising objections to Owen and to formulating an alternative reading. Though Owen's view is important and influential, one wonders if devoting that many pages to it might not place the issue somewhat out of proportion to its significance relative to other matters that one wants to see discussed in connection with Aristotle's treatment of pleasure. For example, one of the key claims emerging in the authors' treatment of Aristotle is that his interest was not primarily in examining the nature of pleasure but in ethical theses, in particular 'his purpose [was] to show that in some sense pleasure is the good' (264). This claim is likely to raise many objections from the thoughtful reader.

Chapter 16 deals with the 'kinesis-energeia' distinction, and on pp. 312-13 an interesting application is made of the authors' view of that distinction to the nature of pleasure. At the end, however, one might still want to know more about the following questions: What is the role of pleasure as a motivating force in Aristotle's psychology? Is pleasure an aim, and if so how does it fit into the hierarchy of ends? Is Aristotle committed to a view of pleasure that would treat it as a felt quality across different types and thus allow for quantitative comparisons? Though this book provides much information relevant to the discussion of these crucial issues, further exploration of them is still needed.

The section on Hellenistic philosophy centers on Epicurus and the Stoics. Epicurus' account of pleasure is 'naturalistic,' linked to his materialist outlook. Gosling and Taylor organize their exposition into outline, problems, and responses. They present a nice account of pleasure as criterion that rests on the analogy between experiencing pleasure and sensations (405). They also suggest an interesting link between Epicurus' two types of pleasures and the two conceptions of pleasure laid out in Aristotle's *NE* Bk VII. Still, one is tempted to disagree with the suggestion that this is a revision of the earlier physiological account (413), since this seems to be the first explicit materialist analysis, hence deserving of the name 'physiological.'

The Stoics too stressed the natural functioning of humans as what one should aim at. Their view on pleasure seems on the surface to be very different from that of Epicurus, but Gosling and Taylor offer suggestions that lessen the contrast (416-17). Gosling and Taylor also provide a summary of the Stoic analysis of action, and suggest some comparisons to modern views on this topic. Like this review, the book offers a more sketchy treatment of the Hellenistic theories than what it offers on the topics of the other two parts.

The book ends with two useful appendices. It is, on the whole, a useful and instructive work. Many of its conclusions will be disputed, but all of it will be found stimulating. There should be more histories of ancient thought that focus on a specific topic or concept.

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H.S. HARRIS, *Hegel's Development*, T. II, *Night Thoughts* (JENA 1801-1806)  
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1983. Pp. LXX + 627. Cdn\$99.75. ISBN 0-19-82-4654-4

L'œuvre hégélienne pourrait bien être entrée en philosophie à la faveur de ce 'bound' dont Hegel, au terme de son itinéraire de jeunesse, fit part à son ami Schelling dans la fameuse lettre du 2 novembre 1800: 'In my scientific development, which began from the subordinate needs of man, I was bound to be driven on to science, and the Ideal of my youthful period was likewise bound to transform itself into the form of reflection, into a system' (Trad. Harris).

Si ce 'Schritt zur Wissenschaft' est bien au coeur des efforts de Hegel pour assumer résolument la tâche de pensée qui s'était esquissée dans les *Jugendschriften* comme étant celle de 'penser la pure vie,' peut-être alors les écrits d'Iéna en portant à son comble l'exigence de la philosophie comme système et spéculation offrent-ils un lieu d'élection pour qui se soucie de la pensée philosophique comme pensée de l'Absolu. 'Lebenslauf Gottes in human consciousness' n'hésite pas à affirmer Harris après avoir passé en revue tous les textes qui ponctuent cette période d'obscuré maturation que fut celle de la première vocation professorale et scientifique de Hegel. Période méconnue, presque délaissée par les érudits tant le style et la structure de ces écrits souvent laissés en chantier — sans compter les difficultés herméneutiques soulevées par la nouvelle chronologie qu'en a établie la *Hegelforschung* au cours des années 60 — constituent un 'serious handicap' qui plonge 'all students of this period into the situation of pioneers.'

*Night Thoughts* ose franchir cet 'handicap' avec l'aide des interprètes les plus autorisés qui y sont cités et discutés. Truffée de sous-titres accrocheurs (Nocturne for the 'Son of the Gods,' Moonlight, Hesperus and Phosphorus, The daylight of the present), cette étude est pourtant moins celle d'une inter-

prétation détaillée, à fleur de texte, que celle d'une 'comprehensive survey.' L'A. en précise lui-même la ressource et la limite lorsqu'il écrit:

One can view Hegel's Iéna manuscripts in many lights. In the body of this work I have tried to treat them "in and for themselves," to elucidate what the concept and aim of each of them in fact was. But there has always been in my mind the consciousness that *my* real aim is to elucidate the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which Hegel finally wrote and published at the end of the period. This project cannot be completed (or even begun) in the present volume. But it seems necessary and proper to acknowledge that it was there. So I have tried here, consciously, to relate the phases of my inquiry to it. Because it is improvised freely, according to my own impressions and feelings and without further reference to the texts — or even to my own text, except to check the accuracy of the quotations and references that came to mind spontaneously — it will serve, I hope, as a reliable indicator of the biases that must be watched for in my more deliberate attempt at objective interpretation.

Difficile, dans ces conditions, d'épouser la 'reconstruction' des écrits d'Iéna proposée dans *Night Thoughts*. D'apprécier, entre autres, les 'novelties' que l'exigence de la philosophie comme savoir absolu aurait apportées aux *Jugendschriften*. Si, d'après l'A., les écrits d'Iéna s'en démarquent par une 'philosophy of philosophy,' on aurait souhaité qu'il étaye des phrases comme celles-ci: 'about the end of 1796, Hegel began, more or less consciously to become a philosopher.' Les nombreuses incitations à renouer avec la problématique des *Écrits de jeunesse* telle que l'A. l'avait exposée dans son *Toward the Sunlight* rédigé, précisait-il, comme 'a first half of an *Erziehungsroman* (Hegel's Development. 1770-1801, Clarendon Press, 1972), ne permettent guère de statuer sur les mutations qui auraient conduit Hegel à adopter un système dialectique de la philosophie. Aussi longtemps en tout cas que n'aura pas été sondé le sol ontologique sur lequel s'est appuyé le jeune Hegel que l'A. a confiné dès 1972 dans un champ anthropologique: 'The true forms of Hegel's researches through his life was always, properly speaking, man; and even when he became convinced, as he did around 1788, that the proper approach to the study of human nature was through the analysis of human social institutions in their genesis and interrelations, he never lost sight of the fact that the real object of his concern was the rational individual agent.'

Souhaitons que l'*Erziehungsroman* se poursuive.

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PETER LAMARQUE, ed. *Philosophy and Fiction*. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press 1983. Pp. ix + 111. £11.95. ISBN 0-08-030353-6.

The five contributors to this interesting volume, all philosophers in whose thinking the influence of Wittgenstein is plainly evident, share the assumption that philosophy should take fiction to be a mode of discourse. One of the central problems created by the new formalist tradition (i.e., structuralism and the New Criticism), which treats literature as 'text' rather than discourse, is that it cannot account for the function of literature in human life, and hence for the value that people ordinarily accord it. To understand it as discourse is both to be able to take questions of value into account, and to allow that the writer's intentions are relevant to the philosophical analysis.

The claim that the author is a full participant in this discourse is most fully defended by Colin Lyas in 'The Relevance of the Author's Sincerity.' Lyas argues that the very fact that people commonly do find sincerity worthy of comment in works of art attests to the relevance of such considerations — despite the epistemological difficulties that attach to them. Peter Lamarque, too, in 'Fiction and Reality,' claims importance for the author's intentions, declaring that it is, in fact, the writer's 'illocutionary intentions' (55) which determine what is fiction and what is not. Flint Schier, in 'Tragedy and the Community of Sentiment,' maintains that 'One of the *pleasures* ... of seeing a tragedy ... stems from our interaction with the controlling intelligence of the artist' (85). And R.W. Beardsmore, in 'The Censorship of Works of Art,' argues (though the problems he is dealing with are markedly different from those central to the other papers) that the acts of gratuitous cruelty Salvador Dali records in his autobiography are by no means incidental to our moral judgement either of the man or of his work. For all that, they do not justify censoring or repressing the autobiography.

It is in Wittgensteinian 'forms of life' terms that Lyas, ultimately, justifies discussion of the artist's sincerity, offering a sociological justification of this practice as one of the two 'master thoughts' (35) of his paper: namely, that relevance is determined by what people take to be relevant. Reference to the artist, and to the artist's feelings and intentions is, he argues, part of the 'form of life' that criticism takes. The burden of proof must be borne by those who would discredit it; and so far they have not been successful. A consideration of the place of literary works and of literary criticism within 'forms of life' works well, too, in Stein Haugom Olsen's paper, 'Criticism and Appreciation,' where the importance of 'literacy' to a just appreciation of literary works is emphasized. Just as one must learn to recognize certain features of wine in order properly to appreciate it, so, Olsen argues, literary appreciation is impossible until certain concepts and conventions are mastered. Psychoanalytic descriptions of works (of which he offers an interesting example on pp. 45-6) do not count as properly literary discussions, since they are concerned only with the cause of the work, not with the value of the experience it affords.

There is an equally strong emphasis upon the place and role of literary works within 'forms of life' in Schier's paper, where he is concerned to understand '[the] unaccountable pleasure which the spectators of a well-written tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety and other passions that are in themselves disagreeable and uneasy' (Hume, quoted by Schier, 74). He rejects Hume's doxastic solution to this puzzle: that disbelief in the reality of its events prevents the experience of the play from being a painful one; and rejects, too, any kind of utilitarian justification of such experiences in terms, for instance, of their character-improving capacities for the spectator. The point is, rather, that the experience of tragedy serves to affirm our place within a community of sentiment. We do not experience tragedy detachedly, from without: it gives us an 'imaginative sense of what it is like to feel, see, and live in a certain way' (84).

An equally puzzling, and not unrelated aspect of our response to literary works is of central concern to Lamarque. As he puts it: 'What is fictional ... cannot be *real* but characters it seems cannot be *nothing*. So what in the world are we talking about?' (52). The problem, as he sees it, is a logical one, about reference and existence: a problem of understanding what fictions are, and what relations can be said to obtain between fictions and the real world. Clearly the relation is not one that can be straightforwardly explained in terms of correspondence with facts, and of truth values. Proper names in fiction have no reference; they do have a sense. Fictional characters exist, Lamarque concludes, as abstract entities, as concepts or sets of properties. He believes that such a theory is able to explain how it is that readers have no problems understanding fictional stories, despite the unreality of their characters; that thinking of characters as sets of properties avoids problems of incompleteness in our discussion of them, and accounts for our emotional response to them, despite their acknowledged unreality.

