This volume is an inspired project. Based on the papers presented at a conference of the same title in 2004 at Princeton University, its ten chapters explore the relation between Kant and five early modern philosophers—Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume—to whom he refers in his critical writings. The book has a distinctive structure: the essays are arranged in pairs, of which the first is a study by a Kant specialist of Kant’s response to some aspect of his predecessor’s thought, while the second is a response to Kant’s interpretation of that early modern philosopher by an expert on that philosopher. The overall effect, as Jean-Marie Beyssade says (40) of his own work and Béatrice Longuenesse says of the works of Descartes and Kant, is that of a series of objections and replies: alternating between Kant’s objections to his predecessors, and the replies that might have been presented by these predecessors had they known of his criticisms.

In their pair of essays, Longuenesse and Beyssade consider Kant’s response to Descartes’ theory of the mind. Longuenesse argues that the ‘I think’ for Kant is not primarily a Cartesian state of self-awareness, but the activity of attributing my representations or judgments to myself. The Paralogisms arise from mistaking what Kant calls the ‘logical’ features of this ‘I think’ with the characteristics of an empirical object as determined by the categories. Longuenesse regards these two aspects of Kant’s view as an advance over Descartes’ characterization of the mind, but she considers the Refutation of Idealism to be unsuccessful as an attempt to refute Descartes’ problematic idealism. In his reply, Beyssade argues that in the Meditations Descartes actually presents a more carefully crafted account of the I as a thinking substance than is recognized by Kant. In Beyssade’s view, Descartes is able to regard the I of self-consciousness as existing in time through my recognition of the changes in the modes of my thought over time: a recognition of duration that stands in contrast to Kant’s apparent interpretation of the Cartesian cogito as a single moment of self-awareness.

Next, Anja Jauernig argues that while he was critical of the German followers of Leibniz on various points, Kant took Leibniz’s own philosophy as his point of departure, so that many of his innovations were responses to problems arising within Leibniz’s thought. She considers in particular the German followers’ discussions of space, arguing that Leibniz is more nearly a transcendental idealist than a transcendental realist about space, but that, as an alternative to Kant, he regards space as the form of God’s intuition. In his reply, Daniel Garber argues that Kant and his contemporaries had very
limited access to Leibniz’s writings, and that Kant sought to reduce Leibniz’s thought to a few fixed principles, and thus failed to recognize both the complexity and the constantly evolving character of Leibniz’s thought. Garber illustrates this fact by considering the dialogical interplay of Leibniz’s various views concerning the relation between monads and bodies.

Paul Guyer and Lisa Downing compare Kant and Locke, particularly their views of the limits of human knowledge. Guyer argues that Locke presented an empirical account of the limits of human knowledge as located in the limited acuity of the human senses. Guyer then rejects as untenable and unnecessary the Kantian limitation of our knowledge to our representations, as expressed in Kant’s transcendental idealism. However, he endorses Kant’s limitation of empirical knowledge to what is connected to sense experience as ‘actual’; a limit which accommodates the continuous expansion of our knowledge through space and over time, which Guyer regards as allowing for the advance of knowledge beyond the limits recognized by Locke. Downing replies by tracing Locke’s conception of ‘uncertain philosophical causes’ in relation to his changing assessment of corpuscularianism, ending with Locke’s admission of qualities (such as gravity) that are ‘superadded’ to matter by God. She concludes that while Kant is right to reject Locke’s empiricist reduction of human knowledge to ideas, Locke’s changing view of matter and force demonstrates more flexibility and room for theoretical development than Kant allows for in his discussion of the laws of nature.

Dina Emundts and Kenneth Winkler address the relation between Kant and Berkeley. Emundts seeks to clarify Kant’s account of the contrast between his own transcendental idealism and Berkeley’s dogmatic idealism. She locates the basis for this contrast in Kant’s claim that the a priori conditions of experience are required for the unity of representations in self-consciousness, which gives Kant a more successful account of objectivity than is available to Berkeley; and she also argues that Kant’s conception of a thing in itself is a limiting concept for what is given to the senses. Winkler argues that Kant understood Berkeley as maintaining a Platonist view that we perceive sensible objects, including ourselves, through intellectual intuition, leading Berkeley to his overconfident claim to know that our sensible ideas are direct determinations of our minds by God. However, neither author claims that Kant is able to refute Berkeley decisively.

Finally, Wayne Waxman and Don Garrett examine the perennially intriguing question of the relation between Hume and Kant. Waxman argues that Hume and Kant are both committed to psychologism and what he calls ‘sensibilism’, and that Kant’s response to Hume consists in his a priorism regarding space, time, and the categories. Kant’s response is ultimately located in the subjective deduction, in which Kant argues that the application of the categories, and thus the original synthetic unity of apperception, is a necessary condition for Humean associationism. In his response, Garrett argues that Hume’s texts actually support a response to three charges made by Kant, since Hume shows that reason does, in a sense, give rise to the concept of cause and
effect; that reason considers itself entitled to regard causal relations as necessary, though not demonstrable; and that many mathematical judgments are synthetic a priori. He concludes by defending the general cogency of Hume’s view as an alternative to that of Kant.

As is indicated by these summaries, each of these essays presents a valuable treatment of specific topics in the works of Kant and his early modern predecessors. In addition, however, many of the essays also provide a survey of Kant’s references to these five predecessors, along with an account of the extent to which their works were available to Kant. This volume therefore provides a useful reference for anyone who is interested in exploring any aspect of the relation between Kant and these five early modern philosophers.

The objections-and-replies format of this collection is very graceful and effective in allowing the authors to explore Kant’s interpretation of his predecessors, and to defend these predecessors against his criticisms. As Garber and Longuenesse note in their introduction (1-5), these essays help to fill out the ‘history of pure reason’ that is sketched by Kant at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason: a history which he presents more as an account of the alternatives leading to his own system than as an investigation of the thought of his predecessors on their own terms. However, the essays in this volume largely leave open a question that would seem to follow from their juxtapositions: to what extent do the reassessments of any of these predecessors represent a challenge to Kant’s own system? The nearest approach to this is found in Garrett’s essay, which is provocatively entitled ‘Should Hume have been a Transcendental Idealist?’ but which also offers a valuable account of the ways in which Hume might have developed his views as a criticism of transcendental idealism. It would be interesting to see the dialogues between Kant and his predecessors developed further, with the groundwork that is provided by the essays this volume.

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