Gerasimos Xenophon Santas’s contribution to the scholarship in ancient Greek philosophy is inestimable—unless one is allowed to use such terms as ‘extraordinary’ or ‘gargantuan’—marking out as it does new and in some cases critical paths to solving interpretive and philosophical problems. Similarly inestimable is the influence that he has had upon his colleagues and students, though EHGS provides a generous glimpse into that dimension of his work. To a wider audience, Santas is perhaps best known for his landmark paper, “The Socratic Paradoxes” (1964), for Socrates (1979), and for Goodness and Justice: Plato, Aristotle and the Moderns (2001).

It is no surprise, therefore, that Santas and his work have merited a Festschrift of this magnitude—fully 22 articles from a variety of scholars, most of whom who are established leaders in the field and each of whom has plainly felt his impact upon their own work. The articles are relatively even in their level of scholarship and philosophical discernment. EHGS will be most beneficial to those scholars of ancient Greek philosophy who specialize in Socrates, or in ancient moral psychology. Scholars interested in the Republic will also find many articles pertinent to their research. Each piece is followed by endnotes and its own bibliography, and a complete bibliography of Santas’ work is included.

Socratic intellectualism—the view that Socrates thinks of human action, desire and virtue in strictly rational terms—is featured in a few pieces. Michael Ferejohn argues that two distinct conceptions of this view are attributable to Socrates. However, while each by itself is innocent enough, they do not fit well together and, perhaps, lead to a “deep incoherency” (1) throughout the dialogues. Christopher Rowe examines the persistent problem of where the Gorgias fits in the Platonic corpus. The dialogue seems to include incompatible Socratic and Platonic elements, perhaps especially when it comes to the dialogue’s treatment of rhetoric, politics, punishment, and so-called self-control. Rowe argues that it is nevertheless an entirely Socratic dialogue (i.e., intellectualist). George Rudebusch identifies Socrates’ theory of virtue as Reductive Monist Intellectualism (RMI), which he characterizes as the view that expressions such as ‘piety,’ ‘courage,’ ‘temperance,’ etc. all refer to the same one thing: knowledge of the human good. He defends RMI against the objection that Socrates sometimes seems to say or to presume that virtue terms refer to distinct parts of virtue.

Several papers address the so-called Socratic elenchus. Roughly, this refers to his frequent ‘cross-examination’ of interlocutors in which their definitions of virtue terms are purportedly refuted. In 1983, the late Gregory Vlastos famously articulated what has since been dubbed ‘the problem’ of the elenchus, namely, that it cannot demonstrate its negative conclusions. How, then, are elenchoi supposed to work? Nicholas White argues that the purpose of a definitional elenchus is to show that Socrates’ interlocutors—really, people in general—are
ignorent as to how to define virtue terms. Alejandro Santana investigates the problem of the *elenchus* from the point of view of whether or not there is a genuine problem in the first place. In particular, Santana examines the assumption that Socrates would have to suppose that the otherwise unsupported premises used in refutation nevertheless possess some special epistemic warrant. According to Mark McPherran, interpretations of particular *elenchoi* often run aground owing to the failure to appreciate the role *epagoge* (very roughly, inductive argument) plays in getting an interlocutor to assent to a crucial premise. Agreeing with Santas’ (1979) basic account of Socratic *epagoge*, McPherran develops a more thorough account, showing how it is deployed in several key *elenchoi*.