In all of this, Lamarque emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between informed and misinformed readers. Only the former can be viewed as full participants in the language game of literary discourse. Olsen attaches similar importance to the role of expertise in creating and sustaining the practice of literary appreciation. It is a corollary of his claim that appreciation is a non-natural mode that taste (both for literature and for wine) needs to be cultivated, that judgement belongs in the hands of those qualified to judge, and that 'There is no appeal procedure when those acknowledged as supreme authorities disagree' (41). Cultivation of taste is part of what is required for initiation into the practice of literary appreciation.

Expertise finds no such favour in Beardsmore's eyes, at least when attention focuses upon moral values. For in the moral domain, he maintains, there are no experts. We are right to trust the expertise of garage mechanics and of doctors in appropriate circumstances, precisely because of their expertise. But, he insists, 'when we turn to moral issues, the concept of certainty is no longer connected with that of being in a position to judge ... for the simple reason that [this] notion [has] no sense here' (100). Censorship, Beardsmore points out, could be justified only on the assumption that some

people are in a better position to judge than others: an assumption he rejects outright.

Beardsmore's argument against censorship is well-taken, but it is necessary to challenge the basis on which it rests: the claim that there are no moral experts. His point is not to argue for non-cognitivism in morals: he does believe there are moral certainties. But the problem with the denial of expertise in the moral realm is that it suggests too stark a dichotomy: between the declaration that there are moral experts, and the claim that no one knows any better than anyone else, when it comes to morals. I think there is a better route. It is the one Alasdair MacIntyre proposes in *After Virtue*, according to which members of a society acquire their moral definitions from exemplars of moral virtue (whether fictional or 'real'), recognisable figures of moral stature within their common heritage. I do not mean to make room for the censor as such an exemplar: on the contrary. One might argue that it is a mark of expert judgement to recognize the need to allow people to judge for themselves, to have the wisdom to see the far-reaching consequences of not making this possible. I am suggesting, contra Beardsmore, that we are well-advised to consult people of recognisably exemplary moral character for assistance with moral difficulties. Though we may not be certain about their verdicts, we have good reason to take them seriously. (And experience shows that we are often equally well-advised to be less certain about garage mechanics' and doctors' verdicts than Beardsmore suggests. Expertise cannot confer truth.)

There are claims in other papers in the collection, too, with which I must take issue. Foremost among these is Lamarque's claim that fictional characters are to be understood as abstract entities. It is difficult to see how such an analysis can account for the richness of the role literary characters often play in our emotional lives, and for the power with which they exist in our culture. Sets of properties are really quite uninteresting, considered apart from the 'glue of life' they acquire within the literary setting. If Olsen were right to maintain, as he does (45), that literary judgement is 'exclusively intellectual,' then Lamarque's position might be more plausible. But the fact that we must learn to respond appropriately to literature no more suggests that the resulting judgements will be purely intellectual than Wittgenstein's demonstration that we need to learn pain behaviour suggests that our subsequent reactions to pain will be intellectual. Judgement is not diminished in value or validity by being affective as well as intellectual; indeed, in contexts such as this it is more likely to be enhanced. For Olsen, it is a measure of the adequacy of discrimination 'that it maximises the number of textual features successfully assigned aesthetic significance' (44): this connects to his emphasis upon the intellectual nature of the enterprise. It leaves one wondering whether there might be an optimal point for this — an Aristotelian mean — beyond which it becomes an excessively delicate and discerning emphasis which, seeing significance in every detail, loses sight of the whole.

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THOMAS L. LENNON, JOHN M. NICHOLAS, and JOHN W. DAVIS, eds., *Problems of Cartesianism*. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1982. Pp. 235. Cdn \$29.75. ISBN 0-7735-1000-1.

This is a rather uneven collection of eight historical essays, at least some of which were presented at a 1973 Colloquium in Ontario. The contents are, briefly: G. Sebba on Baillet's life of Descartes; R. Popkin on 'Cartesianism and Biblical Criticism,' with a reply by Walter Rex; two essays by Jacques Roger and François Duchesneau on the Cartesian theory of the earth's origin and its influence on eighteenth century theories; two essays on Descartes' problems with transubstantiation, by Richard Watson and Ronald Laymon; and a lengthy essay by Alan Gabbey on Henry More's disillusionment with the Cartesian programme.

I found the essays by Popkin and Rex interesting but somewhat rambling. This is partly due to the variety of sources on which they rely; it seems to me difficult to get a clear picture of the views of Spinoza, Bayle or Toland on religion in a few pages of text; when Jurieu, Nicole, and many more are added, the pot is overflowing. However, I would endorse Rex's concluding comment about the political context in which the discussions of biblical or religious interpretation took place, in France, Geneva or Holland, in the seventeenth century. As Grotius found to his detriment after the Synod of Dort, or as the Huguenots later experienced under the rule of Louis XIV, taking any public position on controversial religious questions left one open to immediate and serious political repercussions.

Jacques Roger discusses the extent to which Descartes' hypothesis about the origin of the earth was originally intended as a genetic account of structures, rather than a historical narrative which might compete with a naive reading of *Genesis*. However, it was soon misunderstood as a historical narrative and thereby influenced the development of theories of the earth in the eighteenth century; 'the Cartesian model ... directed the main development of the science of the earth throughout the eighteenth century. But we must add that it was able to do so ... thanks to a kind of brilliant misinterpretation. From a logical model, the theory of earth evolved to a reconstructed history and, in this way, could play a very important and specific role in the development of natural sciences and natural philosophy throughout the eighteenth century' (112).

Richard Watson's essay on 'Transubstantiation among the Cartesians' is marred by a number of irritating errors. For example, Samuel Clarke is said to have presented Rohault's *Traité*, in translation, as a Newtonian text (p. 127, n.2); he claims that 'only the ordained could take the sacrament' of the Eucharist in Catholic services (129); the '*donec corrigantur*' of the Holy Office is changed to '*donec corrignatur*' in two places (130, 138); and Dom Robert Desgabets is said to be a Dominican rather than a Benedictine, as Lamaire's book, cited in the footnote, makes abundantly clear (136). Apart from the factual errors, this essay is also hampered by a style of exposition

which tends to undermine one's confidence in the reliability of the author's interpretation of historical evidence. For example, Desgabets is said to be a 'busybody' (136) because he got involved in controversies with Malebranche and the scholastic defenders of transubstantiation, and Watson describes his own essay as a 'eulogy to the greatest and most influential failure in modern philosophy' (145). In my opinion, Watson should stop celebrating the failure of Cartesianism and begin to explain why it was so successful. The change of attitude might generate a more sympathetic understanding of historical texts. Readers who are interested in the controversy about transubstantiation should go directly to J.-R. Armogathe's book, *Theologia Cartesiana* (1977).

By contrast with Watson's paper, Ronald Laymon recognises that many of the Cartesian problems with transubstantiation derive from Descartes' understanding of substances and their modes, rather than from a meddling interest in theological mysteries. This discussion should encourage a careful re-reading of the Cartesian account of surface and space, although I have some doubts about the interpretation of 'modes' on p. 158. The collection concludes with a lengthy, detailed essay by Gabbey (171-250) on the changing attitudes of More towards Cartesianism, from his initial enthusiasm and interest to the conviction (in the *Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, 1671) that Cartesianism was the source of impiety and godlessness.

In general, I would be reluctant to recommend this collection to philosophers interested in Descartes, because it tends to explore historical problems with insufficient control over the conceptual issues involved. It is equally clear, however, that philosophical discussions of Descartes could benefit from an injection of historical scholarship. This collection might be added to other recent volumes which begin to improve our historical sensitivities.

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EMMANUEL LÉVINAS, *Transcendance et intelligibilité*, suivi d'un entretien, Genève; Labor et Fides 1984, 70 p. ISBN 2-8309-0013-8.

Ce petit livre contient le texte d'une conférence donnée à Genève le 1er juin 1983 et le compte-rendu d'un entretien qui eut lieu le lendemain.

A partir de Hegel, peu de philosophes ont résisté à la tentation de penser la vie spirituelle sur le modèle du savoir et nous subissons encore les suites de ce coup d'Etat. 'Le savoir est une relation du *Même* avec l'*Autre* où l'*Autre* se réduit au *Même* et se dépouille de son étrangeté, où la pensée se rapporte à l'autre mais où l'autre n'est plus l'autre en tant que tel, où il est déjà le propre, déjà *mien*. Il est désormais sans secrets ou ouvert à la recherche, c'est-à-dire *monde*. Il est *immanence*' (12-13). De là, Lévinas reprend, à nouveau, son plaidoyer pour le *Transcendant*, pas la simple Transcendance comme dit le titre. Quand le paradigme de l'intelligibilité est celui d'une '*aperception transcendante*' qui englobe le pensable dans sa totalité' (14), on déclare inintelligible ce qui déborde cette mesure de la totalité immanente. La volonté d'adéquation de la pensée à l'être, volonté de possession, se ferme à l'autre. La pensée se met en retrait 'de l'autre en tant qu'autre qui ne loge pas dans le noème d'une noëse et qui pourrait cependant importer à l'humain' (16). Au delà de ce type immanentiste d'intentionnalité, gouvernée par l'idée de savoir, Lévinas trouve une pensée qui est intelligence d'un être-saisi par l'autre. Ce qui est à vérifier au plus près, chez le 'prochain,' dans la rencontre de l'autre humain, en ce qu'il se donne comme celui dont j'ai souci, dont je suis responsable. 'Excellence de l'amour, de la socialité, de la "crainte pour les autres" et de la responsabilité pour les autres qui n'est pas mon angoisse pour ma mort, *mienne*' (27), qui n'est pas recrutement du réel comme remplissage de *mon horizon*, mais perte extatique.

Sur le plan philosophique, Lévinas croit que l'idée d'infini, par exemple comme on la trouve chez Descartes, est la médiation de cette extraversion, et que 'l'idée de Dieu est, de fond en comble, affectivité, ... affection du fini par l'infini qu'il ne s'agit pas de réduire' (26). Le thème est désormais familier aux lecteurs de Lévinas, qui en redemandent ... Ce court texte ne remplace pas des ouvrages plus étayés comme *Humanisme de l'autre homme* (Montpellier, Fata Morgana, 1972).

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DAVID MILLER, *Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 218. Cdn\$32.25. ISBN 0-19-824658-7.

In this welcome book, David Miller sets out to provide a reasonably concise account of Hume's social and political thought which will restore Hume to

his proper place in the company of past masters of political theory and which will explore the relationships between philosophy and politics. Both these aims are worthy, the first because Hume deserves a place in that company, the second because there is much question about the extent to which criticism of philosophical views is relevant to criticism of political views. (For example, to what extent do we overthrow Plato's vision of the ideal state by challenging his theory of knowledge?) Miller's knowledge of Hume's *Essays* and *History of England*, as well as the *Enquiries* and *Treatise*, allows him to describe and explain Hume's views on economic, political and social issues. Readers who know Hume's philosophical writings best will find Miller's discussion useful and interesting. However Miller's decision to restrict himself pretty much to exposition of Hume prevents him from fully realizing his grander aims.

