Part of Routledge’s ‘Studies in American Philosophy’ series, Pragmatism and the European Traditions—edited by Maria Baghramian and Sarin Marchetti—aims to give pragmatism its due as one of the three defining philosophical movements of the twentieth century. It offers analyses of a variety of encounters between the Analytic tradition (developing from the work of such key figures as Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein), phenomenology (emerging from the thought of Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger), and pragmatism (with origins in the writings of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey). The analyses are not restricted to the founding figures of the respective traditions, however; they extend the discussion through later generations of thinkers and into the latter half of the twentieth century. Through these analyses, the editors seek to establish the indispensability of pragmatism in arriving at a comprehensive overview of the philosophical landscape of the past century. Its indispensability lies in the mediating role it plays between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. While the volume most obviously appeals to researchers and academics working in the area of pragmatism, philosophers focused on the other schools of thought covered should also find constructive insights and ideas.

In order to effectively highlight the fecundity of the exchanges between these schools of thought, it is necessary—as the sub-title of the volume indicates—to focus on the interactions taking place between these two European traditions and American pragmatism before the ‘great divide.’ The divide in question here is, of course, that between Analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy. The editors address this issue at the outset. In the introductory chapter (‘Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Mingled Story of Three Revolutions’), they sketch a portrait of the intertwined development of analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and pragmatism. ‘One source of dissatisfaction,’ they submit, ‘is the puzzling contrast between an “Analytic” way of understanding practicing philosophy, a question of methodology, and a “Continental” one, which references a geographical location’ (2). Regardless of whether this contrast is genuinely puzzling, it is the case that retaining a broad focus on ‘Continental’ philosophy does not allow the editors of this volume to illuminate the mediatory facets of pragmatism in this context. Restricting the focus to the concerns of phenomenology, on the other hand, does facilitate such an illumination.

Pragmatism shares analytic philosophy’s focus on language and the analysis of concepts while also emphasizing, along with phenomenology, the importance of lived experience as a basis for philosophical inquiry. Moreover, binding all three movements is ‘the disenchantment with Idealism’ (2). Hence the central thesis of the volume is that pragmatism can play the role of reconciler between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, providing the basis for a productive dialogue between the two schools of thought. Pragmatism is thus the key to combatting ‘isolationist’ accounts of these three traditions (5). Indeed, given that this dialogue continues well into the 20th century, it might be suggested that the encounters examined between these traditions are more aptly described as taking place beyond the titular great divide rather than before it.

Beyond the introductory essay, the volume is tidily divided into two sections: ‘Early Encounters’ (seven chapters) and ‘Later Encounters’ (five chapters). In chapter 1, ‘Two Very Different, but Potentially Complementary readings of William James,’ Richard Cobb-Stevens examines the extent to which Husserl’s and Wittgenstein’s respective readings of James’s The Principles of Psychology
have had a profound influence on the disparity in the methodologies of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. Cobb-Stevens argues that these readings have had more of a role in creating a perceived divide between the two schools of thought than the actual debate between Frege and Husserl over psychologism. He further argues that ‘James’s critique of the psychologist’s fallacy is remarkably similar to Husserl’s critique of philosophies that remain captive to what he calls the natural attitude, as opposed to the phenomenological attitude’ (26).

In chapter 2, ‘How to Marry Phenomenology and Pragmatism: Scheler’s Proposal,’ Kevin Mulligan contests the notion that there is any core philosophical opposition between pragmatism and early phenomenology. The third chapter, ‘Pragmatic and Analytic Evasions of Idealism: James and Wittgenstein on Conduct and Practice,’ focuses on some links between pragmatism and analytic philosophy vis-à-vis a discussion of James and Wittgenstein. In particular, both figures engage in ‘evasions’ of the then-dominant philosophical school of Idealism, and these evasions indicate a connection between pragmatism and analytic philosophy.

In chapter 4, ‘Other Minds and God: Russell and Stout on James and Schiller,’ Tim Button explores Schiller’s and James’ respective accounts of the content of the claim ‘other minds exist.’ Button argues that Schiller is susceptible to a charge of solipsism on this score whereas James is not.


The essays in this volume undoubtedly reveal intriguing and promising interconnections between pragmatism, analytic philosophy, and phenomenology. However, a note on the effacement of the traditional ‘Continental-Analytic’ contrast is in order. There is no question that placing these two traditions in opposition to each other can be unconstructive and often leads to pointless academic debates and even institutional skirmishes. Baghramian and Marchetti demonstrate that there is much to be gained from seeking a rapprochement between the two traditions via the mediating role of pragmatism. Still, we should be wary of a possible sleight of hand involved in replacing the ‘Continental-Analytic’ contrast with ‘phenomenology-analytic.’ In particular, the claim that the ‘Continental-Analytic’ contrast is ‘puzzling’ does seem a bit disingenuous: certainly, one might expect non-specialists to be confused by this contrast, but anyone steeped in the history of philosophy is well aware of the origins of the contrast and the various commitments encapsulated by it. To be
fair, the editors acknowledge the complexity of the Continental tradition and do not reduce it to phenomenology, but the replacement contrast is still a bit misleading, just as relegating existentialism, critical theory, hermeneutics and post-structuralism to an endnote (14) is a bit dismissive. If the feeling remains that there is something evasive here, it may be for no other reason than that there is surely a reason the term ‘Continental’ philosophy endures. Nonetheless, an in-depth examination of this issue is simply not one of the objectives of the volume, and the editors are of course free to frame the relevant philosophical positions in the manner they deem most effective.

Given the prominence it accords to pragmatism as a mediating school of thought in the twentieth century, this book, as indicated earlier, should appeal in particular to researchers and philosophers engaged with the pragmatic tradition—and key figures such as James, Peirce, and Dewey—and it could certainly be a valuable resource in a graduate-level seminar course devoted to the subject. However, scholars working with figures such as Wittgenstein, Quine, and Husserl should also find much that is of interest. This volume is an essential contribution to the philosophic literature in that it will certainly encourage scholars working in these three schools of thought to reconsider—and perhaps render more constructive—the manner in which they characterize and problematize the central issues in their respective areas of study.

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