Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus philosophiques

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Corey Beals
Levinas and the Wisdom of Love:
The Question of Invisibility.
Waco, TX: Baylor University Press 2007. Pp. 182.
US$39.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-9327-9259-1).

In the final paragraph of her article, 'Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes that Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida' (*Postmodern Culture* 2006), Chloe Taylor summarizes her case for seeing 'visionary ethics' as a common ground between Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida: 'I have argued that Levinas' persistent use of visual metaphors throughout his work despite his own critique of visuality shows not only that this metaphor is, as Derrida says, inescapable, but also that it can be transformed to describe other ways of seeing that we already experience.' We cannot simply step out of the light, but can imagine alternatives to either donning a blindfold or persisting with a penetrating gaze. We can imagine thinking by the light of the moon or reflecting through indirect light. Our eyes do more than gaze. They also weep, and we can see tears and see through tears, exposing us to a different vision of ethics. This is an image Taylor develops at a junction between Levinas and Derrida to help us see how closely these thinkers can cross paths.

'Visionary ethics' presents a direct challenge to Beals' book. Beals aims at excising Derrida (and other post-structuralist thinkers) from Levinas to show that Levinas' thought is not an ethics of undecidability but rather provides a model for ethical decision making. Beals pursues this interpretation through an explication of a central statement of Levinas: 'philosophy is the wisdom of love at/in the service of love' (*Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, 162), a discussion of the role of visibility, invisibility, and the secret of Gyges in Levinas' philosophy, and examinations of examples from Holocaust testimonies. Despite certain strengths, though, Beals' book cannot meet the challenge of visionary ethics.

'*La philosophie: sagesse de l'amour au service de l'amour*': This is Levinas' inversion of the traditional definition of philosophy as 'the love of wisdom', which gives priority to ontology and epistemology over ethics, to wisdom over love, to that which appears over that which does not. Writing to introduce, clarify, and redeem the humanism of Levinas' turn to ethics as first philosophy, Beals focuses on this key statement to argue for the 'achievability' (79) of ethics and politics within the real world situation of a 'multiplicity of men' without succumbing to a return to symmetry in the relations between the self, the Other, and the Third. According to Beals, an all-too-accepted, hyperbolic reading of Levinas understands ethics as an infinite responsibility to the Other, one that can never be met, and thus prohibits the possibility of achieving a non-violent politics. On the contrary, asserts Beals, such a politics can be 'actualized' (78), even if Levinas never provided 'a first-order ethical or political theory' (7). In fact, he claims, '[i]t is more accurate to say that Levinas is providing a "prolegomena to any future politics." His ethical metaphysics is a grounding for a wisdom of love — for ethical or political

theories and practices. But his task is not primarily one of building on that foundation' (7). That foundation's roots in vision, how I see and how I am seen, provides the controlling metaphor for Beals' explication of Levinasian terminology in general as well as for his examination of the phrases constituting his central sentence concerning 'the wisdom of love' in particular.

First, in one of the most valuable portions of the book, Beals provides a concise encyclopedia of familiar and unfamiliar terms from across Levinas' texts: Wisdom, Third, Justice, Comparison, Said, Thematization, Ontology, Politics, Anonymous, Totalitarian, Originally Antagonistic, Watchfulness of Persons, Concern-for-the-Third, Original Responsibility, Love, Satiable Desire, A-Satiable Desire, The 'A-satiable' in 'Insatiable Desire,' and The 'Desire' in Insatiable Desire. Then, he spends a chapter each expanding his discussions of Love, Service, and Wisdom.

He contends, against Derrida, Caputo, Irigaray, and others, that 'Levinas holds a view of neighbor-love such that it is empirically possible, it is not reducible to concupiscence, and it remains asymmetrical in important ways' (44). This neighbor-love is not a gift, is not attached to preaching, and carries no promise with it; rather it remains 'a-satiable, sacrificial, *agape*, altruistic' (44), being for the Other, what makes us 'most fully human' (64). Addressing 'service' requires addressing 'priority,' and addressing priority requires distinguishing among chronological, logical, and hierarchical relations, which Beals does to argue that Levinasian service 'is not a reversal of priority or a mutualization of priority but, rather, is a pacific inversion of priority . . . possible once we see the distinction between authority and power' (92). The Other has the authority to 'command' me to be responsible but not the power to 'demand' I obey, which Beals asserts Levinas thinks, 'is a distinction with a difference' because it allows us to imagine ethics and politics otherwise than as founded in coercion or dread (91). But, 'what *practical difference* does it make whether the democratic state has a pedigree as Hobbes describes or as Levinas describes?' (96)

Here, Beals turns toward wisdom and the ethical/political scene of the Third to examine how Gyges' secret can be broken, how we can become visible to the Other, the theme at 'the center of Levinas' philosophy' (107). In order to demonstrate what it means to 'become visible', Beals contrasts two groups from the Holocaust: on the one hand, Andre and Magda Trocmé and the villagers in Le Chambon who risked their lives to shelter endangered Jews, and on the other hand the Nazi doctors who exterminated Jews in the concentration camps. The Chombonnais made themselves visible to the visibility of the Other and did what was 'only natural and normal' (100) when they saw the life of the Other as more important than their own. The doctors, who refused to see or be seen, distanced themselves, 'learned to become dis-integrated' (107), in order to preserve themselves when they murdered as they did. In the end, we can learn from the Chombonnais, not necessarily how to overcome Gyges' secret invisibility, but 'that nonviolent speech is possible' (119), especially in everyday democratic modes of prophecy, teaching, and testimony that welcome the Other.

Finally, after establishing why and how he thinks this welcoming takes place in the real world, Beals closes the book by claiming that 'it is conceivable that all other factors being equal, the smaller society will always be more humane than the larger' (125). He then shares a small example from his own life that illustrates how simple it can be to 'testify with a wisdom of love in the service of love' (132).

This book certainly has its strengths. Beals is a good reader of Levinas, able to decipher and explain denser points concisely, especially in the chapter on priority. When he leaves all else behind, Beals' explications are fresh and revealing. His articulation of Levinasian terminology in general and his discussions of authority and power in particular are quite valuable. Likewise, his focus on one of Levinas' central sentences and one of his principal metaphors make the book very readable. And yet, as I mentioned at the top of this review, these strengths are not enough to meet Taylor's challenge, stated at the outset, that Levinas and Derrida share a 'visionary ethics.'

While Beals covers the central concerns of this challenge — 'the wisdom of love' and the myth of Gyges — in detail, he fails to do so with its secondary concerns and too often leaves off just as he touches on the crucial points to consider. For example, although the book intends to separate Levinas from Derrida, it fails to consider the later texts where Derrida most directly addresses Levinas or ethics, such as *Politics of Friendship*, *Spectres of Marx*, *Memoirs of the Blind*, or *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, texts where Derrida is most Levinasian. As well, there is no engagement with work such as Simon Critchley's, which repeatedly has addressed questions of clôture, ethics, politics, subjectivity, and the infinite demand across Levinas' and Derrida's philosophies. There is also no analysis of Levinas' own statement in *Proper Names* regarding 'the pleasure given by an encounter at the heart of a chiasmus' that he shares with Derrida. Furthermore, Beals' very understanding of the centrality and complexity of the myth of Gyges for Levinas — that we can neither abandon ourselves to the myth of Gyges nor simply leave it behind — seems precisely to evoke Taylor's argument that we must transform metaphors of visuality to describe other ways of seeing. If Levinas teaches us that we cannot be 'the unseen seer' or 'the unseeing seen' (85) then he, like Derrida (and other post-structuralist thinkers), is calling for new metaphors of light and seeing, other than the dualism of blindness and insight. Beals appears aware of the failures of such dualisms and yet returns to them just at the moments when his arguments point beyond them.

In the end, this book is simply too short to accomplish all it sets out to accomplish. Its strengths come from its focus and explication of key terms from across Levinas' writings. Its weaknesses come from its recourse to dualism and statement and assertion rather than demonstration. Perhaps, in the end, its value lies in the clarity of its explications and the ambition of its focus.

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Michael Bergmann
Justification without Awareness:
A Defense of Epistemic Externalism.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 272.
US$70.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927574-8);
US$35.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-956242-8).

This book significantly raises the standard of rigor that future discussions of the internalism/externalism debate will have to meet. Besides its rigor, it is also impressive in scope, as Bergmann provides interesting discussions of connected topics like epistemic deontology, justification defeaters, epistemic circularity, skepticism, and the new evil demon problem.

In the first of the book's two parts, 'Against Internalism', Bergmann argues against two important motivations for internalism, and also against Mentalism. One motivation comes from Laurence Bonjour's Norman case. According to Bonjour, Norman's reliable clairvoyant beliefs about the president's location are unjustified because he is unaware of anything that these beliefs have going for them; from his perspective, Norman's beliefs are no different from a hunch or an arbitrary conviction; hence, from his perspective, it is an accident that these beliefs are true. According to Bonjour, what Norman lacks is awareness that his beliefs possess anything that contributes to their justification. Bergmann levels a dilemma at the awareness requirement that internalists like Bonjour want to impose. Is it strong in the sense that Norman must conceive of some justification-contributor as being relevant to the truth or justification of his belief? Or is it weak in the sense that Norman must be aware of something, but not necessarily of anything that contributes to the justification of his beliefs? If it is strong, Bergmann argues, such conceiving had itself better be justified. This triggers a regress: that such a conceiving is justified will require that Norman conceive of something that contributes to that awareness' justification; but that second conceiving had better be justified too; but it will be only be if the believer conceives of something that contributes to *its* being justified, etc. The problem with this regress is its complexity: soon enough, the required contents get too complicated for us to entertain, and an implausible form of skepticism ensues. The alternative is to say that some other form of awareness is required. But, Bergmann argues, this is just to abandon the alleged lesson of the Norman case. For any other required awareness will be compatible with it being, from Norman's perspective, an accident that his beliefs are true. Chapter 1 spells out this dilemma; Chapter 2 argues against attempts to circumvent it, attempts made by Richard Fumerton, Laurence Bonjour, Evan Fales, and one inspired by Timothy McGrew's work.

Chapter 4 takes up the second motivation for internalism, deontologism. This is the view that justification is to be analyzed in terms of notions like duty, blame, obligation, and responsibility. Bergmann looks at attempts to show that one or other deontological analysis entails internalism. After ar-

guing that these attempts fail, he offers an intriguing explanation of why it *appears* as if deontology entails internalism: the plausible view that there is an awareness requirement on being epistemically *blameworthy* appears to entail, but really does not entail, that there is an awareness requirement on being epistemically *blameless*.

Though Bergmann helps to clarify what views of epistemic justification count as internalist, and which ones don't, his own way of dividing up the territory is peculiar. It leaves the view that he dubs 'mentalism' as neither internalist nor externalist. This view, the focus of Chapter 3, says that justification is entirely determined by one's mental states and the basing relation. This view is not internalist, according to Bergmann, because it does not impose an awareness requirement; nor is it externalist since it requires that the inputs into our belief-forming processes be mental states — something externalist views deny.

The second half of the book details Bergmann's own externalist view of epistemic justification. It imposes a no-defeater and a proper function condition on justified belief. The official version says that S's belief B is justified iff (i) S does not take B to be defeated, and (ii) B is produced by faculties that are (a) functioning properly, (b) truth-aimed, and (c) reliable in the environments for which they were 'designed' (133). Chapter 5 argues for the teleologically laden condition, (ii), by cases and by the account that it provides of the connection between justification and truth. Chapter 6 covers the no-defeater condition, (i). This condition departs from the most popular no-defeater condition by restricting justification defeaters to *believed* justification defeaters; consequently things that one does not believe, but should believe, are not defeaters. It also departs from the standard view by including all believed justification defeaters as defeaters; consequently, even an unjustified belief that some other belief is defeated counts as a genuine defeater. Bergmann ably defends both of these unorthodox claims.

Chapters 7 and 8 round out the discussion with two objections to externalism. To the objection that externalism approves of epistemic circularity, Bergmann offers a pair of arguments that the relevant kind of epistemic circularity is benign; he also offers an important diagnosis of why all epistemically circular arguments *appear* problematic; and he suggests that we have noninferential knowledge of the reliability of some belief forming processes. To the objection that externalism delivers an unsatisfying response to skeptical arguments that use demon scenarios, Bergmann argues that the most plausible versions of internalism offer responses to skepticism that are similarly unsatisfying.

This is a very good book. It will help readers get a better handle on how different aspects of the internalism/externalism debate relate to one another. More importantly, it may well constitute the most compelling case yet for a position in this debate. All serious epistemologists should study it.

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Many philosophers have recently come to the conclusion that we need to draw upon cognitive science if we are to understand why music moves us and to answer many other questions in philosophy of music. This book can be seen as a contribution to the literature that seeks to naturalize philosophy of music, but Bicknell adds a twist of her own. She argues that, besides the natural, psychological facts that other philosophers have discussed, we need to understand music as a social phenomenon if we are to explain how it moves us. Bicknell is particularly interested in the social factors that make possible the experience of music as sublime.

Bicknell begins by tracing some of the history of thinking about how music moves us. She begins with the story of Odysseus moved to tears by Demodocus then continues with the impact of David's music making on Saul and Plato's views on music and emotion. She hurries through certain medieval thinkers (both Christian and Muslim) before sketching some modern theories of how music expresses emotion (Derek Matravers' arousal theory and Peter Kivy's contour theory). In Chapter 2 Bicknell turns to how philosophical changes — and here Burke, Kant and Schopenhauer make appearances — and social changes, including the so-called 'Great Divide' in music appreciation (which I have argued elsewhere is a myth), made possible the experience of music as sublime.

Chapter 3 draws on the Strong Experience of Music Project and other sources to argue that the empirical evidence establishes that music does arouse emotion. (Kivy has famously denied that music arouses what he calls 'garden-variety' emotions.) Bicknell suggests that intense reactions to music are to be identified with experiences of sublimity. Chapter 4 begins to investigate what causes experiences of the sublime and other intense experiences of music (such as trance states). Musical performances that elicit such responses are quite various. Bicknell concludes that reflection on the specific structural and sonic features of particular musical performances will not provide a general explanation of why music moves listeners. Motivated by this conclusion, Bicknell moves to a consideration of the 'nature of music more generally' (86). This begins in Chapter 5, which surveys reflection by thinkers from Descartes to Jaak Panksepp on the effect of music on listeners. Panksepp believes that features of music can resemble the separation calls of young animals and that this resemblance can trigger emotional circuitry in the brain. (Notice that not all musical works resemble separation calls. Panksepp's work provides no basis for thinking that the effect of music on listeners can be explained without reference to particular structural or sonic features of a performance.)

In Chapter 6 Bicknell begins to focus on the social aspect of listeners' response to music, and she argues that 'there could be no strictly private mu-

sical experience' (93). Here, 'private' is contrasted with 'natural', so this is another way of saying that listeners' responses to music are social. This chapter contains a variety of loosely connected observations designed to establish this point. Music, Bicknell observes, is used to worship, sooth children, enhance romantic interaction and establish group solidarity. Then, in a strange transition, Bicknell considers the biological basis of emotional responses. For example, again drawing on Panksepp's research, Bicknell speculates that music stimulates the production of oxytocin (and this explains part of music's emotional impact). If so, then our emotional response to music is (at least in part) a natural (not social) phenomenon.

Bicknell proceeds to argue that music is the source of emotional communion or intimacy. Like many others in the history of reflection on music, she holds that music 'can allow us access to the heart and mind of another' (113). I am not certain how this conclusion (however plausible it may be) follows from the preceding reflections on social and biological bases of our responses to music. I also find implausible her claim that music's 'lack of determinate meaning' makes it 'very well-suited to providing an object of sustained focus' (115). Just the contrary seems to be true: the items (books, movies) that hold our attention for extended periods normally have a semantic or representational element. I am not denying that music holds our attention. I am simply remarking on the puzzle that this should be so, a puzzle not fully resolved in this book.

Chapter 7 returns to the topic of the sublime. Bicknell considers and rejects the suggestion that the concept of sublimity is not useful in understanding listeners' responses to music. I confess that I find that the concept is too vague to be particularly useful. This chapter also contains reflections on the profundity of music and on music and morality. In the conclusion, Bicknell returns to the question of why Odysseus wept when the bard sang and played. She concludes that he did so 'because the music *mattered* to him' (149). It mattered because it reminded him of events in his personal history and it mattered because of the social dimension of music: it had always been part of Odysseus' life, from his infancy through the rituals and ceremonies of his adult life. This is, perhaps, a somewhat disappointing and less than revelatory conclusion to the book. Likely, reflection on the structural and sonic features of music will need to be considered if we are to explain why music moves us. Only reflection on specific features of musical performances has the potential to explain the fine-grain of emotional responses to music. Here writers such as Jenefer Robinson, whose *Deeper than Reason* is not cited, will be useful.

Although I have made some critical comments, Bicknell is almost certainly right to stress that part of the explanation of why music moves us will be a social explanation. Many writers on music have neglected this social dimension. So, even if the details of Bicknell's story are open to doubt, her book is a significant contribution to the debate. And many of the details one hears about along the way are fascinating.

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Derek Bolton
What is Mental Disorder?
An Essay in Philosophy, Science, and Values.
New York: Oxford University Press 2008.
Pp. 320.
US$57.50 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-856592-5).

Bolton's essay is just what the doctor ordered. It surveys recent philosophical and psychiatric debate on how to distinguish mental health from mental illness, with some discussion about whether some conditions are over-diagnosed and whether there has been a trend to medicalize the problems of everyday life. Bolton is both a clinical psychologist and a philosopher, and while his writing style fits with Anglo-American philosophy, his views fit with those of Jaspers and Foucault. He sees as profoundly important the criticisms of mainstream psychiatry that gained prominence in the 1960s from Szasz, Laing, Foucault and others, who argued that judgments of mental illness had no rational basis but were rather simply impositions of cultural views of normality, used to marginalize alternative conceptions of how to live, and used to silence political criticism. Defenders of psychiatry have tried to give our judgments of abnormality a scientific basis, but Bolton argues that these attempts fail.

Unlike the anti-psychiatrists, however, Bolton does not want to do away with psychiatric practice. He argues that there needs to be legislation to protect the rights of people to live as they want, and that we should be very careful about when to force treatment involuntarily on them. The fundamental aim of the mental health professions is to help people who experience distress and disability, and the goal of separating normal from abnormal conditions should be given less emphasis. Furthermore, we do not need to have just one label such as 'disorder' for all conditions that can be treated; rather we can have a variety of labels, including 'mental disorder', 'mental health problem', and possibly others. The justification of mental health services is essentially that they relieve distress and disability. Bolton regards the worries about the use of psychiatry as a form of social control to enforce cultural conformity as well-founded, and argues that steps need to be taken to address those concerns.

The book's early chapters survey the current state of psychiatry and the role of the scientific. Bolton argues that behavioral science is making progress in finding the causes of mental illness, using genetics, brain science, and evolutionary theory. However, he argues convincingly that the sciences provide no way to demarcate normal from abnormal conditions. He briefly considers and dismisses Boorse's biostatistical theory of disease, and then devotes considerable attention to Wakefield's influential harmful dysfunction theory of disorder. He argues that Wakefield has managed to defend his view from proposed counterexamples, where critics have pointed out conditions that are not dysfunctions of the evolutionarily designed mind yet which we normally consider as disorders. Bolton goes on to argue that the central

weakness in Wakefield's argument is his reliance on a distinction between natural design by evolution and social or cultural design, on the ground that for evolutionary psychology there is no such distinction: an individual's design is always relative to a social context. Bolton's discussion here is notable for being probably the longest single discussion of Wakefield in print, and he returns to Wakefield's work often in the later stages of the book, so he clearly is sincere in his belief in the work's importance. Nevertheless, most philosophers have little sympathy with Wakefield's argument, because of its heavy reliance on the notion of *evolutionary design*, and because of its goal of placing a normative distinction between normal and abnormal on a scientific basis, with the help of the qualifier 'harmful'. The whole project never had much chance of success, and has already come under heavy criticism. While many in psychiatry and medicine still hold on to hopes of a basically scientific distinction between health and illness, the majority of those in medical ethics, philosophy of medicine, and the social sciences have long accepted that illness is an inherently normative concept.

The innovative part of Bolton's work comes with his exploration of non-scientific approaches to understanding mental disorder. While there have been gestures in the literature to understanding value laden medicine or pragmatic approaches to psychiatric classification, these have been extremely programmatic. Bolton sets out medicine in a cultural context and discusses how psychiatry should confront the problem of specifying its proper domain. He gives sustained and serious consideration to the proposal that psychiatry deals with breakdowns in meaningful connections. This is somewhat surprising, since the notion of the meaningful is so vague and hard to spell out, and he does ultimately reject it. However, he takes the notion of a meaningful response to the world as a helpful and important one; he argues that many conditions treated by psychiatry can indeed be seen as meaningful yet maladaptive responses to one's experience. One of his main examples here is the idea that a person who is very difficult and self-harming, diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, can be seen as reacting to her history of childhood abuse, in which case her condition is meaningful yet legitimately deserving of psychiatric treatment.

So Bolton moves to the view that we are not going to achieve a universal account of what conditions should be treated by the mental health profession. The domain of psychiatry will vary with culture and with patients, and there is no fundamental matter of fact at issue regarding differences of opinion about who should be treated. Nevertheless, decisions about who should be treated are not arbitrary either: there are many relevant considerations. There are ethical considerations, for example, about psychiatric labeling, about the rights of freedom from interference, and the limited resources available in some health care schemes. Bolton emphasizes that we have flexibility in how we treat different cases. We do not need to label all conditions that get mental health treatment as 'mental disorders', and he favors another category of 'mental health problems' that could be used for conditions that are expectable yet still involve distress and disability. With regard to the

concern about social control, he points out that what stops abuse in practice is the apparatus of political democracy, and this can work without a trans-cultural definition of mental disorder; indeed, such definitions are generally of no use in protecting people's rights, because they can be stretched and used against people in vulnerable positions. Similarly, when detaining people because of their apparent dangerousness when they have not committed a crime, Bolton emphasizes that the determination of dangerousness is funda-mentally political rather than psychiatric, and so it is best not to emphasize the question whether they have a mental disorder. Yet he does not spell out in either sort of case how the political decision should be made, either in the absence of any judgment of mental disorder, or in recognition of the cultur-ally bound definition of mental disorder with which we must operate. If there is no hard and fast way to judge who has a mental disorder, then we might be worried that taking Bolton's approach may lead to removal of the rights of normal people.

