
F.M. Kamm's *The Moral Target* examines the factors that are morally significant when considering the moral status of cases in standard war and non-standard conflicts such as terrorism, communal injustice and nuclear deterrence. It deals with topics from the beginning of wars, to activities during war, and problems after war, through a heavy use of hypothetical cases and intuitive judgments. This differentiates it from other works on military ethics that are grounded in actual cases, and discussed within the framework of international law and philosophy of war and peace.

The first chapter looks at setting limits to the start or continuation of war for the purpose of altering the status quo for the better. Connecting just cause and just peace, it proposes three conceptions of justified peace: (1) a condition that one could not justify its alteration by war; (2) a condition when one is about to go to war or has just started, but are offered terms that meet the requirement for justified peace, and (3) a state of affairs where the conditions that justifiably prevent a war are the same as those that justifiably end a war that has already started (3-4). In short, a less than perfect justice (where there are still some rights violation) is insufficient to justify war and reason enough to maintain peace; this contrasts with Avishai Magalit's definition of 'just peace' which argues for justice to be present for lasting peace (5).

Chapters two through four discuss the moral conduct of war. Chapter two outlines the commonly understood standard and revised version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), in favour of a making a distinction between means to a good and a component of a good instead of the revised version of unintended foreseeable side-effects in Warren Quinn’s work. This is because Kamm considers both the standard and revised DDE accounts to permit too much since they cannot give us a clear distinction between strategic bombing and terror bombing. Kamm’s account is successful as she makes a distinction between means to a good (where the evil itself produces the greater good in terror bombing), and a component of a good (where the strategic bomber does not intend the foreseeable deaths and the lesser evil is an effect of a greater good or of means not causally related to it) (30). The variations explored here are generally aligned with how we commonly understood versions of means-ends and causal relationships.

In Chapter three, Kamm extends the challenge to DDE and the principle of discrimination in just war theory: that it is permissible to intend evil for the purpose of greater good, that is, it is permissible to kill combatants and noncombatants for the purposes of terror, albeit it is only successful in some conditions. This is because according to Kamm, the “standard just war theory typically assumes that means other than terror killing of non-combatants (TKN) are available with which to pursue a just war even if the war will then not be pursued efficiently” but this is not the case for some such as the French resistant forces during WWII (38). Further, it appears that terror killing of combatants and non-combatants is permissible so long as objective factors are present (that permits them as side effects) even if we kill for other reasons (44). Finally, it is also permissible to kill non-combatants who previously or currently are responsible for an on-going unjust war (45) or who became threats that we can justify terror-killing in self-defense or to end a war. What might be interesting is to bring this analysis to examine today’s asymmetrical warfare.

Chapter four engages with the more useful notions of ‘supreme emergency’ and ‘military necessity’ that most works in military ethics deal with, by extending the discussion of DDE from the previous chapters. According to the standard *jus in bello* principle of discrimination and
proportionality principles, Kamm believes that non-combatants may be deliberately killed as a foreseeable side effect in supreme emergency (83-5). Responding to the distinction Jeff McMahan makes between what unjust combatants are not morally permitted to do and whatever just combatants are permitted to do, Kamm demonstrates that permissible opportunistic use of enemy combatants is independent of whether a combatant is on the just or unjust side (93). She also finds it morally permissible to deliberately kill non-combatants based on the belief that it will bring about military advantage, and also when non-combatants are killed as collateral harm for achieving a greater good (99). However, when we bring these arguments to some actual events (such as the terror-bombing of Dresden) we may still find some of her conclusions contentious.

