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*Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* has an established reputation as a premier outlet for fresh and innovative work in ancient philosophy, and these three volumes edited by Brad Inwood live up to expectations. The quality is excellent and all the articles make challenging and significant contributions to scholarship and critical debate. Without exception, the articles are clear, concise, and elegantly written—both editor and contributors must take credit for this as well as for the noticeable lack of errors. Across the three volumes, there are ten articles relating to Plato, nine to Aristotle, two to Hellenistic philosophy, one to Plotinus, and one to Parmenides; there are also four critical discussions of recent major monographs. Unsurprisingly the vast majority of the content concerns Plato and Aristotle, but there is nevertheless an impressive range of issues covered (see below in the synopses). One gets the impression of a vibrant field with a number of fertile areas for further philosophical enquiry. And *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* is certainly pitched to an audience of philosophers. Thankfully for those without Greek or Latin, translations are always provided and there are few if any cases of prolonged or technical discussion of textual issues. Indeed, all the contributions drive towards points of philosophical interest. To be sure, frequently the interest lies in how we might interpret the ancient texts and uncover and understand the tenets of the ancient philosophers, but a number do also engage explicitly with contemporary debates. As such, all three volumes are required reading for specialists in ancient philosophy, but much of the material crosses boundaries and will be of interest to specialists in other fields—in particular, those working on moral philosophy and aesthetics will find much of value in these three volumes. This is a great virtue of the series and could be increased further in the future. Having made these general remarks, I now provide brief synopses of the articles in each volume (omitting the discussion pieces).

Volume XXXVIII

David C. Lee ‘Dialectic and Disagreement in the *Hippias Major*’
Lee offers a new interpretation of the *Hippias Major*. Rather than taking Hippias as prone to misunderstanding Socrates, he argues that Plato presents the two characters in a genuine disagreement owing to the complexity and flexibility of the notion of ‘explanation’ that is at issue. As such, the dialogue can be read as a serious philosophical exploration of the vexed question ‘what is needed for an explanation?’ This interpretation attractively enhances the philosophical force and significance of the dialogue; it also opens up new lines of interpretation with regard to other Platonic dialogues.

Stephen N. Menn ‘On Socrates’ First Objections to the Physicists (*Phaedo* 95e8-97b7)’

Menn offers a helpful discussion of Socrates’ worries about how one might explain growth, first expressed in response to Cebes’ cloak and weaver argument. He sets out clearly why Socrates’ objections to the sorts of explanation provided by figures such as Anaxagoras are understandable given the ancient philosophical context. At the heart of the matter, Menn argues, is a concern for the criteria of identity through time, which the *Phaedo* tackles with the famous account of the soul. The case is well argued and offers a satisfying philosophical role for a passage that is often met with some discomfort.

Verity Harte ‘*Republic* 10 and the Role of the Audience in Art’

Harte argues that in *Republic* 10 one key aim is to establish that ‘the harmful effects of mimetic art are a kind of joint progeny between artist and audience’. This is important, for if the audience bears some responsibility for the harmful effects then perhaps it can do something to mitigate them. Harte’s case rests on a close reading of the text, and she helpfully draws attention to the psychological mechanisms involved and the theme of personal responsibility that runs through *Republic* 10. The interpretation is compelling and should be of wide interest.

Francesco Ademollo ‘The Principle of Bivalence in *De interpretatione* 4’

Ademollo addresses a tension in *De interpretatione*, namely: ‘how is Aristotle’s statement of bivalence in chapter 4 to be reconciled with his denial of (unrestricted) bivalence in chapter 9’, in which the problem of future contingents is famously discussed. Ademollo argues that the two chapters can be reconciled through positing that Aristotle held only declarative statements to be true or false, not all statements. This is an established thesis and Ademollo bolsters it by drawing attention to some other illuminating passages in Aristotle, but the conclusion is somewhat tentative.

David Bronstein ‘Meno’s Paradox in *Posterior Analytics* 1.1’

Bronstein offers an analysis of Aristotle’s treatment of Meno’s paradox. He argues that Aristotle is dealing with a different version of the problem to that which exercised Plato: ‘the Meno puzzle concerns the sort of enquiry and learning one must undertake in order to acquire scientific knowledge, whereas the *Post. An. 1.1* puzzle concerns the sort of learning one can undertake in virtue of having it’. The discussion is stimulating and offers a number of insights into Aristotle’s theories of learning and the nature of scientific knowledge.
Daniel Russell ‘Virtue and Happiness in the Lyceum and Beyond’

Russell provides an excellent critical survey of Aristotelian and Peripatetic attempts to account for the precise relationship between virtue, external goods, and human happiness. Russell gets right to the heart of the matter through a perceptive reading of the Priam example in *Nicomachean Ethics* book 1. He identifies three conflicting theses to which Aristotle appears committed: (1) ‘happiness is controlled by virtuous activity’; (2) ‘there are bodily and external goods that are parts of happiness’; (3) ‘these goods themselves are not activity or parts of activity’. Russell makes a compelling case that Aristotle and his followers, despite best efforts, all fail to reconcile these claims. To succeed in this endeavour, he argues that we must reject (3). This, he suggests, involves rethinking the nature of the self so that bodily and external goods are indistinguishable from the virtuous activity that makes one happy, something that no ancient follower of Aristotle appears to have done. The article is very enlightening and drives Aristotelian ethics into new territory that looks very fertile; Russell’s forthcoming monograph on the topic will be eagerly anticipated.