Abandoning a naturalist account of mental disorder means that we have to refigure debates concerning the over-diagnosis of conditions such as de-pression, autism, or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. If it is true that the kinds of conditions, such as deep sadness, that were previously treated as normal are now being counted as medical problems, we cannot criticize this on the grounds that it is a factual mistake. The evaluation of medicalization must be in terms of its effects. While he does not provide a complete guide to such evaluation, Bolton does make some suggestions about what sorts of things to look for when making such an evaluation, e.g., the effectiveness of treatment, the effective use of the placebo effect, the acceptability of treat-ment to those who seek it, and the value for money of the treatment. Bolton also points out that we now have a variety of medical, psychiatric, psychologi-cal, sociological and interpersonal ways to treat problems that are listed in the psychiatric diagnostic manuals, and this flexibility makes the assessment of 'medicalization' more complex.

The argumentation in the second half of the book is less linear than in the first half: at times it has the feel of a collection of notes or remarks rather than a sustained argument, and occasionally one has the impression that Bolton could have reached a stronger conclusion than he does. There is a good deal of repetition from one section and chapter to the next. But these are largely quibbles with style. This work gives a clearer picture than any other of how we are to operate without a naturalistic conception. Questions of policy regarding controversial issues concerning treatment need to be ad-dressed pragmatically at a political level. Although Bolton never calls his theory a pragmatic one, that is basically what it is. His book will hopefully pave the way for future work on different kinds of pragmatic approaches and, possibly, contrast with the emerging 'values-based medicine'. It is a valuable addition to the literature.

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Malcolm Budd
Aesthetic Essays.
New York: Oxford University Press 2008.
Pp. 272.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-955617-5).

This is a collection of papers about what Budd calls 'the abstract heart of aes-thetics' (1). By this, he means the scope and essence of aesthetics, the claim of intersubjective validity that is built into aesthetic judgments, the question to know whether such judgments can be true and false, and related topics con-cerning aesthetic experience, pleasure, value, properties, metaphors, expres-sions, emotions, and so on. Even though Budd affirms that these papers were written independently of one another, they form a reasonably coherent set, and quite often reading one helps with understanding another, by completing or clarifying points made elsewhere. At a minimum, the papers all discuss related questions, and, above all, they all do so in the same spirit.

Budd focuses on the concept of aesthetic value: 'the idea of an object which is intrinsically valuable to experience, with understanding of both what kind of thing it is and its specific character' (2). And the majority of the essays in the collection can (or even must) be read as an explanation, development, or discussion of this claim, already taken as central in Budd's *Values of Art* (Pen-guin Books 1995). According to Budd, 'intrinsic value' is the central concept in all fields of aesthetics. The aim of art is the achievement of intrinsic value in a medium. Aesthetic judgments claim to merit the justified agreement of others.

Kant's cloudy reasoning about this sort of intersubjective validity can, or even must, be improved upon. The important paper that opens this collec-tion, 'Aesthetic Judgment, Aesthetic Principles, and Aesthetic Properties', is intended to provide such an improvement. This is likewise the goal of 'The Intersubjective Validity of Aesthetic Judgment'. A better understanding of the notion of aesthetic value, which is the topic of 'Aesthetic Essence' and of a brilliant revisiting of Kant's notion of an aesthetic reflective judgment in 'The Pure Judgment of Taste as an Aesthetic Reflective Judgment', is also supposed to shed new light on the notion of intersubjective validity.

Budd's paper, 'The Acquaintance Principle', merits special attention. There Budd introduces a very important question for aesthetics and the phi-losophy of art: Is it true that judgments of aesthetic value, or aesthetic judg-ments of other kinds — for instance, the simple attribution of an aesthetic property — must be based on acquaintance with the characterized item? If the answer is affirmative, that would imply a Principle of Autonomy, viz. that it is never justifiable to change one's mind about the aesthetic value of a certain aesthetic property solely on the basis of the testimony of oth-ers, no matter how many they are or how well qualified. The principle of acquaintance is strongly entrenched in aesthetics. It also seems to me to be accepted by aesthetic common sense. You might easily hear a person saying: 'If you have not seen this painting (heard this musical work, read this book,

etc.), you cannot pronounce upon it aesthetically.' You can *know* quite well the departure hour of a plane if you have visited the airport website, but you cannot know the aesthetic properties of the Mona Lisa if you never seen the painting. Budd examines various claims about aesthetic acquaintance and autonomy and finally proposes his own thesis. He writes: 'Suppose (some) work is characterized as being graceful. The reliable informer, as he perceives the work, will not just perceive the work as being graceful but will perceive the gracefulness *as it is realized in the work*' (57). The difference between this judge and someone who has not seen the work is a difference in their respective 'cognitive states', claims Budd.

While this coheres with the importance he gives to the notion of aesthetic experience, I wonder whether the problem should not be examined by focusing on the nature of aesthetic properties, independently of the experience one may have of a work of art. Perhaps these properties are inherently properties of particulars, so that the gracefulness-of-this-thing would not be the same property as the 'gracefulness-of-that-thing', and would be quite different from 'gracefulness-of-whatever-thing', which is universal. Perhaps the question concerns the indexical status of these properties. Budd seems to think that the nature of the cognitive states in the two different cases — the true perceiver and the testimonial perceiver (the one that has reported that something is graceful) — justifies the principle of acquaintance. But is this not simply an idealist prejudice, coming from an overly Kantian aesthetic theory? I regret that the question concerning the nature of aesthetic properties is not adequately examined. While the 2007 postscript to Budd's paper suggests that he is aware that the nature of such properties could explain why you cannot get knowledge from testimony in the aesthetic domain, the remarks he makes there are far too sketchy to resolve the issue. Even so, Budd's paper is a seminal work on this crucial topic, initiating a very interesting discussion, and it thus deserves to be read attentively.

'Judgments that attribute aesthetic properties to objects are often expressed by metaphors,' Budd maintains. This leads him to examine attentively how metaphor works, not only in general, but also in specific forms of art, especially music ('The Characterization of Aesthetic Qualities by Essential Metaphors and Quasi-Metaphors' and 'Musical Movement and Aesthetic Metaphors'). He also examines the understanding of music ('Understanding Music') and aesthetic realism ('Aesthetic Realism and Emotional Qualities of Music'). This last question — a crucial one also, I think — is examined through what Budd calls the canonical basis upon which judgment of an item's aesthetic properties are made: 'a perceptual or imaginative experience of the item as possessing the property or properties.' But although Budd continuously appeals to this canonical basis, this is an option he chooses and therefore not indisputable evidence for aesthetic realism. Indeed, it is introduced quite dogmatically at the beginning of the book's nineth chapter.

Two papers, 'On Looking at a Picture' and 'The Look of a Picture', are as their titles indicate devoted to the way we look at pictures. They are comments upon, and discussions with, Richard Wollheim on representations.

Roger Scruton, Nelson Goodman and Kendall Walton, Wollheim and Frank Sibley are the main references for Budd. Wollheim's views are discussed in 'Wollheim on Correspondence, Projective Properties, and Expressive Emotions', where his influence is made explicit. But Sibley's spirit pervades all of the book.

One should recall that, twenty years ago, Budd wrote an important book about *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology* (Routledge 1989). At that time such a topic was not so current as it is today. The last paper in the present collection is 'Wittgenstein on Aesthetics'. Budd's ability to read carefully and to penetrate into the thought of others is clearly at work when he examines Sibley's or Wollheim's works, and it is also evident in this paper. I consider this presentation of Wittgenstein on aesthetics to be the best I have ever read. Wittgenstein's remarks on aesthetics take aesthetics to mainly concern a certain kind of experience — quite classically in a sense — and especially the experience of value. This is an account of aesthetics that is ultimately close to Budd's own. This does not mean that Budd refrains from criticizing Wittgenstein. In fact, I think that most of his criticisms are well founded and enlightening.

On the topics that they examine and discuss, the papers in this volume will certainly provide a basis for many further discussions, at least among those who accept his idea that the main point of aesthetics is to examine a special sort of valuable experience. But is that true?

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Steven Crowell and **Jeff Malpas**, **eds**.
Transcendental Heidegger.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2007.
Pp. 320.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-5510-8);
US$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-5511-5).

Crowell and Malpas bring together an international group of top-flight scholars to explore the relationship between Heidegger's thought and the tradition of transcendental philosophy inaugurated by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The book consists of thirteen original essays, as well as an informative introduction by the editors that summarizes each essay and provides a framework orienting the entire discussion. All of the essays are works

of exemplary scholarship. However, since space is limited, I will reserve comment here for several of them that stand out for argumentative strength and originality of insight. I then conclude with two critical observations about this collection as a whole.

The first essay is William Blattner's 'Ontology, the A Priori, and the Primacy of Practice: An Aporia in Heidegger's Early Philosophy'. Beginning from some of his own earlier work on Heidegger, Blattner examines the question of the overall consistency of Heidegger's project. Unlike his earlier discussions, Blattner here links up with Theodore Kisiel's important studies of Heidegger's development prior to *Being and Time*, and he draws attention to some of the problematic aspects of Heidegger's early insistence on the 'scientific' character of philosophy. The most valuable aspect of this discussion lies in Blattner's argument that these problems explain Heidegger's shift, after about 1929, towards a 'non-scientific' conception of philosophy. An important point to note here, however, is that Heidegger was ambivalent about talk of philosophy as a 'science' already in the early 1920's. At one level, this can be read, as Blattner does, as an attempt to work out just what it means to call philosophy a 'science'. On the other hand, it also hints at what Gadamer called the 'turn before the turn', i.e., the idea that already in the 1920's the seeds are sown for Heidegger's decisive break with the philosophical style of his contemporaries.

Co-editor Crowell's 'Conscience and Reason: Heidegger and the Grounds of Intentionality' is the third essay in this collection, and it represents a particularly important contribution to the literature in the field. Crowell takes on the common criticism of Heidegger's revision of the Kantian project, namely, that it fails to provide an adequate account of the 'normative aspects of our experience' (45). The key move in Crowell's discussion is the claim that Heidegger's well-known discussions of conscience and guilt in Division Two of *Being and Time* 'serve the *ontological* function of clarifying how any answer to [the question of what my life means] brings with it an orientation toward reasons' (48). In other words, what Heidegger provides is an account of how we come to care about reasons in the first place.

Daniel O. Dahlstrom, who has written at length elsewhere about the concept of truth in Heidegger, takes up this issue again in his contribution, 'Transcendental Truth and the Truth that Prevails', the fourth essay in the book. Dahlstrom explores some of Heidegger's self-criticisms in both the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* and some much later comments made in 1964. Dahlstrom, like Crowell, argues that Heidegger's inquiry concerns a basic transcendental structure that makes it possible for us to recognize norms and so engage in intelligible discourse. Along the way, Dahlstrom sheds some much needed light on Heidegger's criticisms of traditional notions of the transcendental. However, to anticipate my concluding remarks below, a considerable amount of work is yet to be done in this respect.

I would like to comment as well on co-editor Malpas' essay, 'Heidegger's Topology of Being'. Like Dahlstrom and Blattner, Malpas examines the fraught question of the continuity of Heidegger's work between the 1920's

and later essays from the 1930's and 1950's. Drawing on Heidegger's important 1923 course of lectures, *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, Malpas makes a strong case for the original claim that a concept of 'place' holds the key to understanding Heidegger's revision of the tradition of transcendental philosophy.

Aside from the contributions made by each of the individual essays in this volume, this volume as a whole is important for at least two reasons. First, it succeeds where many other studies fail, namely, in reading Heidegger *within* an important philosophical tradition rather than in a kind of intellectual vacuum. In doing so, Crowell and Malpas, together with their co-contributors, have cleared important ground for further investigations of Heidegger's relationship to Husserl and to the Neo-Kantians, among others. Second, the volume raises a number of challenging questions about the overall trajectory and coherence of Heidegger's thought, showing that the precise nature of his project is something still worthy of question.

There remain two points mildly critical of this volume. First of all, while these essays collectively help to situate Heidegger within the post-Kantian tradition, they are all strangely silent on the more immediate context of his engagement with transcendental philosophy. During the 1920's and 1930's, Heidegger was engaged in a multi-faceted intellectual contest with other leading heirs of Kant concerning the true nature of Kant's philosophical achievement and its broader implications. In particular, Heidegger struggled to carve out an intellectual space over against the then-dominant schools of neo-Kantianism (i.e., the Marburg and Heidelberg or Baden schools). A discussion of his criticisms of neo-Kantianism would certainly provide significant elucidation of the problematic of transcendental philosophy in Heidegger's thought.

Second, aside from some important insights in Dahlstrom's essay, there is not enough engagement here with what seems to be a deep problem in Heidegger's appropriation of transcendental philosophy. The transcendental structures Heidegger derives in the course of his analyses clearly stand in some kind of grounding relation to quotidian experience. Yet, this relation seems to sit poorly with Heidegger's criticisms of metaphysics as onto-theology and with his express goal of 'getting over' or overcoming metaphysics. Given these criticisms, the grounding relation here can be neither causal nor justificatory. What, one might ask, remains?

These criticisms notwithstanding, this is a very valuable book that clearly demonstrates the continued relevance of Heidegger's challenging work to contemporary philosophical debates.

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Will Dudley
Understanding German Idealism.
Durham, UK: Acumen Publishing 2007.
Pp. 224.
US$95.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-84465-098-8);
US$22.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-1-84465-096-5).

This book attempts the difficult task of introducing German idealism to new readers. It appears in the series 'Understanding Movements in Modern Thought', and shares features with the other volumes in that series, such as the absence of notes to the text and the inclusion of questions for discussion and revision. Its author, Will Dudley, is known for his earlier and well-received *Hegel, Nietzsche and Philosophy: Thinking Freedom* (2002), which considered the two philosophers' critical developments of Kant's account of autonomy. Some reviewers judged that book to be better on Hegel than on Nietzsche, given Dudley's evident preference for the former, and a similar judgment could be made of this new book. In what follows, I shall focus on its reliability and utility as a guide for students, pointing up aspects which teachers who may use or recommend the book might want to bear in mind.

Given the breadth and complexity of German idealism, Dudley has had to be selective, which is fair enough. But he rather blithely informs us that his principle of selection is simply importance: the book will deal with 'the most important aspects of the most important works of the most important thinkers' (2). One feels tempted to qualify this statement by adding 'from Hegel's point of view'. The most notable exclusion is that of the early romantics. What is problematic is not so much that they are not treated, but that they are excluded from the movement itself, being brought to our attention only in the conclusion as *critics* of German idealism. Dudley's situating them in this way repeats Hegel's own tendentious distancing of idealism from romanticism. This helps Dudley to construct a strong story leading from Kant to Hegel, but means that there is just less to German idealism on his account as compared with other presentations, for example such as Frederick Beiser's.

According to Dudley, 'German idealism is best understood as the philosophical manifestation of the modern demand for rationality and freedom' (183). What drives the development of the movement is the repeated resurgence of skepticism and the consequent attempts to overcome it. The book starts with Hume's skeptical challenge to the rationalist enlightenment and Kant's 'Copernican' response to Hume. The third chapter then deals with the skeptical rejoinders to Kant's philosophy developed by Jacobi and Schulze, before touching on Reinhold's renewal of the Kantian project in response to them. And so on through Fichte and Schelling, leading up to Hegel's attempt to answer the yet more radical threat posed by ancient skepticism. This works well, though perhaps the various types of skepticism and objects of skepticism could have been differentiated more clearly. Once again, though, there is a narrowing of focus here. The skeptical problems seemingly created by Kant are surely only part of the explanation for the development

of the more thorough-going idealisms of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Equally important, and similarly rooted in Kant's dualisms, are what one might call the problems of alienation identified — indeed experienced — by many of the post-Kantians (if not indeed by Kant himself): the dissociation of the self split between duty and inclination, the self cut off from nature, etc. Some of these issues do eventually get mentioned by Dudley, but overall they are insufficiently integrated. Significantly, emphasizing this aspect of the story of German idealism would provide one reason to include the romantics, as these issues were clearly more important for them than skepticism was, which in fact they were happy to take on board.

Dudley's sympathies result in a narrative which presents Hegel's philosophy as 'the logical culmination of German idealism' (194). The reader gets little sense why anyone — then or now — might prefer Kant, Fichte or Schelling to Hegel. That said, the chapter on Hegel is particularly good, delivering a very clear account of his 'foundationless ontology' and ranging over the entirety of his philosophical works. One issue which is side-stepped is the singularity of Spirit — Dudley prefers to talk about 'spiritual beings'.

Dudley's approach for the most part is to give succinct accounts of the main works of the thinkers he examines. He sticks closer to the texts when dealing with Jacobi, Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling; the treatments of Kant and Hegel are more wide-ranging. Fichte is covered up to 1799, Schelling to 1809. One noteworthy feature is the almost complete absence of discussion of interpretative debates. There are brief mentions of the contrasting two-world / two-aspect construals of Kant's transcendental idealism (17-18, 54; no references given), but that's it. This is in a way refreshing, given the tendency of commentators to approach the German idealists (especially Hegel) through a thicket of different interpretations, and it helps in giving students a clear story; but it also runs the risk of presenting too tidy a narrative.

Experts on the thinkers covered will no doubt be able to find points to quibble with, but for the most part Dudley is reliable. The only place where I have serious criticisms is the final section in the chapter on Kant, dealing with the *Critique of Judgment*. Dudley ties aesthetic judgment too closely to Kant's account of reflective judgment. This leads to claims such as this: 'Aesthetic judgments of natural beauty emerge, Kant claims, from our efforts to comprehend our experience by developing universal concepts, principles and laws that describe and predict the behavior of particular phenomena' (41). This surely bases aesthetic experience far too firmly on explicit cognitive, indeed scientific, endeavor. This is a shame, as the rest of the chapter on Kant is very good.

This book fulfils its remit admirably. However, given the breadth and complexity of the movement, teachers will want to suggest other ways in which the story can be told.

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Tom Flynn, ed.
The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief.
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 2007.
Pp. 897.
US$199.98 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-5910-2391-3).

Three questions immediately arise when contemplating the nearly nine hundred pages of this new volume, the sequel to *The Encyclopedia of Unbelief* (ed. Gordon Stein, 1985). 1) Is unbelief — 'one of the few labels no major faction ever claimed', the editor explains in his introduction, so 'it can be equally inclusive toward atheists and agnostics, deists and freethinkers, religious humanists and secular humanists, Ethical Culturists and infidels' (16) — so salient a phenomenon as to demand its own encyclopedia? 2) Even if so, is the provenance of the book — published by Prometheus Books, the leading publisher of atheist books in the United States, and edited by Flynn, who also edits the Council for Secular Humanism's magazine *Free Inquiry* — consistent with a scholarly and objective treatment of the topics discussed? 3) And again, even if so, was the editor able to recruit — *sans récompense* except for a complimentary copy of the encyclopedia, as he disarmingly notes — competent scholars to write the entries? The answer to all three questions is a thankful yes, albeit with a few qualifications and reservations.

Beginning with 1), although unbelief is not so unitary a phenomenon as is, say, Buddhism or Judaism, the volume in effect makes a powerful case that it indeed deserves scholarly attention. The chronological range of the entries is impressive, from antiquity to the modern day (although Flynn decided not to include any entries for living people or organizations that have not operated for at least fifty years); the geographical range is likewise impressive, with articles on unbelief in countries and regions around the world. Among the strengths of the volume are the entries that trace the historical connections, especially in the nineteenth century, between unbelief and various social movements, including (as Flynn lists) 'anarchism, socialism, labor reform, feminism and woman suffrage, sex radicalism, and even Spiritualism' (16). Entries on the empirical study and neglect of unbelief and irreligion, periodicals of unbelief, and library collections on unbelief highlight areas where further scholarly attention to unbelief would be especially in order.

As for 2), there are a few entries that seem of dubious importance: agathonism (a system of humanistic ethics devised by Mario Bunge), Steve Allen (the American entertainer and author), and eupraxsophy (literally, 'good practical wisdom', a term coined by Paul Kurtz to describe secular humanism). The entry on women and Islam (beginning, 'It cannot be denied that Islam is deeply, irreparably antiwoman' [826]) is mysteriously unaccompanied by any comparable entry for women and Christianity, women and Judaism, and so on. In general, though, the choice of entries seems to be untendentious: there is no attempt to whitewash atheism in the twentieth century by omitting the racism of Charles Lee Smith or the vulgarity of Madalyn Murray O'Hair, for example. Individual entries are sometimes tendentious, however; the entry

on the anthropic principle ends with a profession of atheism that, whatever its merits, is not a consequence of the entry's discussion. There are enough such examples to provoke a wish for a greater degree of editorial control.

And as for 3), there are a handful of entries written by authors who are undisputed experts on their subjects: James Moore, Van A. Harvey, and John Lachs, for example, contributed the entries on Darwin, Feuerbach, and Santayana, respectively. Not all contributors are so authoritative, and quite a few entries were evidently written by people with no claim to scholarly expertise on the topic — which is certainly not to imply that their articles are less than competent. Entries on Islamic philosophy and culture are by the pseudonymous Ibn Warraq, not listed in the index of contributors, making it difficult to assess his scholarly competence. Individual articles are occasionally sarcastic, argumentative, or otherwise written in a way that seems inappropriate for a work of reference — for example, the entry on the antivice crusader Anthony Comstock ends, 'His cadaver was put into a hole in Brooklyn, New York' (209), where 'He was buried in Brooklyn, New York' would have sufficed.

