
Sandra Lapointe and Christopher Pincock have edited an interesting volume on *Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy*. The book is part of Palgrave Macmillan’s ‘Innovations in Philosophy’ series, which aims to bring forward original research about ‘hot topics’ and ‘emerging areas’ (v). The editors confirm that their idea was to gather young scholars who have already contributed much to the emerging field of ‘history of analytic philosophy.’ Their choice of contributors is entirely justified and the topic is indeed a hot one. However, one thing should be noted from the start. The title – *Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy* – might suggest that innovations in the history of analytical philosophy will be dealt with in the volume. One might expect chapters about the various innovations that characterized analytic philosophy in the twentieth century: methods, concepts, and ideas that were developed by analytic philosophers in order to solve or dissolve traditional problems and difficulties. If you open the book with that goal in mind, you might be disappointed. Nonetheless, what the reader gets is still interesting and important.

After a lengthy introduction comparing recent historiographies, the book divides into four major parts—‘Aspects of Analytic Philosophy,’ ‘Logic and Language,’ ‘Ontology and Mind,’ and finally ‘Mathematics’—thus representing all the customary major divisions of analytic philosophy. I will go through them in turn, emphasizing the merits and disadvantages of each part.

Greg Frost-Arnold aims to reconstruct and contextualize the usage of the term ‘analytic philosophy.’ His approach is quite interesting: given the fact that many of the current investigations into the nature and definition of analytic philosophy have broken down, Frost-Arnold chooses a bypass road to approach his subject. He favours a contextual, historical approach, ‘focusing … upon an issue that may be more tractable: the rise of the category or label “analytic philosophy”’ (28). He shows that the term (and closely related ones) was not used widely until the 1950s despite its appearance in the early 1930s. This is explained by the fact that one of the most important elements of the term (‘linguistic analysis’) was not shared by everyone commonly placed under the umbrella term ‘analytic philosophy.’ Though important elements of this narrative (the status of the linguistic turn, and the constructive element in building up a tradition by using a vexed term for various groups) have already been put on the table by others (for example, Aaron Preston), Frost-Arnold offers important new details about both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the problem.

The second paper in the first section, by Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Leon Geerdink, is ‘The Dissonant Origins of Analytical Philosophy.’ The authors claim that a tension that was present at the birth of analytic philosophy still haunts contemporary philosophers. Early analytic philosophy was characterized by a duality of methods. There were those who relied on common sense and intuitions, and those whose ‘methods [relied] extensively on formal, mathematical tools, and/or operating in close proximity with the empirical and exact sciences’ (70). Dutilh Novaes and Geerdink rightly point out that the philosophies of Moore and Russell more or less correspond to this division, but this is not ‘anything very novel so far’ as they admit (70). The original twist in their paper is the idea that Moore and Russell differed in their attitudes towards the ‘analysandum’ in their philosophical practice, and that that differentiation can still be found in the contemporary literature as well.

Dutilh Novaes and Geerdink seem to be right about what they say regarding the different methodologies both in former and in current analytic philosophy. But distinctions like this one have been drawn for decades: ideal language philosophy vs. ordinary language philosophy; naturalism vs. voluntarism; and so on, etc. Only their terminology seems innovative: they talk about conservative
and transformative/revisionary attitudes towards common sense belief. They distil these attitudes from the cases of Moore and Russell, though they also devote pages to show that Moore and Russell exemplify what they dubbed, respectively, the conservative and revisionary attitudes.

Moving on from the explicitly historical papers to the ‘Logic and Language’ section, we get, in fact, three more historically aimed articles. There is a paper on Wittgenstein by Colin Johnston, which gives a nice summary of two interconnected topics of the Tractatus (representability and possibility), along with some critical remarks on the literature. There is also one paper on Russell, and one on the history of semantics.

Lydia Patton’s essay is one of the best in the volume. She provides a nice context for the ideas of the early Russell. Patton starts from Henry Sheffer’s (wrongly indicated in the paper as ‘Harry Sheffer’) famous ‘logocentric predicament.’ Sheffer claimed in the review of Principia Mathematica’s second edition that there might be a certain circularity with regard to the universality of logic: we need to presuppose logic in order to account for the nature of logic. Patton reconstructs from this observation the nature of Russell’s method (in order to motivate and maintain logicism) that had, or presumably had, important nineteenth-century sources.

