Troels Engberg-Pedersen, ed. *From Stoicism to Platonism: The Development of Philosophy, 100 BCE – 100 CE*. Cambridge University Press 2017. 408 pp. $120.00 USD (Hardcover ISBN 9781107166196).

This book addresses the question: What was the precise character of the interaction between Stoicism and Platonism in the years 100 BCE-100 CE? The period is often characterized as follows: the first century BCE begins with Stoicism as the philosophical 'pace-setter' but is then distinguished by the weakening of traditional Hellenistic school identities and boundaries, with philosophers of all persuasions critiquing and selectively appropriating into their own systems elements taken from other philosophical schools (a period of 'eclecticism'), before Platonism emerges as the dominant force in philosophy at the end of the first century CE, heralding a new period. The book as a whole questions this narrative. In particular, it interrogates the usefulness and accuracy of 'eclecticism' (and associated terms such as 'syncretism') as a broad characterization of philosophical practice in the period, while seeking to explain why there was such a change in the philosophical landscape between 100 BCE and 100 CE.

The editor's introduction contains a good literature review that summarizes the state of scholarship and brings out the key questions that the book addresses. The editor also presents some conclusions that emerge from the collected papers as a whole and that might serve as a synoptic overview of the period: (1) 'Stoicism was an inevitable presence in philosophy throughout the period and well into the second century CE, which the first-century BCE new-comers in the form of dogmatic Platonism and an invigorated Aristotelianism had to address as part of the development of their own philosophies'; (2) 'their way of addressing it was fundamentally polemical, either in the form of explicit rejection or of subordinating appropriation where that could be done without detriment to their own position'; (3) the Stoics were less polemical towards Plato and 'all in all, the combined result of the whole investigation will thus allow us to speak of a movement "from Stoicism to Platonism" in our period that is characterized by an "asymmetrical" relationship between the two schools ... Where the Platonists were on the attack, the Stoics basically stayed where they were—until Platonists and Christians wholly overtook them' (25-26). Some care and nuance is clearly needed when assenting to these conclusions: taken together, the weight of evidence presented in the book's seventeen chapters does lend considerable support, but, as will become clear in the chapter synopses below, some of the individual papers indicate that the details are more complicated than might be suggested by the breezy 'from Stoicism to Platonism' line in the book's title.

Alex Long's paper, 'Plato, Chrysippus and Posidonius' Theory of Affective Movements,' outlines an early example of the Stoics interacting positively with Plato. He focuses on Posidonius' appropriation of Platonic material in his account of the emotions, in particular his use of what Plato has to say about early education in the *Laws.* Malcolm Schofield's paper, 'Cicero's Plato,' similarly stresses the compatibility of Plato and Stoicism in the eyes of Cicero, the Roman statesman and philosopher. Schofield shows that in his letters from the civil war Cicero draws on both Plato and Stoic ethics when deliberating about his own conduct, and that in his dialogues *De republica* and *De legibus* Plato and the Stoics combine in his discussions of political community, justice, and the law. Schofield rightly concludes that both Plato and Stoicism were central to Cicero's philosophizing, although Plato was more important, particularly regarding literary style and thinking about practical politics. These two papers indicate that in the first century BCE Plato's works were not only widely read and admired, but that his ideas were seen as fitting readily with Stoic commitments.

It is not clear, however, that there was a defined 'Platonist' philosophical identity at this time, beyond the sceptical New and the Antiochean Old Academy (Antiochus having argued for the

fundamental accord of Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic philosophy). In his paper 'Are We Nearly There Yet? Eudorus on Aristotle's *Categories*,' George Boys-Stones presents an assertive and powerful argument that there was. He argues that a clearly defined Platonism does not emerge after a period of transition, distinguished by 'eclecticism' or 'syncretism,' but rather it was there at least by the time of Eudorus—Platonism may have emerged dominant after a period of time, but it did not emerge newly-forged. The paper offers a very welcome discussion of the pernicious implications of thinking in terms of 'transition' and 'eclecticism': it commits one to inaccurate and unhelpful interpretative positions vis-à-vis the evidence from the 'post-Hellenistic' period, as it is defined as falling between beginning- and end-points, the 'great philosophers' or the 'great schools' who really warrant our attention. The decisive example offered is Eudorus' critique of Aristotle's *Categories*. Boys-Stones argues that it is not just a re-ordering or assimilating of Aristotle into a Platonic framework, a reading that the eclectic model encourages. Most damningly, it is shown that such a reading unfairly robs Eudorus' work of any philosophical motivation or interest. Instead Boys-Stones demonstrates that Eudorus is at pains to show that Aristotle's *Categories* are a flawed attempt at ontology, and something much more philosophically interesting becomes clear: Eudorus is reaffirming Platonic ontology in opposition to Aristotle, not merging Aristotle with Plato. Boys-Stones concludes that the modes of inter-school interaction in this period were evidently not so different to what we see in periods both before and after that we would not wish to label as 'transitions' or 'eclectic.' This is an eloquent paper that makes a compelling case for overhauling dominant and commonplace assumptions about the nature of philosophy in the 'post-Hellenistic' period.