Turning to the philosophical content of the book, it is clear that philosophy matters to unbelief: there are entries on a number of philosophers and philosophical schools as well as a handful of philosophical concepts and areas of philosophy. Useful entries for such central concepts as agnosticism, agnosticism and atheism (together), atheism, deism, freethought, and skepticism are provided; Theodore Drange illuminatingly discusses ten arguments for and ten arguments against the existence of God in about eight pages, visibly chafing at the space limit. Several articles resembled essays rather than encyclopedia entries: Kai Nielsen's entries on ethics and unbelief, reason, and verificationism, and Harry Stopes-Roe's entries on morality from a humanist standpoint, physicalism, and religion, are the principal offenders. The entry on falsifiability overlooks the arguments against Popper's use of the notion; the entry on freethought misrepresents falsifiability as a criterion for meaningfulness and misattributes it to logical positivism; the entry on logical positivism, in turn, fails to mention its great popularizer in the Anglophone world, A. J. Ayer.

Ayer is accorded his own entry, although his near-death experience (of a red light 'responsible for the government of the universe') is mentioned only in the entry on deathbed claims concerning unbelievers. Plenty of philosophers also receive their own entries, whether or not they were unbelievers: thus Descartes and Leibniz are included as well as Hume and Russell. Most of the entries are conventional and unsurprising, with a few lacunae; for instance, Antony Flew's entry on Hobbes disappointingly fails to engage with the view of A. P. Martinich that he was a committed if unconventional Christian. The most interesting articles are David Berman's on the relatively obscure figures of Anthony Collins and John Toland. The most surprising omissions are of Plato and Schopenhauer: although it is tempting to wonder whether Flynn had no idea about the former and lacked the will for the latter, the presence of cross-references to those missing entries suggests that they were omitted inadvertently.

All in all, this volume certainly belongs on the reference shelf of any good public or university library, alongside such works as *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* and the *New Encyclopedia of Catholicism* that likewise aspire to be comprehensive references to historically important systems of thought. While the book is not without its flaws, it is a valuable compendium of information about unbelief, including material that is not readily accessible elsewhere. Its philosophical content is not so thorough, accurate, and detailed as to warrant a recommendation that philosophers acquire it for their personal libraries — the best single-volume reference on the philosophical issues associated with unbelief presently available is probably *The Cambridge Companion to Atheism* (2006), edited by Michael Martin — but they should certainly recommend it for the reference collections at their institutions and commend it to the attention of their curious students. It is to be hoped that by 2029, if not sooner, there will be a new update.

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Jerry A. Fodor
LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.
New York: Oxford University Press 2008.
Pp. 240.
US$37.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-954877-4).

Despite its title, Fodor's new book is much less concerned with rehashing old material from his seminal 1975 work, *The Language of Thought (LOT1)*, than with boldly advancing it towards a comprehensive, albeit highly speculative vision of mind-world relation. Relying on guesses, hunches, and, arguably, ad hoc solutions to the problems he formulates, Fodor, true to his visionary style, constructs a picture which seems stronger than the sum of its parts.

Reflecting on *LOT1*, Fodor identifies it as a scarecrow kind of construction in its negative programme. By contrast, *LOT2* is unambiguous about its enemy par excellence, pragmatism. Pragmatism, the dominant school of Anglophone philosophical psychology, got everything backwards: abilities to theories; precepts to concepts; competences to content; acting to knowing. Infecting the mainstream cognitive psychology through the functionalist's focus on executing commands, pragmatism established knowing how as the paradigm cognitive state, and it identified the essential aspect of thought in its relation to guiding action rather than to things in the world. Motivated by his life's work of naturalizing commonsense intentional psychology, Fodor

reverses the pragmatist order of priorities by proposing a naturalized, causal theory of reference to explain the content of mental representations.

Fodor argues that reference is the only primitive mind-world semantic property. Missing the centrality of compositionality in constraining the semantics of mental representations, *LOT1* failed to recognize reference as the only composing semantic property. Fixing the shortcomings of *LOT1* requires supplementing the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) with pure referentialist semantics of Mentalese. Working out the implications of this programme is what Fodor identifies as the main goal of his book.

A stumbling block for referential semantics, Frege's Problem demonstrates that substitution of co-referring expressions fails to preserve the truth of the linguistic formula in opaque contexts. Suggesting that reference cannot explain content, the argument undercuts the best way to construct a naturalist theory of mental content to which *LOT* is committed. Fodor chooses to deflate the problem rather than to attempt to construct a naturalist theory of sense: two-factor semantics would require explaining what holds sense and reference together and construing senses within inferential-role-semantics, which, due to semantic holism and problems with individuation and stability of expressions over time, implies an implausible account of the metaphysics of words and languages. Being atomistic, reference avoids these problems: whether a word refers to A does not depend on the reference of other words; thus, expressions can be individuated prior to languages, concepts can remain stable over time, and the productivity and systematicity of language can be explained through the compositionality of reference.

Arguing that Frege's case is built up on modal intuitions, which are under pressure from such demands on theory as simplicity, coherence, explanatory power and so on, Fodor chooses to nibble at the problem until little is left. He argues that every complex expression is composed of parts, some of which are semantically interpretable constituents. In accord with compositional semantics, each constituent contributes its semantic content to the semantic content of its host expression (reference, in referential semantics). Crucially, however, apart from reference the constituent concepts also contribute their possession conditions. The possession conditions of 'The Morning Star' are different from the possession conditions of the co-referring expression 'The Evening Star' in virtue of the difference between the possession conditions of their respective syntactic constituents. Thus, by distinguishing coextensive but syntactically different expressions and relating these distinctions to different causal powers of mental representations, syntax can do the work of senses for complex expressions. This syntactic solution to Frege's Problem, whereby coextensive concepts are distinguished by their constituent structure, is independently justified: metaphysically less costly than senses, it explains the causal power of concepts by showing how different conceptualizations translate into different computational processes in virtue of distinct constituent structures.

Frege's Problem, however, still remains for the basic concepts, which lack constituent structure (e.g., CICERO/TULLY). However, since from the com-

putational perspective the Mentalese formulae are sensitive to syntax rather than content, beliefs with the same content can still differ in their causal powers as long as the underlying mental states are tokenings of type-distinct mental representations. Illustrating his point, Fodor argues that the PADEREWSKI/PADEREWSKI problem shows that Paderewski, just like Cicero, must have two formally distinct names in Mentalese (PADEREWSKI1; PADEREWSKI2) but happens to have only one in (surface) English. Intuitions to the contrary, which underlie the various formulations of Frege's Problem, are an outgrowth of two distinct motivations that ground our interest in what others think or say, namely, information about the world and information about the speaker. Referential semantics is helpful in the first case; an individual's modes of presentation, embedded in a cluster of related feelings and beliefs, in the second. While a concept's mode of presentation has something to do with its inferential role in mental processes, it has nothing to do with its content; mixing the two is to confuse semantics and psychology.

Explaining the pivotal dual role of Mentalese in referring to things in the world and in defining mental processes, Fodor proposes a 'filing cabinet' metaphor as a model for a possible cognitive architecture of mind. Serving as names for things in the world, mental representations also serve as names of files in the memory, which contain memos written in Mentalese and include various beliefs and associations. Upon acquaintance with John, one assigns to him a Mentalese name and opens a file under the same Mentalese expression, where information about John is subsequently stored. Since one thinks in file names, without thereby accessing a galaxy of various associations stored in the file, this architecture solves problems that plague associationist accounts of cognitive structure as a causal network.

Yet, Fodor argues that the classical RTM LOT CTM (computational theory of mind) account of cognition must be revised: computations, being defined over constituent structure of mental representations, are constrained by the intrinsic locality of the postulated mental processes. While locality helps to explain the fetching function, it fails to account for some pervasive cognitive processes (e.g., perception, learning) which, being a species of non-demonstrative belief fixation, are non-local. Heuristic solutions to the Frame Problem beg the question by presupposing the notion of relevant similarity. Ultimately, if cognitive processes such as learning, perception, or belief fixation are based on non-demonstrative inference, they must be sensitive to such non-syntactic global parameters of belief systems as simplicity, conservatism, or relevance. But in that case, they cannot be computational. So, one must provide either a non-vacuous account of heuristic procedure or a new notion of computation that does not have locality built into it.

In the second half of the book, Fodor rehashes his argument for nativism by reiterating that the abductive approach to concept learning is circular in so far as it presupposes the availability of concepts in the formulations of the hypotheses — one must not model acquisition of concepts on the acquisition of beliefs. However, the doorknob/DOORKNOB criticism prompts Fodor to reformulate his view of concept attainment. On the new model, learning ste-

reotypes through statistical inference induces a reliable, subintentional, non-inferential neurological process culminating in the locking to the property expressed by the concept. Drawing on the gestalt treatment of perceptual closure and neural nets, Fodor proposes a picture of mind as an attractor landscape — a metaphorical sea with concepts as whirlpools and stereotypes as boats. The closer the stereotype is to a concept, the greater the chance that learning the stereotype is sufficient for attaining it. Although changeable by experience, the geometry of the attractor landscape is innate. Nativism is ultimately a matter of the generality of principles that map stereotypes to concepts.

Drawing on the constituent structure of representations, Fodor argues that because the constituents of iconic (as opposed to discursive) representations are semantically and syntactically homogeneous, they lack logical form and cannot carry ontological commitments or provide principles of individuation for their domains of interpretation. This suggests that experiential content is unconceptualized informational content, content that can be recovered by the subject through the application of concepts. Nevertheless, drawing on experimental results, Fodor argues that the experiential given is almost never accessible to introspection and therefore cannot ground perceptual judgments.

Fodor concludes by reflecting on the challenges facing the project of naturalizing intentional psychology. Supplemented with a theory of perceptual representation, a naturalistic causal theory of reference is a key step in this endeavor. In addressing objections to the referential theory, Fodor reiterates his 'asymmetrical dependence' solution to the 'disjunction problem', and employs Davidson's idea of triangulation in responding to the 'which link?' problem. The causal link which is the referent of $Adam_1$'s thought is located at the point of intersection with the causal chain of the counterfactual $Adam_2$.

Holding implications for epistemology, metaphysics, semantics, and cognition, this work shows the maturity of Fodor's philosophical vision, which blossoms on barren grounds, unhindered by its own mostly speculative character. The structural weaknesses of this work, such as the acknowledged resurrection of the doorknob/DOORKNOB problem at the level of the non-inferential but reliable stereotype/concept transition, or the suspect treatment of Frege's Problem as engendered merely by modal intuitions, fail to detract significantly from its overall value as a thought provoking, comprehensive alternative to some of the dominant positions in the philosophy of mind.

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Robert E. Goodin
Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and
Practice after the Deliberative Turn.
New York: Oxford University Press 2008.
Pp. 320.
US$60.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-954794-4).

Despite Jon Elster's caveat that the market potentially endangers the forum, Goodin insists that commercial innovations, such as the focus group and the market test, would actually strengthen democracy and citizen engagement. His thesis in this book is that governments should task members of small-scale deliberative bodies — or what he calls, in the singular, a 'micro-public', and what Robert Dahl before him termed a 'mini-populus' — to experiment with alternative solutions to public problems. While the book is a collection of previously published essays, many are extensively altered and rewritten to support this thesis and to round out a literature that has recently become increasingly oriented toward deliberative practice. Indeed, Goodin is more circumspect than some of the less praxis-focused deliberative theorists — for instance, Jürgen Habermas — concerning the capacity of deliberative forums to displace traditional democratic institutions: 'Inevitably . . . deliberative democracy can only supplement rather than supplant the institutional apparatus of representative democracy as we know it' (7-8). The book is organized into two sections, one concerning the design and function of small-scale deliberative bodies or micro-publics, and the other devoted to deliberative activities in macro-political institutions, including the translation of micro-public recommendations into sound public policy (what is often called 'uptake').

In Chapter 2, 'Making Use of Mini-publics', the author adumbrates a series of practical experiments in deliberative democracy, involving groups of average citizens convened to clarify and, in some cases, resolve public issues of considerable importance. They include: the UK Power Project, *America-Speaks* Town Meetings, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil, Citizens' Juries, Consensus Conferences, Deliberative Polls, National Issues Forums and the 'GM Nation?' public debate in the UK (13-19). Designers of these small-scale deliberative engagements, or micro-publics, confront two critical obstacles: i) scale and ii) legitimacy. Since assembling the entire nation or public-at-large proves too time-consuming and resource-intensive, smaller groups — anywhere from twelve to fifteen-hundred — must suffice. However, the smaller the group, the less legitimacy the outcome has and, consequently, the less capacity the deliberative exercise has for leveraging change in macro-political processes, policies and institutions. Despite popular perceptions that deliberative assemblies lack the political power of elected representative bodies, Goodin concludes that '[i]nnovative mini-publics genuinely have, from time to time, had major impacts on macro-politics' (37).

In the second chapter, Goodin collaborates with Simon Niemeyer to answer the question (as the title suggests) 'when does deliberation begin?' through a combination of empirical observation, data analysis and normative

theorizing. Observing the pre- and post-test surveys of participant preferences in an Australian citizen jury, the authors show that the greatest changes in attitudes occurred during the stage of receiving information, not discussing it (48). This conclusion reinforces Goodin's earlier theory that deliberation possesses a strongly monological component, whereby agents internally weigh reasons, imagine others' perspectives and render personal judgments prior to talking. Many deliberative democrats (over)emphasize the dialogical component, and thereby neglect what Goodin calls 'deliberation within' (see Goodin, 'Democratic Deliberation Within', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 29 [2000]: 79-107 and my forthcoming 'Dewey and Goodin on the Value of Monological Deliberation', *Etica & Politica* 2 [2010]). However convincing Goodin and Niemeyer's argument is, though, the reader is left with the suspicion that the confirmation of Goodin's earlier theory is not just coincidental. An alternative analysis of the same data pointing to the same conclusion would dispel this looming suspicion.

The last three chapters in the book's first section (entitled 'Talking Politics: Perils and Promise', 'How Talk Informs', and 'First Talk, Then Vote') address the three significant stages of deliberative engagement: i) agenda-setting, ii) information-gathering and iii) deciding, respectively. In setting the agenda for a micro-public, deliberators must determine whether some topics or issues are 'off the table' — or as Goodin calls them, 'politically undiscussable' (66). He classifies these subjects as those that are 'pointless' to discuss (e.g., the issue of when to close the debate, a problem that is impossible to resolve, and a controversy that is either unripe or radically polarizing) and those that are 'impolitic' (e.g., the issue evokes emotionally charged reactions, a problem that is offensive to some minority and controversies that either involve state secrets or are politically inconvenient). Moving to the next stage (and corresponding chapter), the author distinguishes two kinds of information-pooling: i) mechanical and ii) discursive. While the mechanical kind occurs when agents independently update their beliefs based on conditional probabilities that the information gathered is true (i.e. a Bayesian decision model), discursive information-pooling happens when agents talk and form their beliefs through interaction. In many cases, mechanical information-pooling risks engendering what Goodin calls an 'unwelcome cascade', or a flood of undesirable consequences based on prior critical choices (e.g., when jury members propose lowered plaintiff damages after miscalculating that their fellows will vote for higher ones), which could have been avoided if the matter had been discussed up front, i.e., through discursive information-pooling (101-3). In 'First Talk, Then Vote', Goodin demonstrates that this skepticism about mechanical information-gathering does not militate against voting *per se*. Voting is still a paradigm case of independently formed democratic judgment, whereby the principle of 'one person, one vote' ensures procedural fairness. Rather, the process of deliberating should complement voting, such that 'talking together' (or deliberation) delivers a superior 'discovery procedure', and after talking, voting provides 'a particularly good decision procedure' (124).

The second half of the book shifts to the topic of deliberation in large-scale institutions. Chapter 7, 'Who Counts?' addresses the perennial question of whose voices should be included in large-scale electoral and deliberative decision-making exercises, from the expansive standard of all those with affected interests to the more restrictive account of all those within a particular sovereign territory. Goodin persuasively argues for a qualified version of the latter. In Chapter 8, 'Modes of Democratic Accountability', the author evaluates three forms of accountability — hierarchical, competitive and networked — and concludes that the last is, by far, the most cooperative and also the best suited for accommodating political demands across multiple sectors of society. Chapter 9, 'Sequencing Deliberative Moments', illustrates how specific deliberative virtues (e.g. openness, authenticity, common-good emphasis) emerge in different phases of institutionalized decision-making processes, such as the debates of parliamentary assemblies, electoral campaigns and formal negotiations. Still, Goodin argues that deliberation does its best service when employed as a 'discovery procedure' and not a 'decision procedure' (267).

In Chapter 10, 'The Place of Parties', the author considers whether a democracy without political parties would be possible. In the end, they prove necessary for organizing publics around principles and 'ratios' (reasons), 'ideationally unifying' them around policy positions and broader political platforms (220-21). Chapter 11, 'Democratic Mandates', features Goodin and Michael Saward's brief argument that engaging in dog-whistle politics, or political campaigning that selectively communicates racist and other questionable messages to some audiences that mean little to others, is a sure-fire way for the eventual party-in-government to weaken its mandate to rule. In Chapter 12, 'Representing Diversity', the author demonstrates that the mirroring metaphor in political representation, i.e., a popular assembly should be demographically identical to its constituents, is infeasible, and that the better route is to let small-'d' diversity in representative bodies 'serve as a reminder' of big-'D' diversity, or of 'the even-wider-diversity that is absent' (252).

Though the last half of this book might pique the interest of the political philosopher or theorist less than that of the political scientist, its emphasis on institutions and institutional design is an undeniable trend in contemporary deliberative democracy scholarship (see, for instance, Gastil and Levine, eds., *The Deliberative Democracy Handbook*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 2005). Goodin's collected essays cover a great deal of ground, detailing how democracy and deliberation work at the local, national and global levels, and how 'deliberative mini-publics can serve as invaluable adjuncts to those other familiar features of the democratic process' (269). Overall, this volume represents a significant contribution to the burgeoning literature on deliberative democratic theory.

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Grabowski's study (hereafter: *PMF*) pursues two ambitious and worthy aims. The first is to undermine the 'standard interpretation' of Plato's ontology according to which his Forms are abstract universals. The second is to make a case for an alternative interpretation according to which the Forms are non-physical, 'concrete' particulars. Motivations for preparing such a study abound. For Grabowski, these include an interesting blend of faithfulness to Plato's text and plain philosophical good sense regarding ontology. Plato's texts resist plausible, consistent interpretation along lines required by the standard reading; also, conceptual difficulties arise for Plato if he takes the Forms to be abstract universals. Both problems dissolve if we take Plato to instead be positing a non-spatio-temporal brand of particulars. What's more, Grabowski shows, the dialogues are somewhat more receptive to these interpretive adjustments.

This monograph is an installment in Continuum's *Studies in Ancient Philosophy Series*. Overall, *PMF* is a sterling instance of an increasing attention paid in recent ancient philosophy scholarship to historical integrity in interpretation. Chief among Grabowski's argumentative strategies is a resistance to the common notion that one can readily find among remote texts solutions to perennial philosophical problems that surprisingly approximate solutions favored by more contemporary philosophical movements. 'Analytic' philosophers, for example, are themselves interested in the problem of attribute agreement; for how can two apples both *be* red if the redness is instantiated in different locations? They tend to favor solutions to it which introduce abstract universals: there must be abstract objects, such as redness, which bear multiple instantiation — redness can be in both locations. Now, the Forms, the dialogues tell us, are non-spatio-temporal objects which are sometimes described by Plato as those things represented by physical objects and shared by them. Redness is a Form shared by stop signs, blood and tomatoes. But what *are* these Forms, exactly? Surely, it would seem, contemporary interpreters cannot be far off the mark in supposing that these Forms are what we now think of as abstract universals, even if Plato's own conception of them is often garbled, unsophisticated and quaint. Grabowski's position is that Plato's Forms are *not* the same things as abstract universals, and that a more careful attention to Plato's texts, and a willingness to free oneself from the grip of contemporary (analytic) thought, reveals this. Plato's discussions about the Forms are therefore probably not so garbled, unsophisticated and quaint as we might have once thought. Are they, then, a more viable solution to the problem of so-called attribute agreement, than are abstract universals?

Grabowski's work is thus like a building restoration project: Once washed of years of steady use, Plato's discussions about the Forms give them a rather

different, captivating look. This metaphor is becoming more and more applicable to recent scholarship in ancient philosophy, it seems, perhaps because more and more scholars are in a position to treat analytic philosophy *as* a historical period, rather than as a default methodology. The results are as exciting as they are inventive, for they promise a fresh contribution to the study of our discipline's foundational texts.

Among Grabowski's foils is none other than Bertrand Russell, a discussion of whom (19-23) is among *PMF*'s best. Unlike Guthrie or Vlastos, say, Russell is not someone dedicated to a life of ancient study, but he is someone whose discussions of Plato continue to be influential — indeed, he is among those most responsible for the persistence of the standard interpretation. Grabowski's discussion demonstrates not only how wide an interpretive gap there is between what Plato's text says in the Greek and the standard interpretation, but how that text nevertheless becomes, in Russell's view, a theory of abstract universals designed to address the problem of attribute agreement. Yet, Russell's conclusion is reached with surprisingly little in the way of argument.

Another of *PMF*'s highlights is Grabowski's convincing argument concerning Plato's motivation for positing Forms, in the first place (45-50). Plato's main interest, according to Grabowski, is to address the epistemological problem lying at the heart of Heraclitean thought. If, as Heraclitus maintains, spatio-temporal things are constantly in flux, then they are unknowable because knowledge requires stability in its objects. To avoid skepticism, then human knowledge, which people at least seem to think *is* possible in the sciences (let alone as a matter of common sense), would need to be about non-spatio-temporal objects, e.g. equality itself, largeness itself, beauty itself, and so on. These are none other than the Forms. But this line of reasoning is *not* what typically motivates more modern philosophers to posit abstract universals, namely, the want of a solution to *the problem of attribute agreement*! Grabowski's point here is that Plato wasn't thinking in terms of *attributes*, the spatial multiplicity of which is presumably accounted for with abstract universals. Instead, Plato's is an epistemological concern: the need for there to be stable *objects* for the sciences to know. Not only is there thus one more reason to suppose that Plato's Forms are not universals, but, as Grabowski points out, we have another instance of infelicitous interpretation. For the standard interpretation also supposes that Plato is motivated by the problem of attribute agreement!

