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Andrew Benjamin, ed.
Walter Benjamin and History.
New York: Continuum 2005.
Pp. 260.
US$130.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-6745-4);
US$44.95
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-6746-1).

Walter Benjamin has arrived. In the last decade there has been a remarkable acceleration in the number of books published on Benjamin's work and this volume is a welcome addition. In the introduction to the collection of essays, the second in the 'Walter Benjamin Studies Series', editor Andrew Benjamin describes the intent of the volume as the development of the detail of Benjamin's thinking on history and, moving within Benjamin's *Gesamtwerk,* the exploration of the philosophical, political and theological interconnections of the project. But he is at haste to point out that it is also the applicability of Benjamin's project that requires attention. Investigating a thinking of 'History', a translation into the present in the name of applicability, means recognizing the temporalities implicit in such an engagement. For, as Andrew Benjamin puts it, '[p]art of what comprises the present is a conflict concerning the nature of the present itself' (2). The need to think through the bearing of the present on Benjamin's texts, together with the importance of finding a way to read the historicity of Benjamin's writing without reducing it to systemic assumptions, is a core part of what's at stake in these essays. One thus expects the essays to be haunted by the ghosts of deconstruction — and we catch occasional glimpses of them.

In Andrew Benjamin's contribution, 'Boredom and Distraction: The Moods of Modernity', it is Heidegger's discussion of the disclosure of moods (*Being and Time,* 5.1) that moves behind the attempt to think through 'the relationship between bodily presence and the operation of historical time.' (Werner Hamacher's complex articulation of the intersection of happiness and temporality [38-40] makes for an interesting counter-argument.) Andrew Benjamin's discussion of boredom — conceived as a 'threshold' whose overcoming augurs the future's potentiality — is a little strained when it comes to locating that overcoming (or boredom's 'dialectical antithesis') in experimentation 'both as mood and as act' (170). Nevertheless, the essay does successfully demonstrate the centrality of boredom to *The Arcades Project.*

Charles Rice's essay, 'Walter Benjamin's Interior History', also concerns itself with a threshold, though here it is the point at which the 'arcade and domestic interior come together' (171). For Rice, the architecture of *The Arcades Project* evinces a dialectic of interior and exterior in such a way as to render the very condition of dwelling in the former, together with any thinking that would make of such experience 'something timeless and essential to identity' (174), radically historical.

'Down the K. Hole: Walter Benjamin's Destructive Land-Surveying of History', contributed by Stephanie Polsky, similarly employs a spatial metaphor: K, the enigmatic land-surveyor from Kafka's *The Castle,* is here called upon to map the co-ordinates of Benjamin's historical understanding. Drawing on Deleuzean 'rhizomes' and 'minor histories', the essay shows how Benjamin successfully moves between various ideological camps, obscuring his points of entry and constructing a kind of 'anti-genealogy for his intellectual and personal motivations' (69). A topographical map — one that strangely inscribes the points where diametrical oppositions come together, and at the same time deconstructs those interstices — is thus an appropriate metaphor for the movement of Benjamin's writing between history and politics.

Robert Gibb's essay, 'Messianic Epistemology: Thesis XV', usefully complements Polsky's contribution by arguing for the representational force of the calendar's circular inscription of time. Gibbs sets up a dialogue between Benjamin and Rosenzweig, where the latter's understanding of the Jewish calendar as 'a complex machine of wheels within wheels' (207) is read as a critique of both linear and circular conceptions of time, an assessment that marks an essential departure point for a consideration of Benjamin's conception of the dialectic. Moreover, thinking this relation allows a counterpoint to emerge that underscores the debasement of a calendrical conception of time by modernity, how '[t]he triumph of chronology — of the line — leads us to desire a simple circle' (214).

In 'The Sickness of Tradition' Rebecca Comay calls into question the circular repetition of melancholia, wondering how one might 'acknowledge loss without thereby surreptitiously disavowing it' (88). Arguing that the discourses of melancholia and fetishism "collude to produce the illusion of an intact present ... immune from past or future threat'(96), Comay looks to Benjamin's writing, as well as to Adorno's widely discussed criticism of *The Arcades Project* as lacking the necessary mediation of base and superstructure, to find a way to negotiate the stasis of the present. Here Comay is perhaps less successful. As in the contributions of Andrew Benjamin, Rice, and Hamacher, the essay presents *The Arcades Project* as a text unique in its evocation of liminal experiences; and while it diagnoses that project's content as informed by fetishism, as endlessly 'constructing a retroactive "before" of missed opportunities, the moment *before* the final congealing of capitalist social relations, the flickering of possibilities rendered legible only from the perspective of an irredeemably damaged present day' (101), one comes to suspect — and this comes very close to Phillipe Simay's conception, in his essay on tradition elsewhere in the volume, of the Benjaminian present — that it is nonetheless with this (ir)redeemable past that the hope of the present might lie. Indeed, the choice of Kafka's description of 'hope in the past' as a conclusion is apposite in its bivalence: 'hope, an infinite amount, but not for us' (101).

One may come to the end of this collection wondering about the lack of material on how fascism, in its cultural rather than political manifestations, is to be historicized. But this is not to deny the volume's strength: it allows

Benjamin's thinking on history to emerge not demarcating lines, but rupturing them by calling them into question. As such, Benjamin's exigency lies in his ability to evade our appropriations and to compel us to read him again.

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Trinity College Dublin

Bettina Bergo, Joseph Cohen, and **Raphael Zagury-Orly, eds.**
Judeities. Questions for Jacques Derrida.
New York: Fordham University Press 2007.
Pp. 279.
US$60.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8232-2641-2);
US$21.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8232-2642-9).

This is an absolutely excellent book and should be required reading by anyone interested in both Derrida's thought and the current debate on religion and philosophy. In recent years there has been much discussion of Derrida's work, particularly of the so-called 'later' Derrida who, in dealing with the topic of identity, sharpened important distinctions between the singularity and universality, the conditional and the unconditional, and the 'otherness of the other' and the 'absolute other'.

Derrida's 'Abraham, the Other', on which I focus, begins this account of the proceedings of the international colloquium 'Judeites. Questions pour Jaques Derrida' (Paris, 3-5 December, 2000). The conference dealt with the possibility of simultaneously questioning how the term 'Judaism' is to be understood, while investigating the relationship between Derrida's writing and the multiplicity of ways of being as a Jew. Also of interest was the possible Judaism within the Derrida's *oeuvre*, particularly in regard to themes such as belonging, identity, origin, promise, and hospitality. The distinguished scholars who attended — Gérard Bensussan, Hélène Cixous, Michal Ben Naftali, Moshe Idel, Gianni Vattimo, Jürgen Habermas, Joseph Cohen and Raphael Zagury-Orly, Hent De Vries, Jean-Luc Nancy — addressed these issues. They confronted Derrida's views with positions of philosophical predecessors such as Rosenzweig, Levinas, Celan, and Scholem, and they traced the confluences between deconstruction and Kabbalah. Derrida's relationship to universalist aspirations in contemporary theology was discussed, as were his late autobiographical writings. The most frequent questions were: Is there anything Jewish about Derrida? Is it possible, right now, to affirm Jewish identity, or any other spiritual affinity, and not betray Derrida? Is

Derrida a heterodox Jew like his coreligionist Spinoza? What is it to be a Jew and a philosopher? And what is the relation between Derrida and Christianity?

Invited to address his relationship to Judaism, Derrida began speaking through Franz Kafka, citing Kafka's letter of June 1921 to his friend physician Robert Klopstock: 'I could think of another Abraham for myself.' The letter deals with another Abraham, the one who absolutely desires to make a just sacrifice, the one who in general has an inkling of the issue, but who cannot believe his and his son's turn has arrived. He believes, and he would sacrifice in the just spirit, provided he could believe that it is specifically for him. He fears that he will depart on horseback as Abraham, in the company of his son, but on the way will be transformed into Don Quixote.

In truth Derrida never denied that a certain nexus could subsist between some aspects of his philosophical discourse, aimed entirely at working on the margins of philosophy, and some marginal figures of Jewish history, e.g., the marrano. He has admitted that, insofar as it is possible to speak of his own Judaism, we are dealing with the Judaism of a marrano. And really, present or absent, hidden or unhidden, true or false, the figure of marrano does appear and disappear in Derrida's writings.

Later Derrida compares the Jewish/non-Jewish aporia to the authentic/unauthentic Other, taking inspiration from the ontological *différance*, and in particular from the pages of *Being and Time*, wherein the figure of the *arrivant* is drowned. The *arrivant* is he whose role is to cause disorientation within those taxonomies usually intended to identify and create hierarchies among ethnic, linguistic and national families. Outside of Heidegger, Derrida points out that human resources are demanded by the right of hospitality. (In *Of Hospitality*, he maintains that hospitality is not merely an ethical duty but a fundamental principle of culture: 'Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic amongst others' [110].)

The Derridean opposition is neither a game, nor a double-game, nor an *ingénue* opposition, as some readers and critics have thought. Nor does the Derridean deconstructive practice aim at forming binary classical oppositions characterized by hierarchy and involving a pair of terms in which one member is taken as primary, the other as secondary and derivative, so that the first attains prominence while the second is rejected. Nor again does it amount to a free play of two opposites, without hierarchic relation, awaiting a Hegelian synthesis.

However, it would seem that at one point in Derrida's discourse the distinction between inauthentic and authentic, and between Jewishness and Judaism, are no longer certain. Yet some vestige remains. So that in between the tangle of directions (religious, historical, philosophical, linguistic, juridical, political), and in between the prehistoric and protean melting pot, two contradictory postulates arise. On the one hand, there is the condition of freeing oneself; on the other hand, this freeing can be interpreted as revelation or election, the denial of nihilism and awareness of man. Derrida concludes, 'That there should be yet another Abraham: here, then, is the most threat-

ened Jewish thought ... , but also the most vertiginously, the most intimately Jewish one that I know to this day' (34-5).

In the colloquium's introductory remarks Gérard Bensussan ('The Last, The Remnant') notes that if Derrida could appear as the last of the Jews, then surely we are dealing with a Jew in a flexible, inside-outside position, because '[t]he identity of the one who says "I am Jewish" in order to say "I am not non-Jewish" undoes itself, dislocates itself, from the moment that it identifies itself in a belonging' (37). The Judaism of the last of the Jews is impossible, as is, following Rosenzweig, the Jewish identity. Bensussan closes: 'I have simply wanted to suggest a few remarkable consonances, a few intersections, hoping to provoke questions and renewals — and perhaps the beginnings of a commentary by Derrida himself' (49). Moshe Idel, in 'Derrida and Kabbalistic Sources', affirms that the dialogue between Derrida and some Jewish thinkers is evident. Every Jew has read and many have studied the Torah, so he suggests 'it could be interesting to examine a relatively rare position, that of identifying the Torah with God' (112), that is, to affirm *Deus* is the text as the Spinozian *Deus sive natura*. Not by chance has the claim 'There is nothing outside the text' been attributed to Derrida. The same concept of Setirah can be explained by means of a sort of deconstruction of the Text. According to Idel, in this text-centric path we could find an alternative description of the history of Western thought, taking inspiration from the synthesis of Greek philosophy through the mediation of Syrian, Arabic, and Hebraic translations in the eleventh century.

'How to Answer the Ethical Question' is the title of Habermas' essay. It puts Heidegger and Derrida face to face on the humanistic tradition. Habermas begins by commenting on the classical definition: 'Ethics was once the doctrine that could tell us how to lead the right kind of life.' After he addresses the post-metaphysical answer to the ethical question by Kierkegaard, adding that Kierkegaard was the first to give a post-metaphysical answer to the ethical question in terms of how 'to be oneself'. Finally he concludes 'that Derrida's own appropriation of Heidegger's later philosophy rests on a ground that is theological rather than pre-Socratic, and Jewish rather than Greek' (154). In his recent writings Habermas has been particularly keen to allow the possibility of a way of thinking that is 'post-metaphysical' but still religiously inflected in some manner.

The contribution of Hent De Vries, 'The Shiboleth Effect: On Reading Paul Celan', focuses on the comparison between Celan's poetry and poetic and Derrida's thinking, or 'on how the singularity — the shibboleth, the date, and, what will turn out to be the same thing, the spectre and the ashes — of philosophemes, theologemes, or ethico-political tropes is figured and disfigured in Celan's poetry and poetic in ways that reveal an important aspect of Derrida's own thinking' (176). After a profound and critical analysis, De Vries comes to the irreducible polarity and mutual implication of singularity and universality, shibboleth and partisanship, ashes and remembrance, and in a Derridean stroke concludes, 'With this nonformalizable gesture, the date — the gift of the date or the date of the gift — once again, time and again,

would thereby, after all is said and done, reaffirm its priority, a primacy without precedent' (213).

In present-day confusion, in times in which identity is affirmed and denied, this book represents the kind of work — religious, philosophical, historical, linguistic, literary, juridical, and political — that makes us want to keep talking and thinking.

Francesco Tampoia

Peg Birmingham
Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2007.
Pp. 176.
US$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-253-21865-0).

Few formulas have so captivated political thinkers in recent times as Hannah Arendt's invocation of the 'right to have rights'. Arendt's readers have never tired of invoking her ambitious reformulation of human rights even as they have ceaselessly lamented her failure to offer a meaningful foundation for it. The signal contribution of Birmingham's book is her reconstruction of a coherent and convincing argument for Arendt's radical refoundation of human rights.

Birmingham's is a careful and profound reading of Arendt that should impact, for the better, both the burgeoning field of human rights and the more prosaic world of the Hannah Arendt industry. She states her thesis directly: 'Arendt's entire work can be read as an attempt to work out theoretically this fundamental right to have rights' (1). Dozens of books have been published recently that dutifully detail and bemoan the fact that there is no ground for human rights; Birmingham's book — despite its different genre — is a welcome remedy that argues, largely convincingly, that Arendt does develop just such a foundation.

The key to Arendt's re-formulation of human rights is based on her demand that humanity 'itself must guarantee the right to have rights' (6). What Birmingham sees is that Arendt never drops her call for a new law of humanity; instead, in her later work, she continues to explore the law of humanity under the heading of natality. By connecting Arendt's concept of natality to her guiding project of founding a right to have rights, Birmingham both deepens our understanding of Arendt and makes clear Arendt's importance to the human rights community.

Against the single-minded focus of Arendt scholars on the political and participatory understanding of natality as a principle of beginning, Birmingham sees that natality encompasses two related principles, the principle of beginning and the principle of givenness. Chapters 1 and 2 enrich the traditional account of natality through a sympathetic reading of Arendt's debt to Martin Heidegger and Franz Kafka. Birmingham shows that the freedom to begin is rooted in a specifically human temporality of mortality that is the ontological foundation of the right to have rights. The right to have rights is best understood not as a right in the legal sense of the term, but as a fundamental demand of being human, that one be born and die. To be born, she argues, is to be bound into a linguistic world; it is to be thrown into a world where we are abandoned in a space of beginning that is 'always open to something other than itself' (31). Human freedom, Birmingham argues, emerges from an obligation to oneself and others in the condition of natal vulnerability (61).

Birmingham develops her second and most original contribution in Chapter 3, 'The Principle of Givenness: Appearance, Singularity, and the Right to Have Rights'. Here Birmingham argues that natality means more than beginning; in addition, natality names the givenness of human being. Again Birmingham illuminates Arendt by exploring the source of her thinking in Heidegger, this time through Arendt's own critique of the discussion of *physis* in Heidegger's Anaximander fragment. Since '*physis* is *genesis*, an unpredictable appearing,' it shares with natality a quality of an absolute beginning free of any cause or governing telos (84). The principle of givenness is an 'anarchic' principle that is '[c]ut off and adrift from any sovereign constituting power or foundation . . .' (86). Since each person is a radical beginning, human rights and the right to have rights 'includes the principle of givenness,' by which Arendt means the mere right to exist, to appear as a singular, alien, foreign and isolated individual (91). It is the obligation in the face of the alien that must be respected as part of the human that, according to Birmingham, underlies Arendt's guarantee of the right to have rights to every human being.

Since human existence, as *physis*, is cut off from any prior reason or ground, man is unjustifiable and thus vulnerable. Man stands alone as alien and strange. And this strangeness that attaches to man's natality both underlies Arendt's defense of plurality and her insistence that the right to have rights includes the right to be as you are. Birmingham does not make the connection, but this right to be as one is lies behind Arendt's passionate defense of a rich private sphere, including the rights of parents to send their children to segregated schools. Though much criticized, the Little Rock essay is, I think, at the core of the principle of givenness Birmingham highlights.

The first three chapters of this book offer a discourse-shifting reading of Arendt's work as providing an ontologically sound foundation for human rights, something that modern human rights discourse desperately needs. As strong as these chapters are, Chapter 4 seems a digression. Birmingham argues that Julia Kristeva's psychoanalytic concept of abjection is a 'neces-

sary' aide to understanding Arendt's claim about the givenness of human difference (119). Why this foray into psychology (which Birmingham knows full well Arendt would not support) is necessary, is never clarified.

The short conclusion offers a preliminary inquiry into the institutional forms that Arendt discusses that might support her account of the right to have rights. The critique of sovereignty and the distinction between (dangerous) globalism and (promising) internationalism are suggestive, but the political potential of Birmingham's account is never carried through. This was not the goal of her book, and she generously points the way toward future scholarship in these areas. Short, clearly organized, and densely written, this book is a must-read for anyone interested in thinking deeply about human rights.

Roger Berkowitz
Bard College

Julian Bourg
From Revolution to Ethics:
May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought.
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press 2007.
Pp. 468.
Cdn$39.95/US$32.95
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7735-3199-4).

The basic thesis of historian Julian Bourg's study of the lasting significance of the 'events of May 68' can be summarized simply: what was clearly a failed revolution gave rise to the re-emergence in France of ethical reflection that has operated in the background of historical and theoretical events in France since then, and has come to dominate the French theoretical scene since the early 1990s. To support this thesis, Bourg discusses a wide range of historical events and political movements that set the context in which he thinks various philosophical and theoretical interventions need to be understood. Philosophical readers will learn much from Bourg's historical recounting of the turn to ethics following 1968 and from his account of how and why this took place.

Bourg intends his study to contribute to two discussions: 'the largely unwritten history of ... "French theory," and ... existing English-language histories of postwar France' (11). It is his contribution to the first of these discussions — the history of 'French theory' — to which this review will primarily attend.

Bourg's book unfolds in four parts, framed by an opening chapter providing a brief, but informative, account of the events of May-June 1968 and of the competing interpretations of those events, and a concluding chapter arguing that the 'ethical turn' begun in the post-68 years has contributed something important to the French understanding of civil society, especially the revitalization of the role of 'associations' (legally recognized groups of individuals who come together for purposes other than financial or familial) in civic life.

Part 1 traces the emergence and eventual decline of one of the most influential French leftist groups arising after 1968, the Maoist Gauche prolétarienne (GP). Founded in October 1968 and associated with the École Normale insofar as many of Althusser's former students were among its leading members, the GP was highly visible throughout the late 60s and early 70s, both in various confrontations with the government and in its willingness to endorse violence as a means to challenge state authority. While the GP never went as far as their 'peers' in Germany (the Baader-Meinhof group) or Italy (the Red Brigade) in terms of actual acts of terrorism, they were deemed dangerous enough to be banned and persecuted under the '*Anti-Casseurs*' law of 1970. The mass incarceration of leftist activists, Bourg suggests, played a significant role in the emergence of a 'popular justice' movement that needs to be understood in conjunction with the formation of the Group d'information sur les prisons (GIP), whose driving force was Michel Foucault, and whose work followed the Maoist radicals' model of 'revolutionary investigations'. While Foucault eventually broke with the Maoists, the GIP did investigate prison riots and their causes and brought to the public information about the treatment and conditions of prisoners in France. Significant here for Bourg's story is Foucault's and the GIP's subtle appeal to the ethical language of 'dignity' and 'rights', as their investigations, along with other groups addressing health, mental illness, worker safety, etc., revealed information that empowered people to confront the existing power-knowledge regime and 'speak truth to power'.