Miller sees Hume as 'the best example we have' (187) of a secular and sceptical conservatism, characterized by a 'cautious and moderate approach to politics (which does not exclude progressive change, provided this is gradual), backed up by a sceptical attitude towards all grandiose schemes for social or political reconstruction erected on rationalist foundations' (15). The core of Hume's political standpoint is that, *ceteris paribus*, we should preserve 'the ancient fabric' of our own society and 'the chief pillars and supports of the constitution' even if we can imagine a better set of political and social institutions than the ones we have. Thus the fact, if it is one, that it might be better to be a citizen of Britain than one of France or Russia does not, for Hume, give the citizen of France or Russia a good reason for trying to make France or Russia like Britain. This decidedly unrevolutionary (but not counter-revolutionary) approach to politics contrasts with the radical's: *ceteris paribus*, we should try to change 'the chief pillars and supports of the constitution' if we can imagine a better set of political and social institutions than the ones we have.

Such conservatism is hardly unique to Hume. For Miller, much of Hume's significance and interest derives from the way this political standpoint (C) depends on his philosophical views. Miller distinguishes Hume's philosophy (A), his 'epistemological and meta-ethical premisses' (12) from his ideology (B), his 'assumptions' about human nature, especially about human motivation and social behaviour, which 'came to him immediately from his social and political environment' (13). Miller devotes the first half of his book to A and the second half to B; their connection with C is developed mostly in his introduction and conclusion. Miller claims that both A and B make an 'essential contribution' to Hume's political thought. He says,

more formally, the truth of Hume's philosophical premises is a necessary but insufficient condition of the truth of his political standpoint. The remaining necessary conditions are provided by his ideological commitments. (14)

This is an exciting claim, given the interest of Hume's conservative political standpoint, but also, surely false.

Miller is claiming not only (1) that A and B imply C, i.e., that Hume's philosophy and his ideology together yield his political standpoint, but also (2) that C implies A, i.e., that no other philosophical views, no matter how hare-brained, in combination with any other ideology, no matter how hare-brained, would produce his political standpoint. Can one imagine no such views? In any case, establishing (2) would require some grand transcendental argument which goes beyond an exposition of Hume and which Miller does not even attempt.

Perhaps, to be charitable to Miller, we should read his claim instead as not only (1) but also (3) that B and C imply A, i.e., that given his ideology, his conservatism requires his philosophy. Really? Suppose, against Hume, it were self-evident that the future resembles the past. Does it thereby follow that either Hume's views about motivation or his conservative political stance is wrong? Surely this is far from clear even though (3), together with modus tollens, would require so. Suppose instead, against Hume's meta-ethics, that the principle of utility is self-evident. Suppose further, with Hume's ideology, that, as a matter of fact, given the way human beings are, the benefits of social cooperation depend on habits and customs of obedience and allegiance which develop incrementally as people see the interests of themselves and their fellows satisfied and are praised or blamed by their fellows for conforming or failing to conform. Doesn't this give us pretty much C, Hume's conservatism, especially if these suppositions are combined with Hume's claim that judgements about causes and effects are always fallible? Yet (3), together with modus tollens, would require that C be false. Again, even if my counter-possibilities are not convincing, Miller can rule them out and establish his exciting claims only by doing political philosophy himself and not restricting himself to expounding Hume.

Miller also suggests that (1) is true and that among the philosophical standpoints which conservatives might use to defend their political standpoint, Hume's is most defensible (cf. p. 205) Hume is a mitigated sceptic, both with respect to empirical judgements and judgements of vice and virtue. Neither sort of judgement nor the principles they exemplify are self-evident, provable from self-evident premisses or provably more likely than not correct from past experience. Nonetheless, neither sort of judgement is entirely arbitrary or conventional but rather both have a basis in human nature. Moreover, Miller claims, 'mitigated scepticism shows how better judgement is possible' (39): we may improve our judgment by judging on habits founded in the 'inescapable' principles of belief formation. However Miller never asks or explains why judgements founded on the permanent principles of the understanding are better than those which are not. Without doing epistemology, Miller cannot justify his claims about Hume's importance. How can Hume make this claim? He can't show that some judgements are better because more likely to be true or less likely to be in error. Perhaps, as Hume sometimes suggests, judgements exemplifying the rules by which to

judge of causes and effects are 'more useful in the conduct of life' and thus are better because they would be approved by an impartial spectator. Yet, only on pain of circularity can one then claim, as Miller does, that improvement in moral judgement is a matter of improvement in empirical judgement (cf. 57) or that Hume's epistemology is a necessary condition of his moral philosophy (95). Thus, for all Miller says, the merits of mitigated scepticism are unclear. Miller's best case lies in Hume's appeal to the associative activities of the mind in defence of specific principles of property and allegiance. However, as Miller notes, and many readers feel, Hume's arguments are strained. In any case, suppose it true that if, when we think of object X, we naturally think of person Y, then we naturally approve of Y's enjoyment of X and disapprove of anyone else's enjoyment of X and thereby assign Y exclusive rights to X. Thus we might further suppose that people will naturally judge in accordance with principles of property and allegiance like Hume's and converge on such principles when trying to agree on common rules. But why would this justify them, as Miller suggests it does? Perhaps Hume has answers of merit. (Are the principles justified because impartial judges must find natural practices useful in mankind and so be compelled to judge in accordance with them?) Miller avoids pursuing such questions.

Despite these cavils, Miller's book should be recommended strongly both to those who know Hume's philosophy well but not his political writings and to those who want a general introduction to both Hume's philosophy and his politics. It is a pity more is not attempted in Miller's book.

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JULIUS MORAVCSIK and PHILIP TEMKO, eds., *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield 1982. Pp. x + 150. U.S.\$27.50. ISBN 0-8476-7030-9.

The six essays comprising this collection originated from an interdisciplinary conference held in 1979 at Bodega, California. As the editors explain, the conference was inspired by the question of a young contemporary poet who 'wanted to know how Plato, the philosopher who used poetic images more than anyone else, could talk about art the way he did.' From the six contributors, we get six different answers to the poet's question.

In 'Plato on the Triviality of Literature,' Julia Annas argues that Plato is uncompromisingly opposed to art and poetry. Her argument rests upon what she regards as a split in Plato's thought about poetry reflected in the tension between the two criticisms found in *Republic*. She claims that Plato treats poetry as quite important in Books II and III, but as trivial and unworthy of serious consideration in the first two arguments of Book X (595a-602c, 602c-605c), where he is 'trying to show that the poet does not *create* at all. He is merely a man with a mirror, doing something silly that requires no knowledge' (22). In what she identifies as the third argument in Book X (605c-608b), Annas sees Plato returning to the serious consideration of poetry as posing a serious moral threat to the audience, its dangerous power deriving from the creativity of the poet. She concludes that this split in Plato's thought indicates that he 'cannot be considered the advocate of "civic poetry" ... he knows that the verses he finally permits are not real poetry' (23).

Whereas Annas claims that there are three separate arguments in *Republic* X, other authors — e.g., Adam, Nettleship, Crombie, Grube — have maintained that there are two, the first attacking art and poetry as at 'three removes' from the truth (595c-602b), and the second criticizing poetry for the negative effect it has on the souls of the audience (602c-606d). Alexander Nehamas, in 'Plato on Imitation and Poetry in *Republic* 10', argues that there are not even two arguments here, but only one. What others have taken as separate arguments are, he claims, 'only parts of the single argument against poetry that we find announced at the very beginning of the book.' Nehamas maintains that Plato's argument against poetry depends upon 'his view that it appeals to and strengthens the irrational elements in the soul' (66), which it is capable of doing by virtue of two 'oppositions' inherent in our psychological make-up: 'the opposition of reason to the irrational parts of the soul,' and that existing 'between two aspects of reasoning' (68), namely, 'the uncritical acceptance of the senses' reports' and 'reflective judgments' about these reports (65). It is the latter opposition, according to Nehamas, which is the more crucial for Plato, for it accounts for our 'tendency to take as models for imitation what are merely products of imitation' (68); our tendency, that is, to value the appearance over reality and, ultimately, to lose the ability to distinguish the good from the bad. It is with an eye to this unacceptable outcome, then, that Plato banishes poetry from the city.

Martha Craven Nussbaum, in 'Poetry, Goodness, and Understanding in Plato's *Phaedrus*', follows a completely different line of interpretation. Identifying *Phaedrus* as a transitional work composed after *Republic* and about the time of *Theaetetus*, Nussbaum sees in this dialogue both a 'shift in Plato's moral psychology' and a 'new epistemological/metaphysical direction.' She argues that 'the *Phaedrus* both implicitly criticizes and formally recants some views about the appetites and emotions, about the components of the good life, and about personal identity that had been seriously defended in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*' (81). Suggesting that *Phaedrus* is the *apologia* of poetry intimated at in *Republic* X (607d-608b), Nussbaum claims that Plato has here 'recanted or seriously qualified' (105) his criticism of the irrational in

*Republic* by offering a 'defense of *mania*' (96), the upshot of which is that Plato reinstates poetry as in fact essential to the quest for truth, now recognizing that 'the poet can serve ... as a model for the philosopher and the lover, those other creators of truth and value' (117).

Like Nehamas, Urmson argues in 'Plato and the Poets' that Plato is criticizing the poet for his skill in persuading the audience to accept his falsehood as truth. Urmson demonstrates further that Plato's criticism is 'directed against a view of serious imaginative literature that is still very common in modern times' (135). According to this view of literature, the writer of fiction possesses special insight into human psychology and is therefore to be regarded as an authority; as, for example, Dostoevsky might be considered to possess insight into 'the criminal mentality, the repentant sinner' (134). Urmson maintains that Plato would reject this view: while the author may be skilful in writing a convincing book, there is no reason whatsoever to 'think it as in any way truthful' (134). Thus, given their ability to deceive the audience by giving 'a very convincing show of apparent insight into important matters of which they know nothing' (135), the poets are to be banished.

Paul Woodruff presents yet another way in which to interpret Plato's criticism. In 'What Could Go Wrong with Inspiration? Why Plato's Poets Fail,' he argues that 'Plato thinks at least three things can go wrong with inspiration when it happens to poets' (137). First, while poets may be inspired by the *kalon* ('the fine'), they do not *love* it — they love only what they make. Their attention is directed away from the fine itself and toward the production of beautiful objects, which are only images (*eikones*) of the fine,' and 'lovers of these beauties, the lovers of sights and sounds, are not lovers of the fine' (142). Secondly, the inspired poet not only has no knowledge of her subject matter, but she does not even believe what she herself says. Concentrating on the dramatic poet, Woodruff writes that what she 'gets by inspiration is a *drama*, and that is not the sort of thing she can believe. Such inspiration, therefore, cannot issue in belief; a fortiori it could not deliver knowledge, if knowledge requires belief' (144). Thirdly, inspiration 'leaves no scope for a *technē* ('skill') of poetry' (144), and without this the poet is unable to explain what she does and says. In sum, the poet knows neither how she produces her poems nor whether they are true, and according to Woodruff it is for this reason that Plato banishes her.