Now, the standard interpretation is not without any support. In addition to linguistic evidence (which Grabowski discusses, mostly concerning Plato's use of the verb *echein*, 36-40), there is the observation that non-spatio-temporal things, if there are any, are very probably abstract universals. Such entities, after all have a snug fit with our modern thing-and-attribute sentential analysis, and our more or less steady resistance to the sort of full-blown, science-less, speculative metaphysics of some past systematic philosophers. To the extent that we are confident in our preferred method of sentential analysis, we should be confident in our interpretation of remote texts au-

thored by great minds. But *this* reasoning, of course, only feeds Grabowski's methodological concerns discussed earlier, putting the analytically minded cart before the historico-philosophically minded horse.

Some readers of *PMF* will perhaps be a little impatient with some of its editorial choices. In his substantial discussion of Plato's epistemology, for instance, Grabowski discusses the main influences upon Plato's development, including that of Homer. Grabowski acknowledges the respects in which Homer's inclusion may seem philosophically irrelevant (as opposed, say, to his inclusion of Xenophanes, Heraclitus and Parmenides). But he defends his choice in light of Homer's undeniably extensive influence upon ancient Greek civilization and education. Still, in light both of *PMF*'s satisfying discussions of the philosophical influences, and of Plato's own willingness to disparage Homer's lack of philosophical understanding, this material seems better suited for endnote discussion.

Other readers, who, say, have routinely benefited from the careful study of Oxford-type commentaries, will likely find Grabowski's linguistic analyses inadequate. He focuses upon such verbs as *echein* ('to have', a verb crucial to the standard interpretation's defense), and the central nouns, *eidos* ('idea', 'Form') and *paradeigmata* ('paradigms', 'standards'). For them, these portions of *PMF* may seem a little sparse and, so, one-sided in light of the breadth and depth featured in commentaries. (This is not to say, by the way, that Grabowski's discussions of the Greek aren't frequently and plainly knowledgeable.) Grabowski, though, is doing the history of *philosophy*, a task which, some philosophers maintain, should focus more upon the conceptually plausible. For those readers, there is much here.

Notes are gathered at the end of the volume, grouped according to chapter. A substantial bibliography is included, as well as a general index and list of common abbreviations. There is no *index locorum*.

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In 1980 the American Food and Drug Administration began accepting data from foreign research trials in its consideration of new drugs for release on the U.S. market. Over a quarter of all applications made to the FDA now include results from research conducted abroad, typically in the developing world. Medical research in developing nations can be conducted faster because of the size of test populations from which to draw, enabling new drugs to gain approval and reach market sooner. Research trials also bring infrastructure, training and equipment to health poor regions of the globe. But despite these apparent advantages, international trials have given rise to concerns about the exploitation of test subjects by first world drug manufacturers. Trials can be run faster in the developing world precisely because there are so many sick people to enlist, people who may be willing to sign up for anything they perceive as treatment when faced with no other health care options, and who may agree to participate without properly understanding the antecedent risks.

These concerns dominate current debates in international research ethics and have been termed the problems of standard of care, informed consent and reasonable availability, respectively. The standard of care worry is that, although the Declaration of Helsinki insists that all trial participants be assured the best prophylactic, diagnostic, or therapeutic care, it is unclear whether this means that subjects are guaranteed best local care, or best care globally understood. Accordingly, it may or may not be justifiable to deny third world subjects first world care on the grounds that they would not have had access to that level of care otherwise. The problem of informed consent is thornier still: due to illness, poverty, lack of alternative health care options, limited education, language barriers, and allegiance to moral codes that do not value autonomy, citizens of developing nations may not be in a position to give the kind of genuinely informed and voluntary consent demanded by the Nuremberg Code. Finally, the risks of participation are typically thought to be offset by the potential benefits that new drugs provide for the community at large. But this positive risk/benefit ratio rests on the assumption that the communities from which participants are drawn will actually have reasonable access to the fruits of the research once the trial is complete. In the developing world this assumption is false, given the absence of effective health care infrastructure for delivering drugs, low per capita health care spending, and low per capita income.

Research ethicists have been arguing with increasing vehemence that standard of care must be globally understood, that trial sponsors must (at the very least) make their products reasonably available post-trial, and that every effort must be made to guarantee that consent is genuinely informed and uncoerced; failing to do these things, they claim, would be to exploit third world vulnerability for first world gain. But what is missing in these discussions, according to Hawkins and Emanuel, is a clear and coherent understanding of the very concept of exploitation. As they rightly point out, 'characterizing the ethical issue at the heart of clinical research as one of exploitation can be both helpful and problematic. It is helpful because it unifies what have often been diffuse, disjointed, and even incoherent concerns about research in developing countries into what seems to be a single clear ethical issue. It is problematic because the appearance of simplicity is deceiving. Exploitation is itself a diffuse and unclear concept. Hence we run the danger of substituting a vague pile of concerns for an equally vague label — giving it the patina of coherence but without any real clarity' (13).

Hawkins and Emanuel thus take it as their task to provide genuine coherence to the concept of exploitation in the context in international clinical research. Two famous case studies are offered early on, which the central papers in the volume are meant to use as a common reference point — as benchmarks against which to test their theories of exploitation. Hawkins and Emanuel are quick to dismiss the original, Marxist understanding of the concept, offering no reason for doing so but presumably accepting the general (and widely undefended) view that trial participation does not constitute a form of labor. The volume goes on to present five essays which offer five (quasi) distinct conceptions of exploitation: transactional, institutional, utilitarian, Kantian and contextual. The editors make it quite obvious, both in the introduction and in their respective contributions at the end of the volume, that they endorse the transactional conception defended by Alan Wertheimer in the first substantive chapter of the book.

According to Wertheimer, exploitation is a matter of how cooperative gains are distributed among co-contractors. For him, morally troubling exploitation occurs if one party walks away better off, and the other worse off, as a result of their transaction. If both parties benefit, even to wildly different degrees, no morally troubling exploitation has occurred (provided both parties consented). Ergo, if developing world communities benefit in any way from hosting or participating in clinical research, there is nothing morally troublesome about the transaction. In the chapter immediately following, respondent Thomas Pogge argues compellingly (although apparently not compellingly enough for the editors) that we shouldn't accept the wildly different starting points of co-contractors in research transactions as normatively acceptable benchmarks against which to judge their distributive entitlements. He goes on to make his usual case for global redistribution: because first world citizens benefit from the vulnerability of the global poor they have obligations to erode the very conditions of that vulnerability. In this particular piece he defends his new preferred strategy: that tax dollars be spent incen-

tivizing pharmaceutical companies to develop and distribute drugs actually needed in the third world.

The next few contributions are less interesting and even a little repetitive. Richard Arneson defends a Wertheimerian account in consequentialist terms, arguing unsurprisingly that when exploitation produces greater overall utility for the worst off it should be tolerated. A hard and fast anti-exploitation principle (rather than a general and flexible utilitarian rule) would produce perverse incentives that would leave everyone worse off. International research may indeed take advantage of developing world subjects, but all told it produces greater benefits than would realistically be achieved without it. Andrew Siegel responds with a nicely nuanced but predictable Kantian version of Pogge's argument, arguing for international duties of beneficence on the grounds of our shared humanity but acknowledging that these belong to all of those in a position to help rather than to researchers and their sponsors alone. Finally, Carse and Little add something new to the debate with their contextualist account, according to which exploitation occurs in the research context when subject vulnerability is taken advantage of for purposes not in accord with research objectives. On their view, international research objectives share much with the objectives of public health, and so international researchers encounter unique obligations because of the emergent public health crises in the developing world. Hawkins and Emanuel close the volume with respective pieces, previously published, in which the former employs Wertheimer's account to assess standard of care requirements in placebo trials, and the latter articulates a post-trial distributive principle alternative to that of reasonable availability.

The volume as a whole is a good one: clear in its central aims, well-organized, and argumentative. Some of the contributions, however, exhibit a failure of consistency when their authors finally get around to discussing the case studies, as though they had already forgotten that they had just presented a reasonably worked out theory of exploitation to which they might appeal. (This is not true of the chapters by Carse and Little, or by Hawkins.) If philosophical accounts of exploitation cannot be coherently applied by their own authors to actual cases, what hope for the clinicians, policy-makers, and research sponsors that philosophers love to belittle for their failures of systematicity? Only the contributions by Carse and Little, and Emanuel offer anything strategic for the clinical community. But to be fair, the target audience here (despite the editors' claim to be casting the net more widely) is philosophers frustrated by the lack of scholarly coherence in bioethical debates on the topic of international research. And as one such philosopher, I am grateful for the volume. The book is bang on in its timeliness, usefulness and central insight: yes, various problems in international research do come down to one large worry about the exploitation of vulnerable populations, and that acknowledgement doesn't settle the debate, it launches it.

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Virginia Held
How Terrorism is Wrong:
Morality and Political Violence.
New York: Oxford University Press 2008.
Pp. 224.
US$45.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-532959-9).

That Held, a noted care ethicist, should defend terrorism must surely come as a surprise. However, her nuanced analysis of the various forms of political violence cannot be reduced to a defense of the seemingly indefensible. She provides a compelling argument that we must attend to the experience of the marginalized and those narrow, unique circumstances in which violence serves as a means to its own obsolescence.

This text is not a monograph so much as a set of articles cycling through the theme of political violence and the question when it may be morally justified. It is divided into three sections. The first four chapters engage the morality of terrorism directly through comparisons with war, humanitarian military intervention or national liberation movements. The fifth and sixth discuss the cases of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and the media's responsibility to promote democratic discourse and reduce violence. The seventh and eighth, the most abstract and philosophical, recapitulate the argument justifying political violence and propose a model of moral experience and inquiry. Because the chapters reflect their origin as separate but parallel articles, the argument is sometimes disjointed and repetitive until it is reconstructed in Chapter 7, 'The Moral Assessment of Violence and Terrorism'.

True to the contextual and experimental method of moral inquiry set out in the final chapter, Held's account of terrorism does not begin from abstract principles, but from within contemporary debates. Defined as intentional acts of violence against innocents by non-state agents to produce fear and achieve a political aim, terrorism is typically taken to be a clear moral evil. Held argues that the common definition is crude and assumes the rightness of acts committed by nation-states or by 'us' rather than 'them'. States commit terrorist acts when they engage in violence both domestically and abroad to pursue political aims, use fear to 'shock and awe' the enemy or use weapons that inevitably kill noncombatants. But, because of her desire not to oversimplify the phenomenon of terrorism, Held barely distinguishes it from political violence in general. Crisp distinctions mark off violence from force and coercion or political violence from crime and law enforcement, but the central term 'terrorism' is defined only obliquely, as 'not any of the above'. (She does note that terrorists generally attack noncombatants and use fear, but neither quality is essential.) This allows her to avoid outworn dichotomies that have stunted other discussions of terrorism, but it poses the danger of effacing what makes it unique.

If terrorism is a species of political violence and such violence is justifiable in cases of war or military and humanitarian intervention, as Held argues in the opening chapters on 'Terrorism and War' and 'Military Intervention and

Terrorism', then one must be open to the possibility that terrorism may also be morally permissible. Her intent is not to advocate violence nor introduce a moral equivalence between all violent acts. Rather, it is to determine the conditions under which political violence is morally justifiable.

Held's archetype is a national liberation movement under conditions of tyranny. Her ideal is that of a democratic community that allows for inclusive, fair and reasoned debate between free and equal individuals and groups. Under ideal conditions, each is respected and has the option to persuade their fellow citizens. Nonviolent, morally superior action is possible and political violence is unjustifiable. However, when state coercion is not based on moral discourse, the use of violence to raise awareness, assert identity or reshape the political system may be morally justifiable. Under undemocratic regimes violence is inevitable, whether it is by the state or against it, and we must ask whether the immorality of violent resistance is absolute. Political violence, including terrorism, would be justified if it satisfied a number of conditions: The violence must institute 'effective' respect for marginalized individuals and groups (84) and secure universal, or at least more equitable, distribution of basic rights (87-8). The violent acts must not perpetuate themselves, resulting in even greater harm (136). The political system must be so corrupt that it offers no other means to address the concerns of the oppressed (129). In essence, political violence is justifiable when it institutes discourse and democracy and, in so doing, eliminates the need for further violence.

Ultimately, she argues, terrorism is fueled by the experience of cultural humiliation and, when it is not possible for peoples to secure self-determination through non-violent means, then violence may be justifiable. It is this last point that joins her theory of political violence with her broader ethic of care. In the introduction and concluding chapter, 'Moral Inquiry, Action and Care', she contends that theories of national and international justice must rest on attentiveness to the experiences of both the victims and the perpetrators of political violence and appeal to an ideal of care-giving and reconciliation.

Held's argument is vulnerable to charges of naïveté. It may be unreasonable to expect that we would care for those who would use violence against us. The ideal of a discursive community undistorted by violence (yet achieved by violence) may overlook its self-perpetuating character or the inevitability of violence in all political systems. Or the fundamentalist may see her pluralist, caring democracy as corrupt, irreligious and hostile to tradition — the very worldview that Held contends is the source of most contemporary terrorism. Even so, Held should be lauded for her willingness to examine subtly the morality of political violence as a concrete, complex problem. This book refuses to demonize either governments or insurgents and does not insist that the reader precede thinking by choosing a side.

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William B. Irvine
A Guide to the Good Life:
The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy.
New York: Oxford University Press 2008.
Pp. 336.
US$19.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-019-537461-2).

Irvine's book draws on Stoic principles from the ancient world to offer a philosophy of life which aims at achieving serenity. Irvine presents us with Stoic psychological strategies for dealing with loss, but also suggests that it is important for individuals to have a philosophy of life, even if it is not Stoicism. He draws on the spirit of the ancients by assuming that philosophy ought to be in the service of helping people live better lives, rather than 'debating esoteric topics', a tendency which he attributes to modern philosophers.

The text begins with an historical overview of Stoicism to offer some context about how and why philosophy was practiced in the ancient world, prior to professional guilds. Irvine suggests that Stoicism has gotten a bad wrap because the term 'stoic' is often associated with a philosophy of asceticism, austerity, and non-feeling. He suggests that such a claim accurately portrays the Cynics, but not the Stoics: 'the Stoics were not stoical' (213)! Much rides on this, as the title of the book indicates he is in search of a Stoic concept of joy.

Although drawing freely from anecdotes in Diogenes Laertius to help provide a portrait of the origins of Stoicism in the ancient world, Irvine does not mention that the earlier surviving indices of the *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* by Diogenes Laertius included numerous lost chapters devoted to the Stoics. While it may not be fair to criticize the author for not addressing Stoic texts which no longer exist, it is a curious omission, since the author offers a detailed historical development of Stoicism by claiming that Zeno's Stoicism was an amalgam of earlier philosophies, the Cynics, the Megarians, and the Academy. However, there are grounds for criticism on a related issue, the internal diversity of the Stoics.

Irvine recognizes that he may be glossing over differences among Stoic thinkers by offering hypothetical objections to his own analysis by 'Stoic purists' (243). One wonders who or what a Stoic purist might be. After all, he points out that Stoicism was eclectic in its origins. Irvine recognizes that all the Stoics are not univocal when he writes, 'I had to cobble together a brand of Stoicism from clues scattered throughout the writings of the Roman Stoics. The resulting version, though derived from the ancient Stoics, is unlike any other version' (244). There is nothing wrong with doing this. However, part of the text's aim is to show that there is such a thing as Stoic joy and to reject the popular view that Stoics are gloomy, non-feeling types. To do this he has to ignore aspects of primary texts and 'cobble together (his own) . . . brand of Stoicism'. His selective version of Stoicism ignores at least some of the counsel given by Epictetus.

Irvine presents one of the Stoic strategies for dealing with jerks and annoying people: humor. Of course this is not unique to Stoicism, but when he

suggests that Epictetus counsels us to laugh off insults (148), he collapses the distinction between laughter and humor. After all, Epictetus specifically counsels us 'not to laugh at many things or boisterously' in the *Enchiridion*. The gloomy image of the Stoic who does not laugh is still there in Epictetus. Irvine forges a new brand of Stoicism, however, by relying on other Stoic thinkers, especially Seneca. Later Irvine returns to the value of laughter, stating that 'instead of letting myself be angered by events, I persuade my-self to laugh at them' (258). Seneca's defense of laughter is important for the text. So the author's attempt to vindicate the Stoics from the gloomy image of Stoicism is refreshing, but it requires that he selectively ignore some of the counsel given by primary Stoic thinkers. Further identifying the differences between Seneca and Epictetus would be useful to acknowledge the substantial internal diversity within Stoicism itself.

Irvine suggests that Stoicism has fallen out of favor in the contemporary world due to numerous factors, including the rise of Christianity, linguistic philosophy, and the view that the Stoics were 'humorless, grim, and unfeeling'. Contemporary Stoics are rare, but Irvine maintains that strategies of negative visualization — the practice of recognizing that things could be worse off than they are now — and the use of humor still offer us something important which we can use to live better lives. Irvine reflects on death too, in particular the Stoic attitude which looks at suicide favorably. Although drawing on the relevance of these thinkers for a philosophy of life in the contemporary world, Irvine neither comments on the relevance of the Stoics for contemporary debate about physician-assisted suicide nor does he address the legal obstacles for a good death which are present in most of the world today. He dwells briefly on the suicides of Zeno, Cato, and Cleanthes, as well as the counsel of Musonius Rufus to die well when one can (191), but Irvine does not address the political implications of permitting practice of this aspect of Stoic philosophy in the contemporary world.

Irvine also challenges widely accepted views about grief counseling by suggesting counselors sometimes make people worse off by coddling them, rather than making them toughen up. This controversial claim clashes with a widespread view that people must have time to grieve. What is the proper amount of grief to experience after loss? The nature and extent of the loss surely matters, but Irvine suggests that the general Stoic view is that people usually overdo it by assuming that extended grieving is necessary for the healing process.

Overall, the text is a fine piece of work which resembles a self-help book. It is difficult to create a philosophy book which is useful and engaging for both philosophers and non-philosophers, but Irvine does a good job. Although he may seem overly self-indulgent in his closing chapters by addressing his mother, yoga practice, rowing, and banjo playing, his examples are relevant for explicating the common types of challenges to serenity people face, as well as plausible strategies for seeking and maintaining tranquility.

Among the most provocative claims which Irvine advances is that there is a danger of *not* having a philosophy of life because one risks misliving:

this poses a challenge to philosophy which goes beyond the scope of the Stoic thinkers. There is a cost to having a philosophy of life. It requires both practical and theoretical training, so what type of person has the time or effort to spend toward such a goal? Irvine's answer is that virtually everyone has time to develop a philosophy of life, since it will probably cost more *not* to have a philosophy of life in the long run if one wastes time and energy devoted to mistaken goals. In this respect, Irvine shows us that we may still learn something from the ancients, such as strategies for living and achieving happiness.

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David Jones, ed.
Confucius Now:
Contemporary Encounters with the Analects.
Chicago: Open Court 2008.
Pp. 315.
US$38.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8126-9610-3).

It is perhaps paradoxical that Confucius (551-479 BCE) saw himself primarily as a transmitter and not an originator (*Analects* 7.1), yet we readily accept a 'Confucianism' that studies primarily the *Analects*, rather than the traditional texts Confucius himself venerated, such as the *Shijing*. Given a tradition exhibiting from the very start this sort of bootstrapping tendency, it is not surprising that the essays in this worthy volume show little interest either in the traditions anterior to Confucius or — with the exception of Kwong-loi Shun's essay on Zhu Xi, which is really about the textual strategies of the commentator as such, and could in this respect have been written, *mutatis mutandis*, about a Neo-Platonist as easily as a Neo-Confucian — in the post-Confucian tradition.

The reserve with respect to the traditions in which the *Analects* is embedded seems to derive from the rejection of a significant role for any substantive metaphysics in Confucius, whether we mean by this an ontology implicit in the religious literature and practices prior to Confucius or the product of the explicitly ontologizing and systematizing efforts of, in particular, Neo-Confucians. And yet the authors of these essays do not wish the topical scope of 'contemporary' Confucian thought to be narrowed as a result of this fore-understanding, so there is much concern given to 'spirituality' insofar as it can be derived from the *Analects* in isolation from these traditional sources, especially in Mary Bockover's essay on Confucian 'spiritual humanism'. The

project of identifying a process-inflected ontology embodied in the text is also carried forward particularly energetically in Roger Ames' essay on the anti-Aristotelian, 'paronomastic' logic of the *Analects*.

From another perspective, there is in these essays much consideration of the significance of 'ritual' (*li*) as a relationship to tradition in general, but never of what might constitute an appropriate relationship to tradition in a pluralistic context, or a context of contestation, alternative or 'minor' traditions, or the role of recovering a 'lost' tradition. The common judgment is apparently expressed by Bockover in a note stating that Confucius 'most likely thought of *li* . . . as distinctively and even exclusively Chinese . . . . The tendency would then be not to recognize the *li* of another culture as *li*, or even worse, to see it as "barbarian"' (201, n.8). Assuming this to be true, the contributors to this volume have the delicate task of finding universality in an explicitly tradition-embedded text *without*, on the other hand, recourse to the universality which would derive from the substantive metaphysics of the later Confucian tradition.