Sylvia Berryman ‘The Puppet and the Sage: Images of the Self in Marcus Aurelius’

Berryman analyses Aurelius’ use of the puppet analogy. She argues that Aurelius employs the analogy to portray the lack of rational agency on the part of the non-sage in a determined universe, so as to encourage the non-sage to perceive this and so turn towards Stoicism and the true good. She makes helpful points about developments in puppet technology and nuances in ancient thinking about ‘mechanical’ processes, and the interpretation of Aurelius’ use of puppet imagery as a method of Stoic protreptic is convincing.

Volume XXXIX

James Warren ‘Plato on the Pleasures and Pains of Knowing’

Warren addresses Plato’s claim in *Republic* 9 that the life of the philosopher is the most pleasant possible. This has seemed problematic since the great pleasures of learning are apparently no longer open to the fully-fledged philosopher. Through a careful reading of the *Philebus*, Warren makes the case that Plato can tell a compelling story about the novel intellectual pleasures that arise in the context of being a philosopher-ruler.

Andreas Anagnostopoulos ‘Change in Aristotle’s *Physics* 3’

Anagnostopoulos challenges the scholarly consensus surrounding the vexed question of Aristotle’s definition of change. He makes some apt criticisms of existing views and suggests that, for Aristotle, change is defined as the activity (not the actuality) of potential being. The article presents a rigorous case that involves teasing out the precise connotations of Aristotle’s argument, in particular his use of the technical terms *energeia* and *entelecheia*. Anagnostopoulos makes a powerful case and one anticipates a fruitful ongoing debate on this topic.
Klaus Corcilius and Pavel Gregoric ‘Separability vs. Difference: Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle’

Cocilius and Gregoric address the issue of how we are to understand the notions of parts and capacities in Aristotle’s account of the soul. They argue that ‘parts of the soul are the fundamental capacities of the soul whose existence we minimally have to assume in order to be able to give a satisfactory account of the soul on which the science of living beings will be based’. This interpretation differs from recent contributions to the debate and avoids a number of ongoing worries.

Michail M. Peramatzis ‘Essence and per se Predication in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z 4’

Peramatzis offers an interpretation of a particular contentious chapter in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z. Through a detailed and rigorous analysis of the text, he unpacks Aristotle’s attempts to get a grip on the notions of essence and per se predication. Peramatzis concludes that Aristotle fails to reach definite conclusions in Z 4 owing to the insufficiency of the criteria on which he focuses, in particular primacy and categorical unity, but that alternative criteria might provide a way forward. This is a dense but rewarding paper that offers a compelling reading of a challenging text.

Jessica Gelber ‘Form and Inheritance in Aristotle’s Embryology’

Gelber addresses the tension between reproductive hylomorphism and maternal resemblance in Aristotle’s account of inherited traits. She challenges the thesis that Aristotle in his embryology appeals to subspecific forms to account for inheritance and develops an alternative strategy in which the male provides form, the female matter, but both kinesis, which is where the explanation for inherited traits lies. This interpretation avoids burdening Aristotle with various inconsistent theses, and it appears to have reasonable textual support.

Alexander Nehamas ‘Aristotelian Philia, Modern Friendship?’

Nehamas provides a stimulating discussion of Aristotle’s views on friendship, with particular attention given to attempts in modern moral philosophy to find a suitable place for friendship. A number of significant differences between ancient and modern outlooks are identified, and Nehamas makes some preliminary suggestions as to precisely what can be taken from Aristotle when developing a viable account of friendship. There is much food for thought and the article should be of wide interest.

