Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill, eds.
*The Metaphysics of the Incarnation.*
253 pages
$125.00 (cloth ISBN 978–0–19–958316–4)

As contributor Thomas Senor writes, “while the doctrine of the God-man certainly stirs the soul, it just as surely confounds the mind, and in many ways and along a host of different dimensions.” (88) While the papers in the present volume, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation,* make only modest claims towards solving the conundrums involved in explicating philosophically the meaning of the incarnation, they nevertheless advance many and various, even if small, contributions. The authors clarify various positions, identify their strengths and limits, and suggest promising avenues for further thought and scholarship, all the while presenting the state of the debates surrounding the metaphysics of the incarnation in analytic or Anglo-American circles. Given such an age-old question, one should not expect advancement to be achieved in sweeping gains, but rather, to be more akin to trench warfare.

In the Preface, the editors write that “The present volume brings together twelve new papers by key thinkers in the debate over the metaphysical possibility of the incarnation, to showcase and advance the new approaches to incarnation that contemporary philosophers of religion are developing today. (As with most treatments of the topic, they assume a Christian context for the doctrine of incarnation, though not necessarily Christian commitment.)” Many of the papers included in the volume were presented at an international conference on the metaphysics of the incarnation at Oxford University in September 2009. With perhaps the exceptions of Jedwab’s phenomenologically-minded contribution and Cross’s historical analysis, the contributions take an analytic approach to the doctrine of the incarnation while taking advantage of recent developments in the philosophy of mind. While most readers will perhaps not tackle such a volume by reading it cover to cover, going—as the present reviewer did—through the papers in the order in which they appear, it is nevertheless clear that some care was taken to determine the arrangement of its contents. The subject matter and style of the papers follow a progression: for the most part, each contribution reasonably moves into the next as the reader observes a transition of approaches, models, and arguments.

The volume begins with an excellent and helpful introduction by Jonathan Hill, who sets out the main questions at hand: “What does the claim that the divine Son ‘became human’ amount to philosophically? What did that involve? How can we even make sense of the notion of a person who is both divine and human?” (1) The introduction familiarises those new to the topic with the ‘problem’ of the incarnation and with some of the various kinds of solutions and subsets of these types of solutions. In Hill’s words, he provides a “bird’s-eye view of the contours of debate concerning the metaphysics of the incarnation, setting out the major features on the map.” (19) Hill discusses the differences between linguistic and metaphysical solutions, including reduplication and relative identity; transformationalist models, which include both the physical and dualist varieties; and relational models, which include concretism and abstractism, prophetic models, compositionalist models, and two-mind models. The introduction concludes with some of the strengths and weaknesses of these different kinds of approaches. The introduction is clear
and informative without overwhelming the reader new to the topic with too much detail or nuance. However, the introduction does contain many footnotes which refer the interested reader to examples and to further explications of these positions contained within the present volume and elsewhere.

The first two papers following the introduction, Brian Leftow’s “The humanity of God” (20–44) and Oliver Crisp’s “Compositional christology without Nestorianism,” (45–66), go together in that they approach the problem by utilising compositional models. Leftow, in his attempt to move beyond ‘traditional christology,’ which he claims, “is often content to leave these relations—those of hypostatic union—a mystery,” suggests eight options and argues in defense of one of them in particular: that God the Son, a human body, and a human soul came to compose one thing, but that the human body and soul did not become part of God the Son. He argues against the challenge that this position amounts to the Nestorian heresy. While the paper employs many of the typical ‘brain in a vat’ and ‘parallel world double’ analogies that one is apt to find in philosophical papers of this sort, which the present author usually finds tedious and moot given that the proposed scenarios are precisely not the case, Leftow nevertheless provides a compelling defence against Trenton Merricks’s challenges. One criticism is that what Leftow takes as ‘Platonism’ is misleading in that it universalises certain of Plato’s early and Pythagorean leanings evident in the Phaedo which treat the body negatively: this is an inaccurate characterisation of Platonism, which fails to take into account Plato’s positive assessment of the body and the world in his later dialogues and in the Platonic tradition following him. Still, while this does distract, it does not detract from Leftow’s argument, even if his own position is not quite ‘Platonic’ in the end.

