
In edited volumes about philosophy and some subject S, one typically finds an assemblage of papers by experts on S. Given that these experts have written extensively on S before, the papers tend to be recapitulations or summaries of views they have expressed elsewhere. What’s so exciting about the volume on *Creativity and Philosophy*, edited by Berys Gaut and Matthew Kieran, is that it takes a different path. The majority of the papers in the volume are authored by philosophers who have never written about creativity before. In their contributions to this volume, they bring their expertise on a vast range of subjects – from virtue epistemology to philosophy of mathematics to political philosophy – to bear on the philosophical investigation of creativity. Fittingly, this makes for a collection that breaks new ground on the study of creativity and thus exhibits the very feature that it’s about.

In their helpful introductory chapter, the editors begin with an overview of philosophical discussions of creativity. This is the first of many places in the book where attention is devoted to definitional matters. As Gaut and Kieran note, exactly how creativity should be defined is a matter of philosophical controversy. That said, most of the authors (editors included) seem to operate within the general framework that was developed by Margaret Boden in her influential book, *The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms* (Routledge, 2004; see also her chapter in this volume), even if they reject parts of that framework. According to Boden, we must distinguish between *psychological* creativity and *historical* creativity. In her view, all creative actions result in outputs that are surprising. But surprising in what sense? When an action is psychologically creative, it’s new to the person involved. In contrast, when an action is historically creative, it’s new not only to the person involved but with respect to all of human history. That so many of the authors draw on Boden helps unify the discussion throughout the book but also makes for some repetition when one reads the book in its entirety. Her basic framework is explained in at least five different chapters, plus the introduction. Repetition of this sort is understandable and, I suppose, inevitable in this kind of edited volume – especially if one aims for the individual chapters to function in a freestanding way so that they are readable in isolation from the book as a whole.

The bulk of the editors’ introductory chapter provides a detailed roadmap to the 20 other contributions in the book. Those contributions divide into six broad sections. The first section consists of four papers that discuss whether and how creativity can be understood as a virtue. The second section consists of five papers discussing whether and how creativity is related to value. The third section consists of two papers on creativity and agency, while the fourth section contains three papers that take up questions relating to how creativity can be explained. Finally, the last two sections of the volume treat creativity in relation to more specific subject matters, with section five devoted to creativity in philosophy and mathematics and section six devoted to creativity in art, morality, and politics.

As the editors also note, however, in addition to these thematic groupings by section, there are several different themes that are interwoven throughout the book and that connect chapters that otherwise might seem very disparate. In the remainder of this review, I will briefly discuss how two of these themes feature in the book: first, the relation between creativity and imagination; and second, the question of whether creativity can be learned.

In most of the places where the contributions in this volume take up the first of these two themes, it is addressed relatively briefly in the context of some broader discussion. In contrast, ex-
exploring this theme is at the center of Robert Audi’s chapter on ‘Creativity, Imagination, and Intellectual Virtue.’ In his view, imagination ‘lies at the center’ (25) of creativity and is its ‘chief constituent’ (27). But what is imagination? Historically, philosophers such as Descartes and Kant characterized imagination as a faculty, and Audi’s treatment is in line with this general tradition; in his view, imagination should be understood as the capacity to produce new things. Among contemporary philosophers working on imagination, this faculty-based treatment of imagination has fallen out of fashion, so it is somewhat difficult to situate Audi’s view within the philosophical discussion of imagination of the last twenty years or so. That talk aside, much of what he says about imagination is compatible with this contemporary discussion: it is not just a matter of linear inferential power, it is not codifiable, it needs to be differentiated from intuition, and it often involves both foresight and insight.

