

# **Canadian Philosophical Reviews**

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AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

SPECIAL ISSUE

ON

WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITOR: BRIAN ELLIS

CONSULTING EDITOR: JANNA THOMPSON

Papers are invited:

- Has male dominance in philosophy been an important factor in its history?
- Have assumptions about women, or sex differences, affected the development of philosophical theories — e.g. in ethics, political philosophy, ontology or epistemology?
- Have philosophical theories or standards of rationality been influenced by association with masculine ways of thinking or acting?
- Are women disadvantaged in philosophy? If so how? Why? What should be done about it?

Papers on more general issues concerning women will also be considered.

Papers should be in the style and format of the Journal (see any recent issue for details) and sent to the Editor, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, 1983, Australia not later than 31 December 1984.

A decision will be made early in 1985 whether to proceed with the planned issue. If it is decided not to go ahead, papers submitted for this issue will automatically be considered for publication in normal issues, unless marked 'Special Issue Only'.

## SPINDEL CONFERENCE 1983



### THE CONCEPT OF SUPERVENIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

Jaegwon Kim - Supervenience and Supervenient Causation.  
Paul Teller and John Haugeland - Commentary. Jerry Fodor - Aesthetic Supervenience. Norman Gillespie - Commentary. John Post - On the Determinacy of Truth and Translation. Jaegwon Kim - Commentary. Terence Horgan - Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics. Michael Tye - Commentary. John Haugeland - Ontological Supervenience. Jerry Fodor - Commentary. Paul Teller - A Poor Man's Guide to Supervenience and Determination. John Post - Commentary.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY,  
VOL. XXII, 1984. Individual copies \$5.00. Free with each \$10.00 annual  
subscription to The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Memphis State University,  
Memphis, TN 38152, U.S.A.

MARCEL BLANC, dir., *L'état des sciences et des techniques*. Collection L'état du monde. Paris/Montréal: La découverte-Maspéro/Boréal Express 1983. 539 p. 110 FF. ISBN 2-7071-1424-3 / 2-89052-080-3.

Voilà un livre qui réjouira tous ceux qui veulent s'informer rapidement sur les développements les plus récents de la science et de la technique ainsi que sur les défis qu'elles posent aux sociétés contemporaines. Édité sous la direction de M. Blanc, il est le fruit de la coopération franco-québécoise, de l'aide de la Mission inter-ministérielle de l'information scientifique et technique (MIDIST) et de la collaboration d'un grand nombre d'hommes de science, d'universitaires qui œuvrent dans une variété de secteurs (de la physique, à l'économie et à la psychologie), de journalistes scientifiques et d'un bon nombre de philosophes (Marc Guillaume, Pierre Lévy, Abraham Moles, Pierre Thuillier ...). Il intéressera non seulement les philosophes travaillant dans l'enseignement, mais surtout ceux qui s'occupent de philosophie des affaires publiques et qui ont besoin d'un instrument de travail qui donne une vue synoptique des découvertes scientifiques et leurs applications technologiques qui produisent des effets destructeurs et inducteurs sur la société et les cultures contemporaines. Il donne une série d'impressions saisissantes du tourbillon dans lequel se trouvent absorbés aussi bien les optimistes que les pessimistes, nous invitant à nous faire nous-mêmes une opinion qui soit indépendante de l'oracle des experts.

Dans cette perspective, *L'état des sciences et des techniques* nous livre, sous forme de bilan des principales découvertes (section 3 qui constitue la partie centrale du livre, 195-430), une quantité d'informations sur les aspects les plus variés des innovations techniques dans tous les domaines stratégiques, non seulement de celles qui sont effectivement réalisées, mais aussi de celles qui verront le jour dans un avenir immédiat. L'exposé ne suit pas le schéma habituel de la classification des sciences, mais touche aux domaines qui ont été marqués par des découvertes récentes et des applications

technologiques spectaculaires dont l'impact est percutant. On passe en revue les sciences de la vie, les secteurs de l'information et l'usage de l'informatique dans la production, le secteur de l'exploration de l'espace sans oublier le secteur qui constitue, à côté de la recherche du profit, le moteur principal du développement technologique, à savoir la recherche militaire. (Il est instructif d'apprendre que les Etats-Unis ont consacré en 1983 à la Défense et à l'Aérospatial 76.6% du budget fédéral de RD contre 3.5% à la promotion générale des connaissances, c'est-à-dire à la recherche 'pure,' [446].)

Les différents exposés sont non seulement très informatifs, mais encore vont-ils à l'essentiel; ils sont écrits dans un langage qui peut aussi se comprendre par le non-expert en matière de science et de technologie. Ces contributions comportent aussi une dimension appréciative pour bien montrer, d'une part, les enjeux auxquels doivent faire face les décideurs sur le terrain de l'orientation des ressources cognitives technologiques et de l'implantation de technologies nouvelles, pour faire ressortir, d'autre part, les implications juridico-éthiques de technologies controversées (touchant, par exemple, les seuils de sécurité et de nocivité concernant la technologie nucléaire, problèmes qui peuvent tourner en une véritable obsession; la désirabilité de la manipulation d'embryons, de la greffe de tissus foetaux, de la congélation de foetus — dont on aurait à déterminer les propriétaires —, de la division d'un foetus en deux 'jumeaux' pour tester *in vitro* la qualité génétique de la moitié réimplantée, de l'établissement de carte d'identité génétique; la liste de ce genre de défi occupe plus de 200 pages). La réflexion critique qui soutient bon nombre de ces exposés permet d'entrevoir les failles majeures de ces innovations technologiques (par exemple la vulnérabilité et la fragilisation d'une société informatisée: les centres de calculs nationaux peuvent devenir des cibles privilégiées de sabotage et un 'blocus' contre des pièces de rechange pourrait être lourd de conséquences).

C'est surtout dans la section 1 (10-193), intitulée 'Science, techniques et société' que l'on trouve un panorama des impacts du progrès scientifique et technique sur la société et la vie des individus. On y fait part des interrogations inquiétantes que soulèvent les débats au sujet de ce progrès. Ces interrogations ont trait aux mutations profondes notamment des conditions de travail, commençant par la génétique à l'embauche — on n'a pas seulement la tête de l'emploi mais surtout les gènes pour l'emploi — pour éliminer les 'hypersensibles' (solution de facilité qui détournera l'attention des solutions de rechange pour améliorer l'hygiène au travail). Le danger de l'eugénisme présente un visage plus positif, la manipulation génétique permettant maintenant d'éradiquer le matériel génétique 'défectueux'; tout le monde semble préférer être guéri de cette façon que de transmettre à sa progéniture une maladie mortelle. Autre mutation: l'informatisation de la production semble être une alternative acceptée au Taylorisme, mais pas forcément moins centralisatrice et "autoritaire"; et si elle garantit des profits à l'entreprise, c'est bien souvent au détriment de l'opérateur obligé, par exemple, de s'engager dans un 'dialogue' véritablement pathologique avec un dit 'conversationnel' qui n'est pas programmé, faute de logiques appropriées, conformément aux

maximes et règles de conversation et qui peut vous poser 10 fois de suite la même question. Les auteurs dépeignent finalement les sombres perspectives du chômage technologique: 40% d'emplois, surtout féminins, seront supprimés dans le secteur de service.

De nombreux exposés sont consacrés aux enjeux politiques et idéologiques que représentent les mutations sociales anticipées, par exemple la contestation grandissante de ce grand nombre de jeunes qui ont décidé de 'vivre autrement', qui argumentent que le progrès technique n'est pas pour eux et qu'il n'est pas synonyme de progrès social. On touche également aux transferts technologiques nord-sud et est-ouest, à la coopération internationale et surtout aux questions du contrôle (impossible?) de la prolifération d'armes nucléaires. Ces questions concernent aussi les limites dans lesquelles le contrôle étatique du développement technologique semble possible, nécessaire et souhaitable.

Ce tour de multiples débats et prises de position que suscite le développement technique montre que celui-ci n'est pas socialement neutre, que ce développement est fonction d'intérêts qui ne rencontrent pas nécessairement la demande sociale. Plus d'une fois les auteurs soulignent à quel point les décisions en matière d'orientations de ressources cognitives technologiques sont prises de manière profondément antidémocratique, excluant systématiquement le citoyen ordinaire auquel les experts reprochent habituellement l'ignorance, le manque d'expertise qui le rend inapte à participer aux délibérations et à la prise de décision. L'exemple le plus éloquent constitue sans doute l'implantation de la technologie nucléaire en France, dont le sort dépendait d'une poignée d'individus; dans d'autres pays, on procédait par référendum, ou du moins offrait-on un simulacre de consultation. Le caractère antidémocratique de certaines technologies se constate par le fait qu'elles se trouvent au service du contrôle social revêtant la forme allant des techniques du 'contrôle behavioral' jusqu'à la torture médicalisée.

La section 4 (433-517), intitulée 'Les déterminants du progrès technique,' nous fournit une série de tableaux comparatifs de l'investissement, aussi bien pour le secteur public que privé, que consacrent les pays industrialisés au domaine de recherche et développements (RD). S'y ajoute une caractérisation succincte des politiques scientifiques de l'URSS, de la RDA, de la Chine, de l'Inde et du Brésil, une comparaison des complexes militaro-industriels américain et soviétique et une brève description des structures économiques qui caractérisent les liaisons complexes entre le progrès technique et la variété des secteurs de l'industrie de pointe.

Un court calendrier scientifique qui remplit la section 3 (196-205) nous donne une idée de la vitesse avec laquelle se sont succédées les principales découvertes ou inventions dans tous les domaines de janvier 1981 à juin 1983. Une section 5 contient une liste des centres publics nationaux et internationaux de recherche scientifique et des revues scientifiques et techniques qui diffusent de l'information en langue française.

Chaque article — il y en a 128 en tout — se termine par une courte bibliographie qui nous donne les principales et plus récentes références sur le

sujet discuté; elle comprend des livres, des articles et surtout des dossiers dont l'existence est très souvent inconnue, provenant des organismes publics des principaux pays industrialisés.

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FRANÇOIS BOUSQUET, et al., éds., *La Vérité*. Paris: Beauchesne (Institut Catholique de Paris) 1983. 274 p. 99 FF. ISBN 2-7010-1059-4.

Le volume présente une série d'articles, d'inégale valeur, sur le thème protéiforme de la vérité. Plus que l'unité d'inspiration qui anime le groupe, c'est la diversité des approches qui retient l'attention, diversité qui reflète les multiples points de vue selon lesquels le problème de la vérité est abordé par les philosophes contemporains. Les articles sont regroupés autour de quatre thèmes principaux: vérité ontologique, vérité-communication, désir du vrai et production de la vérité.

S. Breton ouvre le recueil avec une intéressante étude qui s'inspire du dialogue, 'Sur l'E de Delphes,' de Plutarque. En suivant les variations du 'E,' qui évoque la vérité du cosmos grec, au 'Tu es' (Ei) suscité par la réponse admirative du fidèle, au 'si' (Ei) qui joue un rôle important dans la dialectique, Breton éclaire le passage de Parménide à Gorgias. Il révise la figure traditionnelle du sophiste. Dès que la parole est manifestation, elle signifie et entre dans les vicissitudes du discours; les signes étant ambigus, elle exige une interprétation et donc est vouée à la pluralité. En introduisant le 'si,' le sophiste permet à la diversité des possibles de s'imposer contre le monolithisme de la vérité: 'L'hypothétique préserve et réserve, en effet, contre la domination du même, la place de l'autre' (40).

Jean Greisch part du commentaire de Heidegger sur un passage du *Crépuscule des idoles*, et d'une réponse de Derrida à la question: pourquoi Heidegger se tait-il sur le devenir-femme de la vérité? En guise d'explication, Greisch renvoie à un cours de Heidegger de 1942-43 sur Parménide, où c'est la déesse Vérité qui inaugure une histoire. 'Pour Heidegger, l'origine toujours partiellement manquée de l'histoire de la vérité est ce rendez-vous avec la déesse *Alètheia*' (46). Après cela seulement se situe la compréhension platonicienne de la vérité, qui est aussi la première défiguration, celle qui entraîne toutes les autres. L'auteur montre comment Heidegger pense l'essence de la

vérité et comment les deux phases décisives de l'oubli de la vérité se comprennent: sa mutation chez Platon et Aristote, puis sa romanisation et sa christianisation; il propose enfin une version heideggérienne de la fable de Nietzsche.

Les deux études sur 'Le partage de la vérité' tentent d'harmoniser la vérité-manifestation et la vérité-communication. Yves Labbé reconnaît comme un fait que le dialogue 'unit de façon évidente l'échange de parole et l'identification d'objet, la socialité du dire et l'unicité du dit' (81). Puis il étudie respectivement chacun des aspects de la vérité. La vérité-manifestation est développée à partir de trois voies d'accès différentes: la voie symbolique de J. Lacan, la voie formelle de F. Jacques et la voie éthique de E. Lévinas. Dans ces perspectives, 'l'accord sur la chose a sa cause totale dans l'accord de l'un avec l'autre' (92). Pour suivre l'autre versant, celui de la venue du dit au dire, c'est l'herméneutique qui sert de guide: 'Les voies frayées dans l'interprétation accréditent l'idée que la chose dite prend une part active à sa propre constitution en même temps qu'à la définition de l'échange' (101). François Marty met l'accent sur un point différent: lorsque la vérité est pensée à l'intérieur de la communication, elle doit prendre en considération, en plus de la conformité aux choses, l'espace même où se déploie la communication. L'échange donne accès à l'espace symbolique du langage, où les libertés doivent être reconnues. Marty propose alors une définition de la vérité, comme 'l'horizon de convergence qu'institue l'échange des paroles entre corps signifiants, dans lequel la présence de l'étranger révèle et relève la particularité des corps sociaux' (119). Dans cet horizon de convergence, dire la vérité suppose une transformation des deux participants au dialogue.

Sous le thème, "Le désir du vrai," la troisième partie regroupe des études qui sont reliées par un fil plutôt mince. Philippe Kaepplin part de son expérience du psychodrame analytique et du groupe Balint, pour expliciter le type de vérité qui s'y trouve à l'œuvre. Ici, la méthode de Moréno se laisse enseigner par la psychanalyse (Freud et Lacan) et s'enrichit de l'exploration des manifestations du désir refoulé. Par leur dire face au groupe et à l'analyste, les participants peuvent passer progressivement de l'imaginaire au symbolique. Ce dire suppose donc un milieu intersubjectif, dans lequel le désir puisse s'articuler dans le langage, et dans lequel aussi les autres puissent réagir, tout particulièrement l'analyste, par l'interprétation et par la construction. De ce point de vue, peut-être ne voyons-nous pas suffisamment en quoi l'efficacité de la relation groupale se distingue de celle de la relation intersubjective duelle.