Julius Moravcsik states the 'theme' of his 'Noetic Aspiration and Artistic Inspiration' quite succinctly:

... according to Plato while the objects and products of noetic aspiration are intrinsically good, the objects and products of inspiration have at best instrumental value insofar as they contribute to the seeking of understanding on higher, more theoretical levels. At their worst they lead us astray, since they suggest the self-contained nature of art and its allegedly intrinsically meritorious insights, and hence keep us from reaching toward the kind of understanding that culminates in the contemplation of the Forms. (30)

Moravscik concludes his study, which is both comprehensive and insightful, with a brief discussion of 'Plato's Legacy,' in which he indicates the radical departure of Plato's thought from the course of traditional Greek culture and draws an unusual and striking contrast between Plato and Christianity. While all the essays in *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts* are both informative and provocative, the book is already to be highly recommended for Moravscik's essay alone.

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ELIANE MOSSÉ, *Les riches et les pauvres*, Paris: Editions du Seuil 1983, 250 p.  
ISBN 2-02-006556-8.

Pour certains, ce ne serait qu'aux années 1960 que le peuple américain a 'découvert la pauvreté.' Cette conscientisation subite daterait de la campagne électorale de John F. Kennedy, les caméras de la télévision se mettant à scruter les visages et les taudis des gens des charbonnages de West Virginia ... Puis, alors que Michael Harrington publia son *Other America*, la 'société d'abondance' afficha une 'guerre à la pauvreté.'

Le scénario laisse songeur. D'autant plus que notre citation est tirée de la préface d'un ouvrage intitulé *Poverty in New York 1783-1825*.<sup>1</sup> Autrement plus sérieux que les illusions préfabriquées dans le style *public relations* intéressées, est le regard posé par Eliane Mossé sur des données essentielles de la physionomie de la misère contemporaine dans les pays riches de notre planète.

Ce livre, nous avertit l'A. d'entrée de jeu, 'ne constitue ni une tentative d'explication de la pauvreté dans les pays riches ... ni une analyse des recettes propres à éliminer la pauvreté ...' Le propos essentiel consiste plutôt à 'tenter de saisir la pauvreté aujourd'hui: que veut dire être pauvre à Paris, à Rennes, en Italie? Que veut dire chômeur pauvre, vieillard pauvre, immigré pauvre? Quelles sont les conditions de vie de l'enfant pauvre? Quelles sont les relations entre pauvreté et délinquance?' (11)

Comme point de départ, des 'fragments d'un discours sur la pauvreté' (paroles de pauvres) fournissent un tracé saïssissant, souvent accablant, d'une réalité vécue qui est à la fois complexe et d'une brutalité simple. Ces fragments sont tirés d'une dizaine de sources, depuis le Secours Catholique de

Paris à des recherches menées à Vaucresson, à Chambéry, Saint-Quentin, Noisy-le-Grand, Guiglano en Campanie, au nord-ouest de Naples; aux données cueillies par les circuits officiels s'ajoutent (de façon combien éclairante) celles d'organismes tels que ceux d'ATD (Aide à toute détresse). La Conclusion prend la forme d'une interrogation: 'Vaincre la pauvreté?'

A la question, 'Qui est pauvre?' (ch. 2), l'A. aborde une réponse en partant des analyses proposées par la CEE, l'OCDE, les études de Rowntree, Beveridge et P. Townsend (Angleterre), M. Harrington (E.-U.). S'y profilent les débats sur la pauvreté comme concept absolu ou relatif, la 'ligne' (ou seuil) de pauvreté, l'approche en fonction des indicateurs sociaux. La définition choisie définit la pauvreté comme '*la situation de personnes ou de groupes de personnes marqués par l'insuffisance des ressources disponibles, la précarité du statut social et l'exclusion d'un mode de vie (matériel et culturel) dominant*' (37). Les chapitres qui suivent illustrent, avec abondance de documents-témoignages inédits ou peu connus, chacun des éléments évoqués par la définition. Par exemple:

- Combien y a-t-il de pauvres?
- Précarité et exclusion. Etre pauvre: à Rennes, en banlieue, en Italie; avoir faim à Lyon; des pauvres aux Etats-Unis; à Nanterre, les Tziganes ...
- Etre pauvre ... et chômeur
  - ... et vieux
  - ... et immigrés.
- L'enfant pauvre.
- Pauvreté et délinquance.

Pour donner un aperçu du concret déconcertant et émouvant dont foisonne cet ouvrage, en voici un échantillon:

*Vieillesse des pauvres: les chemins de l'hospice* (rapport publié aux Editions ouvrières, Paris, 1980): L'entassement, la promiscuité: longues galeries abritant 85 à 114 lits en dortoirs, quelquefois divisés en boxes de 20. La coupure par rapport au monde des vivants marque l'altération du temps. Les auteurs écrivent: 'L'absence de calendriers et de pendules dans les locaux est l'indice le plus flagrant de cette altération. Seuls demeurent les repères naturels (le jour, la nuit, les saisons) et les repères administratifs (le jour de visite du médecin, la répartition hebdomadaire des menus, les horaires des repas et des soins. On retrouve aussi la dépersonnalisation, ... et presque toujours la brimade, l'humiliation' (120). Et les paroles de quelques-uns des hôtes:

Ici, on se moque bien de la dignité des gens: on les torche et puis c'est tout.

Ici, c'est déprimant ... vous êtes toute la journée avec des fous, des malades, des morts, tout le temps la maladie, la souffrance, on gueule tout le temps, ça crie partout ...

J'attends la fin de mon monde et puis c'est tout, j'attends de crever, c'est tout ce que je demande ... (32)

Âge d'or. De Gaulle aurait dit autrefois, 'la vieillesse est un naufrage' ... Et la vieillesse du pauvre? Malgré la proportion élevée du nombre de démunis parmi les personnes âgées, 'les politiques de la vieillesse, si généreuses qu'elles se veulent parfois, partent toujours du principe que les besoins de la personne âgée sont moindres que ceux de l'adulte: alors qu'on pourrait au contraire très bien inverser la proposition ...' (114).

Dans tous les grands domaines de la discrimination, la pauvreté s'insère comme composante. Ainsi, aux Etats-Unis, en % du total des familles se trouvant en dessous du seuil de la pauvreté, les familles blanches comptaient pour 8,8%, les familles noires, 30,8% (1981).

Les familles blanches, dont le chef de famille est un homme, se trouvant en dessous du seuil de la pauvreté: 6,2%. Celles de cette catégorie, mais dont le chef de famille est une femme: 34,6%

Dont, familles blanches	27,4%	
familles noires	52,9%	(104).

En France, 'l'inégalité par rapport à la santé est également considérable. Une illustration: le taux de mortalité infantile (durant la première année) est presque le double pour un enfant dont la mère est algérienne de celui dont la mère est française.' Dans le cas des maladies d'acquisition, 'la tuberculose ... frappe *trente fois* plus certaines catégories de travailleurs immigrés — Africains noirs en particulier' ... (125).

Autre domaine: celui des 'relations à l'appareil judiciaire et pénal, (où) on constate une surreprésentation des étrangers au niveau des condamnations, mais, surtout, au niveau de l'emprisonnement' (127).

L'exclusion par la délinquance: surtout juvénile. L'énumération des vols jugés en janvier 1970 par le tribunal pour enfants de Douai. Au nombre de 80, la liste débute ainsi:

1 oiseau mécanique, 1 carnet, 2 canifs, 1 paquet de vis, 1 couteau à mastic, 2 plaques de chocolat, 2 sachets de bonbons, 1 sablier ...

— et encore pour vingt lignes d' 'items' (149).

Multiples, donc, sont les manifestations et les retombées de la déprivation; ce n'est que très brièvement, et vers la toute fin, que l'A. tente d'esquisser un 'cadrage macro-économique' de l'écart existant entre les plus riches et les plus pauvres, ainsi que de 'la très grande inertie des disparités dans le temps et dans l'espace' (217-24). Face à ceux qui se débattent avec le cumul des handicaps, se trouve le cumul des avantages, 'La liberté extrême de décision ... (de) ceux qui bénéficient à la fois de l'avoir, du savoir et du pouvoir' (214). Là

où la distribution des *revenus* des familles avant impôt au début des années 70 se traduisit, au plan des déciles de population, par un écart de 1,5 à 31,0 pour la France (1, 2 à 27,1 pour le Canada), le contraste sur le plan des patrimoines se résume ainsi pour la France: 'si les revenus après impôts sont sept fois supérieurs, les patrimoines sont plus de quatre-vingt-dix fois supérieurs' (223).

Le livre d'Eliane Mossé a jeté d'importants éclairages 'sur le phénomène complexe, multidimensionnel, difficile à mesurer ou même à décrire, plus difficile encore à comprendre, qu'est la pauvreté.'

*Mais:* 'Pourquoi y a-t-il des pauvres dans les sociétés riches? Nous nous sommes bien gardés de poser le problème — car toute réponse serait nécessairement imprégnée d'un *a priori* doctrinal ...'

Avancer une problématique de la pauvreté? 'Alors, inévitablement, on tombe dans l'idéologie ...' — marxiste, ou libéral ou néo-classique, ou encore technocratique ou néo-keynésienne. Toutes ces problématiques seraient inaptes à expliquer le phénomène, et 'Galbraith aurait peut-être raison d'écrire: "De ce phénomène de la pauvreté, nous n'avons pas d'explications ..." (229-230).

Laissons plutôt à l'historien, économiste et géographe Pierre Vilar le mot de réplique: 'Les riches. Les pauvres. Voilà l'aspect extérieur. Il est important. Il détermine les psychologies. Il n'est pas un moteur des changements et des luttes. Le problème n'est pas de savoir comment on *est* riche ou pauvre. Il est de savoir comment on le *devient*. Accumulations, paupérisations: voilà des problèmes majeurs de l'histoire sociale ... C'est le *mode de prélèvement* sur la production, c'est le mécanisme d'accumulation qui constitue le fait social significatif, éclairant.'<sup>2</sup> Bref, c'est d'une dynamique de rapports sociaux d'exploitation et de domination, dans leur mouvance historique concrète, qu'il s'agit — et qui seule permettra une perspective d'explications qui engendreront la transformation sociale.

Les 'paroles de pauvres' du début se terminent avec une boutade et des vers, de sources assez diverses:

- 'Saint-Quentin, c'est toujours pareil, d'un côté il y a les patrons, de l'autre les ouvriers.'
- 'Je voudrais bien qu'un jour, / on mette les gens riches dehors, / et les gens pauvres dans les maisons. / Comme ça, / les riches. / ils verront ce que c'est. / Et après / on rendrait les maisons aux riches, / et peut-être que, / s'ils ont des places en trop dans leur maison, / ils accueilleraient les pauvres chez eux ...' (32-33).