The anchor essay of the volume and the one which speaks most directly to the requisites of such a post-metaphysical, but hopefully not truncated, Confucianism is Herbert Fingarette's 'Discovering the *Analects*'. Fingarette takes up the aspect of Confucian *li* which is most apt to make commentators nervous, namely its relationship to 'magic'. Fingarette argues that the relationship between Confucian *li* and 'magic' is not a 'residue of superstition' nor something to be 'interpreted away', taken as interpolation or 'poetic statements of a prosaic truth' (5). Instead, 'Confucius saw . . . that the truly, distinctively human powers have, characteristically, a magical quality,' for Fingarette argues that '(r)ite that is literally sacred can be seen as an emphatic, intensified, and sharply elaborated extension of everyday civilized intercourse' (8). In inspired fashion, Fingarette seeks to identify the 'magic' aspect of *li* with Austin's 'performative utterance', and thus to identify the Confucian domain of rites with social performativity *in toto*. In this way, Fingarette is able to marshal Confucius' tendency to virtually identify the subject with the *li* (e.g., *Analects* 12.1) in support of the non-intentional character Fingarette has attributed to Confucian virtue — an identification questioned, in a passing and rare instance of internal polemic in this volume, in Philip Ivanhoe's essay (88). This 'performative' interpretation of *li* also helps to explain the seeming contradiction between Confucius' overwhelming concern with ritual and his reluctance to make 'spiritual beings' (*guishen*) an object of discussion (e.g., *Analects* 6.20, 7.20, 11.11). Such passages are not, upon this reading, denials of the transcendence of spiritual beings, but affirmations of their immanence or immediacy *in* the rites, along with all the world's other 'ideal' constituents.

Fingarette's reading is pursued further in a particular direction by editor Jones in his essay 'Walking the Way In-Between with Confucius: *Tianwen* and Emerging Patterns of Human Heavens'. Jones cleverly appeals to the organic, emergent quality of the performative *li* in order to explain Confucius' reluctance to consider the exotic, forceful, or miraculous (*Analects* 7.21), for

these are not, as he puts it, 'sustainable'. Jones seems to go too far, however, in the direction of hypostatizing the source of order in the social world as an 'unknown immanent force'. Not for the last time in this book, moreover, one encounters in Jones' essay the stereotype of a Western conception of the self 'where society is seen as a derived arrangement of autonomous individuals vying for recognition, success, and assertion of their rights, including rights to privacy and ownership' (14). The combination of an excessively broad critique of metaphysical individuality with an incautious affirmation of a metaphysical substance of community is especially unfortunate. Henry Rosemont, Jr. similarly indicts 'the concept of freely choosing autonomous individuals' implicit in 'first-generation human rights' with 'providing legal justification for transnational corporations to do pretty much as they wish' (162). Ames seems to have a sounder grasp when he speaks of a 'pluriverse' of unique particulars as the ontological starting-point of Confucian thought (41f.), while James Behuniak, Jr. also emphasizes in his essay the importance of a dialectic of uniqueness and form in the *Analects*. Whatever the merits of the critique of political concepts of autonomy that animates Jones, Rosemont, *et al.*, it might be possible for all sides to agree that the issue ought not be argued on ontological grounds.

Peimin Ni's essay on *gongfu* is exemplary in deriving results in harmony with the interpretive choices of many of the contributors to this volume in a fashion more informed by the existing commentarial tradition. Ni uses the concept of *gongfu* — meaning, more or less, *praxis* — to formulate a 'praxiological' reading of the *Analects* in which the discourse on theoretical topics is seen as determined by the prior sense of understanding *as* practical attainment. In this light, the difference between Confucius' refusal to speak on the essence or 'whatness' of the concepts he uses and Mencius' willingness to speak in theoretical terms, for example, becomes less 'troubling', because Confucianism is *not* 'primarily a theory about the Way of *tian* and human nature . . . only secondarily applied . . . to practice' (173). Different, even opposing, views on theoretical questions can, on this reading, coexist within Confucianism, and in fact always have, insofar as the same goals are shared. Ni goes on to use the praxiological perspective to unravel some familiar problems in the interpretation of the *Analects*. Most interesting is his attempt to find an 'instructive' rather than 'descriptive' value in controversial social and political views in the *Analects* such as the advocacy of filial piety to a degree that naturally draws the charge of a partiality incompatible with social justice, elitist statements about the 'common people', and sexist statements. One would have liked this part of Ni's discussion to go a bit slower, and I am not sure it is successful in any case. However, it is salutary both in its intention, and in Ni's use of the commentarial tradition, in contradistinction to other contributors.

In a review of this length it is unavoidable to have to treat selectively only of 'major' essays. And so the final 'major' essay in the collection is Mary Bockover's 'The *Ren Dao* of Confucius: A Spiritual Account of Humanity'. Bockover argues for the virtual identity of *li* and *ren*, 'goodness', in Confu-

cius' thought, and interprets *ren* rather strongly as a universal human spirit embodied in particular cultural conventions (*li*), thus going further in the direction of a split between content and form than most other contributors to this volume might be willing to follow. In recognition, however, of the demands imposed by the transcendence she attributes to *ren*, she argues that 'conclusively identifying *ren* action or a *ren* person as a social or historical fact is impossible' (198). More inscrutable is Bockover's use of a passage from the *Great Learning* affirming that '[f]rom the emperor to the common people, all must see the cultivation of their own person as the root of all else' as support for her argument that from the unity of *ren* and *li* somehow follows 'a total elimination of individualistic, self-defining boundaries', when the text would seem to go in just the opposite direction (194).

The essays in this collection put forward an unusually united theoretical front due to the decision to put into practice what the editor terms the Confucian 'intergenerelationality of teacher and student' (x) by combining essays by major scholars with essays by their students. While this has made it easier to criticize as representing a more or less unified 'tendency', this criticism should not overshadow the praise merited by the very coherence that makes the criticism possible.

Edward Butler

Joshua Knobe and **Shaun Nichols**, eds.
Experimental Philosophy.
New York: Oxford University Press 2008.
Pp. 244.
US$99.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-532325-2);
US$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-532326-9).

This collection of essays surveys a range of issues that philosophers have recently explored using experimental methods. The volume touches upon several traditional philosophical problems such as skepticism, free will, intentional action, and moral responsibility. It also considers the nature and methodology of philosophy itself: What role do intuitions play in the pursuit of philosophical truth? How does empirical philosophy differ from experimental philosophy? And should philosophers remain seated in their armchairs and leave experimentation to the men and women in white coats?

Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols take themselves to be representative of an exciting new movement that has emerged in philosophy: experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophers are unwilling to sit back and examine

their personal intuitions and wait until potentially relevant scientific findings trickle in. Instead, 'armed with the methods of contemporary cognitive science', they develop their own studies and experiments designed to test the intuitions of ordinary people (7). To be sure, experimental philosophers are not simply interested in collecting data about human intuitions for its own sake; rather they hope to learn more about the mind, human nature, and folk psychology in the process. The philosopher plays an important role in interpreting experimental findings and applying them to traditional philosophical problems. Knobe and Nichols are not suggesting that we replace conceptual analysis and other philosophical methods with experimentation; instead, they are proposing that we 'add another tool to the philosopher's toolbox' (10).

We can witness the experimental philosopher at work throughout this book. In one intriguing essay, 'The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology', Knobe examines the way that morality shapes our understanding and use of folk psychology. Specifically, he tries to show that whether or not we judge a behavior to be intentional depends upon whether we take the behavior to be good or bad (130). To test this hypothesis, Knobe presented subjects in a controlled experiment with two cases that were nearly identical. While the *behaviours* depicted in the two cases were of the same kind, the *outcomes* of the behaviors were different: one was 'good' and the other was 'bad'. The first group of subjects was asked to consider whether or not the chairman of a company intentionally harmed the environment by knowingly starting a new program that would harm the environment. And the second group was asked to consider whether or not the chairman of a company intentionally helped the environment by knowingly starting a new program that would help the environment (130-31).

Knobe reports that '82 percent of subjects who received the story about environmental harm said that the chairman harmed the environment intentionally, whereas only 23 percent of subjects who received the story about environmental help said that the chairman helped the environment intentionally' (131). These results are startling and challenge the commonly accepted view that folk psychology functions primarily as a device for the prediction and explanation of behavior (130). If Knobe is correct, then moral considerations may cause ordinary human beings to ascribe folk psychological concepts, such as intention, in a motivated and asymmetrical way. In 'Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for Juror Impartiality', Thomas Nadelhoffer considers the disturbing practical implications of these findings: If folk ascriptions of intentional action are influenced by moral considerations, then can a defendant accused of committing a morally reprehensible crime ever receive a fair trial? Is it humanly possible for jurors in such a trial to deliberate impartially about a defendant's state of mind (149-51)? Knobe's experimental work encourages philosophers to explore these and other questions.

Not all philosophers are as eager as Knobe and Nichols to jump on the experimental bandwagon. These philosophers will be happy to learn that the book is conscious of their concerns. A number of essays contained in the vol-

ume respond directly to charges that have been raised against experimental philosophy and its practitioners. Jesse J. Prinz speaks in defense of the philosophical use of experimentation in 'Empirical Philosophy and Experimental Philosophy'. According to Prinz, philosophers should not turn their backs on experimental modes of observation because philosophy itself is an observational field. In his view, ignoring empirical and experimental findings 'is like walking across the room with a blindfold on' (207). In an ideal academic world, members of different departments would share a common language that would 'contribute to understanding the world and our place in it' (207).

Most readers will find something of interest in this book, whether or not they view it as pure and unadulterated philosophy. If one hopes to understand the way that human beings think and behave, then one should remain open to empirical findings about how they do think and behave. Otherwise, one risks theorizing (or developing intuitions) about the products of one's own philosophical imagination. In my view, it is perfectly acceptable — commendable even — for a philosopher with a particular research interest to play an active role in creating and collecting relevant empirical data. It is somewhat reminiscent of the way that Descartes used dissection in attempting to understand consciousness, emotions, and the relationship between the mind and the body. More often than not, academics find themselves separated from each other by the profoundly specialized walls of their respective disciplines. It is refreshing to see that some academics are chipping their way through the concrete. As a movement, experimental philosophy may involve a certain amount of interdisciplinary work. However, if the results contribute to our understanding of the world and each other, then this is something that philosophers and non-philosophers should embrace.

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Megan Laverty
Iris Murdoch's Ethics:
A Consideration of her Romantic Vision.
New York: Continuum 2007.
Pp. 134.
US$120.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8535-9).

Ten years ago the British novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch (1919-1999) died, after having suffered from Alzheimer's disease for some years. The years immediately following her death saw an increasing interest in her personal life, which pushed her work to the background. The publication of her

husband's three memoirs, the release of the film 'Iris', as well as two biographies all drew attention to Murdoch's life. In the popular imagination at least her work seemed to come second to stories about her early relationships and her final years of illness.

Alongside this surge in stories about Murdoch's life, the calmer world of academia witnessed a rather different development: a growing number of books by authors who not only could not claim to have discussed their ideas with Murdoch, but also focused on her philosophical writing rather than her novels. In both aspects these works were rather different from the earlier scholarship on Murdoch, which concerned itself most of all with her novels, considering the philosophical writing only as far as it could enlighten the reading of the former.

Laverty's book is another addition to this development, that started with Patricia O'Connor's *To Love the Good* (1996), and became widely recognized with Maria Antonaccio's *Picturing the Human* (2000) and Heather Widdows' *The Moral Vision of Iris Murdoch* (2005). Laverty explains in the introduction to her book why the interest in Murdoch's philosophy took some time to develop (1). Prominent among Laverty's reasons is the scattered nature of Murdoch's work. The philosophical writings were not only overshadowed by the focus on her literary work, but also scattered over various journals and over time. In addition, Laverty points out, the dominant analytical tradition of philosophy was slow to engage with Murdoch's rather different way of doing philosophy.

Murdoch has left scholars with a difficulty of interpretation: how to bring coherence and unity to a diverse oeuvre whose author does not shrink from discussing God, Good and the self in only a few pages. Laverty takes the following approach. She places Murdoch's philosophy in the tradition of philosophical romanticism. While Laverty mentions the work of Nikolas Kompridis and Frederick C. Beiser (2, 60 respectively), her discussion of philosophical romanticism in both the introduction and chapter three refers principally to Murdoch's philosophical work.

Laverty cites two reasons for her approach. First, philosophical romanticism allows her to show 'the authority of (Murdoch's) philosophy as given by its location in, and ability to comment on, a larger philosophical tradition, in this case romantic' (2). Secondly, romanticism will not obscure the individuating characteristics of Murdoch's philosophy. On the contrary, Laverty claims, romanticism, 'of all the philosophical traditions . . . uniquely does justice to the enigmatic quality of Murdoch's work,' and offers a 'more complex and subtle interpretation of her work' (3).

Whether romanticism is 'unique' in doing justice to Murdoch's work, or whether it offers indeed 'a more complex and subtle interpretation', Laverty never argues explicitly. Her engagement with other interpretations of Murdoch's work is limited and certainly not put in terms of competition. Indeed, Laverty explicitly states that the purpose of her book is not to 'replicate (Murdoch's) ideas, but rather to engage in a process of *learning* them' (12, emphasis added).

The importance of philosophical romanticism in this process of learning is perhaps best described by highlighting the emphasis put on Kant's Copernican Revolution. Laverty presents Murdoch's work as an attempt to overcome the gap between the phenomenal and noumenal world (4). Whereas Kant, Laverty explains, would hold that we can only know the phenomenal world, Murdoch insists that people nevertheless are aware of reality outside human constructions. Yet, they may not be able to describe it except in imagery (9). Moreover, despite the limitations of these descriptions, humans should not stop trying to formulate these, for such attempts define us as human beings (29).

The pivotal question in any process of learning thus arises: how can we tell we are learning anything, that we are moving closer to the truth, and not merely replacing one image with another? Laverty argues that Murdoch answers this question in moral rather than epistemic terms. As Laverty puts it: 'the epistemic question of how it is possible to know whether a philosophical theory is true is reformulated as a moral question about whether, and to what extent, a philosophical theory serves our profound egoism' (34). Laverty's book reads thus as a collection of Murdoch's various attempts to curb this egoism: of Murdoch's use of irony, temperament, dialogue (37-49), of Murdoch's reading of Plato and Kant (49-57, 60-68), and most importantly of Murdoch's reading of the notions of the sublime (91-8) and of love (104-9). These elements are not strictly confined to different chapters, but rather keep returning throughout the book. Indeed, Laverty warns her readers not to expect a progressive argument. Instead, she describes the chapters as 'laid over one another, deepening the reader's perspective' (13).

This structure may thus be understood to support the book's purpose of individual learning, especially as it seems to resist any recounting of the argument, other than the mere summary above. It may indeed have been Laverty's intention to create this resistance, by giving the reader limited structural help (e.g. some chapters have introductions and conclusions, but others don't), by ending the book abruptly, by a dense writing style, and by the lack of distinction between describing or interpreting Murdoch's ideas. All these elements serve against easily acquiring a defining image. This book would thus underline how it does not want to provide a new interpretation of Murdoch's work, but rather encourage the learning of central ideas (12). Whether it succeeds in doing so, I find difficult to judge. It left me with some insights — especially on the significance of Kant for Murdoch — but also with a sense of regret at a missed opportunity to provide a significant discussion of Murdoch's ideas, which have been pushed to the background for too long.

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Angela Leighton
On Form:
Poetry, Aestheticism, and the Legacy of a Word.
New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 304.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929060-4);
US$34.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-955193-4).

Although this book is not, I take it, aimed directly at an audience of philosophers, it is a rich and provocative philosophical stimulus. Leighton dwells on and illuminates an overlapping, jostling series of ideas about form that have been at work in poetic and critical practice since the late 18th century. I will not do justice to the range of poets, poems, thinkers, and themes that occupy her, but will note that there are chapters focusing on Keats, Tennyson, Pater, Vernon Lee, Woolf, Yeats, Wallace Stevens, and W. S. Graham, plus substantial discussion of works by a number of twentieth- and twenty-first-century poets. Her goal is in part to enhance and complicate our understanding of nineteenth-century aestheticism and to plot out a lineage of aestheticist concerns still alive and well. Rather than attempt to recount this complex lineage, I will just sketch some of the challenging and suggestive ideas that emerge from it in Leighton's hands.

Leighton's central concern is with artistic form, the kind of form that is taken to be essential to literature, a marker of 'the literary'. Two of the overarching claims are, first, that the idea of form is inevitably amorphous and in motion, not a concept that could be fixed and defined; and second, that we can nonetheless think fruitfully about form by linking it insistently to 'nothing'. In reckoning with what form has to do with nothing, we reach a third claim, which is that form represents a kind of knowledge or knowing: 'Form, then, might be a word which . . . starts to alter the very thing we mean by knowing. To be a "capacity for", rather than an object of knowledge, shifts attention towards a kind of knowing which is an imaginative attitude rather than an accumulation of known things. Such knowledge, like form itself, gravitates towards an intransitive mode in its nature' (27). The link between form and nothing is developed in various ways, including toward the roughly Kantian thought that aesthetic form is not 'for' anything, such as a practical or moral purpose. But it also works as a way of teasing out the force of distinguishing form and content. Form, even if it contributes wonderfully to the conveying of content, resists 'aboutness' — form is not, or at least is not essentially, 'about about' (246). If we press certain questions concerning form — what does it say? what does it mean? — we will get nothing (or perhaps, in the spirit of fluidity, not much). Even so, the claim is that form is a kind of knowing, an 'intransitive' knowing, since it is not a vehicle for coming to know *something*. Here is another passage that pursues this claim: 'To acknowledge the "nothing" at the heart of the literary is a way of starting to ask what the work knows, and therefore of seeking to modify the very terms of knowing. . . . It is . . . to suggest that something constantly pulls against relevance, and

reference. However it is described, form, style, beauty, music, it consists of finding what is "for nothing" in the text — a kind of lucky bargain' (35-6).

As the flat-footed philosopher, it is hard not to pop up immediately with queries and objections. How could there be knowing that is not a matter of knowing something? How could relevance and reference *not* be implicated in knowing, so as to ensure, for instance, that the knowing follows from experience and is in genuine contact with the world? And how is this stuff we find in poetry, its form, supposed to be *doing* something, in particular carrying out an activity of knowing? I'm not going to resolve these questions here, but I hope that pointing at this kind of reaction hints at why the book is nicely provocative for philosophers. The accumulation of poets, poems, and critics circling around these ideas starts to shake your confidence that you know what could and couldn't be a matter of knowing.

Let me mention a few of the remarks that I found helpful in suggesting how to push these ideas further. Leighton quotes Roger Fry on significant form as 'the effort on the part of the artist to bend to our emotional understanding by means of his passionate conviction some intractable material which is alien to our spirit' (13). Here the notions of intractability and alienness suggests that the artist/poet has to work in terms that she will never assimilate as her own; perhaps this helps express a kind of working with the world that might be called a knowing achievement, a successful negotiation, but one that falls short of knowing the nature of that world. Or, in another passage, 'form' 'may refer, not to a single boundary line, but to a dividing line, an outline, between different dimensions of understanding. Form, by this account, is not a fixed shape to be seen, but the shape of a choice to be made' (16). The idea that form manifests the 'shape of a choice' seems again, to articulate a kind of awareness, a sensitivity to possibilities for understanding, without actually being a matter of understanding. The final chapters of the book return repeatedly to notions of attention. Of Wallace Stevens, she says his 'object . . . is not to see objects clearly or truly, but to catch "forms that are attentive". . . . What matters is that they are "forms" — a word full of the vague, animate presence of something which calls attention to itself while rebuffing the conventions of ordinary knowledge' (190). And later, Leighton speaks of poems that provoke a 'hair-raising wakefulness. In a sense, this is where all poems lead. Once all the "abouts" have been listed, the horrors imagined, and the plots mapped out, what remains is a listening, shocked into nervous attention . . . ' (265). The idea again is of an intransitive attentiveness, suggesting the importance of the quality of the attention even if there turns out to be nothing to be attended to.

Let me conclude with two last, flat-footed comments. The discussions of specific poems are packed with interesting claims and ideas, and it is hard not to think that, if these discussions engage with the form of these poems, then their form is replete, overflowing, with ideas, relevance, reference, understanding, and all sorts of cognitively ambitious 'happenings' like acknowledging, worrying, questioning, rejecting, exposing. And then it seems that 'nothing' can't be the right notion, even if the poems are thematically con-

cerned with, and worried about turning into, 'nothing'. Leighton discusses the tension between what critics want to 'get' out of poems — something, of course — and what poems have to offer, so it would be interesting to hear further discussion of how her readings of these poems reflect or defuse that tension. Second, along with embracing a multitude of ideas about form, and affirming that it is a moving, changing notion, the book suggests that there is a stable need for form, and a certain kind of reality of form with which poets work. In what sense is form an amorphous, fluid notion, if form also has this sort of substantial and ongoing presence? This is perhaps a question in which Leighton would not be interested — why not just be happy with the embrace of multiplicity and change? — but I would be interested in her views on why a notion such as form is, or needs to be, amorphous and unstable.

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Noah Lemos
An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pp. 242.
US$90.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-84213-6);
US$26.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-60309-6).

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies knowledge. It attempts to answer basic questions: What is knowledge? To what extent can we have justified knowledge claims? What is the scope and extent of knowledge? Epistemological questions have given rise to so many serious philosophical enquiries that it is extremely difficult to cover the vastness of the subject for a beginner in philosophy. Keeping in view the goal of introducing a basic book in epistemology, Lemos' book discusses a wide array of topics and captures both the expanse and the conceptual depth of the subject. It aims to introduce some of the main problems of epistemology, e.g., some theories of knowledge, the concepts of truth and justification, the Gettier problem and some classical solutions to it, skepticism, naturalized epistemology, and the two main approaches to theory of justification (internalism and externalism).

In the introductory chapter Lemos briefly discusses some views on the nature of belief, truth and epistemic justification. He also elaborates the classical Gettier problem, giving a very concise introduction to it and some solutions offered by various philosophers. However, towards the end of the chapter he rightly points out that Gettier problem has been over-emphasized, despite the fact that all attempts have failed to resolve it. This repeti-

tion has throttled progress in epistemology, to the extent that solution to Gettier problem has lost its worth: Lemos suggests that one does not need a definition of knowledge in order to pick out instances of it. We need to get deeper into epistemological questions, rather than continue to harp on the same problem.