François Bousquet étudie la conception de la vérité qui se dégage du *Post-Scriptum* de Kierkegaard. La question de la vérité n'est pas résolue par un savoir objectif de type historique ou de type spéculatif. Le véritable lieu de la vérité se trouve dans le rapport du sujet existant à la vérité: "La vérité est dans l'inconditionnalité de la passion de la vérité. L'absolu est déjà dans l'exigence avant d'être dans le résultat" (172). L'auteur insiste avec raison sur le fait que la conception de la vérité comme "devenir-sujet" dépasse le niveau religieux proprement dit.

Pierre Colin tente de dégager la conception que Blondel se fait de la vérité de sa philosophie. Ici encore, la définition traditionnelle de la vérité est remplacée par une autre, qui affirme l'équation de la pensée et de la vie. 'Reprise critique et systématique de la pensée spontanée qui nous fait hommes, la philosophie s'ordonne à l'action dont elle dit le sens' (179). La philosophie joue donc une rôle médiateur, qu'elle remplit en proposant un itinéraire: 'Métaphysique et morale, l'idée philosophique est à la fois principe d'explication et norme de conduite' (187). Cependant, même si elle se veut science rigoureuse de l'action, objet de vérification pratique, la philosophie de Blondel serait sous-tendue par un postulat selon lequel 'l'homme est en quête de l'adéquation de soi à soi' (212); or ce postulat n'est pas universel, il 'ne dit qu'une *vérité possible* de l'existence et de la philosophie' (213).

Les deux premières communications de la quatrième partie portent sur un même problème. M.-D. Delaunay-Popelard s'interroge, à la suite de Frege, sur la valeur référentielle du discours, et donc sur la relation entre le fait linguistique et le fait non linguistique. Mais le problème de l'extension du modèle des langages formels aux langues naturelles fait surgir des difficultés, dont la solution exige de tenir compte de l'interlocution: 'Si l'on veut revenir à la langue naturelle, il faut peut-être, au contraire de ce qu'a fait Frege, rétablir les contraintes de l'interlocution' (228). Francis Jacques reprend le même problème de façon plus élaborée: 'Est-il possible de réintégrer l'interlocution dans l'analyse de l'énoncé, interlocution qui a été exclue par les logiciens de la référence, comme Frege et Tarski?' (240). Le modèle construit doit pouvoir montrer que, par l'interlocution, l'information communicable est modifiée dans sa *teneur* même. Jacques porte la réflexion jusqu'au niveau transcendantal: 'il s'agit de faire de l'interlocution une instance fondamentale en lui donnant juste le mode d'assentiment qu'on réserve à une condition transcendantale' (253). Dans cette mesure, selon lui, on dépassera ce que font la plupart des philosophes, qui ont 'assigné au dialogue des conditions de possibilité non dialogiques' (253).

JULIEN NAUD  
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GÉRAD DELEDALLE, *La philosophie américaine*. 'Nouveaux horizons.' Lausanne: Editions Age d'Homme 1983, 287 p.

On ne saurait reprocher un manque d'ambition au livre de G. Deledalle.

L'auteur entreprend dans cet ouvrage rien de moins que la présentation de 3 siècles d'histoire philosophique américaine de 1620 à 1976, et ce, en ne dépassant pas 300 pages. Comme il est de coutume de procéder dans une certaine philosophie francophone, Deledalle commence par établir un certain parallèle entre l'idéologie et la philosophie américaines. Il va sans dire que le lien est étroit selon l'auteur et cela nous est montré dans son introduction (13-19). Le livre comprend ensuite quatre parties. La première s'ouvre sur ce que l'auteur nomme la période 'européenne' qui va jusqu'à 1865. Les deuxièmes et troisième parties sont consacrées à la philosophie 'typiquement' américaine et elles forment le corps du texte (51-198). Cela se justifie, selon Deledalle, par le fait que la période qui va de 1865 à 1940 constitue l' 'âge d'or' de la philosophie américaine. Dans un premier temps, on a droit à un exposé 'analytique.' On y expose les différents 'courants' de l'époque: le 'pragmatisme,' le 'néo-réalisme,' le 'réalisme critique,' le 'naturalisme' et l' 'idéalisme' y sont tour à tour passés en revue. La troisième partie, par contre, se veut plus 'synthétique.' L'auteur nous présente, de façon on ne peut plus succincte les philosophes les plus importants de la période: Peirce, James, Royce, Dewey et Mead. Même s'il s'en tient à un niveau très général, on peut au moins se réjouir du fait, qu'ici au moins, l'auteur tient compte de l'essentiel.

Dans la dernière partie, Deledalle se concentre sur la période d'après-guerre (1945-76). Pour Deledalle, la philosophie américaine contemporaine garde toujours un caractère fondamentalement 'pragmatiste' et l'auteur cherche moins à dresser le tableau des différents courants contemporains qu'à prouver son hypothèse. Ici, le corpus apparaît formidablement restreint. C'est ainsi que l' 'examen' de la philosophie de Quine et Sellars suffisent pour démontrer le pragmatisme de la philosophie analytique. L'auteur voit aussi une influence pragmatiste en métaphysique en se rapportant à deux philosophes (C. Harsthorne et P. Weiss). Il fait la même 'démonstration' en éthique, en considérant seulement le cas de Stevenson et de Blanshard.

L'ouvrage se termine par un appendice dans lequel Deledalle étudie l'influence de philosophes d'origine étrangère aux Etats-Unis. Encore une fois, le choix des auteurs est aussi éclectique qu'arbitraire. C'est ainsi que les 'cas' de Marcuse, Maritain, Whitehead et Santayana sont tour à tour examinés. On a raison d'inclure ces auteurs dans une histoire de la philosophie américaine car 'qui est ou qui n'est pas philosophe américain dépendra en dernière analyse, non de sa nationalité, mais de sa philosophie selon qu'elle possède ou non les caractères dont nous avons dressé la liste ou, à tout le moins, des caractères qui ne sont pas incompatibles avec les traits majeurs de l'idéologie américaine' (254).

On regrettera que M. Deledalle n'ait pas cru bon de produire plutôt une version refondue et approfondie d'un ouvrage précédent qui couvrait justement la période de 1865 à 1940. En lieu et place, on a droit à une vision 'globale' qui pèche autant par son ambition démesurée que par une interprétation confuse et disproportionnée des différentes contributions philosophiques américaines. On reste estomaqué de constater que l'auteur réserve 2

pages à la philosophie de Quine et ne le cite qu'à trois autres occasions. Il affirme candidement que 'son problème est celui de la signification et de la traduction' (216). Si on excepte de telles affirmations savoureuses qui laissent le lecteur pantois, le livre souffre d'abord et avant tout du défaut habituel d'une certaine philosophie française, à savoir, une méconnaissance radicale des différents courants philosophiques contemporains. Dans son avant-propos, l'auteur avoue ne pas avoir consacré de chapitre à la logique et à l'épistémologie tout en admettant du même souffle que ces disciplines sont présentes dans la plupart des théories examinées et il reconnaît que l'intérêt pour la logique 'moderne' est un des traits caractéristiques de la philosophie américaine! Le même sort attend la philosophie du langage. Ensuite, le lecteur ne trouvera pas dans le livre de M. Deledalle une mention quelconque des développements en logique aux Etats-Unis. Church, Tarski, ou Kripke ne sont jamais cités. Aucune mention n'est faite de l'école de Chomsky. C'est en vain qu'on cherchera une discussion brève des débats épistémologiques autour de philosophes tels que Kuhn, Feyerabend, Nagel, Hempel, Van Fraassen ou Carnap. A lire l'ouvrage de Deledalle, on croirait que la sémantique californienne n'a jamais existé. Montague, Kaplan, Lewis et Stalnaker ne sont même pas mentionnés. Le sort des philosophes de Pittsburg, tels que Rescher et Thomason, est le même. Deledalle ne perd pas son temps non plus à discuter du débat entre réalistes et nominalistes poursuivi depuis plusieurs années par Goodman, Bergman, Hochberg, Sellars et Quine. Il ne prend pas acte du renouveau réaliste inauguré par Putnam, Kripke, Plantinga et Loux. Aucune allusion n'est faite à l'impact que connaît la phénoménologie aux Etats-Unis chez Northwestern University Press. Il va sans dire que l'émergence du psychologisme est aussi reléguée aux oubliettes. Searle, Grice, Schiffer, Bennett et Donnellan ne sont jamais cités. Enfin, l'auteur ne croit pas opportun de mentionner l'existence de philosophes tels que R. Chisholm et D. Davidson dont l'influence est considérable.

Bref, il serait étonnant que le livre de M. Deledalle connaisse le succès escompté. Loin de familiariser à la philosophie américaine, il ne réussit qu'à creuser davantage le fossé qui la sépare d'une certaine philosophie continentale. On se doit donc d'espérer qu'il ne trouvera pas preneur ici ou à l'étranger.

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JAMES C. EDWARDS, *Ethics Without Philosophy: Wittgenstein and the Moral Life*. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida 1982. Pp. xii + 271.  
US\$20.00. ISBN 0-8130-0706-2.

On Edwards' view, philosophy is a type of disease to which Wittgenstein partly succumbed in his early work but from which, in his later, he helps to deliver us. The source of this disease lies in 'rationality as representation.' This is not so much an error as a misleading picture from which Wittgenstein delivers us not by supplying a better one but by showing the inadequacy of all pictures. So released, we acquire, in the place of diseased thought, a sound human understanding which consists not in the futile attempt to grasp reality as it is but in a loving and humble acceptance of reality in all its shifting appearances.

I have stated the above views with some definiteness. But this is misleading, for definiteness is not a characteristic of Edwards' writing. For example, although, on some occasions, it is philosophy as such which is described as diseased, on others, it is traditional philosophy that is so described; and, on others again, it is metaphysical philosophy. The claim is treated as being the same in each case, though in fact it varies from the remarkable to the comparatively commonplace. Thus metaphysical philosophy is evidently not identical with philosophy as such; nor is it identical with traditional philosophy, since many in the tradition have criticised it. As for 'rationality as representation,' this is a monster with so many heads that one despairs of counting them. So far as I can see, the phrase covers at least the following ideas — 1. that language has meaning by possessing a structure in common with the world: 2. that representing the world is the only thing we do with language: 3. that representing the world is *one* of the things we do with language: 4. that the mind in representing the world is external to it: 5. that the world can be represented as it is and not simply as it appears to human beings: 6. that to represent the world is to reflect it in a manner entirely passive: 7. that some languages represent the world more accurately than others and that the aim of philosophy is to construct a language that represents the world perfectly. Edwards makes no attempt to distinguish between these ideas; rather, they are allowed to merge into one cloudy picture which is then treated as the root of all philosophical evil. Yet the ideas are evidently disparate. For example, Wittgenstein, who is said in his early work to be captured by this picture, may plausibly be accused of holding the first idea but hardly of holding the last, since he explicitly denied it. Again, there is evidently a difference in plausibility between the idea that representing the world is the only function of language and the idea that this is one of its functions. Nor is the man who holds that representing the world is one of the functions of language (one of the functions, for example, of science) committed to the idea that this can be done independently of active thought with a mind entirely passive. Nor again, is he committed to the idea that the mind in representing the world is external to it (i.e. not in the world at all) but only

that, within the world, there is, between minds and other things, this difference: the other things can represent neither themselves nor minds whereas minds can represent both themselves and the other things. And so on.

Moreover this cloudiness extends not simply to Edwards's diagnosis of the disease but also to his advocacy of the remedy. As we have seen, we are released from philosophy, on Edwards's interpretation, when we acknowledge that reality cannot be grasped as a whole, that we can know only its shifting appearances, each of which is to be treated with love and humility. Now we may wonder why this is not itself to count as a doctrine in philosophy i.e. as the sort of thing from which we are to obtain release. (It sounds like the type of view someone might utter under the influence of Kant.) Edwards's answer is that this is a picture which cannot be stated but only shown (though what it is that can only be shown he has just stated). Very well; but what gives this picture its privileged status? Why is it not simply yet another picture to be cherished for the moment but later to be seen through and passed beyond? Edwards is not clear on the matter. He gets into a similar difficulty in his treatment of ethics. On the face of it, his view bears a strong resemblance to the traditional doctrine of relativism. He denies this, however, on the ground that relativism is a doctrine, and he is putting forward no doctrine, whether it be relativism or realism. In a sense he is right, but only because he holds no consistent view at all. Thus he rejects relativism on the ground that no ethical position is finally true and relativism on the ground that not everything is permitted. (Here, incidentally, he misrepresents relativism. 'Everything is permitted,' for the relativist, is a personal judgment not a philosophical view. As such, it may be rejected by any relativist whose personal values conflict with it.) What then of his own view? Well, he advocates a loving attention to all ethical positions, seeing none as final. This is not the same as accepting all ethical positions, for some are incompatible with valuing those qualities of seriousness, patience, etc., which are necessary to a loving attention. But what of the position that advocates the loving attention itself? It seems to be ethical, so presumably it is not final. But in that case, how are we supposed to take it? Or, perhaps, we *are* supposed to take it as final. But in that case, Edwards has contradicted himself.

When he confines himself to an examination of particular points (as, for example in the first part of Chapter Four) Edwards can be illuminating and he sometimes shows a neat turn of phrase: 'In science, one makes a problem disappear by gaining clarity. In philosophy, one gains (i.e. regains) clarity by making the problem disappear' (133). Unfortunately he desires nothing less than to provide the key to the whole of Wittgenstein's life and thought. In short, his work suffers from over-ambition.

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GARETH EVANS, *The Varieties of Reference*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford University Press 1982. Pp. xiii + 418. Cdn\$42.75; US\$30.00 (paper: ISBN 0-19-824685-4); Cdn\$15.50; US\$10.00 (paper: ISBN 0-19-824686-2).

This original and ingenious but somewhat overlong book was almost completed by Gareth Evans before his death in 1980. John McDowell has edited the text, supplementing it with some of Evans' notes and a few interpolations of his own. While the project of the book is to study various kinds of referring expressions, the bulk of it is devoted to a theory of singular concepts, 'Ideas' in Evans' terminology. This emphasis is due to Evans' thesis that understanding a referring expression requires exercising an ability to have certain thoughts; and hence that a theory of those terms will include an account of those thoughts and their constituent 'Ideas.'