En exergue à sa conclusion Eliane Mossé cite les paroles d'*'Une saison en enfer'* d'Arthur Rimbaud:

'Changer la vie?'

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- 1 Avant-propos de Richard C. Wade, general editor, *Urban Life in America* series. L'auteur de cette étude historique utile est Raymond A. Mohl. Pour lui 'The problem seems just as real in mid-20th century ... while the public condemn the poor, poverty endures and deepens' (265).
- 2 *Une Histoire en construction*: approches marxistes et problématiques conjoncturelles. Paris: Gallimard/Seuil 1982, p. 360.

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GORDON NAGEL, *The Structure of Experience: Kant's System of Principles*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 1983. Pp. vii + 283. US \$27.50. ISBN 0-226-56766-4.

*The Structure of Experience* is a remarkable blend of the provocative and the perverse. Gordon Nagel inveighs against the mainstream of Kant commentators from Kemp Smith on that they have been faster to impute a contradiction to Kant than to reconsider the reliability of their own interpretations in light of the contradictions these produce (3). But what he has produced is a very free interpretation indeed, something closer in spirit (though certainly not in style) to the 'Variations on Kantian Themes' of Wilfrid Sellars. (In fact, there is enough substantive similarity between Nagel's and Sellars' versions of Kantianism to make the total absence of any reference to *Science and Metaphysics* in *The Structure of Experience* somewhat glaring.)

The heart of Nagel's interpretation is a vision of Kant as the *allzermalmende* critic of the 'two-element' model of epistemology adopted by eighteenth-century empiricism but also by much twentieth-century analytic philosophy. On this model, the mind has only the two faculties of sense and reason, and is engaged in the — inevitably fruitless — task of trying to justify its beliefs in an external world, other minds and so on by purely rational inference from sensory materials which, because of their total lack of conceptual structure, are completely unsuitable for employment as premises in the desired inferences (e.g., 16). In its current guise, this model condemns the mind to the equally vain job of trying to establish connection between thought which is purely propositional and a sensory given which has no propositional structure capable of bearing truth-value at all (41-3). Kant, on the contrary, escapes from the hopeless dilemma of traditional epistemology by revising the conception of both its task and its tools. For the useless project of attempting to *justify* our beliefs, Kant substitutes the more promising one of

explaining them, and between the otherwise incommensurable faculties of sense and inferential reason (or propositional thought) Kant inserts the powerful faculty of understanding. This faculty provides structured conceptions of objects which may be filled in by sense, for intuition also contains structured relations (43) (here is the unexplored connection with Sellars), and in the face of occasional difficulties supplemented by the puzzle-solving ability of reason. But it does not face the impossible task of trying to glue up a world-picture out of two materials which refuse to adhere, because it already contains the general outlines of such a picture and only needs to make it more specific or determinate by the use of sensory material on the one hand and the inferential plugging of gaps on the other (e.g., 21, 29, 111, 119, 215, 224-25, 239).

There is surely something deeply right about Nagel's analysis of Kant's diagnosis of the dilemma of empiricism (just as there is in Sellars' enlistment of Kant for his struggle against the myth of the given). But there are equally deep difficulties with his portrayal of Kant's alternative model of knowledge. For one, his thesis that Kant is interested in explanation *instead* of justification fails to persuade. He does not, to begin with, even spell out the contrast at any length. Nor does he attempt to reconcile it with the text: he does not comment on Kant's own remark that he, unlike Locke (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 127), is concerned with the *quid juris* rather than the *quid facti* (A 84/B 116); more generally, he deals with the most obvious evidence against his view, the Transcendental Deduction, by simply skipping over it (though he does promise discussion of it on another occasion [256 n. 5]). On the question of contrary evidence, by the way, an omission from the secondary literature even more peculiar than that of Sellars may also be noted: Nagel nowhere refers to his own Toronto colleague D.P. Dryer's distinguished presentation of Kant precisely as a justificatory epistemologist. But finally, and most importantly, Nagel's discussion of the Analogies of Experience ultimately belies his own contrast between explanation and justification. Thus, in his groundbreaking (although also excessive) interpretation of the third Analogy, Nagel sees Kant as criticizing Hume's 'failure to appreciate the need for an objective ground to support any judgment of perception' (198), and presents Kant's own argument as turning on the premise that 'Copresence in sense ... gives us the idea of things being at the same time; but if we are to make a judgment to this effect, we must have some ground for doing so' (195). If these remarks do not suggest an argument about conditions for the justification of a type of judgment, it is not clear what would.

The second general problem is with Nagel's conception of Kantian understanding as coming equipped with a general though indeterminate world-picture which is merely made more determinate by sense and reason. Nagel does not do much to make plausible the psychological claim which this implies, namely the presence of a considerable amount of innate representation, though there is approving reference to some relevant work in cognitive psychology (15 and 252 n.32). Further, Nagel again makes no attempt to reconcile his interpretation with Kant's own programmatic remarks. This

time he fails to reconcile his model of cognition as a continuum from generality to specificity with Kant's own claim that his predecessors, especially Leibniz and Wolff, confused the distinction between intuition and concept precisely by treating it as a difference of degree, a 'merely logical' distinction, rather than as a 'transcendental' one, or a difference in 'origin and content' and most importantly function (A 44/B 61-2). But where Kant's own view is that there are very clear transcendental or functional differences between intuitions and concepts in general, and within the sphere of the latter between pure concepts and schemata on the one hand and empirical concepts on the other, Nagel's approach blurs all these into mere distinctions of degree of determinateness and even difficulty (in spite of 29).

Space will allow me only to suggest how these general problems emerge in the heart of Nagel's book, his discussion of the three Analogies of Experience. These chapters correctly emphasize the general view that the three Analogies must be understood together as jointly providing the conditions for making determinations of objective relations of succession (change) and coexistence in the face of our inadequate sensory evidence for discrimination between such relations, namely our always successive apprehensions themselves; but again they contain some striking peculiarities. Thus, Chapter 5 rightly objects against the view of Ralph Walker and one part of the interpretation of Arthur Melnick that the first Analogy has nothing to do with the *measurement* of duration (that is actually the province of the Axioms of Intuition), but instead argues for the necessity of duration for the representation of *change*; and the chapter contains a brief but perspicuous explanation, along the lines of the other half of Melnick's interpretation, of why duration is such a condition (151). But the chapter also defends Kant's opening argument, added in B (B 224-5), precisely by inverting Kant's sense: Nagel sees Kant as arguing that permanent substance may be posited because time represents a permanent substratum of matter in physical objects (125-6), although what Kant (unpersuasively) argues is rather that substance must be posited in order to represent the permanence of *time* itself. Further, Nagel's picture of the first Analogy as adding permanence to spatiality in order to produce objectivity (122-3) might be thought to pre-empt as well as misunderstand the Refutation of Idealism's addition of *independence* to *permanence* for this same end. (The Refutation of Idealism is treated only perfunctorily in the last two pages of the book [244-6].)

The discussion of the second Analogy in Chapter 6 begins with the astute observation that Kant's point was not to solve Hume's problem of induction from observed events to unobserved ones, but rather was to show how any events may be observed at all in light of the fact that changing apprehensions themselves do not discriminate between objective events and non-events (154-5). But the interpretation Nagel then develops illustrates the difficulty of reconciling his model of the somewhat indeterminate world-picture provided by understanding being made more specific by sense with Kant's own conception of the relation between sensibility and understanding. Nagel's argument is that the *concepts* of the powers of objects provide some general con-

straints to tell us whether or not any change is represented by a succession of representations, although precisely *which* change it is that may then be represented — e.g., whether a ship which is indeed moving rather than stationary must be represented as moving upstream or down — must be left up to the specific details provided by sense (158-61). This misses Kant's actual point, which is precisely that *no* amount of sensory information can uniquely determine what is objectively transpiring, and that it is indeed only from knowledge of causal *laws* that objective sequences can be inferred. That is, though of course we usually do not possess all the details — which is exactly why Kant's argument must ultimately be understood to concern the ideal justification rather than actual acquisition of knowledge — it is only from causal laws that entail that in the given circumstances the ship *must* be sailing downstream that we could determine that it *is* in spite of the variety of interpretations that we could place on our untutored observations of its apparent motions.

Chapter 7 contains a useful discussion of the usually neglected third Analogy, which errs by asking this interesting argument to do too much. Nagel correctly sees that the premise of the argument is that spatial position can no more directly be perceived than temporal position, and that Kant's claim is then that the coexistence of objects in separate spatial positions which cannot simultaneously be perceived can be grounded only in dynamic interactions between them — although here, as previously remarked, his own emphasis on explanation rather than justification is compromised (193-9). He also correctly notices that it is just a subcase of this conclusion that the determination of the relative positions of a *perceiver* and any other object also requires causal interaction between them (200-04; cf. A 213-14/B 260-1). However, he then simply reads too much into this argument when he tries to present the third Analogy as Kant's theory of subjectivity, objectivity, *and intersubjectivity*: a community of *knowers* of the sort which can for instance confirm memory-claims (214 ff.) is simply not to be derived from Kant's conception of a community of *objects* in space.

All students of Kant, no matter how traditional their own interpretations, will want to read this iconoclastic work and will benefit if from nothing else than from Nagel's often perspicuous presentation of the *questions* Kant was asking. In the long run, however, the book may be of more significance as a contribution to the critique of traditional epistemology which is now in full swing, and the fact that it is cast as a commentary on Kant will come to be regarded as a bit of a mystery.

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ROSEMARY PATTENDEN. *The Judge, Discretion, and the Criminal Trial*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford University Press 1982. Pp. xv + 299. Cdn\$56.95; US\$48.00. ISBN 0-19-825373-7.

This book deals with the exercise of discretion by English and Australian judges in criminal trials on indictment, 'from the point at which the accused is arraigned until the stage at which the jury returns its verdict' (43). The dispositions considered all arise under procedural law and the law of evidence and range from the discretion to stay proceedings to the discretion of a judge to comment on the credibility of witnesses, the strength of the defence, and on the verdict which a jury ought to return.

Pattenden's aim is to provide both a descriptive account of present practice and a general theoretical framework within which that practice might best be understood and assessed. She is particularly concerned to dispel the notion that discretion is tantamount to a licence to decide arbitrarily and on whim. She argues that guidelines and limitations derived from usage, judicial remark and occasionally statute, together with the ever increasing possibility of successful appeal based on the 'wrongful,' indeed 'unlawful,' (29) exercise of judicial discretion have served, and can continue to serve, to keep judicial discretion reasonably circumscribed. She also argues following Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics* V, 10) and Hart (*The Concept of Law*, ch. VII) that certain areas of law are sometimes best served by a flexible judicial discretion duly guided and limited rather than by fixed rules which would be either highly undesirable or virtually impossible to frame in any rational manner.

