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Stacy Alaimo and **Susan Hekman, eds**.
Material Feminisms.
Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press 2008.
Pp. 435.
US$60.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-253-34978-1);
US$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-253-21946-6).

This anthology aims 'to bring the material, specifically the materiality of the human body and the natural world, into the forefront of feminist theory and practice,' so as to counter the perceived *'impasse* caused by the contemporary linguistic turn in feminist thought' (1). Although the dichotomy between 'social constructionism' and 'materiality' feels over-drawn and repetitive, this volume achieves its more conciliatory ambition 'to build on rather than abandon lessons learned in the linguistic turn' (6).

Part 1, 'Material Theory', outlines 'the broad parameter of issues confronting material feminisms' today (10). Opening, Elizabeth Grosz examines feminism's traditional hostility towards Darwin's evolutionary biology and identifies much of significance in Darwin's writings — his logic of self overcoming and model of history for example — 'that may be of value for developing a more politicized, radical and far reaching feminist understanding of matter, nature, biology, time, and becoming — objects and concepts usually considered outside the direct focus of feminist analysis' (46). Grosz encourages feminism to broaden its discursive horizons to enrich its own discourses and political models through 'growth and self-transformation' (40).

In 'On Not Becoming Man', Claire Colebrook argues some of the 'best work in feminist philosophy takes the form of vitalism: refusing the idea that matter needs to be granted meaning by thought' (56); a stark rejoinder to the 'exhaustion and limits of the linguistic paradigm' (52). Critically examining the concept of 'matter' as it appears in the work of Grosz, Hegel, Bergson, Butler, Foucault and Deleuze, Colebrook conceives of matter as 'positive difference', which no longer simply places the body at the service of a productive life-giving culture. Liberating the material from actualization, Colebrook concludes with an image of feminist art criticism and politics which affirms the potentiality of materiality for non-realization, dispersion, inertia and non-identity.

In 'Constructing the Ballast', co-editor Hekman follows Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour in seeking to recover 'the material' not by returning to modernist objectivity or affirming unrestrained play, but by seeking to understand it in discursive terms. The counter-balance is to show language not as *constituting reality*, but *disclosing* reality, a position which helps to develop a (feminist) social ontology of the subject which recognizes identity to be both material and discursive, helping to incorporate 'both bodies and social scripts' (115).

In 'Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter comes to Matter', Karen Barad replaces both social constructionism and

traditional realism with a very different theory of knowledge: 'agential realism'. Building on the philosophy-physics of Niels Bohr, this 'onto-epistemology' ('the study of practices of knowing in being' [147]) takes reality to consist of *phenomena* reconstituted through 'intra-action' with the intervention of knowers. This 'posthumanist materialist account of performativity . . . challenges the positioning of materiality as either given or the mere effect of human agency' (145); it thereby fatally undercuts, in terms of intra-action (or co-implication), foundational inscriptions of such dualisms as nature/culture, human/non-human, and the material/the discursive.

Part 2, 'Material World', 'addresses the principle subject of science: nature . . . [a] treacherous terrain for feminism' (12). Opening, Donna Haraway calls for another relationship to nature besides that of 'reification, possession, appropriation and nostalgia' (158). Through three autobiographical stories about demarcation and continuity among actors — organic or not — Haraway argues that our understanding of nature must incorporate 'historically located people and other organisms or parts of organisms as well as technological artifacts' (167). Turning away from old subject/object, nature/culture, human/non-human binaries, she fleshes out a universe 'replete with "material-semiotic actors"' (12), and figures like the cyborg, trickster coyote and the Onco Mouse; this is a new ethical space generated by 'interesting intercourse with possible subjects (human and non-human) about livable worlds' (184).

Also concerned with the material-semiotic, Nancy Tuana in 'Viscous Porosity: Witnessing Katrina' implores *all* theorists, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans, to embrace an interactionist ontology (and its concomitant epistemology) that '*rematerializes the social and takes seriously the agency of the natural*' (188), thereby abandoning all ontological divides between nature and culture, as well as the human and non-human. Attention to the '*porosity*' of material-semiotic interactions 'helps to undermine the notion that distinctions . . . signify a natural or unchanging boundary', and '*viscosity*' 'retains an emphasis on resistance to changing form' (194).

In an interesting take on matters, Vicky Kirby in 'Natural Conversations' asks: 'What if culture was really nature all along?' (214). For if nature is neither lacking, nor primordial, but rather 'a plenitude of possibilities, a cacophony of convers(at)ion', then perhaps it is the same 'force field of articulation, reinvention, and frission' (234) that we are used to calling 'Culture'. And if this *is* the case, then rather than reject the conflation of 'woman' with 'nature', feminism should *embrace* this identification and consider the question of origins and identity more rigorously.

Similarly criticizing the 'flight from nature' of much postmodern and poststructuralist feminism, co-editor Alaimo argues that discussion of the materiality of the body is too often restricted to how various bodies have been discursively produced, which 'casts the body as passive, plastic matter' (238). Instead, she proposes we inhabit a 'trans-corporeality' — 'the time-space where human corporeality, in all its material fleshiness, is inseparable from "nature" or "environment" ' (238). Alaimo gives the example of 'toxic bodies', which demonstrate that 'environmentalism, human health, and social

justice cannot be severed' (262). In the process, an epistemological space is envisaged which 'allows for both the unpredictable becomings of other creatures and the limits of human knowledge' (262).

Catherine Mortimer-Sandilands' 'Landscape, Memory, and Forgetting: Thinking Through (My Mother's) Body and Place' uses her experience of her mother's Alzheimer's to 'consider the social and deeply personal, ways in which embodiment is intertwined with relationships between and among reflection, perceptual experience and landscape' (271). She argues we must ask how both symbolic reflection and sensuous perception are phenomenally organized in particular techno-historical relationships between human bodies and others. Taking in environmental philosophy, Jane Urquhart's *A Map of Glass*, the science of Alzheimer's, and a deeply personal, poetic account of her mother's disease, Mortimer-Sandilands concludes (against David Abram) that landscape continues 'to embody, support and create memory', and that we must 'seek to cultivate an awareness of and respect for this process through our environmental philosophies and activisms' (238).

Taking the physicality of the human body into account in 'our' theorising is reinforced in Part 3, Material Bodies'. In 'Disability Experience on Trial' Tobin Siebers argues, against an inaccurate version of 'poststructuralism' (absolute critique and the denial of experience), that social identity is both constructed and *real*. He argues that disability experience demonstrates 'both the social construction of experience and the political promise arising from the knowledge that experience is constructed; such experiences helping to clarify the fact that identities many contain legitimate claims to knowledge, and this knowledge, once verified, is a valuable weapon against the oppression of minority people' (297).

In 'How Real is Race?' Michael Hames-Garcia explores 'some of the contradictions between social and biological conceptions of the reality of race' (308), arguing against critics of identity politics like Wendy Brown that racial identities can be useful, productive and transformative, and that their political potential 'can benefit from a substantive account of their material reality (309). Pointing to racial identity projects like the Harlem Renaissance and the Negritude Movement, he concludes that it is only by letting these and similar project identities flourish 'that we will be able to find possibilities for a more egalitarian future' (332).

Wendy Brown also features in Suzanne Bost's essay on the shifting matter of Chicana feminism; this time in order to affirm the move away from the 'nominal security of identity politics', towards a more heterogeneous, roving, relatively non-institutionalised, democratic politics of the sort Bost identifies in the work of Chicana feminists Gloria Anzaldua and Cherrie Moraga. As Bost argues, personal experiences of pain, illness, disability and medical treatment led both women increasingly to focus on the body 'as sentient, ever-changing, always important and highly vulnerable' (362); helping to conceive new ways of thinking about identity and new bases of coalition — physical needs, shared environments — that are not race/sex specific.

In 'Organic Empathy: Feminism, Psychopharmaceuticals, and the Embodiment of Depression', Elizabeth A. Wilson also seeks to recast feminism's political foundations, arguing in recent years they have been restrictively anti-biological, which has 'left academic feminism in a singularly ineffectual position for analyzing the new biochemical treatments of depressive states' (374). Focusing on the biological effects of the SSRI and SNRI antidepressants, Wilson argues that projects that 'lean on and amplify biological data' open themselves up to 'a more vibrant source of political agency and energy' (390), by taking into account the 'intimate cohabitation' of registers (the biochemical and the psychological for example) previously ignored in traditional mind/body schemata.

The final piece, 'Cassie's Hair', once again reminds us of how the biological and the social interact. To this end, Susan Bordo contrasts 'abstract' conceptions of difference of the sort gleaned through her own experience of the materiality of her biracial daughter's hair. Through this intimate, touching family portrait, the physicality of bodies are shown to demonstrate the inextricable co-implication of the personal, the political and the material, with Cassie's cornrows serving as a parting reminder to the reader of the mantra of this volume: matter *matters*.

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Deane-Peter Baker, ed.
Alvin Plantinga.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.
Pp. 233.
US$85.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-85531-0);
US$24.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-67143-9).

This volume consists of an introduction, eight new essays discussing Plantinga's work, and the text of Plantinga's previously unpublished notes, 'Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments'.

1. Graham Oppy's 'Natural Theology' offers a work-by-work survey of Plantinga's discussions of natural theology and natural a-theology from 1967 to 2000, tracing the development of Plantinga's views of both what natural theology is and how successful it is. This essay concentrates on the detail rather than trying to argue an overall thesis, though Oppy does not hide his own views.

2. Richard M. Gale's 'Evil and Alvin Plantinga' works through (i) Plantinga's famous free-will defense against the logical problem of evil, and (ii) his defense of theistic skepticism against the evidential problem of evil. In (i) Gale argues that while counterfactuals of creaturely freedom may be true, they do not relieve God of his causal responsibility for the free actions of human agents. Gale's main argument against (ii) is that 'it seems to require that we become complete moral skeptics' (67). This doesn't follow; from the fact that something happened we can infer that God wanted (in some sense) it to happen, but it doesn't follow from the fact that something is threatening to happen that God wants it to happen. So Gale is wrong to allege that 'the result of this moral skepticism is paralysis of the will, since we can have no reason for acting' (67). It should also be noted that Gale does not address Plantinga's recent attempt at theodicy in his essay 'Supralapsarianism, or "O Felix Culpa" ' in Inwagen's 2004 *Christian Faith and The Problem of Evil*.

3. John Divers' 'The Modal Metaphysics of Alvin Plantinga' identifies Plantinga as a major contributor to the contemporary 'research programme . . . in the metaphysics of modality' (74), and then summarizes his contribution in terms of twelve theses. Collectively these reveal that 'he is the consummate realist and antiempiricist modal metaphysician' (86). Divers briefly raises three lines of criticism. First, Plantinga does little to interact with that version of antirealism that is agnostic about the need even to posit modal reality to explain our modalizing. (In addition, Plantinga does not defend the utility of modal locutions against those that think them dispensable.) Secondly, it is unclear how and to what extent Plantinga's 'modal theorizing' is an 'explanatory advance' in our understanding of modality (86-7). Thirdly, the notion of a power set seems to generate a major inconsistency for Plantinga's modal metaphysics, at least if the latter is committed to there being a maximal consistent set of some kind.

4. In 'Natural Theology and Naturalist Atheology: Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism', Ernest Sosa discusses Plantinga's famous argument that if one believes that one is the product of random evolutionary forces then one should not trust one's cognitive faculties since one has no reason to trust them: the random evolutionary forces are unlikely to have made them reliable. But that means that one should also not trust the deliverance of one's cognitive faculties that evolutionary naturalism itself is true, hence such a position is self-defeating. Sosa suggests two possible replies for the naturalist: first, 'perhaps we could not have been in existence, all of us, deprived of our successful cognitive faculties,' (103) and, second, since 'believing that our faculties are unreliable is self-defeating, as is even suspending judgment on that question,' (105) 'on the question whether your faculties are reliable, you have no rational choice but to assent, therefore, and so you would be within your rights to draw the further conclusion that *if* your origins are evolutionary, *then* such origins cannot make your faculties unreliable' (105, italics added). But if, as Plantinga suggests, the 'probability that our faculties are reliable is low or inscrutable (on the proposition that they are the product of undirected evolutionary forces)' (105), does that not

mean that we should reject the antecedent, that our origins are evolutionary? No, responds Sosa, 'from those considerations it cannot even be inferred that it is *unlikely* that our origins are evolutionary, for inscrutability would permit no such inference' (105, italics original). As Sosa himself says, 'a fully adequate response' to Plantinga's argument 'remains to be formulated' (103), but Sosa has certainly gestured in an interesting direction.

5. Jonathan Kvanvig's 'Two Approaches to Epistemic Defeat' compares his (Kvanvig's) own 'front-door' approach to epistemic defeat, which is a 'propositionalist' account beginning 'with propositional relationships, only by implication describing what happens in the context of a noetic system,' with Plantinga's 'backdoor' approach, which is a 'doxasticist' account assuming 'a context of actual belief and an entire noetic system . . . describing defeat in terms of what sort of doxastic and noetic response would be appropriate to the addition of particular pieces of information' (108).

Kvanvig argues that Plantinga's backdoor approach to epistemic defeat cannot be successful, because it can accommodate the notion of defeater-defeaters only by abandoning the backdoor approach for a front-door approach. (By way of contrast, Kvanvig offers a concise front-door account of defeater-defeaters on p. 115 that requires no such compromise, being purely propositionalist in character.) Kvanvig illuminates the central problem by invoking the Quine-Duhem thesis about testing scientific hypotheses, and finishes by noting that Plantinga's celebrated 'naturalism defeated' argument against evolutionary naturalism seems to 'fit well with a propositionalist approach in spite of his official doxasticist dogma' (122).

6. In 'Plantinga's Model of Warranted Christian Belief' James Beilby gives a careful exposition of Plantinga's apologetic program and religious epistemology from *Warranted Christian Belief*, and then presents three criticisms of Plantinga's methodology: (i) Plantinga 'seemingly completely ignores the role of the religious community in his description of the formation of faith' (140); (ii) Plantinga's 'construal of natural theology is unnecessarily stringent in that he doesn't seem to have a place for good arguments that are unlikely to convince the skeptic' (143); and (iii) Plantinga's 'unwillingness to argue for the truth of the Extended (Aquinas/Calvin) Model saddles him with an argumentative methodology that applies too widely, to too many religious traditions' (146), and 'it is far from clear whether there are *any* people whose faith looks like that described in Plantinga's model' (146, italics original).

Beilby concludes with four criticisms of Plantinga's extended Aquinas/Calvin model of how religious belief is warranted: (a) '(c)ontrary to Plantinga's models, I suggest that the religious beliefs of the typical Christian are more likely based on a complex mixture of personal, social, and evidential factors in addition to pneumatological factors such as the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit' (148); (b) 'even if a part of humanity's native noetic equipment, say the *sensus divinitatis*, produced a belief that met Plantinga's criterion for warrant, it isn't obvious that beliefs produced by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, a cognitive process *not* a part of humanity's original equipment, would also be warranted' (151, italics original); (c) 'there are instances

of belief in God that are not explained by the model, or are explained only awkwardly' (153). Beilby explores four possible responses to this criticism, and plumps for the 'noetic effects of sin on the believer' (155). Beilby's final plea is that Plantinga make more of the role of human free will in his account of the formation of faith in the believer: Calvin himself would not have liked the idea — in the Reformed tradition faith is entirely the product of God, not the recipient.

7. Many philosophers claim that 'awareness of religious diversity either eliminates warrant (for Christian beliefs) or requires the Christian to offer non-question-begging evidence for his or her Christian beliefs' (167). Plantinga has argued quite emphatically that this is not the case. In assessing Plantinga's response to the challenge of religious pluralism, Kelly James Clark ('Pluralism and Proper Function') concisely and accurately presents Plantinga's theory of warrant and his defense of Christian exclusivism, essentially siding with Plantinga on both of these issues. But Clark emphasizes that even if we grant that Plantinga's view of warrant is correct, 'there is no "one-size-fits-all" approach to these matters' (168). That is, awareness of religious diversity may be compatible with warranted Christian belief, but this is not *always* the case.

8. Plantinga has argued against materialism about human persons, inferring that 'I am not identical with my body' from the fact that I would survive 'the rapid replacement of various parts of my body' (191-2). Peter van Inwagen ('Plantinga's Replacement Argument') responds that, in the scenario Plantinga envisions, my body would indeed be destroyed, but there is no reason to think that I continue to exist. Plantinga must be able to argue that during the relevant interval, 'a single episode of conscious awareness occurs' (197), and this Plantinga has not done.

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Anjan Chakravartty
A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism.
Knowing the Unobservable.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.
Pp. 272.
US$89.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-87649-0).

Neopositivist prejudices having progressively faded away, philosophy of science has become more and more open to contributions coming from metaphysics. Already in the 1980s, with the idea of 'experimental metaphysics', the latter was granted a certain degree of autonomy and significance, provided however that it was read off directly from our best physics. Nowadays, the idea is becoming gradually more widespread that a parallel study of metaphysics and science as two equally respectable disciplines is to be auspicated. This hints at the view that, although tightly interrelated, metaphysics and science are not in a relation of dependence (in either direction), and that, in fact, by starting from the assumption that they can integrate each other, one can seek and achieve the most progress toward knowledge of reality.

Chakravartty's starting point is exactly that philosophers of science in general must deal with metaphysics (if only to provide arguments against the need to study it), and scientific realists in particular must offer a metaphysical underpinning to their views.

The book reworks and completes material that has already appeared in a number of papers, the result being a nice self-contained monograph. In Chapter 1, Chakravartty offers a very useful conceptual taxonomy of positions that philosophers can take (and have taken) regarding scientific theories and the infamous observable/unobservable distinction. He also argues convincingly in favor of the metaphysical stance, while also acknowledging that, being a stance, it can consistently be set aside by empiricists and in general by those skeptical about abductive explanations.

Chapter 2 focuses on the traditional troubles for scientific realism, e.g., skepticism concerning induction and the underdetermination of theories by data. Against these, realists normally apply restrictive strategies aimed at showing that they can commit themselves to certain parts of theories only, and so avoid the alleged problems. The most popular of these forms of 'selective scepticism', as Chakravartty calls it, are entity realism, which prescribes that we be realist only about those unobservable entities with which we can interact causally, and structural realism, by which we can be realists only about whatever aspects of reality are described by the mathematical part of our scientific theories and preserved across theory change — at least as a limiting case. Chakravartty convincingly argues that neither of these can satisfy the realist's needs (although, in the case of structural realism, he seems unwarrantedly to generalize to all structural realists the idea that one should be realist only about higher-order structures that describe the properties of the relations holding between things (38). In fact, this seems not only open to discussion, but one of the things most in need of clarification in the debate

about structural realism. Chakravartty then goes on to define his own position, semirealism. Semirealism is realism restricted to causal structures, that is, to structures consisting of causal relations between things and to these relata as 'bearers' for the intrinsic natures giving rise to such relations. As such, it represents an astute mixture of elements from both entity and structural realism.

Chapter 3 expands on this, arguing for the mutual interrelation between causal relations and objects as the relata that bear the dispositions that determine such relations. Simple but compelling arguments are offered against the most radical and revisionist form of structural realism, according to which structure is all that we can be realist about it is all there is to reality (this is known as 'ontic structural realism'). In particular, Chakravartty correctly puts into doubt the move from the (alleged) underdetermination between individuality and non-individuality at the level of the ontology of the microworld as it is described by quantum mechanics to ontic structural realism.

Chakravartty interestingly contends that the natures of objects are best understood in terms of real — 'occurent' — but dispositional properties. More specifically, according to Chakravartty a distinction can be drawn between genuinely causal 'detection' properties, about which we can be realist, and 'auxiliary' properties, also part of the description of things offered by the theory but in fact dispensable.

And here is where the need for metaphysics kicks in. Chapter 4 provides a sophisticated defense of a realist conception of causation. Against some traditional objections, Chakravartty delineates a view according to which complex causal processes exist as continuous alterations of properties in which dispositions become manifest and more dispositions are created (107-10). One might wonder whether the problem with the allegedly necessary connection between an event as 'cause' and another event as 'effect' truly disappears with this move, but one should bear in mind that Chakravartty is offering 'a' metaphysics for scientific realism here, and certainly not a definitive argument for causal realism. In Chapter 5, he endorses the so-called 'dispositional identity thesis', according to which a causal property is entirely identified on the basis of the dispositions it confers, and thus of the behaviors it determines on its bearer, although a disposition is not identical with its manifestations. If dispositions are known only through their manifestations, though, it seems that the identity of causal properties is to be reconstructed post hoc, grouping together the alleged by identical causes of the same manifestations. Maybe Chakravartty needs to say more about this.

In Chapter 6, the notion of kind is analyzed. A form of essentialism on certain natural kinds is endorsed together with a concept of a kind as a cluster of properties — none of which is necessary for belonging to the kind — that Chakravartty convincingly argues for on the basis of biology.