Evans' novel claim is the great and unrecognized extent to which singular thoughts and consequently, singular terms, are 'Russellian.' Russellian singular thoughts must have an object; the existence of apparently singular thoughts without objects is an illusion. Evans says a 'Russellian' term is one '... whose significance depends upon its having a referent (12).' A sentence with a non-denoting Russellian singular term lacks semantic significance; nothing is said by such a sentence.

Evans' theory of singular thoughts is explicitly contrary to two prominent alternatives. One is what Evans terms the 'Photograph Model.' Inspired by Kripke's causal theory of names it determines the object of a mental representations as a matter of its causal source, just as the object of a photograph is its causal source. Evans also rejects what may be termed the 'intentional' model deriving from Brentano and found in Husserl. These philosophers insist both that mental states are directed towards external objects and that the existence of those objects can be ignored or 'bracketed' while the directedness of those states is studied independently. A well recognized difficulty for the intentional model is the tension between the internal nature of mental states and their ability to represent particular external objects. Those who invoke the 'Photograph Model' use causal relations to explain this success, with the consequence that representation then includes an extra-mental element. Evans' own view is clearly put in a section of an appendix on 'Methodological Solipsism, (200-4). What he proposes is, in essence, to extend the realm of the 'mental' to include certain relations involving external objects. For a speaker to have an adequate Idea of an object he must stand in certain relations to it and have other more purely intentional attitudes towards it. One large class of Ideas, those in 'information-invoking thoughts,' represent an individual by involving information derived from the object which is also about that object. That the information comes from the object requires that there be an object, yet there is also an 'aboutness' to the information. Information invoking thoughts will be both Russellian and have their object presented in a certain way. (This will remind readers of Evans' earlier criticisms of the causal theory of names, which is fully consistent with these more developed thoughts on

reference.) Other sorts of singular thoughts, such as those accompanying demonstratives or about the self, have different structures, perhaps requiring certain abilities with regard to their objects, but all are Russellian.

Evans is explicit about his semantic program, formulating several 'principles' which together require developing a theory of Ideas. The starting point is explicitly credited to Dummett; a theory of meaning must be a theory of understanding. For Evans this means that an account of a singular term must be a theory of the particular abilities to make judgements, or have thoughts, which are required for understanding uses of sentences including that term. Via the 'Generality Principle' we learn that '... if a subject can be credited with the thought that  $a$  is  $F$ , then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that  $a$  is  $G$ , for every property of being  $G$  of which he has a conception' (104). Thus abilities are structured with components corresponding closely to the parts of judgements. The component corresponding to a singular term in a judgement report (that  $a$  is  $F$ ) is an Idea. Now 'Russell's Principle' is invoked, '... a subject cannot make a judgement about something unless he knows which object his judgement is about ...,' thus '... the subject must have a capacity to distinguish the object of his judgement from all other things' (89). The final project has a distinctly Strawsonian flavour — to study reference we must study how people 'know which' object has been referred to. Many will find such strong requirements on the ability to identify to be unrealistic and to require more than is necessary for understanding; yet Evans argues that they are met in genuine cases of understanding.

The use of Russell's name is meant by Evans to claim descent for his theory from Russell's notion of logically proper names. Yet, unlike Russell, Evans insists that associated with every singular term is a mode of presentation of its referent. Evans' theory is not straightforwardly Fregean either, for he says 'It is not really clear how there can be a mode of presentation associated with some term when there is no object to be presented' (22); there can be no non-denoting singular terms. Indeed, Evans insists that Frege never asserted that there could be non-denoting terms, that such a view would be inconsistent with the rest of his philosophy!

Whatever the merits of Evans' anti-'Cartesian' view of mental representation, (as Charles Taylor describes it in his review in the *Times Literary Supplement*), however important such an account may ultimately be for a theory of understanding language, it also seems to have been responsible for a very unusual reading of Frege and Russell. Evans' citation for 'Russell's Principle' is the statement in the *Problems of Philosophy* that one must be acquainted with the constituents of propositions one can entertain. Evans interprets 'acquaintance' with an object as requiring an epistemically rich ability to 'know which' object it is. A more standard reading of Russell is to see it as the sort of direct eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with an object so well captured by the causal 'Photograph Model.' Evans, however, has attributed his own theory of mental representation to Russell. Similarly Evans avoids finding any signs of the intentional model of mental representation in Frege, while Dagfinn Føllesdal and others have explicitly compared the Fregean *Sinn* with intentional states.

*If Frege had an intentional view of the mental it is easy to see how he might* coherently distinguish two kinds of semantic significance and hold that a singular term could have one without the other. The relation between sense and denotation would be like that between an intentional state and its object.

Evans is open to accusations of improperly enlisting Frege and Russell in his own project, as he accuses another of the same thing. After (incorrectly) attributing to David Kaplan the view that rigid designators must lack a sense he says that '... Kaplan, like many others, has derived his Frege from Carnap, and is prepared to ascribe many of Carnap's views to Frege ... If a Fregean *Sinn* is thought of as a Carnapian intension, then some of Kaplan's criticisms become explicable' (63). Evans, one might reply, has derived *his* Frege and Russell from Dummett and Strawson. The transatlantic struggle over the proper way to do semantics has expanded into a quarrel over who has truly inherited the tradition of Frege and Russell.

While *The Varieties of Reference* does espouse a unified program, it is full of provocative insights and challenges to many different views of demonstratives, definite descriptions, self-knowledge, recognition and more. These points as well as the interpretation of Russell and Frege deserve independent discussion.

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MOSTAFA FAGHFOURY, ed. *Analytical Philosophy of Religion in Canada*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1982. Pp. xiv + 288. Cdn\$9.75. ISBN 2-7603-1032-9.

Some of the most significant work in philosophy of religion in the past thirty years has been done in Canada. In this volume, Faghfouri has collected key articles by four of its most outstanding spokesmen — Terence Penelhum, Kai Nielsen, Alastair McKinnon, and Donald Evans — together with critical discussions of these articles by a further four eminent philosophers. The result is a set of seminal writings in the philosophy of religion, showing both the provenance and the direction of much current debate in the area.

Yet in a sense the very eminence of the four main contributors raises a question about the point of the book. Their writings are already well-known — almost all the included articles are reprinted — so the purpose cannot have

been to present new ideas to the philosophical world. Was it, then, to display the developments in their thinking, from early papers which they now regard as 'brash' or 'overconfident' (3, 71) to more mature views? But again, this progress is already well-known, though as we shall see, putting the papers together in this way illustrates overall shifts in emphasis in the philosophy of religion. Is there perhaps a desire to display what is being done in philosophy of religion in Canada — a patriotic rather than philosophical endeavour?

Whatever the answer, the book does show a striking shift of emphasis in the philosophy of religion from preoccupation with linguistic analysis to anthropological concern: from language to the language-user. This can be seen in each of the four sections. Penelhum's first item, a reprint of his 1956 'Faith, Fact and Philosophy,' is an application of a not-much-modified verificationism to religious language which concludes that the task of giving sense to the notion of an actively present yet transcendent God is 'almost impossibly difficult' (16). His second, 'Is a Religious Epistemology Possible?' (1970), still concerns itself with the meaning and verification of religious claims, but argues that 'theological non-naturalism,' that is, the belief that nothing could in principle verify theism, is arbitrary: one must look at individual arguments and pieces of evidence as they arise, not dismiss them wholesale. In his third piece, 'Survival and Identity' (1977), Penelhum applies this conclusion to an investigation of the issues surrounding the meaningfulness and possibility of survival of bodily death, arguing that even if mental states are (contingently) brain states as is held by Central State Materialism, this does not present a logical barrier to supposing that after death this mind-brain identity no longer holds, though the problems of personal identity discussed in *Survival and Disembodied Existence* remain crucial.

John King-Farlow, commenting on Penelhum's work, considers that the movement from verificationism to human concern has not gone far enough, emphasising the varieties of human culture and hence the varieties of ideas that will be found meaningful and evidential within them. For instance, he argues that in some cultures memory claims could be checked not by appeal to bodily criteria which Penelhum emphasizes, but by some other body being possessed and giving voice to the memory claims of the possessor (60). However, Penelhum could reply here that his analysis is designed precisely to call such beliefs into question: although the fact that within some cultures they are entertained means that we must consider them seriously, it does not follow that those beliefs are correct or even rational. King-Farlow slips from the notion of 'rational believer' — one who, given his cultural context, is reasonable in believing as he does — to 'rational belief.' But as Penelhum was using this later term, it involves coherence and consistency; so the shift hides an equivocation. One can after all accept diversity of culture without accepting relativism of truth.

The increasing anthropological concern is shown in Kai Nielsen's articles in his movement from a rather strident verificationism to his concern with religious language and belief as rooted in a form of life. 'On Speaking of God' (1962) and 'Wittgensteinian Fideism' (1967) are considerably less subtle (as

Nielsen recognizes) in their awareness of the role of religious claims within the whole framework of individual and social life than is 'Religion and Groundless Believing' (1981), though Nielsen continues to argue that just because religious claims are embedded in a form of life this does not show them to be true. What it does show is that if they are false, a whole way of life is called into question, not just some isolated religious claims.

This goes along with Nielsen's long-standing concern with religion as ideology (cf. 71, 83, 87, 123-4). But here a problem arises. Nielsen moves without notice between the verificationist position that nothing could count for or against a religious claim (and it is therefore meaningless) to a quite different position that religious believers will not allow anything to count against their claims (and are therefore in the grip of an ideology). An ideology is not a theory which nothing could count against; it is a theory which is held as an individual or collective self-deception. As with many other forms of self-deception, those in its grip are psychologically or sociologically incapable of acknowledging those things which perfectly well do count against their theory. Nielsen cannot legitimately play it both ways, and his increasing concern with religion as embedded in a form of life indicates that the ideological motif should replace the verificationist concern. If this is correct, then the comments of Benoît Garceau get a stronger purchase, for Garceau shifts the question from belief in God to belief in man, arguing that religious faith as an expression of what it is to be fully human cannot be removed without great loss to humanity. Garceau recognizes, of course, that religion has also done much harm. But the debate must now be piecemeal rather than sweeping: when and in what circumstances is religion a dehumanizing ideology, and when is it a creative expression and focus of human transcendence?

All three of Alastair McKinnon's articles concern themselves with religious language, but again move from emphasis on the terms themselves to emphasis on the religious communities using the terms. 'The Meaning of Religious Assertions' (1960) argues that the notion of meaning is not monolithic, and that in many situations the meaning of a claim depends on its content — something inadequately appreciated by the verificationists. ' "Miracle" and "Paradox" ' (1967) analyzes the terms of the title in a manner reminiscent of Hume's discussion of natural law. McKinnon takes natural law as 'shorthand descriptions of how things do in fact happen' (156). But as Leslie Armour points out in his discussion, this 'shorthand' thesis is inadequate: science seeks not just description but explanatory power, and in that context 'miracle' and 'paradox' may have a role to play. Furthermore, this would not imply that only miraculous events are revelatory, as McKinnon fears, though they might be revelatory in a greater degree, just as a person's actions in a crisis are more revelatory of his or her character than is the daily routine, though even this is not without significance. In ' "Existence" in "The Existence of God" ' McKinnon argues that given current philosophical assumptions about existence as the assertion of there being an object corresponding to one's concept, it is impossible to say that God exists. This

should not be taken as an expression of atheism, however, but as a way of pointing out the inadequacy of philosophical assumptions, somewhat after the order of Kierkegaard whose works McKinnon has studied in such detail.

Donald Evans' contributions begin with his 'Differences between Scientific and Religious Assertions' (1968) in which he discusses the depth experience which give rise to religious claims and the way in which these claims therefore differ from the neutrality of scientific assertions. In 'Analogies, Attitudes, and Religious Beliefs' (composed of passages from *Faith, Authenticity and Morality* [1980] and *Struggle and Fulfillment* [1979]) he moves from analysis of the expression of religious claims to their underlying attitudes as found in those depth-experiences. He provides a system of analogies which help to make the move from the expression of human actions, attitudes, and relationships to talk about God, and emphasizes the need for personal self-involvement and basic trust as significant for linguistic/intellectual understanding — a theme carried further in his final article 'Towards a Philosophy of Openness,' printed here for the first time. Evans argues that healthy human attitudes like thankfulness or basic trust logically require an object: one cannot be thankful unless one is thankful to someone. (But even if this is granted, would it not be open to the sceptic to say, 'If that's how you define it, then I suppose what I really feel isn't thankfulness after all, just joy and relief.'?) When one probes healthy-minded openness to the universe in a reflective way, one will, Evans believes, find deeper human fulfilment as well as relation to God at a fundamental level. He offers no argument to the open and reflective atheist; what he does offer is the weight of his own testimony. Evans' contributions are discussed in French by Jacques Poulain.

The move from linguistic to anthropological concerns which occurs in each writer is paralleled by an overall move from consideration of specifically Christian claims to a much more diffuse notion of human religiosity. It is a long way from discussion of 'human openness to the transcendent' to analysis of belief in the resurrection of Christ: whether philosophy of religion is gaining or losing in its movement from the latter to the former is a question which should not be ignored.

The book is riddled with typographical errors, most of them trivial. But on p. 58 in the quotation from Penelhum 'meaning' is substituted for 'memory' and seriously distorts the sense of the passage.

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[*Editorial note:* the debates between Nielsen and Garceau, and between Penelhum and King-Farlow are continued in *Dialogue* 22.3 (September 1983) and 22.4 (December 1983) respectively.]

JOHN FISHER, ed., *Essays on Aesthetics: Perspectives on the Work of Monroe C. Beardsley*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1983. Pp. xiii + 309. US\$24.95. ISBN 0-87722-287-8.

The seventeen essays in this collection, arranged in groups under the headings 'The Philosophy of Art,' 'Aesthetic Experience,' 'Art and Society,' 'Narrative in Literature,' 'Literature and Language' and 'Tragedy and Comedy,' have been written for this volume in honour of Monroe Beardsley, who at the end offers a brief response to each essay.

So many people have reason to honour Monroe Beardsley that it is not surprising that the editor, John Fisher, had to restrict the field of contributors to those who 'have had some significant working relationship' with him. That is interesting to know as one runs one's eye down the list of many distinguished contributors.

