
Hanno Sauer’s Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions is an engaging and rigorously reasoned example of the way in which moral philosophers can theorize about the psychology of moral judgments against recent challenges derived from findings in the contemporary movement known as empirical psychology of moral judgment, which contends that moral verdicts have no rational basis. The book puts forward a rationalist argument about the psychology of moral judgments, to say that moral cognition has a rational foundation. That is, moral reasoning, through automatic responses that can be supported by episodes of rational reflection, plays a crucial role in moral judgment. Sauer extensively appeals to different empirical evidence concerning the psychology of moral judgment to show that reasoning plays a significant role in our moral judgment, as opposed to the anti-rationalist (21) and emotionist camp, for whom either reasoning plays no significant role or emotions are the basis of moral judgments.

The author argues for a rationalist model of moral judgments according to which moral judgments are educated moral intuitions, hence the title of the book. These intuitions are typically fast and often the upshot of emotionally-charged reactions to morally salient situations. Like cognitive habits, intuitions are automatized responses produced by unconscious mechanisms which have nothing to do with moral deliberative reflection and reasoning. Although deliberative reflection or reasoning is not typically what produces moral judgments, it can support our intuitive judgments, when necessary, to resolve, control and monitor inconsistencies. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time. In this way, since deliberative reflection and reasoning can form our automatic and emotionally-charged responses to morally salient situations, Sauer’s view reconciles a rationalist model of psychology of moral judgments with empirical evidence.

To say that moral reasoning has a role in our moral judgment does not entail that conscious moral reasoning directly produces such moral judgments. Moral reasoning has a role in forming, maintaining, and correcting moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that at the time of making moral judgments, we do use our intuitions concerning what is morally acceptable, however, it is through deliberative reflection and reasoning that patterns are established for our automatic and spontaneous moral judgments. It is our moral education that makes the foundation for our moral judgments.

Although Sauer is well aware of a growing body of empirical research that supports the idea that moral judgments are automatic and intuitive emotional responses to morally salient situations, he does not believe that this empirical research is inconsistent with what he refers to as a rationalist model of moral judgments. Sauer brings empirical reasons to claim that deliberative moral reflection and reasoning can form automatic and intuitive emotional responses to morally salient situations and supply our moral intuitions with checks and balances (12). That is, most of our moral judgments are typically made on the basis of automatic emotionally-charged intuitions, however, the intuitions themselves are educable through deliberative reflection and reasoning. Sauer concludes that not only are moral judgments moral intuitions, but that deliberative reflection and reasoning play a crucial role in correcting our moral intuitions: ‘[m]oral judgments are educated and rationally amendable moral intuition’ (12).

One, however, might ask if on the one hand moral intuitions are spontaneous and emotionally-charged reactions, and on the other moral judgments are educated and rationally amendable moral intuitions, how does the rationalist model square with the emotionist model of
moral judgments? Does Sauer’s solution resolve the rationalist-emotionist division? Sauer’s educated intuitions account shows how emotion, intuition, and reason interact. Several empirical studies show that emotion and reason do not always exclude each other; rather, moral judgments can be sensitive to moral reasons when they pick out morally relevant features of emotional responses. For Sauer, ‘[m]oral judgments without emotions are empty, emotions without moral reasoning are blind’ (15). Sauer’s psychology of moral judgments tries to bring emotion, reason and intuition together as partners, not as contestants (121-3).

How does Sauer set the stage for such an account of partnership between intuition, emotion and reason? Sauer uses Joshua Greene’s Dual Process model of moral cognition and Jonathan Haidt’s Social Intuitionist model to test whether his account of educated intuitions is empirically viable and normatively persuasive. He discusses Joshua Greene’s Dual Process model of moral cognition to support the claim that there are two types of moral judgments: deontological and consequential. These two basic types of moral judgments are produced by different cognitive systems. Deontological moral judgments are produced by a fast, spontaneous and emotionally-charged system, and consequentialist moral judgments are produced by a slow, controlled, and reflective system. While Greene supports his idea with empirical evidence from brain science and neuroimaging, Sauer casts doubt on Greene’s idea by providing other empirical evidence to show that the two cognitive systems do not map onto two types of moral judgments under closer scrutiny.

But suppose we have a model that generalizes Greene’s claim about fast, spontaneous and emotionally-charged deontological moral judgments to all moral judgments. Sauer refers to Jonathan Haidt’s Social Intuitionist model as an example of such a model (97-9). According to Haidt’s model, empirical evidence gives us reason to believe that moral judgments in general are automatic and intuitive gut reactions, and moral reasoning’s role in general is confabulatory and playing as post hoc rationalizations for the moral intuitions people already had. For Haidt, moral reasoning does not provide truth and it is for others’ persuasion. Sauer, however, argues against the Social Intuitionist model on the basis that it does not make a distinction between ordinary post hoc reasoning and genuine confabulatory rationalizations. Sauer also believes that Haidt is wrong in interpreting empirical evidence, suggesting that moral reasoning does not touch our intuitions. In order to show that reasons do touch our intuitions, Sauer gives us his empirical evidence as ‘experimentum crucis’ from recent work by Joshua Greene and his colleagues. Sauer’s ‘experimentum crucis’ shows that our moral intuitions about Jonathan Haidt’s incest case might be changed responsively when we challenge them; as a result, we can educate our moral intuitions. Sauer also points to another recent work by Matthew Feinberg and his colleagues to show that our intuitions about Haidt’s incest case actually can change and qualify as educating (117-18).

Sauer argues with supporting empirical evidence that ‘emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgments’ (15). In Sauer’s view, this necessity and sufficiency thesis can be compatible with the rationalist model. Sauer offers the empirical evidence on psychopathy to claim that emotions are necessary for moral judgments, since psychopaths’ emotional impairments can result in an inability to understand features of moral cognition. Sauer also reviews the empirical evidence on emotion manipulation experiments such as footbridge-dilemma to suggest that emotions are sufficient for moral judgments, since emotional changes can change people’s moral verdicts. In Sauer’s style of rationalism, emotions have the pervasive role in our moral judgments and there might be a hope that we can open the way for explaining how moral error and progress happen.
Although Sauer is dealing with the psychology of moral judgments, he does not pay much attention to the psychology of moral intuition. There are two places that Sauer seems to refer to the theory of intuition when he writes, ‘intuitions are, at the core, emotionally charged quasi-perceptual seemings of what morality requires’ (15) and ‘[e]motionally charged intuitions are a lot like moral perception’ (16), however, it is not clear why intuitions are perceptual seemings and not intellectual seemings. It seems that Sauer assumes similarities between the nature of moral intuitions and other kinds of intuitions such as philosophical, logical or mathematical intuitions. For he appeals to some empirical works that have been done on other kinds of intuitions to see whether they are educable. He refers to the study on implicit biases (prejudice and stereotype) by Rudman and her colleagues to show that implicit biases can be changed if there are some interventional strategies. This entails that Sauer treats implicit biases like moral intuitions and, in his view, both are educable (76).

Sauer’s educated intuitions account seeks for an empirically supported comprehensive rationalist theory to show the influence of reason as well as emotion on moral judgments. This account proposes that spontaneous moral intuitions have a crucial role in our moral cognition, and offers the justificatory status of moral intuitions within the social practice of moral reasoning. Sauer writes, ‘[w]e can be rationalists and emotionists about moral judgment, just like we can meet tomorrow and outside’ (129).

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