The last two chapters of the book deal with the way in which 'theory meets world', that is, with the notions of representation and truth. Chapter 7 presents compelling arguments to the effect that realists cannot avoid the challenges associated with the interpretation of language, for any repre-

sentation of the world is either linguistic or to be interpreted via language. Likewise, the idea that there is a correspondence between representations and the world is presented as necessary. In Chapter 8, Chakravartty goes on to examine and dismiss the most popular approaches to verisimilitude and truthlikeness. He embraces a Goodmanian viewpoint, according to which in science as in art the core of representation is denotation (226). Chakravartty claims that very often representations contribute to a true representation of reality only in terms of existential claims. Otherwise, representations can be more or less approximately true by describing more or less closely the concrete structures that (at least according to the semirealist) constitute reality. Chakravartty leaves the definition of such closeness open, saying that 'degrees of resemblances are defined as appropriate in each case' (229) and that improvement in representation has to do with how many relevant properties and relations one describes and how accurately one does so (229-30). He closes by emphasizing the degree of pragmatism, and so of context-relativity of truth, that realists must acknowledge in view of the utility-oriented nature of contemporary science. This would perhaps require a longer argument, but certainly makes sense in view of the inevitably imprecise nature of our description of things.

Chakravartty's book certainly represents a welcome contribution to the debate on scientific realism in particular, and to the philosophy of science more generally. The specific suggestions made are almost invariably stimulating, well formulated and convincing, although every now and then they fall short of constituting an inviolable fortress for the realistically-inclined philosopher, and are best regarded as indications of possible views and avenues of research — something that, on the other hand, Chakravartty honestly declares from the outset of his book.

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John B. Cobb Jr., ed.
Back to Darwin: A Richer Account of Evolution.
Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company 2008.
Pp. 434.
US$36.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8028-4837-6).

Often fascinating, often frustrating, this is a hefty — and unfortunately un-indexed — anthology on evolution and religion, distinguished by its emphasis on process thought, the philosophical-cum-theological approach to metaphysics based on the writings of Whitehead. As Cobb, himself a pioneer of process theology, explains, the purpose of the book (and of the conference on which it was based) is 'to introduce a Whiteheadian voice into the present discussion of evolution and religion' and to indicate 'the way in which a theistic evolutionary theory can be coherently developed from a Whiteheadian point of view' (17-18). Not all of the contributors are invested, or even particularly interested, in process thought, but the volume is editorially shaped in such a way as to present 'one long argument' (to borrow Darwin's phrase) for the importance of process thought for understanding evolution, scientifically as well as theologically.

Cobb challenges what he takes to be three dubious claims: that contemporary evolutionary theory is scientifically adequate, that the metaphysics presupposed in contemporary scientific practice is philosophically adequate, and *that both of these are theologically adequate for 'a revised formulation of theology' (311) — that is, a formulation along the Whiteheadian lines he favors.* In so doing, he is seeking to integrate science and theology in a way that may require revisions not only to theology but also to science; he is thus rejecting, in the familiar typology offered by Ian Barbour, the alternative positions on which science and theology are regarded as in conflict, as independent, and as in dialogue. On none of these points, too, are all the contributors in agreement with Cobb, as he acknowledges, but it is fair to judge the volume's success in terms of the success of his ambitious project.

In reacting against contemporary evolutionary theory, Cobb's argument finds a foil in what he calls neo-Darwinism, here represented in person by Francisco Ayala. A student of Dobzhansky and a formidable scientist in his own right, Ayala is also a former Dominican priest with a doctoral degree in theology; he favors the independence position in Barbour's typology. His main contribution to this collection is 'From Paley to Darwin: Design to Natural Selection', but he also furnishes four subsidiary essays on various subjects. In all, about a generous seventh of the book is Ayala's, although anyone wanting to understand his views will probably be better served by reading his *Darwin's Gift to Science and Religion* (2007). He devotes a few salient pages to the term 'neo-Darwinism', observing that it 'has little currency among evolutionary biologists' and seems to be 'mostly confined to the writings of philosophers and theologians' (53).

As if to prove him right, neo-Darwinism turns out to be the philosophical and theological bogey of the volume. David Ray Griffin, for example, identi-

fies no fewer than fifteen tenets of neo-Darwinism, and hints darkly at a conspiracy on the part of journal editors and research funders to enforce a neo-Darwinist orthodoxy. Even Jeffrey Schloss, who expresses a number of thoughtful reservations about the use of the term, tries to capture neo-Darwinism in six tenets. In the usage of 'neo-Darwinism' and otherwise, there is a notable over-reliance in this book on popular, programmatic, and polemic expositions of evolutionary theory; the result is often unedifying, especially when such expositions are taken as definitive of evolutionary orthodoxy. There is little by way of serious engagement with the historical and sociological contexts in which contemporary evolutionary theory was formulated and its popularizations are composed and received.

The second section of the book is occupied with discussions of theories that are supposed to rectify the purported scientific inadequacies of neo-Darwinism. A. Y. Gunter rushes through six: quantum evolution, thermodynamic evolution, chaos evolution, neo-Lamarckianism, Baldwinian evolution, and symbiogenesis. Dorion Sagan and Lynn Margulis contribute three essays between them: Sagan on 'Evolution, Complexity, and Energy Flow' (Gunter's 'thermodynamic evolution'), Margulis on the Gaia hypothesis, and both on symbiogenesis. Reg Morrison rhapsodizes about the biological centrality of hydrogen, although it is somewhat unclear what his point is: the considerations he cites are reminiscent of Henderson's *The Fitness of the Environment* (1913). Little critical scientific evaluation of these views is offered as a counterpoint, although Ayala is skeptical about punctuated equilibrium and deflationary about the Baldwin effect.

Also appearing here are essays by Barbour and Cobb that discuss in detail how a few such alternatives to neo-Darwinism are congenial to process theology. It is not always clear in Barbour's essay how the congeniality is supposed to follow, however. For example, he describes a dispute between Gould and Conway Morris about the role of contingency in evolutionary history, and then concludes, 'I would argue that Gould has overemphasized the role of contingency and Conway Morris has underemphasized it' (199) with no actual argument with reference to the data and theory that the two contending paleontologists deemed relevant. He continues by suggesting that the intermediate position he favors is 'consistent' with process theology, 'which envisages a broad directionality and teleology in cosmic history but not a detailed preordained goal' (199); given such a vague description, it would be difficult not to attain consistency.

Cobb, on the other hand, starts with process theology's emphasis on the autonomous activity of the entities that compose the world, and then criticizes neo-Darwinism for neglecting such activity: 'this is an independent variable that must be added to the nature that selects, the preexistent organism, and the genome. The activity of organisms affects both the environment that selects and the genetic constitution of future organisms' (241). Acknowledging the activity of the organism, he argues, would not only improve the empirical adequacy of evolutionary theory but also facilitate the acceptance of a Whiteheadian panpsychism (or 'panexperientialism'). However, while re-

citing a litany of ways in which organisms affect their environment, he fails to provide a convincing argument that contemporary evolutionary theory is refusing or unable to take account of such activity.

In the third section of this book, two of the four essays (by Charles Birch and Robert Valenza) argue that contemporary science, including evolutionary biology, is incapable of accounting for consciousness, and suggest that process thought is helpful; neither engages with the rich philosophical literature on consciousness enough to be convincing. Also in the third section are Griffin's 'Neo-Darwinism and its Religious Implications', easily the most frustrating paper in the volume for its belaboring of a caricature, and Philip Clayton's difficult 'Process and Emergence', which concludes with a useful sketch of a continuum of positions on biology and metaphysics — from 'reductionist-physicalist approaches' (302) all the way through to 'classical philosophical theism in the West' (308). Clayton challenges the advocates of a process approach to biology to justify their exact position on the continuum, although it is unclear that they will accept his criteria.

The fourth and final section of the book is devoted to 'Evolution and God'. Schloss provides a scientifically informed discussion of evolutionary directionality, suggesting that 'theological hope rather than calculative assurance' (349) is the proper response to the hints of directionality toward the emergence of creatures capable of compassion he detects. Two authors express their debt to process thought, John Haught for Whitehead's view of the universe as aiming toward beauty, and Howard J. Van Till for Griffin's idea of noncoercive — or 'contributive', as Van Till prefers — divine action. Griffin himself again frustrates, by offering Whitehead's philosophy as not only a compromise between neo-Darwinism and 'intelligent design' creationism but also a philosophical panacea. Cobb gives himself the last word, hoping to persuade scientists 'that it is scientifically responsible to think of the world as having those characteristics that allow for interpretation in terms of process thought' (394).

Who ought to read this book? Anyone interested in process thought and its relationship to science, certainly, and anyone interested in the sheer variety of theological responses to evolutionary theory — outright rejection, as in creationism, is not the only option. (The contributors are keen to distance themselves from creationism, although Griffin is sometimes too credulous of the claims of 'intelligent design' creationists.) The overall appeal of the collection is limited, however. Individual essays, especially those of Haught, Schloss, Van Till, and John Greene (who opens the volume with a historically rich introduction to the debates over evolutionary naturalism), are worthwhile. But a certain reverent attitude toward Whitehead, coupled with a 'with one bound Jack was free' approach to philosophy and a generally superficial approach to understanding contemporary evolutionary theory, seems to vitiate Cobb's long argument.

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Cynthia B. Cohen
Renewing the Stuff of Life:
Stem Cells, Ethics, and Public Policy.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University
Press 2007.
Pp. 311.
Cdn$49.50/US$39.99
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-530524-1).

Cohen believes that the stem cell research debate has been too limited to funding questions and shaped by pre-existing convictions from the abortion debate. Cohen's remedy for this is to examine a wider range of scientific, ethical, religious, policy, and regulatory issues raised by the research. Although her interest is primarily in US policy, situations in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan receive considerable attention.

The first two chapters address basic scientific questions about stem cells, a highly useful feature of the book. Reporting on a rapidly developing research field always faces the possibility of sudden obsolescence, and this is no exception. Cohen argues that on the issue of the comparative plasticity of adult versus embryonic stem cells many factors 'give embryonic stem cells an edge over adult stem cells for research and therapy' (26). In 2006, however, induced pluripotent stem cells were produced from mouse cells. These cells were morphologically and biochemically similar to pluripotent cells derived from embryos. In November 2007, two independent research teams were able to produce these cells from human skin fibroblasts. Unfortunately, the method of viral transfection used to produce these cells resulted in ones likely to form malignant tumors. In March 2009, however, researchers working at the Universities of Edinburgh and Toronto discovered a way to produce induced pluripotent stem cells without relying on viruses. Safer therapeutic applications are expected from this discovery. So even though methods for inducing pluripotent adult stem cells are still unsafe for therapeutic use, Cohen's conclusion about the advantage of embryonic stem cells probably needs revision. Much of the basic science, however, remains unchanged, and this book is an invaluable resource for readers seeking approachable scientific information on stem cell research.

The remainder of the book discusses moral (Chapters 3 and 5), religious (Chapter 4), legal, and policy related issues (Chapters 6 - 8). Five appendices also collect major US policies from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines of August 25, 2000 to the July 2006 veto President Bush gave to the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act.

Stem cell research raises at least three moral concerns. First, embryonic and adult stem cell research may promote other questionable research. In particular, chimeras (organisms which combine human and nonhuman cells) could be developed, a question Cohen discusses in an entire chapter. Also, if embryonic stem cells are the best therapeutic choice, efforts to generate stem cells unlikely to cause immune rejection may promote investigations into

human cloning. Secondly, if embryonic stem cells are needed, morally questionable sources of embryos may be necessary. Presently, the main source is leftover embryos from standard in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures. If this proves insufficient, serious concerns arise that women undergoing IVF may be coerced to overproduce eggs. IVF procedures also have attendant health risks which would be increased for no therapeutic benefit for donors. Finally, although attempts have been made to biopsy embryonic stem cells, extracting embryonic stem cells presently requires the destruction of the embryo. While Cohen deals quite adequately with each of these issues, the latter is the main focus of the book.

One of the least satisfying aspects of the book is the discussion of religious views regarding the standing of human embryos. While Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism are dealt with in one page or less, Cohen does provide a useful summary of present and historical Christian views. Standard scriptural passages — Genesis 1:26; Jeremiah 1:5; Psalm 139:13-16; Exodus 21:22-25 — are briefly examined. Apart from making the rather obvious point that none of these passages provide a decisive moral standing for human embryos, wider theological views developed from these passages are not considered.

The discussion of secular philosophical views on the moral status of embryos is more thorough. Cohen considers five views about when or why moral status can be attributed (or denied): fertilization, fourteen-days or later, potentiality, the group of cells view, and the personhood approach.

Cohen summarily rejects the group of cells view which denies embryos have moral status. A pile of miscellaneous building materials is not a house, nor does it need to become a house. But this cannot be said of early human embryos. An embryo constitutes, she argues, 'an integrated biological whole with the potential to develop into an individual human being' (80). The potentiality view contends that, even though a fertilized human egg (zygote) may not be an individual human being (since the possibility of monozygotic twinning exists during 2 weeks after fertilization), it is still a potential human being. Hence, defenders of the view claim, the fertilized egg deserves protection from destruction right from the moment of conception. Cohen, however, argues that this view fails to recognize the distinction between the potential a thing has to *become* in contrast with its potential to *produce*. If an entity has the potential to become something, it must remain, at the end of the process, numerically identical to the thing that began. In contrast, the potential to produce is the capacity to cause something else, and hence there is no need for numerical identity. Embryos prior to fourteen days, however, have only productive potential: 'the fertilized egg does not stand at the beginning of the process of development of the embryo proper . . . . Instead, it produces or causes the embryo proper' (78). So because a fertilized egg is not the same thing numerically as the embryo proper, the potentiality argument does not establish that a fertilized egg is a potential human being. Cohen rejects the fertilization view with this same argument.

Cohen also rejects the personhood approach to moral status as developed by Peter Singer. She claims that the 'very notion of being a person . . . requires

an individual to have characteristics that we understand only in terms of what it means to be human' (83). Furthermore, the idea of a person implies a cluster of reasonably well-developed characteristics and capacities. But when we ask whether it would be wrong to destroy an early human embryo this could have nothing to do with whether an embryo exhibits a series of well-developed traits; embryos lack such qualities. Therefore, Cohen concludes, the personhood view must be rejected because it cannot answer the question of whether early human embryos are individual human beings.

This leaves us with the position that Cohen favors: the fourteen-day or later view. Cohen defends this view, first, because prior to fourteen days, an embryo is not unequivocally a unique, integrated individual (i.e., twinning can occur). Secondly, after thirteen days significant biological changes begin to occur. Specifically, cell differentiation begins dramatically and the 'primitive streak' — a cluster of cells from which the brain, nervous system, and organs of the body will grow — appears. These features point to the appearance of a more unique, individuated being than in previous embryonic stages. Finally, Cohen argues that it is a mistake to conceive of the moral value of early embryos exclusively in reproductive terms. They also have a significant preservative and regenerative potential and can serve the good end of 'countering disease and forms of ill health and disability of those who are living' (87). In using human embryos for this end, therefore, we do not disrespect their value because it is not found exclusively in the fact that they fulfill some reproductive purpose.

The first of these arguments passes too easily over difficult questions of personal and numerical identity. It is by no means obvious that merely because one thing can become two separate things that it thereby has less or no value. Equally, if an undivided thing has value (as conservatives maintain), it is unclear that value is lost if it becomes two separate, unique things. The second argument may point to something more significant. If embryos gain features that establish their individuality after fourteen days, then the identity and characteristics of an individual seems more tied to this event than to fertilization. But we must still ask what a pre-fourteen day embryo is and what value it has. If, as Cohen has insisted, we should accept the humanity approach in place of the personhood view, it seems difficult to hold that prior to fourteen days an embryo is not a *human* embryo. It seems to be an obvious biological beginning of all human beings, twins and non-twins alike. Adopting the humanity approach, then, seems to make the fourteen-day view more difficult to maintain than the fertilization view. This problem does not seem to face the personhood approach.

The final argument Cohen gives for the fourteen-day view seems to ignore completely the basic distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value. Cohen seems to suggest that the more conservative fertilization view grasps the value of embryos exclusively in terms of the interests others might have in seeing them come to full development. That embryos can be valued for their preservative and regenerative usefulness seems indisputable, but morally controversial. Conservatives rarely contend that fertilized embryos are

valuable because they are useful in realizing someone else's ends/interests, reproductive or otherwise. Rather, they have value in themselves. Strangely, Cohen does not seem to deal directly with this rather obvious concern.

This points to a more common feature of this book that may dissuade philosophers: it does not give an exhaustive argument in defense of the ethical use of embryos in stem cell research. This, however, does not seem to be its primary purpose or value. Rather, the worth of Cohen's discussion is that it places the ethical debate about this research in its broadest context. In this sense, it is an admirable work of practical ethics.

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Rachel Cooper
Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science.
Montreal and Kiongston: McGill-Queen's University Press 2007.
Pp. 240.
Cdn$/US$90.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7735-3386-8);
Cdn$29.95/US$27.95
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-7735-3387-5).

This book surveys four main issues: the nature of mental illness, psychiatric explanation, relations between different psychiatric theories, and the role of values in psychiatric theory and practice. Each of these issues has two chapters devoted to them, and this provides readers with an overview of how central theoretical questions in psychiatry are approached in philosophy of science, broadly construed. Inevitably in such a book, Cooper devotes single chapters to topics on which others have written whole books, and so she often goes quickly, not pausing for details. Yet at some points she does take the trouble to spell out the arguments in some detail, she often presents her own perspectives and she occasionally presents original research. Her writing is consistently clear and straightforward, and chapters are structured logically. This is a rich and much needed book that will serve as an introduction to one side of philosophy of psychiatry, which amply demonstrates how its debates are deeply connected with those in related areas, and how interesting the area is. It would be appropriate for upper level undergraduate courses and graduate courses, and helpful to professional philosophers and mental health care professionals wanting to orient themselves in the current literature.

Cooper starts out, as many others do, by addressing anti-psychiatry, with a survey of Foucault, R. D. Laing and Thomas Szasz. While she defends the view that mental illness is real and psychiatry is a legitimate enterprise, she is surprisingly sympathetic to many of the claims of its critics, and suggests that there is much of value in their work, and that they are not as radical as they often seem to be. Her characterization of early Foucault as 'W. V. Quine plus history' is indeed helpful, and Cooper shows that a historical perspective on psychiatry is important in understanding the field, even though most current philosophy tends to be ahistorical in its approach to psychiatry.

The next chapter compares Boorse's biological account, Fulford's action-based account, and Aristotelian accounts of disorder. She argues that none of these is successful on its own, but that a 'messy' account that combines different theories could do the trick. She cites her own previous suggestion that takes elements from the Aristotelian approach that a disorder must be a harm for a person in some sense, and adds that the sufferer both could reasonably have expected to be better off and could in principle be treated medically, if not at present, then at some point in the future of medicine. She also cites Reznek's claim that a condition is pathological 'if and only if it is an abnormal bodily/mental condition that requires medical intervention and that harms standard members of the species in standard conditions' (40). Both these ideas face the challenge of providing a non-circular definition of 'medicine', in non-ad hoc ways that justify the special status of medical disorders in our society.

The chapter on natural kinds argues that mental disorders can be scientific kinds, even if they do not have essences. She summarizes much of the literature and focuses Hacking's objections; she argues that the concept of natural kind is broad enough to include the phenomena he describes of temporally transient disorders and looping effects in the relation between the medical description of disorders and people having those disorders. Cooper resists the worries of Dupré that categorizing people and their problems will lead to conservative politics by saying that ethics cannot drive metaphysics. She does not address some pragmatist approaches that do precisely that, viz. allow ethics to influence our decisions about how to conceptualize human problems. Given that pragmatist approaches to categorization have gained a good deal of support in recent years, this is an unfortunate omission.

One of the most original chapters makes an argument that individual case histories can be explanatorily helpful because they help us simulate other case histories by providing us with scaffolding. This is an interesting idea that deserves further attention given the importance of narratives in clinical psychology and the tendency of those who support the 'scientific approach' to dismiss narratives as secondary to a scientific understanding.

In the first chapter, on relations between theories, Cooper argues that in the psychological sciences there are different paradigms competing at the same time, and that although Kuhn said that different paradigms are incommensurable, it is possible to achieve genuine communication between different approaches, if enough effort is made. The second chapter in this sec-

tion asks if reductionist theories are incompatible with our ordinary under-standing of people. Cooper examines dualism, identity theory, functionalism and anomalous monism and concludes that most psychiatric explanation is largely independent of these theories. Only eliminative materialism is genu-inely incompatible with standard psychiatric explanation involving propo-sitional attitudes. Both these chapters are rather quick and rough in their arguments, but the conclusions are plausible.