Fisher writes of Beardsley's generosity with his time and attention to all comers. That is not hyperbole. I was fortunate enough to experience this generosity myself when, as a junior academic from another country who had never been introduced to Beardsley, I sent him the long typescript of a book on Tolstoy's theory of art for his comments. The criticisms he sent in reply, it will come as no surprise to those who know him to hear, were done with the utmost care blending kindly encouragement with judicious exactness. It is a pleasure on the occasion of this festschrift to acknowledge the debt we owe him.

Festschriften are usually uneven in quality, and this one has its weaker moments, but not many, nor is it possible in a review to discuss anything adequately. Different reviewers too have different prejudices. One of mine is to favour untechnical writing in aesthetics, which disqualifies me from discussing Ann Banfield's 'Linguistic Competence and Literary Theory.' This makes few concessions to those not trained in linguistics; Beardsley responds with enviable ease.

Nobody interested in aesthetics will want to miss papers by Frank Sibley, George Dickie and Francis Sparshott. They write, respectively, on general criteria for aesthetic judgements in criticism, in defence of the institutional theory of art against Beardsley's criticism put forward in Aagaard-Mogensen's collection *Culture and Art*, and on pictorial representation.

Many other papers are of interest too: Göran Hermerén's, in which he illuminatingly analyses the various senses in which a work of art may be said to be autonomous; Bohdan Dziemidok on aesthetic experience and the evaluation of art; John Fisher's own paper in which he writes incisively on how the lack of a theory of art, among other factors, has hampered the adequacy of Beardsley's theory of aesthetic experience; and to those interested in the sociology of art (what is sometimes catalogued, as here, 'Art and Society') Charles Dyke's 'The Praxis of Art and the Liberal Dream' is especially to be recommended. Dyke says straight out and then explores what I suspect followers of the arts more often fear than articulate: namely 'the emargination of art in most contemporary societies' (109).

Sibley wants to uphold Beardsley's 'generalist' position, the view that 'in criticism there are and can be general reasons for aesthetic judgments' (3). Sibley usefully dubs those who deny this 'particularists.' He does not have the space or the intention to mount a general case against particularism, or to argue extensively against particular Particularists (Isenberg say, though Mary Mothersill gets a brief notice). Rather, he stays close to Beardsley's arguments, exploring, criticizing and supplementing them, while maintaining their shared generalist position.

Sparshott's paper is an important contribution to the literature on representation; the disclaimer 'whether it leads anywhere worth going remains unclear' (130) is unnecessarily modest. The paper starts from the claims that pictorial representation is a practice, the conditions of which are conditions of recognizability and that the primacy of these is a biological absolute. It moves via discussions of reference, of pictures as projecting samples of possible worlds, and a comparison of theories of painting with the theory of propositional attitudes to the conclusion that a theory of picturing is a theory of the imagination. The ground thus covered is immense and will need to be gone over more amply but the sketch already on offer is worth having. Sparshott puts the point well, urged hitherto by a minority of philosophers, notably Harold Osborne: 'Nelson Goodman's elegant treatment of what he calls "representation" has earned its influence and deserved its reputation. It is, however, an essay in formal logic' (132-3). Sparshott's insistence is timely that we should think about the skills of recognition (and their extension in picturing) in terms of their survival value — 'biological priorities are the only real absolutes we have' (135).

Hermerén's twelfth version of the autonomy thesis might provoke students of *moral* philosophy since in effect it inverts Richard Hare's well-known claim that moral principles override all others: 'In cases of conflict between values or norms, aesthetic and artistic considerations should always be decisive and outweigh moral, political, and religious ones when works of art are to be evaluated' (46). Incidentally, the two 'attractive poles' that Charles Dyke says liberalism is stretched between — 'the authority of the individual conscience and the belief in objective right and wrong' (110) — constitute the antinomy from which Hare's *Freedom and Reason* begins.

Stephen Barker ('Kant on Experiencing Beauty') is well aware of the recent scholarship devoted to Kant's Third Critique, though I'm not convinced that it is less 'often read and studied than the *Critique of Pure Reason* or the *Critique of Practical Reason*' (69). Certainly the First Critique is the most familiar, but I wonder whether the Second is not the most neglected of them all. I think that this is the case in Britain where the neglect of the Third Critique should not be exaggerated. It receives careful attention from philosophers interested in aesthetics, one of whom is learning German in order to retranslate it into English.

Paul Ricoeur thinks that narrative activity is a 'poetic' solution to Augustine's paradoxes of time experience; hence one might say, as Ricoeur later does, the consolation of literature.

Alexander Nehamas argues arrestingly that plot 'is not a part of a novel that can be described in its own right. To describe a novel's plot is not to describe an elementary aspect of that novel, but to give an elementary description of the novel itself' (181).

Samuel Hynes's suggestion ('On Hardy's Badnesses') that Thomas Hardy 'was not good at short narrative, whether in prose or in verse' (249) is interesting, though I would myself exempt the poem 'The Dance at the Phoenix' from Hynes's strictures, for it is a poem which remains in and haunts the imagination for years after reading it. And is it consistent to complain that 'Apparently Hardy liked everything he wrote and kept it all (... in his later years, he would dig up early poems and include them in his new collections)' (248) while later citing 'the fact that he wrote virtually all of his poems after he had ended his novel-writing career' (251), i.e. after he was some fifty-five years of age?

George McFadden characterizes 'the most persistent identifying mark of literature written during the last two hundred years' as 'nostalgia for the naive' — a feeling, bound up with a sense of loss of childhood innocence and happiness, that nature is no longer our human home (271) (though surely that characterization of childhood is itself naive).

He also says that 'writing about the comic is no laughing matter.' I think, however, that writing about the tragic may be sad: at any rate Stefan Morawski's confession (his word) will renew our tragic sense of life.

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D.A. GILLIES, *Frege, Dedekind, and Peano on the Foundations of Arithmetic*. Assen: Van Gorcum 1982. Pp. iii + 103. 19.50 Dfl. ISBN 90-232-1888-4.

This book is intended as a critical exposition, accessible to 'any philosophy student who has done the usual basic course in logic,' of the views of Frege (chiefly *Begriffsschrift* [1879], *Grundlagen* [1884], and *Grundgesetze* [1893]), Dedekind (*Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?* [1888]), and Peano (*Arithmetices Principia* [1889], and *Sul concetto di numero* [1891] on the foundations of arithmetic.

It is, of course, Frege, who most fully addressed the philosophical issues, who receives the most attention. The first few chapters establish the context: the arithmetization of analysis (per Dedekind's *Continuity and irrational numbers* [1872]) is outlined briefly, and then the opinions of Kant and Mill, and Frege's criticisms thereof. Chapter 6 examines Frege's Platonism: numbers exist objectively. Dedekind, it will turn out, regarded them as 'free creations of the human mind,' and Peano, a proto-Formalist, did not seem much concerned about the question. Frege's famous definition ['The Number which belongs to the concept F is the extension of the concept "equinumerous with (*gleichzahlig*) the concept F"'] is presented in Chapter 7. The next two chapters are devoted to Dedekind's abstract characterization of the natural numbers (as the closure of a singleton under a one-to-one unary operation whose range is disjoint from the singleton). Chapter 10 presents Peano's axioms, and summarizes the similarities and differences among Frege, Dedekind, and Peano — it is held that Peano, like Dedekind and unlike Frege, accepted 'set' as a logical notion; that like Frege and unlike Dedekind he saw the need for a formal logic; and that unlike both Frege and Dedekind he did not consider arithmetic reducible to logic. The last two chapters examine Frege's formal logic, contrasting it with those of Boole (*Mathematical analysis of logic* [1847]) and Peano, and conclude with Russell's paradox and Frege's reaction. Two brief appendices deal with the notation of symbolic logic and with the principle of mathematical induction.

In my opinion, *Frege, Dedekind, and Peano* does very well what it sets out to do. I think however that Gillies has rather misrepresented the distinction between Frege's concepts and Dedekind's sets. The differences, other than merely terminological, all follow from the facts that sets are held (i) unequivocally to exist as objects and (ii) to be identical (or at least indiscernible!) whenever coextensive. (Dedekind had them non-vacuous as well, but that is inessential.) However, no doubt against Frege's will, his concepts came to possess a high degree of objecthood — they 'fall under' concepts (for only concepts are capable of falling under the concept 'equinumerous with F') and inhabit the range of quantifiers (in the definition of equinumerous ([1884], page 79 and Section 70) and, more explicitly, in the definition of successor ([1884], page 89)). This is enough to subject them to Russell's paradox — let F be the concept 'does not fall under itself.' Gillies thinks (33) that it is the passage to *extensions* of concepts which gives rise to Russell's paradox — that is, that (ii), which is just the axiom of extensionality, is somehow critical. This suggests that Gillies doesn't really understand the axiom of extensionality, a suggestion which is reinforced by his proposal (35) to reconstruct concepts from sets — no concepts 'featherless biped' and 'rational animal,' discernible one from the other, could ensue.

It is, of course, more difficult to understand the axiom of extensionality for one who, like Gillies, denies the objective existence of mathematical entities: a statement of identity is not then straightforwardly meaningful. Indeed, when it comes to statements of identity Gillies often seems confused, as in his refutation (42ff.) of Frege's argument about astronomers, or confusing,

as when he renders *gleichzahlig* as 'equal to' (46). Thus this work may be seen as evidence of the utility, if not the correctness, of Frege's Platonism.

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V.A. HOWARD, *Artistry: the Work of Artists*. Indianapolis: Hackett 1982. Pp. 228. US\$12.50. ISBN 0-915145-06-5.

In this book, Howard, both an accomplished classical singer and a professional philosopher, covers a good deal of ground in a relatively short time. We find a rethinking of the distinction between art and craft; a detailed case analysis of singing and learning to sing (providing the central example which is developed throughout the book); a thorough and original examination of the languages and lores of artistic instruction; examinations of creativity and of imagination in performance; an investigation into the nature of practice and rehearsal (a curiously neglected topic); and a final brief interweaving of a number of these issues with related work in psychology. Here I can touch on only a few of these.

Howard's central question is 'what sort of knowledge, if that, it was that I had so painstakingly acquired yet about which I was so inarticulate' (3). One can see in Howard's answers the influences of Collingwood, Wittgenstein, and Goodman, as well as traces of Ryle and Austin. This philosophical family is, although always interesting, not always perfectly happy.

In the discussion of musical practice, for instance, Howard observes that one common conception of practice — mere repetitive drill — is insufficient. There are further 'teleological, evaluative, and cognitive' (161) dimensions of practice which the simple conception fails to capture; there are obviously significant differences between the mindlessly repeated tapping of one's fingers and trying to get the wide interval leaps of a Schoenberg song in tune. But this difference comes in the end, Howard suggests, to in the latter case 'performing up to some preconceived standard' (161-2). Perhaps here the influence of Collingwood's aesthetic idealism is too great. Practice is here being described as the making in the external world of a representation of an inner model which precedes it. In some cases this model seems apt enough — the

singer might envision, or hear in the mind's ear, the perfect high C, and *then* try to produce it with perfect tone and intonation, judging the performance against the imagined ideal. One can indeed see here telelogical, evaluative, and cognitive features at work. But in practice many different things can happen that involve these features without there being a reference to an imaginary standard. One might liken the trying out of various phrasings and dynamic shadings to experimenting with the placement of furniture in a room; one often does not know what one wants before one gets it right. We also must make theoretical room for the somewhat recalcitrant case of practicing improvisation, in which one does indeed think, judge, and act with purpose, but in doing it one is often acutely aware of the absence of anything like the mental ideal of the perfect high C. In another sense as well Howard's mentalistic characterization of practice is surprising; earlier in the book Howard quoted Vincent Tomas to the effect that the very concept of creativity itself implies that the creator does not foresee the result of the creative act. These are, however, rather minor quibbles about a generally rich discussion of a neglected topic.

Howard explores other aspects of the mental lives of artists. In a section entitled 'Nonverbal Thinking' Howard begins his inquiry into the philosophically rather mysterious area in which musicians speak of dome-like sounds, lighter and darker sounds, crispier and muddier sounds, and the sound of a trumpet feeling like cold, shiny, porcelain. These are examples in which the 'languages of craft and skill [are] laced ... by innumerable cross-modal references' (146), and in this discussion he shows how crucial synaesthesia and synaesthetic description are to the learning of musical craft. This discussion reveals a good deal about the special sort of knowledge that, defying any clear propositional formulation, is passed on from teacher to student. His account would begin to explain also the fact that, in learning music, the student must study *with* the maestro, whereas in science, by contrast, the reading of written work is often sufficient for significant influence to occur.

Howard claims that synaesthetic images (discussed in terms of seeing-as) are 'held in imagination as directives' (135), and that the question of mental images in artistic creativity ought not be 'a question of what images *are*, their specifiable features, but what they *do*, how they function to control' (139). This change of tack, from the nature of images to their function, is also taken earlier in the book where the illocutionary force of heuristic imagery is discussed (59).

Pressing further into his investigation of the workings of the artist's mind, Howard turns to a discussion of learning to perform in the Wittgensteinian terms of 'knowing how to go on' (61). He here makes the interesting point, implicitly against behaviorism, that '“knowing how” to go on cannot be reduced to the mere ability to go on; for not only may one continue to understand long after losing the abilities once demonstrated, but it is quite conceivable that one be able to go on without understanding how' (62). The first case, fairly unproblematic, is illustrated by the elderly retired singer who can no longer demonstrate with his voice what he still understands

about singing. The second case, however, leads to more trouble: this is the 'natural' performer who performs to high standards without, in a strange sense, knowing how he does it. This is a fairly familiar phenomenon for anyone who has taught or performed music; indeed, it often occurs that, when one stops to investigate closely what one is doing and precisely how one is doing it, one loses the very ability under investigation. Howard observes here that ' "know-how" in the sense of *formulable* technique is neither necessary nor sufficient' (62) to an understanding of how to go on, and relies on some further remarks of Wittgenstein's concerning the learning of a technique and the subtleties and complexities of describing such learning. Howard considers the significance of Wittgenstein's remark that 'it is *the circumstances* under which he had such an experience that justify him in saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows how to go on' (61). Howard might, however, have deepened our comprehension of unformulable artistic knowledge by making the connection with his own discussion, elsewhere in the book, of artistic practices as rule-governed activities. One suspects that when performance is interrupted by self-analysis in the way explained above, some 'natural' or 'second-nature' procedure is being artificially fragmented into components which correspond to a progressive sequence of rules. The natural performer thus cannot explain what he does any more than a speaker can give an expressive and unbroken delivery while mentally accounting for every word he utters in terms of its grammatical function. Howard, taking over Black's varieties of actions which are rule invoking, accepting, covered, or guided, examines the ways in which rules enter into artistic performance; in a sophisticated discussion, he shows why it is that, although rules may indeed conform to performance, they need not by any means have been operative in the way the conformity would initially seem to suggest.