The book culminates in an interesting discussion about the relation between naturalized and traditional epistemology. Naturalized epistemology suggests that we need to focus more on scientific explanation of acquisition of beliefs and less on justification of belief. The author presents some main arguments in favor of naturalized epistemology. First he reproduces Quine's argument that we need to know the psychological processes that lead us from our sensory stimulations to our beliefs about the external world. Second, there is Kornblith's argument, which holds that since we have a predisposition to form true beliefs, and our cognitive make up is such that we tend to form only true beliefs, therefore our thrust should be on the study of empirical psychology. A further argument in favor of naturalized epistemology suggests that epistemology, like science, is a posteriori enquiry. In order to find out whether our mental faculties like perception and memory are reliable we need to empirically validate their reliability. Keeping in view the latest trends in cognitive science and various epistemological questions to which they have given rise, Lemos rightly suggests that epistemology should proceed in cooperation with natural science and thus open new avenues for itself. Any empirical enquiry can also see that the traditional standards of justification of beliefs cannot be completely ignored.

Lemos provides a concise summary of both foundationalism and the coherence theory of justification. Foundationalism is the view that basic beliefs are justified in virtue of nondoxastic experiences i.e. experiences or mental states which are not beliefs or sets of beliefs. It also holds that there are basic beliefs that have some degree of justification independently of the support they get from other beliefs. By contrast, the coherence theory of justification holds that the relation of a belief to other beliefs is what is important for the justification of that belief, as that there are no justified basic beliefs. Both theories set high standards when it comes to the purity of the source of beliefs, but neither succeeds in providing sufficient and necessary conditions for the justification of belief. Lemos' detailed comparison between these theories is fair. However, in an attempt to give a mixed theory of belief justification based on these two theories, he affirms both the significance of nondoxastic beliefs as well as the need of support from other beliefs. His suggestion is that there are no justified basic beliefs but that the degree of justification of any belief can be enhanced by one's nondoxastic experience. He does not offer any argument for his 'mixed theory'. He does not explain how nondoxastic experiences are basic beliefs but are not sufficiently justified in themselves and so need further justification from other beliefs. It seems impossible to construct a moderate view, incorporating two contradictory theories, without abandoning the central ideas of both theories. On the one hand, accepting some beliefs as basic is not acceptable to pure coherentist; and on the other

hand the pure foundationalist does not want to further justify his 'nondoxastic basic beliefs'. Such a mixed theory is insufficient to solve the problem of justification.

Theories of epistemic justification can be classified as either internalist or externalist. According to internalism, the epistemic justification of a subject's belief is entirely determined by factors internal to the subject's perspective. Externalism is the view that epistemic justification depends on its being the product of factors external to the subject. Given that this is an introductory book on epistemology, Lemos merely discusses these two approaches, without taking a position in favor of either of them. He raises the issue of epistemic justification and epistemic responsibility, but does not bring in the difference between 'first and third person authority' while discussing epistemic justification, though this is one of the key terms required to explain the internalist-externalist debate. The idea of first-person authority on one's beliefs is that one has a privileged access to one's own beliefs, and what is internally accessible to oneself makes it true for her. The idea of third-person authority on one's belief is that justification of one's belief depends on factors that are not known to the subject herself; justification depends on conditions external to the subject. The first person or third person perspectives on epistemic justification explain the ways in which epistemic responsibility can be understood. An internalist would say that justification of my beliefs is an internal issue and I alone am responsible for my belief. S' belief 'that p' is justified to S if and only if S has a first person authority on her belief. If I know my beliefs in a way no one else can know, I am responsible for my beliefs and they are justified to me. I do not need to justify my beliefs to anyone else. An externalist would say that the responsibility for justification of one's belief does not lie within the range of the subject alone, but is a matter of external conditions. One incurs a collective responsibility in justifying one's beliefs. Thus the connection between epistemic responsibility and justification can be explained by both the theories.

In general, Lemos' choice of topics is commendable: they are appropriate and relevant. He does justice to most of the issues he raises. While his book will have great appeal for readers with a general interest in epistemology, it will also serve as a basic reference work for professionals in the field. It is undoubtedly a fine addition to the literature on epistemology.

Richa Yadav

Ernest Lepore and **Kurt Ludwig**
Donald Davidson's Truth Theoretic Semantics.
New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 360.
US$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929093-2);
US$45.00 (ISBN-13: 978-0-19-956168-1).

We are finite beings with finite minds, and yet the expressive power of natural language is infinite. Indeed, as Mother Goose once demonstrated, constructing a seemingly unending series of nonsynonymous expressions is mere child's play: 'This is the house that Jack built', 'This is the malt that lay in the house that Jack built,' 'This is the rat that ate the malt that lay in the house that Jack built,' and so on, ad infinitum. Our ability to comprehend a potential infinity of nonsynonymous expressions suggests that natural language is *compositional*, consisting of a finite number of primitive expressions together with a finite number of recursive rules for constructing complex expressions from these primitives. This 'compositionality constraint' is one of the two germinal ideas from which Donald Davidson's semantic project grew, and it is the focus of Lepore and Ludwig's recent book.

As Lepore and Ludwig (L and L) explain in their introduction, a compositional meaning theory is only part of a complete theory of meaning. It explains how the meanings of complex expressions are inherited from their primitive parts; a complete theory must account for the meanings of these primitive parts. Having already written a book on Davidson's approach to the more ambitious project, L and L's focus in this book is exclusively on the more modest project. The early chapters contain a detailed explanation of Davidson's approach, and the chapters that follow apply this approach to parts of language thought to provide it with difficulties: quantifiers (Chapters 2 and 3), proper names and indexicals (Chapter 4), demonstratives (Chapters 4 and 5), quotation and indirect discourse (Chapters 6 and 11, respectively), adjectives and adverbs (Chapter 7), tense and temporal expressions (Chapters 8, 9, and 10), and non-declarative sentences (Chapter 12).

I have said that the compositionality constraint is one of the two inspirations of Davidson's project. The other is the realization that an axiomatic truth theory of the Tarskian variety meets this constraint. Tarski argued that an adequate theory of truth for a language would have to meet his 'Convention T' — generating for every sentence *s* in the language a theorem or 'T-sentence' of the form '(T) *s* is T iff *p*' where '"s" is replaced with a structural description of an object language sentence . . . and . . . "p" is replaced by a metalanguage sentence that translates it' (28). Because *p* translates *s* only if they have the same truth conditions, a theory satisfying Convention T would consist of a complete specification in the theory's metalanguage of the truth conditions for expressions in the object language. Davidson's insight was to see that such a theory could double as a compositional meaning theory, for, with some additional constraints, the predicate 'is T iff' could be replaced with 'means that' while preserving truth. Davidson himself was never very

clear about the nature of these ancillary constraints, but L and L suggest that 1) the axioms of the theory must be interpretive, where an axiom is interpretive if it 'gives the reference or truth conditions for an object language term using a metalanguage term that translates it' (34), and 2) T-sentences must be derived from axioms by means of canonical proofs, i.e. proofs that 'draw only on the content of the axioms to prove T-form sentences' (36). If the axioms of the theory are interpretive and derivations of the theorems rely only on their content, the theorems will be interpretive as well.

L and L construct a compositional meaning theory meeting all three constraints for what they call 'Simple English$_0$'. Simple English$_0$ contains a single predicate (*is ambitious*), two names (*Caesar* and *Brutus*), three logical constants (*and*, *or*, and *not*), parentheses, and spaces (29). As L and L demonstrate, with a few well-chosen axioms and rules of inference we are able to generate a T-sentence for each of the infinitely many expressions of Simple English$_0$. For example, the T-sentence for (S), 'Brutus is ambitious or Caesar is ambitious', can be generated from interpretive axioms (A1 - A4) by means of a canonical derivation relying only on universal quantifier instantiation (UI), replacement of equivalent expressions (R), and substitution of identities (S).

(A1) The referent of 'Brutus' = Brutus.
(A2) The referent of 'Caesar' = Caesar.
(A3) For all x, 'x is ambitious' is true iff the referent of x is ambitious.
(A4) For all formulae p, q , 'p or q' is true iff p is true or q is true.
(T1) 'Brutus is ambitious or Caesar is ambitious' is true iff 'Brutus is ambitious' is true or 'Caesar is ambitious' is true. (From A4 by UI)
(T2) 'Brutus is ambitious' is true iff the referent of 'Brutus' is ambitious. (A3, UI)
(T3) 'Caesar is ambitious' is true iff the referent of 'Caesar' is ambitious. (A3, UI)
(T4) 'Brutus is ambitious' is true iff Brutus is ambitious. (A1, T2, S)
(T5) 'Caesar is ambitious' is true iff Caesar is ambitious. (A2, T3, S)
(T6) 'Brutus is ambitious or Caesar is ambitious' is true iff Brutus is ambitious or Caesar is ambitious. (T1, T4, T5, R)

Note that (T6) is the T-sentence for S.

The bulk of the book is dedicated to applying the compositional meaning theory embodied in Simple English$_0$ to elements of natural language thought to be problematic for Davidson's approach. Solutions to these difficulties fall into two general categories: 1) dissolutions of the apparent problem by a clarification of Davidson's project, and 2) the introduction of technical maneuvers to render tractable seemingly intractable expressions. Chapter 4, for example, takes up the question of whether a truth theoretic approach can accommodate the Fregean intuition that names have senses. Truth theories, being extensional, would seem to have difficulties handling such intensional objects. Not so, according to L and L, for we have to keep in mind that the axioms of a compositional meaning theory will be *interpretive*. Thus, Fre-

gean intuitions can be accommodated simply by choosing (A5) over (A6): (A5) 'The referent of "Samuel Clemens" = Samuel Clemens'; (A6) 'The referent of "Samuel Clemens" = Mark Twain'. This seems like cheating until we remember that a compositional meaning theory is intended to show only how the meanings of complex expressions depend on the meanings of their primitive parts. It is no part of such a theory to derive the meanings of these primitives from some more primitive source.

Chapter 11, in which L and L present a modified account of Davidson's paratactic account of indirect discourse, provides an example of the second strategy. Consider the following sentences: (1) 'Lois said that Superman flies'; (2) 'Lois said that Clark Kent flies'. Assuming that Clark Kent is identical to Superman, the embedded sentences have identical truth conditions, and yet (1) and (2) do not. These sorts of 'opaque contexts' present difficulties to any approach suggesting that an extensional truth theory can function as a meaning theory, for the embedded sentences seem to be contributing something more than their truth conditions. Davidson attempted to resolve the issue by suggesting a syntactically more perspicuous rendering of (1), namely (1*): 'Lois said that. Superman flies.' That is, a speaker who utters (1) is actually uttering two sentences, one of which is asserted, the other of which is exhibited. It is as if the speaker is saying 'Lois said that' while pointing to an inscription of 'Superman flies'. The inscription is referred to by the speaker, but is not part of the content of her assertion. Thus, any theory that can handle demonstratives can handle indirect discourse as well.

This book goes a long way toward working out the details of Davidson's project, and these details matter. However, they are not all that matters. There is one crucial question L and L never address. The argument for the compositionality constraint is psychological in nature. It is because our minds are finite and our language is not that a theory of the latter has to be compositional. Thus, one might expect that the meaning theory offered by L and L would also be psychological in nature, a description of what a speaker knows in knowing a language. However, L and L are clear that this is not their intent: 'there is no suggestion here that (a compositional meaning theory) is or must be a theory which speakers of the language know, explicitly or implicitly' (19). Rather, a compositional meaning theory 'aims to capture the structure of the dispositions of the speaker which constitute her competence in speaking and understanding speech in the language' (19-20). It is not clear what L and L mean by the 'structure of a disposition', and nothing they say in Chapter 13 on logical form provides much clarification. But if a meaning theory is not intended to provide a description of what speakers know in knowing a language, it is not clear why a theory of meaning has to meet the compositionality constraint. After all, any disposition that can be described by means of a compositional theory can be described by means of a noncompositional theory. So why prefer the former to the latter?

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David McFarland
Guilty Robots, Happy Dogs:
The Question of Alien Minds.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University
Press 2008.
Pp. 256.
US$34.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921929-2);
Cdn$16.95/US$15.95
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921930-8).

David McFarland is a retired professor of animal behavior and robotics who pursues an active interest in philosophy. In this book he treats the question of whether non-human animals and imagined super-robots could be said to have minds. While much of the book brings research in animal behavior and robotics to bear on its theme, McFarland is also well acquainted with the philosophy of mind and he readily appropriates philosophical concepts and terminology — 'philosopher-speak' (50) — when needed. Although several chapters are almost completely devoted to philosophical ideas, I think that philosophers will actually find the non-philosophical sections more stimulating.

Chapter 1, 'Mindless Machines', sets up a taxonomy of increasingly so-phisticated robot behaviors and abilities. Robots can be simply reactive to certain elements of their environment; they can demonstrate 'stigmercy', or '[t]he production of behavior that is a direct consequence of the effects produced in the local environment by previous behavior' (219); a robotic 'goal-achieving system' can change its behavior (by stopping, for instance) when a certain goal has been achieved; a 'goal-seeking system' is designed to work towards the accomplishment of a certain goal 'without the goal being represented within the system' (11), while the behavior of 'goal-directed' systems is informed by such representations. Next comes a discussion of different types of autonomy. Robots can be autonomous as regards their procurement of energy (as exemplified by the fascinating 'slugbot' slug-hunting robot). If a robot is capable of determining which of its goals it will pursue in different circumstances — choosing, for example, either to continue working or to recharge its batteries — it is 'motivationally autonomous'.

Chapter 2, 'Design of Animals and Robots', makes an interesting attempt to explain both the origins of species in nature and the development of robots in a market economy in terms of a single broad evolutionary framework. It also outlines a model of resource management as practiced by both animals and robots. Robots seem very different from biological organisms insofar as they depend upon humans to 'reproduce' them; however, many domesticated animals also reproduce with human assistance. Parasites in nature are similarly highly dependent upon their host organisms. More generally speaking, robots and animals alike are designed to fit particular niches and serve particular functions: 'There is no such thing as a generalized animal; there will never be successful generalized robots' (30). Here McFarland is already gesturing towards one of the book's main points: that human beings

are designed to perform human activities in human environments and thus are endowed with human intelligence and human minds, while other animals are designed to engage in other kinds of activities in other kinds of environments and thus are likely to possess other kinds of intelligence and other kinds of minds.

Chapter 3, 'Interpreting Behaviour', is more philosophical than the previous chapters and perhaps less interesting to philosophers. It offers an overview of the debate over folk psychology and eliminative materialism, continues with a more detailed account of Daniel Dennett's notion of the 'Intentional Stance' and rationality, and concludes with the 'rule of thumb' that 'for an animal or robot to have a mind it must have intentionality (including rationality) and subjectivity' (95), where subjectivity requires not only that the animal/robot has experiences, but also that it *knows* that it has experiences.

The next three chapters introduce a number of phenomena associated with human mental activity (having a 'theory of mind', tool use, qualia, and self-awareness) and describe attempts to uncover their presence in animals through empirical research. I was particularly intrigued by the idea that the presence of subjective experience might be detected by experiments in which animals seem to choose the optimal available combinations of various pains and pleasures. Chapter 7, 'The Material Mind', returns to an overview of standard themes in the philosophy of mind, including mental causation, Searle's Chinese Room, and various brands of functionalism. This is not a particularly strong chapter, and the material is better covered by many introductory texts. Chapter 8, 'Mental Autonomy', includes further discussions of subjective experience and self-awareness and develops a 'wish list' of powers and characteristics that an animal or robot should possess in order for it to be thought of as having a mind. This leads to questions of moral accountability; when something goes wrong, 'Who is to blame, the robot or its designer?' (188). Going beyond the 'motivational autonomy' described in Chapter 1, McFarland suggests that a robot might be designed to step outside pre-programmed decision-making algorithms, to 'take the initiative' and 'break the rules' when necessary (but how would it know when this is necessary?). Perhaps ironically, he mentions in an aside that, '[w]e hope its values would be such that it would not do anything stupid' (198).

The book's surprise conclusion is reserved for its epilogue, 'The Alien Mind'. McFarland holds out little hope for the possibility that science will solve the problems of philosophy. He thinks that the empirical data can accommodate just about any of the various and conflicting theories at play in the contemporary philosophy of mind. The final closing paragraphs suggest that the attribution of mindedness to animals or (future) robots will, at the end of the day, be a matter of social convention.

Despite its anticlimactic conclusion, the book is certainly worth reading. Even in this age of fashionable naturalism, philosophers will still have something to learn from McFarland's style of thinking, with its thorough grounding in robotic engineering and empirical studies of animal behavior. They will certainly come away with a new stock of practical examples and ideas to phi-

losophize about. One odd deficiency of the book is that it seems a bit dated. Its references peter out towards the end of the 1990s and it has nothing to say about the great recent advances in brain research resulting from new imaging technologies. The book is generally well written and is equipped with a useful glossary, which should make it accessible and even interesting for lay readers and undergraduates. There are, however, better first introductions to its more strictly philosophical content.

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Wholly lacking in the obsequious mimicry of the Masters' work so common in continental philosophy today, Mills' book is a true critical introduction. Displaying the interpretive lightness of touch that Agamben's work requires, she patiently explains connections between ideas and thinkers in a manner that commands respect. Especially admirable is a controlled circuit of interpretation that oscillates between close textual engagement and distant critical detachment. It is refreshing that her patience is not infinite, as she shows exasperation with Agamben's often coyly furtive 'argumentation'. The disciplined conclusion of the book is a true gem that adheres closely to her achievement chapter-by-chapter; it surveys the appropriately chosen subjects of metaphysics and language, aesthetics, politics, ethics and messianism.

From the outset, Mills makes it clear that Agamben's work may 'have a logic', but it is dangerous to interpret it as if it has an underlying systematicity. In Agamben's work, 'highly compacted arguments and insights are presented without explication but with a sharp elegance that provokes as much as it compels (2).' A 'densely interconnected conceptual web', it surveys the same conceptual terrain from different perspectives, so that later texts do not necessarily 'complete or address an inadequacy in the earlier text as reinterpreting an aspect of the problem at hand' (2). One can easily perceive the consequences of this in the body of the book. For example, the first chapter's work on language arises again in each of the chapters thereafter, and one might even note that Agamben's 'complex recursive exercise' (2) enables one

to read the chapters backwards, such that claims made in association with messianism in the final chapter are provocatively foreshadowed in the second chapter, which is devoted to aesthetics.

The first chapter surveys Agamben's critical engagement with Hegel and Heidegger on language. His concept of Voice arises from their grounding of language in negativity, producing a debilitating nihilism. And from this his famous concept of 'infancy' emerges as the silent experience of language preceding speech. Mills then clarifies that the concept of potentiality, reconfigured by means of the critique of metaphysics this work on language implies, involves the notion of a negation of negation that recurs forcefully throughout his work. To conceive of language without Voice means 'to open thought to a new experience of language that does not presuppose an ineffability or negativity, and instead thinks language as such' (37).

The second chapter addresses Agamben's vision of an ideal language that communicates only its own communicability. In particular she notes that Agamben is disgusted by a certain 'corrosive nihilistic essence in our conceptions of artistic genius and taste' because of contemporary aesthetics' fixation with a 'metaphysics of will' (36). Typifying this nihilism is Derrida's deconstruction, which demonstrates among other things that the very distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis* has been lost.

Agamben's political theory is the subject of chapter three, which may be the core chapter of the book. Challenging Foucault on biopolitics and intervening in the ferocious dialogue between Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin about sovereignty and the exception, Agamben is also seen to develop another controversial concept — bare life. Ambiguous as it may be, bare life in respect of potentiality is positioned in opposition to certain conceptual developments in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri. Of particular interest may be Agamben's notion of 'happy life', which answers to his demand for a new conception of life that no longer requires a separation between natural life and political life, a life lived in pure immanence, an experience of pure unity (77).

The relation between normativity and nihilism is explored in Chapter 4, where Agamben's controversial position on the National Socialist concentration camps is probed for flaws. Here we learn that Agamben is concerned to purge ethical discourse of any juridical contaminant (98). Unclear to the extreme, his concept of 'happy life' as the vital precondition for any challenge to the prevailing biopolitical democracy is found to be underdeveloped but interesting within the context of his earlier work. Mills is especially critical of Agamben's dismissal of Levinas' concept of 'responsibility'. The astonishing claim that responsibility is dangerously misunderstood as an ethical concept when it is in fact a legal one is shown to be very poorly grounded. Along the way, work on problems of witnessing and testimony, in the camps and more broadly in modernity, are interwoven with the earlier work on language and subjectivity. Mills finds fault with Agamben's effort to establish an ethics without reference to law, or one that does not rely on standard moral concepts such as dignity and respect (81-2) and with his effort to develop an ethics of witness while avoiding questions of relationality (104).

In the concluding chapter, which concerns messianism, Mills takes Agamben to task for the incoherence of his effort to identify a 'coming politics' that is not operative within the terrain of biological and political life. She addresses Agamben's critique of Heidegger on animal life as being 'poor in world', as well as arguments leveled for or against Benjamin, Kojève, and Derrida. After a succinct presentation of Agamben's usage of *kairos*, which she might have compared with similar work done by Antonio Negri, she makes the fine point that 'for Benjamin, the gate to justice is study; for Agamben the gate to happiness is play' (126). She finds fault with this by arguing that '[c]harming as the notion of play might be, it is not hard to imagine that the gestures of playful repetition and temporary *désœuvrement* that Agamben urges may be as empty and deadly as the regime of spectacular capitalism against which they are posed' (128-9). In fact, an analogous objection serves as the conclusion of the book: 'To the extent that Agamben's theory of political liberation is ultimately based on the suspension of the passage of potentiality into action or actuality (doing or being), the worry is that his apparent philosophical radicalism passes into its opposite in the realm of politics (that is, into a "kind of anti-political quietism")' (137). This powerful conclusion, which she takes care to pose as a suggestion for the reader's scrutiny, offers an intriguing frame for the book at large. In other words, for all his demand for a 'coming politics' that avoids traditional metaphysical, linguistic and ethical snares, is there truly anything more than a recursive, exploratory project in Agamben's work, and one that precludes the means to meet the ends he passionately urges us to pursue?