The final two chapters address the role of ethics. The first of these spells out the ways in which psychiatric science can be value-laden, and it does so very effectively by using the example of how race was treated in the *American Journal of Psychiatry* between 1844 and 1962. From this, Cooper shows how values shape the scientific project from start to finish. She proceeds to critically evaluate suggestions for how to avoid the problems of bad values infecting science, including making science value-neutral, making sure sci-ence is laden with good values, and adopting standpoint epistemology. She finds each of these proposals limited, and suggests that the best bet is to get a diverse body of researchers and to encourage debate about the science. The second chapter is far more specialized, addressing recent problems for psy-chiatry and medicine generally in the conduct of randomized controlled trials of new treatments. Cooper argues that large corporations have become so in-volved in these trials that the public has lost its trust in psychiatry, especially with regard to medication. She argues that the methods for policing scientific testimony have broken down, and in order to repair them, new regulations and initiatives need to be introduced. Again, as with most of the rest of this book, Cooper's arguments here are interesting and plausible.

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Austin Dacey
The Secular Conscience:
Why Belief Belongs in Public Life.
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 2008.
Pp. 269.
US$24.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-59102-604-4).

This is a call to secular liberals to reclaim their moral identity and regain their self-confidence. Dacey argues that they are confused, having succumbed to two fallacies, the Privacy and Liberty Fallacies: 'The Privacy Fallacy consists in assuming that because matters of conscience are private in the sense of nongovernmental, they are private in the sense of personal preference . . . . [The Liberty Fallacy] begins in the core liberal principle that conscience must be left free from coercion. The mistake lies in thinking that because conscience is free from coercion, it must be free from criticism, reason, truth, or independent, objective standards of right and wrong' (15). Dacey claims that matters of conscience ought to be open and held to the same standards as any other type of claim in the public square. These standards include 'honesty, consistency, rationality, evidential support, feasibility, legality, morality, and revisability' (17).

According to Dacey, many secular liberals think that respect for religion means not criticizing it, but he points out that this is just blanket acceptance, or worse, disregard. True respect, he claims, is taking religious points of view seriously enough to give them a fair hearing, and 'by holding them to the same intellectual, moral, and legal standards we apply to ourselves' (82). This criticism is not a violation of the freedom of conscience so long as the conversation occurs in the public sphere and not in the governmental sphere.

In Chapter 1, 'How Secularism Lost Its Soul', Dacey traces the historical evolution of the ideas of secularism and privatization that led to the present-day confusion. In Chapter 2, he rebuts some common reasons given for excluding matters of conscience from the public square, and he shows that the Privacy Fallacy has insulated organized religion from criticism and allowed it to influence culture and politics with impunity. Chapter 3 outlines Spinoza's (and others') arguments from theology and futility in defense of a secular state and shows how many thinkers (including secular Muslims) have based their arguments for secularism on religious ideas. In Chapter 4, Dacey argues that even religions founded on revelation are public and supported by reason. In Chapter 5, 'Has God Found Science?', he describes how religion and science are currently in dialogue. He argues in Chapter 6 that ethics should be empirical but not based strictly on evolutionary facts. In Chapters 7 - 9, he defends the view that secular ethics can be objective and answer questions of moral motivation, knowledge, and reality; his favored philosophy is consequentialism, especially that of John Stuart Mill. In the final chapters, he describes the community of conscience. He considers how an 'open source ethics' and freedom of conscience will serve an important social function, the discovery of meaning, identity, value and truth.

Dacey's invitation for dialogue is a refreshing respite from the hostile words that are often hurled back and forth between secular liberals and religious conservatives; hopefully, both will find his arguments compelling and accept his invitation. Certainly, both sides can make progress, and Dacey has shown that secular liberals have the philosophical and ethical resources to engage in such a discussion.

His challenge is right: 'Freedom from coercion does not entail freedom from reason' (96). Claims of conscience should be open — in that they belong in public life — and should be subject to standards of reason, especially when such claims put demands on society. A healthy liberal democracy depends on such a debate, not only for the purpose of discovering meaning, identity, value and truth, but also to ensure that the opinions of one group do not violate the freedom of conscience of another.

In spite of the merits of his arguments, Dacey seems overly optimistic about the power and scope of reason to settle *all* debates of conscience, and to settle them in his favor. For example, he thinks that ascribing moral standing or rights to early fetuses is obviously false. This is not so obvious to me, but I will leave this argument for others in the public sphere. Contrary to what Dacey claims, it seems possible that some religious beliefs are beyond the scope of public reason. Take, for instance, eastern beliefs that arise from a deep meditative awareness, such as the Hindu belief that *Atman is Brahman*. What does it mean to subject such a belief to the standards of evidence and rationality? If it cannot be done, would Dacey respect and tolerate such believers, or would he chastise them (morally and epistemically) since they do not contribute in the right way to society's pursuit of meaning, identity, value, and truth? Dacey could ask them to keep their mystical beliefs to themselves if they cannot be defended in rational public discourse, but this would lead back to the Privacy and Liberty Fallacies.

Another example comes from reformed epistemology, which says that knowledge of God is given through direct awareness, a basic belief produced by a special subjective faculty (a *sensus divinitatus*) similar to normal sense perception. Knowledge of God in this sense is rational but not based on evidence that would be publicly available. Dacey argues that such a view fails by disanalogy because the *sensus divinitatis* is too much unlike normal sense perception: experiences cannot be predicted, and the mechanics of such a faculty cannot be described adequately (94). Nevertheless, his criticisms fall short because he demands too much from the analogy; it is simply meant to show that basic beliefs of this sort are not inferred from other beliefs, because they are immediate. If it is possible that belief in God is properly basic, then there must be limits to the scope of public reason.

Dacey's book would benefit by including a more careful discussion of these problem cases, but the main argument of the book is still convincing. Matters of conscience should be debated and discussed in the public sphere.

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Michael Dauphinais, Barry David,
and **Matthew Levering, eds**.
Aquinas the Augustinian.
Washington, DC: The Catholic University
of America Press 2007.
Pp. 291.
US$39.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8132-1492-4).

This collection of essays suggests that the hopes for a revival of Thomistic studies, expressed by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879) and reformulated by Pope John Paul II over a century later in *Fides et Ratio* (1998), are being fulfilled in a rather surprising way, namely, by drawing more deeply from the immense reservoir of non-Aristotelian resources which formed Aquinas's synthetic vision of faith and reason, philosophy and theology. The studies in this book revolve around a crucial though frequently underappreciated figure in Thomistic thought: Augustine of Hippo. For many years, Augustine's impact on Aquinas was given short shrift by Etienne Gilson, Charles Boyer, and others who drew a strident contrast between the metaphysical views held by these two giants. A rare counter-voice emerged in the person of Marie-Dominique Chenu (1895-1990), highly esteemed by all the contributors to this volume, who was convinced that Aquinas was Augustine's 'faithful disciple, both in theological doctrine and in the quality of this spirituality' (xii). More recently, Jean-Pierre Torrell has exposed the simplistic attempt to separate thirteenth-century theologians neatly into Augustinian and Aristotelian camps. Torrell, in fact, has been an important proponent of Augustinian Thomism, as evidenced by his meticulous study of Augustine's influence on Thomas's theology of the indwelling of the Trinity (The Catholic University of America Press 2003).

The book in fact opens with three essays on Trinitarian theology. Gilles Emery argues that attempts to contrast Augustine's 'spiritual' approach with Aquinas's 'rationalistic' approach introduce a false dichotomy. Neither separates faith from reason in his investigation of the Trinity, though both make a distinction between the two. For Aquinas, 'it is not a matter of proving the faith but of showing the intelligibility of faith by using "plausible" or "likely reasons" ' (24). While striving to make the Trinitarian mystery more intelligible to believers, Aquinas nevertheless adheres to the Augustinian idea that theology is a spiritual exercise bringing about a purification of the mind. It thus requires not only truth, but love, prompting Aquinas to expand considerably upon Augustine's doctrine of the analogy of the Word and Love. Medievalists will find particularly interesting Emery's distinction between the *via expositionis* (Thomas's presentation of the results of his inquiry) and the *via inventionis* (the path that led him to those results). Bruce D. Marshall tackles the thorny question of whether Aquinas considered Augustine an 'essentialist' (i.e., one who holds that the divine essence can substitute for the divine persons in the Trinity). Marshall argues that Aquinas did not so much have a problem with Augustine's alleged essentialism but with Lombard's

logic in the *Sentences*. In fact, Aquinas worked out an answer to the *essentia generat essentiam* problem in a way strikingly similar to Augustine, though he apparently did not extract the argument from Augustine's text. Aquinas' resolution ultimately involved a highly refined notion of 'relation' as the fundamental basis for the distinction of persons in the Trinity. Harm Goris probes the philosophical and theological meanings of *verbum*, showing that Aquinas's growing familiarity with Aristotle gradually caused him to drift away from Augustine on this point. All three of the essays in this section have far reaching implications for the philosophical notions of personhood and relation which extend far beyond Christian theology.

Aquinas's ability to integrate Aristotle into the Christian faith is the concern of John M. Rist, who further argues that the Thomistic texts exonerate Augustine from the charge of a Platonist confusion between essence and existence. Rist specifically looks at three metaphysical issues that illustrate Aquinas's attempt to integrate Augustine and Aristotle: the distinction between *esse* and *essentia,* the question of human freedom after the fall, and the soul-body relationship together with its implications for the philosophy of womanhood.

Of more explicit theological interest are John P. O'Callaghan's chapter on Aquinas's notion of the *imago Dei* and Mark Johnson's comparison of Augustine and Aquinas on the doctrine of original sin. Guy Mansini explains how Aquinas used Augustine to maintain a balance between the human mind's ability to reach God and its incapacity to comprehend the divine nature fully without the help of grace. Filling out these theological chapters are Matthew Levering's exegesis of John 10:1-18, Wayne J. Hankey's study of Augustine and Aquinas on the Eucharist, and Matthew L. Lamb's chapter on eschatology.

Particularly noteworthy is Michael S. Sherwin's study of the elusive relationship between love and desire, a central concern for both Augustine and Aquinas. The driving question is to what extent charity, which is ideally other-directed, involves a quasi-selfish desire for God as the fulfillment of our beatitude. Sherwin asserts that a careful reading of Augustine will reveal that desire is an aspect of charity, but not the whole of it. Unfortunately, Sherwin explains, a poor understanding of the terms *uti* and *frui* in Augustine is responsible for serious distortions of his doctrine on love through the centuries, including Anders Nygren's work on *eros* and *agape* in the 1930s. It is not certain whether Aquinas was familiar with the love-literature of the 12th century, but it is clear that he wished to elaborate a coherent teaching on charity by drawing from the Augustinian inheritance. Desire presupposes love, even though love, the principle of every appetitive power, is not reducible to desire. Following Augustine, Aquinas portrays love as a type of friendship: that is, a communicative exchange, a mutual well-wishing. Sherwin explains how Aquinas combined the insights of Augustine with those of Aristotle, and how he ingeniously framed *eros* within his theology of hope.

The debunking of a false opposition between Augustinianism and Thomism to which this book contributes opens up exciting possibilities for future re-

search. Alasdair MacIntyre's remark that Aquinas's lifelong project was to integrate the Augustinian and Aristotelian inheritances may be pushing the point, but it is nevertheless true that we will never truly understand Aquinas if we view him as nothing more than the baptizer of Aristotle.

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The problem of the meaning of proper names, and related problems like substitution in belief attributions and informative identity statements, have been discussed in the analytic philosophy of language *ad nauseam,* and some way beyond that. So no one really waits for another book on these issues. This is another book on these issues. Its authors are well aware of the situation: '(It) might seem like trying to grow corn from hardscrabble earth' (4). Their excuse for this further book is that it uses the proper name problems only to illustrate their theory of meta-linguistic beliefs. Meta-linguistic beliefs are said to occur at the linguistic derivational level of Logical Form (and thus propositional content), and attributing such beliefs is said to improve accounting for language use (*inter alia* with respect to proper names).

The book collects four papers: on belief-attribution, names, identity statements, and the Paderewski Puzzle. The papers thus share the core topic of the meaning of proper names, and they all employ Fiengo's and May's theory of *de lingua* beliefs. As they are stand alone papers they can be read in isolation, and the book, therefore, exhibits (up to three times) repetition of the central claims and ideas.

The two central ideas of the book are (i) a distinction between names and 'expressions', which embed names, and (ii) an analysis of the logical form of some sentences which proposes meta-linguistic additional content (beyond presumable surface content).

(ad i) Fiengo and May claim that names 'do not refer' (14) at all! They are employed in 'expressions'. An 'expression' is a phrase using some phonological form carrying an index to distinguish it from another 'expression' using the same phonological form, e.g. $(Fred_1)$ vs. $(Fred_2)$. The co-indexing device can also be used to explain anaphoric reference (use of pronouns). Co-in-

dexing thus does *not* require identity of used phonological form. Referential knowledge consists in knowing 'assignments' which correlate 'expressions' with their referents. If 'expressions' are part of the logical form of a statement, seemingly tautological statements can be informative: $(Paderewski_1)$ is $(Paderewski_2)$. And the logical form reveals the information in informative identity statements: $(Cicero_1)$ is $(Tully_1)$.

(ad ii) Fiengo and May distinguish *de dicto* attributions, as these include a commitment to the way the described person uses expressions, as involving meta-linguistic content from, ordinary, *de re* attributions. For instance: 'Fred believes Cicero is a Roman' is taken as 'Fred believes $(((Cicero_1)$ is a Roman) and $("(Cicero_1)"$ refers to Cicero))'. The last occurrence of 'Cicero' may be exchanged by any other way to pick out the reference of the 'expression' $(Cicero_1)$, e.g. to account for Fred mistaking somebody else for Cicero. Further on, the failure of substitution into *de dicto* attribution can now be explained. As the 'expression' is quoted in the second conjunct, substitution would be substitution *into* quotation marks, which is forbidden.

These main ideas account for the problems in the vicinity of proper name semantics, but if true they substantially revise our picture of semantics (e.g., which items refer, the role of the lexicon, the theory of the linguistic-conceptual interface)! As names are only used in 'expressions', one needs supposedly fewer lexical entries for the same phonological form; but this is no representational gain, as the authors complaining about the 'many names of the same phonological shape' (146) seem to think, since one needs now as 'many' assignment statements (for each possible referent of an 'expression' built by using that name). These assignments supposedly work as semantic axioms to be used in deriving truth conditions in internal semantics, and so forth.

Both main ideas invite a couple of questions. The indices which come with 'expressions' we find neither in verbal communication nor in written texts, nor in inner speech (verbal imagination). Thus 'expressions' occur on some sub-doxastic cognitive level, say of processing of syntax somewhere in the linguistic derivational system. One may ask now whether what carries such indexed labels are syntactic entities or concepts themselves. If one adheres to some *language of thought hypothesis*, one may say that a speaker may have two Paderewski concepts, each of which labels some memory folder with corresponding beliefs. The indices distinguish these concepts and the concepts are linked to the ambiguous name. If one learns about their co-referentiality, the two files are merged. As the sub-doxastic 'expressions' have to be *language of thought* items themselves, the only reason to introduce these additional representations (beyond concepts and lexical items) can be some derivational advantage (like better anaphoric reference). In case of an ambiguous spoken name, the standard picture sees the ambiguity arising at the level of *interpretation* (assigning a concept); Fiengo and May will see the ambiguity arising in *derivation* (building a different 'expression'). Then they also need a new account of parsing/de-coding by the audience. Phonological forms, especially if mentioned in meta-linguistic beliefs, have to be processed

early in derivations now. One therefore has to reconsider basic derivational procedures (like Merge in Generative Grammar) — quite an agenda, it seems. The second main idea, the proposal of meta-linguistic propositional content, invites similar questions. A whole conjunct present in Logical Form does not get spelled out (is not pronounced). One needs principles beyond those currently used in Generative Grammar to explain what governs spelling out now.

This book deals with an important and too often neglected topic: meta-linguistic beliefs. Fiengo's and May's theory of meta-linguistic beliefs not only offers some interesting proposals but even brings some new twists to the discussion about the meaning of proper names. As these proposals are both new and of wide impact if true, one might have preferred a book with less repetition (due to collecting four papers) and more debate on possible criticisms and on the wider impact of, say, the introduction of 'expressions'.

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James R. Flynn
What is Intelligence? Beyond the Flynn Effect.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.
Pp. 226.
US$22.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-88007-7).

Philosophers have been long concerned with human thinking and its source, the human brain. It has been long recognized also that the brain itself, in the guise of the human mind, as a topic of discourse, has been the subject of much vintage philosophy. Plato, Locke, Descartes, and more recently Chomsky, for example, have had much to say about the human mind and its operations in this regard. Much of the long-standing discussion has focused on the connection between the subjectively sensate aspect of the brain, known colloquially as the mind, and the material brain itself. The debate has grown more interesting with the scientific advances made in the areas of neuroscience, linguistics and behavioral psychology. General questions in this regard have been among the following: how is thinking possible? What is consciousness? Does colloquial language mislead in terms of the analysis of thought itself?

Yet what is most interesting about the human brain and its sensate correlate, the mind, is that although all brains resemble each other structurally, the mental operations of individual brains can vary enormously. The behaviorally expressed mental activities of individual humans can vary to such

an extent that they are immediately noticed. Some individuals can perform mental feats that are beyond the reach of all others in the myriad modes of human mental expression. The outstanding chess player, musician, writer, mathematician, etc. all impress with the output of their individual minds. What is also evident is that different individuals appear to others as having greater mental acuity than others. It is on this basis that humans often use the term 'intelligence' to describe the differences in such mental acuity.

The debate over the years has been preoccupied with how much of measured cognitive scores could be maximally attributed to environmental effects and how much to innate cognitive skills for particular individuals, and more importantly for different population groups. Researchers like Jensen (*The g Factor: The Science of Mental Ability*, 1998) and Herrnstein and Murray (*The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class in American Life*, 1994), have long argued that 'intelligence quotient' scores on supposedly 'g-loaded' tests reflect the innate cognitive abilities of individuals and groups. But Flynn's careful analysis of the tests used over the years, that is the Wechsler Intelligent Scale for Children (WISC) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) contains detailed information on the particular kinds of tests that demonstrate not only increases in IQ test scores — the Flynn effect — but also increases in g (the so-called 'general intelligence factor'). Flynn presents data showing that test results from the heavily g-loaded Raven's Progressive Matrices, derived from WISC, WAIS and the Stanford-Binet, indicate an overall increase of 0.30 IQ points per year since 1947 and extending beyond the year 2000 (112). This, of course, runs counter to the standard view that 'intelligence' is a fixed, mainly — estimated by nativists at approximately 70% of demonstrated cognitive abilities — genetically derived attribute of populations.

What is significant in Flynn's study is that he effectively dismantles the notion that the concept of 'g' — much touted by Jensen and other cognitive nativists — has been invariant over time. Flynn demonstrates that the most g-loaded subtest on the WISC, that is the Raven's Similarities test has shown much change over time. Flynn writes: 'We have seen that the present generation has made huge gains compared to the last on Raven's, perhaps the test with highest g loading of them all. There is no evidence that the test was drained of its normal cognitive complexity by being taught and the items thereby reduced to a measure of rote memory' (61).

The explanation that Flynn offers for his thesis is that IQ scores are subject to change as a function of the cognitive environment. Flynn argues that the crucial difference between generations over the last several decades is due to the qualitative change in the methodology of thinking from the more concrete to the more scientific. As Flynn puts it: 'Nonetheless, post-1950 IQ cognitive gains have been significant. More and more people began to put on scientific spectacles. As use of logic and the hypothetical moved beyond the concrete, people developed new habits of mind. They became practiced at solving problems with abstract or visual content and more innovative at administrative tasks' (173-4). Thus while individual differences in IQ within

similar environments may be attributed to native cognitive dispositions, differences in scores between the populations of qualitatively different environments as in the case of monozygotic twins reared apart, can be logically attributed to different cognitive environments. In this regard, Flynn's thesis undermines the well-known alternative thesis, supported by Jensen et al., that inter-population differences in cognitive scores derive maximally from genetic sources. The robustness of Flynn's thesis derives from the fact that the steady increases in cognitive scores are all registered from the same biologically descended populations over the last several decades. Thus the compounded influence of the environment is evidenced by what Flynn refers to as individual and social multipliers (39-41). Some have argued that neural modifications prompted by better diet could lead to cognitive improvements. But Flynn discounts such with his reference to the Dutch famine of 1944 where, despite the war-engendered famine, IQ gains were still noted for future Dutch cohorts.

Flynn claims repeatedly that these noted differences derive from the social evolution from concrete to scientific modes of thought. I would be more specific and argue that such novel modes of thinking spring more from learning theories founded on principles of inferential thinking. I argue too that Flynn's thesis confirms the hypothesis that human brains must be structurally similar given the unique capacity of humans to learn the natural language of any population. The fact that randomly chosen individuals may demonstrate significant cognitive differentials in testing is to be explained mainly due to individual psychological dispositions, subjectively different learning environments and the contingencies of the neuronal operations of the brain. It is on this basis that Flynn brings to light the fact — often unacknowledged — that IQ tests have been 'normed', i.e. qualitatively upgraded, over the years. Flynn's chapter titled 'IQ Gains Can Kill' shows how individual responsibility for crimes committed by the mentally impaired may be subject to the vagaries of IQ test 'norming'. Starkly put: Flynn demonstrates how mentally incompetent individuals who have committed capital crimes may have been victims of un-normed IQ tests over the years.