Practitioners have suspected of theorists, that they are merely inventing stories about, or, more charitably, rationally reconstructing, their intuitive and inspired labors in almost syllogistic terms. Howard's discussion sheds considerable light on this area specifically. This section again demonstrates the greatest overall virtue of this study — the healthy unwillingness to subordinate, and thus misrepresent, the actual work of artists for the benefit of aesthetic theory.

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ANGÈLE KREMER-MARIETTI, *Entre le signe et l'histoire; l'anthropologie positiviste d'Auguste Comte*. Paris: Klincksieck et Cie 1982. 263 p. ISBN 2-86563-011-0.

C'est à une lecture nouvelle de l'œuvre d'Auguste Comte que nous invite Angèle Kremer-Marietti dans son intéressant ouvrage *Entre le signe et l'histoire: l'anthropologie positiviste d'Auguste Comte*. L'auteur nous révèle, en effet, dans l'œuvre de Comte une anthropologie du signe fondée dans l'histoire.

L'intention de l'auteur, exprimée dans la Préface (8), est rappelée dans la Conclusion de l'ouvrage en ces termes:

Par la familiarité que nous avions déjà développée avec l'œuvre d'un Rousseau ou d'un Nietzsche, et, en particulier, par l'importance que ces œuvres accordent à la nature et à la fonction de la *métaphore*, nous étions d'emblée placée sur la voie de la recherche rhétorique et sémiologique, voie grâce à laquelle nous avons enfin pu dégager le sens dernier de l'anthropologie comtienne et comprendre qu'elle est, fondamentalement, une *Anthropologie du signe* (le "signe" étant pris ici au sens défini par Comte dans le *Système*, II, 222, "la liaison constante entre une influence objective et une impression subjective," véritable unité biface), fondée dans l'optique que d'une *sémiologie naturelle*, sur le modèle du célèbre schème de Bichat: *assimilation/désassimilation*. Ce schème permet, à l'examen, de mieux reconnaître la parfaite *homologie* des répétitives oppositions comtiennes, telles que sensation/mouvement, ou théorie/pratique, ou autorité/pouvoir (c'est-à-dire: "pouvoir spirituel"/"pouvoir temporel"), en référence au processus, végétatif et organique, qui commande aussi, par dérivation, les processus cognitifs et actifs d'un organisme dans son milieu, qu'il s'agisse de l'animal ou de l'homme. (260)

Cette intention, l'auteur la poursuit en montrant principalement comment, dans l'œuvre de Comte, nous pouvons trouver une profonde analyse des systèmes de signes qui relient l'homme à son milieu et l'enveloppent en quelque sorte avec son milieu. Invoquant la *théorie des milieux* dégagée par Comte, l'auteur fait bien voir comment pour le fondateur du positivisme la totalisation reste une préoccupation constante et qu'on ne saurait vraiment comprendre l'organisme sans son milieu, ni l'individu sans sa société. Ainsi, les différents systèmes de signes produits par l'esprit et l'action de l'homme, s'insèrent dans la totalité humaine engagée dans l'histoire qui concilie l'ordre et le progrès. Compris de cette façon, les divers systèmes de signes expriment les dimensions de l'homme et son rapport au monde.

Dans la première partie de l'ouvrage, consacrée aux 'Questions de méthode,' A. Kremer-Marietti montre comment pour Auguste Comte le langage des sciences positives sert de médiation entre le monde et l'homme; et comment la sociologie en tant que langage et médiation exprime le rapport inverse de l'homme au monde. Le langage des sciences positives et l'histoire de ce langage deviennent inséparables de l'histoire de l'humanité et le langage de la sociologie exprime le fondement de l'unité humaine par son interven-

tion dans le concert des sciences positives en vue de produire la 'systématisation totale de l'esprit positif.'

Dans la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage, consacrée aux 'Questions de doctrine,' l'auteur rappelle par une analyse bien fouillée, l'orientation générale de l'anthropologie au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Cette analyse est présentée au moyen du concept d'espèce. Puis, progressivement, le caractère propre de l'anthropologie positiviste et de son discours est dégagé. Ce caractère propre s'exprime, selon A. Kremer-Marietti, à travers la catégorie de la totalité puisque le dessein de Comte vise 'la totalisation de l'expérience humaine mondiale, historique et géographique' (143). Et cette ambition d'une anthropologie intégrale conduit à l'élaboration d'une théorie de la synthèse, d'une théorie de la solidarité, d'une théorie de la société et même d'une théorie positive de la souveraineté.

En bref, cet ouvrage sur l'anthropologie de Comte, outre qu'il nous rappelle sans cesse le projet de totalisation de l'expérience de l'Humanité, poursuivi par Comte, montre en même temps que ce projet passe par une analyse des divers systèmes de signes produits au cours de l'histoire, lesquels révèlent 'une psyché totale de l'homme, sise dans les profondeurs de la vie et de la société' (237). Un ouvrage bien documenté qui situe dans une perspective nouvelle l'œuvre encore trop peu comprise d'Auguste Comte.

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MICHAEL J. LANGFORD, *Providence*. London: SCM Press 1982. Pp. 183. £5.50. ISBN 0-334-01342-9.

Unless you consider no topic in religion worth bothering philosophy about, this is a topic abundantly worth treating. Alas, this book may not be the treatment it needs.

No less an authority than Plato is said (by David Hume in a 1743 letter to William Mure) to have equated the denial of God's providence with atheism. It follows that the discovery of conceptual confusion or emptiness in the idea of providence would, in the eyes of some, entail the emptiness of theistic belief. It is not clear that Langford takes quite so high a ground; but he plainly attaches great importance to this notion in orthodox Christianity. He wishes,

therefore, to consider what sort of sense, if any, may be made of the claim that such-and-such is a part of the providence of God, and whether there are any grounds for making such a claim. Langford's stated plan is to divide his enquiry into two parts: (1) explication of the concept as it is and has been used, and (2) assessment of (a) its intelligibility and (b) grounds for its use. In Langford's practice, explication frequently gives way to assessment; but that, by itself, is no ground for complaint. Some may have qualms about the way in which the concept 'as used' is trimmed or tidied up in order to free it from inconsistency or implausibility. But it is arguable that any concept, particularly one with a complex history, should be allowed refurbishment. The question to be asked is whether the alterations are successful and whether they leave the notion recognizably connected with its forebearer.

Langford begins by considering three questions which are present throughout the enquiry: (1) To what sort of divine activity is reference attempted through use of 'providence'? (2) Does such attempted reference involve an empirical claim? (3) How, if at all, can claims concerning God's providence be reconciled with claims concerning divine timelessness and changelessness? These queries receive introductory attention in Chapter I. Five subsequent chapters contribute to their consideration by examining the historical background of the idea; analogies which might be thought to illuminate it; and the ways in which providence may be placed in nature, human nature and history. The concluding chapter summarizes the work of analysis, clarifying somewhat its relation to the three leading questions; and then proceeds to the task of assessment.

Concerning the kind of thing that providence is, Langford narrows the range to two sub-sorts: 'general,' and 'special.' This move requires both a distinction of these two species from other things that might be included in providence (e.g., creation and miracles), and their distinction from one another. Both distinctions are problematic. First, the difference between providence and such notions as creation and sustenance is not marked convincingly. And the distinction between special providence and miracle is made to rest on a distinction between God's 'steering' the course of events (special providence), and interfering with it in a way rendering it incapable of complete naturalistic explanation (miracle). Langford recognizes one difficulty here. 'Is not to steer nature ultimately to interfere with it ...?', he asks (77). But his reply, that seeing providential action is more a matter of overall interpretation than of responding to some gap in scientific explanation, seems unsatisfactory on two counts: (a) it seems more illustrative of *general* providence, and (b) if it applies to special providence, it appears just as applicable to miracles.

Further elucidation of the concept of providence is sought by looking for an apt analogy. Difficulties are evident from the outset of this discussion. Langford gives almost no idea of what view he holds concerning the nature of analogy. He refers to Aquinas, but leaves it quite unclear what part(s) of the Thomistic theory he adopts, and offers neither mention of nor defense against the problems usually cited in that view. It is part of this crucial

vagueness that Langford fails to say whether his search is merely for a helpful, but theoretically dispensible, illumination (as one might in a poem or figure of speech); or whether something more essential, and systematically related to a whole conceptual framework is looked for (as in the choice of analogies to articulate a scientific paradigm). Tidal action is judged to be the most helpful analogy for general providence; partly on the ground that it allows for both a general direction of things and scope for unpredictability at the level of individual units. The problem is, of course, that that scope may well be merely a result of the practical limit on our knowledge of conditions and covering laws. Special providence is said to be best compared to human action. With that Langford knowingly buys into a host of controversies in the philosophy of mind. His defense is that whatever mysteries there are in both human and divine action, there is a 'correspondence' between them.

In his consideration of the ways in which the notion of providential action may be fitted into the areas of nature, human nature and history, Langford has a good eye for where the problems lie. Concerning the natural order, references to providence will appear to many to be rendered otiose, if not falsified. Regarding human nature, there is a question as to how talk of providence is to be reconciled with human freedom, and another as to why God does not exercise *more* providence. With respect to history, the question of consistency with freedom recurs, and a new query as to whether there is a discernible 'direction' to history arises. It is perhaps not surprising that Langford's success in dealing with such an array of questions is less clear than that his success in identifying them. He makes a number of interesting, if partially developed, suggestions (e.g., that providence may better be understood as opening up possibilities than forcing something to happen). But there are many lines of argument either too compressed or unclear to be helpful (e.g., that the operation of providence is consistent with the possibility of naturalistic explanation). The possibility that the problem of evil constitutes a falsification of providence receives a maddeningly compressed discussion.

Running through all this is Langford's view that a claim about providential action is not, strictly, an empirical claim. It is more, he suggests, a judgement as to the general appropriateness of a conceptual framework. Interestingly, and somewhat implausibly, Langford considers that question, as well as the one about the shape of the concept, to be less fundamental than the problem of how God's providence is to be reconciled with such alleged attributes as his timelessness and changelessness. There is a somewhat puzzling jump at this point to the general question of reconciling divine transcendence and immanence. To many, it will seem more reasonable to reconsider the Greek metaphysical commitments that lead to such problematic doctrines as timelessness and immutability, than to glance sympathetically in the direction of Whitehead, as Langford does.

Langford's concluding 'rational assessment' is explicitly confined to what it is *rational* to believe concerning providence; i.e., what is internally consistent and in accord with the most obvious facts of experience. He concludes that it is (in this sense) rational to reject the idea altogether; but also to believe only in

general providence, and in both general and special providence. His defense of the third option rests on the work of previous chapters in attempting to show that in the various realms of its application 'providence' shows a coherent use and one not falsified by experience. My guess is that many will find that work too scattered and sketchy to support the conclusion.

Neither the professional philosopher-or-theologian nor the interested layperson is likely to find this book satisfying. The professional is likely to find too many topics mentioned, with too little development and penetration, to be helpful. The range of authorities cited seems at the same time to be too broad, and missing some of the most obvious resources. To the non-professional, the number of issues and their commentators is likely to merge into a blur. For both groups, the fundamental question of how talk about providence meshes with other sorts of talk about happenings in the world is apt to seem clearly recognized, but never quite dealt with.

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ALBERT MENNE and NIELS ÖFFENBERGER, eds., *Zur modernen Deutung der aristotelischen Logik I. Über den Folgerungsbegriff in der aristotelischen Logik*. Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms Verlag 1982. Pp. 220 DM48.

Why is syllogistic so controversial? It is a sign of our peculiar time that the interpretation and evaluation of such a straightforward contribution as Aristotle's logic should still elude consensus. With due allowances for difference of style and presentation, what Aristotle essentially achieved was a complete formalization of the basic core of term logic — the logic of 'all,' 'some,' and 'not' as applied to nonempty monadic terms in immediate inferences and syllogistic figures. Although this is not now ordinarily considered the basic core of modern logic, it could be. Although Aristotle typically formulates his syllogisms as conditionals, it seems more faithful to his architectonic spirit to read them as arguments in a natural-deduction framework, as J. Corcoran points out here (98-104). This reading is buttressed by A.N. Prior's insight, taken up by V. Sainati (111-27), that Aristotle's peculiar unidiomatic formulation 'The A belongs to all of the B' is metalinguistic. G. Granger (128 et seq.)

and N. Öffenberger (158 et seq., also 206 et seq. with Sainati) likewise support the inferential reading of Aristotle's syllogisms. If Aristotle's syllogistic is based upon an underlying propositional logic, it is important to recognize that far less than the full truth-functional propositional calculus is required, as P. Lorenzen (94-7) and A. Menne (70f) show.

Logic systems are often fruitfully studied in families, as e.g., modal logic or constructive logic or relevance logic. The same goes for syllogistic: Aristotle gave us the basic system; it is up to us to explore the interesting variations. This latter call may fill some friends of the text with suspicion. But after the text in its historical purity has received its due, we are still left with an elegant little logic system as a springboard for further development. *Amicus Aristoteles, sed magis amica logica.*

The first obvious extension of Aristotle's assertoric syllogistic (AS) is to develop the treatment of negative terms more systematically. This is undertaken by Menne (69-78).

The second obvious extension of AS is to relax the restriction of argument forms to immediate inferences and syllogistic figures. The recognition of the fourth figure was an early such innovation. Further extension in this direction is instructive, for while AS is classically complete, the extension need not be so. It is not even clear that 'All S are S' would be a theorem by Aristotle's lights. And as H. Zwergel notes (51), for Aristotle nothing follows from a contradiction (64<sup>b</sup> 17). Indeed, we still get an interesting extension of AS without *ex falso quodlibet*. This suggests that Aristotle was the first relevance logician, an affinity remarked in effect by Menne (71 on *strenge Implikation*). It is of great interest that Aristotle preserved relevance by such a simple expedient as restricting argument forms.

A third natural development of syllogistic was a long time coming: the inclusion of empty terms, apparently first by Boole. Since this semantic generalization undercut the validity of some of the traditional moods, the stage was set for the modern stalemate, in which neo-Scholastic friends and quantificational foes alike undervalue the potential of syllogistic-based logic. The minds drawn to 'existential import' are not always the deepest: they have helped cloud a fairly simple issue in *falsche Spitzfindigkeit*. Of deeper interest is the surfacing of another relevance problem once empty terms are admitted. Since Boole, the empty class is included in every class: all round squares are gods, and so forth. Needless to say, there is nothing in Aristotle to support such a supposition. But more to the point: like *ex falso quodlibet* it turns out not to be needed for an otherwise Boolean syllogistic. Once again, we see how much trouble Aristotle saved himself by restricting the forms of argument treated in his syllogistic (in this case, by excluding categorical propositions from consideration in which the same term occurs twice).