Like Audi, many of the other contributors to the volume draw a tight connection between creativity and imagination. Perhaps James Grant, who in ‘Creativity as an artistic merit’ suggests that creativity is the very same property as imaginativeness (333), draws the strongest connection. In ‘Intellectual Creativity,’ Jason Baehr notes that creativity is ‘closely tied’ to imagination (45). In ‘Creativity Without Value,’ Alison Hills and Alexander Bird characterize creativity as being generated through the use of imagination (95), and in a similar vein Charles Taliaferro and Meredith Varie, in their discussion of ‘The Active and Passive Life of Creativity’ suggest that imagination is exercised in most cases of creativity (141). Though Michael Beaney, in ‘Conceptual Creativity in Philosophy and Logic,’ does not offer any general principle linking creativity and imagination, he notes that imagination is likely often involved when philosophers and logicians exhibit creativity. In particular, when testing theories and new ideas, they will likely use imagination ‘to think of the possible situations in which a concept or principle may or may not apply’ (274). Among the contributors who address this theme linking creativity and imagination, perhaps the biggest outlier is Tim Mulgan in his essay, ‘Moral Creativity and Possible Futures.’ Mulgan first distinguishes imagination from imaginativeness, where imagination involves a process of visualization or picturing while imaginativeness involves the recognition or invention of new possibilities. Then, turning specifically to the moral domain, he distinguishes moral imaginativeness from moral creativity. In his view, ‘the morally imaginative person envisages new ethical possibilities, while the morally creative person puts them into practice’ (352). Though this distinction seems to put Mulgan at odds with many of the volume’s other contributors, he does note explicitly that his usage is an artificial one that might fail to correspond to actual usage. He introduces it specifically to allow us to capture a distinction between the practical and the theoretical. Thus, perhaps there is less disagreement between him and the others than there may initially seem.

Turning now to the second of the two themes I mentioned above, the question of whether creativity can be learned or taught, we see numerous contributors in the volume pushing back against what we might think of as the muse objection – the claim that creativity is muselike, a talent that one is simply born with or without. (Historically, such a view is often associated with Kant.) Two of the places where we see discussion of this issue are contributions I have already mentioned above. First, Audi discusses how creativity can be nurtured or stimulated, even if it cannot, strictly speaking, be taught. Second, Baehr’s account of creativity as an intellectual virtue commits him to the claim that it can arise ‘through a process of practice and habituation,’ on par with other virtues (54). In explicit response to the muse objection, Baehr offers a list of practices that could help one to cultivate creativity-practices such as surrounding oneself with creative people and making time for free thought and experimentation. One might also work at various activities such as asking questions, switching perspectives, noticing details, and drawing connections.
This list of practices connects nicely with Alan Hajek’s discussion in ‘Creating Heuristics for Philosophical Creativity.’ Like Baehr, Hajek explicitly addresses the muse objection and suggests that it is mistaken: ‘One’s creativity can be enhanced by learning and internalizing appropriate techniques’ (292). Hajek focuses on philosophical creativity, and in a practically oriented discussion that draws from his own experience, he goes on to offer a concrete set of heuristics that one can employ to enhance one’s philosophical creativity. He begins with a discussion of ‘philosophical fridge words,’ a heuristic (based on the popular novelty item Magnetic Poetry) that helps to foster problem and hypothesis generation. Other heuristics involve taxonomizing and colonizing, drawing attention to alternative members of a contrast class, and engaging in analogical reasoning.

Hajek’s discussion in turn connects with Michael Wheeler’s discussion of the path of creation in ‘Talking About More Than Heads.’ Wheeler does not address the muse objection directly, but his argument that the creative mind is ‘embodied, embedded and extended’ (231) seems to presuppose that there are steps one can take to enhance one’s creativity. In particular, Wheeler highlights the fact that there are many different kinds of processes involved in creativity. Some that he mentions specifically include rule-governed manipulations, pattern completion, perceptual sensitivity, imagery, and analogical reasoning. Given that many of these processes are ones that people can work to improve, his discussion seems to have the clear implication that the muse objection might be wrong. Likewise, though Jennifer Hawkins’ discussion of ‘Artistic Creativity and Suffering’ does not take up the muse objection directly, her claim that creativity may be enhanced when one has a ‘deeper and wider experience of extremes of emotion’ (156) suggests ways that one may improve one’s creativity.

Though I have not discussed all of the chapters here, they are uniformly strong and interesting, and there is much to be gained from a careful read of the book as a whole. In the closing sentence of their introductory chapter, Gaut and Kieran express their belief that the publication of these essays ‘will materially improve the debate and help to consolidate and advance the emerging field of philosophy of creativity’ (18). This strikes me as exactly right, and to my mind, there’s no question that this will soon become a go-to volume – perhaps the go-to volume – on the philosophical treatment of creativity.

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