The question of the nature of human intelligence as evidenced by the results of IQ tests is seen as problematic only because of the intrusion of ideological thinking into a matter that should be treated as purely scientific. There is nothing problematic with seeking to determine whether there is any inductive warrant to the claim that because humans as a single species differ empirically in terms of the preponderance of genotype and phenotype across geographical regions that, therefore, differences in cognitive test results should also spring from genomic causes. No doubt the long-standing debate between Jensen and Flynn has been about this issue. I want to argue that, given the robustness of Flynn's empirically derived thesis, and the fact that once humans acquired the capacity for abstract thinking and symbolic representation as is witnessed in language acquisition and pictorial representation, the threshold of evolutionary development would have been reached. This evolutionary threshold strongly supports the principle of the cognitive

unity of humankind. The dictates of evolutionary biology as is evidenced by genetic drift, assorted mating, natural selection, etc. would have had no effect on the architecture of the human brain, in much the same way that there was no evolutionary need to modify the established efficiency of the human eye since the Paleolithic period, a time span that witnessed much environmental challenge and technological change.

In the same context, it would be an error to equate the architecture of the human brain with the computer. The limits of the operations of a computer are set by its programming. This is not the case with the human brain which seems to operate on the principles of quantum mechanics given its capacity for unpredicted creative novelty. It is this cognitive emergentism that the standard cognitive tests do not seem to capture.

The only structural problem with Flynn's commendable text is that most of Chapter 7, 'What If Gains are Over?', could have been omitted. It veers off into ethical discussions which detract from the sober empiricism of the author's findings.

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Trudy Govier
Taking Wrongs Seriously:
Acknowledgement, Reconciliation, and the
Politics of Sustainable Peace.
Amherst, NY: Humanity Books 2006.
Pp. 303.
US$42.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-5912-425-5).

Feelings of animosity, resentment and suspicion are often pervasive in the aftermath of oppression and violent conflict. In such contexts, if there is to be a transition to democracy and the rule of law, then some form of reconciliation will be required, so that once antagonistic parties may cultivate the kinds of trusting relationships that make social cooperation possible. Govier's admirable book is a philosophical analysis of the nature and difficulties of reconciliation, focusing especially on the problem of political reconciliation after serious wrongdoings. As might be expected in a book that discusses some of the most deeply entrenched and bitter group enmities in the world today, as well as some of the severest cruelties inflicted by humankind in recent history, Govier is skeptical about finding a generally applicable 'algorithm for solutions in the aftermath of violent conflict' (201). She repeatedly

emphasizes that the kind of decent relationships required for sustainable peace cannot be built according to a fixed blueprint. With a range of case studies, Govier illustrates the ways in which the particular history and political conditions can shape a conflict, and in turn offer and foreclose different possibilities for reconciliation. Govier is also keen to illustrate the ways in which philosophy can be informed by reflecting on contexts where the need for reconciliation is especially urgent, and this book can be profitably read by philosophers interested in retributive and restorative justice, individual and collective responsibility, acknowledgement and forgiveness, as well as the concept of reconciliation itself.

The problem of reconciliation has been a vital issue in many societies during recent years. The most prominent example is probably South Africa, whose Truth and Reconciliation Commission has attracted significant international interest and won numerable (and deserved) plaudits, not least because of the moral authority of Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela. Often encouraged as a model to be emulated elsewhere, Govier's text is peppered with interesting reflections on the successes and frustrations experienced by similar procedures in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Northern Ireland. In general, Govier is justifiably skeptical about the strategy of simply transferring the South African model *tout court* onto other contexts. Doing so not only obscures the distinctive history and difficulties of each case, but also tempts undue optimism where much hard work is still required, as in Rwanda. The need for reconciliation is not limited to societies recovering from civil war and genocide, and there are other contexts where past 'serious wrongdoings' continue to stain the present. One further welcome feature of Govier's book is the attention she pays to the need for (and specific difficulties of) reconciliation amongst indigenous and settler populations, for example in Australia and Canada. For these and many of the other cases she discusses, Govier helpfully includes nearly one hundred pages of appendices, containing potted histories and salient details.

Reconciliation, on Govier's account, is a matter of improving relationships. It is 'a coming together after a rift (political violence or oppression) that has undermined the capacity for decent cooperation between the people involved' (18). Persons who have harmed and been harmed are unlikely to trust one another, and interactions amongst former adversaries are often poisoned by alienation and suspicion, making social cooperation impossible. Throughout, Govier makes a number of interesting arguments and observations about the conditions that both frustrate and nurture reconciliation. Particularly rewarding are the sensitive discussions of apologies, acknowledgement and forgiveness, where Govier draws on (and advances) some of her previous work. The treatment of these three concepts eloquently blends abstract philosophical analysis with both social psychological studies and some concrete historical lessons learnt from the case studies. The discussion here is sophisticated, engaging, and balanced, and Govier is consistently careful to avoid exaggerating the importance of any one of the three for reconciliation.

At least amongst scholars of law and politics, it is likely that the most controversial part of the book will be the rejection of criminal trials as a tool of reconciliation. According to Govier, the 'notion that victims will be satisfied when perpetrators are punished and that these shifts will pave the road to decent and trusting relations between former enemies is naïve and seriously flawed' (151). Govier's argument here is typically careful. She is clear that 'it is not reasonable to oppose (war crimes) trials' (150-1), and she is optimistic that they may gradually contribute to the establishment of the rule of law based on respect for human rights. But she insists that 'the legal story is not the story of reconciliation' (151), arguing that proponents of the legalistic response to serious wrongdoing have often exaggerated the beneficial psychological effects of war crimes trials. In her view, criminal trials of the most conspicuous offenders may (at best) provide a partial route towards reconciliation, and she notes a number of ways in which legal procedures may actually encourage alienation and resentment to fester (for example, by creating martyrs or promoting a sentiment of victimization). Unfortunately, Govier does not push her argument here as far as she might have done; in particular, the implications of her fleeting discussion of different theories of punishment are not explored in any serious depth. This leaves an ambiguity about how decision makers should balance the respective imperatives to ensure that justice is done, and to establish trusting relationships amongst former adversaries.

In summary, Govier's book contains a wealth of insights about how the bonds of social trust that are extinguished by serious wrongdoing can be restored. In practical terms, she is at her most effective when drawing attention to the ways in which clumsy attempts at political reconciliation have been counterproductive. She also provides an excellent philosophical analysis of the nature and conditions of moral repair after serious wrongdoing. One theoretical point that Govier is curiously reticent about, however, is specifying the precise role that trust plays in social cooperation and sustainable peace. Certainly, one is left with the impression that social trust is a necessary condition for lasting peace, and without it any political settlement amongst former enemies will be unstable. But even where there is trust, this is not always a guarantee against future political violence; in other words, social trust might be a necessary condition of peace, but it is not a sufficient condition. A full account of peace after serious wrongdoing might therefore be complemented by a wider exploration of all the conditions, economic and political as well as social and psychological, that are favorable to sustained peace.

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A. C. Grayling
Descartes: The Life and Times of a Genius.
New York: St. Martin's Press 2006.
Pp. 368.
US$26.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8027-1501-2).

This book is a finely crafted popular biography that succeeds remarkably well in conveying the general tenor of European intellectual and cultural life in the first half of the seventeenth-century. The framework for the book is provided by Descartes' travels in Western Europe, and the author has a deft hand for historical and geographical detail: from the large-scale geo-political background of the Thirty Years War (1618-48), to interesting facts about individuals. He is especially good when discussing the other biographies of Descartes, which do not always agree, but his work predates Clarke's (Cambridge University Press 2006), so we are left wondering about some discrepancies (such as the fate of Helena Jans). Stylistically the book tends toward the mini-epic: its prime trait is digression and there is a lot of juxtaposition and interweaving of narrative; there is a strong love interest (Jans) and a pronounced focus on women (Princess Elizabeth, Queen Christine); the action is set against a romanticized realistic setting (the diplomatic intrigue of war); and finally, Descartes appears as a morally flawed, or at least ambiguous figure — he ends in Sweden, frozen and 'unhappy'.

Descartes' surroundings are given special attention, particularly the socio-cultural context, which is comprised mainly of the Counter Reformation, the Thirty Years War, and the Scientific Revolution. It is Descartes' role in the last of these that justifies a biography like Grayling's in the first place, and Descartes is correspondingly portrayed right from the start as primarily a hero of the scientific world-view: the overcoming of the superstitious and stultifying power of the Church by the liberating power of enlightened reason. For his role in this struggle Descartes is called 'the Thales' of the modern age (3). The weakness of this Whig interpretation, however, is indicated by the fact that Mersenne, who is portrayed as on the side of reason as against the Church, was a Minim friar. This discrepancy is never explained.

But, according to Grayling, Descartes may also have played a role in the Thirty Years War and the Counter Reformation, namely, spying and carrying secret documents for the Jesuits. This hypothesis allows him to centre the first part of his book on a mystery: the most famous unknown about Descartes' life concerns the 1628 encounter with Chandoux and the subsequent meeting with Bèrulle, after which Descartes left France, never to return. The usual story told about this incident is that Bèrulle told Descartes that he ought to devote his life to the pursuit of his philosophical muse and that thereafter Descartes moved to the Netherlands. But why did Descartes really leave after the interview with Bèrulle (115)? Why was he always on the move after he arrived in the Low Countries? He changed residence at least twenty-four times in twenty years (272). Grayling suggests (86) that Bèrulle told Descartes that, because of his work on behalf of the Jesuits in gathering

intelligence about the Rosicrucians during the Thirty Years War, he was no longer welcome in France; so Descartes went on the lam. This explains his years of travel from 1619-25 (he was spying), his presence at the coronation of the Emperor in 1619, his trip to Ulm (he was visiting Rosicrucians), his use of pseudonyms, his association with Rosicrucianism in Paris in 1623, as well as his subsequent peripatetic life in the Low Countries (85).

This is an interesting hypothesis, but it seems to be offered only half-heartedly. Grayling's tone is too suggestive and vague, so the whole story comes across as rather unconvincing (94). It accounts for either twelve (7) or six years (85) of Descartes' life. He states at one point (85) that the spying could explain the mysterious source of Descartes' income; yet in a later footnote (282) we read that Watson shows that his inheritance provided enough for Descartes to live throughout the 1630s and 40s. In addition, in order to make the theory work, he links Bèrulle and Richelieu politically (117); but it is clear that, despite their earlier association, by 1628, and perhaps even earlier, Bèrulle was out of favour with the Cardinal-Minister. His 1625 trip to England in order to oversee the marriage of Princess Henrietta and Charles I effectively removed him from the Paris scene. Moreover, Richelieu saw Oratorian mysticism as too individualistic on the parish level for absolutist orthodoxy (see Charles Williams). In addition, it is unclear why the Bèrulle-Richelieu link has to be made in the first place, except as a way of allowing Grayling to connect Richelieu's story with Descartes'. And while it may be true that Descartes, like other itinerant and educated exiles on the move during the Thirty Years War, was one source of 'the rich fabric of exchange of ideas and intelligence during the first half of the seventeenth century' (84), there is no evidence to suggest that he ever acted as a secret agent on behalf of the Jesuits, despite the fact that he clearly had personal relationships with members of the Society.

Grayling occasionally provides a useful survey of the secondary literature, and although he does not follow a 'life and works' approach, he shows a thorough familiarity with Descartes' letters and published writings, often citing directly from them to illustrate a point or to reveal an aspect of Descartes' character. Thematically, the book is divided almost exactly in two, with the first half dealing with Descartes' early years and his life of adventure in Europe, and the second part treating his life as a writer after he settled down to publish in the Netherlands in 1629. There are also thirty-eight illustrations and two appendices, one discussing the contents and implications of Descartes' philosophy, the other addressing the nature of philosophical biography. The appendices are well written and philosophically interesting, as is the whole second half of the book, which treats Descartes' published work. In the end, however, it is unclear how the first and second parts of the book — and subsequently the first and second parts of Descartes' life — might be related (119). We are left wondering exactly how Descartes' philosophical search for order might have been connected to the larger struggles for stability in early-modern Europe.

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Hickerson's book traces the concept of intentionality from Franz Brentano's distinction between psychic and physical phenomena in *Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint* through developments on the problem of mental contents in the writings of two of Brentano's students: Kazimierz Twardowski's *On the Content and Object of Representations* and Edmund Husserl's early work, especially his *Logical Investigations*. Hickerson's orientation in this book is clearly grounded in the analytic tradition. But this is less a limitation than a mere starting point, since Hickerson offers a compelling insight into Husserl's phenomenological philosophy, especially as formulated in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*. Unfortunately, significant chapters in the development of intentionality up to and including Husserl are left out of this study. For instance, though Hickerson anchors his analysis in the Brentano School, there is only cursory treatment of its rich history. Still, while this work is not *the* history of intentionality as its title suggests, it nevertheless offers a useful historical analysis of the concept for both analytic and continental philosophers.

The book is composed of five chapters, not including the introduction and conclusion, and an appendix concerning the first edition of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. The first two chapters deal with Brentano and Twardowski explicitly, whereas the latter chapters detail Husserl's critical appropriation and re-formulation of the concept of intentionality on the basis of these philosophers' work. Since more than half of the study concerns Husserl's theory of intentionality, Hickerson's work is most precisely a study of the background and a clarification of the idea of intentionality in Husserl's 'first phenomenology'.

This focus points to the greatest defect of the work. In his analysis of Husserl's *Investigations*, Hickerson restricts himself almost exclusively to the first edition of this work, and almost exclusively to the 5th Investigation. This is a profound limitation. For one thing, it avoids completely any discussion of the development of genetic intentional analysis in Husserl's later work. Furthermore, Hickerson's analysis of Husserl's model of intentionality articulated in the *Logical Investigations*, i.e., the static model of apprehension and content of that apprehension, remains too tightly focused on the content side of the problem. It may be, as Hickerson suggests, that 'Husserl's most important, if underappreciated, distinction in the *Logical Investigations* is between two kinds of content', i.e., content *qua* non-intentional sense data really inherent (*reell*) to consciousness as such, and content *qua* objective sense intended in consciousness (80). If Hickerson is correct, this only highlights the fundamental role that *Auffassung* or animating apprehension

plays in Husserl's static model of intentionality. The overly strong restriction to the problem of content in Husserl's theory leads Hickerson to contradict himself on the nature of phenomenological experience. On the one hand, phenomenological experience is, as Hickerson notes, 'that in which the appearance of objects (but not the objects themselves) "consists" (*besteht*) or is "constituted" (*konstitutierenden*)' (80). Yet later he will assert quite explicitly that the constitution of conscious objectivities 'is a topic of particular concern for Husserl's *transcendental phenomenology*, one that need not (and did not) arise in the first edition of the *Investigations*' (112). So we are left to wonder whether the theory of constitution is, in fact, absent in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*; and if it is, in what manner it arises in Husserl's later work on the basis of a revision of the theory of intentionality articulated in this first edition.

Regardless of these issues, Hickerson is quite right that 'the first edition of the *Investigations* demands a reading of its own . . . because [it] presented a theory of its own' (124). Hickerson's work excels particularly as a study of Husserl's 'first phenomenology'. The present English translation of the *Logical Investigations* is based on the second edition of this work and, unfortunately, makes almost no distinction between the first and second edition in the English. Hence it veils Husserl's 'first phenomenology'. Hickerson's book is important precisely because it explicitly takes upon itself the task of studying this first edition for its own sake.

Of course, Hickerson offers more than merely a study of the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*. He also provides an in-depth study of Brentano and Twardowski. In his introduction, Hickerson presents a clear argument why contemporary philosophy of mind can learn much from the historical study of the problem of intentional content in the Brentano School. In his chapter on Brentano's *Psychology*, he shows that physical phenomena, though described by Brentano in sensory terms, are 'factual and extra-mental rather than thing-like or mind dependent' (44). He argues for this reason that Brentano is the origin not merely of the phenomenological tradition but also of contemporary philosophy of mind. In his study of Twardowski's *Habilitationsschrift* he shows that Twardowski's mediator-content representationalism breaks from traditional representational theories of mental content in favor of a more semiotic conception. Though Twardowski stands as one of the last picture theorists, Hickerson convincingly argues that he 'was on the cusp of movement away from older representational theories and toward twentieth-century ones' (54).

Hickerson's historical study of intentionality provides a genuine contribution to contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, since it explicitly anchors on-going debates, e.g., internalism vs. externalism, in a philosophical development that is all too often ignored. Furthermore, his study of the *Logical Investigations* offers a unique contribution even within the field of continental philosophy. It is refreshing to find a work that bridges the analytic-continental divide within philosophy so naturally and without fatal compromise. For this reason above all, this book is worthwhile. Given its limited aims, it

provides a serious contribution to the study of intentionality generally and to the problem of mental contents particularly.

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David L. Hull and **Michael Ruse, eds.**
The Cambridge Companion to
The Philosophy of Biology.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.
Pp. 513.
US$90.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-85128-2);
$34.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-61671-3).

There has been a recent explosion in books devoted to providing an introduction to the philosophy of biology. In the past two years alone, there have been five additions to an area that previously had only two narrative introductions (Sober; Sterelny and Griffiths) and three broad anthologies (Ruse; Sober; Hull and Ruse). Two of these recent additions are narrative introductions (Garvey; Rosenberg and McShea) and three are wide-ranging anthologies (Ruse; Matthen and Stephens; Sarkar and Plutynski). Thus, it is in the midst of a sudden doubling of offerings for those seeking introductions to the philosophy of biology that this new Cambridge Companion enters the scene.

On the one hand, this publishing boom is indicative of an increased interest in the philosophy of biology, one to which the Cambridge Companion Series has perceptively responded. On the other hand, it is unclear why the series is venturing into new territory of this kind. These companions normally focus on specific historical figures or periods (e.g. Medieval Philosophy, the Stoics, etc.). With the exception of 'Feminism in Philosophy', this new volume is the only one in the series that covers a contemporary topic with no explicit historical connection. It is therefore both curious and a sign of the rising interest in the philosophy of biology that Cambridge University Press has chosen to extend their Companion series in this direction.

I mention these details because they bear upon what I take to be the appropriate standard by which such a companion ought to be evaluated. As I understand the series' mandate, it ought to provide competent non-specialists with an engaging overview of the relevant subject by offering a broad selection of essays in which specialists introduce a topic of interest to uninitiated readers who are presumed to have a reasonable level of philosophical sophistication but no formal training in the area. The criterion for a success-

ful companion, then, is one that contains accessible, informative essays with lively enough narrative structures to retain the attention of readers who are curious yet not likely to persevere if they are presented with material that is at all obscure or presumptive of specialist knowledge.

With this in mind, I think this volume by Hull and Ruse succeeds admirably. It is not perfect, but it will not disappoint those looking for a compelling survey of the issues typically addressed in contemporary philosophy of biology. With few exceptions, it contains essays that effectively convey to the reader the key arguments and conceptual difficulties that arise when philosophical attention is paid to the biological sciences.

The features of the anthology on the whole that stand out are the editors' choice to commission essays on a wide range of subjects, and the fact that some of these subjects stretch beyond the usual candidates that appear in introductory philosophy of biology anthologies. The editorial decision, I think, was wise, and one in keeping with the strengths of the Companion series. Readers drawn to the series are not looking for a general, textbookish overview of the figure or topic in question; they want a picture of the figure or topic assembled from accessible snapshots of the research being done by leading experts in the field. So, for example, in this volume one is given the opportunity to have Kim Sterelny provide a guided tour through the complex relationship between microevolutionary processes and macroevolutionary patterns in the context of the radiation of animal life during the so-called 'Cambrian Explosion'. This is familiar territory for those working in the area, but for outsiders it is material too difficult to find in a straightforward narrative introduction to the philosophy of biology. Sterelny, however, does an excellent job organizing the issues at stake so that an outsider is able to get a sense of the controversy surrounding this puzzling paleobiological phenomenon.

Another model essay, in terms of accessibility, is Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz's historical overview of the 'gene' concept. This *is* territory found in any introduction to the philosophy of biology, but it is a topic that is deceptively complicated and most often relegated to a brief word of caution as the gene concept appears in other contexts, e.g., the levels of selection debate. By contrast, Griffiths and Stotz provide a detailed account of how the gene concept has been interpreted over the past century. The essay is technical in parts, to be sure, but it never loses a narrative thread that lets casual readers keep up as they learn just how mystifying the seemingly ordinary concept of a gene actually is. In a similar vein, in her essay 'What Is an "Embryo" and How Do We Know?' Jane Maienschein treats readers to a historical tour of a concept that most of us take for granted. This is a concise case study that will get readers thinking about a topic they otherwise would not expect to draw philosophical interest and is thus a perfect match for the volume.

Unfortunately, not all the essays in this volume fare so well when it comes to making specialty topics accessible to an inexperienced audience. Lindley Darden's piece on mechanisms and models, Valerie Gray Hardcastle's overview of neurobiology, and the introduction by Gregory Mikkelson to issues

related to ecology, all fail to provide enough of a lucid narrative path to capture the attention of non-specialists. One can hardly fault these authors for the difficulty encountered when trying to make such complex research topics accessible to a broad audience; but, difficult or not, that is their assigned task. There is simply no point including essays in this kind of volume that will be tedious for anyone except those with enough background knowledge to process the material.