In Part 2, Bourg examines the role played by Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* (1972) as exemplifying the antinomian liberationist moment of 1968, which while keeping the ethical dimension in check (even though Foucault referred to the book, as Bourg cites several times, as a 'work of ethics'), gives voice to one of the guiding motifs of May 68 — 'It is forbidden to forbid' (*'Interdit d'interdire'*) — as it challenges institutional psychotherapy with an anti-authoritarian philosophy of desire. Following a survey of the main arguments in *Anti-Oedipus*' 'valorization of desire' and some of the immediate responses to its publication, Bourg steps back to review how Deleuze and Guattari move from their respective roots in Spinozism and institutional psychotherapy to the anti-Oedipal project. This recounting of Guattari's itinerary through his early activism, his time with Jean Oury at La Borde, and his relationship with Lacan, all make sense as leading him to *Anti-Oedipus*. However, attempting as Bourg does to see Deleuze's contribution to the anti-Oedipal project as growing out of his encounter with Spinozist ethics does

justice neither to the Nietzschean or Marxist dimensions of *Anti-Oedipus* nor to the Bergsonian dimension of Deleuze's vitalism. It also fails to do justice to the ways in which Deleuze's collaborative work with Guattari stands somewhat apart both from his historical studies and from his major philosophical works of the late 60s (*Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense*). Part 2 ends with a discussion of the anti-Oedipal exaltation of schizophrenia and some of the critical responses it received.

Where Part 2 might falter bringing together the historical events and the philosophical developments, Part 3 provides important historical information on the relationship between the 'philosophy of desire' and developments in both the women's and gay activist movements that significantly differentiate these French movements from their American counterparts. The tensions Bourg discusses within the French left's enactments of the sexual revolution are important, and he shows clearly the antagonisms that emerged between the masculinist liberation of desire associated with Guy Hocquenghem and other gay activists, and the feminist moral and legal arguments that sought not so much an emancipation of feminine *jouissance* as equal rights and ethical treatment of women before the law. Of particular interest here are the different relations to the law and legal institutions, as some members of the radical and gay left wanted to escape entirely from the law's restrictions (not only concerning man-man relations but also man-boy relations, as both Hocquenghem and René Schérer offered defenses of pedophilia), while women wanted to appeal to the law in the prosecution of rape. Bourg here highlights how women's groups appealing to the law for protection against sexual violence were accused by some representatives of the radical left of 'sexual moralism' and 'selling out' the revolution by appealing to the state and its 'bourgeois' legal and moral standards.

Part 4 addresses what Bourg calls the 'Ethical Jansenism' of the New Philosophers. This is the most philosophically detailed part of the book, as Bourg reviews the historical phenomenon of the *nouveaux philosophes* and the philosophical arguments put forward by Maurice Clavel, Christian Jambert and Guy Lardreau, André Glucksmann, and Bernard-Henri Lévy as the first *explicit* turn to ethics. Bourg makes a persuasive case that although none of the 'new philosophers' deserve consideration as great philosophical thinkers, together they offer a variety of appeals to turn away from the revolutionary rhetoric of the 'events of May' that capture the *Zeitgeist* and help explain why there was newfound interest in the 80s in the work of more significant ethical thinkers like Levinas, Jankélévitch, and Ricoeur, and a turn to ethics in the late work of Sartre (in his interviews with Benny Lévy) and Foucault.

Throughout his text, Bourg's historical account is guided by the tension he sees between the themes of ethos and law. This tension is at the heart of May 68, as the ethos, 'the character or spirit of 1968 and the manifold liberational aspirations it unleashed' stands in stark contrast to the law, which Bourg sees as imposing 'limits of various kinds' (13). While this notion of law might be challenged along lines suggested by Foucault's skepticism concerning the 'Repressive Hypothesis' and the understanding of laws as only saying

no, the basic point of the distinction as an aid to understanding the events of May in terms of an immanent antinomian ethos confronting transcendent and transcendental laws is well taken. But when thinking about the 'ethical turn' in French theory, it seems that another distinction, which also takes the form of situating immanence against transcendence, is also relevant: the distinction between 'ethics' and 'morality'. And here I think Bourg's account misses some of the *ethical* importance of Deleuze.

On several occasions, Deleuze notes a distinction between ethics and morality that speaks to his desire to avoid transcendence and remain within the immanent: 'Morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a special sort, ones that judge actions and intentions by considering them in relation to transcendent values (this is good, that is evil . . .); ethics is a set of optional rules that assess what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of existing involved' (*Negotiations, 1972-1990*, trans. Martin Joughin [New York: Columbia University Press 1995], p. 100, translation modified). This distinction, which he sees in Foucault and Spinoza, he sees first and foremost in Nietzsche's genealogical critique of morality, which distinguishes between the immanent, ethical difference between good and bad that grounds evaluative judgments on one's 'way of being or style of life', and the transcendent moral opposition between good and evil that grounds evaluative judgment on an absolute and otherworldly ideal (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson [New York: Columbia University Press 1983], p. 2). This distinction between ethics and morality complicates Bourg's tension between ethos and law and, more than the Foucaultian appeals to the language of both ethos and ethics in his last works, it seems to support Bourg's point concerning the lasting significance of the ethos of May 68. But it does so by situating Deleuze, with his accounts of Spinoza and Nietzsche, on the side of the ethical turn, while placing the New Philosophers where they belong, on the side of having renounced the ethos of 68 and by turning instead to morality, if not to moralism.

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Costica Bradatan
The Other Bishop Berkeley:
An Exercise in Reenchantment.
New York: Fordham University Press 2006.
Pp. 237.
US$55.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8232-2693-1).

This is a refreshing and welcome book, illuminating aspects of Berkeley's thought that have been relatively neglected in recent scholarship. It aims at giving a fuller and more complex picture of Berkeley than usual, by adding to the standard view of Berkeley as a theologically-minded pre-analytical empiricist the portrait of a thinker profoundly steeped in longstanding religious, spiritual and philosophical traditions.

Bradatan aims at two different things. On the one hand, he examines issues often treated as comparatively marginal — some more so, some much less — in Berkeley's philosophy. He attempts to show how these aspects of Berkeley's thought are related more closely than one might think to Berkeley's philosophy as generally understood. On the other hand, Bradatan sets these aspects of Berkeley's thought in historical perspective by relating them to ancient, medieval, renaissance and early modern philosophical views and religious traditions.

The first chapter deals with Berkeley and the Platonic tradition. Berkeley's appeal to archetypes in God's mind is well known. But Bradatan shows that there are many more Platonic themes in Berkeley's philosophy, that several are present in his first writings, and that — from the *New Theory of Vision* to *Siris* — they form a coherent network. Two of these themes are the principle of a likeness between the infinite and the finite mind, and nature construed as a *liber mundi*. It is debatable, however, whether Bradatan is correct in saying that it was in some sense inevitable that in his later years Berkeley should adopt the openly Platonic perspective offered in *Siris*, thereby fully revealing the Platonism implicit in his early writings.

Chapter 2 deals with archetypal knowledge in *Siris*, a work bent on displaying aspects of the philosophical and spiritual wisdom handed down over centuries through the Platonic tradition. Bradatan seeks to explain why in *Siris*, Berkeley, no longer the audacious inventor of bold philosophical tenets, comes to rely on the hermeneutics of ancient texts as affording enlightenment and truth.

In the third chapter, after an overview of the *liber mundi* tradition from the Bible to the seventeenth century, Bradatan shows how Berkeley's 'language of the author of nature' draws on the tradition and innovates within it. One of the differences between Berkeley and his predecessors within the tradition is that God's system of signs is, as is it were, more 'work in progress' than a fully written text. Another is that, contrary to the tradition that sees nature as a God-written book, Berkeley's divine language has no material support, thus making God more intimately present to finite minds. One should note, however, that there are two quite different systems of signs in-

stituted by God in Berkeley: one is related to the claim that visual ideas are signs of tangible ideas; the other depends on the claim that what we call empirical causes and effects within nature are related as sign to thing signified. Although Bradatan distinguishes them, perhaps he should have explained why the two systems of signs do not at all function the same way.

Chapter 4 develops the significance of Berkeley's interest in alchemy in *Siris*. He was mainly interested in the medical, cosmological and metaphysical aspects of alchemy, in particular the notions of a 'great chain of being', of a secret union and interconnectedness of all things, and of the possibility of a cosmic restoration. This chapter also serves to confirm Bradatan's view of Berkeley as shifting from the radically empiricist, anti-authoritative and anti-scholastic position of his early years to the more humble attitude of his later years, seeking spiritual enlightenment in authors and traditions of the past.

Chapter 5, on Berkeley's conception of philosophy as apologetics, focuses mainly on *Alciphron*, in particular Berkeley's assault on freethinking. Although interesting and useful, the chapter breaks less new ground than others, especially in comparison with G. Brykman's massive, two-volume work, *Berkeley: Philosophie et apologétique* (Paris: Vrin 1984), which seems to have escaped Bradatan's attention. In Chapter 6 Berkeley's 'Bermuda project' is revealingly interpreted in the light of several theologically related issues in the history of ideas, such as the quest for an earthly paradise, the aspiration to an educational utopia, messianism and the millennialist context of the times.

In the final, deliberately experimental chapter, Bradatan compares Berkeley's denial of the existence of matter with medieval dualistic heresies, in particular Catharism, in the belief that the comparison affords a better understanding of immaterialism. Why? Because, says Bradatan, Berkeley and the Cathars saw evil as related to matter as its source. This is rather unconvincing. Of course, Berkeley saw the belief in the existence of matter as the source of evils such as atheism and scepticism. Yet in Berkeley matter is not at all a source of evil, since it does not exist. There is all the difference in the world, which Bradatan seems to play down, between saying that matter is a source of evil, and saying that the (false) *belief* in the existence of matter is such.

This is an impressive and suggestive book, but sometimes it is little more than suggestive. It is one thing to explain the rich historical background lying behind aspects of Berkeley's thought. It is another to determine what knowledge Berkeley had of the several traditions Bradatan discusses and relates him to. For instance, Berkeley certainly knew his Plato well enough, but what knowledge did he have, exactly, of the later Platonic and Neoplatonic traditions, or of the *liber mundi* tradition? Concerning Platonism, one regrets that Bradatan does not discuss more thoroughly Malebranche and the Cambridge Platonists; at least we know that Berkeley was well acquainted with Malebranche's philosophy. Hopefully, this will be the subject matter of a further publication. In any case, Bradatan's book abounds with relevant

and significant historical knowledge that recommends it to anyone wishing to reconsider, in a new light, the depth and originality of Berkeley's spiritual, religious and philosophical aspirations.

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William Byers
How Mathematicians Think: Using Ambiguity, Contradiction, and Paradox to Create Mathematics.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2007.
Pp. 415.
US$35.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-691-12738-5).

In this book Byers focuses on the hermeneutical side of the philosophy of mathematics. How can we understand what mathematicians do when they do mathematics? What has to happen in order that a new interesting result sees the light of day? Byers tries to argue that mathematics has been and still is widely misunderstood. Far from being algorithmic and fixed on proofs, the real core of mathematics is creativity. And creativity is tied to 'great' or (simple) 'mathematical ideas'. These ideas are not only placed at the centre of mathematical understanding, which Byers calls 'turning on the light', but they also propel mathematical progress.

Byers presents a couple of examples in which a crucial step forward in the development of mathematics depended on the presence of two at first sight unrelated or even barely compatible perspectives on some mathematical structure. He starts with the discovery of the irrational numbers, like $\sqrt{2}$, where $\sqrt{2}$ is clearly present as a geometric object — the length of the hypotenuse of the right angled triangle with unit length sides — but is not allowed for by (early Greek) arithmetic. The real numbers 'provide a context' (38) in which the two perspectives are unified. Another famous example is the Fundamental Theorem of calculus, which says 'that there is in fact one process in calculus that is integration when it is looked at in one way and differentiation when it is looked at in another' (50). The core of mathematics, according to Byers, is finding such situations and being able to understand them by providing a more comprehensive view. This process is creative and not algorithmic. Proofs only sum up the discovery and preserve the result in text books. Mechanical proofs Byers sees as 'trivial' (373), whereas 'deep' proofs are framed in expressing some (great) 'idea'. Re-ordering the terms in

an infinite series of additions and subtractions, for instance, makes it obvious to see a sum formula. Good mathematicians are, therefore, those who hit on 'ideas', like Cantor hitting on diagonalization and the continuum hypotheses. Even more revolutionary are 'great ideas'. An example of a great idea is formalism. Formalism provided a unifying perspective on the whole of mathematics. When Hilbert started with formalizing Euclid's geometry, '*formalism* was born and, in the process, the whole notion of truth was radically transformed' (291). A great idea is then inflated (as in Hilbert's claims on behalf of formalism) and then again delimited in a wider perspective (as when Gödel's theorems hit formalism). Because ideas are outbursts of creativity, 'the answer to the question of whether a computer could ever do mathematics is clearly "No!"' (369). Byers finally relates his view to the question of how mathematics is to be taught, namely by getting students to understand the ideas so as to 'turn on the light'.

In the introduction Byers remarks that, unluckily, mathematicians are not the best source to account for how mathematics works or what mathematicians are doing. This cliché about the working scientist unfortunately applies to Byers as well, who is a mathematician himself. On the one hand his central concept of 'ambiguity' remains far from being clearly developed, and on the other hand the reader is constantly provided with a subtext airing some post-modern world view, sometimes bordering on post-modern mumbo jumbo.

Ambiguity can consist in one expression having several meanings, 'bank' being a paradigm example. Some of the ideas Byers mentions are of this type. Gödel's discovery that some number theoretic statements are about the number theoretic proof system itself depends on the ambiguity of reading these statements as at one time being about numbers and at one time being about the proof system itself. Reading these statements in the latter way employs the Gödel numbering semantically coded in the meta-language. The majority of the cases Byers uses are, however, not of this type. The core aspect here seems to be that one and the same mathematical object or structure can be seen from two perspectives (these perspectives often being theories of different mathematical fields). The two perspectives unified shed further light on the structure in question, but they (still) refer to the *same* structure. This does not seem to fit well our folk concept of ambiguity. Nor need it do so; but a more worked out concept of, say, 'multiperspectivity' or 'perspective integration' would strengthen Byers' analysis of the examples he presents. (In fact several examples do not even refer in detail to his supposed methodological tool set of ambiguity, contradiction, etc.)

To such criticism Byers certainly could answer, as he in fact on occasion does, that 'the definition of ambiguity is itself ambiguous' (31). This highlights his more post-modern inclination to pseudo-deep remarks. One more example (introducing the idea of contradictions): 'The contradictory is an irreducible element of human life as we all experience it. ... In this way and others we are all walking contradictions' (80). Whatever this means — and even if it is true — it relates only very vaguely to the concept of contradic-

tion used in the formal sciences. Starting with his confession that he found the unity of Zen and mathematics, up to his equation of formula and other 'metaphors' found in literature, Byers throws fog on otherwise interesting analyses.

Byers ends up with an anti-realistic understanding of mathematics, one that stresses constructive ideas: 'Knowing and truth are not two; they are different perspectives on the same reality. There is no truth without knowing and no knowing without truth' (343). This even outdoes intuitionism. Byers stresses that his is also a qualified constructivism. But this will not do: calling both anti-realist and realist theories 'perspectives', far from being a compromise in which both theories equally cede ground, in fact simply caves in to the anti-realist.

A reader who ignores Byers' post-modern musings — or skips a few chapters — will find a few challenging ideas on the practice of mathematics in this book. The examples are often lucidly presented. They await a more thorough going analysis along the line of Byers' main ideas of mathematical creativity in the integration of perspectives.

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T. A. Cavanaugh
Double-Effect Reasoning.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 315.
US$85.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927219-8).

The doctrine of Double Effect (DE), with its insistence on the moral importance of the distinction between the intended effects of one's actions and the merely foreseen effects, has become increasingly influential in the field of moral philosophy, and for good reason. Though it derives from the Catholic tradition, it is not a religious doctrine any more than the prohibition on homicide is religious because it has roots in the Ten Commandments. Cavanaugh's new book on DE approaches it as a general moral doctrine, rightly rejecting the claim one sometimes hears that it cannot be understood or accepted outside the context of its Catholic history or tradition. (It is thus unfortunate that the book is published in the Oxford series on 'theological ethics'.)

The book is an important contribution to DE studies. It is, so far as I know, the first full-length treatment of DE that attempts to provide a comprehensive (however brief) review of virtually all of the significant issues in

the doctrine. This includes discussions of its historical background, of the analysis of the distinction between intended and foreseen effects, of the moral significance of the distinction, and of the various criticisms of the doctrine. In a useful final chapter, it mentions other topics such as the doctrine's role in law and the (neglected) problem of reparations for the harm one foreseeingly causes. The book is too short to develop most of these topics in great detail, but it provides a model for future discussions of DE. Cavanaugh is especially sharp in responding to recent critics of the doctrine, including Bennett and Kamm, and showing the flaws in their analysis. He marshals a series of arguments defending DE, drawing on Kant, Anscombe, Aristotle, Thomas Nagel, and others.

The chapter detailing the historical background of DE is quite useful, though with one caveat. It was apparently published too early to take account of Gregory Reichberg's important article in *The Thomist* (69 [2005] 341-70) on Aquinas and DE. This is unfortunate, as Reichberg's well-argued essay provides a very different interpretation of Aquinas, arguing that Aquinas did *not* use DE to justify self-defense. For Aquinas, self-defense is permissible in that one may intend an attacker's death as a means to the end of self-preservation. Reichberg does concede that Aquinas did advocate DE, just not in the context of self-defense. Readers who are interested in Aquinas' position would be well-advised to read Reichberg as a balance to Cavanaugh's interpretation.

One other criticism is in order here, regarding Cavanaugh's unfortunate habit of revising traditional nomenclature. While some commentators use the phrase 'Doctrine of Double Effect' and others use 'Principle of Double Effect', Cavanaugh rejects both of these (for not very convincing reasons) and substitutes his own 'Double-Effect Reasoning' (xx). This new name is not likely to catch on, and indeed is somewhat misleading as it implies that DE is a rule of reasoning rather than a moral principle or doctrine. Also problematic is Cavanaugh's replacement of the term 'Strategic Bombing' with the term 'Tactical Bombing' (xii) in making the classic contrast with Terror Bombing. Again, his rationale is weak: apparently he thinks people will be confused by the fact that the WWII British 'Office of Strategic Bombing' sometimes approved what we consider to be Terror Bombing. More importantly, Cavanaugh seems to be unaware that 'strategic' and 'tactical' are technical terms in the military (and elsewhere) with specific meanings. Tactical bombings are those undertaken in immediate response to the actions of one's opponent, thus typically taking place on the front lines. In contrast, strategic bombing aims at more long-term effects by aiming to disable the enemy's capacity to wage war; it will typically target such things as munitions factories behind enemy lines. The moral problem, of course, arises when leaders are tempted to use strategic bombing against civilians, with the long-range goal of winning the war by undermining morale. Hence Cavanaugh is misusing the term 'tactical'; the distinction at issue is between legitimate and illegitimate uses of Strategic Bombing, the latter of which can be called Terror Bombing, since it aims to use the creation of fear as a means to victory. Cavanaugh's manipu-

lation of the terminology does not affect his argument, but it does introduce unnecessary confusion.

Cavanaugh will likely provoke debate with his suggested reconstruction of the principles constituting the doctrine of DE (36). Citing the goal of simplicity, he reduces the traditional four provisions of the doctrine to three (though he also praises the pedagogical value of redundancy in the doctrine [22]). His revised version has merit, especially his insistence on articulating, as an essential element of DE, a principle often unfortunately omitted, namely the Necessity Principle: one must not cause any harm unless it is necessary to achieve one's legitimate goal. However, it seems unwise to combine the Proportionality and the Necessity Principles in a single provision, as they are logically distinct, and should each be considered separately. Thus a better formulation might be: 1) the act considered independently of its evil effects is not in itself wrong; 2) the agent intends the good and does not intend the evil either as an end or as a means; 3) there is no way to achieve the good without causing the evil effects, and 4) the evil effects are not disproportionately large relative to the good being sought.

It is, needless to say, a virtue of this book that it is likely to stimulate debate on such questions. Anyone interested in DE will do well to consider Cavanaugh's contribution to the topic.

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Timothy Chappell, ed.
Values and Virtues:
Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 320.
US$74.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929145-8).

Several years ago bracelets appeared imprinted with 'WWJD?'. This is perhaps the finest and best-known example of Aristotelianism in contemporary ethics, as some Christians took Jesus to be the proper model for how to behave in particular situations: 'What Would Jesus Do?' To Aristotelians this should have come as a welcome relief from the rule-based guidance of the Ten Commandments, or a host of rules from the teachings of Paul. Jesus took on the role of Aristotle's man of practical wisdom. In fact, in the early 1980's, when I was a grad student at UCLA, I heard Jean Hampton give a sermon entitled 'Jesus: Aristotle's Man of Practical Wisdom'. I suppose this would

make her the intellectual Godmother of the 'WWJD?' movement! Just as virtue ethicists have wondered how the man of practical wisdom himself knew what to do, clever (but unemployed) philosophers recently designed a plush doll of Jesus wearing a 'WWID?' bracelet: www.philosophersguild.com.