The dispositions discussed by Pattenden are not, it should be noted, of the sort which exist, by default or design, at the 'open-textured fringes' of laws, and whose existence and nature have recently been the subject of considerable controversy among philosophers. Rather, they are all explicitly granted by law, and their existence seems therefore beyond question. What is not beyond question, however, is whether the existence of those dispositions has any real implications for recent philosophical debates about law and adjudication. In particular, does it have any real force against Dworkin's rights thesis: that 'judicial decisions' are not discretionary, but rather 'enforce existing political rights' (*Taking Rights Seriously*, 87)? It may be instructive to consider briefly how Dworkin might respond to Pattenden's conclusion that discretion permeates the law of evidence and procedure in England and Australia.

His first reply would undoubtedly be to claim that Pattenden has, like so many others, simply confused weak with strong discretion. The 'guidelines' and 'limitations' she documents serve, like legal principles, to convert any strong discretion judges might otherwise have into weak discretion. It is doubtful, however, that this reply will succeed. As Pattenden argues, those guidelines and limitations sometimes serve to rule out some discretionary

decisions as wrong, and indeed unlawful, but frequently leave (as Hart might put it) 'open alternatives' none of which anyone is entitled to have chosen. In short, they allow considerable strong discretion.

Perhaps Dworkin's next move would simply be to brand Pattenden's observations interesting, but strictly speaking irrelevant. The rights thesis, he might claim, 'holds in standard *civil* cases, when the ruling assumption is that one of the parties has a right to win' (*TRS*, 100, emphasis added). But this manoeuvre does not seem open to Dworkin, for immediately following his restriction of the (full-blooded) rights thesis to standard civil cases, he adds that it also holds partially or 'asymmetrically' in criminal cases. Here the accused always has a right to be acquitted if innocent, but the state has no parallel right to a conviction if he is guilty. So the rights thesis does extend, at least partially, to criminal cases, and the question remains whether Pattenden's dispositions, which sometimes work against the accused, place the thesis in jeopardy.

The only reply open to Dworkin at this point would seem to be the following. Assume arguendo that English and Australian judges have the vast range of evidentiary and procedural dispositions Pattenden says they do. It is still the case that, if innocent, the accused has a *right* to acquittal, and the court has no strong discretion to convict him on grounds of policy. This is true even if the rules of evidence and procedure under which the court attempts to determine whether the accused is guilty, and therefore has a right to acquittal, grant judges all sorts of discretion. The accused may, if Pattenden is correct, not enjoy the right to have damaging but illegally obtained evidence excluded. He does nevertheless have a right to be acquitted if he is in fact innocent, just as one of the two litigants in a standard civil case has a right to judgment in his favour if he in fact has the legal right he claims.

Assuming this is indeed how Dworkin would respond, then it is questionable whether Pattenden's findings have any direct force against the rights thesis. (I should add that no such force is claimed by Pattenden.) But they may have indirect force. Even if, as Dworkin would insist, the accused retains the inviolable right to be acquitted if he is innocent, we are left with the following important question. In many familiar legal systems critical questions concerning the evidence to be admitted and the procedures to be followed in determining whether the accused *has* that right are left largely, and from the point of view of the accused perhaps somewhat precariously, in the hands of judges and their discretion. Do such systems really take the right to acquittal if innocent as seriously as Dworkin would want, or would have us suppose? Perhaps instead they believe, along with Pattenden, Aristotle and Hart, that the exercise of judicial discretion, duly limited and guided, need be neither arbitrary nor unfair. Indeed it may sometimes represent the only reasonable course. Such systems may believe that a structure of fixed, pre-established legal rights, with no room for an informed, flexible judicial discretion, does not always represent the best method for securing justice and fairness. The

fact that it raises such vital questions in the context of the criminal law is perhaps reason enough why this book should be recommended to legal philosophers.

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R.A. SHARPE, *Contemporary Aesthetics: A Philosophical Analysis*. Sussex: The Harvester Press 1983. Pp. viii + 199. £18.95. ISBN 0-7-108-0456-3.

Westminster Abbey and the book under review alike are chock full of things arranged in no particular order, and as in Westminster Abbey some of the famous dead have memorial tablets but not their bodies there, so in *Contemporary Aesthetics* some schools of thought are there in name but not in body (or mind or soul). Quite as though *The Blue Guide* were to induce us to the Abbey with the promise of our being able to pay respect to the body of Shakespeare (which is in Stratford-on-Avon), The Harvester Press invites us into the book by saying, on the dust cover and in the advertising copy, that it 'is the first book by an analytic philosopher to use the insights of the Prague Structuralists to make a close examination of the principal problems in aesthetics.' The dust cover's promise is not kept, and structuralism is absent from what it covers.

What has been mooted by structuralism is precisely the criteria for what counts as one and, hence, for what constitutes the boundaries of a work. It follows from the structural thesis that the meanings of a work's words are logically tied to their differences from the other words in the language; that no work is a self-contained whole but only a fragment of the language in which it occurs. On a Derridean post-structural reading of *Contemporary Aesthetics*, structuralism is present as the trace of the other, of the Anglo-American aesthetics within which the book situates itself, but this is not how the copy writer and Sharpe think structuralism to figure in the book. (Sharpe acknowledges the difference of structuralism and hermeneutics from analytic aesthetics by speaking of the *exotic flavour* they impart.) On traditional theories of language, something may be said to be within a work if it is either asserted therein or presupposed or implied by what is asserted. None of the theses of structuralism is even mentioned, let alone asserted, in the book, and none of Sharpe's analyses depends on or commits one to structural tenets. We are told, however, that Prague Structuralism is *used*. But how?

Before answering this, I will say something about the book's aims and about how the exotic jargon enters. The book is uneven in the extreme, its unevenness mimed by the lengths of its chapters: one is 6 pages, another 67. At its best it is an arresting essay on the concepts of interpretation and performance in the arts, an essay some of whose elements are compatible with elements in hermeneutics and structuralism. However, the essay is embedded in, and barely motivated by, summary treatments of topics that have exercised analytic philosophers of art. The book is conceived as an answer to neo-Wittgensteinian and Marxist skepticism about art's having a nature rather than being either a collection of resembling objects or an invention of the bourgeoisie. (The Marxism mentioned in the first chapter is, Sharpe allows, a 'vulgar and unsophisticated form,' the answer to whose difficulties may lie in the assumption of a common human nature. He proposes to say no more about this assumption but does so on pages 87 to 90, the only other reference to Marxism. The book appears to be unedited, and hardly proofread, as well.)

The answer to skepticism consists in showing that there are general features possessed by works of art: 'art contains a conscious tradition in which earlier works are related to later' and 'works of art are objects for interpretation' (8). Prague Structuralism enters here, albeit in name only. Sharpe takes history to be a narrative showing how major figures affected their tradition and a tradition to be a selection from the history of works agreed to be valuable, saying that 'the idea of a tradition is close to the concept of an internal history of art which the Prague Structuralists inherited from ... the Russian Formalists' (170). And that is all he says. Only if the reader knows the work out of Prague or Russia can this glancing reference do what Sharpe does not adequately do: elaborate the concept of a tradition.

The other references to early structural literary theory appear in the discussion of interpretation: interpretations of works of art are underdetermined by them because various features of a given work may be attended to at different times, and various impressions are the starting points for different interpretations. These impressions are the result of selective attention, and the attention is in part a function of our knowledge of where the work stands in the tradition. 'In the ugly jargon of Ingarden a particular "concretion" (our net impression of a work) may be influenced by our knowledge of where the work stands in the tradition thus enabling us to foreground certain elements and place others in the background' (180). 'To use the fashionable jargon we owe to the Prague Structuralists, certain elements are foregrounded' (143). 'This selective attention requires some discussion, and the Prague School of Structuralists, in their distinction between foregrounding and backgrounding, provides us with a terminology in which these essential distinctions can be made' (172). (Emphasis added.) This last sentence is followed by a one page description of the distinction.

Sharpe explains his reference to hermeneutical notions by saying that his theory of interpretation and critical reasoning 'fits much more happily' into the tradition that includes the theory of explanatory reasoning deriving from the German philosopher Dilthey than into his own tradition within which all

explanation 'has been based on what philosophers believed scientific reasoning to be' (146). It is, however, false that there are no English-grown theories of explanation alternative to causal theories: for example, William Dray, David Pears, and others have developed accounts of the explanation of actions by reasons. (Sharpe gives no explanation whatever, well-founded or ill, for why he uses certain terminology of Prague Structuralism.)

*Contemporary Aesthetics* is not stillborn (there is life in it), but it was too early born and is the weaker for that. Perhaps what is of moment for the history of analytic thought, however, is that it was conceived at all.

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HUGH J. SILVERMAN, JOHN SALLIS and THOMAS M. SEEBOHM, eds., *Continental Philosophy in America*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1983. Pp. x + 261. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-8207-0160-2.

Over the last twenty years there has been a growing interest in continental philosophy, particularly phenomenology, in America. A number of small working groups have developed there for the specific purpose of discussing the work of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. This volume gives a selection from the papers read to these groups. It is well produced, well edited, has informative scholarly notes and an adequate index. What these essays show is how American philosophers have assimilated the phenomenological tradition and given it a new direction.

These essays are organised under three heads in groups of four, in the order Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. They have this, however, in common: they are largely of an interpretative nature. This is particularly the case with the Heidegger papers. Although they raise important ontological questions, they are obviously aimed at readers who already have some acquaintance with Heidegger's writings.

The Husserl essays are mainly concerned with high-lighting the distinction between the world of the natural attitude and that of the transcendental realm of eidetic truth. And by the transcendental Husserl is not referring to some unearthly ballet of abstract forms, but to the elements given in experience when by means of the reduction, we put aside our natural common-

sense attitude. Elisabeth Ströker in her paper, 'The Role of Psychology in Husserl's Phenomenology', shows how Husserl conceives the role of psychology in the light of this distinction. This is an important question if one remembers that Frege accused Husserl of psychologism, when the latter tried to base arithmetic on intellectual operations. Ströker points out that there is a need to distinguish between psychology as an empirical science and transcendental phenomenology. The later Husserl, at least, was concerned with the phenomenological basis of psychology — with the eidetic laws of consciousness, especially intentionality.

Richard Cobb-Stevens ('Transcendental and Empirical Dimensions in Husserl's Phenomenology') discusses the difference between natural and transcendental reflection. He also claims that Husserl failed to take adequate account of the linguistic dimension, and argues that his uncritical use of the metaphor 'life' gives his interpretation of the transcendental a subjective tone. José Huertas-Jourda ('The Origins of Otherness and Ownness') contends that Husserl is not a solipsist, as the ego, alter-ego and physical objects are contained within the living present. A somewhat different set of problems is examined by Thomas M. Seeböhm ('The New Hermeneutics, Other Trends, and the Human Sciences from the Standpoint of Transcendental Phenomenology'). He rebuts criticisms that the new hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur have made against Husserlian phenomenology. These, he believes are based on a dubious explication of what 'patent' and 'latent' can mean for phenomenology.