One might, of course, worry about erring on the side of oversimplification, but it is a forgivable sin in this context. Consider Christopher Horvath's essay on the genetic basis of sexual orientation: it sets aside important complications (e.g., whether there is any clearly defined boundary to sexual orientation at all), and it is so restrained in its mention of the fact that a biological basis for sexual orientation ought to have no direct normative upshot, even if it *does* exist, that one suspects a dry wit in play. Nevertheless, the essay offers a concise snapshot of the subject with enough secondary references that interested readers can seek out further detail if they so choose. Similarly, Robert Pennock's survey of the links between biology and religion is an understated report of the ways in which it is not necessary for Christianity to conflict with evolutionary theory in the way it does so spectacularly in the hands of fundamentalist theologians. Pennock forgoes opportunities to explore more thoughtful combinations of biology and religion as he reservedly targets egregious instances of Christian dogmatism (e.g., Reagan appointee James Watt testifying that natural resource protection is unnecessary due to the immanent return of Jesus), but, again, references to more detailed sources are included for those still interested after they finish this dryly comic starter.

Another trait I think is perfectly acceptable in a Cambridge Companion is arguing for one's own position rather than attempting to give a neutral overview of the relevant area. As long as alternative positions (with appropriate references) are fairly represented, this can be an engaging way to get readers interested in the topic. Thus, proponents of statistical interpretations of population-level theories of natural selection and drift would surely like the chance to reply to Robert Brandon and Grant Ramsey's critique of the view, but this critique is presented clearly enough that readers will be drawn in to the subject and given the chance to wonder what this reply will look like. Similarly, Elisabeth Lloyd provides a lucid but partisan survey of the levels of selection debate. Her essay should have paid less attention to Dawkins and addressed the more sophisticated defense of the genocentric perspective from Kitcher and Sterelny, but it is nevertheless a cogent introduction to the significance of concepts like replicators, interactors and group selection.

There are, of course, some essays in the volume with less subtle deficiencies. In an otherwise interesting analysis of teleology, André Ariew's 'materialist' is a straw man who rejects not only purposive forces in nature but any explanation for adaptive qualities other than the 'chance side-effects' of natural processes. Zachary Ernst's user-friendly introduction to game theory is marred by an unnecessary inversion of cells in the initial illustrations of

a prisoner's dilemma and a typo (310) in a Nash Equilibrium example that will confuse readers for a full three pages. (More substantively, he presents iteration as an alternative to correlation rather than a particular means of generating it.) And Jason Scott Robert closes his useful reality check on the promise of the Human Genome Project with some terribly programmatic allusions to the 'new' bioethics necessary to handle a move to systems biology.

Still, every one of these essays is redeemed by its ability to engage inexperienced readers and lead them through some very intricate material. This is a far more difficult task than most of us recognize, and it is the overall merit of this volume for which it ought to be given high praise.

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Haig Khatchadourian
Meaning and Criteria: With Application
to Various Philosophical Problems.
New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc. 2007.
Pp. 324.
US$78.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8204-8881-3).

Raising the stakes high, Khatchadourian begins by emphasizing that many philosophical problems in metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, moral and political philosophy stem from the confusion between the meaning of expressions and the criteria for their application. The author undertakes to rectify this problem: after critically analyzing four fundamental theories of meaning — Davidson, Wittgenstein, Alston, and Grice — he develops his own account and applies it to problems in different areas of philosophy.

Concentrating his analysis on the work of Stephen G. Williams, William G. Lycan, and Robert K. Shope, Khatchadourian identifies two major issues with the truth conditional approach to meaning. In his opinion, the theory, incapable of extending our understanding of ordinary linguistic meaning beyond illuminating the logical connection between statements and truth conditions, fails to address context and speaker's intentions, or to provide a method for discovering the contribution of individual words and phrases to sentence meaning. As the author argues, the theory also cannot be extended to non-declarative statements, e.g., requests, questions, etc. Khatchadourian criticizes the attempt to address this problem by transforming non-declarative sentences into declarative form, claiming that the meaning of imperatives is fundamentally and irreducibly different from declarative sentences.

For the same reasons, he is skeptical of solving the problem by substituting the knowledge-expectations and compliance conditions for the truth conditions. Khatchadourian is similarly unimpressed with Lycan's attempt to deal with problems of vagueness, ambiguity, context-dependent pronouns, coextensive non-synonymous predicates, or non-truth-functional connectives, by framing the truth conditions in terms of possible worlds. The author points out that ambiguity and vagueness present as many problems for the intensional version of truth conditions as they do for Davidson's original version.

In addressing Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning, Khatchadourian relies on the analysis of the work by P. M. S. Hacker. Hacker, maintaining that there is a difference between symptoms, criteria, and necessary and sufficient truth conditions, views criteria as conditions that non-inductively justify the assertion of a sentence. Since in cases of false avowals (pretending, lying) the satisfaction of public criteria does not entail the truth of the assertion, the criteria are inferentially weaker than entailment but, being non-inductive, stronger than symptoms. Khatchadourian argues that Wittgenstein's view of avowals as non-cognizable is due to a confusion related to the need for public criteria in initially fixing the meaning of psychological concepts and to the inapplicability of the concept of evidence to first person psychological avowals. He suggests that viewing the experience of pain as a necessary and sufficient condition for applying the concept of pain is ultimately compatible with Wittgenstein's denial of the possibility of private language. Drawing on examples of nonsensical words that have linguistic application and meaningful words that lack it, Khatchadourian argues that meaning cannot be identified with use in language, because use is both broader and narrower than meaning. Ultimately, while conventional use determines meaning, it is not meaning.

Khatchadourian criticizes Alston's contention that meaning is an illocutionary act potential, suggesting that the theory presupposes the meaning of the propositional content to which illocutionary force applies. While successful in establishing the relation between specific sentences and meaning of utterances in contexts, the theory fails to relate speaker-meaning and sentence-meaning or to provide adequate criteria of synonymy for sentences. Since illocutionary acts themselves are partly determined by the meanings of constituent words and their syntactic relations, they can illuminate meaning but not determine it. The social meaning of performative utterances is over and above their semantic meaning, which should be defined before illocutionary acts can take place.

While too brief to contain an adequate literature overview, in depth analysis, or a good faith attempt to address criticisms, Khatchadourian's treatment of these theories of meaning suggests that its purpose is to be a prolonged introduction to the author's own analytical approach to meaning. Indeed, at the beginning of Part 2, emphasizing the distinctions between criteria, necessary and sufficient conditions, evidence, and symptoms, Khatchadourian lays the framework for his approach by distinguishing dependent and independent criteria (D-criteria and I-criteria) of meaning. A D-criterion is

part of the meaning of an expression: criteria features qualify as D-criteria if they are either identical with the defining (classifying conditions) features of the expressed concept, or logically presuppose them. An I-criterion, which resembles Wittgenstein's notion of a symptom, is not part of the meaning of expression: criteria features qualify as I-criteria if they coincide with the defining features of the designated concept based on experience rather than logical entailment. The author also distinguishes cluster and family resemblance criteria (C-criteria and F-criteria), which he considers in the context of non-essentialist concepts, and quasi-independent criteria (Q-criteria), which he relates to defeasible and non-evaluative 'expressive' concepts.

Khatchadourian argues that evaluative expressions fall into general and special grading labels. The general labels, consisting of such moral, aesthetic, or political grading standards as good/bad or right/wrong, acquire different meanings from their different referents. The specialized labels, e.g. sacred/profane, cowardly/brave, contain descriptive elements and evaluate particular kinds of things they designate. Defining dependent and independent evaluative criteria (D-criteria/I-criteria) on analogy with descriptive expressions, Khatchadourian considers them in the context of functional/non-functional words, aesthetic terms, emotive expressions, cluster terms, and defeasible concepts.

In the final chapter, Khatchadourian aims to resolve philosophical confusions plaguing Cartesian Dualism, Logical Positivism, Sense-Datum Theory, as well as metaphysical and epistemological views of such authors as Hume, Mill, Berkeley, C. I. Lewis, and G. E. Moore, by revealing the misidentification of meaning, criteria, and sufficient and necessary conditions in the corresponding arguments. Yet, as the author admits, the difficulty is that in the processes of analysis one is forced to fall back on the pre-analytical, intuitive knowledge of at least rudimentary linguistic expressions. Accomplishing this Munchhausen feat puts Khatchadourian's applied type of linguistic analysis in sharp contrast with the theoretical frameworks — such as truth conditional theory or intention-based semantics — that refuse to take the right-hand side of the semantic equation for granted. Nevertheless, it is the final chapters of this book, which lay out the topology of concepts and criteria for evaluative and non-evaluative expressions and apply them to philosophical problems, that merit particular interest. On the negative side, the book seems to be unjustifiably long and, featuring borderline arbitrary punctuation, occasional incomplete sentences, and some endnote reference inconsistencies, betrays few signs of adequate copy editing.

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The defense of torture has been of much interest to philosophers, political scientists, and legal theorists in recent years. This defense has been largely in response to the view that we are now in a 'new kind of warfare' that requires rapid intelligence gathering in the face of possibly tragic outcomes. This view has been promulgated by the US intelligence community, the media, and various political pundits. Such careening for what the Bush administration blithely called 'enhanced interrogation techniques' has led to a surge in defense of torture in both exceptional and unexceptional cases.

This blind surge has almost uniformly helped itself to what is known as the 'ticking bomb argument'. The form of this argument is predictable: we imagine that we have captured a suspected (or known) terrorist who has knowledge of an imminent bomb detonation in a densely populated urban area. Torture is the only way to obtain information of the whereabouts of the bomb, information that will allow one to prevent the needless death of thousands of people. This thought experiment has been the point of departure for numerous, and varied, positions on torture's presumed permissibility. For instance, Alan Dershowitz defends the view that we should set up judicial oversight through a system of torture warrants. Others defend a view of exceptionalism regarding torture's illegality: despite being illegal (and needing to remain so), there must be cases in which we excuse or permit torture.

The past two years have seen increasing numbers of books and article-length treatments devoted to demonstrating severe problems with ticking-bomb reasoning. Matthews' book is among the best of this literature. His arguments are persuasive and powerful, and his treatment of the issue of torture's absolute prohibition is far-reaching and thorough. Matthews' strategy is to demonstrate that the arguments against torture are persuasive despite one's metaethical preferences. To this end, he argues that torture is impermissible from the point of view of deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue theory. Due to considerations of space, I will not rehearse all of the many arguments Matthews uses. Instead, I will concentrate on his argument that the utilitarian (of whatever stripe) *must* support the absolute prohibition of torture, even in so-called 'ticking-bomb' cases. I take this argument to be Matthews' most important (and most interesting), as it tackles the primary proponent of occasional torture on her own ground, and insists on a utilitarian being true to an empirically grounded assessment of *actual* pleasures and pains.

Matthews' analysis reveals the emptiness of the ticking bomb scenario. Because the thought experiment asks us to assume that torture will work, and that it will do so in a restricted time span, the meaning of the term 'torture' is anything but clear in this thought experiment. As Matthews points out, 'torture' 'functions like an unbound variable of predicate logic, bearing no relation to possible empirical instantiations' (96). It is simply an empty term, plugged into a thought experiment that is unconstrained even by the empirical *reality* of actual torture. In this respect, the term 'torture' might as well stand for 'dog' or 'cat', as it resembles these mammals no less closely than it resembles actual torture practices. It is presumably for this reason that the ticking-bomb scenario is capable of justifying everything (if it can justify anything). As Matthews notes, similar arguments could be used 'for the establishment of rape and torture camps, the deliberate spreading of terror, or *any* of the other purposes for which torture is used' (121).

The utilitarian, then, if she is to talk about torture, must talk about more realistic (and empirically grounded) cases. Once this happens, the pleasure and pain calculations are by no means pro-torture. It is here that Matthews contributes significantly to the torture literature: he exposes the extensive damage caused by torture, and explodes the myth that damage is done only to *the person who is tortured*. As Matthews argues, in cases of torture, 'the individual is separated from the community and isolated. But the reverse holds as well. The community is separated and isolated from the individual. Both are thereby harmed' (51). Moreover, the family of those tortured undergo 'parallel experiences' to the torture victim: 'psychological terror and suffering on the part of the family; stress for the family as a result of the suffering inflicted on their loved one; confusion, anger, emotional isolation; difficulties in maintaining healthy relationships' (55). Finally, torture involves the attempt to destroy a person's identity, and hence involves (at least a symbolic) violence against the constituent parts of this identity: one's gender, ethnicity, religion, and so on. In this respect, Matthews argues, torture is 'simultaneously an assault on the entire culture' (57).

But this is not all that is relevant to the calculations that a utilitarian must make in thinking through the moral issue of torture. In addition, one must accept that torture is a kind of *skill*, and hence that to effectively engage in torture requires *training*. As will come as a surprise to no one, acquiring such skill will involve the existence of institutions in which one can become a torturer, as well as eventual victims upon which one can practice one's craft. The addition of such institutions can have an effect on the entire mood of a culture, and a utilitarian cannot very well ignore such things. When the cultural, personal, and social costs of torture are weighed against the *possible* pain of a detonating device, the outcome is clear: torture must be prohibited, and prohibited without exception.

For all of its persuasiveness, Matthews' book has its faults, though in my view they are minor when compared to the overall case Matthews makes against the permissibility of torture in any case. Nevertheless, at least one of these flaws ought to be pointed out. This is Matthews' propensity, appar-

ent in a couple of instances, to overstate the force of his conclusions. I cite one example that, I believe, has some effect on the evaluation of the overall argument of the book. Matthews claims that torture will inevitably get out of control: 'It is not a risk but is inevitable. Torture attacks identity, and identity is social. When states torture, they attack not individuals but groups and communities . . . state torture is one tactic in a coercive assault on some community . . . [the harm of torture] spreads out across these entire groups in complicated ways. This spreading is intrinsic to torture and cannot be avoided' (202). I do not know what kind of necessity is meant to be at work in the above claim, and I find it difficult to believe that any act of torture will inevitably produce multiple acts of torture. The only possible argument I can currently envision for a claim like this might go as follows: torture is a practice. As such, anything that is to count as 'torture' must be built into particular institutions. If torture requires institutions, though, there cannot be a solitary act of torture (in much the way that one person cannot follow a rule only once).

The problem with this argument, I think, is fairly obvious: it appeals to what look like *a priori* considerations to justify what must, in the end, be an empirical claim. It might be true that state-run torture will *likely* get out of control, and it is presumably this kind of torture that Matthews has in mind in the above passage. But is it obvious that we cannot construct a counter-example? We need only imagine a state-sponsored torture program that is terminated almost immediately after its inception, and hence is not given enough time to get out of control. Insisting that this is not a case of torture (or state sponsored torture) seems dangerously like letting one's *a priori* commitments guide one's empirical findings.

As I said, this is not a serious objection to Matthews' view. At best, it points to the need for some elaboration on the kind of 'necessity' to which Matthews is appealing, and perhaps also for a comment on how empirical claims can involve necessity. At worst, the objection points to the need for Matthews to mitigate his claim, to say that we are justified in thinking that state-sponsored torture is not controllable, rather than to say that loss of control is inevitable. This claim is weaker, but still quite powerful.

There are other cases in this book, in my opinion, where conclusions are overstated, or where more argument is required for a particular conclusion to be fully warranted. This is hardly unique in our discipline. Argumentative gaps in Matthews' book are infrequent occurrences, though, and should not distract any reader from what I take to be one of the finest books yet published on the question of torture. Matthews has done us a service with this book; he has taken the debate to a new level of sophistication, and offered arguments against the pro-torture position that seem to me decisive.

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Colin McGinn
Mindfucking:
A Critique of Mental Manipulation.
Stockfield: Acumen 2008.
Pp. 76.
US$24.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-84465-114-6).

Deja-vu! A respected analytic philosopher publishes a medium-length paper as a tiny yet self-standing hardcover book. In it he analyses a folk-epistemological term whose obscenity allows it also to serve as the book's provocative and eye-catching title.

Is McGinn's book simply his attempt to gain the fifteen minutes of celebrity enjoyed by Harry Frankfurt when the essay 'Bullshit' was republished as the overpriced nanobook, *Bullshit*? The question is unavoidable, but out of fairness I shall address that comparison only after discussing the book's actual content.

What, then, is the meaning of 'mindfucking'? The term usually (but only usually, as we shall see) refers to the uninvited and malevolent manipulation of someone's mind and beliefs through illegitimate, non-rational, emotion-based techniques. Such techniques prey upon the particular psychological weaknesses of their intended victims and also require their practitioners to engage in a preliminary process of 'seduction' in which the confidence of the victim is gained and his or her resistance worn away. Mindfucking is an especially reprehensible form of deception because, unlike simple lying or 'bullshitting' (in Frankfurt's sense of speech completely untethered from considerations of truth and untruth), it intrinsically involves the deliberate infliction of grave psychological harm upon its victims. McGinn is exactly on target when he mobilizes Iago's manipulation of Othello as the classic illustration of these phenomena. When carried out by collectives or institutions, mindfucking is related to the all-too-familiar practices of indoctrination, brainwashing, and propaganda.

For better or worse, it appears that the term 'mindfucking' is not entirely unambiguous. McGinn insists that 'the meaning of "mindfuck" is not exclusively negative: 'The phrase is sometimes used to describe the positive sensation involved in having, or in being presented with, some striking new idea, or in having some sort of agreeably life-altering experience' (5). This assertion makes one wonder why McGinn is so eager to promote a term whose inherent ambiguity is bound to promote confusion, especially when the phrase 'to fuck with someone's mind' can usually be replaced without loss of meaning with the clearly negative but admittedly less titillating expression, 'to mess with someone's mind'. In any event, we learn that certain films (*Fight Club*!), Kuhnian paradigm shifts, and even romantic love might count as mindfucks in this non-pejorative sense. However, the concluding pages of the book assure us that it is not itself a mindfuck, but rather merely an essay on mindfucking that 'will have served its purpose if it alerts the reader to a phenomenon on which it is advisable to have a clear grip' (76).

So: is this a worthwhile book or just a *Bullshit* wannabe? McGinn must certainly be aware that people are bound to make comparisons; in fact, he makes constant references to Frankfurt's work, starting from the very opening sentence of his preface. Unfortunately for McGinn, while *Bullshit* is actually the shorter of the two works, its philosophical and literary references are more intriguing — and numerous — than those found in *Mindfucking*. *Bullshit* also contains the germ of a theory of the prevalence of bullshit in our day, while McGinn has basically nothing to say about factors affecting the frequency with which mindfucking occurs in contemporary society. Most importantly, in *Bullshit* Frankfurt brings to light a new epistemological category, while people have long been aware of mindfucking, even if they lacked an obscene term with which to speak of it. A simple Google-search for 'psychological manipulation' will produce countless articles on what McGinn calls 'mind-fucking'. How great would have been the loss to philosophy if McGinn had used the book's subtitle as its main title: *A Critique of Mental Manipulation*?

Sometimes McGinn seems bored with his topic; he dutifully cranks out a workmanlike and predictable analysis of a not especially promising concept. It is disappointing that, given the tremendous amount of new research in cognitive science taking place today, McGinn could find nothing in its results worth mentioning when writing an essay about psychological manipulation. Such practical information would have helped readers learn how to escape the clutches of potential mindfuckers.

If McGinn's little book draws new readers into the philosophical audience, more power to him. However, the whole affair strikes me as unworthy of his considerable philosophical talents.

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Ohad Nachtomy
Possibility, Agency, and Individuality
in Leibniz's Metaphysics.
Dordrecht: Springer 2007.
Pp. 272.
US$129.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-4020-5244-6).

In this book Nachtomy shows that there are important connections between Leibniz's early logical notion of possibility, his later understanding of agency (human and divine), and his understanding of the individuation of created entities. The book contains ten chapters divided into three parts.

Part 1, 'Possibility', contains four chapters that span approximately half of the book. In the first chapter, Nachtomy argues that Leibniz's views on possibility are fundamentally combinatorial: God 'thinks' the combinations of his own simple attributes and from this mental activity the realm of possible entities is produced. Chapter 2 is a more detailed discussion of how concepts of possible *individuals* are generated in God's mind. Nachtomy argues that Leibniz's God employs a production rule, one akin to an algorithm, for mentally combining his simple attributes in certain ways in order to produce concepts of individuals. In Chapter 3, Nachtomy discusses the relations between these individuals, and thus Leibniz's views on the ontological status of relations. Chapter 4 is devoted almost entirely to Catherine Wilson's claim that Leibnizian worlds are not built up out of individuals, but rather logically *precede* individuals. Nachtomy's response to Wilson involves an account of what compossibility amounts to for Leibniz.