Myrto Hatzimachali's paper, 'Stoicism and Platonism in Arius Didymus,' focuses on the doxographer Arius Didymus, who provides accounts of the theory of Forms and Plato's line on 'becoming like God' in a recognizably Hellenistic framework. Hatzimachali makes the neat argument that, rather than being indicative of an 'eclectic' or 'syncretic' agenda on the part of the doxographer, this shows instead that Plato's thought was being 'packaged in order to fit with the dominant mode of discourse,' thus allowing a Platonist position to be compared more easily with those of other schools. In keeping with Boys-Stones on Eudorus, Arius' doxography suggests that a dogmatic Platonism was already well-defined in the late first century BCE.

Christopher Gill's paper, '*Oikeiōsis* in Stoicism, Antiochus and Arius Didymus,' explores the complicated lines of influence between the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and Antiochus on the subject of *oikeōsis*. Gill offers a sustained close reading of various key texts and argues that the Stoic version was the original, subsequently adapted by Antiochus who is then followed in Arius' Peripatetic account. To what extent does the complex critical interplay between the various schools indicate a transition from Stoicism to Platonism? Gill concludes that a number of Stoic ideas are accepted by Antiochus and Arius, with some modification so as to fit an Aristotelian ethical framework, but there is no real indication of a substantive shift from Stoicism to Platonism on the issue of *oikeiōsis* in the first century BCE (this becomes apparent in the next century and onwards).

Mauro Bonazzi's paper, 'The Platonist Appropriation of Stoic Epistemology,' makes the important point that the Platonists had two key aims: (1) reintroduce Plato to the debates between the Hellenistic schools; (2) show that Plato, properly understood, provides solutions to the problems that the Hellenistic schools had been arguing over for some time. This required the Platonists to accept the problems and the terms of the Hellenistic schools so as to join and ultimately win the debate, but this is not indicative of 'eclecticism' or an attempt to 'harmonise' Platonic ideas with the Hellenistic schools. Bonazzi considers the example of the criterion, how to determine between what is true and what is false, and demonstrates how Platonists sought to improve the Stoic theory of the *ennoiai* ('notions') by showing that they must rely on Plato's Forms rather than sensory experience if they are to be reliable criteria for knowledge: the Stoic theory is beset by problems as it stands, but those

problems dissolve once the full Platonic framework is in hand. To be sure, other fresh questions then arise about how we access the Forms, but there is a sense of philosophical progress being made (even if it is something of a 'back to Plato' movement). Bonazzi concludes that instead of being evidence of 'eclecticism,' bringing Stoicism into Platonism, the evidence suggests that Platonists could show the supremacy of their own position using terms that their opponents were beholden to accept—an excellent persuasive strategy that also helps to explain the growing dominance of Platonism.

In her paper, '"Becoming Like God" in Platonism and Stoicism,' Gretchen Reydams-Schils explores the crossover between Stoic and Platonic themes in Alcinous, Plutarch, and the anonymous commentator on Plato's *Theaetetus*, who each unpack what 'becoming like god' actually entails for our understanding of the divine and our pursuit of the virtuous life. Each author engages with Stoic and Platonic ideas, but Plato consistently comes out on top—there is not an eclectic middle-ground Stoicised-Platonism but rather both traditions appear as mutually informing challengers on the key issues.

The next three chapters shift our attention to Jewish sources, in particular Philo of Alexandria and the anonymous *Wisdom of Solomon*. David Runia's paper, 'From Stoicism to Platonism: The Difficult Case of Philo of Alexandria's *De Providentia* I,' shows how Philo uses a Stoic framework and terminology in *On Providence*, but draws more heavily on philosophical arguments from the Platonic tradition, while at the same time remaining fundamentally committed to Judaism (to which both Stoicism and Platonism are subordinate). Carlos Levy and Gregory Stirling, in their papers 'From Cicero to Philo of Alexandria: Ascending and Descending Axes in the Interpretation of Platonism and Stoicism' and 'The Love of Wisdom: Middle Platonism and Stoicism in the *Wisdom of Solomon*,' make much the same case through close reading of other texts. These papers all persuasively illustrate a trend: Platonism is more dominant in terms of the philosophical arguments brought to bear on certain topics such as the creation of the world and the will of god, which makes some sense given the metaphysical commitments of Judaism, but a Stoic argumentative framework remains central. The papers of Stanley Stowers and Harold Attridge, 'The Dilemma of Paul's Physics: Feature Stoic-Platonist or Platonist-Stoic' and 'Stoic and Platonic Reflections on Naming in Early Christian Circles: Or, What's in a Name?,' both reinforce this conclusion with regard to Philo's physics and his discussion of the unnameability of god, which is influential on the New Testament *Gospel according to John* and the Gnostic *Gospel of Truth.*

