
It is very hard to provide a detailed overview of Hegelian philosophy, but it is much harder to reach this goal by taking into account only certain aspects of the philosopher of Stuttgart. Does this mean that a Hegelian scholar should always analyze the entirety of Hegel’s philosophical production rather than focusing on only some aspects such as the aesthetics, the logic, the natural sciences, the ethics, and so on? Obviously this is possible only if one keeps in mind the Hegelian dialectical method, otherwise it would be impossible to provide a homogeneous view of Hegel’s thought.

This very extensive volume devoted to the philosophy of Hegel entitled The Oxford Handbook of Hegel attempts to provide a unitary image of Hegelian philosophy while focusing on a selection of Hegel’s philosophical works.

As Moray points out in his Introduction, ‘The trouble with that kind of topic-oriented handbook in Hegel’s case is that it would run a serious risk of obscuring what remains the most distinctive characteristic of his philosophy, namely its rigorously dialectical character. Hegel’s motive for philosophizing dialectically is to avoid dogmatism, to avoid merely assuming premises rather than developing them from earlier stages in the argument. In planning this handbook I aimed to respect the method largely keeping to Hegel’s own divisions of the subject matter as presented in his major writings’ (xxvii).

This volume is well structured and is divided into seven sections that take into account Hegel’s main works and his philosophical development starting from his stay in Jena. Part I, ‘Hegel’s Development in Jena,’ opens with Birgit Sandkauelen’s essay ‘Hegel’s First System Program and the Task of Philosophy.’ This period is very important because in 1801 Hegel made his debut in the philosophical landscape with The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy. The year 1801 is extremely relevant because Hegel’s ‘attempt to clarify … the “task of philosophy” centres on three key concepts, around which further concepts cluster: the absolute, speculation, and system. In 1801, all three concepts appear for the first time in his work, henceforth constitute his core conception of philosophy’ (7).

This essay is followed by Michael Nance’s essay ‘Hegel’s Jena Practical Philosophy,’ which takes into account Hegel’s main political and social ideas that he developed during the years between 1801 and the publication of his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).

Part II, entitled ‘Phenomenology of Spirit,’ opens with Dina Edmunts’ contribution entitled ‘Consciousness and the Criterion of Knowledge in the Phenomenology of Spirit.’ Edmunts analyzes the main philosophical problem raised in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit and the section on consciousness. This is very interesting because ‘Hegel describes his project as an attempt to determine when knowing (Wissen) corresponds to truth (Wahrheit). In order to correctly understand what Hegel is up to, one must understand “knowing” (Wissen) as “holding-to-be-true” (Fürwahrhalten), whereas “truth” (Wahrheit) means that something is in fact the case. Therefore, knowledge proper (Erkenntnis) is only present when something that is held to be true is also the case’ (62).

Part III is devoted to the *The Science of Logic*, and it opens with Robert B. Pippin’s essay ‘Hegel on Logic as Metaphysics.’ According to Pippin it is ‘especially important that Hegel doesn’t say that metaphysics has a subject matter that requires a speculative logic in the Hegelian sense, but that this new metaphysics is logic’ (199). Brady Bowman’s essay ‘Self Determination and Ideality in Hegel’s Logic of Being’ takes into account the ponderous Hegelian work *The Science of Logic*, by showing that ‘Kant’s transcendental idealism is not the only philosophy with which *The Science of Logic* stands in critical dialogue. Equally important, says Bowman, is ‘the confrontation with Spinoza’s substance monism’ (219). Part III also includes the following essays: ‘The Logic of Essence as Internal Reflection’ by Michael Quante, ‘From Actuality to Concept in Hegel’s Logic’ by Karen Ng, ‘Subjectivity in Hegel’s Logic’ by Rocío Zambrana, and ‘From Objectivity to the Absolute Idea in Hegel’s Logic’ by James Kreines.