The title of this book promises a lot. When I first saw it I considered using the book for a class on Aristotle and contemporary virtue ethics — but that would have been a mistake. It turns out that the collection is based on papers from a conference, 'Values and Virtues'. The subtitle seems to have been added retrospectively, in hopes of suggesting some unity to the otherwise rather broad subject-matter. But the subtitle is an exercise in wishful thinking, as only some of the essays deserve that description. What we have here instead is the usual collection of generally strong essays, by a variety of philosophers who happened to go to a certain conference (in Scotland), on topics of their choosing. These often make for interesting reading, but not for a book.

Linda Zagzebski, in her contribution, addresses the problem of characterizing practical wisdom. Rather than first developing a theory of practical wisdom and then seeing who satisfies it, she notes that Aristotle reversed the order, first identifying a person of practical wisdom as an exemplar, and then proceeding to characterize practical wisdom as what is exhibited by people *like that*. Zagzebski proposes to legitimize Aristotle's procedure by comparing it with the theory of direct reference advocated by Kripke, Putnam and Donnellan. According to this approach water, for example, is picked out not by a set of essential properties, but by a demonstrated sample or paradigm, and a similarity-relation. Water's essence is then discovered *a posteriori*. Zagzebski makes the application: 'we can pick out persons who are *phronimoi* [practically wise] in advance of investigating the nature of *phronesis*. The *phronimos* can be defined, roughly, as a person *like that*, where we make a demonstrative reference to a paradigmatically practically wise person' (58).

But Zagzebski will run into the same problems that Kripke and company do. What is *like that* is not built into nature, waiting to be discovered by us. Whether the paradigmatic sample of water is to be construed as all isotopes of H_2O, or as the most common isotope of H_2O, is a decision that we (or scientists) need to make. It is not a discovery. So too, whether this or that characteristic of the person of practical wisdom is crucial to being practically wise is not determined apart from us — it is decided by us. This result, not anticipated by Zagzebski, may not be completely uncongenial to Aristotle, however, since there is an element of relativism in Aristotle that may allow for different cultures to construe practical wisdom in different ways. Conflicting cultures are not necessarily making mistakes, but may simply be making different choices. The mean for good-temper may be different in Southern California from what it is in New York City. Is one of them wrong? Is Jesus' reaction to the money-changers or his admonition to turn the other cheek the key aspect of his exhibition of good-temper? Can't a case be made either way?

The next essay, by Fred Miller, also uses some tools of contemporary philosophy of language, but more successfully. Miller counters the common as-

sertion that Aristotle had no concept of 'rights'. If we were to insist on a causal-historical theory of meaning, then it is likely true that there is no causal chain running back from our use of 'rights' to that of the Greeks, and the common assertion would hold. But while Aristotle and the Classical Greeks had no single word that coincides with the modern concept of a 'right', he employed concepts that played each of the crucial roles (claim, liberty/privilege, authority/power, immunity) played by the modern term. The case would be like that in which someone claimed that the Greeks had no concept of love, since '*agape*', '*eros*', and '*philia*' all have to be deployed to cover the ground that 'love' does in English. Indeed, it seems perhaps a defect of English that we have a single term that is ambiguous in these various ways.

Talbot Brewer, in the final essay, objects to the automatic assimilation of cases of desire to desire *that* a state of affairs hold. In particular, he highlights desire for God, or for another person, as uncapturable in propositional form. This is a significant claim, since it aims to undermine the widely held account of desire as a *propositional* attitude. But, while Brewer's point seems well-taken that not all desire is propositional, it is hard to accept what seems to be his extended claim that really no desire is fully propositional. There is also a long-standing tradition of believing *in* God, or Jesus, or another person, (and even, in some traditions, believing *on* Jesus). But would that justify us in doubting whether any belief is really propositional? As these few examples show, this collection might also have been subtitled: 'Contemporary Semantics in Aristotelianism'.

Finally, I cannot end without mention of the opening essay by Christopher Coope. Working within the long-standing tradition of British curmudgeons — Anscombe, Geach, Hare, Hacker, etc. — Coope offers many valuable reminders of the limits of the virtue-theory enterprise from the perspective of a senior member of the profession. With the substance, if not the tone, of these wide-ranging remarks I fully agreed. While this essay alone may not be worth the price of the book, it is worth careful attention.

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Lorenzo Chiesa
Subjectivity and Otherness:
A Philosophical Reading of Lacan.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2007.
Pp. 268.
US$19.95
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-262-53294-5).

There is little doubt that Lacanian theory is now widely accepted as a legitimate and rewarding resource in contemporary debates around political theory, cultural criticism and philosophy. The abundance of new publications utilizing Lacan's corpus in order to illuminate political, cultural and philosophical issues and dilemmas amply demonstrates this point. The title of Chiesa's book is bound to stimulate the reader with the implicit promise of a novel philosophical approach to Lacanian theory. In fact this promise is not only implicit, for already on the first page of the introduction Chiesa is quick to distinguish his project from what he calls a 'soft', 'mistaken', approach to Lacan's work. In a consciously polemical way he makes explicit his rejection of previous attempts to draw a link between Lacan and philosophy, thereby raising the stakes on his own contribution and the expectations of his readers: 'despite the current renaissance of Lacanian studies, Lacan's (philosophical) reception has thus far been less than satisfactory, [and] one is inclined to propose that the time for — serious — exegesis can now finally *begin*.' Does Chiesa succeed in delivering the goods?

Admittedly the table of contents does not seem to embody such a radical agenda, and the same applies to the principal aim of the book, 'to analyze the evolution of the concept of subjectivity in the works of Jacques Lacan,' that is, to advance a chronologically arranged 'detailed reading of the Lacanian subject in its necessary relation to otherness according to the three orders of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real' (4). At this point the reader starts to feel a bit perplexed, and her/his puzzlement increases upon going through the rather banal chapter outline included in the introduction, and even more so upon moving from chapter to chapter. The book is clearly structured as a more or less standard introduction to Lacanian theory. It follows the trajectory of Lacan's theorizations from the mirror stage and the imaginary subject to *jouissance* and the subject of the real. Thus, Part 1, which includes only one chapter, is titled 'The Subject of the Imaginary (Other)'. (Both Part 1 and Chapter 1, by the way, share exactly the same title.) From there it moves to Lacan's stress on the symbolic in his re-conceptualizations of the unconscious and the Oedipus complex. This is Part 2, 'The Subject of the Symbolic (Other)'. It then proceeds to Lacan's subsequent focus on *jouissance* and fantasy, in Part 3, 'The Subject of the Real (Other)'.

Chiesa himself seems to be aware of the effect on his readers that this disjunction between the robust pretensions of his early claims and his rather disappointing delivery can have. Already in the introduction, speaking about

the second part of the book, he acknowledges that descriptions of the influence of structural linguistics on Lacanian theory are 'already available in countless introductory books,' and he defends the originality of his approach by highlighting a number of questions, e.g., 'What is the difference between conscious-diachronic and unconscious-synchronic metonymy? Why is metaphor also said to represent a vertical quilting point? Is there a way to pinpoint appropriately the distinction between the Name-of-the-Father and the phallus?' (8). What Chiesa fails to realize is that this problem affects the whole book and not only its second part. Furthermore, any original questions he raises, such as the ones just mentioned (although, even here, their importance for the overall debate around Lacan should not be over-stated), remain rather peripheral in his narrative and, most importantly, are rarely linked to an explicitly philosophical problematic. In fact, a rigorous philosophical discussion of Lacan seems to start only after p. 168 (in a text which ends on p. 192), and even then only because Chiesa's focus turns to the ethics of psychoanalysis, a field which already in Lacan's work acquires a strongly philosophical tone.

All this is not to say that the book is devoid of interesting moments. On the contrary, the reader will be fascinated and rewarded by the detailed and informed discussion of the paradoxes of the real (125-38), by the well-argued section (167-82) on ethics and Antigone (highlighting the structural deadlock marking Lacan's Seminar VII), and even by Chiesa's 'neologism' of *jouis-sans* (184). Moreover, the book could always function as a general introduction for newcomers to Lacanian theory. The only problem is that it is debatable to what extent it constitutes a better package compared to other introductions already available; and in any event this is certainly not the way Chiesa himself has conceived this project.

Not only is the book to be found wanting when judged on the basis of the initial claims of its author, but its function as a general introduction is likewise undermined by Chiesa's admission concerning the adequate psychoanalytic experience which he 'do[es] not possess and whose evidence would in any case lie beyond the scope of a book of philosophy' (6). However, and despite this disclaimer, Chiesa's text seems much more devoted to an esoteric, immanent reading of Lacan, which would benefit immensely from the experience he, by his own admission, lacks, and much less — if at all — oriented towards his explicitly stated aim of advancing a serious philosophical exegesis of Lacanian theory. One really wonders whether the purpose of including the word 'philosophical' in the subtitle of the book and of describing it as 'a book of philosophy', might only be to indicate that the author of this introductory book has no clinical background. Perhaps it should be interpreted as a plea not to judge the text on the basis of its clinical value, because it does not seem otherwise to affect the scope of Chiesa's arguments or their overall orientation.

To conclude, this is a well-structured and systematic text with some imaginative moments, but one that adds very little to available introductions to Lacanian theory and largely fails to highlight and discuss the profound

(anti)philosophical implications of Lacan's *oeuvre* within the philosophical constellation of our age.

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Desmond Clarke
Descartes: A Biography.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 530.
US$40.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-82301-2).

Clarke's biography of Descartes gives an updated popular treatment of Descartes' life and work by focusing on the well-known trope of Descartes as an early-modern scientist. This is in keeping with Clarke's earlier approach in both *Descartes' Philosophy of Science* and *Descartes' Philosophy of Mind*. Here, however, the image is painted in somewhat Faustian overtones: Descartes is demonized as an evil genius who sells his soul for scientific knowledge of the world. He manipulates people like he manipulates words and objects.

According to Clarke, Descartes is best characterized as a philosopher of the scientific revolution. He is described as 'an astronomer' who 'avoided church censure of his astronomy for almost two decades by dissimulation, self-censorship, and astuteness' (4). Descartes is thus one of the antagonists in the early-modern conflict between science and scholasticism. His main contribution to the history of ideas was in articulating that conflict and in proposing a new way of thinking that made the older theories unnecessary: 'In particular, he claimed that natural phenomena are explained ultimately by small particles of matter and their properties, rather than by the philosophical entities his opponents assumed' (5).

Descartes' philosophy of science accordingly plays a central role, as does his philosophy of mind. The two areas are related, Clarke argues, because Descartes' distinction between two different kinds of scientific explanation lies behind his 'property dualism', which is how we are to understand the relation between mind and body, i.e., not as the relation between two substances but as the relation between two kinds of explanatory properties. Though he cannot avoid the occasional slip into substance terminology (464), this opens-up some fascinating possibilities for interpretations of the mind-body union, particularly in the discussion of the correspondence with Elizabeth, where he suggests that Descartes' exploration of the natural unity of the mind and the

body had as much to do with human health as it did with metaphysics (273). In general, according to Clarke, Descartes wants to downplay metaphysics in favour of explanatory scientific properties.

In keeping with the Faustian theme, evasion and dissimulation are the main motifs of the book. Descartes is obsessively reclusive and always on the move — Appendix 2 provides an itinerary — though why he wants to be alone is never fully explained. Descartes lies about his daughter, his past, and even his sexual orientation (46, 131), which is, of course, part of the demonization. At several points Clarke appears to doubt Descartes' expressions of faith, but in the end he hedges his bets. Descartes straddles the fence on most theological issues; it is the consequences of his views that challenge religious orthodoxy.

The dominant pattern of Descartes' life, Clarke argues, is dispute. He 'fought with almost everyone he encountered' (5), and he is usually cast as the instigator. Paranoid and suspicious, Descartes behaves in a wilful and petulant fashion, though Clarke never attempts to explain this either (except, perhaps ironically, to chalk it up to Descartes' egoism). Such behaviour is clearly related to the aristocratic ethos and the age of controversy — particularly the quarrel with Roberval — but Clarke seems simply mystified by Descartes' noble capriciousness.

Still, he tells a good, if gloomy, story, relying on Baillet's influential seventeenth-century biography, but also using recent work by Theo Verbeek and others on Descartes' correspondence. Verbeek proofed the work, along with Erik-Jan Bos, and there is a subtle Dutch bias: in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Spanish Netherlands 'acquired a distinctive political, linguistic, and social character that explains their positive response to Calvinism and, especially, their defensive reaction to the repressive Spanish Counter-Reformation' (38). Descartes' Dutch disciple Regius is the champion of the piece because he heroically and publicly argued against the university authorities in Utrecht for the freedom to push the Cartesian philosophy to its logical physicalist conclusions. Descartes, however, is the dark master who dissociates himself from his student just when this quarrel (which he instigated) starts to heat up.

The work is entirely unsympathetic, and the author never misses an opportunity to cast Descartes in a negative light: he is portrayed as a 'reclusive, cantankerous, and oversensitive loner' (180), with a weakness 'for making permanent enemies' (307) and a penchant for duplicity (*passim*). Torn between mechanism and spiritualism (53), he fathered a child, Francine, as part of an anatomical investigation (133), and his routine was 'only briefly interrupted' (134) upon her early death. (Compare Gaukroger on this episode.) Even Descartes' letter of condolence to Huygens on the death of his wife is inappropriately self-centred (141).

The book provides some excellent details about the publication history of Descartes' *oeuvre*, acknowledging Matthijs van Otegem's recent bibliography of Descartes' works. The material on the intellectual context in mathematics and Renaissance philosophy is also well-done, but there is too much empha-

sis on Descartes' quarrel with Scholasticism. Descartes is indebted to the Scholastics in more ways than one, and the latest literature (Marion, Secada, Carraud) has been exploring the links, rather than the breaks.

The historical background is generally strong, and there is some interesting information on the political and social context of Descartes' family at the beginning of the book (a family-tree is also provided), but a clearer explanation of the structure of the seventeenth-century French polity would have been useful; and he gives the wrong impression about the French promulgation of the Council of Trent (71), which was in fact tempered by the Edict of Nantes.

The dust jacket bills the book as 'the first biography in English that addresses the full range of Descartes' interest in theology, philosophy and the sciences and that traces his intellectual development through his entire career.' Gaukroger and Watson, who have both published their own biographies, must have been amused. Clarke's is a decent story of Descartes' life and work, but it does not explain much about the man behind the scientific image. Even if we accept his main thesis about Descartes' role in the scientific revolution, he still never explains *why* Descartes thought it mattered to get the world right. Why was he willing to be such a liar for the sake of truth?

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Catherine Conybeare
The Irrational Augustine.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 239.
US$99.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926208-3).

Conybeare has provided us with a fresh study of Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues, which she has correctly found to represent anything but the dogmatic and systematic theologian that the future bishop of Hippo has at times been taken to have been. Perhaps 'The Non-Dogmatic Augustine' or 'The Uncertain and Tentative Augustine' might have provided us with a better idea of what the book is about, but they would also perhaps have lacked the zip and provocativeness of the present title. Conybeare presents us with 'a study *between the lines*' (viii) of the early dialogues that emphasizes a careful reading of the Latin text, the staging of the dialogues, and a certain amount of innuendo rather than the typical straightforward exposition of the lines of argumentation. Such an approach is surely justified since the dialogue form and its development were undoubtedly intended to provide us with

something more than a philosophical set of arguments. The book 'traces Augustine's gradual realization that, if he was to commit himself fully to the Christian faith, he would have to begin to detach himself from the primacy of reason, or *ratio*' (1).

Connybeare is correct, I believe, in holding that Augustine's commitment to Christianity at Cassiciacum is solid (though he still has to work out what that commitment entails), and her study reveals a liminal or transitional Augustine who 'gives questioning, uncertainty, and human limitations their due role in his theology' (7).

After the introduction the book has three parts: the first on why Augustine chose the dialogue form, the second on women doing philosophy, and the third on a really liberal education. One of the major changes that Augustine's full acceptance of the Christian faith entailed was a transformation of the classical understanding of reason and philosophy, which had been to a large extent restricted to a few of the learned, and these males. Conybeare rightly sees the Augustine of the dialogues as moving toward a greater inclusiveness by which not only the learned, but the simple believers, and not only men, but also women, and not only adults, but even children and youngsters, could share '*nostra philosophia*', namely, the Christian faith.

Needless to say, Monica's role in the dialogues is extensively and rightly emphasized. She not merely steers the dialogue in *De beata vita* back on track several times when it begins to flounder, but is the one character who at the end recognizes in Augustine's fascinating blend of the Stoic virtues with the Neoplatonic hypostases the triune God, whom she knew and recognized as the God found in Saint Ambrose's hymn, '*Fove precantes, Trinitas*'. So too, it is Monica who, in *De beata vita* and *De ordine*, is praised by her son for having reached the very pinnacle of philosophy, which many great and learned men have not attained — not, of course, the philosophy of this world, but the love of wisdom that is 'our philosophy', namely, the love of Christ, the wisdom and knowledge of God.

Conybeare also emphasizes other feminine characters in the dialogues, whose femininity at times seems little more than the gender of the Latin word, such as *ratio*, with which Augustine carries on the conversation in his *Soliloquia*. Similarly she sees Augustine representing himself as Leah in *De ordine* 1, 10, 29, because the Latin verb, *lippio*, was used most often in Augustine's era in reference to Leah's bleary eyes. Here I find the argument somewhat contrived and the emphasis on the importance of gender less convincing, although not impossible.

In the epilogue, 'Exploiting Potential', Conybeare asks what Augustine did with the insights won at Cassiciacum. Turning to *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, a work whose value she in my opinion underestimates, she points out three themes gained at Cassiciacum that Augustine exploits: 'the quest for inclusivity, the question of the convention of language, and the formulation of "potential" as a notion that transcends rigid dichotomies' (174–5), themes that she rightly sees as tied to his growing grasp of Christianity. Augustine, for example, acknowledges in the preface to the work the admonition that

he received to write in a way that both the learned and the unlearned could understand. Similarly, Augustine points to different referents for individual words, which allows him to escape from the Manichaean objection to God's having made man from the mud or slime of the earth. Conybeare thus sees that, given the lessons learned at Cassicicum, Augustine is able in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* to launch his project of Christian interpretation, which was to be a major feature of his later works.

In a final note on method, entitled 'Augustine amongst the Natals' (a term roughly equivalent to 'mortals', but one that Conybeare sees as more closely tied to the birthing function and to human relationality), Conybeare expresses her indebtedness to Luce Iragary, Grace Jantzen, and Hannah Arendt, who provided her with many insights and leads.

What I miss in this study of the dialogues is an awareness of the importance of the *libri Platonicorum* to the early Augustine's transition from Stoic and Manichaean corporealism to a spiritualist metaphysics. Augustine's own emphasis upon the significance of the Platonic books upon his intellectual conversion to Catholic Christianity should not be overlooked, although Conybeare is certainly right that the Augustine we see in the dialogues is an Augustine who is also coming to a new understanding of reason and of the inclusiveness in Christian philosophy for the many and not just the few, for the uneducated and not just the lettered, even for youngsters and not just grown-ups, and for women and not just men. Perhaps my objections to the book, which are mild, are due more to my life as a philosopher, to my education as such, and to my being a man than they are to a reading of the dialogues from another perspective, namely, that of a classicist and a learned woman who is sensitive to a quite different sort of richness found in the text.

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Keith Crome and **James Williams, eds.**
The Lyotard Reader and Guide.
New York: Columbia University Press 2006.
Pp. 368.
US$77.50 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-231-13934-2);
US$31.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-231-13935-9).

Why another Lyotard reader? *The Lyotard Reader*, edited by Andrew Benjamin, was published by Blackwell in 1989. Crome and Williams, the editors of this new volume, justify its production on the grounds that Lyotard pub-

lished much since then, and that Lyotard scholarship has also advanced significantly (1-2). While both points are true, the differences between the two readers are far more extensive than those reasons suggest. The two volumes differ markedly in their aims and scope.

