Nicholas Jolley. *Causality and Mind: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy*. Publisher year. 296 pp. $74.00 USD (Hardcover ISBN 9780199669554)

Nicholas Jolley has been a reliable guide to a number of Early Modern philosophers, especially Locke and Leibniz. In this collection of essays one can see a more provocative side of him – Jolley challenges many traditional doctrines on Early Modern philosophy and brings forth a fresh picture of causality discussions in this rich era of philosophy.

There are seventeen essays, most of which have been published as articles or book chapters (one appearing in English for the first time). Some of the essays are relatively old, but they are revised for this volume. They cover a wide range of themes: causality, self-knowledge, the mind-body-problem, theory of ideas, consciousness, theodicy, theory of substance, phenomenalism, innateness and the epistemological status of animals. The primary philosophers discussed include Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Jolley situates himself squarely on the side of the contextualists regarding the method of doing history of philosophy, and this is evident throughout the volume. He is very much aware of the historical context of the thinkers and, indeed, some of his most interesting arguments have to do with this approach.

Causality is the leading theme, but Jolley’s take on the topic is not an orthodox one. He says: ‘One aim of the essays in this volume is to portray Hume as the culmination rather than the beginning of a story; that is, I seek to tell a narrative that begins with Descartes and ends with Hume’ (3). In this story Descartes followed the medieval doctrine of continuous creation, but it was Malebranche who was a creative thinker on causality, regarding it as based on natural laws which are a compound of God’s general and particular volitions (94 and 101). Jolley sees Malebranche’s view of causality as a necessary connection between a cause and an effect (in God) as superior, not only to Berkeley (who had difficulties in separating his views from the views of the Frenchman), but also to Hume’s criticism of causation, which, despite its brilliance, does not help us conceiving how nature works. In the last essay ‘Hume, Malebranche, and the Last Occult Quality’ Jolley argues that Hume’s subjective approach to causality is less convincing than Malebranche’s emphasis on necessary connection and that this is probably due to the fact that Malebranche was a practicing scientist whereas Hume was already detached from philosophy of nature and concentrated on the science of the mind (255). These are surely controversial claims, but Jolley is certain that, properly understood, Malebranche’s occasionalism is the most important doctrine on causality in Early Modern philosophy. One has to note, however, that Jolley does not give us a full picture, for he does not discuss causation in Hobbes and Spinoza at all.

The other central topic in the collection is the mind. Here the central figures are Descartes, Malebranche and Locke. Descartes was a major innovator in the philosophy of mind, although, according to Jolley (24), he never claimed that our knowledge of mind approaches *scientia*, scientific knowledge. His shortcomings were addressed by Malebranche and Locke. Jolley concentrates on the strict division between the physical and the mental in Descartes which Malebranche opposed and argues in ‘Intellect and Illumination in Malebranche’ that in his later views Malebranche rejected Descartes’ doctrine of pure understanding and that his Augustine-influenced late views on divine illumination and efficacious ideas are closer to Berkeley than to Descartes! (55). This is a bold claim, but Jolley makes sure that there is still room for Cartesian features in Malebranche’s later views. Again, Malebranche’s alternative doctrine of seeing all things in God was vehemently
opposed by Locke. Sometimes one gets the feeling that Jolley’s Malebranche is too far from the general Cartesian framework, but Jolley utilizes texts from all stages of his career and shows that there are significant developments in his views. Jolley argues that by rejecting Descartes’ views of intentionality as a necessary feature of mental, Malebranche could also ascribe mental properties to animals and joins forces with Locke and Leibniz. The systematic character of Locke’s criticism of Descartes is emphasized and Jolley argues that Locke’s doctrine of abstract ideas plays a central part in his opposition to Descartes’ nativism.

