Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds.
*The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez.*
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The greatest problem with this book lies in its title. As it now stands, a reader is bound to expect some kind of introduction, companion, or general exposition. Instead, the book contains a collection of eleven independent articles on miscellaneous subjects touching on Suárez’s (1548–1617) philosophy. The purpose is not to discuss all of Suárez’s enormous literary work, or even its most important aspects or general outlines, instead, the book simply picks up on some issues which are interesting enough to merit closer analysis.

The book begins with an introduction by Benjamin Hill. It offers somewhat loose observations about Suárez’s historical position and justified—though perhaps a little excessive —laments concerning the way in which research has long neglected him. The chief merit in this text is a concise and informative sketch of ‘the life and times of Francisco Suárez, S.J.’ (13–21).

The first of the five following sections carries the title ‘Background and Influence’. This sounds promising, because Suárez plays a crucial historical role just because of his position as mediator. However, the two articles in this section are somewhat misplaced. They are just case studies of small details of Suárez’s works compared with certain other authors. First, his physiology is compared with the Jesuit naturalist Dandinus. Second, Roger Ariew explains and comments on how Descartes and Leibniz applied and reinterpreted a couple of ontological principles which Suárez had stated.

The second, metaphysical section, on the most important part of Suárez’s work, only comprises two articles. The article by Christopher Shields, ‘Shadows of Being’, addresses the long final disputation 54 of Suárez’s *Disputationes metaphysicae*, on *entia rationis*. This is a highly interesting study, but unfortunately very difficult and somewhat unclearly written. Briefly, it has often been thought that Suárez’s *entia rationis* are Meinongean nonexistent beings. Shields argues convincingly that this is not true: according to Suárez, they have no being at all, and nothing in common with real beings. Suárez solved the problem of their status ‘by treating *entia rationis* as existing only objectively, as objects of thought whose appearance and endurance rests solely upon the activity of actually existing intellects’ (74). Shields’s suggestion is that this ought to be viewed as a counterfactual approach to these objects of thought by means of the thought acts, which gives a way to refer *de re* to something completely unreal. If Shields is right, as he seems to be, Suárez has formulated a noteworthy alternative in a notorious metaphysical-semantic problem.

In ‘Suárez on Continuous Quantity’ Jorge Secada describes how Suárez treated some problems of physical continuity which Aristotle had introduced in *Physics* V. Aristotle failed to distinguish between density and continuity, although he would have had the necessary apparatus for it. As Secada shows, Suárez makes clear that the two concepts are different, even if he agrees
that they coincide in physical quantities. The issue is mathematically important and one would be curious to learn more about its development in Suárez’s era.

On natural philosophy, Dennis Des Chene’s ‘Suárez on Propinquity and the Efficient Cause’ is a close study of Disputationes 18 § 8, where Suárez examines the ‘propinquity condition’ of efficient causation, that is, the principle that efficient causality can affect in an immediate manner only spatially proximate patients. Like Thomistic Aristotelians, Suárez argues that an agent acts on a distant patient only by acting upon the medium. He elaborates this view further in several steps, but also presents some clever objections which produce genuine difficulties for him. It seems that Suárez’s argumentation in this regard was rather convoluted and ultimately unsuccessful; this is a problem where Suárez had to admit that his position was not completely satisfactory. However, its themes are obviously important, since they remind one of Descartes’ doctrine of matter and causation. Interestingly, Des Chene concludes that we can see how efficient causality was not quite the same thing for early modern philosophers as it was for the Scholastics.

Substantial form is a crucial notion which was troublesome already to late Scholastics and became a target of criticism for modernists. ‘Suárez’s Last Stand for the Substantial Form’ is Helen Hattab’s appraisal of Suárez’s contribution to this problem, mainly in his disputation 15. She argues that Suárez’s position was in many respects already far from common Thomist tradition. His paradigm case of a substantial form is the rational immortal soul, the form of a human being. Then it becomes necessary to show that the same model is applicable to non-rational beings; and this Suárez does mainly by arguing heroically against numerous counterarguments which seemed to explain various natural processes without referring to substantial forms. Moreover, his whole conception of substantial form differed from many predecessors, since he did not see it as anything existentially active but simply as ‘incomplete substance’: it was something which together with matter forms one substance. In describing the generation of substances, Suárez was led to diminish the role of the formal cause. The contrast between substantial and accidental changes also becomes toned down. The original Thomist positions had obviously undergone a great transformation. As Hattab presents the matter, Suárez’s interpretations weakened the old dogmas just enough for the overall attack against substantial forms to become natural. Hattab’s study involves so many details that some things are only lightly touched upon, but the article’s historical insight is interesting and rewarding.