Leftow’s paper naturally leads into Crisp’s contribution wherein the latter argues that the Habitus model of the incarnation “offers an account of the metaphysics of the hypostatic union that is more robust than some recent authors suggest—although it may not offer a completely satisfactory model of the hypostatic union.” (46–7) Crisp explains: “According to the Habitus model of the incarnation, God the Son is not identical to Christ, though God the Son and Christ’s human nature together compose Christ […] The second person of the Trinity puts on human nature like a garment; he is ‘clothed’ by his human nature; but he is not identical to it.” (47) Through a number of different interpretations, the author proceeds to defend this model against a number of charges, including the claims that it falls outside of Catholic orthodoxy and that it essentially amounts to Nestorianism. Crisp’s goal is modest in that he does not advocate for the Habitus model, instead, he mainly wants to show that the position is at least defensible against these claims; nevertheless, his arguments are convincing.

Thomas P. Flint’s “Should concretists part with mereological models of the incarnation?” (67–87), stands alone, but deals with some of the issues raised in the previous two papers. Flint explores the promises and limits of mereological versions of concretism (dealing with the relations between wholes and parts) and, like the other authors represented in this volume, proposes a modest thesis: Flint’s aims are “explicating the problems associated with mereological models, suggesting senses in which those models should (and shouldn’t) be embraced, examining what alternatives to mereological models might be available to the concretist, and highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of those alternatives.” (68) Flint does, however, propose the possibility of mixing models, and seems to favour the Scotist over the
Thomistic model while admitting that the former still leaves the orthodox Christian uneasy with its implications.

The next two papers can be read together in that both deal with ‘kenotic christology’. Thomas Senor’s “Drawing on many traditions: an ecumenical kenotic christology” (88–113) borrows helpful insights from the “two minds view” and “compositional accounts” while rejecting their overall positions. Important in this adoption is the notion of human essence as a “natural kind essence” rather than a “cluster concept”, a distinction which he defends against the incoherence objection that tends to rule out certain divine properties from the human being by \textit{a priori} reflection alone. While all of the contributors are assuming a Christian context, Senor explicitly raises the question concerning the relation between a convincing philosophical account of the incarnation and its consistency with traditional Christian teaching: “is consistency with the ecumenical creeds and the decrees of the early councils a condition of adequacy on one’s account of the incarnation?” (89) He suggests five criteria that ought to be met by a successful metaphysics of the incarnation. Senor recognises that neither his objections to the other models nor his own assertions are “knock-down argument[s]”, a feature common to all of the papers in this collection. While he affirms that a kenotic perspective “emphasizes the surrender of certain divine properties,” he advances a position that is a “loosely kenotic view”, which allows for the surrendering of certain divine properties but not of “essential divine properties.” (105)

Stephen T. Davis’s “The metaphysics of kenosis” (114–33) begins with helpful introductions, which lead the present reviewer to think that this paper should have come before the previous. Davis’s paper does, however, set up well the following contribution, which is, perhaps, why the editors organised these two kenotic papers in the way that they did. The first four sections of this paper are notably helpful, insofar as they define certain terms and clarify certain motivations. In general, kenotic theories “try to understand the incarnation in terms of limiting the divine nature in certain ways.” (115) These theories find authority for this approach in St. Paul’s claim in Philippians 2:6–11 that Christ, in taking on humanity, “emptied himself.” Davis states that his “basic motivation for kenosis is the attempt to understand the picture of Jesus that is presented in the Gospels.” (133) While he recognises that a fully developed metaphysics is not present in Scripture, we should nevertheless look for scriptural “permission” to pursue certain avenues. As with the previous paper, Davis borrows Morris’s distinction between “being human” and “being merely human”, and responds to the incoherence objection by appealing also to reduplicative strategies. He also stresses that mystery should be a part of any philosophical account of the incarnation. Davis writes, “There is no denying that there is paradox involved in the notion of incarnation. Kenosis cannot remove all mystery from the doctrine. Nor can any other christological theory, in my opinion. But kenosis does help us toward an understanding of incarnation.” (123)

In the next contribution, “Hylomorphism and the incarnation” (134–52), Michael C. Rea introduces the reader to some Aristotelian terminology and its use in understanding the metaphysics of the incarnation in the previous paper. Rea argues on neo-Aristotelian grounds: “According to the version of hylomorphism that I am developing, the natures of material objects play the role of form, and they enter into compounds with things or stuffs that play the role of matter.” (143) Rea favours the view that “natures are powers” and argues that “immaterial things are individuated by their nature, and Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share the same divine nature.”
While the author applies this model to the Trinity and to the incarnation, he devotes much more of his space to describing the model than he does to its application. He also raises some consequences that he “strongly dislike[s],” namely, that under his model it is difficult to see how non-material beings can be individuated, but this is an enduring philosophical problem.