A fourth useful augmentation of syllogistic is the addition of singular terms. Although Aristotle used them in examples, he did not work them systematically into his formal treatment. It is an old insight (latterly much scorned) that for certain purposes singular propositions may be treated as universals. But it is quite a young insight, so far as I am aware, that for a

logically singular subject 'some' implies 'all.' Meanwhile, the asymmetric Fregean conception of subject and predicate, according to which singular terms or proper names are categorially contrasted with general terms or predicates, has beguiled the modern logical sensibility. From this perspective, it is one more nail in the coffin of traditional logic that it appears to be inhospitable to singular terms. Recent work dispels this appearance.

Ultimately syllogistic, as generalized by Boole, may be naturally taken as the most fundamental part of predicate-functor logic as propounded by W.V. Quine. This variable-free formulation of first-order logic with identity, inter-translatable with the now standard quantification theory, is the true heir of the algebra of logic of the mid- to late nineteenth century. Together with combinatory logic, it represents the highest development of the tradition of term logic stretching from Aristotle to Schröder.

I have taken pains here to show that Aristotle's logic is of systematic, not just historical interest. But this only enhances its historical interest. The useful anthology under review, handsomely reproduced by offset from copies of the papers as they originally appeared, is primarily but not exclusively historical. Not directly historical is J. Słupecki's piece establishing interconnections between his formulation of Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic and a four-valued system of L. Rogowski's. All of the papers stem from the last three decades except Łukasiewicz's 1904 paper 'On the law of contradiction in Aristotle.' From a historico-systematic point of view, I would have considered including also I.M. Bocheński's 'On the categorical syllogism,' I. Thomas's 'CS(n): an extension of CS,' J.C. Shepherdson's 'On the interpretation of Aristotelian syllogistic,' and T.J. Smiley's 'Syllogism and quantification.' Perhaps there will be room for some of them in the projected second volume of Menne and Öffenberger's anthology, which is to concentrate on modal and many-valued logic.

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JOSEPH PESTIEAU, *L'espoir incertain*, Montréal: Hurtubise HMH 1983, 283 p. ISBN 2-89045-599-8.

Prix d'excellence du Ministère de l'éducation du Québec, *L'espoir incertain* se veut un essai sur la dialectique entre vouloir, pouvoir et espoir, un pari passionné pour la liberté qui n'est cependant pas conçue comme exercice d'une

volonté indéterminée mais bien plutôt comme entreprise toujours déjà aliénée dans ses propres productions, toujours déjà enracinée dans une histoire qui la rend possible en même temps qu'assujettie. Pari nécessaire lorsque, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui, il est de bon ton de dénoncer les échecs -réels ou imaginaires- de tant de projets libertaires, de se plaire dans un défaitisme qui, comme le signale l'auteur, est bien utile à la conservation des pouvoirs établis.

L'ouvrage se présente divisé en trois parties. D'abord, il est question surtout du réseau complexe d'interférences qui font de la liberté morale une liberté conditionnée, et de la connaissance de ce conditionnement une circonstance décisive de son exercice. Interférences entre déterminismes sociaux et mentalités, d'abord, bien sûr, mais aussi entre moyens et fins, extériorité et intérieurité, théorie et pratique. Dans la deuxième partie il s'agit d'examiner la dialectique entre vouloir et pouvoir dans son champ propre, celui du politique. Rapports entre société, politique et Etat, entre forces sociales et forces politiques, entre pluralisme de partis et démocratie, entre pouvoir de l'idéal et idéal du pouvoir, entre liberté et justice. Enfin, dans la troisième section, à partir ou sur la base d'une analyse du phénomène du millénarisme, il est question de la mesure et de la démesure de l'espérance, du rôle de l'imagination et de la ferveur espérantes dans la mobilisation de volontés pour la transformation du monde. Et l'auteur de reprendre ici Bloch quand il affirme que 'c'est dans la disposition à l'espérance, dans le souci d'un remplissage empirique de cette intentionnalité "affective", que se dévoile l'être des choses et des événements' — 'principe du sens à mettre en œuvre dans la pratique' - (228).

Ce n'est certainement pas par l'originalité des idées et des arguments que cet essai s'imposera au lecteur. Affirmer que 'l'existence la plus individuelle se définit dans la coexistence et, plus précisément, dans le devenir de cette coexistence' (35), ou que 'pour juger différents objectifs, il faut les envisager non seulement comme des fins en soi, mais aussi comme différentes variables en interférence avec d'autres variables, dans une même dynamique sociale' (73), ou encore que 'les mirages de l'idéal peuvent être entretenus délibérément ou exploités pour établir le pouvoir des uns sur les autres' (147) -et nous prenons au hasard des exemples d'affirmations qui parsèment l'ouvrage-, n'ajoute rien à ce que nous savons tous. C'est plutôt leur rappel, qui est même celui d'un certain sens commun, qui, dans la conjoncture actuelle, peut avoir un sens et une fonction, donner un sens et une fonction à cet ouvrage. Seul pourrait être signalé ce qui nous apparaît comme une espèce de flottement, par endroits plus visible, entre le social et le culturel, entre des intérêts de classe et un imaginaire collectif qui semble être en lieu commun d'élaboration de projets -lorsqu'il s'agit seulement d'un lieu partiel. C'est notamment le cas lorsque, à l'occasion d'une analyse de l'industrialisation, l'auteur accuse 'une culture qui ne songe qu'à l'emploi d'utilités comptabilisables', en même temps qu'il reconnaît le pouvoir d'imposer leur point de vue de 'ceux qui contrôlent les investissements' (47). Interférence entre le social et le culturel? Sans doute, mais alors cette interférence est réglée, ou l'auteur devrait nous dire comment

elle se règle, d'où partent (et pourquoi?) ses déterminations. On dirait qu'une certaine inspiration marxiste n'arrive pas alors à se faire suffisamment sentir pour mieux éclairer le jeu complexe de rapports qui se nouent entre les intérêts des différentes classes sociales et les productions symboliques et imaginaires qui font le noyau d'une culture.

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KINGSLEY PRICE, ed., *On Criticizing Music* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1982. Pp. ix + 117. US\$12.00. ISBN 0-8018-2613-6.

In the introduction to the five essays of this volume, Price states that 'criticism of music is the effort to understand and to appreciate composition for oneself and to further their informed appreciation in others.' Understanding a composition is taken to be a matter of determining its genesis (generic), its structure (configurational), its meaning (semantic) or a combination of such determination. This is a fine collection of essays representing a diverse approach to the understanding of music critics. Unfortunately, there is a complete unity in regarding music criticism as essentially *technical description*. But, as Peter Kivy remarks in *The Corded Shell*,

as enticing as this is to the musically learned, it leaves a large and worthy musical community completely out in the cold. Music, after all, is not just for musicians and musical scholars, anymore than painting is just for art historians, or poetry for poets. It seems ... both surprising and intolerable that one can read with profit the great critics of the visual and literary arts without being a professor of English or the history of art, the musically untrained but humanistically educated seem to face a choice between descriptions of music too technical for them to understand, or else described as nonsense by the authorities their education has taught them to respect. (8-9)

It would seem that at least a sixth philosophical perspective on criticizing music needs representation.

Charles Rosen treats music criticism as a matter of determining the resemblance between a certain composition and earlier compositions within the literature. Tracing the channels of influence — a genetic understanding — is no doubt a function furthering the informed appreciation of a music com-

position, but, says Rosen, the works in which the critic is most often interested are those that are *original* composition — when 'influence' becomes 'inspiration' there are no resemblances. In such cases the critic can only hope to understand the composition in terms of how its elements are organized, how they work together. In short, genetic understanding must give way to configurational understanding.

Joseph Kerman, objects to the practice among music critics of restricting analysis to a concern with *organicism*. This may be valid for understanding 'the masterpieces of German instrumental music' but, is inadequate to other music that we value. What is needed is the development of criticism which is open to include other elements *internal* to the composition, such as emotional coloration through the use of chromaticism, and *external* to the composition such as the tradition from which it springs.

Monroe Beardsley presents a theory of musical reference according to which a work of music may be regarded as making *reference* but only to its own 'properties — not objects or events or processes or emotional states that occur or belong to the extra-musical world' (68). Compositions refer to their properties when they exemplify them and since it cannot exemplify all of its properties any reasonable semantic understanding of a composition must have some means of determining which properties are the exemplified properties. The principle Beardsley adopts for making this determination is that a composition exemplifies those of its properties that contribute to its 'capacity to interest us aesthetically.' These properties are those Beardsley calls 'human qualities.' Perhaps the most interesting conclusion Beardsley reaches for those concerned with music criticism is his claim that semantic understanding of a composition is logically dependent on prior criticism. We cannot appreciate a composition's meaning without having determined its exemplifications, and we cannot determine what is exemplified until we know what is noteworthy about the piece. We can discover what is noteworthy only through coming to understand the piece either in terms of its genesis or its structure.

Rose Subotnik's essay is a consideration of the differences she perceives in criticism required for classical music and romantic music. Both are claimed to be semiotic, the difference lies in the type of meaningfulness relevant to each. Where the meaning of classical music is a function of a kind of necessary temporal progression — each element requiring its successor from start to finish; romantic music is composed of episodes, as it were, each of which may itself be a tonally determined progression from sequence to sequence but whose episodes appear devoid of any strict implicative connections to predecessors or successors. When dealing with romantic music one must focus one's attention on *extra-compositional* considerations such as those suggested by titles, text, or programs.

Karl Aschenbrenner argues that since music works are intrinsically temporal structures, it is the job of music criticism to discover the elements and connections that comprise those structures — be they 'tones, intervals, cords and basic sequences (or if not these, then the pops, gurgles, thumps, swishes,

hoots, and honks we have been hearing)’ (102). Having discerned the temporal organization of the composition the critic must appraise the work by offering apt characterizations which, though not genuine descriptions of the work, are at least metaphorically appropriate to it. The critic’s aim is, of course, to lead his or her audience to enjoy a response to the work similar to the critic’s, the audience having had the benefit of both the critic’s discernment of structure and subjective yet informed and discriminating judgements about the value of the work.

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CLAUDE REICHLER, ed. *Le Corps et ses Fictions*. Collection ‘Arguments’. Paris: Minuit 1983. 132 p. 35FF. ISBN 2-7073-0647-9.

Voici dans l’eau ma chair de lune et de rosée,

O forme obéissante à mes yeux opposée!

Voici mes bras d’argent dont les gestes sont purs !...

Mes lentes mains dans l’or adorable se lassent

D’appeler ce captif que les feuilles enlacent,

Et je crie aux échos les noms des dieux obscurs!...

Paul Valéry

I alone can hear your music. Your body dissolves in sounds each time I say  
your name aloud.

Daniel Sloate.

Lorsque nous refermons le livre du corps et de ses fictions, nous restons un instant suspendus à l’étrange et troublante impression d’avoir tenté vainement de saisir un corps désirable aussitôt évanoui en une impalpable brume ou dispersé en mille éclats clairs sur la surface agitée du miroir des eaux.

Il me revient à la mémoire une belle image du film de Jean Cocteau. *Orphée*, lorsqu’Orphée se précipite dans le miroir après l’ange Heurtebise et qu’il traverse avec son corps le reflet même de ce corps pour atteindre un au-delà plein de l’obscuré promesse d’y retrouver l’objet perdu de son amour: la pâle Eurydice.

On ne peut se saisir ni se désaisir du corps. Que serait-ce qu’une saisie de corps autre que l’obscène mensonge d’une menace légale? A vouloir saisir le corps on ne peut que le traverser comme une image ou s’y cogner — comme une tête contre un mur — sans comprendre. Il ne nous reste plus alors qu’à

tenter — parce que nous n'avons pas d'autre choix — de symboliser cette double impossibilité et c'est à quoi ces neuf textes réunis par Claude Reichler, nous invitent.

Lorsque l'homme tente de prendre son propre corps comme objet, il se trouve immédiatement confronté à une double difficulté. Ou bien cet objet ne vaut que comme tout objet, à savoir qu'il n'est jamais qu'un objet irrémédiablement déjà perdu, le lieu d'un manque, d'une absence originaire (cf. le texte de C. Haart-Nibrig), donc un objet à retrouver par le détours du corps de l'autre, son alter ego, celui de la relation imaginaire, de la relation quotidienne. Ou bien il n'est que le reflet, sur cet écran vide du corps de l'autre, de mes projections fantasmatiques, de mon propre corps mais perçu à travers le regard de l'autre dans ce corps à corps de la relation spéculaire où c'est l'image du corps qui structure cette catégorie proprement moïque qu'est l'Imaginaire: le lieu même de mon aliénation, de mon assujettissement à ce mensonge par lequel je suis contraint de passer pour tenter de retrouver ce qui ne sous-tend la tension de ma quête que d'avoir toujours été déjà perdu.

Presque tous les textes de cet ouvrage explorent la structure corporelle de l'Imaginaire. Certains, comme l'étude de Daniel Arasse sur le Saint Sébastien d'Antonello de Messine, nous montrent d'une manière tout à fait fascinante, comment l'objet du désir s'avère être, dans le champ du visible, le regard (Lacan), mais le regard dans le sens où nous sommes regardés par ce que nous regardons, surtout s'il s'agit d'un corps. Admirable regard dissimulé dans l'ombilic décentré du Saint autour duquel le corps de Sébastien se marginalise et qui n'est pas sans nous rappeler dans 'le vagin velu de *Simone*, l'œil bleu pâle de *Marcelle*', qui regardait (le narrateur) en pleurant des larmes d'urine' (Bataille).

Même phénomène d'évanouissement du corps dans le mouvement des regards qui constitue l'écran photographique, 'appel au langage qui n'y répond jamais que trop ou trop peu,' car 'ce n'est pas le corps que la photographie saisit' (Danielle Sallenave) ou encore dans le merveilleux voile de Parasius évoqué par Adolf Muschg.

C'est aussi, c'est toujours de la structure corporelle de l'Imaginaire que nous parlent Ivan Alméida et Pierre Férida.

