Given that many contemporary philosophers consider Saul Kripke to be among the small handful of most important philosophers in the past century, it is remarkable that there do not already exist more edited volumes exclusively dedicated to the critical analysis of Kripke’s work. This gap is exactly what Alan Berger has begun to fill by putting together a volume containing 14 essays whose authors include some leading figures in the philosophy of language, logic, and mind.

The essays are grouped into four Parts, each focused on a major aspect of the contemporary philosophical landscape which Kripke’s work has influenced. Part I is entitled ‘Naming, Necessity, and Apriority’, and contains essays by Bernard Linsky, Nathan Salmon, Scott Soames, and Robert Stalnaker. Part II is on ‘Formal Semantics, Truth, Philosophy of Mathematics, and Philosophy of Logic’, containing two essays by John Burgess, one by Mark Steiner, and one by Alan Berger. Part III is on ‘Language and Mind’, consisting of essays by Mark Richard, Nathan Salmon, George Wilson, and Mario Gomez-Torrente. The final and shortest Part IV, ‘Philosophy of Mind and Philosophical Psychology’, contains essays by Sydney Shoemaker and Jeff Buechner.

One notable feature about this volume is announced on its dustjacket blurb: it is ‘the first and only collection of essays to examine both published and unpublished writings by Kripke’. Berger acknowledges more than ten unpublished sources (14) as having been drawn from by the individual authors; and indeed some of the essays (more on which below) are almost entirely focused on unpublished material.

Another notable feature is that Kripke himself seems to have chosen the contributors. (Berger thanks Kripke ‘for his choice of the contributors to this volume’ [14], which I take to be deliberately stronger than thanking Kripke for his help with the selection of contributors.) One is lead to suspect that, for example, the choice of Linsky to write about general terms signals Kripke’s endorsement of Linsky’s contributions to the controversies about the semantics of general terms which stem from Naming and Necessity, and about which Kripke has not published anything. For another example, philosophers of mind may be tempted to draw conclusions from the selection of Shoemaker as the appropriate critical commentator on Kripkean criticisms of materialism.

Inevitably, these essays differ fairly widely when it comes to accessibility and degree of difficulty. Some of them are primarily focused on publishing exegetical accounts of Kripke’s unpublished work (such as those by Steiner, Berger, Gomez-Torrente, and Buechner); others are intended to be introductions to important aspects of Kripke’s published works (such as those by Linsky, Stalnaker, Burgess, and Shoemaker); and some are largely dedicated to advancing original philosophical theses—though of course theses that are prompted and inspired by
Kripke’s work (this camp includes papers by Salmon and Soames). Some of these essays (such as those by Richard and Wilson) cut across the latter two categories.

The book begins with a fourteen-page Introduction by Berger. Beginning with a two-page overview of Kripke’s monumental career, and ending with two paragraphs of acknowledgements, it is mostly dedicated to brief descriptions of the individual essays. (To pick a nit: I would have liked to see a more extensive account of Kripke’s life and career to open such a volume.)

Next, the first essay of Part I is by Bernard Linsky, entitled ‘Kripke on Proper and General Names’. For the most part, Linsky’s aim is to summarise the main seminal theses within the philosophy of language which Kripke defends in *Naming and Necessity*. As is appropriate, given his own contributions to the existing literature, Linsky goes fairly deeply into the semantics of general terms, and into recent debates as to how the notion of rigid designation should be defined for the case of general terms.

Chapter 2, ‘Fiction, Myth, and Reality’ by Nathan Salmon, is focused on issues pertaining to the perennial problem of true negative existentials (e.g., ‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’). Salmon discusses Kripke’s views on this problem, developed in his unpublished but widely circulated 1973 John Locke lectures entitled ‘Reference and Essence’. Salmon engages with certain complications which befall Kripke’s views and defends a refined version of Kripke’s stance.

Next, ‘Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysial Possibility’ by Scott Soames distinguishes two lines of argument for necessary a posteriori truths in Kripke’s work—i.e., the essentialist route (e.g., ‘heat is the motion of molecules’), and the informative identity statement route (e.g., ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’). Soames argues that the first route is sound, while the second relies on a questionable implicit premise.