Chapter five brings us to a discussion on the deontological threshold in deciding when it is permissible to harm some in order to help others, for the purpose of evaluating the actions of Nazi collaborators. Kamm gives us two justifications as to why we may find it permissible to save some and not others. First, we may find differences in the individual characteristics of persons on both sides that justifies why we choose to save one group of people over another (114-15), and second, we may at times make a distinction between killing some versus letting some die in the process of saving others, of which only the latter is permissible. For the case of the Nazi collaborator, there is a moral difference between taking up an offer freely and acting under duress, in which case, only those acting freely will be said to have acted for the good of some while sacrificing others out of necessity, and those who acted under duress can be excused for their actions since they are under threat themselves (116). There is also a moral difference between being a collaborator in evil that one cannot diminish, in which case, collaboration is not permissible (118), and also whether one uses differential and morally relevant characteristics to select victims rather than a random distribution of scarce benefit (119-120).

Chapters 6 and 7 discuss post-war situations, with Kamm reflecting on Barbara Herman’s arguments for the moral justification of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) in South Africa, and her concerns regarding the recommendations put forth for justice after the war, respectively. Herman’s idea is that the acceptance of TRC generates a ground-level moral change from existing retributive justice (RJ) in South Africa and all citizens now lose a moral right to seek RJ against politically motivated crimes that amnesty covers (135). In response, Kamm points out that RJ cannot be fully replaced by TRC because TRC is unable to give victims all they are entitled to have, that is their right to have criminals pay for their crimes in non-monetary ways. Hence, Hermann is wrong to think that when some people want to make moral changes, it can create obligations for others (138-143). Also, it does not oblige those who want to opt for TRC to do it (144), nor does it mean that one would choose TRC even if one cannot psychologically conceive of RJ (144-5).

Kamm in Chapter 7 examines Brian Orend’s argument that postwar duties may make it harder to justify starting a war and doing things in a war. For instance, if we see that victors have to fulfill some postwar requirements before we start a war (such as having a prima facie duty to seek RJ on unjust leaders and war criminals, and rehabilitate the aggressor country and help its harmed civilians from the war) we are less likely to justify starting a war (158). She considers Orend to be wrong in thinking so because it is easy to justify war if we were to balance causing harm to one set of people with preventing harm or producing benefit to the same people postwar such as humanitarian interventions (159), and also if we balance the postwar compensation a nation will receive with the lost of citizen’s goods and services (161-2). In fact, Kamm concludes, if we were to commit to reconstructive post-bellum actions for others and/or seek compensation for ourselves, we can justify some wars that would otherwise be impermissible (164).
In Chapter 8, Kamm first outlines the following traditional moral distinctions concerning terrorism: state and non-state agent, combatant and non-combatant, intention/foresight, means/side-effects, interrelate necessity/non-necessary means and produce/sustain distinctions, mechanical and non-mechanical use, military/political, harm/terror, harm-for-terror/terror-for-goal. Some acts of terrorism according to Kamm, are permissible if terrorism is the only way to produce a good effect such as a terrorist attack by Resistance movement against Nazi Germany (207-8). Yet, in light of the evolved nature of terrorism and authoritarian states today, we will likely agree that these moral distinctions need to be revisited.

Chapter 9 argues that we should be concerned with preventing unjust acts and with dignity and not only with harm as in the case of Talban women. Kamm argues perpetrators of unjust acts are liable to certain harmful acts being done to them, at times by third parties, although victims should try to defend themselves with as little harm to perpetrators as possible and in a way appropriate to the degree of harm by the perpetrators (219-20). Permissible grounds for killing perpetrators are in defense of others and when victims find suicide as an escape from their oppression (224).

In the final chapter, Kamm engages with Paul Ramsey’s and Michael Walzer’s concern with whether DDE’s conditions of proportionality and not intending evil are satisfied with regard to a strategy that relies on the prospect of collateral damage to civilians as deterrence (229). She argues that a military strategy such as using nuclear weapons for deterrence can be morally justified precisely because it produces bad effects, but without needing us to intend the bad effect since the bad effect of the strategy is necessary to sustain the further good (239). Another approach is to see that intending harm that is lesser than an alternative that could cause greater harm may be permissible when it produces a greater good (242-3).

Jennifer Mei Sze Ang, SIM University