
Highlighting the concept of theoretical work as manifestation, in this book, Donna Haraway’s longstanding attachment to ‘the word made flesh’ as secular praxis and method grounds a retrospective of some of her most influential texts. Very readable, this volume brings together two of Haraway’s well-known ‘manifesto’ essays: ‘The Cyborg Manifesto’ and ‘The Companion Species Manifesto’ (here, with updated footnotes by Haraway, whose ‘generous citational practice’ (ix) is a key feature of all of her work). The volume also includes an introduction by Cary Wolfe, as well as the transcript of a conversation/interview between Haraway and Wolfe, ‘Companions in Conversation.’

While it is tempting to focus on this interview, which is not only new but wide-ranging, funny, and moving, but which lights up the book in unexpected ways, it would be remiss not to notice that reading the ‘manifestos’ together allows for resonances, harmonies, and echoes to emerge, and a reader to bounce back and forth between them. The interview, on its own, would be worth reading for anyone familiar with or interested in Haraway’s work, but coming at the end of such a ‘reading-together,’ the whole is, inevitably, greater than the sum of its fleshy parts.

This is due, in no small part, to Wolfe’s introduction, in which he draws our attention to the ways that pairing the manifestos reveals Haraway’s longstanding and deep attention to what has come to be called ‘biopolitical thought,’ well before it received a name. Wolfe is also attentive to the methodological implications of Haraway’s work, and draws readers’ attention to them, too, which prefaces their lengthier methodological discussion in the interview. Wolfe reminds readers about Haraway’s commitments to the method of negative theology and to ‘irony’ (which she notes is a term now too freighted for her purposes), or blasphemy, as a way of dealing with the tools and ideas one inherits and has been shaped by, that are nevertheless worth critiquing, perhaps even dismantling – those things, perhaps, about ourselves and our tools which we might approach with self-conscious ‘irony.’

Like blasphemy, I have witnessed the tone of ‘The Cyborg Manifesto,’ first published in the Socialist Review in 1985, solicit both awe and annoyance. Wolfe notes that ‘what I wasn’t prepared for – and I don’t think many people were – was its stylistic and rhetorical bravado’ (vii-viii); ‘I remember distinctly the first time I read it … less like remembering where you were on 9/11 than recalling the first time you listened to a record that really blew you away.’ (vii) Yet the text, Wolfe reminds us, is very much of a moment – which is important because cyborgs ‘have no truck with timelessness or immortality’ (ix). As Haraway notes of its reception, in the later interview: ‘My cyborg would have none of [an anti-science-and-technology stance or vocabulary], but it also refused to be a blissed-out technobunny… and that caused controversy from the get-go’ (211).

It was not only the refusal of an anti-science-and-technology stance that caused and continues to cause controversy. The cyborg is a figure, a way of being that is blasphemous, both to liberalism and to most of its progressivist critiques: the cyborg has a deep sense of its history, and it knows, understands, that it has been crafted, not primarily out of intention, but out of worldly things, its orientations toward knowing are not totalizing, but engaged in partial connections with a real world. To be the product of craft is to be the product of complex interactions of nature and culture in which neither leaves the other untouched. Cyborgs therefore refuse the individualisms, essentialisms, and dualisms with which they are co-constituted. Coming at a moment of political pressure in the women’s movements, the civil rights movement, the disability rights, queer, and anti-capitalist movements, to ‘speak with one voice,’ Haraway’s arguments against a ‘we’ that
obliterates differences (so that women, black, disabled, queer, or working class people become unified, and mutually exclusive categories), challenged not only those who might expect to be challenged by someone on the political and radical left, but also those on the left who expected to be bolstered by Haraway’s work – blasphemy, indeed.

The manifesting-shifting from cyborg to companion species between the two essays encourages important reading along-side. Elements of the cyborg become clearer, but readers are also called to attend to the development of Haraway’s thought, its persistent, figurative, and yet worldly manifestation. While ‘cyborgs can be figures for living within contradictions, attentive to the natureculture of mundane practices’ (102), Haraway writes, ‘I have come to see cyborgs as junior siblings in the much bigger, queer family of companion species’ (103). The concept of companion species signals a composition in which ‘co-construction, finitude, impurity, historicity, and complexity are what is’ (102).