Richard Swinburne’s “The coherence of the Chalcedonian Definition of the incarnation” (153–67) discusses various interpretations of the Chalcedonian definition. Swinburne suggests that while Christ performed the actions required of him and felt temptations without being able to yield to them, he “could have yielded to a temptation not to do some supererogatory act […].” While the author realises that this view might be difficult to accept, he nevertheless maintains that it is consistent with the Chalcedonian definition. “The incarnation and unity of consciousness” (168–85) by Joseph Jedwab continues to explore the nature and relation between Christ’s human and divine natures. The author addresses the problem of the relation between the Son’s divine conscious life and his human conscious life and argues for a version of what Jedwab calls the “One-Sphere View”, according to which the Son has one sphere of consciousness which is both divine and human. The author concludes that this one sphere “has a divine part and a human part, and so differs from a typical human sphere, which has no divine part. But, since every divine conscious state is unintrospected or nearly so, and since the only conscious states that are introspected are human ones, such a sphere looks, to the subject, human.” (184)

Richard Cross, in his “Vehicle externalism and the metaphysics of the incarnation: a medieval contribution” (186–205) takes a more historical approach, whereby he develops an understanding of the incarnation “that makes central the notion that Christ’s human nature should be thought of as an instrument of the second person of the Trinity.” (188) The argument relies on the insights of Scotus (along with some disagreements with the Franciscan philosopher), among others, to conclude that the “second person of the Trinity extends himself to include a human substance” by both active and passive causal relations (203).

Anna Marmodoro’s “The metaphysics of the Extended Mind in ontological entanglements” (205–27) takes an approach that is very different from those previous. The author explicitly takes advantage of recent developments in the philosophy of mind made by Clark and Chalmers (1998) who argue that the mind “extends into the world” when using external devices that complement thinking, and thereby, that each is affected by the other. Just as the human mind extends outside of itself when relying on the abilities of the calculator, so too might the divine mind extend “onto an external device (Jesus) to carry out (some of) its mental activities […].” (206) Through a number of thought experiments, the author not only applies current ideas in Extended Mind Theory to the problem of the incarnation; she also develops the theory itself in ways that can be applicable to other questions in the philosophy of mind dealing with various other kinds of entanglements.

In the final paper, Robin Le Poidevin’s “Multiple incarnations and distributed persons” (228–41), the author responds to what he identifies as a “moral objection” to the uniqueness of the incarnation. He argues that “we can make metaphysical sense of multiple incarnations of a single deity by exploiting the notion of distributed persons.” (230) The volume concludes with a list of works referenced throughout the volume and a two and a half page index of names.
Marmodoro and Hill’s *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* is easy to recommend to anyone interested in the topic, especially to those whose philosophical approach might be best described as analytical. Furthermore, regardless of the particular application to the incarnation employed in the volume, a number of the contributions will be of interest to those working on the philosophy of mind in general. Given the broad scope of the title, the present reviewer would like to have seen more varied philosophical approaches to the problem of the metaphysics of the incarnation falling outside of the analytic/philosophy of mind approach, but nonetheless, the volume is everything it claims for itself. There is advancement in explicating the particular pros and cons with these various models, and the state of the debates is brought to light. The authors step carefully and slowly, as they should, in mapping out the ground wherein these arguments and models for perhaps one of the most difficult metaphysical problems in the history of Western thought can be employed. While Flint makes the important point that perhaps we should recognise “with Aquinas, [the possibility] that the relation between the Son and [Christ’s Human Nature] really is *sui generis*—that all attempts simply to subsume it under more familiar relationships will fail,” nevertheless, this daunting possibility should not arrest the endeavours to understand the incarnation philosophically. (87) As Davis notes, “Any view of the […] incarnation that has no room for mystery is probably mistaken. But, of course, Christians are epistemically obligated to reduce theological mysteries as much as possible.” (123–4)

**Seamus O’Neill**
Memorial University, St. John’s, Newfoundland