The final chapter of Part 1, ‘Possible Worlds Semantics: Philosophical Foundations’ by Robert Stalnaker, canvasses Kripke’s contributions to the semantics for modal logic, and discusses various metaphysical questions which are related to the possible-worlds framework.

Part II is lead off by two exegetical papers by John Burgess, ‘Kripke Models’ and ‘Kripke on Truth’. The former is an introduction to Kripke’s innovations in modal and intuitionistic logic, and the latter is an introduction to Kripke’s work on the theory of truth—based mostly on Kripke’s ‘Outline for a Theory of Truth’, published in the mid-1970s but also containing some accounts of Kripke’s subsequent unpublished lectures on the topic.

Next up is Chapter 7—Mark Steiner’s ‘Kripke on Logicism, Wittgenstein, and *de re* Beliefs about Numbers’, which is focused on unpublished lectures in which Kripke develops themes in the philosophy of mathematics. Steiner sees a steady trajectory in Kripke’s thought in this area towards a view which he calls ‘quasi-nominalism’; this Steiner characterizes as being close to the views of the later Wittgenstein.
Chapter 8—Alan Berger’s ‘Kripke on the Incoherency of Adopting a Logic’—is also focused entirely on unpublished material. It develops an argument which threads through several of Kripke’s lectures and seminars, dating back to the early 1970s, against the intelligibility of the naturalists’ idea that a logic (say, quantum logic) is something that we could somehow decide to adopt. The core objection seems to be that this naturalistic idea presupposes the intelligibility of a logic-neutral comparative evaluation of distinct logics and that this presupposition does not stand up to scrutiny.

On to Part III, then, on Language and Mind. Chapter 9 is ‘Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief’ by Mark Richard. Richard explores whether Kripke’s famous Pierre truly instances a puzzle about belief, or about belief ascription, or about translation (or some combination thereof). He argues that, first and foremost, Kripke’s puzzle presents a deep challenge for understanding our practices of belief ascription.

Chapter 10, Nathan Salmon’s ‘A Note on Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief’ is focused on the same general terrain. Salmon distinguishes several different versions of Kripke’s puzzle about belief in order to help to clarify its proper upshot. Ultimately, Salmon will draw from all of this further evidence for his long-defended Millian interpretation of Kripke’s work—namely, that Kripke’s externalism about reference entails that perfectly rational, reflective, competent agents can hold contradictory beliefs.

Next comes George Wilson’s ‘On the Skepticism about Rule-Following in Kripke’s Version of Wittgenstein’. One aim here is to contest a certain prevalent, semantic non-factualist reading of Kripkenstein. In place of this, Wilson develops an interpretation which takes Kripkenstein to be what he calls a ‘temporal externalist’ about meaning.

The final essay in Part III is Mario Gomez-Torrente’s ‘Kripke on Color Words and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction’. In Naming and Necessity (cf. especially n. 71) Kripke briefly expresses opposition to dispositionalism about color terms, and in unpublished lectures in the late 1980s Kripke expands on this opposition and on its relevance to the traditional primary/secondary quality distinction. Gomez-Torrente gives an exposition of Kripke’s views and also goes a bit further to extend Kripke’s insights into criticisms of certain moves subsequently made by color-dispositionalists.

Finally then to Part IV, on Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Psychology. Sidney Shoemaker’s ‘Kripke and Cartesianism’ explores Kripke’s trenchant challenge to materialism about the mind. Employing Steve Yablo’s notion of ‘textbook Kripkeanism’, and thinking through apparent counterexamples to textbook Kripkeanism, Shoemaker points to conceptual space for a plausible materialist reply to Kripke’s challenge.

Lastly, Jeff Buechner’s ‘Not Even Computing Machines can Follow Rules’ is focused on Kripke’s critique of functionalism in the philosophy of psychology, which is first articulated in Kripke’s On Rules and Private Language, and subsequently further developed in unpublished lectures.
On the whole, then, this volume is a welcome and eminently worthwhile contribution. It is a very significant event in the history of Kripke scholarship, both in terms of its dissemination of Kripke’s unpublished work and in the way that it brings together top scholars in the field to continue grappling with problems developed and inspired by Kripke’s published work. Most of these papers are not accessible to neophytes, but this is important reading for experts in these fields.

Arthur Sullivan
Memorial University