In 1989, Benjamin's reader made available to English-speaking scholars a large and rich variety of texts from Lyotard's diverse *oeuvre*, with minimal or practically negligible introductory and commentary material. Prior to Benjamin's edition Lyotard had been known primarily for *The Postmodern Condition*, and Benjamin brought much-needed attention to the far greater scope of his challenging works. However, Benjamin's edition left readers to chart their own precarious way through the bewildering archipelago of Lyotard's difficult texts. From engagements with psychoanalysis and Judaism, to writings for art exhibition catalogues, to dalliances with formal logic, to experimental literary-philosophical writings, to dense exegeses of Kant, the very variety of Lyotard's works collected in the first reader risked leaving one unfamiliar with the main threads and concerns of this thinker none the wiser (at least not without a good deal of analytical work).

Crome and Williams' edition presents a perhaps slightly narrower and less rich sampling of Lyotard's work. However, it is a far more approachable and reader-friendly volume. The selections are governed by a clear intention to provide a sampling of the most important texts covering the main areas in which Lyotard worked. Furthermore, the primary texts are supplemented with a good deal of helpful commentary. As the title indicates, the book is also an introductory guide to Lyotard. It is aimed primarily at students seeking a first introduction to Lyotard's thought, and in this respect it is one of the best introductions available. Lyotard's work is such that the style of his writings is itself philosophically significant, and his thought resists any simple reduction to commentary. At the same time, however, it frequently risks being unapproachable (especially for the student or newcomer to his work) without commentary. The combination presented here is therefore expedient, allowing the reader both a line of approach to the primary texts, and an indispensable engagement with them.

The book is arranged in four major sections: philosophy, literature, politics, and art. The editors provide both a general introduction and an introduction to each section. The pieces collected here nearly span Lyotard's entire career, from his early political writings on Algeria (as a member of *Socialisme ou Barbarie*) to his final, unfinished work on Augustine. The sheer diversity of genres and styles represented here is a notable characteristic of Lyotard's work. Three interesting and important pieces appear for the first time in English translation in this collection, including the opening chapter of *Discours, figure*, Lyotard's first major (and, some would argue, most important) book, which has still not appeared in full translation. Of the eighteen pieces in this collection, only one ('Newman: The Instant') also appears in Benjamin's edition, allowing the two readers to be treated as companion volumes rather than rivals.

The editors are both leading experts in Lyotard scholarship, Williams having authored two books and various articles on Lyotard, and Crome having authored one of the most original and significant recent studies of his work (*Lyotard and Greek Thought: Sophistry*, Palgrave Macmillan 2006). The commentary they provide is in most respects excellent, and reflects many of the recent advances in Lyotard scholarship they mention in the introduction. Most importantly, it achieves a good balance between simplicity and clarity on the one hand, and sensitivity to the complexity of Lyotard's thought on the other hand. A minor drawback is that the commentary occasionally discusses, and underlines the importance of, works which have not been included in the volume, a fact which readers may find a little frustrating, especially in the case of articles which are not available anywhere in English translation, such as 'Freud selon Cézanne' (286-8).

If this book is a good introduction to Lyotard, the question still remains: why should the reader *want* to be introduced to Lyotard? Today, many would seem content to bury his work with postmodernism. Yet the editors of this volume claim that Lyotard 'is one of the key intellectual figures of our time'; that '[f]or anyone seeking to grasp our contemporary cultural, social, and political situation, Lyotard is necessary reading'; and that 'it is certain that his significance will continue to grow as this century strives to come to terms with the artistic, intellectual and political legacy of the previous century' (1). The fact that many today would probably not cite Lyotard as 'one of the key intellectual figures of our time' means that a burden of proof falls upon the editors to demonstrate why we should consider him such. Their success in doing so is one of the additional merits of this book.

The reasons for reading Lyotard are many. Briefly, he is important because he argues that there are kinds of meaning or sense which are intrinsic to life and thought but which cannot be well-formed within systems of representation. Such meanings can often only be *felt* or *sensed*, and are dismissed by most philosophers as having no philosophical significance. Lyotard argues, however, that philosophy itself depends on the subtleties it occludes; for example, he contends that thought is motivated and guided by feeling, sensation, and desire. Moreover, such meanings have a political significance insofar as the political may be understood in terms of systems of representation which are invariably exclusive. In sum, Lyotard's work is significant because it summons us to a sensitivity to those things which give richness and value to life, but which are threatened with extinction by contemporary modes of thought and political organization (such as the pressures exerted on thought by capitalism). Both the selections from Lyotard collected here and the editors' commentary demonstrate this significance amply.

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Carol Diethe
Historical Dictionary of Nietzscheanism.
2nd edition.
Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press 2007.
Pp. 424.
$90.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8108-5613-4).

John Protevi, ed.
A Dictionary of Continental Philosophy.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2006.
Pp. 638.
$56.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-300-11605-2).

Students in philosophy and social sciences always need to consult reliable dictionaries in their area of specialization, in order to understand and distinguish concepts and ideas, or just to find clear definitions with greater detail than ordinary dictionaries provide. Since these two A-Z reference books are not just general dictionaries in philosophy but specialized works in specific areas of the discipline, both will be quite useful for advanced undergraduates and other scholars (and even non-philosophers). I examine each work separately.

In Protevi's dictionary we find almost 500 entries and longer articles (ranging from one paragraph to three pages) in roughly three categories: philosophers (from T. W. Adorno and Kant to Marx and Slavoj Žižek), social thinkers (like Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault), and countless theoretical and philosophical concepts (absurdity, aesthetics, literary theory, *négritude*, phenomenology, rationalization). And of course we find here a detailed entry on postmodernism, understood as 'a rejection of the abstraction, cold formalism, elitism', and 'a collapsing of the distinction between the high and the low' (459). If a dictionary succeeds in making the lay reader understand what a complex concept such as postmodernism is, then one can say it is a good pedagogical instrument.

Oddly, in his short introduction, Protevi seems on the one hand reluctant to provide his own definition of continental philosophy, appearing to rely instead on a sharp geographical delineation between authors in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the 1950s and Western European authors (mainly) of Germany and France (viii). On this view continental philosophy sounds like non-Anglophone or non-British European philosophy, as seen by British observers. On the other hand, Protevi's actual definition relies on a short non-geographical account taken from the entry on 'Analytic philosophy', in which Simon Glendinning draws from Gilbert Ryle's distinction: 'Continental philosophers' are 'those philosophers who ... regard philosophy as some kind of quasi-perpetual intuition of essences' (25).

Even though continental philosophy is in one sense supposed to refer to European authors, some American philosophers are included, such as Alphonso Lingis, who was a professor and translator (for the books of Lévinas

and Merleau-Ponty), or Donald Donaldson, who was very much influenced by the French tradition of Saussure (but also Kant), plus many European-born philosophers who had a long career in the United States, like Leo Strauss or Scottish-born Alasdair MacIntyre. There is as well an entry on Montréal-born Charles Taylor, who studied at Oxford University from the late 1950s. A few authors from the eighteenth century are included, but there is no entry for, say, encyclopaedists Denis Diderot and his colleague D'Alembert. In other words, we do not get everything about European philosophy; largely we get a series of articles about contemporary European philosophers in their unique or exclusive approaches. (One way of construing this is to say that we get a high dose of reputedly eccentric writers who became hip at some point in Anglo-Saxon universities, from Jean Baudrillard and Guy Debord to Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Julia Kristeva, and some others targeted in the Sokal Hoax.) There are also some timely comparative entries on Asian and African philosophies.

Among the many fine entries found here, the article on cinema includes some avant-garde films as examples. In addition to citing a few famous films, it refers to Aristotle, Kant and Wittgenstein (as they apply to film theory). Importantly it also has entries on Kierkegaard and on Gaston Bachelard, who is an excellent example of a French philosopher influential in Europe and almost everywhere else, except English-speaking countries. The omission of Bachelard in a dictionary on European thinking would have meant, overall, a less credible work. By the same token, however, among the French admirers of Bachelard, an entry on Pierre Bourdieu should have been included, though perhaps this is just a point of detail.

Despite its undeniable positive qualities, there are at least two general objections to be made about Protevi's dictionary. First, certain influential thinkers from Switzerland are overlooked, like Carl G. Jung and Jean Piaget. They were not philosophers, although they influenced their generation. Others are also missing, like German philosopher Oswald Spengler, who in the early 1920s wrote *The Decline of West*, plus some important French thinkers such as Raymond Aron and Edgar Morin — both core thinkers who can be located between the social sciences and philosophy. A sociologist and philosopher, Edgar Morin wrote dozens of books on complexity theory and interdisciplinary methods. (Alas! very few of his works were translated into English.) The introduction should have explained the main criteria for inclusion (or exclusion) of specific themes or authors. While we find an entry on French philosophers like Sarah Kofman and Michel Serres, we get no entries on some contemporary French philosophers who published an even greater number of books, e.g., Luc Ferry or Patrick Tort (who wrote extensively on Darwinism, a fundamental continental matter).

My second complaint is about the lack of reference tools that should be found in any reference book. There is neither an index nor a bibliography, and not all quotes and works mentioned in the entries have the names of publishers or the page numbers of the quoted passages (as we require from our students). For instance, a long six line quote of Gramsci notes only that it

comes from his *Prison Notebooks*, with no precise reference about the version used or year of initial publication (275). Contrary to what is claimed in the introduction (xi), editors should not rely first on the internet to provide the complete references to standard works in this discipline; *au contraire*, even in the twenty-first century, references should be to autonomous and complete editions. The absence of an index in this dictionary is also a pity. Consider a student doing research on symbols: shouldn't she be directed to the entry on Edmund Husserl, which also mentions that concept (292), and to the entry on feminism (214), and of course to the entry on symbolic exchange (566) (which relies a little too much on Baudrillard but does not mention Bachelard)? Even the most general books carry an index, and we expect reference books to provide even more of these cross-referencing tools.

Philosophers are always asking for more when investigating their own discipline, and most editors thus want to include more entries. But publishers are often reluctant to carry too many pages, specially when the number reaches the 700-page mark. So, although we already have a short entry on philosophical imaginary, which only focuses on the works of Michèle Le Doeuff (and not, say, Gilbert Durand), a future version should include as well entries on *imaginaire* (or imagery), interdisciplinary, and of course on culture and cross-cultural theory, essential topics in continental philosophy. Nevertheless, one should not focus too much on what is missing in a dictionary, but should instead try to appreciate what is to be found. In this case, there are hundreds of instructive pages of explanations and discussions about the fundamental concepts of continental philosophy. Here, definitions are not one-liners; terms are often explained in a few sentences by various authors. One might suppose this dictionary was conceived for English-speaking students requiring the conceptual means to tackle complex (and sometimes elusive) European thinkers, who were not themselves the champions of clarity — yes, there are much-needed entries on Derrida and Ricoeur. Even experienced professors in continental philosophy will probably learn from this dictionary. Incidentally, a less expensive, paperback version also appeared in Scotland, with a slightly different title: *The Edinburgh Dictionary of Continental Philosophy*, published by the Edinburgh University Press (2005).

Now to the second edition of Diethe's dictionary, which includes the general philosophical concepts of Nietzsche (1844-1900), plus those salient elements and themes central to Nietzsche's thought, such as eternal return, *ressentiment* (written in French, as Nietzsche always did), science, sexuality, and slave morality. A first edition of this dictionary appeared in 1999, but this new version is much more comprehensive, now with some 100 additional pages. Every book Nietzsche wrote (and even *The Anti-Christ*) is introduced in a specific entry. All major philosophers (before and after Nietzsche) are included here, with discussion of their mutual critiques (whenever feasible) and their sets of influences, from Plato and Darwin to Hannah Arendt and Gilles Deleuze. Of course, Nietzsche's friends and relatives are included as well, in a general entry on friendship, plus some specific entries related to his closest associates (from Lou Andreas-Salomé to Richard Wagner). The

entry on Nietzsche's sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche explains how she reconstructed Nietzsche's thoughts after his death. The musical universe of Nietzsche is covered as well, both in an entry on music, and in another on Nietzsche's close friend Peter Gast, with whom he exchanged hundreds of letters that were published and even translated into French. In fact, there seems to be no one missing here. We even have an entry about the odd whip that can be seen on the famous photograph from 1882 of Lou Andreas-Salomé, Paul Rée, and Nietzsche (as shown here on p. 207).

This dictionary really is extensive: the introductory essay has more than fifty pages and focuses on Nietzsche's influence in various countries (from Spain to China). Most entries are about one page long. Surprisingly, along with the names of philosophers, included here are entries on some major novelists and playwrights like Hölderlin, Goethe, Georg Kaiser, Franz Wedekind (the author of *Erdgeist* [*Earth Spirit*] and *Lulu*). One of the strong points of this book is that it highlights the indirect influence of Nietzsche's thinking on many fields and disciplines that are sometimes distant from philosophy, including German expressionism. We even get an entry on the famous weekly journal *Die Aktion*, published in Berlin between 1911 and 1932. In fact, this excellent dictionary has a broad range and is made not only for Nietzsche connoisseurs; it enables the reader to follow most of the history of ideas in Europe using a Nietzschean perspective. This can be fascinating, since this book is clear, well-written, and easy to follow, even for an undergraduate. For instance, we get accurate entries on the futurism movement in Italy (during the early twentieth century), on novelist Milan Kundera, and even on Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw. Appendices provided by Diethe are extensive and helpful; there is a glossary, a chronology, a detailed bibliography with useful references on Nietzschean studies in many countries, but — here again — no index, which is too bad.

It would be difficult and perhaps unfair to compare these two volumes, for although they are both dictionaries, they are quite different one from one another: the first is a collective effort (which implies the simultaneous presence of various styles, sometimes uneven quality, and a variable clarity in the texts), while the second is single-authored. Protevi's dictionary is brand new, Diethe's has had the opportunity to undergo revision and updating — the chance to correct errors and to add missing topics. To sum up, while both dictionaries are insightful and will inspire graduate students and scholars, we should wait for Protevi's revised edition to make some fairer comparisons. Meanwhile, philosophers and serious academics in the social sciences should refer to these two impressive books; any decent university library ought to have them.

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Edward J. Grippe
Richard Rorty's New Pragmatism: Neither Liberal nor Free.
New York: Continuum 2007.
Pp. 210.
US$110.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8901-2).

The degree to which Richard Rorty's liberalism emerges from his anti-foundationalism remains an open and pressing issue. Does his anti-representationalism and anti-essentialism undercut liberalism and sacrifice the ability to remedy injustice? In this book Edward Grippe tackles these issues and ultimately concludes that Rorty's anti-foundational position is incoherent, and that when applied to the public realm it engenders dangerous political consequences.

The structure of the book confronts Rorty on his own terms and goes to great lengths to maximize the plausibility of his position. The book contains nine chapters. Criticisms that are alluded to are not fully fleshed out until the final chapter. The first four chapters deal with Rorty's anti-foundationalism, namely Davidson's principle of charity, the historicization of philosophy, and Rorty's response to critics such as Putnam and Habermas. The next four chapters analyze Rorty's liberalism in light of his anti-foundationalism. The privatization of philosophy, otherwise known as Rorty's Jeffersonian Strategy, figures prominently. Anti-essentialism as applied to the human self is critiqued with reference to Freudian categories.

In the first chapter, Grippe introduces a distinction he borrows from Michael Krausz between singularism and multiplism as applied to interpretation. This is the unifying distinction of the book. Singularists maintain 'that for any object of interpretation, there is one and only one correct (ideally admissible) interpretation' (19) whereas multiplists insist that there can be 'more than one ideally admissible interpretation' (19). Krausz thinks Rorty is a multiplist, but Grippe has doubts. Certainly, Rorty is a multiplist at the level of creating novel metaphors. This has to do with his promotion of poetry and edifying discourse. At the meta-level, Rorty appears to stay faithful. He lays his own philosophical position before the altar of history and blithely accepts that his vision may someday be overtaken. Yet as Grippe asks, what is the status of this part of Rorty's analysis? If Rorty sticks to his guns, he is forced to say that this historicism is itself merely one interpretation among many. But paradoxically, granting this appears to undermine the attractiveness of his position. For Grippe, Rorty needs to be a singularist on the meta-narrative level in order to get his project off the ground. There is one ideal interpretation — Rorty's — and failing to accept this makes Rorty's interpretation at best ornamental with shoddy utility, at worst apologetic to the *status quo*.

Rorty, unsurprisingly, would insist that his multiplism goes 'all the way down', but Grippe identifies several nagging issues that may suggest otherwise. For instance, Rorty sees the development of philosophy not as the

rational analysis of competing theses, but rather as the expression of incommensurable vocabularies. There is no non-circular way to justify the initial supposition of a particular vocabulary. Instead of arguing for a particular position, vocabularies are made to look more attractive to consumers in the intellectual bazaar. This notion of competing vocabularies emerges out of Rorty's Darwinian metaphor. But as Habermas has pointed out, there is a sort of performative contradiction in Rorty. Against Rorty's pleas to the contrary, he does seem to provide arguments for his various positions (anti-representationalism, historicism, etc.). Recalling the singularism / multiplism distinction, Grippe writes that 'Rorty's argument for (and from) ethnocentricity is ... a demonstrative argument meant to promote multiplism as a specific meta-narrative to all audiences in all times. It is an ungrounded singularist contention concealed behind the multiplist's aesthetic narrative of liberal tolerance' (70). This runs counter to Rorty's own claims.

Another nagging issue is Rorty's appropriation of the principle of charity. For Davidson, the principle of charity is a precondition for intelligibility. We are forced to apply it if we are going to get anywhere. But given Rorty's pragmatism, the best he can say is that the principle of charity is useful for our purposes. This diverges from the transcendental quality associated with the Davidsonian conception of charity.

The anti-essentialist version of the self is the complement to Rorty's anti-representationalism. For Rorty, instead of a unified self, there is an assortment of 'persons' within each of us, all constitutive of our identity. To isolate one of them as essential, or elevate one as most representative, is simply wrong-headed. However, in want of psychological health, Rorty concedes that certain facets of the self need to take on a leadership role. Rorty's candidate is the poet. Echoing the criticisms of anti-foundationalism, Grippe argues that Rorty's basis for endorsing the poet is merely a preference. There is 'no grounded reason' (137) to choose the poet over the politician. In addition, the poet, for all his/her creativity and autonomy, often represents a set of undesirable qualities, e.g. elitism, intolerance, selfishness. While these qualities may be permissible (even embraced) in the private realm, they are decidedly destructive in the public realm.

Grippe has succeeded in exhibiting the tensions within Rorty's bifurcated position. However, a deeper analysis of the actual move from anti-foundationalism to an impotent or precarious liberalism would enhance Grippe's thesis. It is not enough simply to follow Rorty's assertions that his liberalism is emergent out of his anti-foundationalism. In what way is it emergent? Certainly, Rorty's metaphilosophical position agrees with his liberalism, but I fail to see a necessary connection. One could accept the anti-foundationalism but still view contemporary society as benefiting from, say, critical social theory. Rorty, politically, thinks that the tools of liberal democracy are the best at our disposal. This is in stark contrast to someone who thinks that the resilience of suffering in society demonstrates the deficiency of the current toolset. This has little to do with Rorty's critique of transcendental conceptions of truth and reason.

I stated earlier that the book confronts Rorty on his own terms. This is both its blessing and its bane. While it does a fine job of teasing out the eccentricities of Rorty's position, especially with reference to the multiplist/singularist distinction, it perhaps takes a unified Rorty for granted. Nevertheless, it articulates what I take to be the central Rortyan predicament, namely the status of Rorty's metaphilosophical critique in relation both to philosophy *qua* philosophy and to the justification for liberalism. This book is essential reading for those interested in Rorty.

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Charles Guignon, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger.
2nd edition.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 454.
US$85.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-82136-0);
US$32.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-52888-7).

The Cambridge Companion series means to serve beginners, advanced students, and specialists alike. Discharging that task with Heidegger is difficult. Yet the first edition (1993) of this companion to Heidegger managed to do a decent job (cf. its favourable review by Richard Polt, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1995, 55[3]: 725–8; Polt's own *Heidegger* [1999] may be the best single-author introduction to Heidegger). The new edition retains ten chapters from the first, drops three pieces, and adds four newly commissioned essays. Guignon has also supplied a preface, updated the book's bibliography, and made minor changes to his original editor's introduction. The back cover of the paperback edition speaks of 'revised versions of several essays from the first edition'. But Guignon mentions no changes to the retained pieces, and I detected none.