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G. Preyer and **G. Peter**, eds.
Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism.
New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 363.
US$150.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921332-0);
US$49.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921331-3).

The present volume is a timely collection, as both context sensitivity and semantic minimalism are hot topics in current philosophy of language and linguistics, especially in the border dispute between semantics and pragmatics. However, all but the most advanced reader will likely be a bit lost with this volume due to the lack of any editorial guidance. Readers are basically

left to fend for themselves in making sense of the disputes (terminological and substantive) in the fifteen chapters comprising this book. Most of the papers take Cappelen and Lepore *Insensitive Semantics* (Blackwell 2005), as their point of departure (pro or con), and Part 1.1 of Pagin and Pelletier (below) is a useful summary. There are seven chapters under the title 'I. The Defense of Moderate Contextualism' (with contributions from P. Pagin and J. Pelletier, K. Taylor, K. Kepa and J. Perry, I. Maitra, S-J. Leslie, E. Corazza and J. Docik, E. Camp); six chapters under the title 'II. On Critiques of Semantic Minimalism' (with contributions from J. Atlas, J. MacFarlane, L. Clapp, R. Elugardo, P. Robins, H. Jackman), ending with a section entitled 'Back to Semantic Minimalism' with a single article by E. Borg. There are no introductions accompanying Parts 1 or 2, so the reader does not know what holds the chapters in these parts together, nor what the difference between a defense of contextualism and a critique of minimalism might be. Here is a bit or orientation.

Lots of things go by the label 'context sensitivity' (or, better, 'knowledge-of-context' sensitivity). Perry usefully distinguishes three roles for context (cf. the Introduction to Recanati, in *Perspectival Thought*, Oxford 2007, for an elaboration of Perry's taxonomy). First, the *pre-semantic* role of context is to fix the language and operative meaning of the expression uttered. Second, the *semantic* role of context is to determine extension, given meaning (or 'character'). This can be done in two ways: i) allowing context to help fix the content (e.g., proposition) expressed, ii) allowing context to contribute to the circumstance of evaluation (for Kaplan typically a world-time pair), which then fixes extension (e.g. truth-value). Or both, depending on the case. For instance, 'The universe is expanding' uttered at time t might express an eternal content true at any time in case the universe is expanding at t. Or it might express a neutral content, true in circumstance t if the world is expanding at t, but possibly false in circumstances when it is not. There is mischief to be found in having the word 'context' label these two sensitivities; a generic 'situation-sensitivity' with two species, 'context' and 'circumstance' sensitivity, would help. Third, the *post-semantic* role of context is to provide implicit or 'unarticulated' information carried by the utterance, and perhaps such things as implicatures, nonliterality and indirection. One dispute regarding context sensitivity has to do with whether implicit information is best captured at the level of content (most 'contextualists'), circumstance of evaluation (Lewis, MacFarlane), or both (Recanati, op. cit.).

Lots of things go by the name of 'semantic minimalism'. The basic idea common to all forms is that the semantic content of an utterance should be as 'close' as possible to the (compositional) semantics of the sentence uttered. There are four favored ways of getting from linguistic meaning to proposition(s) expressed: i) by 'modulating' the meaning of overt constituents, ii) by 'saturating' overt constituents, such as indexicals, iii) by adding 'unarticulated' constituents by 'completing' a propositional function or radical, or iv) by 'expanding' one proposition into a more appropriate one. Some authors, e.g., Cappelen & Lepore, countenance only a small set of con-

text sensitive items ('contextuals' and 'indexicals'), but allow the fixation of reference of these terms to appeal to speakers' intentions. Others, e.g., Borg, subscribing to modularity, abjure appeals to speakers' intentions in favor of 'individual concepts' of the referents. Finally, some authors (Bach, Recanati) embrace the role of unarticulated constituents in the content expressed; others (Cappelen & Lepore) resist it, or limit it to existential quantification (e.g., Borg's 'liberal' truth conditions), or restrict its scope by finding evidence that it is really not as 'unarticulated' as supposed (e.g., Stanley). Those are a lot of issues (and there are more) — too many to cover here — so I will say a few words about the chapters that open and close the volume and about a chapter each from the book's two main parts.

Cappelen's introduction to the volume, 'Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues', is very useful in orienting the reader to issues surrounding the phenomena of context-sensitivity (if not to the other articles in the volume). He sets out the problem of contextual variation and illustrates it with a selection of examples from the literature. He then illustrates how three explanatory strategies might apply. For example, a semantic explanation of variability of content would be the standard account of indexicals such as 'I' and 'now'. A pragmatic account of variability of content might appeal to i) mechanisms of conversational implicature, or ii) variation in speech act contents due to a) the lack of a proposition ('Kiara has had enough'), or b) speech act multiplicity, or c) unarticulated constituents. An index explanation would not apply to traditional contents, but to distributions of truth value, per MacFarlane (below). Cappelen lists six challenges that the field must meet to make progress, including: developing new diagnostic procedures, clarifying the metaphysics of propositions, relating semantic to speech act content (what is said-asserted), understand contextual mechanisms, accounting for shared content, and fitting in compositionality. He ends by provocatively announcing that there is no semantics-pragmatics distinction and that looking for it is a 'waste of time'.

Korta and Perry's chapter ('Radical Minimalism, Moderate Contextualism') follows Kaplan in holding that linguistic meaning is a feature of linguistic types and determines the 'semantic contributions' to the proposition expressed, whereas 'locutionary content' is a feature of linguistic tokens and is rooted in intuitions about what is said. They favor, along with Cappelen and Lepore and others, a minimalist semantics (lexical meaning plus composition), and hold that pragmatics contributes to what is said, and that there are multiple things said on most occasions of utterance. They think, contra Cappelen and Lepore and others, that the concept of what is said is theoretically useful, but they make no mention of the experimental failures to find such a stable pretheoretic concept. They see an informationally incremental series of propositions expressed, and the utterance-bound proposition has a distinctive role to play by quantifying over the contextual and the intentional — it can be computed from linguistic information alone.

Semantic minimalists, such as Cappelen and Lepore, hold that the sentence 'Jane is tall' can expresses many propositions, such as that she is tall

for a seven year old or tall for a basketball player. But if it does it will always also express the proposition P: that Jane is (just plain) tall. MacFarlane ('Semantic Minimalism, Nonindexical Contextualism') doubts that there is such a proposition (the 'intension problem' — what would a world be like for P to be true?). He argues that P is entailed by any proposition ascribing height to Jane, even P*: 'Jane is (just plain) short'. So if Jane has any height she is (just plain) tall and short. Not good. MacFarlane's solution, which he calls 'nonindexical contextualism' is to incorporate a 'counts as' parameter in the circumstance of evaluation and let the evaluation of the (just plain) proposition vary from circumstance to circumstance. Thus, in a 'basketball player' circumstance P might be evaluated false, but in a 'seven year olds' circumstance is might be evaluated true; hence, context sensitivity without traditional content variability. One major problem to be faced is managing the 'counts as' parameter; is there one n-valued parameter or n-parameters? How are they identified? And are they identified in advance, or only in the circumstance? In any event, much more work needs to be done here.

According to Borg ('Minimalism vs Contextualism in Semantics'), minimalists thinks of contents as the literal meaning of sentences and the result of little or no pragmatic processes, whereas contextualists hold that pragmatic effects are endemic in literal content, and defend their position with three types of argument: i) context shifting ('Jill is tall'), ii) incompleteness ('Steel isn't strong enough'), and iii) inappropriateness ('There is nothing to eat'), where the proposition semantically expressed is not contextually appropriate. In response, Borg's minimalists hold four theses: i) every indexical-free sentence expresses a proposition, ii) only obviously context sensitive expressions such as indexicals require contextual input, iii) semantic content is not the content of the speech act being performed, and iv) there is always a syntactic trigger for contextual contributions to content. On Borg's view it is not the number of context-sensitive items that mark the minimalist-contextualist divide, as Cappelen and Lepore might have it, but rather the type of content and the mechanism that delivers it.

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Yuriko Saito
Everyday Aesthetics.
New York: Oxford University Press 2008.
Pp. 280. $49.50
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927835-0).

In this book Saito explores aesthetic matters of philosophical import in the world beyond art. While, to philosophy's disadvantage, many philosophers ignore — in their work if not in their lives — the lived experience of the everyday stuff of life, Saito dwells on it. The arena of the everyday is not new to Saito. For at least a decade she has been publishing insightful articles on philosophical issues related to everyday aesthetics, including the aesthetics of scenic and unscenic landscapes, packaging, wind farms, and Japanese aesthetic tastes and practices. Here Saito builds on and goes far beyond her previous work, offering an extensive and highly interesting exploration of matters both familiar and underanalyzed. Her book's greatest accomplishment is the case it makes for the theoretical and practical importance of aesthetics, by outlining various ways in which our aesthetic tastes guide our thinking and acting in everyday life. Saito stays true to her aim to 'appreciate and unearth the very familiar and commonly shared dimensions of our lives that have been neglected in theoretical aesthetics and to appreciate their significance, aesthetic or otherwise' (4). And the 'otherwise' here is substantial, for Saito unearths not only the aesthetic importance of the everyday, but also the moral, social, political, and existential importance of aesthetics in general and in the everyday in particular. The path she leads readers on is generously paved with novel and interesting examples that function as landmarks and invitations to take the concepts and ideas presented in new directions.

Saito's aim is twofold: first, to make a case that the aesthetic nature of the world beyond art, of the everyday realm, is philosophically and practically important; second, to argue that a philosophical approach to aesthetics of the everyday must be sensitively oriented toward the distinctive characteristics of these distinctive aesthetic objects. We are all very well aware of the aesthetic features of the natural world and of various artifacts, neither of which are artworks. However, as Saito points out, the approach typically taken by philosophers and non-philosophers alike tends to value non-art entities aesthetically only insofar as they can be seen as akin to art. This assimilationist approach to everyday aesthetics, Saito maintains, distorts our understanding of everyday aesthetics, leading us to undervalue or entirely miss its unique features, breadth, and significance. There is a parity of reasoning here with arguments of aestheticians (e.g., Hepburn, Carlson, Saito, just to name a few) who resist the art-centric model of nature appreciation on the grounds that appreciating nature as if it were art is not to appropriately appreciate nature *as* nature.

The book is divided into five chapters, each contributing to the overarching argument and demonstration that everyday aesthetics is philosophically

and practically important enough that it warrants its own treatment. The first two chapters introduce the topic by outlining the neglect of everyday aesthetics and the resultant environmental consequences of such neglect. Saito explores serious consequences of everyday aesthetics by looking at the environmental implications of everyday aesthetic tastes. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters offer novel and insightful analyses. In these chapters, Saito explores distinctive aesthetic character and ambience, everyday aesthetic qualities and the aesthetics of transience, and, in the final chapter, what Saito calls 'moral-aesthetic judgments'. Throughout these chapters Saito's rich discussion is informed by her deep understanding and first-hand experience of Japanese aesthetics. Saito's final chapter articulates her views on what she calls moral-aesthetic judgments. This chapter is both the most satisfying and the most frustrating of the book. It satisfies by giving voice to something that readers may feel they knew all along, yet didn't know they knew until Saito identified and explained it. The frustration the chapter evokes is due to a tension within it. In some places it seems Saito is defining moral-aesthetic judgments as moral judgments that are based *necessarily* on the aesthetic nature of the designed object, whereas at other points she seems to suggest that such judgments must be based *exclusively* on the aesthetic nature of the designed object. Only the first seems a defensible position. However, it isn't clear whether she intends to defend the stronger, latter view.

Some readers may wish Saito had gone in different directions and perhaps not dwelt on just those specific issues she discussed. Saito's focus is on environmental issues, so-called 'green aesthetics', and Japanese aesthetics. However, her foci are not arbitrary: she is deeply knowledgeable about these areas of aesthetics, both from an academic and a personal perspective. Moreover, these areas lend themselves well to theorizing about everyday matters, because of their frequent intersections with the everyday. Here it is worth mentioning another area of philosophy ripe for such analysis, namely, feminist thought. Saito mentions some of the feminist aspects of her work in passing in the introduction and in a few other places throughout the text, but she never really returns to treat such topics with any real seriousness. However, Saito will likely be content if her book inspires others to explore everyday aesthetics with their own selected foci, feminist aesthetics being an excellent place to start. After all, as Saito states in her concluding remarks, the topics she has covered 'constitute only a small fraction of the rich treasure trove of everyday aesthetics' (243).

This book does not present impenetrable arguments. Saito repeatedly emphasizes its exploratory nature, describing it as an 'open-ended exploration' (4) and 'an initiation for further exploration rather than a definite theory of everyday aesthetics' (243). There is much to think about here and a great deal to debate, which is not to be understood as a fault. Given the novelty of the topic, if this book inspires more dialogue and debate about everyday aesthetics, it will be a great success. It should do just that. On a related note, its exploratory nature, excellent examples, and invitation for debate make the

book very well suited for the classroom, precisely because there is so much to talk about in its pages.

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Malcolm Schofield
Plato: Political Philosophy.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 400.
US$45.00 (paper ISBN-10: 0-19-924946-6).

This is one of seven titles on offer in the Oxford University Press series 'Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought', edited by Mark Philp. The other titles in the series are Aquinas, Aristotle, Durkheim, Machiavelli and De Tocqueville. At present neither the volume under review nor the OUP website indicate any other projected volumes.

Schofield of course needs no introduction to those working in ancient philosophy. He is still perhaps best known for his contributions to *The Presocratic Philosophers*, eds. (ed. Kirk and Raven, Cambridge University Press 1957, second edition 1984). Schofield has produced a great deal of literature on ancient political philosophy since the 1980s, including the important *The Stoic Ideal of the City* (University of Chicago Press 1999).

As is characteristic of Schofield's scholarship, this book reveals not only a surplus of breadth and depth of understanding of both classical context and modern scholarship on Plato, but also a willingness to engage with contemporary political thinkers, such as (to name just a few) Nozick, Habermas, Dworkin and Rawls. Engagement with the latter is a feature all too often missing in Platonic scholarship, and Schofield's ability to engage contemporary thought does us a great service in assessing Plato's viability and relevance as a political thinker in contemporary context. Also of note is Schofield's brief but interesting discussion of the classicism of John Stuart Mill, George Grote and Benjamin Jowett in the nineteenth century, although one laments that he did not say more. One is reminded of the value of nineteenth century Victorian scholarship that was instrumental in giving unified perspectives on Plato to the English speaking world. Such perspectives are becoming all the more important as Plato studies become more and more fragmented and specialized.

Schofield's approach in many ways hearkens back to Victorian scholarship, both in terms of taking Platonic political philosophy as a live discussion

in contemporary context, and in terms of his seeking an underlying unity of thought in Plato's various approaches, positions and dialogues. Hence we are presented with a thematic as opposed to a developmental approach, one which treats the *Republic*, *Laws* and *Statesman* as different aspects and approaches within a single body of thought. Schofield is certainly right in treating the *Republic* as the central project of Plato's political thought, and in inflecting differences in *Statesman* and *Laws* as reflections of different purposes, methods and approaches toward the same essential political orientation, regardless of whether they can be rendered entirely commensurate. The most significant insight in this regard is Schofield's valuable identification of Walzer's distinction between immanent critiques of politics and rejectionist critiques with the approaches of the *Laws* and *Republic* respectively.

I am puzzled by Schofield's apparent conflation of questions of the *Seventh Letter*'s authenticity with the incompatibility of employing the *Seventh Letter* as an interpretive device in the context of the *Republic*. Schofield makes much of the point that the *Seventh Letter* speaks of Socrates' words as Plato's ideas. While it may be desirable to divorce Plato from the Socrates who speaks in the *Republic*, we cannot presume to be the orphaned children of such a divorce, forced to speak of Plato's political philosophy, without the ability to attribute to Plato something of what is said in the *Republic*. Regardless of the authorship of the letter, it would be just as problematic and untenable to suggest that Plato's personal experiences are completely absent from the things that Socrates says in the *Republic*, as it would be to suggest they explain them completely.

In keeping with the unitary approach to Plato's political thought, Schofield incorporates a great deal of learned discussion surrounding other dialogues peripheral to and informing Platonic political philosophy, dialogues such as *Apology*, *Crito*, *Critias*, *Gorgias*, *Euthydemus* and *Protagoras*. The absence of the *Clitophon*, a dialogue that is inextricably bound up with the *Republic* both in theme and character, is surprising, since more and more scholars are attempting to assess what it means to accept the little dialogue as an authentic piece of Plato's, and to evaluate Plato's political philosophy and its relation to Socrates in light of this.

In a review of this length a chapter by chapter synopsis of Schofield's rich text is impossible, but a look at the chapter titles will give some idea of the range of his approach and of the themes undertaken in this original exposition of Plato's political thought. The book contains seven chapters: 1. *The Republic*: Contexts and Projects; 2. Athens, Democracy and Freedom; 3. Problematizing Democracy; 4. The Rule of Knowledge; 5. Utopia; 6. Money and the Soul; 7. Ideology. Following this is a very brief (2 page) conclusion followed by an extensive and extremely valuable bibliography and a meticulously prepared index of passages and general index.

Schofield does provide us with an original and important unified perspective on Plato but not perhaps the best introduction: it is a considered position too well considered, and thus lacking in the generic quality and unambiguous lines required for a beginner's introduction to Plato. Despite the relega-

tion of discussions of contemporary scholarship to endnotes in the interest of keeping a discussion uniformly accessible to a non-specialist, Schofield's very deeply considered position may exceed the level appropriate for a non-specialist's approach to Plato's political philosophy. This is an important work by a major scholar in the field, but one has difficulty seeing how it can be aimed at an audience akin to the audience of Julia Annas' *An Introduction to Plato's* Republic; Schofield's work seems much more appropriate for audiences of texts like Chris Bobonich's *Plato's Utopia Recast*. It is an engaging and insightful original interpretation of Plato, one which will assuredly be of great service to scholars familiar with Plato and contemporary debates in Plato scholarship.

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Gary Allan Scott and **William A. Welton**
Erotic Wisdom: Philosophy and Intermediacy in Plato's Symposium.
Albany: State University of New York
Press 2008.
Pp. 301.
US$85.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-7583-6);
US$28.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-7584-3).

The title of Scott and Welton's book suggests, on the one hand, a reconsideration of philosophy as a way of desiring, and on the other, a claim of philosophy's superiority in relation to the various voices that contribute to the intermediacy of Plato's dialogue. True to the role of Eros in the *Symposium*, Scott and Welton deliver a text that lends support to both of these interpretations without finally dedicating itself to either one: the truth lies somewhere in-between. Scott and Welton are at their best in pursuing the former theme describing Socratic philosophy as erotic striving after wisdom, an intermediate position in which the lover is shaped by the object she pursues. They are less effective in distinguishing philosophy as a superior form of desire from its non-philosophical others that populate the dialogue.

Scott and Welton devote an initial chapter to the prologue or 'framing dialogue' of the *Symposium*, emphasizing the distance at which Plato keeps his readers from central events, longing for a glimpse behind the curtain (31). As a tale retold by multiple, quasi-reliable narrators 'who provide the only access to the event' (30), the *Symposium*'s layered complexity lets 'one

part of [the] dialogue to comment on another', highlighting the importance of intertextual relations and the role of audience in shaping ideas even within the scope of a single dialogue (27-8). As if to prevent the multiple voices of the dialogue from becoming mere cacophony, Scott and Welton remind us that distance also marks distinction in the prologue (34-5). Questions of characters' relative goodness, beauty, and wisdom are at play from the first remarks of Apollodorus to his questioning throng, and these comparisons soon assume the more formal order of a speech-making contest 'between philosophy and its rivals' on the subject of love (43). Scott and Welton remind us that philosophy in Plato's time had not been strictly distinguished from poetic or proto-scientific ways of speaking, and it is from this view of the *Symposium* as a book of distinctions between genres that we are led to compare competing forms of human wisdom in their capacity to address the divine and yet fundamentally human mystery of the erotic (35).

Despite the consideration devoted to framing Plato's narrative, the themes developed in the first chapter are only occasionally present in the discussions of the first five speeches on Eros. Scott and Welton offer a familiar analysis of those speeches preceding Socrates' own, according to the narrative order relayed by Apollodorus and according to the faults and limitations that suit the character of their speakers. As their treatment of each speech reflects the idiosyncrasies of its speaker's erotic striving, their analysis leaves the speeches as a set of fairly independent components whose most common element is that they all pale in comparison to the main event.

Once Socrates and Diotima take the stage, Scott and Welton's reading returns to the more nuanced analysis offered in their treatment of the prologue. Drawing from the relational character of Eros and its place in-between the human and divine, Scott and Welton suggest desire as a general theory of psychological formation according to which the human psyche is constituted by the Forms of those earthly objects it desires (92, 105). Taking their cue from Diotima's association of Eros and philosophy, both being concerned with wanting and pursuing rather than with possessing, Scott and Welton endeavor to explain Socrates' demonstrated superiority over the other speechmakers in terms of the desires that attend his philosophical practice. Developing an idea proposed by earlier commentators on the *Symposium*, they link Socrates' desire to his professed ignorance in the *Apology*, emphasizing his awareness of lack in both cases (97-8). From this position, the superiority of philosophy derives not from its claim to possess its object, but its relative awareness of its own limits in understanding those objects it pursues.

In keeping with the themes of intertextuality, distinction and audience raised in the prologue, the discussion of Socrates' relation to wisdom as a matter of desire seems to present an opportunity to return to some of the earlier speeches, in order to consider the relationship between the speakers, their disciplines of knowledge and their loves in the light of Diotima's wisdom. Scott and Welton leave behind the speechmaking competition, however, in favor of a different sort of intertextuality, namely that between the *Symposium* and *Republic*. Aligning the erotic psychology of the former with

the tripartite psychology of the latter creates some interesting if not always convincing arguments, principally around the arguably circular idea that philosophical desires are nobler because they are inspired by those objects desired by superior human beings (111-12). With the aim of establishing philosophy as the superlative and normative desire by virtue of its unmatched objects, Scott and Welton make a number of distinctions: the desired object from the quality desired in the object, appearance from substance, perceived desires from 'true' desires (108-11, 117-18). In doing so, they also separate out much of those characteristics that make desire different from rationality, and threaten to undo Diotima's unified account of Eros as an intermediary between the human and divine by separating out higher and lower desires.