Sara Magrin ‘Sensation and Scepticism in Plotinus’

Magrin offers a fresh interpretation of Plotinus’ epistemology. She emphasises Plotinus’ engagement with the sceptical reading of Democritus found in Aristotle, and provides a compelling discussion of Plotinus’ interpretation of Plato in the light of the Democritean context. Magrin concludes that Plotinus’ epistemology not only engages with the sceptical tradition but is a direct response to it; Plotinus offers a positive account of knowledge that builds on the ground made clear by sceptical concerns.
M. V. Wedin ‘Parmenides’ Three Ways and the Failure of the Ionian Interpretation’

Wedin challenges current interpretations of Parmenides that seek to align him closely with the Ionian natural philosophers by suggesting that his aim is to open up a viable way of enquiry into the empirical world rather than to rule it out. Via a close reading of the text and a detailed and technical logical analysis of Parmenides’ premises and the steps in his argument, Wedin argues that a more austere reading is preferable even if it leaves Parmenides with a number of difficulties. Wedin’s case is rigorous, but much rests on points of detail and renderings of controversial texts, so one can envisage the debate continuing for some time yet.

Alan Kim ‘Crito and Critique’

Kim offers a novel interpretation of the famous ‘personification of the Laws of Athens’ passage (50d-54d). The passage is routinely read through the lens of social contract theory, but Kim argues that in the context of the Crito it is best read as a projection of dialectical reasoning, of the sort Crito and Socrates have been engaged in, onto the political community. Kim concludes that the passage highlights that Socrates’ commitment to the laws of Athens is not merely political but rather a sort of moral duty of the same kind as his intellectual commitment to the truth, which then places Socrates’ commitment to the laws firmly in the context of freedom and rational autonomy. This opens up fertile ground for Kim, and the resonances with aspects of Kantian thought are striking.

Franco V. Trivigno ‘Is Good Tragedy Possible? The Argument of Plato’s Gorgias 502b-503b’

Trivigno argues persuasively that in the Gorgias Plato admits that some tragedies are better than others in so far as they aim at the improvement of the audience; it would appear that good tragedy is at least a theoretical possibility. The challenge falls to the tragedians to realise this possibility, and Trivigno suggests that Euripides’ Antiope is a prime candidate. This article is a useful reminder of the subtlety and complexity of Plato’s engagement with tragedy.

Mark A. Johnstone ‘Changing Rulers in the Soul: Psychological Transitions in Republic 8-9’

Johnstone seeks to explain just how the degenerate character types described in Republic 8-9 come to be. He challenges Irwin’s account in which the rational part of the soul chooses a new mode of life that it considers best. Johnstone argues that the text fails to support such a view but lends itself to an alternative, in which the parts of the soul of a young man struggle with one another before settling on a form of inner control. This developmental process—which is similar to settling on a particular form of government after a period of civil strife—is influenced by both the young man’s father and the wider society in which he finds himself. The interpretation has a number of virtues, not least that it fits smoothly the city-soul analogy that is so prominent in these two books.

Dominic Scott ‘Philosophy and Madness in the Phaedrus’
Scott offers a fresh interpretation of the problematic relationship between philosophy and madness in the *Phaedrus*. He argues that Socrates’ speech in the palinode ‘is put forward as an example of playfully misleading rhetoric, and the main point on which it misleads us is precisely in treating philosophy as a bona fide form of madness’. Scott marshals a significant amount of textual evidence to support his reading, and in particular he makes the compelling suggestion that the second half of the dialogue prompts us to reconsider the first part in such a way that we are more critical and sensitive to misleading rhetoric. In sum, Scott draws attention to a number of contentious issues and his reading is a major contribution to the debate.

Naly Thaler ‘Taking the Syllable Apart: The *Theaetetus* on Elements and Knowledge’

Thaler offers a novel interpretation of the famous dream theory passage. She argues that it is a means for Plato to explore various issues concerning the nature of a scientific account and how it relates to the phenomena it seeks to explain. In particular, Thaler suggests that the analytical model applied to language in the dream theory can also serve as a paradigm for the world of experience. The reading is attractive and pleasingly harmonises some central concerns of the *Theaetetus*.

Devin Henry ‘A Sharp Eye for Kinds: Plato on Collection and Division’

Plato frequently stresses the importance of collection and division: for example, he identifies the dialectician as one who can collect and divide things according to kinds. Henry examines the extent to which Plato presents a set of principles or rules for division and collection. After considering a number of key passages from various dialogues, Henry suggests that Plato offers a model in which the philosopher acquires the skill to collect and divide accurately over time not by following prescriptive rules but through training and first-hand experience. This contrasts with Aristotle, who does present a set of principles for division and collection.

Matthew S. Strohl ‘Pleasure as Perfection: *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.4-5’

Strohl offers a critique of existing interpretations of Aristotle’s account of pleasure before suggesting an alternative: ‘for Aristotle, pleasure is simply the perfection of a perfect activity of awareness, the very perfection that is brought about by the good condition of the capacity activated and the fine object it is active in relation to’. Strohl seeks to justify his claim by a close reading of the passage: his argumentative moves involve the construal of certain key terms so as to fit the interpretation. The thesis is bold, but one anticipates an ongoing debate about the precise meaning of the key terms underpinning Strohl’s case.

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