Le premier, à travers le découpage kaléidoscopique de quatre récits populaires (véritable patchwork) 'qui sont tous, chacun à sa manière, une cristallisation des différentes réponses que la sagesse narrative apporte au problème de l'inscription du corps dans le monde de la signification,' monde imaginaire s'il en est dans lequel ce rapport du corps à la signification est — et ne saurait être — que de radicale méconnaissance.

Une méconnaissance dont le fondement de négativité (de dénégation devrait-on dire) est analysé par Pierre Férida - qui ne parcourt dans son texte que la moitié du chemin que lui offrait la pensée psychanalytique du corps. Il montre bien cependant comment la construction fictive se substitue à l'impossibilité d'une mémoire infantile du corps. 'Ne pas se souvenir est la source négative de toute fiction.' Toutefois la fiction n'est pas le mythe et il me semble qu'une appréhension plus subtile du mythe non pas comme tentative de

masquage du Réel, à la différence de la fiction, mais comme indexation du Réel, forme infantile et sociale de penser le mystère du Réel, aurait conduit Pierre Férida à aborder la question cruciale du Réel du corps comme Chose, du corps comme *das Ding*. Question, il faut le regretter, à peine effleurée dans les textes réunis dans cet ouvrage.

Peut-être une remontée à rebrousse-temps de l'histoire des représentations du corps dans la pensée philosophique eut permis à Rudolf Zur Lippe de tenter de cerner l'espace forclos originaire de la pensée du corps qui domine le mouvement de cette pensée depuis le Grecs. Je ne suis pas certain, en effet, que l'intégration de la pensée plurielle du corps puisse s'inscrire 'dans l'histoire ou la co-histoire' de ce foisonnement. L'étrange de l'insaisissabilité du corps me paraît être corrélative de ce postulat implicite, ô combien réducteur! qui consiste à voir éclore notre pensée philosophique chez les Grecs. Funeste limitation! et d'autant plus grave que Claude Bérard nous montre pourtant bien, sans même sembler s'en douter, quelque chose dans la transformation démonique du corps idéal de l'homme grec en satyre par le biais de l'acteur qui devient ce satyre, qui ne prend tout son sens qu'en remontant à travers le temps et l'espace le déplacement des grand flux humains en provenance de l'Inde. A force de méditer sur les Grecs, Hölderlin s'en était pourtant bien rendu compte, et Schopenhauer!

Les représentations de Katakali — pour ne citer qu'elle — sont très exactement l'actuel et immémorial pendant en Inde de ce que Claude Bérard a étudié chez les anciens Grecs, elles sont également ce qui pourrait nous mettre sur la voie du rapport du mythe au Réel.

Le Réel apparaît comme ce lieu même que l'on doit supposer pour pouvoir penser l'arrachement (ou l'expulsion) du sujet à l'indifférencié originel (condition de son avènement comme sujet) et — corrélativement — la perte irrémédiable de l'objet comme condition du désir. Il est intéressant de remarquer que ce lieu ne saurait être approché sans horreur ni terreur. C'est vers lui, me semble-t-il que pointent, à l'opposé du corps sublime étudié par Claude Reichler qui n'est que le rêve du regard lorsqu'il se détourne du Réel et de l'objet perdu, les mentions du corps bestial et de ce qui n'est pas encore tout à fait la Chose: la Bête. Horreur, terreur certes, mais aussi fascination érotique aussi puissante qu'archaïque qu'avait merveilleusement évoquée le grand cinéaste Valerian Borowcyk dans son film: *La Bête* (1975).

Il y aurait au moins deux voies de questionnement possibles — et sans doute davantage — du corps dans sa dimension de Réel:

1°) Explorer plus avant le corps-Chose dans l'histoire des mythes mais aussi bien dans l'histoire mythique de l'avènement du sujet. Dans l'*Esquisse pour une psychologie scientifique*, texte qui ne trouve toute sa portée que dans l'après — Freud et Lacan, Freud situe bien l'importance tout à fait primordiale de la Chose (*das Ding*) dans le processus de séparation du bébé et de la mère et de l'avènement corrélatif de la pensée. Lorsque la mère — le *Nebenmensch*, dit Freud, le prochain se fait étrangère, Chose pour l'enfant, elle l'expulse et le maintient sur ce bord où, comme sujet, il devra advenir, étranger à ce corps-Chose de la mère et à son propre corps comme Chose, dont il ne

compensera la perte qu'en le remplaçant par le leurre de son reflet dans le miroir, le leurre de son corps désiré par le regard de l'Autre, son corps érotique.

2°) Le processus du masochiste qui désinscrit à force de souffrances la marque du Symbolique sur son corps aliéné à l'ordre du langage et de la parole dans la méconnaissance de l'Imaginaire, serait une autre voie de questionnement vers le Réel du corps.

Ce questionnement aurait sans doute mené à une autre question qui, elle non plus, n'a pas été abordée dans ce livre: celle d'une production sémiotique du corps Réel. Non pas le discours Imaginaire sur le corps, non pas le discours Imaginaire du corps (les gestes, les attitudes, les postures, les poses etc.), non pas le texte comme corps du corps, non pas l'inscription signifiante qui noue le Réel du corps à l'Imaginaire du corps, mais la production sémiotique du corps lui-même en tant qu'elle ne passe par aucune intellection ni représentation chez l'autre mais détermine chez lui une réponse immédiate non médiatisée. Une sémiotique qui ne serait accessible, si l'on prend au sérieux la tâche formidable du masochiste, qu'au terme d'une redoutable déconstruction. Dans la relation si parfaitement silencieuse du sadique au masochiste, ce sera, par exemple, la mesure précise de tel coup qui devra frapper tel lieu précis du corps du masochiste ni trop violemment ni pas assez mais à la limite même de la souffrance exquise, en réponse au discours sans parole du corps du masochiste.

Quoi qu'il en soit, il faut lire ce livre dont l'embarras et les impasses ne font que mieux valoir les nombreuses trouvailles — voire le bonheur d'expression comme disait Roland Barthes - qui émaillent chaque page qu'elles ponctuent d'autant de questions qui nous vont droit au corps.

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RICHARD RORTY, *The Consequences of Pragmatism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1982. Pp. 288. US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1063-0); US\$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1064-9).

The consequences mentioned in the title of Rorty's book are his conclusions after seeing the history of modern philosophy through the glass of pragmatism. To be sure, a larger matter than just philosophy — science and conduct — are subject to pragmatic analysis, but Rorty is concerned with the major philosophical desiderata such as Truth, Goodness, and Rationality. The view, as he sees it, yields a studied disinterest in finding a general theory for

such upper case concepts. For Rorty the realists since Parmenides have been seeking a mirage believing it a reality, a realm where language finally stops and we speechlessly confront the unsullied bright truth of things.

The introduction should be the epilogue for the collection of papers; it was written last and sums up in one line what emerges as keynote of all the other pieces. Between the realist and the pragmatist 'the issue is one about whether philosophy should try to find natural starting-points which are distinct from cultural traditions, or whether all philosophy should do is compare and contrast cultural traditions' (Intro., xxxvii, original in italics). He argues against the goal of discovering such natural points.

In the first paper, 'The World Well Lost,' Kant is primarily responsible for giving us the 'purely vacuous notion of the ineffable cause of sense and goal of intellect' (15). His idea of *Vorstellung* has bedevilled and misled philosophers since. Kant takes a hard drubbing at Rorty's hands. Time and again he is exhibited as the very paradigm of wrongheadedness with the impossible dream of exposing the foundations of knowledge. By the end of the book poor Immanuel is a thorough bugabear. The reader of Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* will recall that when Kant took the task of representing the nature of things as they Really are we were all led down a blind alley. All those that is, except Dewey, Heidegger, and the later Wittgenstein among the few others. For Rorty the author of the *Philosophical Investigations* revealed that philosophy had come to an end as the peculiar study of certain deep problems of Being, Man's Nature, Freedom of Will and so on, a discipline having the monopoly on the best methods for approaching and ultimately solving them. Wittgenstein liberates us from such pride so that we may see philosophy as something quite other than an academic bureau with a traditional budget of problems.

Dewey is a great liberator as well, but Rorty warns us that we must put aside Dewey's attempts to resolve traditional philosophical problems by giving other answers to them, for instance interactionism to replace dualism. Instead we should highlight his Hegelian view that dualism, for instance, be understood as the result of specific cultural conditions (82). If he had stuck to historicism, Dewey would probably be faultless in Rorty's eyes. Heidegger is another who sees that philosophy has come to an end, but he will have to go through a proper rehabilitation. In the introduction Rorty abnegates his own harsh criticism in the present essays and is presently writing a book on Heidegger. Nietzsche and James are heroes as well. Weaving their strands of revolt against the traditional way of doing philosophy, Rorty revokes the 'natural starting points' one after another by rejecting truth as correspondence, the Russellian supposition that names refer to things totally exterior to language, the notion of philosophy as a superscience dealing with natural science (the First Critique), morality, art and religion (the Second and Third Critiques). Rather, we should embrace the radical multifariousness of language, take it as unavoidably creative and poetic and do away with the idea of reference that would tie us to the unconditioned real. This is why Rorty sympathizes with Derrida and the others whom he calls Textualists. No un-

trammelled reality corresponds to what is written; there are merely the written texts.

These essays were first published in a variety of places and some readers will be familiar with at least some of them. But the book is valuable for it gives an added depth to the polemics in Rorty's *Mirror of Nature*. It shows him in the process of developing the viewpoint employed there and even going beyond and supplementing it. But he still does not adequately reply to the questions that strike at the very basis of his idea of what philosophy should be.

Once we are divested of our philosophical myth how do we go on? Evidently whatever we say is acceptable if it will 'work.' But this has always been a shibboleth in Pragmatism. For it is precisely the conditions of what makes language work that have been desiderata in philosophy. Rorty applauds those who turn away from such problems. But even if there be no possible singular Truth of the matter, the relation of philosophy to what it is about is still a legitimate problem. Rorty would, I think, agree with this; but his prescription for the philosophical conversation is to avoid seeking the essence or foundation of the matter. However, if we are not to dump most of the philosophical tradition, we would have to admit in hindsight that the accomplishments were usually due to a faith in ultimately finding the natural *archai*. When we read past philosophers in cultural sympathy, it is clear that they had to have had such faith or they would have abandoned their enterprise. Much philosophy and most science would not have flourished if certainty in the natural *archai* had not been held. It seems, when we look back, the most pragmatic view for our predecessors to have possessed; we have no evidence that Rorty's historicist recommendations would work as well, would, in short, be as pragmatically justifiable. The cultural conversation that Rorty so highly values would have no anvil against which it may be struck and formed. By adopting Realism most philosophers for more than two thousand years may have been wrongheaded, but their discussion with its drive towards ultimate conclusions has been vital and interesting. The myth, if it is one, has worked. Even if Rorty has shown us what the case actually is with philosophy, his gospel should be rejected upon his own pragmatic grounds.

The conversation will become insipid and empty. Realism may be untrue to the possibilities of philosophy, but it has left some magnificent accomplishments in its wake.

Finally, if there are no foundation points — sense data, simple facts, transcendental structures, or what have you — then Rorty's theory is true and in fact corresponds to the nature of things. But then his theory touches foundation points. He is aware of this standard rejoinder, namely that such a theory is self-refuting (24). He also acknowledges that anyone who draws a boundary to language has to know what is on the other side. But Rorty never deals with these objections adequately. They are major questions burdening every historicist theory, and until he does give good answers his metaphilosopical position will lack cogency.

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KEITH WARD, *Rational Theology and the Creativity of God*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; New York: Pilgrim Press 1982. Pp. 240. Cdn\$39.95: ISBN 0-631-12597-3; US\$22.00: ISBN 0-8298-0618-0.

This book opens with a distinction between conceptions of God as inclusive of the universe and as exclusive of and separate from it (roughly Spinoza *vs* Aquinas). On p. 3 Ward states what he takes to be theism's central problem: the reconciliation of these conceptions, given that neither is adequate. We are told that

If God is the creator of a contingent world, he must be contingent and temporal; but if God is a necessary being, then whatever he causes must be necessary and changelessly caused ... The demands of intelligibility require the existence of a necessary, immutable, eternal being. Creation seems to demand a contingent, temporal God ... But how can one have both? (3)

Ward's project is to tell us how. The rest of the book is devoted to a review of central theological topics from the point of view of reconciling necessity and perfection with freedom and spontaneity.

My immediate concern was that Ward seems to readily take central elements of historical traditions as conceptual requirements. The opposed conceptions are cast not as products but as apparently mutually exclusive conceptual inevitabilities. The result is a paradox or dilemma that looks to require resolution by conceptual activity designed to show that the paradox or dilemma is only apparent. I had the strong feeling from the first few pages that the book was an academic exercise. This seemed evident in Ward's remark that while the idea of a necessary being is 'a philosopher's idea rather than a believer's idea,' it is 'none the worse for that' (3).

What Ward sets out to do is work out a notion of 'dynamic infinity' within which he can reconcile necessity and spontaneity and end up with a God that is 'the one self-existent being in whom creation and necessity originate and ... are reconciled' (3). This is how he tries to satisfy the demands of intelligibility for necessity and of creation for freedom or spontaneity. (The latter is my term.) But Ward seems indifferent to the question of what sort of demands these are. He treats them as givens, though there is some supporting discussion of necessity, including the now mandatory reference to Swinburne and to ultimacy of explanation.

Through nine further chapters Ward pursues topics such as that of perfection, purpose and the existence of evil, attempting to open up room for spontaneity in necessity. The crux of the argument comes after the discussion of the divine attributes when Ward prepares us for the chapter on time and eternity. He restates the problem of how the required 'aspects of Godhood can be coherently held together' (148). The 'final duality' to be overcome is that of 'creation and necessity' (148).

The overcoming of the duality in question turns on accepting that God is such that 'not everything about him can be logically explained in terms of the principle of sufficient reason' (170). We are told that it is 'the value of freedom which makes this restriction necessary and desirable' (170).

Ward attributes a liberating temporality to God, within which God may enjoy the spontaneity we so jealously guard. What happens is that Ward sheds the requirement of ultimate *completeness* in God which gives the traditional conception its stultifying, static character. We are assured that 'we shall see nature to be more fully rational the less it is derivable from first principles (as if God were simply a super-computer) and the more it is comprehensible as a product of creative insight and originality' (155).