Scott and Welton draw attention to several questions about Plato's doctrine of desire that are left partially answered. They vacillate over the question of whether we have desires or desires have us (184) and seem to avoid the question of lower desires' divinity entirely. In comparing desires according to their object, they reintroduce dualisms of desire critiqued in earlier speeches, and they neglect Diotima's own valuation of various desires according to the procreation they inspire. Yet because of their emphasis on Eros as in-between, these unfinished ends seem to suit their topic. An appendix indicates various points of erotic intermediacy across the Platonic dialogues, suggesting the broad scope entailed in their vision and the work still to come on the subject. Much like Diotima's assessment of Eros' value in inspiring procreation, the significance of Scott and Welton's articulation of philosophy as desire is that it points to a significant lack in our understanding of the relationship between wisdom and the love of it, inspiring the reader to re-examine Plato's dialogues for traces of philosophy as a practice of divinely inspired desire.

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Bert van den Brink and **David Owen, eds.**
Recognition and Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.
Pp. 414.
US$99.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-86445-9).

Contemporary critical theory faces the ironic situation of having a lack of 'critical' thought represented in the majority of books published on its topic. The fact that one can usually count on a single hand the list of interlocutors discussed in the spate of works purportedly about rethinking the post-Kantian charge to evaluate existing norms and theorize alternative ways for more agents to live a good, free life, outside structures of domination, underscores this unfortunate state. Moreover, while First and Second Wave critical theorists affiliated with the Frankfurt Institute and influenced by Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud successfully made the case internal to Europe for reevaluating social struggles and what Michel Foucault called processes of normalization, many of these twentieth-century intellectuals failed to address the implications of the dialectics of recognition and power *both* within and outside of Europe and Euroamerica. If one aspires to arrive at solutions to the modern human condition, as Hannah Arendt implored, and describe the interstices of those located at modernity's underside, as Enrique Dussel has suggested, then a radical reinvigoration of theory is needed. Thankfully, there is a thinker whose oeuvre from the late twentieth to early twenty-first century continues to expand the boundaries of critical theory in a globalized world that now faces pressing challenges amidst collapsing international markets. That thinker is the Third Wave German critical theorist, Axel Honneth.

This important edited volume by van den Brink and Owen is the defining English-language resource for Honneth's social and political theory. The text contains essays by some of the world's leading scholars whose objective is to examine the ambitious research program developed by Honneth in *The Struggle for Recognition* (1992) and subsequent works. Commentary on Honneth over the last fifteen years has emphasized overwhelmingly Honneth's unique articulation of the concept of recognition. The present work, however, attempts to frame Honneth's understanding of recognition alongside his theorization of the idea of power. As the editors note, '[t]he aim of this volume is to offer a critical clarification and evaluation of this research program and particularly its relationship to the other major development in critical social and political theory over recent years — the focus on power as constitutive of practical identities' (1-2). Later in the Introduction, the editors further explain that the text engages the 'relation of recognition and power' (20).

The core of the volume comprises eleven new essays separated into three sections entitled respectively 'Philosophical Approaches to Recognition' (with contributions by Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen, Robert Pippin, van den Brink, and Patchen Markell), 'Recognition and Power in Social Theory' (with

contributions by Beate Rössler, Lior Barshack, and Iris Marion Young), and 'Recognition and Power in Political Theory' (with chapters by Rainer Forst, Veit Bader, Anthony Simon Laden, and Owen). The concluding fourth section is a gem, in that Honneth provides his own original chapter in addition to a 'Rejoinder' responding meticulously to the critics' probing queries. Although these essays were published slightly prior to Honneth's recently released English-language books, *Reification* (2008) and *Pathologies of Reason* (2009), Honneth indicates that those texts would be forthcoming, hence reinforcing why this edited volume is a definitive, up-to-date collection.

While Honneth's body of work transcends the narrow list of thinkers in much contemporary critical theory — as his discussions of Ralph Ellison, Frantz Fanon, and the periodic political-philosophical exchanges with Nancy Fraser attest — there are five figures in particular whom the chapters in this volume examine in relation to Honneth: G.W.F. Hegel, Theodor Adorno, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In Part 1, Ikäheimo and Laitinen provide a philosophical exploration into the nuances between the ideals of recognition and acknowledgment, paving the way for Pippin, van den Brink, and Markell to address Honneth's readings of Hegel, Adorno, and Mead. Markell's deftly argued 'The Potential and the Actual' explores Mead's fluctuating explications of the notions of the 'I' and the 'me', notions that are intended to explain two sources of the self and the gulf between potentiality and the actualized agency of individuals and groups. Markell contends that Honneth adopts Mead's unstable political language in theorizing recognition, thus mistaking interpreting the recognition of agents as a potential attribute in need of actualization. For Markell, Honneth's own system has the resources for revising it and accepting that humans — enslaved, free, and liminal — all have inherent degrees of agency (100-132).

Part 2 is not simply about recognition in social theory. Rössler, Barshack, and Young apply Honneth's conceptualization of recognition and imaginings on the interrelationships among love, rights, and solidarity to debates in feminist thought and psychoanalysis. What is revealing, as well as ironic, is that Young invokes Rousseau for exactly the opposite reasons as post-*Struggle* Honneth. Whereas Young faults Honneth for adopting Rousseau's patriarchal system of conjugal love (189-212), Honneth in *Disrespect* (2007) and other current works builds upon Rousseau (*not* Kant) as the foundational modern critical theorist arguing against domination in favor of freedom. In Part 3, Laden's chapter distinguishes itself as the sole entry explicitly interrogating Honneth's ideals of recognition and power (270-89). Owen's contribution also is novel because it is the only essay focused on Honneth's reading of Dewey and the implications of this for democratic theory (290-320).

Honneth's chapter, 'Recognition as Ideology', is simultaneously the lead essay to a concluding section and a piece aimed at renewing the research agenda begun in *Struggle*. Honneth distinguishes Louis Althusser's negative ideological view of recognition in the public sphere from what he calls an ethical, 'moderate value realism' conception of recognition (334-7). Moderate

value realism for Honneth leads to two factors: heightened autonomy and progress. The volume ends peculiarly without either a discussion of Fraser's dual systems critique of Honneth or inquiry into Honneth's theory of power developed in *The Critique of Power* and subsequent writings. A question left unanswered throughout the collection is the extent to which all the essays, save one, overemphasize Honneth's idea of recognition as first principle instead of sufficiently investigating equally Honneth's notion of power. Criticisms notwithstanding, the works presented shall certainly be the subject of discussions for years to come.

This book is required reading for anyone concerned with the thought of Axel Honneth, the dialectics of struggles for recognition, the regimes of power out of which recognition struggles emerge, and the fate of truly 'critical' theory today.

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Based on a doctoral dissertation, this work is a significant contribution to the interpretation of the moral thought of the Basran Mu'tazilites, one branch of a medieval Islamic school of thought often associated with rationalism and in recent years held up as an inspiration by 'modernist reformers' in certain Muslim circles. At the center of Mu'tazilite thought, Vasalou plausibly claims, is the concept of desert, the 'unanalyzable *definiens* of all moral language' (76). With this *definiens* in mind, the book examines a series of theoretical issues including intuitionism and the relation between faith and reason in moral knowledge, the commensurability of moral value, the grounds that generate desert, the agents who are bound by desert-relations, the justificatory force of the obligation that such desert relations establish, and the metaphysics of enduring souls that carry desert across time. All of these topics, among others, are parts of the 'conceptual edifice built around the notion of desert' (x). The result of Vasalou's excavation of this edifice is a lively and often labyrinthine analysis of thinkers who have received little attention in Western intellectual circles.

Simplistic accounts of Mu'tazilite ethics often depict an objective and deontological moral economy, whereby the exemplification of certain act descriptions give rise to rewards and punishments in an austere nomological fashion and carry the force of strict obligations. Thus, to take a simple example, failing to repay a debt would necessarily and always give rise to blame and punishment, by virtue of a relation of desert tying act and consequence together. Vasalou builds on the work of previous scholars to show that this simplistic picture is inadequate: conditions pertaining to the agent such as intention and the absence of compulsion are required if an act is to generate desert; factors about subsequent actions affect the realization of deserved treatments; and while desert is a fundamental part of moral ontology, it is only one ground for determining whether something is unjust, utilitarian calculations serving as a second and distinct ground. She also goes much further than previous scholarship in exploring additional details concerning desert. For example, she traces Mu'tazilite reflection on whether the act of punishing itself should be construed as good because it is deserved. The consensus that emerged over time, she claims, argued toward the conclusion that while punishment might be judged to be good, it is not good because it is deserved. In part, this conclusion rested on the fact that desert was not a 'ground' of goodness. Further, the question of whether punishment is good or not arises in the first place because of a presupposed asymmetry between reward and punishment: while the justificatory force of reward is one of necessity, deserved punishment has the force only of a permission.

Because Vasalou's analysis takes the form of a commentary that tracks a large number of related claims, it resists concise summary. Nonetheless, one point that resurfaces in several places is a claim about the Mu'tazilites 'extrinsic perspective on the moral agent' (115). She argues that the Basrans understood desert not as attaching, first and foremost, to interior states of an agent, such that Jones deserves punishment for certain acts that he performed, but rather to third-person observers, and the actions that they have reasons to perform, for example, punishing. This extrinsic perspective gives rise to a conceptual matrix that 'forces open a space of questioning concerning the *agent* who is responsible for making the adjustments of the order when violated or respected — that is, of giving deserts' (62). For Vasalou, this insight is closely tied to her claim that Mu'tazilite moral thought was thoroughly interwoven with both legal and theological reflection. The legal context of medieval Islamic moral thought provided an order that helped to render commensurate harms and benefits through a system of rights, obligations, and values, and emphasized systems of acts. The more encompassing theological context for legal discourse adds a further layer of complexity. One of the agents 'responsible for . . . giving deserts', after all, is God. This presupposition fits well with the further claim that faith and reason were intertwined in understandings of legal judgment and the justification of legal norms. These theological assumptions also gave desert a distinctive shape; for example, it helped account for the asymmetry between reward and punishment. Finally, because ultimately the response to moral violations was

ascribed to 'God as a private claim', the Mu 'tazilites were able to qualify an 'austere objectivist view of values' by granting some discretion to 'the will of moral subjects who could decide what force to give to their own rights' (86). These interwoven legal and theological discourses also raise additional puzzles and potential aporia, which the author attempts to track and integrate in her exposition.

Vasalou does not seek explicitly to persuade the reader that Mu'tazilite thought ought to be of more than antiquarian interest, even though her exposition is enlivened by her own philosophical sensibilities, and she drops occasional asides to readers who might wish to develop Mu'tazilite trajectories of thought in the future. She is scrupulous about the ways in such trajectories resist easy translation into modern Western thought, and is an instructive critic of past interpreters who have neglected the theological and legal context of that moral thought only to misrepresent it. She is right, I suspect, in claiming that Mu'tazilite perceptions of 'what explained itself and what needed to be argued' (95) are different than 21st century Western philosophical perceptions. But she comes close, at points, to suggesting that Mu'tazilite theological and legal assumptions 'furnish the bounds of the rationality peculiar to them' (38) in a way that prevents one from entering into a constructive argument with them. On this last point, she may underestimate the way in which her own study overlaps with current interests in the fields of philosophical theology and comparative ethics. Readers looking for more constructive argumentation about what one ought to think concerning desert will probably be unsatisfied with this book. Those who wish to engage the Islamic tradition of moral thought, however, if they have sufficient background, will find it a rich interpretive resource that may be of great use to them in their own endeavors.

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Rebecca L. Walker and
Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds.
*Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and
Contemporary Moral Problems.*
Toronto and New York: Oxford University
Press 2007.
Pp. 319.
Cdn$127.00/US$99.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927165-8);
US$37.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-957086-7).

Traditional ideas about virtue and virtue theory are often founded upon Aristotle's concept of *eudaimonia*, that is, upon a broad concept of human happiness that is usually associated with ideas about human flourishing. Various metaphors such as the leaf that shades well (Aristotle) or the knife that cuts well (Philippa Foot) are offered by virtue theorists to explain and expound upon this notion of human flourishing. But human life is not necessarily lived (or lived well) merely as a generalized state of being or as a *status quo*. To live is to do, to act, and to choose. And many, if not most, of our actions and choices are role-based. That is, we flourish as a parent if we parent well. We flourish as an entrepreneur, a professional, or an employee, if we perform our work-related tasks well. And we flourish in relationship to others, if we interact well with them.

This anthology of articles on the subject of virtue ethics views virtue largely through the lenses of the roles played by people. Various work-related roles are highlighted, but the subject matter of this book is not limited to the workplace. Instead, the articles cover a broad range of contemporary moral issues, but do so within the language and the conceptual framework of virtue ethics. If there is anything that serves as a common denominator, it is the confidence that virtue ethics offers something more — something more helpful, more insightful, more practical, and perhaps more useful — than traditional Enlightenment notions of rules-based deontological or utilitarian regimes. The proposition that virtue works well, at work and elsewhere, is explored critically and poignantly.

Among the workplace-related roles examined, are those played (or, more precisely, worked) by teachers, lawyers, military professionals, business managers, medical doctors (including both general practitioners and specialists such as psychiatrists) and other health care professionals. Other contributions, less connected to the workplace, address virtue ethics in regard to the ecological environment, non-human animals, race relations, family relationships, and social concerns about such realities as famine and poverty.

One of the more striking articles is Nancy Sherman's piece entitled 'Virtue and a Warrior's Anger'. In a manner reminiscent of Aristotle's approach to the idea of courage, Sherman presents anger as a behavioral response that can in some limited circumstances be interpreted to be a virtue. In other circumstances, the response functions as a vice. The soldier whose anger pro-

pels him to appropriately forceful actions and reactions on the battlefield (or, more often, as a peacekeeper under attack by insurgents), may discover, upon return home, that his newly learned habitual rage is no longer helpful. In fact, it is dangerous and devastating to family and friends. Civilian life's everyday insults, thwarted plans, and sudden disruptions, will often require that the military professional learn (or re-learn) non-vengeful responses and behaviors. As she sorts out the various facets and nuances of anger as both a virtue and a vice, Sherman adopts both a historical and an analytical stance that give heft and credence to her ultimate conclusions about the irrationality of some forms of anger, and about therapeutic strategies in regard to anger.

Christine Swanton's contribution on the topic of business ethics also stands out among the roles-based analyses. For Swanton, virtues can be understood both generally and specifically. Virtues, in her view, constitute admirable traits of character generally, but are often better understood in context. She considers the possibilities and parameters of the meta-ethics of virtue-ethical role-ethics, and elaborates on the notion that the goodness of a role is more or less understood by reference to its place in the life of a good human being. It may seem to the reader that conflicts between being a good human being generally, and being a good human being while performing or working a role, should seldom exist — unless, for example, thought is given to what it means to be a good businessperson. Indeed, being a good businessperson may seem to some to represent an oxymoron. Swanton tackles this dilemma by considering specific prototype virtues within and without a business or business management context, and concludes by offering a critique of the manner in which virtue ethics is often applied to business ethics.

Not all of the content of this book is keyed to roles. A chapter on law, morality, and virtue by Peter Koller, for example, does not address legal ethics as such. Instead, it serves as a systematic presentation of the relationships between virtue and morality, between law and morality, and between law and the virtues. In regard to the latter, Koller points out that the law is generally inefficient to the extent that it cannot adequately result in 100 percent compliance at all times by all citizens (largely because at some time or another some people will discover and take advantage of no-risk opportunities for non-compliance), and to the extent that enforcement relies upon cooperation by the citizenry rather than solely upon law enforcement. He also addresses the influence of the 'tone at the top' (that is, of the sense of justice exhibited by the highest officeholders) as a limiting or enhancing factor in the effectiveness of law enforcement. Koller shows how the virtues play an important role in both supporting the law by filling in some of these gaps, and in making it possible for individuals and societies to achieve more than they would achieve if the minimum standards of the law served as the only standards of conduct within a society.

In short, this anthology offers the reader a *mosaic of concepts* that, taken together, show how virtue ethics is more than merely an alternative to deontological and utilitarian approaches to moral philosophy. The classical ar-

ticulations of virtue theory, in both Western and Eastern traditions, serve as reference points that allow a twenty-first-century reader to consider the role of virtues in society, and the virtues of various roles within society. The contributions to this work constitute reliable and comprehensive observations and analyses that draw from those reference points, but do so in the direction of a fresh and highly relevant understanding of practical wisdom.

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David Wills
Dorsality: Thinking Back through Technology and Politics.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2008.
Pp. 280.
US$67.50 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8166-5345-4);
US$22.50 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8166-5346-1).

Wills' book begins with a neologism of sorts, a noun derived from an adjective referring to the backside of a body; under Wills' novel spin, it also refers to the back of our thought. Regarding the former, the notion of dorsality serves to describe the constitution of a human body and, therefore, humanity; regarding the latter, it is a standard philosophical practice of looking back or beyond and into the customary conditions of possibility of philosophy. This is not a book about the latest technological developments in metallurgy or biotechnology; rather, it is a philosophical treatise concerning the conceptual framework that governs our understanding of technology.

As spelled out by Plato and Aristotle, and interpreted by Heidegger, Derrida, and Wills, *techne* means both art and craft — that is, both artistic creation and technological production. To grasp fully the meaning of technology, one must inquire into the nature of both. Moreover, following the thesis of his *Prosthesis*, which according to Wills, is to be seen as a 'back-ground' for this work, there is no pure, natural, non-prosthetic origin; instead, everything is always already infused by the artificial (245). The same applies to humans: there is no pristine, simple human that later creates technology; instead, moving the timeline of evolutionary biology by following the anthropologist Leroi-Gourhan, Wills asserts that technology is literally embedded in our upright stance which in turn frees our thought-creating brains and tool-mak-

ing hands. Technology as production/creation by humans of something other than human, as a differentiating force, is, after all, not something other than human.

Wills' work is made up of a series of readings ranging from Exodus and Homer to Rimbaud, Sade, Heidegger, and Derrida. Given his background in literary theory and practice in deconstruction, Wills mainly focuses on the Western literary and philosophical tradition. Wills' method and style are decidedly deconstructive. Unlike *Prosthesis*, *Dorsality* does not employ an elaborate personal autobiographical conceit and, as such, is more akin to his *Matchbook*. Thematically, it explores the areas of ethics, politics and sexuality. Wills refers to the standard-bearers of continental philosophy and literary theory such as Blanchot, Barthes, Lyotard, Deleuze, Derrida, Nancy, and Lacoue-Labarthe, as well as the more recent, rising stars such as Giorgio Agamben and Bernard Stiegler. On a more personal note, one of the concepts developed — namely, that of 'leaving' as 'the originary moment of thinking (and desiring)' — is said to be owed to Branka Arsić, to whom, it may be inferred from a reference to the first name in the dedication, the book is dedicated (251).

Dorsality is 'framed' by black and white reproductions of art works that precede epigraphs. The works range from Salvador Dalí and Frida Kahlo to Bill Viola, and even include a photograph of Emily Dickinson's tombstone by Wills himself. The common theme among most of these seem to be women and (fragmented, disintegrating) bodies.

'The Dorsal Turn' serves as an introduction to both the notion of dorsality and the rest of the book. In 'Facades of the Other: Heidegger, Althusser, Levinas', in addition to discussing Althusser's analysis, via the notion of interpellation, of the constitution of the political subject in 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' and Levinas' notion of ethical relation, Wills offers a reading of a number of Heidegger's texts with a focus on 'The Question concerning Technology'. Through the analysis of Heidegger's shifts, turns and step-backs, Wills attempts to recover Heidegger's rejection of technology.

'No One Home: Homer, Joyce, Broch' describes the odyssey of 'polytropic' and 'polytechnic Odysseus' by developing the concept of 'originary exile' or 'technotropological departure'. Departing from one end of Western literary history, the chapter arrives at the other end by examining Joyce's *Ulysses* and Broch's *Death of Virgil*. Along the way, Wills asks: 'What if, "before" any act of creation or procreation, before any domestication via the womb or the earth, before any Earth Mother or Uranus, any Rangi or Papa, any Zeus or Hera, there were only the fiction of the same? What if the origin could only ever be conceived (of) in the form of such a construction, if the originary home were a possibility of a concept, a technotropological hypo-prosthesis that is the opening to inventing, to thinking and to fiction?' (82). In a similar fashion, 'A Line Drawn in the Ocean: Exodus, *Freud, Rimbaud*' looks further into the formation of national identity, this time by means of, literally speaking, oceanographic exploration — that is, by describing the rhetorical force of the ocean in Exodus, Freud and Rimbaud.

'Friendship in Torsion: Schmitt, Derrida' examines the possibility of un-natural (technological, prosthetic) friendship as developed by Wills' 'sorely missed' friend Derrida in his analysis of Schmitt in *The Politics of Friendship*. 'Revolutions in the Darkroom: Balász, Benjamin, Sade' is an essay in aesthetics that takes a penetrating look at dorsal sexuality via a series of reversals (theory/practice, aesthetic/political, nature/technological artifice) cinematically developing in Sade's darkrooms. Moving from perversion to controversion, the final chapter, 'The Controversy of Dissidence: Nietzsche', examines Nietzsche's deicide and concludes that: 'Henceforth, whichever way we walk, we are all on Nietzsche's path' (243).

Effectively demonstrating Wills' dexterity and the breadth and scope of his interest, this is an excellent book. It is essential reading for those practicing continental philosophy, aesthetics, or literary theory. It could be an interesting read for those interested in philosophy in general or those engaged in foundational aspects of technology studies.

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