As David Miller rightly notes, topics concerning immigration provoke strong reactions. ‘In such a political climate, working out a coherent and balanced way of thinking about immigration is difficult. Move in one direction and you can be accused of heartlessness toward vulnerable and desperate people; move in the other and you will be called elitist with no understanding of the impact that immigration can have on working-class communities’ (152-3). Given this situation, how should we think about a justified immigration policy?

Miller offers four guiding values. The first is weak moral cosmopolitanism. As human beings, immigrants have moral standing. We must not act in ways that violate their human rights and sometimes we have positive duties to assist with protecting those rights. In addition, weak cosmopolitanism ‘requires us to give reasons if we decide to refuse people’s demands or requests, even when there are no rights at stake’ (153). The second value is national self-determination. Citizens have the right to decide on their society’s future direction within weak cosmopolitan bounds. But that still allows them wide scope to determine whom and how many to admit, and what the terms of admission should be. ‘In reaching such decisions, citizens should reflect on the goals that they would like to see their society achieve, which need not just be narrowly economic, but might also be sporting, cultural, or environmental’ (154). A third value is that of fairness, which informs discussion in several ways. Social practices must include attention to the distribution of rights and responsibilities, along with benefits and burdens. This entails balancing ‘the claims that immigrants can rightfully make and the responsibilities they can reasonably be expected to assume’ (155). Fairness also requires doing one’s part once agreements have been reached, such as when a treaty exists governing numbers of refugees to be resettled in various countries. The fourth value is an ideal of integration in which people from diverse backgrounds interact well on equal terms. As Miller notes, while there are sometimes unavoidable tensions among these values, they can still play useful role.

Miller identifies two ways in which his view differs from rival accounts. Thinking about immigration must be holistic. In addition, his position pays more attention to consequences of admission, both for sending and receiving countries. In particular, admission decisions may take into account how admission affects the overall shape and character of the receiving society. Miller begins from the realistic view that there are considerable pressures on the immigration regimes of liberal democracies as a result of factors such as high demand from potential migrants coupled with ‘the anxieties, resentments, and prejudices felt by native citizens toward many … immigrants, creating considerable pressure on governments to cap numbers… and also making it more difficult for the immigrants who are entitled to stay to integrate socially’ (159-60).

Miller argues that there is no one immigration policy that all liberal democracies must adopt as a matter of justice. However, he believes that the four values he offers will provide significant constraints on what is permissible. On his broadly communitarian or social democratic view, social cohesion and social justice play a prominent role. Immigrants should be able to become full members of the societies they join. They are also entitled to ‘retain their specific group-based identities and their cultural differences’ (161). All states must also take up their fair share of collective responsibility for protecting refugees. They must take in ‘as many as their agreement requires, passing on the remainder if necessary’ (163). Where there are no agreements, there may be an incentive to underestimate fair shares. So there are duties to make good faith efforts to reach international arrangements to manage refugee flows fairly. What if other states do not do their fair
share? States are not obligated to admit further refugees. If they choose to do so, this is a humanitarian matter, not something that can be demanded as a matter of justice.

Miller notes that his view presents significant constraints on what states may do and therefore challenges the status quo quite dramatically. For instance, states must first fulfill their duties to refugees, as specified in their agreements, before they may admit other categories of immigrants, if numbers are to be limited. A second constraint is that they may not recruit professionals who are urgently needed in low-income countries of origin and which provided their training.

In this insightful work, Miller offers a characteristically nuanced approach to a comprehensive range of immigration topics. This is an important book that will dominate normative discussion of immigration for some years to come and is highly recommended reading for all philosophers interested in social, political, moral and applied philosophy.

As I write, President Trump has issued an executive order concerning heavy restrictions on those who would like to visit or immigrate to the USA from seven predominantly Muslim countries. So I wondered whether Miller’s account had included enough to reject such policies as permissible ones that social democracies may adopt. Though there is some discussion about relevant issues (103-8), I do not believe Miller’s position is clear, given his conclusion that ‘democracies are entitled to decide how far they wish to protect their inherited national cultures and how far to encourage cultural diversity within their borders’ (108). So in the space remaining, I attempt to see whether his four values might be deployed to resist the kinds of highly restrictive immigration executive orders that have been issued.

Miller’s commitment to values of national self-determination and integration would seem to offer insufficient resistance. Though his commitment to fairness requires that refugee agreements be honored, this does not apply to the situation where there are no agreements about visitors, temporary residents, or immigrants. By contrast, the commitment to weak cosmopolitanism does seem to offer a potential source for blocking such policies. However, on closer examination this is not at all clear. Recall that Miller says weak cosmopolitanism ‘requires us to give reasons if we decide to refuse people’s demands or requests, even when there are no rights at stake’ (153). Several kinds of reasons that appeal to legitimate state purposes, such as the desire to promote civic accord in neighborhoods and protect citizens’ security, could be offered to exclude those from the seven countries identified. One kind of defense might go like this:

We have vastly more applicants who would like to come to the USA than we could possibly accept and we can therefore be highly selective. We have evidence that a high percentage of citizens from your country are hostile towards the USA. We would rather have people in our country who love America and its values. In addition, the recent election indicates that people are extremely concerned about their security and feel highly threatened by Muslims in their neighborhoods. So we have a mandate to prioritize citizens’ security and harmony in local neighborhoods in our admission decisions. Whether or not you personally intend to engage in behavior that is antagonistic towards citizens, your mere presence is likely to fuel tensions in communities spilling over into violence that we would rather avoid. Furthermore, a majority of citizens support bans of further Muslim migration. (Not incidentally, we also have information that people from your country are more likely to engage in terrorist acts, so even if you personally would not commit terrorist acts, we must take account of citizens’ legitimate fears that you or your associates might.) Moreover, we have a right to determine the shape and character of our future society and the people have spoken in support of a certain vision that does not include you. In fact, the people have spoken in favor of very restrictive immigration policies, so we are drastically limiting the number of immigrants we admit more generally. Given this pressure, we must be convinced that any immigrant we admit will offer substantial advantages to our nation. In your case we do not judge this to be the case.
We understand that weak cosmopolitanism requires us to offer you reasons that you ought to accept (105). We believe you should be able to appreciate the importance of civic harmony, felt security, and protecting citizens from unnecessary violence. We believe that you would want these goods as well, or at least you ought to want them. In addition, these are legitimate aims for governments to pursue (105). Whether or not our citizens’ fears are based on misperceptions is irrelevant. These are our beliefs about what is best for our country and we have a right to determine its future direction. You ought to accept that each country has a right to self-determination, just as you have in your country.

While I do not find this set of reasons at all plausible, others in contemporary democracies obviously do, given reported high levels of support for the executive orders. In future work, I hope Miller will develop his account of acceptable reasons so that we can more clearly establish the impermissibility of the line of reasoning just provided.

Gillian Brock, University of Auckland