The preface remarks that were Guignon 'to write an introduction to the companion today' — as he has not — 'it would certainly be different' from the one he wrote before (xxiv), if only because he is 'even less inclined than ever to think of Heidegger as an anti-realist in a strong sense' (id.). As it stands, the introduction presents the early Heidegger as holding that 'mind', 'physical objects and their causal relations', and any other 'entities taken as basic by certain regional sciences', are 'derivative', 'theoretical constructs with no privileged status in helping us grasp the nature of reality' (4–10).

It is 'the ready-to-hand world of familiar things that is real (or is "as real as anything can get")' (37n10). Indeed, Guignon takes Heidegger to maintain that, '*The* world just is the human world in its various manifestations' (14, Guignon's emphasis). Nonetheless, 'it may be useful to assume that such ['derivative'] things exist for the purposes of certain regional inquiries' (10). Further, Guignon perceives difficulties in *conflicting* manifestations and the fittingness of beings to manifest themselves to us (38n14). Thus Heidegger's work generates 'a set of puzzles about [ontological] relativism, truth, and the idea of a "thing-in-itself" ' (xxvi). While little penetrating these puzzles, Guignon's introduction is a good overview of the early Heidegger and, in its latter half, of the later Heidegger (on whom more below).

Of the retained chapters, I have found three to serve particularly well as ways into Heidegger: Dorothea Frede, 'The Question of Being'; John Caputo, 'Heidegger and Theology'; Hubert Dreyfus, 'Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics'. The other retained chapters are by Thomas Sheehan, Robert Dostal, David Hoy, Charles Taylor, Piotr Hoffman, Michael Zimmerman, and Guignon himself. Of the deleted chapters, those owing respectively to Harrison Hall and Richard Rorty are available in other collections, as the preface notes. The third omitted piece, Frederick Olafson's 'The Unity of Heidegger's Thought', is not collected, and the volume it summarises, Olafson's *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind*, is out of print. Now Olafson is one of the few to have published criticisms of the approach taken to Heidegger by Dreyfus (Olafson, 'Heidegger *à la* Wittgenstein or "Coping" with Professor Dreyfus', *Inquiry* 37 [1994] 45–64). By contrast, the influence of Dreyfus loomed large in the first edition (cf. Polt, *Heidegger*, 725); and all but one of the new chapters are by former students of Dreyfus. But each of those former students — Taylor Carman, William Blattner, and Mark Wrathall — is well known for his work on Heidegger. The new contributor who is the exception, namely Julian Young, is prominent too.

Carman's 'The Principle of Phenomenology' explores 'the broad outlines' of Husserl's influence on Heidegger, but also how 'philosophically speaking, the two thinkers remained so deeply at odds' (98). Carman argues that only a thin phenomenological principle unites Husserl and Heidegger, the principle that philosophy should not hypothesise but describe; once the principle is elaborated, Carman thinks, Heidegger diverges considerably from Husserl. This picture of the Husserl-Heidegger relation is common (compare pp. 50ff. of the Frede essay, and pp. 80–3 of the Sheehan) and indeed Heidegger's own. Other views place the two thinkers closer together (cf. Dostal's contribution to the *Companion*, and A. D. Smith, *Husserl and the* Cartesian Meditations [Routledge 2003], *passim*). Carman does allow that Husserl and Heidegger unite in their wonderment that intentionality, any kind of apprehension of things, is possible at all (114–16). One could delineate Heidegger's views more nicely here by distinguishing 'ontic' from 'ontological' 'transcendence' (see Heidegger's lectures *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, and compare p. 124 of Hall's piece in the first edition of the *Companion*). Carman's article, though, will aid the beginner.

Blattner's piece is 'Laying the Ground for Metaphysics: Heidegger's Appropriation of Kant'. Blattner examines the less inaccessible of Heidegger's two major works on Kant: the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's* ***Critique of Pure Reason***. Blattner's contribution illuminates the Kant–Heidegger relationship and stresses how important that relationship, together with the notion of *time*, was to Heidegger. Moreover, and interestingly, Blattner argues that Heidegger 'cannot demonstrate any philosophical claim to exercise unchallenged authority over the fundamental concepts of the sciences' (173). How well Blattner serves the beginner, however, is not clear. The Frede, Dostal, and Taylor pieces, while providing less on Heidegger's debt to Kant, do so more accessibly. (Those needing a *more* comprehensive treatment could see Béatrice Han-Pile, 'Early Heidegger's Appropriation of Kant', *Blackwell Companion to Heidegger*, 2004.)

Wrathall's 'Truth and the Essence of Truth in Heidegger's Thought' distinguishes three levels in Heidegger's account of truth. They are: (A) propositional or predicative truth as a correspondence to, or, better, making salient of, a state of affairs; (B) a more practical and non-predicative apprehension of things as a *condition* of propositional truth; (C) an 'unconcealment' enabling both predicative and non-predicative truth. Distinguishing A–C is useful, and true to Heidegger. But I do not find Wrathall to be as clear as he might be, especially when he comes to discuss 'essential properties'. For one thing, Wrathall generates excessively heavy weather by, at first, denying himself a version (he uses Kripke's) of the distinction between nominal and real essence. Still, Wrathall's conclusion is interpretatively plausible and interesting: '[T]he properties of a thing that we consider most important to it — the properties that determine its "essence" — are a function of the historical age' (261). Finally here: it would have been good had Wrathall to have engaged critics of Heidegger's notion of truth, such as Ernst Tugendhat.

Young's contribution, 'The Fourfold', begins by asserting an 'almost total absence' of engagement with the fourfold by Heidegger scholars. In fact, there is good work on the fourfold by Albert Borgmann, Andrew Feenburg and, indeed, Dreyfus and Wrathall. What then does Young add? He is helpful on the connotations of the words — earth (*Erde*) and sky (*Himmel*), gods (*Göttlichen*) and morals (*Sterblichen*) — that name the constitutive terms of the fourfold (*das Geviert*). Like Wrathall, and less like the others just mentioned, Young means to take the fourfold as literally as possible. True, he begins with the following glosses. 'Earth' is 'the totality of things, animal, vegetable and mineral, with which we share our world'. 'Sky' is climate. 'Mortals' are perishable human beings. The 'gods' are a reworking of the 'heroes' of *Being and Time* and are thus, roughly, exemplars of a culture's way of life. But Young proceeds to explain Heidegger's 'elevated, poetic language' (375) — language that means to suggest several things, Young avers. The fourfold is — or can and should be — a dwelling place. A dwelling place 'shows up' 'poetically', as something 'holy'. Only in such a place can one dwell in the full or emphatic sense and thereby become a true mortal. Young's account of all this is fuller than other 'literal' accounts. Or, at least, it is so when taken

as metonymic for material in Young's *Heidegger's Later Philosophy* of 2002 (to the first chapter of which Young's present piece refers the reader). It is notable that the book brings out the distinction between *normative* and *descriptive* senses of the fourfold, and a parallel distinction pertaining to dwelling, better than the present text. Arguably, however, the notion of 'showing up' remains vague even in Young's book (and I warn that the aforementioned first chapter employs textual evidence somewhat ingeniously).

Young does *try* to explicate showing up. Some of the other contributors to the *Companion* employ the notion with very little explanation. One feels that the volume as a whole leaves its difficult puzzles about truth and company underinvestigated. That said, a considerable literature on that front (or those fronts) exists already (and the preface and introduction to the *Companion* mentions some of it). However, unlike some of the retained pieces, and excepting Blattner, the new essays are rather uncritical. Further, Young's contribution is the only new chapter on the later Heidegger. Moreover, of the retained chapters, only Dreyfus' says much about the Heidegger of the 1940s onwards. Consequently, a seemingly contrary remark in the preface (xxiii) notwithstanding, the collection remains light on Heidegger's later work.

To conclude: the new material has its infelicities. The collection as a whole only slightly mitigates the first edition's marginalisation of the later Heidegger. Nonetheless the second edition achieves the following feat pulled off in the first. To an impressive extent, it manages to be useful for those fresh to Heidegger and for those already immersed. For those who own the original version, the new material has some claim to justify purchase, although in that case the price may be a little steep.

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Paul Guyer
Kant.
New York: Routledge 2006.
Pp. 453.
US$100.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-415-28335-9)
US$27.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-415-28336-6).

This valuable introduction to Kant's thought analyzes the four main dimensions of the critical philosophy: epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics. The book is divided into eleven chapters, four devoted to epistemology, four to ethics and politics (significantly, discussed as part of an inseparable whole), two to the *Critique of Judgement*, and one to Kant's philosophy of history. It surveys Kant's major insights without ever falling into oversimplification or abandoning a language accessible to non-specialists. To deal with the three critiques and the political writings in a single introduction is, in and of itself, an impressive accomplishment. Perhaps even more noteworthy is Guyer's ability to engage in authentic hermeneutical reflection as he confronts the major (and numerous) difficult turns of Kant's thought. Throughout the reader has the impression, not of being supplied with pre-determined answers, but of engaging with the author in the search for the best account of Kant's most intriguing thoughts. Many of the solutions offered in this introduction are, to be sure, ultimately those elaborated in Guyer's previous publications (*Kant and the Claim of Knowledge, Kant and the Claim of Freedom, Kant and the Claim of Taste*). Yet the reasoning leading to those solutions is neither hidden from the reader nor oversimplified, despite the introductory nature of the work.

Guyer's hermeneutical views are all ingenious and thought provoking. Let us focus on one topic obviously central to Kant's thought, transcendental idealism. Guyer reiterates the suggestion, offered twenty years ago in *Kant and the Claim of Knowledge* (1987), that we should understand Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves as a distinction between two sets of objects (the 'two world' view, as it is usually referred to). Guyer thinks that Kant relocates certain properties (space and time) from ordinary objects to representations (mental entities), just as his predecessors had done with secondary qualities, although, as Kant insists, he has done so with space and time for opposite reasons, viz. to account for the necessity of space and time as contrasted with the subjectivity of tastes, colours, sounds. Guyer's (old and new) reasons for rejecting the competing reading — the 'two aspect' view espoused by Allison and others — are as follows. (A) Guyer notes, 'one might ask why Kant would have chosen to emphasize that space and time are indispensable "epistemic conditions" of all our knowledge precisely by formulating a conception of objects that *omits* or abstracts from those conditions' (68). The very thought of objects viewed from two different perspectives, Guyer seems to think, presupposes a conception of objects that does without epistemic conditions. Such a conception, however, is incompatible with the status that the 'two aspect' view assigns to these conditions. (B) On the 'two aspect'

interpretation one finds it hard to accommodate Kant's repeated argument that if things other than representations had spatio-temporal properties, they would have them only contingently. This argument, for Guyer, clearly commits Kant to the view that no mind-independent *things* can have spatio-temporal properties (and therefore to the thesis that mathematics is about mental entities). (C) The 'two aspect' view makes it impossible for us to *be* free, as opposed to merely *conceiving of* ourselves as free, which seems to run counter to the main thrust of Kant's ethics. (D) In adopting a 'two world' view, Kant was far from inventing an abstruse new ontology. He was merely following the trend of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in which everybody (except Berkeley) saw the world as made up of two sets of objects: ordinary objects and the representations of them.

All these considerations deserve the closest attention. Here are some counterarguments coming from a defender of the 'two aspect' view. Regarding '(A)', it seems that the possibility of entertaining the thought of objects as independent of epistemic conditions is precisely why one would want to introduce that very notion: it allows us to understand how the world we experience is merely the world as we are bound to know it, given the peculiarities of our cognitive apparatus. In other words, the notion of epistemic conditions opens a conceptual space in which one can intelligibly talk of objects as independent of *our* knowledge of them. Moreover, Kant's own notion of the transcendental object ('the entirely undetermined thought of something in general') points to an object X that can become either an appearance or a thing in itself depending on whether epistemic conditions enter to determine that otherwise 'entirely undetermined' object. Regarding '(B)', it seems that Guyer begs the question against the 'two aspect' view by assuming that the objects of mathematics can be either things in themselves or mental entities. Since Kant rules out (the contingency claim) that they are things in themselves, he must mean that they are mental entities. The possibility that mathematics applies to genuine mind-independent, sensible objects is not even considered. Being able to interpret Kant as claiming just that, however, seems to be a virtue, not a limit, of the 'two aspect' view. In fact, the reading favored by Guyer commits Kant to the absurdity that mathematics and physics are about mental entities.

Regarding '(C)', although the issue is extremely complex and neither of the two hermeneutical options can claim to solve all problems, one should note that the 'two world' view is even more exposed to the criticism mentioned by Guyer than the 'two aspect' view. If freedom is attributed to the noumenal self, understood as an entity numerically distinct from the empirical self, Kant can hardly avoid the dilemma so often leveled against his theory: either freedom is located in some remote noumenal world, in which case it could not make a difference in the realm of human actions, or if it does make a difference, then its noumenal status has to be abandoned along with the idea of the unlimited applicability — see the Second Analogy — of the causal principle within the empirical world. The 'two aspect' view at least enables us to attribute to the same human subject the predicate 'free' and

'causally determined'. Moreover, through reference to Kant's idea that the practical spontaneity of humans can be thought but not experienced, it explains how these two predicates are not inconsistently attributed to the same entity. As such, it does not (and cannot) conflict with any empirical description of the self. Finally, regarding '(D)', I have attempted to show elsewhere (*Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy*) that Kant's critical period begins when he abandons the ontology Guyer rightly considers as commonplace in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and to which Kant himself still adhered in 1770.

The final outcome of this hermeneutical quarrel over transcendental idealism — and over other issues that Guyer's book will provoke — has no bearing on the quality of this book. It is by far the most complete and accurate critical introduction ever produced in the English-speaking world.

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Jean Hampton
The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.
Pp. 236.
US$70.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-85686-7);
US$26.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-67325-9).

This posthumous collection of six previously published papers covers a range of topics including the moral basis for liberal ideals, guilt and moral responsibility, self-identity and altruism, and feminist objections to liberal theory. There is also a nice forward by David Gauthier.

In 'Feminist Contractarianism', Hampton argues that feminism is well-served by a conception of contractarianism which rests upon the idea that each person has an inherent worth and equal moral status. In her words, 'I want to propose that by invoking the idea of a contract we can make a moral evaluation of any relationship, whether it is in the family, the marketplace, the political society, or the workshop — namely, an evaluation of the extent to which that relationship is just' (20). Not all versions of contractarianism can serve as the basis for a feminist conception of morality and politics. According to the Hobbesian model, morality is largely a conventional practice whose principles are treated as binding because they serve the self-interest of

agents who opt for cooperation as an alternative to conflict. Thus, 'by invoking self-interest in the way that Hobbesians do, one makes not only cooperative action but also the human beings with whom one will cooperate merely of *instrumental value*' (11-12). Against this conception, Hampton defends a feminist version of Kantian contractarian theory which rests upon a 'conception of moral worth and a conception of a person's legitimate interests' (22).

In 'Selflessness and Loss of Self', Hampton claims that most defenses of altruism are insensitive to the fact that some forms of other-regarding concern pose a threat to the caregiver's personal identity and moral health. On Hampton's view, 'not all self-sacrifice is worthy of our respect and moral commendation' (40), and thus there is a need to find a way to distinguish 'good' from 'bad' forms of other-regarding concern, where 'bad' refers to threats to the integrity of the caregiver's personal identity. One especially noteworthy feature to this paper is the way that Hampton is able to bring together ideas from virtue theory (e.g. a robust moral psychology and stronger emphasis on human flourishing than is found within the Kantian tradition) and Kantian ethics (e.g. an insistence upon the centrality of autonomy or self-authorship).

In '*Mens Rea*' Hampton argues that 'a culpable agent is one who chooses to defy what she knows to be an authoritative moral command in the name of the satisfaction of one of her wishes, whose satisfaction the command forbids' (91). This paper is striking for the way that Hampton navigates a discussion on rationality, akrasia, and responsibility, while exploring the relevance of these topics to both the moral and legal domains.

In 'Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution', Hampton both defends her expressive theory of retribution against critics and makes clear how her version of retributivism differs from traditional conceptions. Hampton claims that retributivism is well-suited to provide an account of the moral wrongs that need righting. The idea of moral injury is central to her account; the immoral actions which call for a retributive assessment are those which constitute '*an affront to the victim's value or dignity*' (115). On this view, not all harms are moral harms; 'a moral injury is an injury to what I ... call the victim's "realization of her value" ' (115). Hampton's view differs from the classical retributivism famously defended by Herbert Morris. Morris claimed that our retributive judgments rest upon the idea that the wrongdoer is a kind to free-rider (e.g. he acquires by dubious means benefits which the morally upstanding either lack or acquire by honest means). Yet this approach fails to connect our reactive attitudes to our moral disapproval of the wrongdoer's denial of the victim's equal moral status. The paper ends with a discussion of how this conception of moral injury can serve to justify the state's role in legally enforcing retributive principles.

'The Common Faith of Liberalism' has two primary aims. One is to show that liberalism is a moral framework that unifies ideas about justice, public reason, political power, and responsibility. The other is to argue against the Rawlsian idea that liberalism can be defended as a 'freestanding' as opposed to 'comprehensive' doctrine. The common faith of liberalism consists of 'five

fundamental commitments' (158). These are: 1) individual autonomy; 2) equality; 3) the state should secure freedom and equality; 4) political authority must be justified to the persons subject to it; and 5) reason is the basis for the liberal state and the political ideals it is authorized to defend (158-9). Much of the paper is devoted to showing how liberalism aims to unify these convictions within a systematic political philosophy. Moreover, Hampton insists that the moral basis for a liberal conception of justice, resting as it does on the idea of a shared capacity for reason, cannot be freestanding in the Rawlsian sense. Hampton makes clear that her objections to the idea of a freestanding liberalism do not center on a disagreement over the content to liberal ideals, but rather, on the justification offered for these ideals. 'So how should Enlightenment liberals react to Rawls' notion of public reason? I see no reason why they should not accept it so long as it is added to, and not substituted for, for their conception of reason as a mode of access to ... normative truth' (170).

In 'The Contractarian Explanation for the Emergence of the State', Hampton defends another original thesis. Drawing from recent work in rational-choice theory and analyses of social conventions, Hampton argues that a contractarian model can explain the emergence of states. This is an important topic for contractarians. David Hume and many others have argued that the very idea of a state constituted by the consent of the governed is a total fiction. Hampton tries to meet this kind of skepticism by offering a 'convention analysis' (204) of rules that create institutions and empower office holders. This account is partly inspired by an idea famously defended by H. L. A. Hart in legal theory, namely, that law is a system of rules whose status as conventions can explain a law practice. Hampton makes clear that this position aspires to explain but not justify the state's authority.

This is an excellent collection. Each essay is filled with insightful examples, some personal, others from legal cases and others still taken from philosophers' folklore. The book invites readers to learn from Hampton's important contributions to moral, political and legal theory.

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Kevin Hart, ed.
Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion.
Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press 2007.
Pp. 478.
US$40.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-268-03078-0).

In this book Hart collects several essays on the work of French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion, the majority of which grew out of a conference on Marion's work at Notre Dame University (May 7-9, 2004). Apart from essays on various topics in Marion's work, the collection also includes Marion's essay 'The Banality of Saturation', which explains and defends his notion of the saturated phenomenon. The lengthy collection, including essays from twelve contributors, many of them well-known commentators on and translators of Marion's work, is divided into five sections. It begins with a helpful introduction by Hart which provides a brief overview of Marion's work and outlines his fundamental focus and sources (especially Husserl and Heidegger).

The first section considers the context of Marion's writings. David Tracy outlines the three emphases or stages in Marion's work and evaluates its relevance for theology. He also emphasizes the essentially visual nature of Marion's discourse and challenges him to develop a 'phenomenology of the voice'. John Caputo outlines two ways of appropriating Husserl in recent phenomenology, which he sees as different manners of transgression or 'hyperbolization'. He contrasts Derrida, whom he sees engaged in a hyperbolization of desire, with Marion and the 'new phenomenologists', who instead engage in a hyperbolization of givenness. While Derrida seeks to extend the domain of intention in Husserl, Marion maximizes the realm of intuition. Caputo contends that Marion's thought is informed by a literalistic hermeneutics that forces the reader into a faith commitment instead of leaving the path of faith open. The third essay in this section, by Cyril O'Regan, comments on Marion's relationship to Hegel. O'Regan wonders why Hegel appears so little in Marion's texts, and he shows that Hegel continually reappears in the borders of Marion's texts. He sees this as particularly true of what he calls the 'theologically aspirated' works in which Hegel always remains a hidden interlocutor, especially in regard to notions of distance and transcendence. In showing how Hegel haunts Marion's texts and boundaries, O'Regan provides a rich and careful reading of several of Marion's works.