The fourth section, Mind and Psychology, has as its main source Suárez’s detailed commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima—the lectures from the 1570s and their revision from the 1610s. James B. South’s delightfully legible chapter, ‘Suárez, Immortality, and the Soul’s Dependence on the Body’, situates Suárez within the sixteenth-century debate, maintaining that Suárez has tacit connections to the Pomponazzi debate. This appears in his demonstration of the soul’s immortality. There he repeats Aquinas’s proof, but sees the danger of circularity in it and supports it by analysing Aristotle. In his analysis, he claims that the intellect is not dependent on imagination in any causal way, since its only cause is the soul itself: the faculties are only ‘concomitant’ with each other, and the activity belongs to the immortal soul. This is an unusual thesis, and South argues plausibly, though without strict proof, that it was an answer to Pomponazzi’s challenge. The result is that Suárez’s Aristotelianism gets clear dualist features.
Cees Leijenhorst’s ‘Suárez on Self-Awareness’ takes up a theme that was urgent in Aristotelian psychology, namely, the explanation of self-awareness. Here, Suárez deviates from Aquinas in several respects. In the first place, he does not think that the awareness of sensory acts is accomplished by additional self-reflexive acts of the internal sensus communis. For Suárez, such awareness is not reflexivity at all, since cognition itself includes a pre-reflexive attention or self-awareness and does not need another act of reflexion: ‘the sensory act not only carries with it an immediate directedness towards the object, but also an immediate awareness of itself” (142). Moreover, his reasoning endangers the traditional Thomist doctrine that the disembodied ‘separate souls’ know themselves immediately; but here he suspends judgement since the matter is of a theological character. In his chapter, Leijenhorst excitingly shows how Suárez takes up a theme that has recurred through modern philosophy: in what sense is self-knowledge implicit in mental acts, and how is it related to the contents of the acts?

‘Unity in the Multiplicity of Suárez’s Soul’ by Marleen Rozamond is devoted to the question how the soul can be one entity when its functions are really distinct. According to Suárez’s answer, various faculties of the soul are in harmony, but not in causal interaction. Suárez argues that the substantial form, soul, has direct efficient influence on all actions of the faculties; the functioning of one faculty only provides the ‘occasion’ for another, while the soul itself is the cause. This is also intended as an explanation for the coordination of all the faculties. Rozamond carries on the analysis of this theme that is found also in South’s paper. Suárez uses his nonstandard view to show that a human being only has one soul, which is completely simple. His reasoning on this point is compared to a famous line of thought (the ‘Achilles Argument’) that wants to conclude the unity of the human soul from the unity of thought. These comparative considerations are also fascinating, though they remain rather summary; at least it becomes clear that the prehistory of the modern ‘unity of consciousness’ thesis deserves study.

The last section deals with Suárez’s moral philosophy. Thomas Pink’s long paper ‘Reason and Obligation in Suárez’ differs from the others in that it is not only restricted to Suárez but sketches a comparison and overview of some important views concerning moral law in Suárez’s time and after. Pink compares Suárez to Vasquez, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke: he extends and specifies the analyses of seventeenth-century theories about moral obligation, blame, and moral motivation that have become well-known, partly because of Pink’s own earlier writings.

Finally, James Gordley’s ‘Suárez and Natural Law’ is unique in that it evaluates and criticizes Suárez from the standpoint of recent philosophy, that is, recent theory of natural law. It is shown that Suárez’s view of natural law differed greatly from Aquinas. Suárez thought that natural law was very abstract and valid for all occasions; therefore his model makes its ‘precepts negative and minimalist’ and restricts its field. Consequently Suárez had very little to say about practical reason. Gordley’s speculative conclusion is that Suárez’s idea of natural law is related to the systematization of legal theory that took place in the sixteenth century.

It is clear that this is not a book of bold hypotheses or polemical interpretations. The contents are very scholarly research; indeed, since the subject has been so little studied, the book is largely pioneering detailed research about previously unresearched issues. Anyone who is concerned with the so-called Second Scholasticism will therefore profit from acquaintance with this book (though it has been made difficult with the painfully microscopic font). But in addition
to its eleven articles, the book has a special merit: it contains a comprehensive (though not complete) 60-page bibliography of literature on Suárez. What is more, this list includes sources in all languages, as is necessary for serious study of a topic like this. This bibliography will prove to be an invaluable tool for future research.

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