Part 2, 'Agency', contains three chapters. In Chapter 5, Nachtomy explains how Leibniz's possible individuals become actual. They do so by becoming endowed with a primitive force of acting, a power that enables them to carry out the sequence of predicates dictated by the production rule for generating individuals in God's mind (discussed earlier in Chapter 2). In Chapter 6, Nachtomy discusses Leibniz's views on agency and human freedom. He sets himself the task of addressing the 'tension' (see below) between Leibniz's theory of the complete individual concept and Leibniz's insistence that individuals act freely. In Chapter 7, Nachtomy compares Leibniz's views on agency with those of Spinoza, with particular attention to generative definitions and the role they play in each philosopher's theory of agency.

Part 3, 'Individuality', begins with Chapter 8, where Nachtomy focuses on Leibniz's notion of an aggregate. He argues among other things that Leibniz's conception of an aggregate involves a mental operation of relating the substances that make up that aggregate. In Chapter 9, Nachtomy turns to 'nested individuals', i.e., Leibniz's notion that in organic units (as opposed to artificial ones) there are individuals nested in individuals *ad infinitum*. Nachtomy argues that the unity Leibniz attributes to organic individuals stems from their functional organization, an organization that dictates their activity in a teleological way. In Chapter 10, Nachtomy further clarifies his understanding of Leibnizian nested individuals, and he offers the intriguing

suggestion that the production rule used by God to generate concepts of possible individuals — a rule that serves as a principle of individuation — can also explain the functional organization between the dominating monad of an organic unit and the individuals nested in it. If that is correct, then Nachtomy has again shown that Leibniz's combinatorial approach to possibility may shed light on his concept of nested individuals.

The book has some weaknesses. First, Leibniz scholars are not likely to find in the details much that is original. Most of the book is dedicated to arguing for interpretive conclusions that are already generally accepted. For example, in Chapter 3 Nachtomy spends several pages arguing that Leibniz held that relations are mere mental results in the mind that considers the relevant relata. In Chapters 3 and 4, Nachtomy repeatedly makes and defends a distinction between a 'thin' individual concept (i.e. one that consists entirely of monadic predicates) and a complete individual concept (i.e. one that contains relational predicates as well). Chapter 8 defends a well known interpretation of what Leibniz means when he claims that bodies are 'semimental'. All of these interpretations have been defended in the literature in basically the same way Nachtomy defends them here.

Second, in offering solutions to well known interpretive problems, Nachtomy seems at times to misconstrue the issue, or at least not discuss its most important aspect. To take but one example, in Chapter 6, Nachtomy addresses Leibniz on freedom: 'The problem is how to reconcile Leibniz's definition of an individual through its complete concept — a concept which entails all the individual's predicates of past, present, and future actions — with his claim that rational individuals may perform these very actions freely' (145). This is a curious way of framing the problem. Why should there be a problem with freedom vis-à-vis the theory of complete concepts? Nachtomy himself provides the solution to this 'problem' thirteen pages later: 'Even though a complete concept entails every truth about an individual, concepts and agents belong to different categories' (158). Indeed, complete concepts are inactive ideal entities and thus cannot impinge on the agency of a concrete individual. It is generally acknowledged that the real issue with Leibnizian freedom has to do with the modality governing the will: given that all of an agent's states 'follow' from previous states according to the law of the series, what is the modal force of this 'following' when it comes to freely chosen actions? Leibniz wrote that this following is governed by a moral necessity, not a metaphysical one. The challenge is to figure out whether moral necessity amounts to causal necessity or whether it permits a more libertarian reading. *This* is the core of the issue with respect to Leibnizian freedom, and the theory of complete individual concepts would seem not to be directly relevant to the interesting questions about Leibniz's views on freedom. Leibniz himself made this clear to Arnauld.

Finally, the book contains many grammatical and typographical errors, some of which occur even in section headings (e.g., 90). This can be distracting to the reader. Of course, this is not necessarily Nachtomy's fault.

Despite my criticisms, Nachtomy's book offers a number of interesting suggestions about how to understand some of Leibniz's most important metaphysical doctrines. The book is entirely successful at identifying a systematic thread in Leibniz's thinking that begins with his combinatorial approach to possible individuals and runs through his understanding of agency and his philosophy of the organic world. The book is clearly written and is particularly good at guiding the reader in a logical way through some of Leibniz's most difficult territory.

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Tommaso Piazza
A Priori Knowledge:
Toward a Phenomenological Explanation.
Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2007.
Pp. 216.
US$84.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-3-937202-92-1).

In this book Piazza fits an abundance of interesting well-argued discussion into a small number of pages, rarely sacrificing thoroughness. Piazza defends a rationalist account of the a priori, one heavily informed by the recent revival of interest in a priori knowledge amongst analytic philosophers, and simultaneously contributing to the growing body of literature seeking to bridge analytic philosophy and phenomenology. An important contribution of the book is its demonstration of the relevance of Husserl's phenomenology for contemporary discussions of the a priori.

Piazza focuses primarily on a priori *justification*, not *knowledge*. His concern is with what kinds of *reasons* we might have for believing propositions such as those of logic (not with questions of the analysis of 'a priori knowledge', its susceptibility to Gettier-style counterexamples, etc.). For Piazza, the paradigm of an epistemic reason seems to be when a subject undergoes some conscious experience (e.g., perceiving that X or intuiting that X) and in virtue of this acquires a non-inferential reason to believe something. His notion of justification is thus internalist rather than externalist and foundationalist rather than coherentist.

Piazza maintains that the best available *non-intuition-based* accounts of a priori justification result in skepticism; therefore we *must* try to make sense of rational intuition *if* we are to avoid skepticism. In Chapter 1 he reasons that the best recent analyticity accounts only work if logic is grounded in con-

vention. But, he argues in Chapter 2, if logic is merely conventional, relativism or skepticism seems inevitable, and there *are* reasons supporting logic's objectivity. In Chapter 3 it is claimed that while Boghossian's notion of *rule-circular* justification, if successful, might shore up analyticity accounts (thus establishing the expendability of intuition-based-accounts), Boghossian's account fails. Thus, the argument concludes in Chapter 4, rational intuition is unavoidable if skepticism is avoidable, and an account must be developed. Each step of this ambitious argument is well reasoned, analytical, and will reward careful study. Because it is more thorough than other, similar accounts, here I focus on Piazza's positive Husserlian explanation of rational insight.

Piazza identifies rational insight with Husserl's notion of 'eidetic seeing' or intuition of essences, defending the theses '(a) that eidetic seeing could be seen as non-problematic in character, for it eventually comes to a process whereby we clarify the content of our concepts, and that (b), its character of conceptual analysis notwithstanding, the epistemic deliverances of eidetic insight, given the nature of, and the way we acquire our concepts, should be seen as pieces of knowledge about reality' (156).

Piazza provides a clear accessible exposition of Husserl's accounts of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and of eidetic intuition. Eidetic intuition results from a process Husserl called 'eidetic' or 'free' imaginative variation. It involves focusing on a kind of object, such as a triangle (or cat, or color, etc.), and imaginatively varying features of that object, reflecting on whether the object remains, altered feature(s) notwithstanding, an instance of the kind under consideration. When the object *does* survive feature-alteration (as in the size of a triangle or color of a cat) that feature is revealed as inessential; while every feature whose removal results in the object intuitively ceasing to instantiate the kind (e.g., removal of *all* molecules from a cat) is revealed as a necessary feature of that kind. Husserl maintained this procedure could incrementally reveal elements of the essence of something, ideally culminating in complete intuition of that essence.

To establish that such insights involve concepts — thesis '(a)' above — Piazza appeals to Husserl's account of concept-acquisition in terms of 'passive synthesis', 'typification' or empirical concept formation, and finally 'ideational' abstraction, where the empirical concept is reinterpreted as an essence by abstaining from considerations of actual existence regarding it and focusing instead on questions of possibility and impossibility for things of that kind. If eidetic intuition just involves a sort of abstraction from empirical concepts, there is a sense in which eidetic insights concern concepts.

However — thesis '(b)' above — this *does not* mean that propositions believed to be based on eidetic insight are true solely in virtue of concepts they contain, or that they lack factual significance. Piazza's idea is that concepts are not, as sometimes seems suggested, 'mental marbles', semantic entities existing entirely within our heads as direct objects of thought. Rather, concepts are ways of directing thought to the world. Thus, when, on the basis of imaginative variation, a subject intuits the truth of the proposition that 'nothing can be entirely green in color and entirely red in color simultane-

ously', this insight *involves* concepts, but it is not *about* or *true in virtue of* concepts. Rather, the proposition is *about* colors and their instantiation conditions in objects, and it is true in virtue of these. Eidetic intuition is thus a kind of concept-analysis (therefore, unsuspicious), which yet yields insights with substantive factual content (therefore, non-trivial).

While Piazza's Husserlian account of concept-acquisition seems plausible, and his discussion of the directedness of concepts to the world is insightful, the crucial question remains: how is it that concepts acquired via empirical abstraction, when analyzed, yield modal *insights* into the essences of things that are in some sense *responsive* or *connected* to those essences?

If, as Piazza seems to maintain, logical facts are objective facts with normative and modal features, then, it seems, they are facts to which empirical experience alone cannot provide access. If this is so, it is unclear why concepts acquired via abstraction from experience should accurately encode or capture normative and modal features of those facts, such that eidetic intuition would be likely to yield accurate insights regarding them, even if the content of such intuitions is in some sense about such facts. An answer to this concern may well be germinally present in Piazza's critical but brief concluding discussion of conventionalism. For the moment, however, it seems this problem, admittedly confronted by all intuition-based accounts, looms for Piazza's account as well.

Piazza's subtitle is, however, *Toward a Phenomenological Explanation*, and in this regard he has made an impressive and promising beginning, while simultaneously bringing considerations from Husserlian phenomenology into productive dialogue with contemporary discussions of the a priori. This book will be of interest to all philosophers concerned with the a priori, and would be a useful text in a graduate seminar on the a priori, especially if used in conjunction with some of the recent literature that it discusses.

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Stathis Psillos
Philosophy of Science A-Z.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2007.
Pp. 279.
US$70.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7486-2214-6);
US$20.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-7486-2033-3).

This book is part of Edinburgh's 'Philosophy A-Z' series, the volumes of which are essentially dictionaries or glossaries of the terminology, nomenclature and major figures frequently referred to within a sub-discipline. Other A-Z titles include volumes on epistemology, ethics and the philosophy of language. Like all the volumes in the series the entries here are heavily cross-referenced to each other and to suggested sources of further reading. Psillos' book is intended to introduce students of the philosophy of science to its many complicated terms and schools of thought and to be a handy quick reference aid for professionals. Psillos has produced an extremely useful volume that will serve both these functions for a long time to come.

Producing a work like this faces difficult challenges. After all, no single small book can fully cover every term or significant philosopher important to a discipline, and the philosophy of science is no exception. However, the philosophy of science poses its own special challenges. Just as the twentieth century saw a massive expansion in the scope and specialization of the sciences, a similar diversification and expansion happened within the philosophy of science. This process increased after the 1960's, when the naturalist turn eroded the distinction between philosophy and science and the philosophy of science became more concerned with the details of the different special sciences. The result is a wide, varied and highly technical set of philosophical sub-fields: the philosophy of physics, biology, chemistry and so on. Mastering all the technical vocabulary of even one of these sub-fields is the work of a career; encompassing all of them in one volume is an especially daunting challenge. Psillos' well known work on the realism question, which touches on many areas, has left him in as good a position as any to attempt a general philosophy of science dictionary.

Not surprisingly, the realism question is well covered, and the various entries on it trace the turns in the debate back through a century of philosophy. Recent variations such as van Fraassen's constructive empiricism and structural realism are very well covered. The entries on structural realism in particular are excellent. Logical empiricism has had a massive impact on the philosophy of science and continues to exert influence, and this topic is very fully covered as well. Other well-documented topics are probability and the various theories of confirmation.

This book also includes entries on many of the major figures in the philosophy of science. The various logical empiricists are very well treated, for example. A major question in this context is whom to omit and whom to include. Psillos has a natural and fair solution: to get an entry a philosopher must have had a major impact and have been born before the end of the

Second World War. This avoids the difficulty of choosing between the many important but younger philosophers whose longer-term influence is not yet fully established.

Psillos' writing and clarity of explanation are very clear, and the book is pitched to be comprehensible to a novice readership. The discussion is also sufficiently detailed for use as a quick reference by the professional. Of course, every book has to make compromises, and Psillos has made some. While he does emphasize the diversity of contemporary philosophy of science, the book focuses on general philosophy of science questions and on the philosophy of physics more than on other branches of the field. While the entry on Darwin is excellent, philosophers of biology might have desired a bit more on, e.g. the species question, or cladistic classification. For my part, while I very much appreciated the entries on how developments in logic have affected the realism debate, such as the entry on Craig's theorem, I would have liked an entry on the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. Likewise, I was a little disappointed to not to see specific entries on set theory or the Gödel theorems. Others will have their own preferences.

Of course, pleasing everyone in the context of one small volume is impossible, and Psillos has done his best at making the volume as useful as possible to the largest number of readers in the field. For a graduate student contemplating a career in the field this book will be indispensable, and professionals will also make much use of it. For anyone else just interested in learning a little about major developments in the field, this is simply the best book on the market right now. Its scope is very surprising given its manageable length. Specialist and student readers alike will greet Psillos' work with enthusiasm, and it will be much read for a long time to come.

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James Rachels and **Stuart Rachels**, ed.
The Legacy of Socrates:
Essays in Moral Philosophy.
New York: Columbia University Press 2007.
Pp. 256.
US$34.50 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-231-13844-X).

When James Rachels died prematurely of cancer in 2003 at the age of sixty two, applied moral philosophy lost one of its most articulate and influential spokesmen. From his defense of active euthanasia to his development of a non-religious ethics grounded in evolutionary biology, Rachels, like Peter Singer, a kindred spirit (see, e.g., 66, 82), often argued controversial positions. Whether one agreed with him or not — I didn't always — he set a high standard, one that is maintained in this recent collection of essays edited by his son Stuart. It displays all the author's characteristic virtues: clarity, thoughtfulness, intellectual rigor, a willingness to explore and provoke, a sense of humor, a broadly humane vision, and a relaxed, accessible style of writing. Rachels is always a joy to read.

The present volume is a sequel and companion to an earlier collection of Rachels' essays, *Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). Having read both, I think that the first volume is a richer collection, but this one contains essays that are well worth reading. Stuart has divided the essays into five parts: 'Animals', 'Lives', 'Theories', 'Bioethics', and 'Art'. They span thirty years of Rachels' life. Two of them, 'Political Assassination' and 'Two Arguments Against Ethical Egoism', appeared in 1974 and two others, 'The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism' and 'Drawing Lines', were published posthumously in 2004. Taken together, the collection represents the range of topics for which Rachels is probably best known: a rejection of relativism and egoism, the importance of reason in moral decision making, the independence of morality from religion, the relevance of evolution to ethics, the duty to relieve both human and animal suffering, life and death issues in medical practice, and other, related issues in bioethics, and a modest view about the value of human life. Allow me to comment on a couple of the essays.

In 'Drawing Lines', Rachels defends moral individualism, the idea that beings (e.g., persons) should be treated on the basis of their own particular characteristics (27-9), but does not endorse the idea that a single set of properties (rationality, autonomy, self-consciousness, moral agency, sentience, e.g.) always justifies preferential treatment (40-42). There is no such thing as moral standing, or moral preference, *simpliciter*, so the question 'Where do we draw the line between beings that have and beings that lack moral standing?' is misguided, both with respect to the kinds of beings to whom we have duties and with respect to the duties we have, since there is no one place to draw the line (45). This is a conclusion worth thinking about, since moral line-drawing, in one way or another, is the norm in practical ethics. (One can

see why, of course, since one needs a way of determining, non-arbitrarily, who or what counts from a moral point of view.)

In 'Lives and Liberty', Rachels and co-author William Ruddick argue that liberty is necessary for having (living) a life, as opposed to merely being alive. Being alive is biological, while having a life is biographical (90). I think this is right. Do you have to be a person to have a life? Rachels thinks so, since he thinks that self-reflective ability is essential to having a life (90-91). I don't; I think that non-self-conscious beings can have lives — my yellow lab, for example. Rachels also thinks that persons can have *no* life (89, 91), and gives as examples 'total' slaves and victims of dire poverty (92). One can see what he has in mind: Someone who has no say in what she does has no liberty, and if liberty is a necessary condition for having a life, then she has no life (92-5). This may be true of total slaves, but from my experience working with Catholic volunteer organizations in Latin America, it's not true of peasants living in dire poverty; for I have found that they are often living richer lives than the (moderately) affluent folks — like me and my students — who come to help them. They are free in a way that we aren't. It's *our* lives that get transformed by *theirs*, not the other way around.

The last section on art contains only one item: an essay on movies. It might seem odd to include such an essay in a collection of essays on moral philosophy, but it isn't. Stuart tells us that his father was a movie buff, and that he had definite views about which movies were good and which weren't (ix). In this essay, Rachels distinguishes good movies from merely 'likeable' ones in much the way that he distinguished criteria for making moral judgments from mere expressions of taste (see his *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*, Chapter 1). This makes for good reading, for one wants to know *what* movies Rachels thinks are good ones and *why* he thinks they are good. I'm not going to tell you — except to say that he didn't mention any of what I think are the really great movies, most of which satisfy his criteria for 'good' ones. He would certainly include *To Kill a Mockingbird*, *Judgment at Nuremberg*, *The Grapes of Wrath*, and *Citizen Kane*, but probably not *Casablanca* (my all-time favorite) or *It's a Wonderful Life* (my favorite schmaltzy movie). Read the book to see what he does discuss!

Everything that James Rachels wrote, from *The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality* to *Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism*, is worth reading. I am sad that he is no longer around to give expression, even if controversial, to issues and interests that concern us all.

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Rupert Read
Applying Wittgenstein.
Ed. Laura Cook. New York: Continuum Books.
Pp. 192.
US$110.00 (cloth ISBN-10: 0-8264-9450-1).

Read's book is the latest addition to the ongoing debate in Wittgenstein scholarship between the 'resolute' and 'substantial' readings. Following in the footsteps of Cora Diamond, James Conant and those who identify themselves as the 'New Wittgensteinians', Read (along with Laura Cook, his contributing editor) espouses a strongly resolute position. As opposed to the more traditional substantial reading, by which some kinds of nonsense can point beyond the limits of language to *show* otherwise ineffable truths, the resolute reading 'takes nonsense seriously as a term of criticism: nonsense is not a special or hidden kind of sense, and there is no content to what nonsense is trying to say, if it could only succeed in breaking the "linguistic rules" it allegedly violates. Rather, nonsense is a "resolute" failure to mean, and nothing more' (xiv). In this light, Wittgenstein is viewed purely as a philosophical therapist, 'possessing *no "positive" vision of philosophy* (or language) at all, "only" a "negative" account of the temptations to illusion and nonsense to which we are all subject' (xv). This philosophical therapy is designed, in other words, to dissolve philosophical problems rather than to solve them.

In Part 1, Read lays out the theoretical foundations of the work, which include many interesting contributions to the debate, the most central and widely ramifying being the distinction between what he calls 'grammatical effects' and 'meaningful consequences'. The first, as he says, 'are more or less systematic effects of language which words and their interconnections have on us, effects of great "significance" to us, but not well understood as "signifying" in the sense of being used to name something or describe something' (30), whereas the second encompass the genuine kinds of meaning that result from more or less positivistic uses of language put to practical ends.

Read goes on in Part 2 to apply this resolute understanding of sense to Wallace Steven's poetry and Louis Sass' hermeneutic attempt to read a philosophically informed skepticism into the schizophrenic narrative of Benjy in William Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*. While both of their discourses ultimately rest on nonsense rather than sense, Read argues that Stevens does so for good (i.e., in the service of the resolute insight) and Sass for ill (having ultimately mistaken his nonsense for meaningful language). Following this, Part 3 explores Dummett's critique of standard temporal metaphysics. Read here asserts that, while realism can indeed only ever be nonsense, arguing against such nonsense — as Dummett does — mistakenly assumes there is enough 'sense' in it to argue against in the first place. The result is that Dummett is as mired in nonsense as the realist position he attacks. In addition to the three main sections of the book, there is a co-authored conclusion entitled 'Philosophical Problems are at Root Problems of Mood'

dealing with Zen-Buddhism, and an afterword from Read on what he sees as some further prospects on applying Wittgenstein, including such headings as 'Film', 'Math', and 'Politics'.