Section 2 focuses on God and Marion's notion of *l'adonné* (the 'devoted' or 'gifted'). Thomas Carlson defines Marion as a 'liberation theologian' in respect to freeing God from annihilation and nihilism. He explicates Marion's claim that the call which is received by the human self must necessarily be anonymous, and he responds to critiques that see Marion as determining such a call as always already proceeding from a divine source. Carlson emphasizes the ambivalence of the self's receptivity of the saturated phenomenon, evaluating to what extent this self constitutes a new subject that successfully ne-

gotiates the tensions between passivity and activity, humility and exaltation, reception and salvation. Emmanuel Falque carries this argument further in his selection considering the boundary between philosophy and theology in Marion's phenomenology. Unlike most critics of Marion's work, Falque insists that Marion's training in both disciplines 'ought *rightfully* authorize intersections, or even confrontations between' these disciplines (183). He reads Marion as hesitating far too much in this respect, by attempting to uphold boundaries that are no longer necessary and ought to be overcome. This section concludes with a piece by theologian Kathryn Tanner that examines Marion's task of liberating God from metaphysical limits. While she shows how Marion's work provides a tremendous resource for theology, she also finds that he does not go quite far enough because his notion of giveness remains too determined.

In Section 3 the collection turns to Marion's most recent work on love and the erotic phenomenon. Robyn Horner links Marion's thinking on love to his attempts to overcome metaphysics, and she examines how his theology and his phenomenology accomplish this in different but complementary ways. She shows especially how love constitutes a type of alternative knowledge for Marion. John Milbank presents a perhaps not altogether charitable examination of Marion's phenomenology of eros, and insists that Marion is both heretical and remains metaphysical by refusing reciprocal giving and 'analogical participation'. Claude Romano's chapter provides a useful introduction to Marion's phenomenology of eros by outlining its emphasis on love's being univocal, rational, and beyond being.

Section 4, with essays by Gerald McKenny and Michael Kessler, considers the implications of Marion's work in ethics and politics, pointing to some of the lacunae in Marion's work in this respect. McKenny shows how Marion replaces ethics or justice with love as a privileged road of access to the other, by comparing his work to that of Levinas and focusing on specific passages that demonstrate this de-valuation or even rejection of ethics. Through a comparison between Marion's and Locke's ideas, which focuses especially on a reading of Locke's idea of equality, Kessler wonders about Marion's lack of engagement with political questions. While this essay takes its inspiration from Marion's notion of the saturated phenomenon, it focuses primarily on Locke's work.

The text concludes with Marion's own text 'The Banality of Saturation' (beautifully translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky), and an extensive bibliography of Marion's work mostly appropriated (with permission) from Robyn Horner's *Jean-Luc Marion: A* Theo-*logical Introduction*. 'The Banality of Saturation' is probably the most significant of Marion's most recent writings which addresses critiques of his notion of the saturated phenomenon explicitly, and it suggests for the first time that such saturation might be both quite commonplace and in fact not as clearly and permanently distinguishable from less saturated phenomenality. By so doing the text also opens a wide door to further discussion of this fruitful topic. The essay also considers in greater detail than previously the notion of counter-intentionality.

The only omission in this otherwise very comprehensive collection, besides a brief section in Tracy's essay, is any consideration of Marion's work on Descartes. It focuses almost singularly on Marion's most recent writings in phenomenology. While that provides some cohesiveness to the otherwise quite diverse essays, it makes it difficult to shed full light on Marion's negotiation of the boundary between philosophy and theology (a recurrent theme in the collection and most readings of Marion's work), since that boundary is first outlined the most clearly and explicitly in Marion's early writings on Descartes and Pascal. In every other way, this collection contains many careful and insightful essays on Marion's thought, and is indispensable reading for anyone interested in Marion's contributions to contemporary phenomenology and theology.

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David J. Kangas
Kierkegaard's Instant: On Beginnings.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2007.
Pp. 245.
US$45.00 (cloth ISBN: 978-0-253-34859-3).

This book demonstrates how Kierkegaard's treatment of temporality problematizes idealism, particularly insofar as idealist accounts of subjectivity depend on a metaphysics of presence. But Kierkegaard does not merely launch an external attack on idealism. By reading Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous authorship alongside the writings of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling, Kangas shows how Kierkegaard's texts undertake an immanent, deconstructive critique to indicate that which eludes the grasp of the idealist subject (1). The interpretation that follows is radical, and will likely be controversial among those who are accustomed to a safer, more reasonable Kierkegaard. But a great strength of this book is the way Kangas confronts the most difficult passages in Kierkegaard — the aporetic, paradoxical passages that commentators often tend to avoid — to show how Kierkegaard undoes the idealist account of subjectivity.

Kangas organizes his argument around Kierkegaard's notion of the 'instant', which 'is the hinge on which the whole of the early authorship turns' (181). The instant is originary time, and it is irreducibly different from the *present*, because it is precisely that which cannot be brought into the transparency of conceptual presence. The instant is the time of *beginning*, and

here Kierkegaard differs from Hegel, for whom the beginning has its very *telos* in being rendered conceptually present. For Hegel, the beginning already contains the end: the meaning of reality is always already implicit within immediacy. Thus philosophy's goal is to render this meaning explicit through the mediation of conceptual re-presentation. The Kierkegaardian instant eludes this sort of systematic thinking, because subjectivity cannot recuperate it and render it present (5-6). Likewise, the instant is not the sort of time that the subject posits in a spontaneous act. Originary time is given; the self can only receive it passively. As such, its meaning is irreducible to the projects of self-understanding that the self employs. It is a transcendence that cannot be contained within the immanence of consciousness. It precedes consciousness, as a condition of its possibility.

Kangas uses each chapter to focus on one Kierkegaardian text, showing how the text is attuned to that which the subject cannot retrieve. For example, in *The Concept of Irony* Kierkegaard challenges Hegel's account of Socrates, which sees Socratic irony as a necessary moment in the historical advance toward absolute knowledge, but as a moment that needs to be sublated because Socrates ultimately fails to articulate the absolute. By contrast, Kierkegaard praises Socratic irony for preserving the irreducible difference between manifestation and essence, and thereby preserving 'transcendence rather than totality' (21). Operative here are different notions of the absolute: for Hegel, the absolute is 'the totality of ontological determinations (the "system" of the real),' but for Kierkegaard it is the *ab-solute*, i.e. 'what absolves itself of all determinations' (20).

Similarly, *Either/Or* provides a phenomenology of several experiences that cannot properly be determined by the subject. These phenomena 'do not, and cannot, constitute a proper phenomenality,' since they elude adequate conceptual presentation (51-2). Kierkegaard's inventory of such 'quasi-experiences' includes grief, melancholy, anxiety, boredom, and decision (41); what they have in common is the way they reveal the thinking subject as already subject*ed* to a prior transcendent beginning, which frustrates any attempt 'to master temporality' in a comprehensive project (46). The case of boredom illustrates this point well. Commenting on the text, Kangas writes: 'Through boredom the subject is dislodged from the position of being able to posit itself; it finds itself expelled into a process that cannot be ordered according the beginnings or endings that it posits. It finds itself pulled into time as emptiness' (62).

Another text, *De omnibus dubitandum est*, concerns the possibility of entering into philosophy through the Cartesian principle of doubt. This text draws out the aporetic nature of an absolute beginning, which would allow philosophy to 'begin with itself' in an originary moment of self-consciousness (66). Similarly, *Repetition* poses a challenge to the self-positing subject, again with regard to temporalization (95, 99). *Repetition* is one of Kierkegaard's most enigmatic texts, just as 'repetition' is one of his most enigmatic categories, and Kangas manages to give a reading that clarifies while also deepening the enigma. This is entirely fitting, however, since repetition is a figure

for the originary event of the instant; it is not the achievement of an active subject, but involves a fundamental passivity in which the subject receives time, as a gift (105). Repetition reveals that the self is not its own ground, that it is not the ground of reality, temporality, or Being. Instead, repetition indicates the ab-solute, the un-ground (*Af-grund*), the abyss that precedes and underlies the self.

This helps explain why repetition is a religious category. Repetition requires that the subject relinquish its impulse to be the absolute ground of reality. In his reading of *The Concept of Anxiety*, Kangas shows how this impulse for conceptual mastery arises from anxiety, which the self undergoes when it recognizes that it is not its own ground, i.e. that it cannot provide the ultimate justification for its existence (167). In short, the self cannot bear its own finitude, and so it posits itself as the ground of reality. This is the self-positing of the Fichtean *I*, and according to Vigilius Haufniensis, Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author, this supposedly innocent spontaneity is in fact the heart of *sin*. It is '*Eigenwille* — the will to the possession of the self' (162). The sin of idealism is characteristic of sin in general: the self attempts to posit itself as the centre and master of reality.

Kangas borrows the term *Eigenwille* from the German tradition of Christian spirituality that followed Meister Eckhart. Kangas contends that while Kierkegaard did not read Eckhart directly, he was familiar with texts and authors thoroughly informed by Eckhart's metaphysics (9), and that this heritage is important for understanding Kierkegaard's notions of sin and faith. Kangas assimilates Kierkegaardian faith to the Eckhartian notion of *Gelassenheit*, or releasement: in faith, the self surrenders its sinful will to mastery and accepts its finitude, acknowledging that it is constituted by a transcendence that precedes it and cannot be mastered within the pure presence of conceptual re-presentation. (Kierkegaard thereby opposes the errors of onto-theology, in which God becomes the means by which the subject achieves absolute status.) In *Gelassenheit*, the self 'sinks down' into the un-ground, i.e. the transcendence that it cannot master. Paradoxically, in releasing itself this way, the self 'receives everything back'. This is not a Hegelian dialectic of sublation, however, but rather the notion that for the faithful self, 'losing everything *is* its receiving everything' (194).

This proposal regarding Eckhart's influence on Kierkegaard is intriguing, and Kangas does a good job demonstrating how these early Kierkegaardian texts resonate with these Eckhartian themes. His argument is strengthened by the fact that Schelling is a significant influence in *The Concept of Anxiety*, since Schelling had acquired decisively Eckhartian influences through his reading of Jacob Boehme. However, one wonders just how much influence should be attributed to Eckhart, and how much should be attributed to Kierkegaard's Lutheranism, since his descriptions of sin and faith have strongly Lutheran resonances (cf., for instance, Luther's definition of sin in terms of the heart turned in on itself). Moreover, Luther also has great genealogical significance for the critique of the metaphysics of presence. Kangas surely recognizes this, since he opens the book by quoting Luther: 'Whoever

searches into the essences and actions of creation rather than its groanings and expectations is without doubt a fool and a blind man' (v). Beyond this epigram, however, Kangas does not include Luther in the discussion. To be sure, there are complicated and contentious issues involved here, since the relation between Boehme and Luther is a matter of scholarly debate, as is the degree of influence that German mysticism had on Luther's *theologia crucis*. Obviously one book cannot treat every issue, but as things stand Luther remains an important missing link for a full treatment of Kierkegaard's understanding of faith.

Along similar lines, the reader would be mistaken in concluding that *Gelassenheit* provides the best or fullest picture of what the faithful self looks like in Kierkegaard's overall authorship. Thankfully, Kangas never suggests that it does, since his argument focuses on the early pseudonymous authorship. A fuller portrait would also need to address some of the more explicitly Christian texts, such as *Practice in Christianity* or *Works of Love*, because these could thicken the rather thin notion of faith as *Gelassenheit*. Kangas is remarkably gifted as a close reader of Kierkegaard, so it would be interesting to see him turn his attention toward these later works. That, of course, is another day's work. As it stands, Kangas' book is a largely compelling interpretation of some of the most difficult aspects of Kierkegaard's thought, and will therefore make for fascinating and challenging reading for Kierkegaard scholars. It is also vital reading for those interested in the deconstructive critique of transcendental subjectivity, particularly those inclined to disregard Kierkegaard's contribution to such a view because of his religious orientation. In either case, this book deserves careful consideration.

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Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe
Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry.
Trans. Jeff Fort. Urbana: University of Illinois Press 2007.
Pp. 136.
US$35.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-252-03153-3).

In this book Lacoue-Labarthe (L-L) revisits the questions of the sense and possibility of philosophy and of the relations between philosophy and poetry, themes at the center of his previous work. This is done in the form of a coming to terms with Heidegger's conflictive heritage on the one hand, and with

Alain Badiou's claim that for a philosophy to be possible we need to re-enact the Platonic gesture and banish the poet from the realm of truth.

Regarding Heidegger, L-L's thesis reads at times as a culturalist rendering of the *Sonderweg* theory, the claim that, coinciding roughly with the development of Romanticism, Germany's history took a unique course, of which the Third Reich was the inevitable consequence. In L-L's version, this course is the dream 'of an entire "German Ideology" ... to invent a myth or to institute a great art' (4), to repeat the imagined Greek feast. Heidegger's short lived adventure as an agitator and intended philosopher of the Nazi movement is by far not the main issue. There is a deeper sense in which Heidegger's philosophy was attuned to the same moods that took hold of Germany in 1933. This makes the philosophy of Heidegger, including his proposal to submerge philosophy into poetry, an important vantage point to understand the difference between National Socialism and other anti-democratic movements of the 20th century (83). In this sense, claims L-L, it is true that Heidegger indeed tried to think 'the *unthought* of National Socialism', what Heidegger called at that time and even after, 'the inner truth and greatness of the Movement' (83).

This is a strong claim and a heavy challenge. If by 'unthought' we understand something like a psychoanalytical or ideological criticism, nothing of this sort is presented here. It is more likely that L-L means that, by identifying the cover-up of Heidegger's brief but not inconsequential political adventure, we may succeed in uncovering some important truths about how the most culturally gifted country in the twentieth century descended into the horrors of Nazism. L-L stresses the importance of the concept of 'beginning' (6-7), which has roots both in German Romanticism and in Heidegger's discussion of temporality in *Being and Time*, and is connected to myth and the origins of History (*Ur-Geschichte*) in the sense of a transcendental or foundational event. L-L suggests that the absolutization of poetry in Heidegger reveals a deep nostalgia for myth, and that, rather than talking about a reduction of philosophy to poetry in Heidegger, we should talk about the subordination of philosophy to the Mytheme (23). This hypothesis allows him to embark on an analysis of the destiny of poetry in German Romanticism, and of the ambiguities of the 'Earliest System-Program of German Idealism', a document attributed to Hölderlin, Schelling, or Hegel, containing many of the ideas that will play a dominant role in subsequent German culture and that 'has a political aim that will one day prove to be disastrous' (29). However, he also shows that this reading of the romantic tradition is not the only possible reading, and that a few years before Heidegger, Walter Benjamin offered a completely different one (36-7).

Further on, L-L considers in detail Benjamin's reading of a single poem by Hölderlin, which speaks about the vocation and courage of poetry (69) and which will also be interpreted by Heidegger. L-L shows that Benjamin's interpretation is the 'inverse ... but not the complete inverse' of Heidegger's (68). This is a text from Benjamin that was published posthumously, therefore the question is not of influences or polemics but of 'taking the measure' of an

epoch which is, according to the author, still very much our own. It is, says L-L, a matter of 'what poetry testifies to in attesting to itself as such ... in attesting to itself in its relation to truth, in its saying the truth ... in the mode of failure ... on the condition of admitting finally that what is testified to is the "default of God" ... or what amounts to the same thing — of our *a-theist* condition' (80). This is the opposite of what Heidegger wanted to find in Hölderlin. While Benjamin and Heidegger unknowingly stepped in the same direction and even used similar language, the latter succumbed to the temptation to make Hölderlin not a poet of poets, but a poet of Germany.

Though many of these ideas have been already developed elsewhere in L-L's work, in this book, as Jeff Fort remarks in his introduction, the author's indictment of Heidegger is 'less mitigated by ... gestures of defense' (xii) than in prior works, and L-L is also readier to find in Benjamin and in Adorno a counter reading to Heidegger's appropriation of Hölderlin and German romanticism in general.

While in his previous books L-L's main problem was how to continue to elaborate Heidegger's understanding of poetry while at the same time disengaging these insights from Heidegger's politically tainted past, in recent years he had to defend his position against Alain Baidou's demand that the question of the end of philosophy and of its subordination to poetry be abandoned, and that philosophy turn back to its original platonic foundations. L-L questions Badiou's narrow and, to some extent, self-serving delimitation of poetry (starting with Hölderlin and ending with Celan), his diagnosis of the rise of the age of poetry as a consequence of the subordination of philosophy either to science (positivism) or to politics (totalitarianism), and the credence he lends to Heidegger as the one who handed over philosophy to poetry. He summarizes his opposition to Badiou's analysis saying: 'I do not contest the notion of a suturing of philosophy, since Hegel, to one or another of its generic conditions. I am simply saying that in Heidegger this suturing occurs not with the Poem but with the Mytheme' (69). Nevertheless, in a postscript he comments that his position is not diametrically opposed to Baidou's. Both positions, he says, could 'converge', and this convergence is not only possible or probable, but seems to him 'quite real' (81).

Michael Maidan

Penelope Maddy
Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method.
New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 460.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927366-9).

'Naturalize' is a philosophical success word that is invoked more often than it is clearly understood. It can, after all, be used to capture anything conceived as having a connection (however remote) with nature itself (however defined), or with the means to gain knowledge of it (i.e., science). As a result, it is difficult to think of anything that falls definitively outside its potential scope. One indication of the difficulty in fixing the limits of that scope is the umbra of things whose status (in or out of nature) is actively under scrutiny. Logic and mathematics seem to be permanent members of that group.

In her outstanding new book Maddy presents a sophisticated and philosophically engaging account of naturalism as such, an account she considers idiosyncratic enough to warrant a distinct name (hence the title of the book), and a naturalized conception of logic and mathematics. Maddy's well known work in the area has been influential throughout the latter decades of the twentieth century. A leading theme throughout has been the attempt to make sense of the formal sciences by insisting that mathematical *practice* (i.e., how it is applied) be included as an integral part of any overall theory of the subject. As such, her work can be viewed as a formal counterpart of Ian Hacking's early '90s work in the natural sciences.

Rather than using blunt force by immediately invoking a favored account of nature and settling the formal realm amongst the furniture of the universe so conceived, Maddy adopts a more elegant approach by introducing an alter ego 'second philosopher' (SP), who begins by working her way through the development of naturalism. Beginning with the 'first philosophy' of Descartes as a baseline, she goes on to discuss Hume, Kant, Carnap, Quine and Putnam, providing a critique of each version of naturalism as she goes. By following her reactions, the reader gains, little by little, an understanding of what it is to be a naturalist in her sense of the term. In the purely critical phase, this includes avoiding metaphysical pitfalls such as inescapable skepticism (in favor of a view reminiscent of the consequent skepticism of Hume's *Enquiry*), or the kind of transcendentalism that demands recognition of completely independent levels of knowledge or reality. SP's naturalism, by contrast, is not just another philosophical point of view. As Maddy later puts it, SP 'doesn't speak the language of contemporary science "like a native," she *is* a native!' (308).

All of this is accomplished in Part 1. Part 2 consists of SP's rendering of several topics apart from their historical underpinnings. Topics covered in this phase, all having to do with truth, reference and semantics, figure prominently in Maddy's positive theories of logic and mathematics, the topics of parts 3 and 4.

Part 3, devoted to providing a naturalized ground for logical truth, begins again with reasoned advice on what to avoid. This includes psychologism of

the simple sort that treats logic as a descriptive science of the laws of thought, or equally simple inductive empiricism that attempts to read logic off regularities in our experience of the external world. What is needed instead is an account which, while avoiding such foundationalism, provides a place for the world on one hand, and how we know it on the other.

Maddy's alternative has its philosophical roots squarely in Kant's theory of judgment. In an exceptionally clear rendering of Kant's thought, she places the ground of logical truth in the discursive intellect, i.e. in receptive intuition together with spontaneous understanding. Very briefly, logical truths result from the application of rules embodied in judgments ('All oaks are trees') 'whose form is given by the corresponding form of judgment — universal categorical. Application of these rules yields (familiar) logical truths' (217).