In ‘The Companion Species Manifesto,’ the historicist complexities of relations between specific dog breeds and (specifically situated) human beings are revealed in their mutually dependent histories, domestications, practices, ways of life. To think about this companionship, Haraway considers the manifest relations between her dog, Ms. Cayenne Pepper, herself, and many of their ‘messmates’ as they emerge in their historical lives and practices. Even ‘humanist technophiliacs’ love dog stories, but they take instances of domestication as ‘epoch-changing tools’ whereby ‘man makes himself repetitively as he invents (creates) his tools’ (119). Yet there are other, more ‘sympoietic’ stories to tell. Stories of companion species are stories of shaping one another, of taking seriously what biologists call ‘co-evolution,’ and expanding it to the level of sympoietic attention, taking seriously the necessity and persistence not of becoming but of ‘becoming-with.’ Both as kinds and as situated individuals, canines and human beings have become-with, and those familiar with Haraway’s recent work, which urges ‘staying with the trouble,’ will notice her reading this orientation already in her earlier essays. For Haraway, stories about companion species are stories about ‘relations in significant otherness,’ through which ‘the parties come to be who we are in flesh and sign’ (116).

Companion species, like cyborgs, ‘cannot afford evolutionary, personal, or historical amnesia’ (173), and Haraway has always been generous not only in her citational practice, but in giving us some clues about the person who is writing, who is grappling with her lived ironies, her immunities and vulnerabilities. Thus, in ‘Companions in Conversation,’ Haraway recalls to Wolfe that for her, ‘The Cyborg Manifesto’ was ‘a kind of coming together of understanding that I have been formed, as who I am in the world, out of these large and small, intimate and huge matters … I was formed as a person out of all these things… and I was an remained always profoundly in love with biology, the critters, the ways of knowing’ (205) – the sister paper to ‘The Cyborg Manifesto,’ she says, is her paper, ‘Situated Knowledges’ (250). Bristling at the term(s) of ‘posthumanism,’ Haraway’s love of biology grounds her awareness of the ways of knowing the world and ourselves as situated historically ‘in particular apparatuses of knowing,’ both human and non-human, she describes her approach as a statement of ‘Best I can tell, this is not just the way I work, this is how the world works’ – but ‘never in an easy way’ (212).

In part, this lack of ease is a basic function of using language, which, for Haraway, itself inevitably expresses what she once called irony: ‘every act of syntax is also a kind of fierce joke on our desire to clarify, to control, to know, to identify…. You simply can’t say what you mean – that’s not how language works’ (209). Haraway’s self-aware relationship with her formation and inheritance, of being raised as a devoted Catholic (educated in the age of Sputnik, and in love with biology), leads her to take naming seriously as enactment, of, ‘among other things, corporeal
cognitive practice,’ whereas philosophers end up calling companion species or figures/expressions like ‘the word made flesh’ ‘mere metaphor’ (ibid.). By using words, something cognitive, corporeal, and practical manifests. Yet, for Haraway, as for many of us, what manifests is both palpable and never quite what we mean. Words, writing, and theory are therefore, also ways of becoming-with sites of responsibility; they ground the need for irony as a method for writing, if not also as a way of being.

Blasphemy, as Haraway insists in the first pages of ‘The Cyborg Manifesto,’ is ‘not apostacy’ (5). Rather, it is precisely a way of ‘staying with the trouble,’ not imagining it away. Haraway’s work models how to take oneself seriously – and often joyfully – as a site of historical, religious, and ideological words made flesh, precisely without making the mistake of thinking that rejection, refusal, or critique can vanquish that which has formed us. Haraway is not a posthuman (despite her alliances with the movement so named); she is a being in, and of, the ‘mud,’ a ‘messmate’ and companion with others, for whom her continued becoming-with is inevitably, and richly, at issue.

Those familiar with Haraway’s work will find the interview in this volume illuminating. But it would also be useful in undergraduate and graduate classes where biopolitics, animal studies, philosophies of race, technology, posthumanisms, or contemporary political theory are considered. For this reason, it is also, perhaps, an interesting point of entry for those who would like to begin reading Haraway and aren’t sure where to start.

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