The clearest expression of what Read would like to accomplish in his book comes at its end: 'the task of applying Wittgenstein is among other things the task of philosophy shifting from absurd ambitions of *explaining* the world to being able rather, at last, to participate reflectively in a meaningful and useful sense in *changing* it. *Through*, paradoxically, the paradoxical maneuver of "leaving everything as it is" ' (142). Any discussion about whether and to what extent Read has succeeded here will thus hang upon how he has dealt with this 'paradoxical maneuver'. In this respect, the book is clearly the work of an abundant and ambitious philosophical imagination, and Read is to be congratulated for attempting to overcome what could be seen as a return to a kind of willfully naïve theorizing in philosophy after the critical advances of post-structuralism. (The repeated return here to figures such as Heidegger and Nietzsche is a testament to Wittgenstein's having been placed squarely within this tradition.) For all that, there remains something deeply disquieting about the blatant way in which Read skirts many of the tough questions raised by his analysis. How, for example, while claiming to advance no positive theories about the nature of language, Read's own 'nonsensical claims' are justified simply by the fact that they are used in service of the resolute thesis; how he aims to employ a 'therapeutic approach' that, by his own admission, cannot heal the sick: 'If one is shown one's intellectual compulsions, and yet does not want to give them up, there is little or nothing more to say' (124). Or, ultimately to compound immensely his principal claim, how Read can be so highly critical of philosophers such as Sass and Dummett, while at the same time holding it necessary to leave everything as it is. For why should they, and the majority of philosophy along with them, be exempt from the Wittgensteinian mandate?

There are many interesting Wittgensteinian sentiments embedded in a project such as this: the focus on lived experience, for example, or the attempt to find satisfaction in language as it is, rather than in seeking idle theoretical precisions. However, in the absence of a sufficiently nuanced style, Read's investigation seems only to embody the very kind of idle nonsensical discourse he continually disavows with an almost ideological fervor. Rather than a profound reconciliation with the paradoxical character of this investigation that the book is meant to embody, what we find are generally blatant contradictions as Read inevitably has to resort to the very forms of established philosophical discourse he critiques. To address this difficulty, he compulsively places words, e.g., 'theory', 'claim', and 'existence', among others, in scare quotes, which naturally does not suffice to lighten the load of the theory-laden work and seems only to serve as a very un-Wittgensteinian refusal to take responsibility for his discourse. If maneuvers such as these are meant to be ironic or 'self-deconstructing' in Read's words, they are insufficiently so. In the end, however, for a work that claims to advance no positive philosophical theses, the biggest problem is that it simply fails to evoke

the necessary mood the authors themselves claim is essential to 'solving' all philosophical problems.

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Delbert Reed
The Origins of Analytic Philosophy:
Kant and Frege.
New York: Continuum 2007.
Pp. 224.
US$130.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-9337-8).

Reed provides an intricate account of Frege's varying affinities with and radical departures from Leibniz and Kant. Ontology, logic, philosophy of language and philosophy of mathematics are integrated to explain the emergence of analytic philosophy. Reed demonstrates how Frege's reduction of arithmetic to logic originates with Leibniz's program and incorporates Kant's conceptualism while rejecting their ontological commitments.

In Parts 1-3 Reed traces the development of logic from Leibniz to Frege through Kant. He begins by tracking Frege's logicism. For Leibniz arithmetic was a purely rational activity involving proofs but his logicist program failed because of the irreducibility of asymmetrical relational propositions to monadic ones. Kant partitioned mathematics from logic as the former is rooted in sensibility and the latter in understanding. Hence, mathematics is synthetic a priori, and logic analytic a priori. Frege was able to reclaim the Leibnizian reduction of arithmetic to logic.

The spinal chord of Reed's book is that Frege replaced subject-predicate with argument-function logic in which relational propositions are encompassed. By introducing '⊢' Frege, unlike Kant, distinguished between the content and assertion of judgments. Reed poignantly points out that whereas for Kant concepts had primacy over judgments, for Frege judgments were the logical atoms. Frege redefined 'analytic' in terms of provability from the laws of logic, rejecting the Kantian definition in terms of content of judgments. Numbers were objects that did not require sensibility to intuit them. Frege's notational script allowed numbers to be represented as logical objects. Hence, all truths of arithmetic are analytic, because all arithmetical propositions are about numbers. 0 and 1 can be defined and every other number can be defined as a successor of its predecessor, and the concept of 'number' itself can be defined logically. Every arithmetical truth is provable by logical inference

from the axioms of arithmetic. Reed's important insight is that whereas for Kant arithmetic cannot be reduced to contentless logic, for Frege 'analytic' could include content, hence making the reduction possible.

In Part 4 Reed masterfully tracks Frege's concept of 'number'. Following the context principle that a word only has meaning within the context of a sentence, Frege provides definitions of individual numbers in terms of 'falling under a certain concept'. However, these definitions fail to provide the individuation or identity of numbers. Frege defines 'number' contextually: 'the sense of the proposition "the number which belongs to the concept F is the same as that which belongs to the concept G"' (153). This takes care of identity but not of individuation. Frege then defines 'number' explicitly: 'the number which belongs to the concept F is the extension of the concept "equal to the concept F"' (156).

Reed then traces the evolution of the notion of existence. He argues that for Aristotle existence is predicated of self-subsistent substances, for Leibniz it is predicated of monads and of complexes, but for Kant it is predicated neither of phenomenal nor of noumenal objects but is second-level predication of concepts which are derived from objects through the synthesis of sensibility and understanding. Frege accepts this, though his notions of 'concept' and 'object' are radically different from those of Kant; numbers exist because each number falls under a particular concept not because they are constructions.

Now Reed is able to unveil the fulcrum of his book, the revision of the concept of the a priori by Frege which departs from Kant and revives Leibniz. For Leibniz, when the justification of a truth is a general principle of reason, then it is a priori as is the case with all truths of mathematics. For Kant, the a priori is a distinct possibility of experience. Frege, like Leibniz, involves justification in defining different types of truth. If the proof of a proposition appeals only to general logical laws then it is a priori, and this is the case with all arithmetical truths. Reed again brings in the spinal chord when he claims that, by replacing the subject-predicate (substance-attribute) distinction with the function-argument (concept-object) distinction, Frege rejects the Leibnizian appeal to a mind of God for the subsistence of relations outside the human mind, as well as the Kantian notion that relations are imposed by the human mind.

Reed summarizes his project in the final chapter. From Leibniz, Frege adopted the formalist character of logic that arithmetic was derivable solely from the laws of logic. Whereas Aristotelian subject-predicate logic restricted Leibniz from discovering modern logic, the emergence of modern logic allowed Frege to be free of ontological commitment to a categorical structure of substance and properties, and to replace it with the distinction between object and concept. Kant was indispensable in this evolution as he dismantled the notion of substances as self-subsistent entities. So Fregean objects were not Aristotelian or Leibnizian substances. Numbers were established as non-actual objects, without which the notion of infinity in arithmetic could not be grounded. The old notion of self-subsistent substance was transformed

into the new notion of objects, both actual and non actual, as self-subsistent mind-independent entities. Reed has shown that though Frege maintained a strong connection between language and the world, especially the world of numbers, he did not believe that the world consisting of concepts, thoughts and objects depended on language and the mind for its existence.

The theme of the book is that Frege is the founder of analytic philosophy on the basis of his development of formal logic and foundations of arithmetic. Reed's greatest insight is how Frege is able to sustain Leibniz's logicism by first rejecting the Aristotelian-Leibnizian notion of self-subsistent substance just as Kant did, but then rejecting Kant's notion of numbers as constructions of the human mind, and then recovering an ontological status of numbers as non-actual mind independent objects, which is not Platonism because of the qualification of 'non-actual'. What is left incomplete is a closer understanding of what number is for Frege, but as Reed points out in the introduction, near the end of his life Frege, facing Russell's paradox, claimed that Kantian intuition was after all required for grasping numbers (17). Does this mean that Frege gave up on logicism in arithmetic? Reed does not answer this question but the strong indication is that Frege would not have given up but tackled this problem had he lived longer. The only serious deficiency of this book is its brevity, even though it is compact and tightly woven. An additional chapter in which Reed might have developed how Frege sustained or could have sustained logicism in the face of Russell's paradox would have been a fine complement.

All in all, this book is a valuable contribution to a historical perspective on the roots of analytic philosophy.

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In recent years, liberal political theory has undergone what one might understand as a sort of paradigm shift, wherein its individualist presuppositions have been reexamined under the name of communitarianism, multiculturalism, and the like. What this movement, if I may characterize it as such, asserts, is that 'communities,' 'cultures' and other forms of group membership, are important to individual citizens in ways that are largely missed by traditional, individualist liberalism. Though it may be premature to say that this new brand of liberalism has become the dominant theoretical paradigm for social theory, it has nonetheless emerged as an influential discourse in social, political, and pedagogical thought. From theories of justice that attempt to re-inscribe the rule of law within the context of a pluralist society, to pedagogical theories that stress the value of diversity, multiculturalism has become a theoretical force across disciplinary boundaries. But those theories that take groups, in some sense, as fundamental, quite often take for granted the ontological presuppositions of their theories. Sheehy's work addresses this deficiency.

The book's central thesis is that social groups are material particulars, on an ontological par with individual persons, tables, chairs, stones, and so on. He calls this position *ontological holism*, and argues against not only ontological individualism (the claim, roughly, that individuals are the sole constituents of the social universe), but also more nuanced theories that grant that individuals are in some sense social beings, relating to one another in complex ways, but that still hold that individuals are the *ultimate* constituents of social reality. He begins from an epistemological premise: if our best explanations of social reality posit the existence of groups, and if reference to groups is irreducible in such explanations, then we must grant that groups exist, and not simply as a shorthand way of referring to collections of individuals.

Sheehy then goes on to demonstrate that groups are in fact irreducible for explanations of important social phenomena. Of particular interest to Sheehy are explanations that reference groups causally. Consider the following example. In Seattle in 1999, massive protests virtually shut down the third ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization. By taking control of key intersections, and also by sheer number, protestors made it impossible for WTO delegates to reach the conference destination. Setting aside issues of the morality of tactics, the events just described cannot even be explained, let alone evaluated on an individualist model. It is true that the group was comprised of several thousand *individuals*. Yet this fact is inadequate at best, and irrelevant at worst, to the explanation of the events. The actions of the group cannot be reduced, in this case, to the actions and/or intentions of its

individual members. Sheehy writes 'if the joint action is broken down into its individual components, then the essential element in its effectiveness is lost — the jointness or coordination of the actions' (78). An individual, however determined, cannot by mere presence make a street inaccessible, breach a barricade, or halt factory production. Such effects must include the group *qua* group among its causes. In such cases, the collective nature of the group is irreducible.

Sheehy dedicates roughly the first half of the book to this ontological argument. In the remaining chapters, he makes the case that, unlike tables and chairs, social groups are *morally relevant* entities. That social groups exist is not sufficient reason, Sheehy thinks, to conclude that moral properties (like rights, for example) can be predicated of them. Such a claim requires further argument. The thrust of this argument is that groups possess moral status if and only if, 1) the enjoyment of certain values or 'goods' can be experienced only by groups and through group membership ('irreducibly social goods'); and 2) certain morally relevant harms can be experienced only by groups and through group membership ('irreducibly social harms') (159-67). Sheehy argues that such irreducibly social goods and harms do exist. Examples of the former include fraternity, cultural pride, and so on. Such goods make sense only within the framework of shared enjoyment and participation. If an individual enjoys them, it is only because others enjoy them as well. They are, in the first place, predicable of groups rather than individuals. Examples of irreducibly social harms include instances of social disrespect based upon one's cultural, ethnic, or racial background. A Kurd living in a western democracy may have no reason to fear individual mistreatment based on reports that Kurds are being mistreated in Iraq, or elsewhere, but she may still feel harmed by the fact that members of her group have suffered because of their group membership (163). Such a harm is also, in the first place, predicable of groups rather than individuals.

Having demonstrated that groups exist, and that they can have moral status, Sheehy ends by gesturing at the kinds of moral predications that might attach to groups, entering into the rich contemporary debates surrounding group rights. He argues that group rights in the strictest sense are only possible given that groups have an ontological and moral status in the way that he outlines. And though this part of the book is the most speculative, it brings out its richness and importance most clearly. This is a text that aims to bring insights from epistemology, ontology, and the philosophy of social science into contemporary moral and political discourse. It thus represents a subtle but powerful challenge to that discourse, which often exhibits a sort of principled agnosticism regarding issues of ontology. That is, most contemporary liberal theories imagine that they can remain neutral about such deep 'metaphysical' foundations, while continuing to make their normative arguments. If Sheehy is right, however, then that assumption is deeply flawed, at least in relation to the normative justification of group rights. And though the complexity of argument cannot be adequately represented here, I hope the seriousness of this challenge can, and that it will inspire philosophers, especially

those who are interested in the issue of group rights and representation, to engage the work directly.

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John R. Shook and **Hugh P. McDonald**, eds.
F. C. S. Schiller on Pragmatism and
Humanism: Selected Writings 1891-1939.
Amherst, NY: Humanity Books 2008.
Pp. 796.
$67.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-59102-549-8).

Pragmatism's triumvirate is well established: Peirce, James, and Dewey. This volume by Shook and McDonald could potentially challenge that doctrinaire view. And not all of the evidence is from Schiller. Bertrand Russell, himself no fan of pragmatism, once argued for scrapping Peirce and inserting Schiller into the mix as the 'literary' wing of first generation pragmatism (21). Shook and McDonald would likely not make such a bold claim. Nonetheless, their book is a vibrant testament to Schiller's role in the creation of pragmatism.

Shook and McDonald offer the most comprehensive survey of Schiller's works to date. This is no small task for a philosopher such as Schiller, who authored more than a dozen books and hundreds of reviews and essays in the pages of journals such as *Mind*. Forty-two essays are organized into seven parts: 1) First Principles: Humanism, Personalism, Pluralism, and Pragmatism; 2) First Philosophy: Metaphysics and Values; 3) Evolution and Religion; 4) Ethics and Politics; 5) Truth; 6) Meaning and Logic; and 7) Scientific Method. Each section is coupled with attentive introductions that contextualize the essays.

Shook and McDonald are clear that Schiller carried forth the cause of pragmatism under the banner of *humanism*. But Schiller's humanism was meant as a wider application of the psychologically and radically empirical pragmatism developed by James. Schiller's most important work, 'Axioms as Postulates' (included in part five of this collection), highlights this point. Schiller wrote it as a rejoinder to criticisms of James's *Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results* (1898). As against other variations of pragmatism, Schiller remained a lifelong devotee of James. He implied on several occasions that the basics of the pragmatic doctrine had been laid out in James's groundbreaking *Principles of Psychology* (1890). This sort of devotion incurred the wrath of both critics and supporters of Jamesian pragmatism. Early on, Francis Her-

bert Bradley warned James that his own work suffered from such support. Later on, with Ralph Barton Perry peddling James as a realist, pragmatists took exception to the spiritual tinge that Schiller championed in James.

James remained a supporter nonetheless. He sanctioned Schiller's use of humanism as pragmatism writ large. But they quarreled on a key issue: Peirce's role in the development of pragmatism. Schiller resisted the suggestion that Peirce was the originator of pragmatism. In his telling, Peirce was the lucky benefactor of James's generosity of spirit. Shook posits that Schiller's understanding of Peirce was 'superficial' (16). Schiller's reviews of the multi-volume *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* in the pages of *The Personalist* suggest a qualification. Schiller's humanism was meant as an alternative to machinations that strayed beyond pragmatism (as was the case with *pragmaticism*) or attempts to frame James as out of sync with newer iterations of pragmatism (such as those espoused by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss). Shook is right to suggest that Schiller was blind to some of the implications of Peirce's approach, as witnessed in letters they exchanged in 1905. But Schiller showed an intimate understanding of the potential pitfalls of the Peircian path as late as the 1930s. It should come as no surprise that Schiller offered up humanism as the alternative.

As in any collection, there are questions as to selection. Many of Schiller's essays were part of far larger debates that extended over the course of years. Absent such reference points, some of the essays are stripped of their contextual heft. For instance, 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' (included in Part 6) was one piece in a symposium involving Harold B. Joachim and Bertrand Russell that appeared in the pages of *Mind* in 1920. This problem is partially resolved by reference to the wonderfully detailed bibliography at the end of the book. Other selections only hint at far deeper points of significance. 'The Relativity of Metaphysics', in Part 2, focuses on a key point for Schiller: philosophical worldviews are, at base, individual worldviews. Yet it also references a much larger focus for Schiller: the Sophist Protagoras. Schiller's *Quarterly Review* book review 'Plato and His Predecessors' (1906) or his pamphlet, *Plato or Protagoras: Being a Critical Examination of the Protagoras Speech in the 'Theaetetus' with some Remarks upon Error* (1908), would have helped to more fully explore the adversarial relationship Schiller established between the Sophists and Plato. They would also demonstrate how his adoption of Protagoras's dictum that 'man is the measure' was meant to encapsulate the nature of his humanism. In other cases, one selection hints at a potential other. Schiller contributed both 'Scientific Discovery and Logical Proof' and 'Hypothesis' to Charles Joseph Singer's *Studies in the History and Method of Science* (1917; 1921); only the former essay appears in Part 7. Both works, taken together, further emphasize how closely his views accord with the interdisciplinary work currently done in the rhetoric of science and inquiry.

Shook and McDonald would have to fill several volumes to fully take in the range of Schiller's works. That they have covered the basics of his philosophy — for instance, the critique of formal logic — augurs well for Schiller. That they have also candidly engaged his other habits — eugenics, psychical

research, a penchant for biting humor — only goes further in suggesting the merits of their book. If there is, however, one criticism to be made, it is this: they circumscribe Schiller too narrowly. Shook posits that Schiller 'engaged in some related intellectual pursuits that seemed quite unphilosophical to the establishment' (20). This view helps to explain why Schiller is not readily embraced as an active founder of pragmatism, why this British pragmatist is not seen as a corrective to the oft repeated mantra that pragmatism is an American philosophical approach. All of his pursuits, eugenics and psychical research and even humor, *were* philosophical to Schiller. Philosophy was an expression of a personal view of the world, tested and tempered by interactions with others. Challenging Schiller's view of James or questioning his interpretation of Peirce is useful. But sidestepping the philosophical implications of the issues Schiller's humanism encompassed is short-sighted. It reduces an assessment of Schiller to the establishment views he hoped to challenge. That Shook and McDonald have revived a neglected pragmatist is praise enough. That their book provides the impetus for further reflection only adds to its cash value.

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In the contemporary age of globalizing democratic capitalism, freedom and equality seem axiomatic. Many consider it self-evident that, alongside commodities, technologies and expertise, the liberal values of freedom and equality will be exported to the farthest reaches of the globe, and soon we will all be one, big, happy, free and equal McFamily. Critics of the current global system, on the other hand, focus their attention on the economic disadvantages of current practices and policies for the developing world — disadvantages explained as unfortunate, unavoidable, short-term side-effects of ultimate universal prosperity. Critics call for reform of the regulations governing global commerce, easing of the structural adjustments imposed by the International Monetary Fund, and debt-forgiveness in developing countries. They lobby for

more equitable distribution of the benefits of the current system, but they seldom doubt the desirability of those systemic benefits.

In this book Stivers sketches a much broader problem that challenges our assumptions about the consumer culture we are quickly exporting across the globe. He focuses his critique upon technology. Contra Marx, Weber, and modern conflict theorists who argue that technology is an epiphenomenon of capitalism, Stivers argues that technology, in all its varied forms, is the foundational reality of the global capitalist system. Technology, he asserts, is the chief determining factor in the organization of modern society: 'politics and economics depend on and are determined by the movement of the technological system' (97). Technology is not only a 'system', it is our environment and our culture, everywhere eroding and supplanting local culture and identity.

Technology has always represented a mixed blessing: it does not simply supply us with the (washing and radiology) machines that reduce human toil and suffering but also with the atomic weapons that increasingly jeopardize the continuance of the planet and its inhabitants. But Stivers goes far beyond these traditional arguments against technology. Far more troubling, he asserts, are the non-material, non-mechanical technologies, the organizational and psychological techniques that provide us with the highly dubitable benefits of bureaucracy, advertising, political propaganda, and government and corporate surveillance of our every habit and desire.

Technological processes, warns Stivers, are fast supplanting human modes of life, human experiences and morally significant discourse. Technology (rather than capitalism and industrialization, as the conflict theorists hold) dehumanizes human life, pitting one individual against the others, alienating, isolating, and desensitizing us. Visual images replace the spoken word and human dialogue in carving out the landscape of modern life, a stark landscape bereft of moral texture and meaningfulness. Where culture and religion had previously managed the task of 'citizen control' by providing institutions and rituals to create a common mental world and common codes of conduct that molded individuals according to a common value system, Stivers sees technology as infinitely more efficacious at citizen control, by monitoring, normalizing, and reshaping citizen desires. Instead of being coerced into servitude to king and country, citizens are painlessly and perfunctorily propagandized to share the values of global corporate interests. They learn to want and do what is best for the system — continual uncritical consumption of technologies.

Stivers challenges the general optimism about freedom and equality in modernity, and highlights the many dehumanizing aspects of the spreading technological culture. Far from free, we rush headlong into our servitude to advertising and propaganda, and we welcome the meaningless equality of conformism. Worse, in our uncritical consumption of self-help books and popular psychological techniques, we are not only slaves to the technological processes that engulf us, we adopt and reinforce them in every aspect of our lives and apply them to our neighbors.