By discussing the special views of William Stanley Jevons and John Venn, Patton points out that there was a long-standing tradition of invoking regressive methods. The idea was that certain consequences or facts are to be justified regressively, namely, that the solution for the question of what axioms and rules we are supposed to accept should be based on whether their consequences match those statements that we have already accepted. We do not simply deduce certain consequences in an axiomatic structure; rather, with some ingenuity and contingency, we have to find out and use the axioms in order to get closer to the required results. I have elsewhere called this approach (‘The Limits and Basis of Logical Tolerance: Carnap’s Combination of Russell and Wittgenstein,’ in Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell: Life and Legacy, Vernon Press 2017) an ‘inductive-practical’ method that consist in inductive considerations—and thus admits a sort of fallibility—and practical conceptions, admitting external values and aims. What we find in this chapter entirely matches what is promised in the book’s title: Russell reinvented an already known and widely used method in an entirely new setting and for very special purposes (logicism), and this reinvention turned out to be one of the characteristic marks of early analytic philosophy.

The final paper in this part is devoted to an insufficiently discussed topic, namely the history of semantics. Daniel W. Harris writes about ‘the history and prehistory of natural-language semantics,’ and his view is somewhat similar to the one defended in the second chapter (by Dutilh Novaes and Geerdink); namely that many of its elements are well-known and too abstract. Frege, Tarski, and Carnap are presented as forerunners of idealizations in the philosophy of language as providing a form (or precursory version) of truth-conditional semantics. Developments in the late twentieth century might make these approaches seem old-fashioned and dusty. But the paper could have omitted the textbook-like passages at the beginning and concentrated more on the question of how ideologies were masking the intentions and methods of scholars (172). On the other hand, it is not entirely clear why philosophers (like Carnap) should be contrasted with the achievements of first-order theoretical linguists. Though there are obvious continuities between the fields of philosophy of language and logic and theoretical linguistics, it is not at all evident that the results of those who explicitly practiced the former could be compared with the results of more focused linguists.

Moving on to the third part of the volume, the essays on ‘Ontology and Mind’ show a similarly uneven character. Uriah Kriegel’s paper on ‘Brentano’s Concept of Mind’ is an interesting piece, reconstructing Brentano’s philosophy of mind with the tools of analytic philosophy. Brentano is still underappreciated among contemporary analytic philosophers, and Kriegel does his best to sell us
Brentano’s system. He also compares the rationally reconstructed views of Brentano to some contemporary views (using the vocabulary of natural kinds and reference-fixing). Thus the paper’s innovation is that it revives an option and a figure that were long-neglected and perhaps ‘much more faithful to the folk’s spontaneous, natural conception of mentality’ (223) than others.

Kris McDaniel also tries to rehabilitate a historical figure; his choice is Susanne Langer, who was indeed a strange figure in the history and current reception of analytic philosophy. While she seems to be one of the early analytically-minded logicians (viewed favourably even by logical empiricists in the 1930s), and wrote nine books and numerous articles (266), she is simply left out from almost all of the mainstream historical works and narratives of analytic philosophy. McDaniel’s approach thus helps fill in some gaps in the story of analytic philosophy. Langer’s favorite topics and philosophical approach are similar to those of many contemporary thinkers, and from that perspective, it is indeed fruitful to see her major thoughts reconstructed. The paper’s main innovation is, however, methodological: its insistence that ‘[w]e mismeasure the size of an ocean if we look only at the big fish in it’ (267).

The most appealing paper in Part III is Alexander Klein’s article on Russell and William James. The author criticizes the well-known metaphysical reading of Russell’s external-world program, proposing a much more nuanced, epistemologically motivated story that relies substantially on James’s empirical psychology. Though Russell is among the most discussed philosophers of analytic philosophy, and there might seem to be hardly anything new to learn about him, Klein produces quite an interesting and stimulating new reading.

The fourth and final part of the collection is devoted to mathematics. It consists of two papers: one about Russell’s logicism (Jeremy Heis) and one about the history of algebra (Audrey Yap). Heis discusses the question of ‘what changes would have to be made to arrive at logicism’ (304) from Russell’s 1897 viewpoint. Yap, on the other hand, traces the influence lines of algebra and the philosophy of mathematics: she considers the ideas of Richard Dedeking and Emmy Noether and argues for two distinct theses: first, that these mathematicians have a role to play in the history of analytic philosophy; and secondly, that Noether has invented tools and conceptions that were quite original in her own context, and that might play an important role in current debates about structuralism among logicians and philosophers of mathematics.

All in all, the volume contains some interesting and important studies of the history of analytic philosophy, some promising figures and subjects for further historical and problem-oriented studies, and also some quite general and abstract discussions. Nonetheless, it is hardly distinguishable from any contemporary volume about the history of analytic philosophy: while analytic philosophy was considered by many a real innovation in the history of philosophy, the volume presents this only partially.

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