The Heidegger papers deal with the unity of Heidegger's thinking and the influence of Aristotle on his ideas. Walter Biemel ('On the Composition and Unity of *Holzwege*') states that the unity of the *Holzwege* essays is to be found in Heidegger's thinking itself: in his attempt to understand history as the destiny of Being. Graeme Nicholson ('The Coiling Pathway of Heidegger's *Essence of Truth*') sees the coherence of Heidegger's essay *Vom Wesen der Arbeit*, not as a set of doctrines but as a coiling or twisting pathway to thinking. This would seem to resemble the Hegelian notion of thinking conceived as a dialectical process.

The next two papers are concerned with Heidegger's philosophical indebtedness to Aristotle. Thomas Sheehan ('On the Way to *Ereignis*: Heidegger's Interpretation of *Physis*') argues that Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's *Physis* is the foundation for the understanding of *Ereignis*, or the event of disclosure of truth. Theodore Kisiel ('Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of the Categorical') points out that a study of the Aristotelian categories formed Heidegger's philosophical starting point. In *Being and Time* this shows itself as a concern for existential categories in the realm of being-in-the-world.

The Merleau-Ponty papers are more accessible to the non-phenomenological reader. They are largely concerned with his philosophical response to developments in the natural and social sciences. Denis T. O'Connor ('The Philosophy-Science Nexus in the Early Merleau-Ponty') states that experimental studies in neurology, psychopathology and perception made

Merleau-Ponty reconsider the classical theory of perception and enquire into the nature of scientific consciousness. Stephen H. Watson ('Merleau-Ponty's involvement with Saussure') claims that Merleau-Ponty's thinking shows the influence of Saussure. Merleau-Ponty, he tells us, conceived a philosophy like a language to be an architecture of signs closely related to the other modes of exchange which make up our social and historical life.

The nature of the unconscious is discussed by Robert D. Romanyshyn ('Unconsciousness as a Lateral Depth: Perception and the Two Moments of Reflection'). He tells us that on Merleau-Ponty's view the unconscious can be regarded as an activity — as a dialogue between the subject and others. Further as a socio-historical phenomenon its characteristics will change with the social context. Finally Elizabeth A. Behnke ('The Search for an Invariant of Silence') discusses Merleau-Ponty's claim that there are tacit structures underlying language, meaning and perception.

The essays in this volume have an impeccably scholarly character, and most of the problems dealt with fall within the domain of phenomenology proper. However, some of the questions discussed by phenomenologists are not without relevance to contemporary discussions among Anglo-Saxon philosophers. Witness the recent interest by analytical writers such as John Searle in intentionality, one of the key concepts of phenomenology. This book might have appealed to a wider philosophical public, if some of the papers had overtly discussed problems on the interface between phenomenology and analytical philosophy.

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PIERRE THUILLIER, *Les savoirs ventriloques ou comment la culture parle à travers la science*. Collection Science ouverte. Paris: Editions du Seuil 1983, 188 p. 69FF. ISBN 2-02-006585-1.

Une tradition prestigieuse a fondé sa vision et sa défense de la science sur une distinction entre deux 'contextes,' celui de la découverte et celui de la preuve, et la consigne est de ne pas les confondre. A cela il n'est cependant pas toujours facile d'adhérer totalement. Par contre, soutenir qu'il y a des mélanges entre les deux ou encore diverses formes de surdétermination de la science

par la culture et en préciser la nature, ce n'est pas une tâche facile. C'est à la présentation de ces mélanges et de cette surdétermination que se livre Pierre Thuillier dans les onze articles qui sont rassemblés dans ce livre.

En mentionnant le thème ou l'ouvrage auquel se rapportent les articles, je résume ici rapidement les contenus de chacun d'eux: 1. Recension d'une partie importante des études de l'époque (1968-1972) sur l'alchimie et son statut; 2. A partir de l'ouvrage de R. Hooykaas (*Religion and the Rise of Modern Science*, 1972), résumé de certains aspects des thèses 'internalistes' et 'externalistes' en histoire des sciences; 3. C'est le livre de M. Kline (*Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times*, 1973) qui alimente une réflexion portant sur la 'sociologie des mathématiques'; 4. Une mise en cause de l'idéologie formaliste en mathématiques est développée en prenant appui sur I. Lakatos (*Proofs and Refutations*, 1976); 5. Un certain nombre d'études présentent un Newton ambigu, à la fois savant et alchimiste; l'analyse veut montrer des liens subtils entre 'la science et la non-science'; 6. Des thèses (Hooykaas, Kojève) sur la relation religion/science sont ici prolongées vers les institutions sociales et religieuses et la métaphysique newtonienne est expliquée par de telles références; 7. L'ouvrage de C.G. Gillispie (*Science and Policy in France at the End of the Old Regime*, 1980) sert de toile de fond pour mettre en évidence divers aspects institutionnels de la science; 8. De diverses critiques du mécanisme, d'un livre de Jean Charon (*Mort, voici ta défaite*, 1979) et du colloque de Cordoue, on déduit que la science (c'est-à-dire le mécanisme) pose des problèmes socio-culturels; 9. Le philosophe John Passmore (*Science and its Critics*, 1978) témoigne, par son désenchantement et par un 'réquisitoire involontaire', de ce fait que la science est vraiment en crise; 10. A partir d'un échantillonnage (comprenant Haeckel, Leprince-Ringuet, K. Lorenz, C. Flammarion, E.O. Wilson, J. Monod), il est montré que la science débouche sur l'apostolat et la morale, qu'elle se perçoit comme une entreprise sacrée; 11. L'ouvrage de B. Easlea (*Science and Sexual Oppression. Patriarchy's Confrontation with Woman and Nature*, 1981) veut faire voir comment la science est sexiste et on décrit ici les moyens pris pour y parvenir.

Si je me suis attardé à rapporter aussi longuement le contenu explicite de cet ouvrage c'est que je crois que son principal mérite et son objectif est de fournir des informations sur des livres relatifs à une problématique et aussi de la présenter. Et ce que Thuillier tire des livres est fréquemment passionnant et pertinent. C'est en somme une bibliographie commentée. Mais, pris dans son ensemble, le commentaire pose un problème. On peut le désigner en peu de mots au moyen d'une question: à quelle problématique *précise* renvoient ces ouvrages et ces commentaires? Comment peut-on croire que tous les sujets que voici sont du même ordre: l'idéologie formaliste en mathématiques (64), les relations entre Newton et l'alchimie (75-84), entre Newton et la situation socio-culturelle (85-95), une Académie vermoulue qui fait enrager Marat (108-09), la critique de la philosophie mécaniste (114-30), etc. Une idée générale, mais vague et triviale paraît orienter l'ensemble: c'est que la science est une activité humaine, qu'elle est dépassée par autre chose qu'elle (7), par des 'questions et des préoccupations non-scientifiques' (124) et que le scien-

tifique 'est embarqué dans une entreprise qui risque de le dépasser' (162). Mais cela qui dépasse la science a tellement d'aspects et est si peu thématisé et circonscrit qu'on ne parvient pas toujours à saisir l'argument et à profiter de l'information. L'auteur veut aider 'ceux qui ne sont pas familiers avec le sujet à l'aborder de façon relativement concrète' (11). Mais il me semble y avoir bien plus qu'un seul sujet. Et s'il y en a qu'un, quel est-il? (ce qui peut signifier: qu'est-ce que cette culture qui parle au travers de la science, ou encore comment en dire quelque chose de précis?). Certaines indications sont naïves: 'Si grande que soit son utilité (à la science), il n'est pas encore sûr qu'elle soit la panacée universelle' (11). Mais en quoi une telle croyance a-t-elle cours et est-elle répandue? Et pourquoi nous dire qu'en Angleterre au XVIIe siècle la 'science expérimentale' et le labeur qui l'accompagne ont un rapport — notamment chez Boyle — avec le fait que 'pendant qu'on travaille, on n'invente pas d'hérésies et on ne fomente pas de révoltes' (91), ou laisser entendre qu'il y a un lien entre les *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* et ce fait que 'dans la société comme dans la nature, conformément aux décrets divins, devraient régner l'ordre et la stabilité' (94). Bien sûr, tout ceci comporte, à ce niveau de généralité, sa part de vérité. Mais présenté ainsi c'est tout à fait trompeur et cela nécessiterait un traitement plus systématique. Ainsi que Thuillier le demande souvent, sans s'expliquer, les choses sont-elles aussi simples?

Il faut sans doute en savoir gré à l'auteur de vouloir faire comprendre ce qui ne va pas dans le rapport de la science à la culture de même que dans une certaine image de neutralité et d'objectivité que l'on peut rencontrer en science ou en philosophie des sciences. Et de le faire, malgré tout, d'une manière souvent pertinente et passablement prudente. A cet égard, par exemple, les articles sur Kline, Lakatos (où l'on trouve, soit dit en passant, des aperçus intéressants sur l'intrication du contexte de la justification et de celui de la découverte) et Passmore sont excellents et exemplaires. Mais il faut le noter, ces gens sont de l'intérieur et cela entre en contradiction assez vive avec sa thèse qui paraît supposer que les milieux scientifiques sont inconscients des problèmes qu'il soulève ainsi que des filiations qui existent entre la science et la culture. Et à cet égard, quiconque a connaissance de nombreux travaux faits depuis plus de vingt ans (Toulmin, Hanson, Kuhn, D. Crane, W. Hagstrom, J.G. Crowther, etc.) ne peut que s'étonner de ne pas rencontrer ou discerner chez l'auteur un cadre de présentation et de clarification des divers problèmes et aussi qu'il entretienne le sentiment que l'on vient de faire des découvertes. Ainsi, faut-il être impressionné si l'on s'aperçoit que la science à des relations avec le socio-culturel et penser qu'on le faisait dans les milieux scientifiques, alors qu'en 1945 *The Open Society and its Enemies* de Popper postulait justement ce lien entre la science et la société? (Notons par ailleurs que chez les membres du Cercle de Vienne (e.g., Neurath) les relations entre l'esprit scientifique et la culture sont explicites et fondamentales). A moins que l'auteur en ait justement contre de telles positions. Dans ce cas il faudrait s'expliquer clairement.

La 'science' serait-elle tout bonnement impérialiste? Pourtant, un autre défenseur de la science écrit: 'Les idées scientifiques de la Grèce classique furent plus ou moins conservées pendant le Moyen Age, mais les humanistes furent occupés à la redécouverte des poètes, des tragéiens, des essayistes et des historiens de l'Antiquité; et l'effet de cette redécouverte fit plus pour la sensibilité européenne que ne pouvaient le faire un Harvey ou un Galilée.' (S. Toulmin, 'Historical background to the anti-science movement,' *Civilization Science. In conflict or collaboration?*, Elsevier - Excerpta Medica — North Holland, 1972, p. 25). On pourrait multiplier les contre-exemples qui indiquent qu'il faut nuancer et préciser. Je suppose que l'auteur fait un travail pour faire comprendre quelque chose et mon avis est que cela serait beaucoup plus utile si ce qui est en cause était clarifié. Autrement, c'est peut-être dangereux. D'autant plus que l'on s'adresse à 'ceux qui ne sont pas familiers avec le sujet.'