This has the mark of a perfect solution, for it depicts logical truth as having one foot in human conceptualization, and the other in structural features of the world. But the matter cannot be left there. Kant's sense of form is primitive in comparison with our own, and — more worrisome — Kant's version of conceptualization involves a transcendental element of the variety, against which SP has already strongly inveighed on naturalistic grounds. Maddy solves the first problem by liberalizing the notion of form to include later additions, attributable most especially to Gottlob Frege. The result is an abstract model called a 'Kant-Frege' (KF) world, which is essentially a first-order model on the formal side, with matching functions on the content side. So, for instance, the logical 'if-then' is paired with the (material) ground-consequent relation.

Maddy's solution to the second problem involves bringing the KF model down to empirical ground while at the same time ridding it of transcendental taint. Is our world, she asks, a KF world? The answer must involve both physical and conceptual aspects. Her conclusion is that there are grounds on both sides for an affirmative answer.

On the physical side, naturalizing the KF model amounts to determining how modern physics accommodates elements of the model, i.e. objects, relations, dependencies, and whether nature includes states that are less than determinate (i.e. are 'fuzzy'). In an example-filled analysis of how the micro-level quantum theoretical view of the world relates to (or sometimes conflicts with) a view in which the world is populated by medium sized objects with properties, etc., Maddy again demonstrates the moves of the naturalist by rejecting demands made on purely philosophical grounds that, e.g., we choose which 'world' is the *real* one, and insisting instead that we remain on the scientific straight and narrow.

Naturalizing the conceptual side of the KF model involves considering the question whether there is empirical evidence that, on a purely biological basis (i.e. apart from conceptualization learned through e.g. the acquisition of language), our perceived world is a world of persistent, unified objects exhibiting stable properties. Drawing on a research tradition beginning with Jean Piaget and the Gestalt psychologists, but focusing primarily on more

recent behaviorist research, Maddy concludes that there is scientific warrant for the idea that our processes of object and property recognition are as they appear in the KF model.

The grand conclusion at the end of Section 3 is that our world is a KF world, and our conceptual apparatus appears to be structured in a way that maximally fits with it. It is a conclusion that will warm the hearts of logicians everywhere.

With logical truth out of the way, Maddy turns, finally, to mathematics. To further develop ideas introduced in her earlier books on the subject, she first returns to the question of how the mathematical naturalist should deal, in general, with epistemological and ontological issues in the realism vs. anti-realism debate. Focusing specifically on van Fraassen's constructive empiricism and the idea that theories provide no warrant for belief in the existence of unobservable entities, Maddy's naturalist, using the historical debate about the existence of atoms as an example, demonstrates how it is possible to settle the question (on purely evidential grounds) while avoiding purely conceptual, extra-scientific debates.

After showing how it is possible to locate the ground of elementary mathematics in the logical structure of the KF world, and after a delightful argument debunking the so-called 'miracle' of applied mathematics (i.e. the seemingly miraculous way in which mathematics fits with the laws of nature), Maddy turns to the problem of determining the proper methods of that part of mathematics that isn't elementary, i.e. of pure mathematics.

The remainder of the section on mathematics is devoted to a discussion of three approaches to the question of whether the things referred to in pure mathematics are real. The first, 'robust realism', encompasses outright Platonism of the Godelian variety, which stresses the objective, independent existence of mathematical things. SP opposes this option on the naturalistic grounds of inaccessibility. The second, 'thin realism', holds that mathematical things are real, but unlike the robust variety, ties existence to theoretical context in the manner of Putnam's internal realism. The third approach is arealism, which holds that mathematical things are not real. Maddy's conclusion is that from the point of view of mathematical practice, the latter two converge, and it is here that an acceptable conclusion lies.

The value of Maddy's account of naturalism lies in the fact that while other naturalistic theories (such as Quine's) are schematic, in the sense that they leave the details of the science involved as a blank to be filled in later, Maddy provides a top-to-bottom account that includes abstract theory, basic empirical science (both physical and conceptual), and the semantics that connect the two. At the same time — and as the subtitle indicates — the book is intended primarily as a demonstration of the manner in which naturalization is properly accomplished. That is, while the science involved may change, the process by which naturalization takes place will not.

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Lee McIntyre
Dark Ages:
The Case for a Science of Human Behavior.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2006.
Pp. 164.
US$ 24.95(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-262-13469-9).

McIntyre is a man on a mission. He has written a book which is not a monograph on the philosophy of the social sciences, but rather a manifesto and a call to arms. We must save the social and behavioral sciences in time for the social and behavioral sciences to save us! Our technologically modern world is still plagued by the ancient societal ills of crime, war, poverty, etc. However, McIntyre is convinced that with a bit of pluck and methodological purity, the human sciences can become genuinely predictive. Once that happens, human beings will be able to cure society's ills with the help of evidence-based, rational, and scientifically valid policies. Appropriately, *Dark Ages* is written with painstaking concern for clarity and is addressed to a rather broader reading public than would be usually associated with the MIT Press.

According to McIntyre, the human sciences are currently in a very sorry state. While the natural sciences have largely thrown off the shackles of cultural dogmas, research and theory-building in the social and behavioral sciences are still held back by religious and ideological prejudice. He mostly cites examples of the pernicious effects of liberal political correctness, which stymies the search for innate gender and ethnic differences (as illustrated by the reception of Herrnstein and Murray's book, *The Bell Curve*), and which blindly attacks any methodologically sound research that might undermine liberal policy dogmas (such as Gary Kleck's work on guns and violence in America). More generally, people simply try to avoid serious confrontations with ideas — such as the thesis that freedom of the will is an illusion — that challenge their fundamental human self-worth. McIntyre does not offer his own speculations on any of these emotionally-charged topics, but rather insists that we must wait upon the self-correcting process of scientific discovery to give us answers.

McIntyre further claims that the human sciences have suffered because they have failed to adopt the self-critical empiricist methodology that has propelled the natural sciences to greatness. He retells the story of the 'cold fusion' fiasco of 1989 as an example of how the validity of scientific knowledge is preserved by the constant vigilance of researchers who seek the empirical falsification of hypotheses. Unfortunately, such attempts at falsification are rarely made in the human sciences.

Some might claim that the quest for predictive human sciences faces obstacles with which the predictive natural sciences did not have to contend. McIntyre counters by employing historical examples to demonstrate that the natural sciences had to overcome the same kinds of methodological and societal barriers as face the social sciences today. Early modern physics and astronomy had to free themselves of a disciplinary mind-set which eschewed

empirical testing and sought truth through sheer intellectual speculation. The authority of Aristotle, scripture, and church doctrine blocked the way toward genuine advances. McIntyre devotes half a chapter to recounting Galileo's battle for the heliocentric model of the universe as an illustration of how the natural sciences prevailed over the kinds of biases and methodological weaknesses that still plague the social sciences today.

Another challenge comes from the philosophy of the social sciences. Some philosophers claim that it is impossible to describe human psychology in terms of the kinds of explanatory laws which make possible the scientific prediction and control of natural phenomena. McIntyre is well aware of this trend of thought; he has devoted an entire earlier book, *Laws and Explanations in the Social Sciences: Defending a Science of Human Behavior*, to the examination and critique of such claims. In what should have been the most philosophically interesting section of the book, McIntyre spends a mere fifteen pages describing and dismissing what he counts as the five major arguments made against the possibility of a predictive social science: A) The subject matter of the human sciences may appear to be overwhelmingly complex, but McIntyre assures us that the natural sciences have successfully studied complex systems. B) 'Human behavior is part of an open system' (27) and thus determined by a potentially infinite array of factors, but this claim must itself be proven, and in any case science can handle open systems. C) Critics may say that 'it is impossible to be objective about our own behavior' (28), but the natural sciences have also had to contend with illegitimate biases and interests. D) It is often impossible to perform controlled experiments in the social sciences, but that is also true of geology and astronomy. E) If people have free will, their behavior cannot be predicted. McIntyre replies that the hypothesis of human free will must itself be subjected to empirical testing.

Many academic philosophers will be disappointed by McIntyre's short list of objections and his quick treatment of them. However, it must be said in his defense that this is a book intended for a lay audience, and that a fuller version of his arguments can be found in his earlier publications. Leaving those philosophical issues aside, a few other aspects of the book remain troubling. McIntyre over-dramatizes the policy failures of modern western societies. We simply do not suffer from many of the ancient social problems: people do not die of famine in western democracies, the rule of law is generally respected, people can travel across the countryside without fear of bandits, and illiteracy has been largely eradicated. McIntyre's treatment of contemporary religion, including the surprising claim that 'it is an empirical question whether God exists' (54), is weak and seems out of place. Perhaps this was an attempt to hitch his agenda to the neo-secularist bandwagon? (Sam Harris contributed a complimentary blurb to the book's back cover.) He also seems unconcerned about the danger that, once armed with purportedly rigorous human sciences, governments might be tempted to interfere more deeply in the lives of citizens — for their own good, of course. Unfortunately, determination of the proper balance between social utility and individual freedom is not a problem

that even a genuinely predictive social science would be able to solve on its own.

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George Monbiot
Heat: How to Stop the Planet from Burning.
Toronto and New York: Doubleday 2006.
Pp. 304.
US$22.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-385-66221-5);
US$23.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-385-66222-2).

Though not technically a philosophy text, this is a must-read for eco-philosophers. Providing persuasive arguments for both the reality and reversibility of climate change, Monbiot demonstrates the necessity of empirical data for more abstract philosophical debates in environmental ontology and ethics. For such a thoroughly researched account, it is engaging — even the section on cement is not as dull as Monbiot warns. This is because he is the best kind of cynic: witty while scathing, disillusioned yet hopeful, giving no quarter to the conciliatory. His qualified optimism — anthropogenic climate change is not yet run-away, and a nation that stops contributing need not look like a 'very poor, third-world country' (xv) — is encouraging because not naïve, but strategic. He cradles a new-born (Hanna, of the dedication?) while finishing the manuscript. Though not explicitly thematic, inter-generational justice provides justification for resistance to apathy in the face of cognitive dissonance and denial. Relentlessly demanding balanced argument and analysis — he sounds fair-minded and credible — Monbiot the human being remains present throughout the book to counter the dryness of intellectual rigour. Neither politician nor businessman, he promotes a slightly more convenient truth. That is, Monbiot provides the next logical step after Gore's popularization of climate change science: reducing carbon emissions by 90% by 2030 is technologically and economically possible, and the only sacrifice is air travel.

The book's main body consists of an introduction providing a rationale for the book, eleven chapters, and a list of organizations campaigning to reduce climate change. 20% of the book is small-print endnotes that scrupulously document sources — this is a reference text as well as a lay-person accessible narrative (though one cannot search by source, as the index covers only the main text). Each chapter is prefaced by a quotation from Marlowe's *Doctor*

Faustus, and Chapter 1 describes fossil fuel use as a Faustian pact. Chapter 2 exposes a well-resourced denial industry that mastered strategies like doubt-mongering (generating controversy to obscure scientific consensus) and astro-turfing (making corporate agenda look like grass-roots concerns).

Chapter 3 is entitled 'A Ration of Freedom', and Monbiot later notes that the climate change campaign is odd insofar as the fight is for less freedom, not more (215). He argues, while refuting economic defenses of inaction, that the decision to fight climate change must be moral not economic, and he uses distributive justice to analyze both lived consequences of climate change and costs of addressing it. This chapter best treats social and ethical issues concerning disproportionate impacts on North and South, and rich and poor, of climate change, and inequities with respect to adaptation strategies. One gets the sense that Monbiot absolutely understands the costs of climate change to the world's poor, but cannot treat issues of justice and human suffering until he shows it is not inevitable.

Chapters 4 through 10 show how proposed emission reductions are possible in various contexts: the home, energy (separated into chapters on electricity, renewables and micro-generation), transport, and two industries (retailing and cement). The only context in which necessary reductions are not possible is aviation — bad news: 'love miles' are out. (Like many, I suspect, however, most of my air travel is 'work miles'. It might be useful here to know if the issue is really long-distance family.) The conclusion debunks false, sometimes risky, promises: unproven technologies (seeding oceans with iron, clouds with seawater, and chemical scrubbers), peak oil as a market self-regulator, and the easy consumer out of buying carbon offsets.

The foreword to the Canadian edition might raise Canadian hackles — 'one of the most polluting nations on earth' (xiii)! — unless one knows, for example, of Canadian efforts to undermine international policy debates, or that Canada's increase in carbon emissions is the second largest globally over 1990 rates. Monbiot has researched well, but the foreword is inadequate for evaluating Canadian adaptation strategies. The chapter on housing, for example, may not generate insights transferable to Canada, where both climate conditions and development history are radically different from Britain. Yet Monbiot has shown what useful analysis and functional policy might look like, and it is up to Canadians to follow suit.

Non-scientists, especially those encountering these issues in detail for the first time, will find the argument convincing and the book educational (meticulous detailing of calculations in footnotes can be skipped if you trust Monbiot's math, with which I find no fault). Experts can enjoy the marshalling of data and analysis into unique, coherent and comprehensive argument across research specializations. Philosophers in particular should be stimulated, even unnerved, by the challenges this book poses to the epistemological usefulness of objectivity, to the function of empirical data and inter-disciplinary research in philosophical reflection, and to the role of philosophy in global change toward sustainability and environmental justice. This book clearly demonstrates that if academic philosophers remain isolated from global pol-

icy issues of pressing consequence, the philosophical work will still be done, just by others.

This is a fine book that popularizes a pressing issue in a call to action. Industry is too busy protecting its own interests, and politicians will not respond to the urgency of the situation until citizens make climate change an election issue. So, bottom-line: people in the first world need to force politicians to regulate industry and generate sustainable energy, transport and housing policy. In his final pages, Monbiot makes excellent sense of political paralysis, both for individuals and at the level of policy. For each of us, either climate change is worth fighting because it is not too late, or we should become so depressed 'that [we] stay in bed all day, thereby reducing [our] consumption of fossil fuels' (xxv). Concerning politics and policy? As I write, the sun sets in a small village in northern Ghana that has just experienced drought followed by devastating flooding. Unlike Faust's pact, anthropogenic climate change commits others to hell. Even if mass extinction can be averted by stabilizing emissions, the cost in human suffering is already being paid. Depression is a luxury for which many of us have no time.

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Davide Panagia
The Poetics of Political Thinking.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2006.
Pp. 177.
US$74.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8223-3706-5);
US$21.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8223-3718-8).

The thesis of Panagia's book is refreshingly straightforward: 'aesthetic accounts of representation structure our understandings of how political representation works' (4). Put differently, insofar as both appeal to sense experience as the ground of value, political language is aesthetic language. Political thought is implicitly poetic. It is not entirely clear whether Panagia means that political thinking is *intrinsically and essentially* poetic or that it has *historically and contingently* tended to be poetic. Though the former seems closer to the overall sense of Panagia's study, this is neither made explicit nor rigorously defended. In fact, Panagia seems unconcerned with defending either of these possible positions. Instead, his work offers an extended elucidation and justification of a poetics of political thinking.

Panagia's poetics of political thinking points to 'the coincidence of aesthetic and moral conceptions of value' (5). With this in mind, his position, though substantively quite different, bears some resemblance to the intellectual historical work of Charles Taylor (and perhaps implicitly Leo Strauss), for whom the history of thought itself can be conceptualized as a shift from mimetic to poetic frameworks of meaning (see, for instance, *Sources of the Self* and *Malaise of Modernity*). However, Panagia also means something potentially more derisive, placing him much closer to the critical theoretical tradition of Adorno, Lukacs and Benjamin. According to Panagia, 'principles of aesthetic criticism may be successfully championed for political critique' (5). In other words, Panagia presumes at once to uncover something about political thought (whether historical or substantive), and to offer analytic means by which politics and political common sense can be exposed, challenged, disrupted and perhaps overturned. Like his friend Jacques Rancière (and Rancière's friends Alain Badiou and Etienne Balibar), he attempts to occasion a militant political theorizing.

The body of Panagia's text includes four chapters, each of which presents a hermeneutic of the history of political thought intended to expose the often overlooked aesthetic dimension of this history. The topics of these four chapters are: 1) Hobbes' political science as a politics of the spectacle; 2) Deleuze's positive conception of negativity and ethics of the problem; 3) the so-called liberal-poststructuralist debate with emphasis on Rawls and Rancière; and 4) the limitations of Habermasian rational political justification in contrast with a political model of contradiction and contrast derived from William Hazlitt's essays. With more or less success — e.g. the chapter on Hobbes is wonderfully illuminating whereas the chapter on Deleuze strikes one as out of place — each chapter provides close readings aimed at exposing the underlying poetics in political thought and theory. In some sense, Panagia exposes these dimensions in order to revive the blurriness of political discourse and action. His work illumines by problematizing.

Panagia has written an insightful and provocative book. Though not uncharted territory, he provides a relevant and fruitful analysis of the aesthetic dimensions of political judgment. His reinterpretations of key political figures can only improve the quality of future scholarship and bridge existing ideological divisions. For instance, though I'm not convinced there actually is much of a liberal-poststructuralist debate — in my experience, they tend to keep a comfortable distance from each other — the pairing of Rawls and Rancière may help to correct that. Nonetheless, this book is also disconcerting for several reasons.

First, though Panagia insists on the coincidence of aesthetic and political judgment, he ends by privileging the poetic. His claim that political thinking assumes an aesthetic dimension does not admit to privileging the aesthetic over the political, yet Panagia's execution does so by treating the aesthetic as the model for the political. If the poetic and political are concurrent, neither can adequately serve as a model for the other. We can grant Panagia's point that the structure of both judgments is rooted in experience (which is

the original sense of the aesthetic), without granting that aesthetic and political judgments are identical or even substantively alike, let alone that one subtends the other. After all, the objects about which we make judgments in these two fields are presumably different, and if they are not different then some account, missing from Panagia's study, will have to be made to show that. Surely there is a similarity between the judgments, 'X is beautiful' and 'Y is just', but this similarity rests on the nature of empirical judgment itself, e.g., predicating some property of an object. As such, structurally, both judgments are also similar to the uninteresting statement of fact, 'Z is blue'. What is important and interesting for political and aesthetic thought is the nature of X and Y and the extent to which the judgments we make about them are or are not accurate. That political judgments have been and/or are poetically infused is interesting, but it does little to help us with the more pressing political concern: is Y just or not, and why?

Panagia hasn't necessarily committed himself to any essentialist claims about political judgment. His view is that attention to the implicit and sometimes hidden aesthetic dimensions of political judgment and speech might come to illumine political life itself. As such, he might (at least officially) be able to sidestep the first problem. However, a second problem emerges. Panagia's interpretive work is ostensibly compelling. Hobbes' political science may indeed betray aesthetic dimensions; Deleuze may indeed present a politically relevant account of negativity; Rawls and Rancière may indeed both display an implicit commitment to Kant's and/or Burke's sublime; Hazlitt and Habermas may indeed present competing and significantly contrasting views on justification. That's all fair enough. The concern is: why should it follow that attention to the aesthetic is politically expedient here and now? That Hobbes, for instance, assumes aesthetic imagery does not mean that political judgment and thought *must* or *should* assume such imagery. In effect, the problem is that Panagia has provided explication — good explication — but has produced little evidence to support his implicit and explicit preference for a poetics of political thought here and now. His work is exciting; however, the care of close reading is too often not extended to argumentation. In the end, Panagia overextends his own judgments without sufficient support.

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Aaron Preston
Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion.
New York: Continuum 2007.
Pp. 192.
US$110.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-9003-2).

The last two decades have seen the publication of many new books about analytic philosophy — not just about its treatment of particular topics, but about the analytic movement as a whole. Some of these books are histories: Scott Soames' magisterial *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century* is probably the best-known example. Others, such as Bruce Wilshire's *Fashionable Nihilism*, are critiques. They claim that analytic philosophy is fundamentally misguided in some way, and that we would do well to transform it or move beyond it. Preston's book is both a history and a critique. It argues that contemporary analytic philosophy is in crisis, and it sheds light on this crisis by tracing the movement's history. The details of Preston's story will not convince everyone. But the general picture he offers makes an important contribution to our understanding of the movement.