Another set of essays focuses on moral psychology. Naomi Reshotko’s paper, though not ostensibly about Socrates, provides an account of desire which figures prominently in a defense of Socratic intellectualism. Thus, while arguing that *de dicto* accounts of desire are always inadequate (i.e., desire must be identified in terms of how the person conceives the object or action), and that *de re* accounts are better (i.e., desire is identified without regard to the agent’s conceptions of the object or action), she defends a ‘Dominance’ theory of desire. Following Penner and Rowe (1994), this means that desire includes the intention of a person to allow things as they really are to correct and otherwise complete the picture of what the object of desire is. Terry Penner himself contributes the closely-related piece entitled “Gerasimos,” a dialogue between him and Christopher Rowe about Socrates’ account of desire in the *Meno*, 77b-78b. Here, Penner defends his position that this passage is to be read as favoring what is essentially a version of Dominance theory; his and Rowe’s foils are none other than Santas and Mariana Anagnostopoulos, who instead argue on behalf of a *de dicto* account of desire. Now, Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith deny that the *Meno* passage argues that all desire is for the agent’s own good, a position accepted by almost every defender of intellectualism, including Penner, Rowe, and Santas. They do so by attempting to remove one piece of *prima facie* evidence in its favor, namely the ‘Prudential Paradox’ that no one harms oneself voluntarily: Brickhouse and Smith’s argument is that Socrates does not endorse the paradox in this passage. Meanwhile, Mariana Anagnostopoulos examines a puzzling passage in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. In III.4, Aristotle challenges both the account of desire according to which desire is for the person’s real good, as well as that according to which it is for the person’s apparent good. Anagnostopoulos explains how we are to understand Aristotle’s own account, according to which each of these rejected accounts nevertheless figures in the truth about human desire. Inspired by Santas’ (2001) discussion of Platonic and Aristotelian theories of the good—specifically his insight that Plato distinguishes psychic faculties more according to the exclusive functions and characteristic objects of each and much less according to psychic conflict—Deborah K. W. Modrak traces the development of Aristotle’s “better” (329) theory of desire from its Platonic origins.

Many papers center on the *Republic*. John P. Anton demonstrates that, just as the *Phaedo* is to be read against the unfolding drama of Socrates’ imminent execution, so the *Republic* also continues this drama. Antonis Coumoundouros and Ronald Polansky also find inspiration in Santas (2001), where Santas maintains that Plato thinks about the good both as well-functioning and as perfect form. Coumoundouros and Polansky expand upon the former approach and argue that the latter is unnecessary for Plato. Meanwhile, Yuji Kurhihara develops Santas’ account of Plato’s functional theory of the Good in order to answer longstanding questions about the Cave
Anthony W. Price responds to Santas’ “Methods of Reasoning about Justice in Plato’s Republic” (2006), pressing the latter for greater clarity about the relationship between Plato’s methods and theories, particularly as this pertains to Santas’ reading of Book IV. David Keyt’s methodologically rigorous paper aims to say what justice is in the Republic while not going beyond Plato’s dialogues and only rarely going beyond the masterpiece itself (plus the Statesman and the Laws). Christopher Shields addresses a variety of questions about Plato’s Form of the Good inspired by his claim in the Sun Analogy that the Good “is not being, but is still further beyond, surpassing being in dignity and power” (509b6–10). Contrary to some, Shields argues that the Good is indeed a Form and that it enjoys the same ontological status as them: in his view, it is the role that the Good plays that explains how it is nevertheless distinct from Being.

Still other pieces round out the offerings. Spurred on by Socrates’ puzzling turn to writing poetry as he nears death—thus placing myth over philosophy—Fred D. Miller examines the Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic, and Phaedrus which, he argues, bring Plato’s views about myth and philosophy into ever-sharpening focus. Hugh H. Benson’s project concerns the problematic final third of the Meno, in which Socrates seems to maintain that virtue is not teachable. Turning to the Republic, 471c–502c, a passage that Benson shows is structurally parallel to the Meno passage, he explains what is therefore inadequate about the latter. D. Z. Andriopoulos focuses on the Phaedo’s account of causation, offering a reassessment of “well-known” issues in light of scholarly work done in recent decades. Gavin Lawrence provides a preliminary attempt to sort out the various ambiguities and other interpretive problems fostered by Aristotle’s famous Function Argument (EN, I.7). Vassilis Karasmanis argues that Plato’s account of apeiron (the unlimited) in the Philebus is an attempt to understand continuity and magnitude through a third concept, incommensurability.

EHGS is a very sturdy collection of work that easily stands on its own without the support of its celebratory occasion, making the result even more fitting. As philosophers of ancient Greek might express the point: it is a beautiful tribute to a beautiful soul.

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