It should have become already clear that the hero of this collection is Malebranche. The French oratorian priest emerges as a kind of bridge between Descartes and the British philosophers and his own status as an original thinker, especially on causality as a necessary connection between the cause and the effect, is clearly brought out. This is perhaps the most valuable achievement of this collection, since Malebranche has been long undervalued and misunderstood as an anti-common sense philosopher with fanciful theological doctrines. In addition to causality, Jolley shows how many of Malebranche’s views on the mind were reasonable solutions to problems in Descartes’ philosophy and how consistent many of his doctrines were despite some internal difficulties. The central essays in this respect are ‘Sensation, Intentionality, and Animal Consciousness: Malebranche’s Theory of the Mind’ which characterizes the essential features where Malebranche parts ways from Descartes and ‘Malebranche on the Soul’ which gives a comprehensive account on the topic. Jolley argues that Malebranche’s philosophy of mind is in important aspects superior to Descartes (68). This is certainly possible, but one should not forget that Malebranche had something to build upon whereas Descartes gave us a radically new picture of the mind.

Leibniz is often contrasted with Malebranche and once with Berkeley in six essays. Jolley quite rightly emphasizes that the primary target in Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics is Malebranche and offers an excellent account of Leibniz’s defense of innate ideas in contrast to Malebranche who held, like Locke, that there are no such things. The central essay concerning Leibniz and Malebranche is, however, ‘Leibniz and Occasionalism’. The German polymath was famously critical of occasionalism, regarding it as introducing a deus-ex-machina. While Malebranche thought God to be the only cause, Leibniz thought created substances as genuine causes as well. Jolley convincingly argues against Rutherford and others that Leibniz’s opposition to occasionalism in the famous correspondence with Bayle does not have to do with God’s volitions as laws, but with the fact that the laws are not grounded in substances (143-4). Later (168), however, Jolley gives reasons why he thinks Leibniz’s denial of intersubstantial causation is a philosophical dead end whereas Malebranche’s doctrine is fruitful and even anticipated Bertrand Russell’s views (262).

I thought the essay ‘Leibniz and the Causal Self-Sufficiency of Substances’ was somewhat strained, but ‘Leibniz and Phenomenalism’ is Jolley at his best: a careful account of one of the central questions of Leibniz-scholarship which clears up some of the confusions by contrasting Leibniz and Berkeley fruitfully. Jolley argues that Leibniz’s dynamics was the reason he did not adopt phenomenalism. To my mind, this is a valid claim—in Leibniz’s world the monads strive with an active force and this is simply incompatible with the phenomenalist view. Berkeley, on the other hand, thought the independent existence of physical objects self-contradictory (197). On p. 162 Jolley presents a brilliant Leibnizian image: ‘We can…speak as if a possible world is simply one complete concept, and hence one divine disposition.’ Well, why not, although it sounds a bit like science fiction!
On the whole, Jolley’s argumentation and contextualization is reliable and convincing. He analyzes the interpretations of other scholars carefully and clearly indicates his disagreements. Sometimes the detailed discussion gets a bit tedious to read, however, although it is evident that precise arguments need a lot of attention in these difficult questions. There are some cases where the rational reconstructions seem to be somewhat forced, and sometimes Jolley reasonably admits that the problems are too difficult to give positive answers. He also admits that he has been proved wrong in some occasions (37, n. 37). To his credit it has to be said that Jolley does not try to correct the mistakes of past philosophers although he sometimes has to rely on interpretations without strong textual support.

Jolley has also included in the collection many objections to and developments of the topics after the first publication of these essays although the list naturally cannot be exhaustive. In the introduction he addresses recent developments and in the essays themselves he gives a thorough explication of the related discussion on the topic, for example in ‘Scientia and Self-Knowledge in Descartes’ (opponents being Nolan, Whipple and Lolordo on the character of our knowledge of the mind). As the collection includes several essays on the same philosophers, there is bound to be some repetition (especially with respect to Malebranche), but I found this no serious problem.

Nicholas Jolley’s *Causality and Mind* gives a good account of the current controversies in theory of causation and philosophy of mind in Early Modern philosophy and encourages the continuation of discussion of these interesting claims. I recommend this collection warmly to all scholars of Early Modern philosophy.

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