True freedom and equality, argues Stivers, only exist where individuals reify them by breaking free from the herd and undertaking individual action, exercising their individual consciences. Conflict and non-conformity would release us from a common consumer culture, but for conflict and non-conformity to arise, individuals must use their reason to reflect upon the external circumstances of their cultural and political control mechanisms, and take a stand against system norms and concomitant strategies of norm-enforcement, when these fail to align with individual interests and communal flourishing.

Technology is fast eroding the human world, warns Stivers. However, he does not raise us from our consumerist ignorance simply to leave us in hopeless awareness of the moral bankruptcy of modern consumer culture. Stivers leaves us with practical strategies for struggling against the technological forces that colonize human life. He recommends a 'non-violent anarchism' that exercises the individual freedom of civil disobedience to challenge unjust laws. He advocates cultural conservatism, to regain the human texture of our world, but without the dogmatism that pits group against group. Stivers urges our resistance to the psychological techniques — mass media, advertising, public relations, political propaganda, and the bureaucratic mindset — that seek to enslave our individuality, but he also warns us against succumbing to the use of these techniques to manipulate others. Rather, we should restore discourse to our lives and meaningful interactions to our communities, and establish common purposes, meanings, and values to enable us to transcend the technological system and return to a *human* existence.

For all the self-help books and psychological techniques at our disposal, people in modern capitalist-industrial systems are some of the unhappiest people on the planet. Stivers' analysis links the whopping rates of depression and anxiety in our populations with the very technologies that purport to heal them; he exposes in our prosperity the technologies that dehumanize our lives and undermine individual and communal well-being. This fine book serves as a penetrating wake-up call to those who locate the redemption of the world in the steady export of the technology-rich Western lifestyle. This book will be enjoyed by a general educated audience, and in the university classroom it would serve well as a rich introduction to social problems.

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Robert Brandom's *Making it Explicit* (*MIE*) is the kind of book that many people own but few have read. Although published in the same year as Brandom's colleague John McDowell's *Mind and World*, and widely held to be of comparable importance, *MIE* has so far elicited only a fraction of the amount of literature *Mind and World* has generated. There are many reasons why *MIE* has been a 'slow-burner': its style is not to all tastes; many of its themes and the contexts in which it places them are unfamiliar; above all, perhaps, it is very long. Brandom tried to facilitate *MIE*'s reception with an 'introductory' text, *Articulating Reasons*, which is notorious for being more accessible than *MIE* only insofar as it is shorter.

Fortunately, a genuinely edifying introduction to Brandom's thinking is now available. Wanderer's book displays a detailed knowledge and understanding of Brandom's demanding work, and it admirably succeeds in its aim of introducing Brandom's project 'in a manner that provides a glimpse of some fine detail, while having the broad contours clearly in view' (3). Rather than providing a chapter-by-chapter commentary on *MIE*, Wanderer has chosen to provide his own route into Brandom's philosophy, one which pays dividends.

In Part 1, Wanderer examines what features — for Brandom — a practice must exhibit in order for it to count as *linguistic* and so for its participants to count as having cognitive capacities. In short, Part I focuses on Brandom's 'normative pragmatics'. In Part 2, Wanderer investigates Brandom's account of the *meanings* and *contents* possessed and expressed by the expressions and performances caught up in such practices. In short, Part 2 focuses on Brandom's 'inferentialist semantics', while emphasizing its relation to the pragmatic story told in Part 1.

Wanderer has precisely the qualities one looks for in a guide: sympathy for the overall project, but readiness to criticize the details of its execution where appropriate. At every stage, Wanderer engages with a well-chosen selection of prominent commentators' objections, including those of Jürgen Habermas, Daniel Laurier, McDowell, Peter Pagin and Richard Rorty, as well as offering a number of his own. Though Wanderer is prepared to maintain that some of the putative problems facing Brandom's system are genuine, he nonetheless works hard to show how that system can retain both its overall shape and its importance, by tempering some of the more ambitious claims made on its behalf or by tweaking its specifics.

In Part 1, for example, Wanderer provides a description of a game in which each participant makes 'moves' in virtue of which she undertakes various commitments to which she may or may not be entitled, depending on her

other commitments and those of others. Each participant keeps track of her own commitments and those of others, as well as the impact that new commitments have on existing ones. Brandom's 'bold conjecture' (53) — bearing in mind that I have skimped on its details — is that the players of this game qualify as rational and the moves within it as linguistic.

One worry concerning the bold conjecture might be that, if one were to interpret the game as a linguistic practice, one might be unjustifiably projecting 'our own rational practices onto' it (82). However, Wanderer notes that, for Brandom, there is *nothing more* to a practice's being linguistic than its being interpretable as such. Hence, the threat of projection cannot arise. More specifically, Brandom holds, 'If any set of performances within a social practice is interpretable by us, in the sense that it can be mapped onto our linguistic performances so as to make conversation possible, then the social practice interpreted is a rational (linguistic) practice' (83). Accordingly, Wanderer proceeds to consider whether Brandom provides reason to think that the antecedent of this conditional obtains with respect to the scorekeeping model.

Though it is not possible to consider them in this short review, suffice it to say that Wanderer is suspicious of Brandom's attempts to defend the claim that the above conditional's antecedent obtains in the case at hand (84ff). Nonetheless, Wanderer suggests that Brandom need not make the bold conjecture. Rather than seek to explain linguistic practice by 'reducing' it to the aforementioned game, one might treat the game-playing model as an elucidatory tool. On this approach, the description of the game is not an account of what constitutes language use, but rather an object of comparison, attention to which enables one to arrive at a theoretical grasp of features of linguistic practice of which one ordinarily has only practical grasp (91). In this way, Wanderer advocates a 'reconception' of Brandom's 'goals', one 'which may best capture both what he does and what he achieves' (94). One could easily provide other examples of this critical but ultimately conciliatory approach to the Brandomian project.

Predictably, not all of Wanderer's attempts to defend or amend the particulars of Brandom's account are equally or entirely cogent. However, that not all efforts at bolstering Brandom's project are found to be fully convincing is only to be expected given the confines of the book and its overarching aim of *introducing* rather than *vindicating* Brandom. Moreover, that certain of Wanderer's claims, on Brandom's behalf, invite further scrutiny only testifies to the fact that he succeeds in his unenviable task of setting out Brandom's work in such a way as to 'facilitate' its 'assessment' (4).

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David Wong
Natural Moralities:
A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 312.
US$45.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-195-30539-5);
US$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-538329-4).

In this book Wong proposes a kind of ethical relativism which differs not only from universalism but also from the extreme versions of relativism. Indeed, he denies that there is a single true morality, yet affirms that not all moralities are adequate, since there are objective limits on what may be deemed a true morality. Such limits are determined by universally valid criteria rooted in human nature and in certain functions that all moralities must perform. These criteria, however, are not enough to define 'a morality with content sufficiently robust and determinate to guide action' (xiii), so that there are also other criteria for establishing what may be considered an adequate morality, criteria which are local to a given group and independent of those which are universal. As a result, there exists a plurality of moralities that can be regarded as true.

Wong's case for his 'pluralistic' relativism rests on two elements, namely, the phenomenon of 'moral ambivalence' and a naturalistic conception of morality. Moral ambivalence is the feeling we experience when faced with serious conflicts among an irreducible plurality of basic moral values. Such conflicts can be resolved in distinct ways all of which we recognize as reasonable, and we therefore 'understand and appreciate the other side's viewpoint to the extent that our sense of the unique rightness of our own judgments gets destabilized' (5). In Wong's view, conflicting moral positions typically share irreducibly basic values but do not set the same priority among them, so that within a single morality there is a plurality of values that conflict to some extent and that coexist according to a hierarchical relation. For instance, both Chinese and Western moral traditions accept both the values of community and relationship and those of autonomy and individual rights, but differ in the priority they assign to them and, hence, in the way they resolve the tensions between such values. This is why Wong constantly emphasizes that, in general, disagreements between moralities are not radical, i.e., they are not disagreements between entirely different sets of values. In sum, there is a plurality of shared moral values which conflict to some extent and a plurality of adequate ways of resolving such conflicts. Wong maintains that moral ambivalence undermines universalism and that it is best accounted for by a naturalistic conception of morality.

Wong's approach to morality is naturalistic because it is marked 'by a commitment to integrate the understanding of morality with the most relevant empirical theories about human beings and society, such as evolutionary theory and developmental psychology' (xiv). On the basis of such a naturalistic approach, he argues that the general constraints on what can count as a

true morality are its responsiveness to certain compelling human needs and propensities (such as self- and other-concern) as well as its ability to promote both individual flourishing and social cooperation. There are different ways in which these functions can be fulfilled, which fits in well with the phenomenon of moral ambivalence.

After expounding his pluralistic relativism and its naturalistic basis, Wong examines both whether, by accepting a plurality of true moralities, one ends up losing confidence in one's commitments to a particular morality, and how one should act towards those who have (partially) different moral commitments. He claims that we do end up abandoning the beliefs that our morality is the only true one and that moral properties constitute a part of the objective world. Nevertheless, if our own morality answers to the universally valid criteria for adequate moralities, then our moral commitments concern genuine values, so that there is no reason to abandon them. Also, given that it is impossible to realize all the ways of life which are adequate, we can remain committed to our own, which in no way implies dismissing the others. Wong claims, however, that recognition of the worth of other ways of life may also lead us to learn from them by trying to incorporate at least some of their values or ways of setting priorities among values into our own moral commitments. This is possible because a 'living morality' is never entirely determinate, since there is always the possibility that a shift in the balance between two conflicting values may occur either generally or in particular circumstances (237). Still, since such integration has limits, we must constantly face serious moral disagreements among people who need and want to live together. Wong maintains that the value of accommodation proves to be a successful way of dealing with these disagreements. This value represents a general constraint on adequate moralities because it enables stability and integrity within a single society and the peaceful coexistence of different societies. I wonder whether the value of accommodation does not rather form part of the criteria that are local to a given group (in this case, Wong's own), so that those moralities that do not take it into account but satisfy the universal criteria could still be regarded as adequate.

Is Wong's position a form of ethical skepticism? His own answer is 'yes', if by 'skepticism' one means 'that we cannot take our own way of doing things as somehow writ into the fabric of nature, and that others may be equally if not more justified in adopting other views' (261). It is his naturalistic approach which leads Wong to deny that moral properties form an irreducible part of the fabric of the world (33, 62, 202). This ontological ethical skepticism, however, does not lead him to adopt moral nihilism, since he accepts moral truth (79). A morality is true, not because it refers to moral facts or properties, but because it succeeds in satisfying some central human needs and propensities and in performing certain functions. This is precisely why Wong can speak of a plurality of true moralities.

Wong has made a strong case for his pluralistic relativism, which represents a middle way between strong forms of ethical realism and radical kinds of ethical relativism, thus trying to avoid at least some of the pitfalls facing

these positions. The reader will ponder whether Wong's stance constitutes an attractive alternative that adequately accounts for the nature and function of morality.

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Wood's book is a collection of essays, some written specifically for this volume, others dating as far back as 1986. All of them explore the territory opened up by Wood's influential 1989 book *The Deconstruction of Time*. According to Wood, the key philosophical development of the past century is 'not a linguistic turn but a temporal turn' (129). The thinkers associated with this development — Husserl and Heidegger, for example — reject the image of time as a 'great river' (9), and resist thinking of time as a single structure in which all events can be ordered in relations of succession. They claim that there are multiple temporalities, and they replace a single Time with a 'pluri-dimensional, polyphonic temporalization' that is 'neither a concept nor adequately conceptualizable' (51). The essays in this collection explore this pluri-dimensional temporality, and ask what it implies for the practice of philosophy. Those familiar with Wood's earlier work will find few surprises here, since the book defends the same basic position as *The Deconstruction of Time*. It does, however, apply this position to a wide range of topics, and it makes an important contribution by doing so.

The book is divided into four parts. The first, 'Why Time Breaks Down', gives the book's agenda. The first essay in this part, 'Interruptions, Regressions, Discontinuities', gives a particularly good introduction to Wood's work. 'Time', he claims, 'is dead . . . [M]odels of its overarching unity no longer convince us' (12). This does not mean it is impossible to conceive of time as a linear, unifying structure. But such a conception can no longer do what many philosophers would like it to do: give meaning to individual events. Time as we experience it today 'does not supply significance. If anything, it mocks our desire for significance' (13). The other essays in Part 1 explore the implications of this claim. Some of these implications are ontological.

Wood asks, for example, what it could mean to be a *thing* in a world of heterogeneous temporalities. He responds by inventing the concept of a 'time-shelter', which he uses to explain how 'time enters into the constitution of beings' (26). Part 1 also explores the topic of subjectivity. Wood argues that phenomenological accounts of time, which tend to see temporality as a sort of activity we perform, survive recent discussions of the death of the subject. On this view, Husserl's and Heidegger's insights into time have more in common with recent continental philosophy than we might think. Part 2, 'Heidegger's Struggle With Time', gives a revisionist reading of Wood's biggest influence. It defends the early Heidegger's account of temporality, though Heidegger himself abandoned much of this account after 1930. Wood maintains that Heidegger's writings from the 1920s, especially *Being and Time*, contain promising resources for a rethinking of time, space, and representation — more promising resources than Heidegger realized. Part 3, 'The Event of Time', turns to more recent thinkers. It discusses several figures who think of philosophy as an event, and who therefore see it as involving a distinctive sort of temporality. The notion of the event 'has enabled thinkers as diverse as Heidegger, Foucault, and Deleuze to turn our ordinary linear understanding of time inside out' (129). It allows them to understand philosophy not as a recollection of origins, but as a highly ambivalent concern with 'an origin primitively divided against itself' (122) — an origin such as Derrida's *différance*. The book's final section, 'Art and Time', discusses the ways in which visual and literary artworks show us the breakdown of time. Wood uses Escher's prints, Calvino's novels, and Robert Smithson's earth art to illustrate the complex temporalities found in works of art. Of particular interest is an essay ('The Dark Side of Narrative') on the novels of philosopher Richard Kearney. It offers an intriguing look at these lesser-known works.

This is not an especially neat book. Essays overlap; themes recur and get treated from different angles. This is exactly what we would expect. If linear time really has broken down, we would hardly expect a discussion of this fact to proceed in linear fashion. Still, several themes stand out as central. One is the complex relation between time and language. It is largely through language, Wood claims, that we grapple with time and its polyphonic character. Language also helps us humanize time. When we construct a narrative — 'linguistically mediated intelligible connection in time' (193) — we impose a sort of order on temporal experience. That said, Wood criticizes those who, in his view, expect too much from narrative. He sees Paul Ricoeur and Richard Kearney as overly optimistic about narrative's ability to render time coherent. Another central theme is the continuing relevance of Husserl's and Heidegger's reflections on time. Wood insists that we have not yet gotten to the bottom of their seminal works. Even if we reject large parts of their projects, they remain an unsurpassable starting point. A final theme is the philosophical instruction offered by art. We do not encounter the breakdown of time in philosophy alone. We find it in modernist literature, nineteenth century painting, and 'musical ecstasy' (51). Thus there can be no sharp cleavage

between philosophy and art. Wood's focus on time may be single-minded, but his approach to it is impressively broad.

Wood is not the only contemporary philosopher to argue that what we have learned about time over the last century will transform the discipline. John McCumber has spent much of his career advancing this claim; recent books by Miguel de Beistegui and Charles Sherover also explore this fertile territory. But no one has done more than Wood to illuminate time's fragmented character, and to caution us against glossing over its aporias. Wood's work is just one part of a larger conversation about time, but he brings to that conversation a unique, indispensable voice.

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Ugo Zilioli
Protagoras and the Challenge of Relativism:
Plato's Subtlest Enemy.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing
Company 2007.
Pp. 172.
US$99.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-6078-1).

Like skepticism, relativism typically serves as the foil to mainstream objectivist claims about truth and knowledge. One canonical example is Plato's engagement with Protagoras. In this book Zilioli has three aims. First, he attempts to reconstruct Protagoras' position within the Platonic dialogues. There follows an analysis of whether the Platonic Protagoras is an accurate portrayal of the historical Protagoras. Finally, Zilioli seeks to understand the degree to which Protagoras is a relativist. A feature of this final objective is a defense of relativism from its most common objections. This largely depends on deploying 20th century arguments, which may or may not have been held by the historical Protagoras. The first two chapters analyze Protagoras' onto-epistemological position as articulated in the *Theaetetus*, *Cratylus*, and the extant fragments. This is followed by an analysis of Protagoras' ethical and social relativism; the Great Speech in the *Protagoras* is the focal point. The final chapter critiques Plato's objections to relativism and attempts to demonstrate the viability of the Protagorean position.

During the introduction Zilioli identifies a kind of relativism called 'robust relativism'. It is the theoretical backbone. The concept is borrowed from Joseph Margolis and consists of three related theses. First, it is an *alethic*

thesis, which is a claim about the nature of truth. Second, it is an epistemological thesis, which concerns itself with the conditions of truth and knowledge. Lastly it is an ontological thesis about the structure of the world. The mistake, as both Margolis and Zilioli see it, is that too many philosophers, Plato included, have confined philosophical relativism to an epistemological thesis. As such, its refutation is straightforward. Throughout the book, Zilioli continually attempts to make the case that Protagoras is not only an epistemological relativist, but a relativist of the robust sort.

Protagoras' Measure Doctrine features significantly in the opening chapter. Far from resting on the usual interpretation of it as a theory of perceptual truth, Zilioli argues that it is more properly understood as signifying ontological relativism, namely that 'the ontological status of the perceived object is relative to the perceiver' (35). There follows an analysis of the secret doctrine as recounted by Socrates at *Theaetetus* 152d-e. Zilioli rightly points out that this passage contains two distinct theses: ontological indeterminacy and the doctrine of Heraclitean flux. Whereas the former is a genuine re-description of ontological relativism, Zilioli argues that the latter is in fact logically distinct. Relativism allows for a substantive conception of stability. This is so despite Plato's attempt to make Heraclitean flux the cause of ontological indeterminacy. Zilioli's alternative to the theory of flux, which is committed to a radically atomistic theory of perception, is the notion of differing dispositions. Rather than appealing to the doctrine of flux in explaining the inherent privacy of the perceptual act, Zilioli emphasizes 'the particular condition, attitude, or disposition in which the perceiving subject finds himself' (49). This is consistent with Protagoras' conception of the wise man, which is the person who can bring about changes in appearances (or perceptions). These appearances are not 'more true', but they are better, relative to a specific domain.

Given that every perception is veridical, it would seem that Protagoras is committed to the idea that each person lives in their own solipsistic world. Yet Protagoras insists that individuals can compare contrasting perceptions. For Zilioli, the Kuhnian concept of incommensurability is the way out of the impasse. Incommensurability 'does not mean incomparability but it does mean incompatibility' (72). There is no neutral framework to evaluate contrasting perceptions, but that does not prevent them from being fruitfully compared. This is implicit in Protagoras' appeal to the wise man. While a significant portion of Chapter 2 confines itself to contemporary discussions of Feyerabend and Kuhn, it suffices that Zilioli is trying to dispel the claim that Protagoras' relativism is underdeveloped. This comes out in the final chapter when Zilioli deploys the Wittgensteinian distinction between saying and showing in defending Protagorian relativism against the charge that it is self-refuting. As well, the appeals to advantage and health as objective criteria for knowledge and truth are critiqued.

In making the case that Protagoras is also a moral relativist, a lengthy analysis of the Great Speech occurs in Chapter 3. Zilioli's principal evidence for Protagoras' moral relativism consists in Zeus' bestowal of justice and

shame on humankind at *Protagoras* 322c. Whereas justice and shame are normally presented as aristocratic values, Zilioli points out that they are here presented as *technai*. The Greek concept of *techne*, which Zilioli takes Protagoras to be employing, focuses 'on the codification of all those procedures that constituted a skill, not on the identity and objectivity of the results obtained through the performance of such procedures' (101). If justice and shame are taken to be the product of *technai*, it follows that justice and shame will be cashed out differently depending on the context. Zilioli's account of *techne* is drawn from the discussion of medicine as presented in the pamphlet *Ancient Medicine*. Regrettably however, Zilioli glosses over the contentious debate surrounding the very notion of *techne* in 4th century Greece. Crucially, the forfeit of exact precision does not mean the forfeit of objectivity, especially if one makes the distinction between determinate *techne* like geometry and indeterminate, though still substantial, sorts of *techne,* like medicine. In fact, a strong case can be made that justice and shame, as bestowed by a deity, have an objective foundation. Once *techne* is dismissed, there is scant evidence that Protagoras is a relativist in the *Protagoras*.

This latter concern brings to the fore a more general problem with this book, namely the extent to which one can infer a unified Protagoras from the Platonic dialogues and the extant fragments. Zilioli does not spend enough time justifying this approach and dismisses too hastily the problem of chronology in the Platonic dialogues. This does not take away from the book's strength, which is in the argument that the Protagoras of the *Theaetetus* is a proponent of robust relativism. Zilioli should be commended for trying to rehabilitate the status of Protagoras, but the scholarship tends, as in the case of *techne*, to lack adequate rigor.

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