En substance, il me paraît que Thuillier n'attire l'attention que sur certains aspects de la science 'normale,' qu'il ne distingue pas par ailleurs de la *Big Science*. Popper tenait à la science révolutionnaire et à l'esprit critique, s'attachait à des phénomènes parents (de ceux que décrit Thuillier) et jugeait que, à l'intérieur, la situation de la science était 'tragique si ce n'est désespérée.' En diluant une reconnaissance de la raison dans une vague surdétermination par la culture Thuillier pratique le genre de sociologie de la connaissance qui ne peut qu'accentuer le désespoir.

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S. WATERLOW, *Nature, Change and Agency in Aristotle's Physics*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford University Press 1982. Pp. 269. Cdn\$49.95: US\$29.95. ISBN 0-19-824653-6.

The very first paragraph of this book carries an announcement of its bold aim: to show that and how a single metaphysical idea, 'the conception of a natural substance as characterized above all by an "inner principle of change and stasis"' (henceforth IN) is responsible for a significant assortment of the peculiarities in the Aristotelian system of views concerning the nature of the physical world. The assortment in question is remarkable for its diversity. It reaches as far as doctrines in Aristotle's biology (e.g., that the characteristics

and development of a living organism cannot be adequately explained wholly in terms of the intrinsic features and arrangement of its constituent materials) and well into what is customarily called his chemistry (e.g., that each of the four simple elements possesses a distinctive set of inherent capacities, including the tendency to move in the direction of its own 'natural' region of the cosmos). It is, however, in those parts of the *Physics* that speak to the core tenets of Aristotle's physics proper — those where he develops and works with his analysis of *kinesis* — where Waterlow claims to detect the deepest imprints of this piece of a priori metaphysics on the Aristotelian physical system. Consequently, it is most especially in her attempts to make her case in those areas that Waterlow presents us with a powerful and appealing explanatory scheme which succeeds on the whole in drawing together a great many seemingly disparate elements in the *Physics* into a neat unitary structure.

Most of the first chapter is given to motivating (not quite to say defending) IN by locating it between two opposing (and incoherent) extreme positions: (a) viewing a change as completely determined by the nature of its subject (which, in effect, turns every subject of change into a perfectly closed physical system), and (b) making the subject into a 'mere locus' of change with no inherent determinative influence on the character of the change undergone. In contrast to both of these, Aristotle's IN is presented by Waterlow as the intermediate position that the *character* of a change is determined by the nature of its subject, whereas external circumstances are responsible for *triggering* or *hindering* the change thus determined. This is a view Waterlow finds more agreeable, though not entirely satisfactory (since she indicted it as the root of Aristotle's notorious anti-experimentalism). In addition, she argues in this chapter that Aristotle's aversion to (b) also gives rise to the leading insight behind his 'solution' to the problem of change in *Physics I*, 8, namely that underlying every change there is a persistent subject-substance with a fixed nature responsible for the replacement of contrary attributes in which the change consists. In this way, Waterlow argues that both IN and the 'solution' in I,8 are ultimately grounded in the substance/non-substance distinction of the *Categories*. An appendix to the chapter argues that the I,8 solution, thus characterized, can be extended to cases of substantial change without any need to invoke the suspect doctrine of prime matter in the *Physics*.

Chapter II considers the question of whether the change-determinative natures of the preceding chapter are those of concrete substances (paradigmatically, living organisms), or those of the proximate or ultimate (elemental) materials which constitute such substances. By means of a careful examination of *Physics II*, Waterlow develops the complex answer that (1) both concrete substances and the simple elements possess change-determinative natures, but that because (2) the elements exist only potentially in concrete substances, (3) the natures of the latter are 'supervenient' upon those of the former within the state of composition. Moreover, it is argued, inasmuch as a 'teleological' (viz., the 'final/formal cause') model of explana-

tion is predominant throughout the *Physics*, the so-called 'defense of teleology' against materialism in II,8 is better understood as an argument for the superiority of a 'supervenient teleology' (whose explanatory basis is derived from the natures of concrete substances) over a 'materialistic teleology' (grounded wholly in the natures of the simple elements). The chapter also contains some remarks critical of Aristotle's manipulation of the analogies and disanalogies between artefacts and natural substances.

The third chapter is without question the heart of the book. Here Waterlow conducts a close textual study of the passages in *Physics* III, 1 containing and surrounding Aristotle's famous 'definition' of kinesis, the notion that Waterlow (like many others) views as pivotal to the structure of the *Physics*. On her interpretation, the decisive stroke behind this analysis is Aristotle's recognition (or insistence) that the process which collects all of the happenings in the history of a given subject should not be regarded as a simple sequence of events or states linked by some wholly external relation such as efficient causality. The correct conception, on Waterlow's account, is rather that of a process *towards* an independently identifiable end-state of the subject, the presence of which (by definition) terminates the process, and (even more importantly) the absence of which metaphysically 'charges' the subject with the potential to undergo the sequence of local changes (each analyzed as the replacement of some non-substantial characteristic by a contrary), which sequence, again, is directed towards, and terminates in, the end-state which defines the kinesis as a whole. In the second half of the chapter, Waterlow considers the details of an alternative analysis of kinesis (in terms of mathematical continuity) in *Physics* VI, 6, and concludes (i) that the two analyses are inconsistent, (ii) that the VI, 6, account, while amenable to (and perhaps designed for) cases of motion, is ill-suited to handle cases of qualitative change, and (iii) that (perhaps for these reasons) Aristotle ultimately abandons that later analysis (and returns to the earlier one) in *Physics* VIII, 8.

Chapter IV and V explore an additional wrinkle in Aristotle's treatment of kinesis precipitated by his tendency to make a conceptual distinction between an active and passive element in any change. Chapter IV traces the implications of this tendency for Aristotle's treatment of changes where the agent is external to the subject of change. Waterlow is concerned here to understand Aristotle's answer to the question of whether the kinesis in this sort of case should be located in the patient/subject, the external agent, or both. More specifically, she wonders if Aristotle's views that the nature of the agent in such cases (and not that of the patient) determines the character of the change, and that the very same event in such cases is describable both as the agent's acting and the patient's suffering, do not force him to locate the kinesis in agent as well as patient. Her answer (on behalf of Aristotle) is that since the status of kinesis (on the III, 1 account) attaches properly to the entire process towards a definitory end-state, and not to any of its elements per se, Aristotle is free to hold that a single event can be described both as an act of

(and in) the agent, and as an element of a kinesis which is located in the patient, without having to locate the kinesis itself in the agent.

The final chapter confronts issues involved in extending the agent-patient model to changes in organic substances (and perhaps, more specifically to animals), which Aristotle regularly characterizes as capable of self-change. Waterlow considers (and rejects) a number of possible ways of making sense of the conceptual separation of agent and patient within a single entity. In the end, she concludes that the *Physics* simply contains no agent-patient analysis of self-changing organisms (though Waterlow herself speculates on how Aristotle *might* have proceeded). It is argued further that the ultimate explanation of this hiatus is that the *raison d'être* for the concept of self-change in the *Physics* is essentially programmatic, in that it supplies premises required for Aristotle's cosmological argument for the existence of an eternal cause of all change.

This book, it must be said, is not for beginners; in fact, it is a *very* hard book (surprisingly more so than Waterlow's *Passage and Possibility*, which was published at about the same time). Part of this may be set down to the nature of the subject. Certainly the concepts, doctrines, and arguments of the *Physics* are among the most abstruse in the *Corpus*, and Aristotle does not always do all that he could to help his reader through the tough going. But at the same time, many of the problems with this book are quite properly its own. For one thing, it seems at times to suffer from divided (and even opposing) ambitions. On one hand, it is (as advertized) an attempt to demonstrate how IN prefigures Aristotle's physical doctrines, and one would quite naturally expect such a project to involve the selection and highlighting of critical passages (to the exclusion of others), and probably also to diverge at times from the order of Aristotle's own exposition to make the logic of his system more perspicuous. However, the outline of the book sketched above indicates that Waterlow is also interested in working through the *Physics* more or less book by book (and even chapter by chapter), and so in producing something closer to a commentary. In themselves, both of these projects are worthy, but absent a fortuitous coincidence of interest and intellect between scholar and subject, they do tend to get in each other's way. Secondly, there are occasions when Waterlow's attempts to connect issues in the *Physics* with more recent philosophical concerns (e.g., the Humean treatment of causation, or the alleged coherence of backward causation), cross the line between mere diversions and intrusions on the overall structure of the work. But most lamentable (if only because so easily avoidable) is the fact that Waterlow chose to number the paragraphs within chapters. At its best, this device simply generates an additional system of cross-referencing (which the existence of pagination makes superfluous). At its worst (as in this case), where the enumeration is allowed to take the place of indispensable transition sentences (which normally serve to represent the logical structure of a chapter), it can constitute a serious obstacle to understanding.

These difficulties notwithstanding, this book will repay the serious student of Aristotle for the considerable effort expended in reading it carefully.

In fact, it is quite possible that its central line of interpretation will finally not only deeply affect our collective understanding of the *Physics*, but find its way into other areas of Aristotelian scholarship besides.

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JOHN SALLIS, ed., *Husserl and Contemporary Thought*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1983. Pp. vi + 194. U.S.\$15.95. ISBN: 0-391-02847-2.

This is a reprint of Volume 12 (1982) of *Research in Phenomenology*, in which Husserl's work is analyzed in light of recent philosophical developments. J.N. Mohanty continues his polemic against Hintikka et al, who question Husserl's idea of intentionality on the basis of the *de re/de dicto* distinction, while Donn Welton contributes to the debate about the adequacy of Husserl's distinction between perceptual acts and speech acts. Rudolf Boehm poignantly points to a near fatal inconsistency in Husserl's position, whereas Bernhard Waldenfels seeks to salvage phenomenology by radicalizing it. Rudolf Bernet and Giuseppina Moneta both criticize the notion of time, Bernet arguing in a fashion reminiscent of Derrida. Two other articles resonate with structuralism — Sallis rethinks the idea of 'the things themselves' in a way that recalls Foucault's method, while Leonard Lawlor bravely urges that Husserl is actually a precursor of Derrida. Rudolf Makkreel fills out the concept of *Lebenswelt* to make manifest its implications for current social scientific praxis and Fed Kersten offers a graceful little argument in support of Husserl's thoughts on intersubjectivity. Richard Cobb-Stevens makes the interesting (to say the least) suggestion that Husserl's notion of truth grounds a non-relativistic hermeneutics. The collection closes with Maurice Natanson's remarks on the relation between phenomenology and natural languages.

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