There is a crucial discussion of how God is temporal — and in fact 'multi-temporal' — on pages 165 and 166. I am not sure it is coherent, and suppose that it will be taken as more or less so depending on the degree of commitment of the reader. The notion of God branching off down parallel universes spun off at junctures the number of which I can see only as indeterminate, left me rather stunned. And here is the point. Ward remarks that 'The limits of rational theology verge on fantasy' (167). And that is just my problem. Beginning with a set of determinate but problematic abstract principles, we are taken on a journey of intellectual conciliation, and end up with a 'solution' the only support for which seems to me some sort of conformity to rules set down either by the very exercise, or (not much better) by the tradition of such exercises.

Ward sets up his problem as the reconciliation of impossibly restrictive necessity and allegedly undeniable spontaneity. ('What happens when an irresistible force encounters an immovable object?') His answer is that, well, necessity is actually not all that total, because God is sometimes (?) or under some aspects (?) or by nature (?) temporal, hence She can do the neat things we require — most particularly relate to us morally (see Chapters 8 and 9).

There is some suggestion that Ward is aware of my concern, in that he finds it necessary to assure the reader that 'The God of the philosopher is not some chimera of speculation' (234). But he gives the show away by adding that it is 'the product of human reason pressed to its limit' (234). This, taken together with the candid but unfortunate reference to fantasy, does highlight the point that Ward's is an exercise the criteria for success of which are highly problematic. Ward clearly takes it that it is a matter of *discernment* to identify such demands as that of intelligibility for necessity. But it may be a matter of imposition, or of the consequences of adopted principles themselves without adequate support. The relevance of the nature of philosophical conceptions is that it is only when they are brought to bear on religious faith that problems arise — and then only for philosophers and like-minded theologians. At the very least it is not obvious and inescapable that we are saddled with a 'demand' for necessity, or that the related notion of 'intelligibility' is the only one available. This is why Ward's book struck me as scholastic: it is an interesting enough treatment of a problem, comparable to a chess problem of a particularly challenging sort. Given his starting point, he makes some good moves. But it is those starting points that pose the problem, not the reconciliation of necessity and spontaneity within their range.

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ALAN WHITE, *Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1983. Pp. xii + 201. US\$20.00.  
ISBN 0-300-02896-2.

White's book is meant to be an introduction to Schelling's system of freedom. This provides a principle by which to select which of Schelling's work is left out, his *Philosophy of Art*, for example. But at the same time the book's thesis, that Schelling's philosophy is the struggle with a single project to produce a system of freedom as a counterpart to Spinoza, expands White's book to an introduction to Schelling's work as a whole.

Ideally such an introduction should be more than a kind of tourist guide to cultural antiquity. It should do more than provide information and call up nostalgia. It should present its subject as a genuine possibility for philosophizing, attempt to guide the reader beyond an antiquated idiom to something which could still appeal as a live possibility to a philosopher today. Or is everything here antiquated and of possible interest only to antiquarians and historians? But then why introduce? The idea of an introduction is problematical here. I wish White had faced it at the beginning.

Schelling is a far clearer writer than Hegel, and yet there are difficulties to which an introduction really ought to address itself. An account of key terms would have been very welcome, terms like 'absolute,' 'spirit,' 'standpoint,' 'posit,' and the like. No such account is given, but instead the terms are used by White as though there were no problem with them. In fact some other terms are introduced which are equally in need of some explanation. I won't quarrel with 'avatar' because it occurs only once, or with the Heideggerian 'factual' because it is explained well enough. But White uses the unexplained notion of 'existential freedom' with which to contrast Schelling's conception of freedom and against which to judge it, and this is most unhelpful. Also some of White's elucidations are more obscure than the Schelling passages they are meant to elucidate. For example, Schelling argues that I am responsible for my essence because I freely chose it, although the choice was not a conscious one and made outside of time. White explains that my choice of my essence is 'made on the transcendental level rather than the level of ordinary experience' (127). Not very helpful, is it? This is a pity because, I think, a case can be made that this is the only free act, and unless we understand what Schelling is up to here we can't understand his notion of freedom. What is disappointing is that White's book is for the most part simply a restatement of Schelling's work in Schelling's idiom translated into English with most of the flaws of standard work in English on the German idealists. One gets so sick, for example, of the word 'antithesis.' It wouldn't be so bad if it were used only to translate '*Antithese*', but White uses it to translate at least three different German terms.

White goes beyond restatement and discussion to critical assessment. He reaches conclusions about Schelling's work which are beyond the scope of an introductory study. He is aware of this and pleads the introductory scope of his work as an excuse for the possible prematurity of these conclusions (134). There is nothing wrong with a balanced critical stance in an introductory

study, but it should not persuade the reader that the stuff he is being introduced to is not worth pursuing any further. If we look in this book for a reason to look further into a philosophy in which some 'concepts are introduced and developed incoherently,' in which central accounts are 'either unclear, incomplete or incoherent,' which is not only obscure but at times 'intentionally obscure,' then we find the author's assurances that it is 'profound,' 'intriguing,' 'influential,' and 'fascinating,' but the reader is disinclined to believe him.

White's thesis, that Schelling's whole philosophical career was an effort to produce a system of freedom, is an interesting one, but the book hides it as much as it develops it. It is never made clear what a system of freedom is. White quotes Schelling as first using the term in the seventh of the Philosophical Letters of 1795. If that is important then he should have given an account of what Schelling meant by the term based on the fifth of those letters. Was there any important change in Schelling's conception of that notion in the next decades? And does not the emphasis on producing a philosophical response to Spinoza make him as much of a Fichtean during his whole career as he was at its beginning? A propos Fichte: that ten pages of Fichte exposition (14-24) should have been edited out because it neither adds to the book nor could it help anyone 'struggling with Fichte.'

White calls Schelling 'enigmatic.' The core of the enigma is surely the shift from 'negative' to 'positive' philosophy. How is one to understand it? As a protracted rejection of Hegel's philosophy? Yes, there is that about it, but more as well and there really is very little of sour grapes here. It also involves a judgment that philosophy has become irrelevant, even inimical, to life. Positive philosophy could be seen as an attempt to make philosophy a live issue again for an audience which was losing the sense of philosophy's worth. Or it could be seen as having its origin in the realization that the real world was not fully intelligible and that a purely rational approach to the world always missed something important. This important thing might be characterized generally, as Schelling frequently does, as existence. It is as though before the 'invention' (White translates 'Erfindung' as 'discovery') of positive philosophy, philosophy had only been about possible reality, about possible worlds. If by some metaphysical cataclysm our world ceased to be real and some other possible world became real, then according to Schelling nothing would change in philosophy. Philosophy would remain as true as it has always been because if philosophy had been about the real world at all it had only been about it so far as it was a possible world. But that isn't touched by a real disaster. Positive philosophy was to be about reality in some significant way. One could also characterize this important thing not just generally as existence, but specifically as the existence of God. The clue here is Kant's critique of the ontological argument and the charge that existence never enters conceptual speculation. Schelling goes so far as to characterize all previous philosophy as an extended form of the ontological argument with the conclusion that if God exists then he exists necessarily. But in the very nature of the enterprise it must leave the question of God's existence unsettled. Because that question just cannot be left unsettled by real existing human

beings, the nature of the enterprise is transformed from negative to positive philosophy. In a number of places Schelling portrays the structure of the whole positive philosophy as modus ponens (White calls it hypothetical syllogism, I suppose because Schelling does in one place). And yet the argument is not as straightforward as one might expect something with the structure of modus ponens to be because its second premise is problematical, which is why Schelling calls it an *Erweis* of the existence of God more often than a *Beweis* (White indiscriminately translates both as 'proof'). Schelling gives an account of the problematical character of his argument by likening it to the problem of other minds. White cites the relevant passage but doesn't seem to realize what Schelling is doing. The problem of the existence of God is an empirical problem in the same way as the problem of other minds. It has its conceptual side in the determination of what counts as evidence for the existence of a particular mind or of God. But the problem whether God or that mind exists is an empirical one. And further, it is one which is never fully settled because no 'part of experience' can settle it, only the 'whole of experience'. If that is so then one must take exception to White's charge that 'Schelling's final system ... fails ... [because]it does not lead to the intended goal, that is, a coherent and compelling first philosophy' (169). Perhaps I don't understand White's charge and the sense of failure he has in mind. But I nevertheless feel I must remind him of Schelling's discussion of the notion of 'system' in the fifth of the 1795 letters, his discussion of the sense in which his positive philosophy can be called a system at 13:133; and the characterization of positive philosophy as 'philo-sophy' because it can never be a completed science in the Hegelian sense at 13:131.

I was left with the impression that White wrote his book hastily, without the kind of reflection an 'enigmatic' and 'profound' philosopher deserves, even in an introduction. This is a pity because if the current renewed interest in German Idealism is to continue Schelling should not be ignored in favour of Hegel.

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M.R. WRIGHT, *Empedocles: The Extant Fragments*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1982. Pp. vii + 364. US\$45.00. ISBN 0-300-02475-4.

The 'extant fragments' of this edition are the remains of E.'s poetry. Regrettably, the ancient testimonies are not included; fortunately, the more important ones are discussed in the introduction and/or adduced in the commentary. The Greek text provides generous slices of context for fragments and a good *apparatus*; the *constitutio* is sensible, although daggers have been put

in a bit too often. The substantial commentary is useful, too, but less good than the textual part because alternative interpretations are discussed cavalierly, if at all. Such dogmatism also holds for the 'Introduction.' As a clear introduction to a difficult author the book will be clearly useful for students; for scholars it will be a work to consult and to criticize in detail. It is to be regretted, however, that Wright (henceforward W.) does not provide an unbiased introduction to the scholarly discussion concerned with E. Perhaps the explanation is that the book is based on an Oxford thesis dating to 1963 (36, n. 82) and that W. saw no grounds to defend her position by extensively arguing against others. This position is that E. described a cosmic cycle containing one zoogony under the rule of Strife and one under that of Love. Before the two zoogonies came under fire during the 'sixties and 'seventies, this was the general view, although the actual reconstructions current at the time differed as to the details. W.'s version, capably argued, is that the two distinct zoogonies are very much different from one another (others had argued that the phases in the first are identical to those in the second, but occur in reverse order).

A very attractive feature of W.'s text is that the information and intimations about the provenance and relative position of fragments to be found in the sources have been studied in a systematical way. Some reallocations of fragments, e.g., D.-K. B 11 and 15 to the *Katharmoi* and B 129 to the physical poem, are neither suggested by the ancient evidence nor plausible for other reasons, but as a whole the distribution of fragments over both epics is good. W. has also attempted to reconstruct, in as far as possible, the order of fragments — or rather of groups of fragments — in the physical poem. This is unlikely to find general acceptance. After the introductory section of bk. I, we would have the following harsh sequence: (1) 'Many to One in the Cosmos: The Sphere' (fr. 16-22 W.); (2) 'One to Many in the Cosmos: The Present World' (fr. 23-46 W.); (3) 'Many to One and Individual Life: Limbs and Monsters' (fr. 47-52 W.); (4) 'One to Many and Individual Life: Humans, Animals, and Plants' (fr. 53-72 W.). That (4) came somewhere after (3) is certain, because fr. 53 W. is from bk. II and fr. 48 W. from bk. I. It is also virtually certain that cosmogony and cosmology came before zoogony. Now, if W.'s reconstruction would represent E.'s original order, we would have expected E. to have made it very clear that (3) belonged with (1) and (4) with (2). There is no extant fragment proving that he did, which in view of the discussion among ancient commentators as to the allocation of zoogonical phases to phases in the cosmic cycle is odd. An alternative suggestion to W.'s proposal would be the sequence (1) (3) (2) (4), according to which it would have been clear where each zoogony belongs. Then, however, one fails to understand why the dispute should have arisen at all, and against this alternative is the evidence that (3) and (4) were presented continuously (Aet. V 19, 5 = D.-K. fr. 31 A 72).

The real issue, of course, is whether the evidence in favour of two zoogonies or to be more specific that in favour of one under the rule of Strife besides one under that of Love is really compelling enough to justify the

reconstruction of a misshapen epic. The extant fragments are in no way unambiguously in favour of the general idea of a double zoogony, and specific zoogonical fragments can all be explained as relating to the zoogony of Love. I suppose that no one would have searched the fragments for intimations of a double zoogony in the first place if it had not been for Aristotle, who in various places says, or is believed to say, that E. spoke of two opposite worlds (one of Love and one of Strife) which implies, or is believed to imply, that there was a zoogony for each of these worlds. However, no clear and unambiguous sentence exists in which Aristotle says, *expressis verbis*, that there is a zoogony of Strife, and for those statements from which such statements have been inferred other explanations can and have been given. Aristotle's treatment of the elements and the forces that move them in E. is invariably polemical. His analysis at *Met.* B 4 1000a18-b21, for instance, only formulates the paradox that Strife is the necessary cause of the zoogony of Love, not that it generates a separate world of living things by itself which is the opposite of that of Love; at any rate, this is a perfectly respectable interpretation of his argument. In *GC* II 6, 334a6-7, where he says that the world according to E. is in the same condition under Strife now as it was formerly under Love, he does not speak of zoogony at all, but has been discussing the motions of the elements, and what causes these. Paradoxically, it turns out that the cause of natural motion is not Love, but Strife — or even Chance. For Aristotle, the natural motions are those we see *now*, so when he speaks of 'the world of Strife now' he means the present world where fire goes upwards and earth goes downwards, as in E.'s world when Strife prevails, although E. also says that when Strife prevails the elements move by chance. The 'previous world under the rule of Love' may refer to the cosmos before the sudden reunion and mingling of all elements in the homogenous One Sphairos. This world, according to E. according to Aristotle, resembled the present one, which entails, one may presume, that in this world Love is the cause of natural motion, which, again, is contrary to Love's function in the present world. Aristotle, in this context, really complains that E. does *not* give *specific* moving functions to his efficient causes. Inferences as to a zoogony of Strife are hardly pertinent. I do not, of course, argue that this is the only possible or the necessary interpretation of this passage, but affirm that it is at last as respectable as the dogmatically argued interpretation of W. at p. 46, and that it has the advantage of explaining Aristotle's point, which that of W. does not. It is, at any rate, far easier to assume that W.'s (3) + (4) together are the zoogony of Love, and that this was described after the cosmogony and cosmology of Strife. The two zoogonic phases of (4) would be a fitting beginning of a new book, which was dealing with plants and animals in the present world — which, apart from the crust of the earth, where the battle between Love and Strife is equal, is still dominated by Strife — and with subjects such as sensation and thinking. The order would be that of all such works up to Plato's *Timaeus*, viz., one advising us and explaining how and from what the world and what is in it now came to be, and how things function now.

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