Part IV, entitled ‘The Encyclopedia Project, Philosophy of Nature, and Subjective Spirit,’ analyzes the other two parts of the *Science of Logic*, which Hegel never completed, and which he treated only in the three editions of his *Encyclopedia* (1817, 1827, and 1830). This section opens with Angelica Nuzzo’s essay ‘Hegel’s *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* in Outline,’ which considers the structure and method of Hegel’s *Encyclopedia* and the transition from the logical idea to nature and the logic of nature. After all, as Angelica Nuzzo writes, ‘since Hegel insists that the philosophical encyclopedia must provide the necessary “beginning” (and the *Grundbegriffe*) of the different philosophical sciences, we should look at how the beginning of the *Philosophy of Nature* is made once the “transition” from the *Logic* is accomplished’ (356). It is followed by Robert Stern’s essay ‘Hegel’s *Vorbegriff* to the *Encyclopedia Logic* and Its Context,’ which considers the Hegelian *Vorbegriff* or ‘preliminary concept.’ According to Stern it ‘contains some very important material that can be extremely helpful in helping us to understand Hegel’s views, and particularly in enabling us to locate his thought in relation to his predecessors, such as the ancient and rationalist traditions in metaphysics, as well as Kant’s critical philosophy’ (364). Part IV ends with the following contributions: ‘Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature’ by Sebastian Rand, ‘Hegel’s Anthropology’ by Andreja Novakovic, and ‘Hegel’s Psychology’ by Heikki Ikäheimo.

Part V, ‘Objective Spirit,’ opens with Thom Brooks’ ‘Hegel’s Philosophy of Law.’ According to Brooks ‘Hegel’s philosophy of law is best understood as natural law theory’ (543) and he approaches this part of Hegel’s philosophy by taking into account what he calls natural law externalism—that is to say ‘the idea that we determine moral standards for judging legal systems outside of them’ (543)—and natural law internalism, which is ‘the view that we assess legal systems using moral standards found within them’ (543). Next, we have Christopher Yeomans’ essay ‘Hegel’s Philosophy of Action,’ which analyzes the Hegelian philosophy of praxis, while Katerina Deligiorgi, in her essay ‘Hegel’s Moral Philosophy,’ tries to answer the apparently simple question: ‘Does Hegel have anything to contribute to moral philosophy?’ (498). It is a well-known fact that Hegel’s criticism of morality deeply influenced the reception of his thought, but Deligiorgi wishes to correct this ‘received view and to show that Hegel offers a positive argument about the nature of moral willing’ (498). The primary source, obviously, is the *Philosophy of Right*, especially the part devoted to what Hegel calls ‘the ethical’ (das Sittliche).

The next essay, ‘Hegel’s Liberal, Social, and “Ethical” State’ by Ludwig Siep, is strongly connected with the previous one, but it also takes into account the Hegelian theory of the state. In fact, ‘since family … and civil society with its crises both are in need of an institution guaranteeing their stable functioning, this proves the necessity of the state. This necessity refers not only to the functional necessity but even more to the realization of the meaning of freedom. For the individuals and their “political nature,” freedom requires their “public life” within an autonomous institution;
for the all-encompassing institution of the state, freedom means a rational will directed at itself as its goal’ (521).

The last contribution in section V is Terry Pinkard’s essay ‘Hegel’s Philosophy of History as the Metaphysics of Agency.’ This essay is very interesting because Pinkard holds that according to Hegel’s philosophy of history, history is not determined by what Hegel calls Geist, just because ‘the necessity that philosophy claims to find in history is not that of a causal chain … Nor is it a thesis about convergence such that once certain elements are in place, a certain type of social order and political system will arrive… Although it is contingent that history makes sense, the conditions of its making sense are not themselves contingent. Those latter conditions are explicated in the Logic and the Encyclopedia’ (553).


In conclusion, all the essays that form this extensive volume provide a detailed and innovative image of the most important aspects of Hegelian philosophy and it surely helps us in finding new interpretations of the philosopher of Stuttgart. The volume also includes a very useful index of names and subjects.

Giacomo Borbone, Catania University