A. A. Long's paper, 'Seneca and Epictetus on Body, Mind and Dualism,' focuses on the two most important Stoic sources of the first century CE. There are Platonic elements in the work of both Seneca and Epictetus, and they both cite Plato directly. How strongly and to what extent does Plato influence their Stoicism? In the papers thus far, the trend has clearly been towards accepting Platonic over Stoic arguments, and we have also seen growing calls to identify a well-defined Platonism in the first century BCE. Long suggests some caution when we come to the Stoic sources. Exploring the example of soul/body dualism, which has an obvious Platonic pedigree, Long shows that the Stoics have their own account that does not require appropriation of any Platonic metaphysics, even though they present their account with Platonic images and terms. There is no Platonic or Platonist element in Epictetus or Seneca that heralds a sudden divergence from mainstream Stoic doctrine (those Platonic elements are in Stoicism from the beginning), and as a result there is no compulsion to posit a growing Platonist influence on Stoicism in the period: neither Seneca nor Epictetus offer evidence of the development of an eclectic or syncretic Platonised-Stoicism, but they do show that the Stoics were interested in the writings of Plato (as they always had been).

Brad Inwood's paper, 'The Legacy of Musonius Rufus,' assesses what Musonius Rufus can add to the debate and concludes that it is relatively little, with the real interest to be found elsewhere. Inwood stresses the complexity of the philosophical landscape during the first centuries BCE and CE

and makes a compelling argument that Musonius Rufus is 'not a canonical Stoic' but rather 'was in fact a genuine pioneer, in his own way, for the role of philosophically educated public intellectual.' Inwood shows that the philosophical material associated with Musonius Rufus is quite generic and in keeping with a number of traditions, indicative not so much of his 'Stoic' identity but more so of the nature of popular philosophy in the period, which is not 'eclectic' insomuch as it is concerned with using the conceptual resources available in the service of addressing the pressing social and political concerns of the moment. The paper does well in showing that philosophically-informed texts from the period do not all have to be seen in the 'from Stoicism to Platonism' framing narrative; the evidence is clearly more complicated and fascinating than that.

Jan Opsomer's paper, 'Is Plutarch Really Hostile to the Stoics?' considers Plutarch's critical treatment of Stoicism. He shows how Plutarch blends praise with criticism when addressing Stoic ethical and theological ideas, in contrast to the outright contempt he shows towards Epicureanism, and how he employs the Academic method of weighing all positions on a given question, in order to get close to the truth of the matter. In keeping with what we have seen in many of the other chapters, Plutarch ultimately concludes that Plato offers the most compelling views, with some aspects of Stoicism able to absorbed into Platonism.

The final paper of the collection, Charles Brittain's 'Peripatetic Appropriations of *Oikeōsis*: Alexander, *Mantissa* 17,' switches focus to the relationship between Peripatetics and Stoics. It explores the Peripatetics' appropriation of a Stoic framework in their exploration of the psychological basis of ethical development, looking in particular at Alexander of Aphrodisas' historical account of how earlier Peripatetics engaged with Stoic views on *oikeōsis*, as well as his own contribution to the debate. A similar pattern emerges to the other treatments of Platonist, Jewish, and early Christian sources: a distinctly Stoic framework is employed to address the key philosophical issues, but the Stoic arguments are subordinated in favour of the Aristotelian. The paper thus adds considerable weight to the 'from Stoicism' thrust of the volume as a whole, while raising further questions about the precise nature of the relationship between Aristotelianism and Platonism at the end of the first century CE; this, indeed, is a subject that might have been explored more deeply by other chapters in the volume.

On the whole, this book is a substantial contribution to the scholarly literature that should be of interest to a wide range of philosophers, classicists, and historians of early Christian thought. Two aspects really stand out: (1) the problems of approaching the period with preconceived ideas about 'transition,' 'eclecticism,' 'syncretism,' and so on. Such concepts now appear largely unhelpful or even untenable: the evidence strongly suggests that the traditional school boundaries and identities remained well-defined, with Platonism ultimately coming out on top since its arguments were seen as more compelling than the Stoic (and indeed the Epicurean and Aristotelian) alternatives; (2) the need to treat the disparate evidence from the period on a case-by-case basis and in terms of its own internal logic, rather than mining the texts for what they can tell us about how we get from Stoicism to Platonism. As George Boys-Stones bluntly states at the end of his paper, from a philosophical perspective we can in fact understand that shift fairly easily and there are better questions to be asking: 'Post-Hellenistic philosophy can only properly enter our histories when we see that the systems of the age and their engagements are no different in principle from those of any other period. That requires (but also allows) us to understand what they *are* before thinking about what they *do*' (79). In many ways, these lines provide the real take-home message of the volume as a whole.

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