Preston starts by suggesting that analytic philosophy today is experiencing an identity crisis. It dominates the English-speaking world, and it claims to provide standards for determining what counts as good philosophy. But there is a growing dissatisfaction with it. Some critics worry about an 'existential gap' (25) between the narrowly technical work done by many analytic philosophers and the larger concerns of ordinary human life. Another and perhaps more pressing concern is that the nature of analytic philosophy is not understood, not even by its practitioners. Most of us *think* we know what analytic philosophy is. It began, or so the story goes, in the early twentieth century with Russell and Moore. Influenced by Frege, these figures broke with the idealism then dominant in British universities, and devised a new type of philosophy based on a 'linguistic turn' — an insistence that 'philosophy is largely or wholly a matter of linguistic analysis' (31). They suggested that many traditional philosophical problems are pseudo-problems arising from the careless use of language, and they preferred narrowly focused work to the construction of comprehensive philosophical systems. But according to Preston, this 'traditional conception' (31) is wrong. It is not just that the methods favored by Russell and Moore are no longer used by the analytic philosophers of today. Even in the movement's earliest stages, there was *never* a consensus that philosophy is 'largely or wholly a matter of linguistic analysis' (31). So what *was* analytic philosophy, and what *is* it? We lack answers to these questions. Analytic philosophy 'dominates the profession, but no one can say what it is. It has conferred its own standards upon the philosophical profession, but no one can say just what those standards are' (26). How could the school have become dominant despite failing to understand itself?

Preston's answer is that, from the beginning, analytic philosophy has been based on an illusion. Analysis is not and never has been a single method. The philosophers we think of as practicing this method have never been unified

enough to deserve the name of a school. They came to be seen as one because of choices made by a handful of influential philosophers in early twentieth century Britain. These philosophers chose to treat a diverse body of work as more unified than it really was. They also chose to depict this work as more plausible than it really was, and to ignore certain obvious difficulties that it raised. Preston calls the first decision the '*illusion of unity*' (82). By the 1930s, the myth had spread that Russell, Wittgenstein, Strawson, and others were engaged in a common practice: analysis. In fact, these figures disagreed radically about what analysis is and what it produces. Preston refers to the second decision as the '*illusion of promise*' (82). It finds expression in the willingness of these philosophers to embrace certain metaphilosophical principles — such as the verification principle of meaning — even while recognizing that these principles are self-defeating. But why did analytic philosophy come to be seen as more unified and more promising than it actually was? Preston argues that these illusions caught on because of an unquestioned assumption at work in British philosophy of the early twentieth century. This assumption is 'scientism', or 'the view that knowledge can be obtained best or only via the methods of modern science' (124). Scientism is not a theory. It is an unconscious resolve to 'model philosophy after science' (133), and to take scientific thinking as a paradigm for how philosophy ought to proceed. It is the belief that only disciplines with empirical objects and methods deserve to be taken seriously. This belief is the source of the illusion of unity. Analytic philosophy came to be seen as a single movement because those who studied it paid attention only to its empirical character. To put it crudely, all analyses *looked* the same, and for the scientistic mindset, this is all that matters. Analysis came to be seen as a single method because of a habit of 'focusing on the empirical features of the practice rather than the ideas that informed it' (121).

Scientism is also responsible for the illusion of promise. In early twentieth century Britain, it was common to assume that any legitimate academic discipline must resemble empirical science. By this standard, British philosophy prior to Russell and Moore fared badly. The absolute idealism then in vogue looked decidedly unscientific, while the introspective study of the mind invented by Locke was challenged by 'the rise of psychology as a separate science' (151). To appear respectable, philosophy had to find a new subject matter — one that would be 'unique among the sciences' (148). It found this subject matter in language. Language is empirically observable, and the analytical techniques employed by Russell and Moore seem to allow 'symbols to be manipulated with the mechanistic precision of a mathematical calculus' (151). It is no surprise that a pseudo-school supposedly defined by linguistic analysis looked appealing in early twentieth century Britain. To this scientistic culture, 'anything approximating the Newtonian paradigm in any field would have seemed promising' (151). Preston's point is that the rise of analytic philosophy was not a philosophically informed development, but the result of an unarticulated bias. Furthermore, this bias is objectionable. The rise of the new philosophy is bound up with an unreflective embrace of

science and an unquestioned belief that it serves as a model for all types of thinking. To the extent that there is such a thing as analytic philosophy, it is rooted in 'a dogmatic posture that is out of step with traditional philosophical ideals and aspirations' (129).

There is much to admire in this book. It is beautifully written, and it draws on discoveries from an impressive range of fields. Preston finds instruction in metaphilosophy and the sociology of philosophy as well as in the latest scholarship on the history of early analytic thought. He makes an important contribution simply by bringing work from these disparate fields together. The book's vocabulary is not always as precise as Preston wants it to be. For example, he insists that we must sharply distinguish philosophical *schools* from philosophical movements and traditions (60). But he gives only a vague characterization of what distinguishes them, and later goes on to speak of the 'analytic tradition' (124) despite his earlier insistence that analytic philosophy is really a school. That said, Preston makes a compelling case that analytic philosophy has never been as unified as we usually assume. He also argues convincingly that our failure to see this results from biases that are largely unphilosophical. What remains unclear is whether the problems he documents are unique to analytic philosophy. It seems likely that the illusions of unity and promise surface in other philosophical schools as well —perhaps *all* philosophical schools. Consider the movement known as existentialism. We use this label to refer to a well-known group of thinkers, even though there is no one doctrine they all share. In doing so, we are choosing to emphasize certain aspects of their work and not others, probably as a result of unconscious bias. This is not surprising. It is just the price we pay for speaking of schools, movements, or traditions in the first place. As soon as we refer to several different philosophers as a school, we are accepting an illusion, and to that extent, we are ensuring that the school will one day be in crisis. This is not to deny that analytic philosophy (whatever it is) faces real problems. But we may need to think harder about which of these problems are unique to it, and which accrue to schools, movements, and traditions as such.

Preston has not said the last word about the history and the problems of analytic philosophy. But he has made important discoveries about it, some of which are genuinely troubling. Future histories will have to take his discoveries seriously.

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Nicholas Rescher
Epistemetrics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 124.
US$69.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-86120-5).

This book concerns the science of measuring knowledge. It also deals with the limits of human knowledge-acquisition. Rescher distinguishes between information and knowledge, and proposes that ever-increasing amounts of information produce ever decreasing rates of knowledge growth.

One idea presented in this regard is that knowledge is logarithmically related to information. '[L]etting K[*I*] represent the quantity of knowledge inherent in a body of information *I* of size #I, we have K[*I*] = log #I.' A related idea presented by Rescher is the Kantian one that knowledge must have a systemic structure. Kant argues that knowledge only comes once an item of cognition is related to the whole of one's system of cognition. This suggests that new items of information must be related to past knowledge claims for the items of information to count as knowledge. One must place any potential item of knowledge at a proper level of nesting within the nested aggregate.

With this emphasis on knowledge-acquisition as involving an almost-fractal like selection of level within microstructure, and with many of Rescher's comments concerning the growing difficulty of making great advances in scientific research, the implication is that, when it comes to the task of shared scientific pursuit of knowledge, priority must be given to the established structure of knowledge claims. For obviously these claims must have some great role in determining how we understand the place of new items of knowledge within the total structure. Time's arrow exists, as it were, even in the realm of knowledge. Old facts are in some way more significant than new ones, because the old facts will on average more powerfully shape how we see the aggregate. This again raises the spectre of diminishing returns: the true glory of scientific creation lies with the Aristotles and Newtons of our world, while we epigones face an ever more difficult task as we attempt to push science to truly new heights. Still, one must wonder if Rescher has indeed made the case for his logarithmic view, or for his particular usage of Kant. Kuhn is mentioned, but it is not clear that Rescher had the time available in this slim volume to properly answer those who take a view of science that gives greater emphasis to radical, incommensurable breaks with established paradigms.

Rescher also looks to the Kantian idea of system in order to develop a potential means of measuring knowledge. If we think of knowledge as system along Kantian lines, argues Rescher, then we can imagine a set of perfected textbooks of knowledge, each with their own chapters, sections, paragraphs, etc. Cognitive importance is indicated via placement relative to these textbook demarcations. In other words, a fact such as 'Water is H_2O' would deserve something more like a chapter heading in the relevant perfected textbook, while a fact such as 'The water in Lake Mapourika is polluted with CO_2

at level x' would deserve something more like a paragraph. There would be more knowledge found in the former fact or claim than in the latter.

This idea of perfected textbooks is a strange one for the Anglo-Saxon world, perhaps, but conceived of along Franco-German lines it makes more sense — given the traditional interest of the German scientific community in both measurement and hierarchy, and the traditional interest of French academia in offering exact, encyclopedic coverage (not to mention French academic interest in precise hierarchy). Indeed, it seems clear that Rescher is contemplating the completion of Diderot's *Encylopedia* project, and also of Leibniz's project — the second receives explicit mention. One also thinks of Hegel's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophysical Sciences*, with this notion of a 'perfected' textbook — something perhaps akin to the Hegelian Encylopedia at the point of Absolute Knowing.

Another standard for measuring knowledge that is mentioned is that of *space allocation* in perfected textbooks, which again raises the question of how we are to determine what would count as such a textbook, and how we are to apply this standard absent possession of such a textbook. One can say that, in a perfected textbook, more knowledge is contained in a passage that occupies more space than is contained in a smaller passage, or than is contained in a passage of the same size in a non-perfected-textbook. But is it even permissible to speak of a perfected textbook, given that different communities have different epistemic needs and thus will likely have different standards for what counts as proper coverage of a given scientific area? But perhaps all that is indicated by the existence of these differing standards in this case is that different communities will have different standards for measuring knowledge, as they look to different ideals of perfected textbooks.

A third standard for measuring knowledge mentioned is that of *citation linkage*, which is understandably cast as a relative notion: one cannot judge the value of a work simply by the total number of other works citing it, but rather must look to see whether the work in question is cited by other works of high quality. This standard takes us back to the situation mentioned above relative to Kant: more established works have greater importance, as they would seem to have to provide, as it were, the *axios protos* for citation linkages. However, since the ultimate standard that Rescher proposes with regard to citation linkage is that of number of citations *as multiplied* by the number of times the citing works are in turn cited themselves, one supposes, depending on the exact procedure used for computing the citation linkages scores, that pure merit might win out in the end by this measure. That is to say, new works that are cited very often — say, simply by each other in some type of logrolling-in-our-time incident — would eventually be counted by this measure as containing more knowledge than older works which are not cited as often by well-cited works.

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Nicholas Rescher
Error: On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 2007.
Pp. 126.
US$29.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8229-4327-3).

Rescher is the author of approximately 100 books of philosophy and an even larger number of articles on subjects ranging from symbolic logic, to ethics, pragmatism, Arabic philosophy, and much else in between. So it is perhaps unsurprising that this little book of conceptual analysis on the nature of error, comprised of ninety-eight short pages plus endnotes, draws heavily on his previous output. Readers familiar with Rescher's work may see this book as yet another thread added to his wider, systematic tapestry. The uninitiated will likely find the book suggestive in places but thin on details.

In the preface Rescher tells us that recent epistemology has focused on knowledge of the truth at the expense of 'the dark side of the issue' (ix), namely, the fact that we get things wrong and do so in all sorts of ways. Since error is all-too-human, it is important we understand it. Rescher also holds that by examining the concept of error we gain insight into various other epistemic and normative issues.

In Chapter 1, 'The Ways of Error', Rescher distinguishes three basic types of error: 1) cognitive error or failure to attain correct beliefs; 2) practical error or failure in regard to the objectives of action; and 3) axiological error or mistakes in evaluation. The bulk of the book is concerned with addressing these three types of error. Rescher also distinguishes between errors of omission, also known as 'type I errors', and errors of commission, known as 'type II errors'. This distinction applies to cognitive error and practical error, but not to evaluative error. In general, errors of omission are 'failures to accept true facts in the cognitive case and failures to do what is circumstantially required in the practical,' whereas errors of commission 'lie in accepting falsehoods in the cognitive case, performing counterproductive actions in the practical' (10). Rescher notes that there is a trade-off between these two types of error. If we seek to avoid errors of omission then we increase errors of commission, and vice versa.

No doubt much of this will sound familiar. Although Rescher sets his attention on the concept of error, the points he emphasizes and the implications he draws are fairly standard themes in epistemology. For instance, in the second chapter, 'The Dialectic of Ignorance and Error', we are told that 'we must come to terms with the fact that ... at the scientific level of generality and precision, *each* of our accepted beliefs *may* eventuate as false and *many* of our accepted beliefs *will* eventuate as false' (26). Several times Rescher repeats the assertion that humans are fallible inquirers (e.g., 2, 18, 38, 66). In Chapter 3, 'Scepticism and the Risk of Error', he argues that the radical scep-

tic holds a standard of justification that paralyzes the pursuit of knowledge. In Chapter 4, 'Error and Oversimplification', he argues that while economy and simplicity are virtues for scientific inquiry, they inevitably lead to errors of omission, conflation, and confusion; and while we might wish things were otherwise, such is our predicament given our finite cognitive powers and an immeasurably complex universe.

In Chapter 5, 'Error and Morality', Rescher's claims are somewhat more controversial. He asserts that 'moral error is a version of practical error' (69). What distinguishes it from non-moral practical error is not a failure to achieve '*chosen* aims and objectives but rather the impeding realization of that situationally mandated objective of a proper care for the best interests of our fellows' (69). This sounds rich but the reader is left uncertain what it amounts to since Rescher does not elaborate. What is clear is that this view of moral error as (a form of) practical error leads Rescher to reject William Clifford's views on the ethics of belief. He denies that epistemic error is ever unethical. For Rescher, individual lapses of rationality 'do not violate the valid claims of others' (74). In other words, acting rational is not something we morally ought to do, though we might have other sorts of reasons for avoiding epistemic error. Despite Rescher's claims to the contrary, it seems an open question whether or not being cognitively rational is itself part of the best interests of our fellows and not merely instrumentally valuable. Rescher offers few reasons for his position and instead refers us to his 1969 work *Essays on Philosophical Analysis* (78).

In Chapter 6, 'Error and Metaphysics', Rescher draws a connection between error and 'metaphysical realism'. While the existence of error might seem like something secondary, for Rescher the 'very idea of error commits us to a reality that differs from what it is thought to be and thereby requires a robust conception of reality' (80). He supports this claim by first citing Royce's argument that we cannot be wrong in our assertion that error exists: the assertion is necessarily true. But if error exists, he claims, 'realism is home free' since 'for error to obtain — for a judgment to be untrue of the object — means that the object's actual condition is not as the judgment claims it to be, which, of course, requires an actual condition to realize this situation' (82). While this argument might be sound, Rescher does not explain what he means by a robust conception of reality. Nor is it clear why, for example, a Cartesian solipsist couldn't accept this argument. Thus, the kind of 'reality' required by the recognition of error may turn out to be extremely weak rather than robust.

Chapter 7 briefly mentions how some of the ancients, moderns, and contemporary figures thought about the concept of error; and the final chapter, which is under two pages, lists some of the 'ramifications' of error in the areas of philosophy and theology. The book concludes with the thought that 'the dictum "to err is human" is profound in its implications' (98). I close by noting that while this dictum might be true, one of the more mundane implications is exemplified by the surprising number of errata this book contains. There is, for example, a reference to a book not listed in the bibliography

(34), a number for an endnote that does not exist (45), a quote with no citation (45), and a few typos (99). To err is human indeed!

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Ronnie J. Rombs
Saint Augustine and the Fall of the Soul: Beyond O'Connell and his Critics.
Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press 2006.
Pp. 256.
US$64.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8132-1436-8).

The history of Augustine studies over the past century and a quarter has something of the character of a huge tsunami sweeping over his works. The wave consisted in the rapidly increasing discovery that much of what this great 'Father of Western European Christendom' had to say was contained in, and derived from, the non-Christian, neo-Platonic texts of Plotinus. At the peak of this wave, from the 1960s until his death in 1999, was the figure of Robert J. O'Connell, who taught in the Philosophy Department at Fordham University.

Steeped as he was in the work of the French 'rediscovery' of Plotinus — and in particular through his thesis advisor at the Sorbonne, Henri-Irenee Marrou — O'Connell focused on evidence in Augustine's early works (*Confessions*, *De Genesi contra Manachaeos*) suggesting that, shortly before, and for many years after his conversion, he held to a strictly Plotinian notion that the soul existed before the body and fell into bodily life as the result of its sin ... the *tolma* of wanting all for itself. This fall was also the ontological cause of every being that was less than the soul. For Plotinus and, O'Connell implied, for Augustine too, the correction was for the soul to escape from body and to seek a way back from its individuated existence to the One from which it had originated.

Later on O'Connell concluded that the works from the middle period of Augustine's writing show him rejecting this theory that the soul fell into body. That view of the soul turned out to be incompatible with certain positions which, O'Connell held, came to the fore as Augustine matured in his study of the Bible — especially as he came to appreciate the force of texts like *Genesis* (1), which claim that the corporeal and multiple aspects of creation are good and belong to the divine *plan* rather than being consequences of the

soul's *sin* in turning away from the One, and like *Romans* (9:11), which insist that the soul can do neither good nor bad prior to its life in the body. But the tale does not end there.

Towards the end of his life O'Connell started to discover, in writings from the last period of Augustine life, that Augustine had *returned* — although in a more subtle form — to a Plotinian notion of the fall of the soul. In the *On the Trinity* and the *City of God*, O'Connell claims, Augustine uses Plotinus' 'common-proper' distinction which had been developed as an explanation of the fall of the soul, i.e. it fell from a common unity into the multiciplicity of our private or 'proper' — the Latin is *propria* — lives. Augustine adopted this Plotinian distinction to account for our unity with Adam. It justifies our common punishment with him at the hands of God, as against the Pelagian claim that we have no share in Adam's guilt. With it, O'Connell thinks, the Plotinian fall of the soul came back into Augustine's teaching.

Rombs' little book is divided into two parts. The first provides an invaluable service to students in its lucid and sympathetic account of the development of O'Connell's important and rolling arguments that, while often tortured, seemed to sweep everything in front of them. For this alone the book is worth having. But then, in the second half, Rombs goes much further and joins the many critics of O' Connell who have argued for a less uncompromisingly Plotinian understanding of Augustine's work. Here he moves the scholarly argument forward at least one notch — laying the groundwork for a less oppositional structure than the 'Plotinus *or* Christianity' framework in which O'Connell worked throughout his life. Rombs does this chiefly by his sensitivity to the *context* in which Augustine's work developed. He understands, as O'Connell did not, that, while the words and general concepts Augustine uses may be similar to, or even identical with, those of Plotinus, this does not require that they have the same sense.

He makes this point brilliantly by showing how Augustine's supposed return to the Plotinian notion of the fall of soul in his later works was really in no sense 'faithful to Plotinus'. Granting that Augustine continued to use the neo-Platonic imagery and vocabulary, Rombs shows that he set it to a totally different and thoroughly Christianized purpose. The fall of the soul was not the ontological and cosmogonic cause of all things under itself that it was for Plotinus. Instead, it became, for Augustine, a psychological account of the soul's abandonment of God — a '*psychology* of sin'. Most importantly, Rombs' argument provides a convincing account of why Augustine could leave the question of the origin of the soul unanswered at the end of his life. Unlike Plotinus — who *needed* the fall of the soul to explain the universe apart from the primal hypostases of the One, Thought, and Soul — the question of the soul's origin and fall were significant to Augustine 'only to the extent that they were needed to explain the problem of original sin and guilt.' As soon as he found a way to answer these on different grounds — psychological rather than ontological — 'the question of the soul's origin became for the later Augustine merely a matter of natural scientific or philosophical inquiry' (212-13). It was not important.

Rombs surveys the scene after the tsunami has passed. He begins to lay the lines of a reconstruction of Augustine studies which will neither have the exclusivity of O'Connell's neo-Platonic interpretation nor be a return to things as they were before the wave. We can hope that someday he will bring his talents to a similarly nuanced reconsideration of O'Connell's too one-sided estimate of the neo-Platonism of Augustine's early work, especially in the *Confessions*.

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Stewart Shapiro
Vagueness in Context.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 240.
US$70.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928039-1);
US$35.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-954478-3).

Shapiro states the following aim for his new book, a highly innovative contextual account of vagueness: 'The purpose of this work is to develop a philosophical and a formal, model-theoretic account of the meaning, function, and logic of vague terms in an idealized version of a natural language like English' (vi). Criticism aside, he successfully accomplishes what he intends to develop. Yet the book itself is aimed at neither students nor newcomers to the field, as was for example *Vagueness: A Reader* by Keefe and Smith (1999) or *Theories of Vagueness* by Keefe (2006). Rather, it is directed mainly at researchers and graduate students who already have considerable insight into the subject matter. Although the book is rather repetitive in its examples, somewhat dry to read, and doesn't give the reader much motivation and defense for the proposed account, logicians will love the book because of its formalism.

Shapiro advances the following key thesis: 'The main feature of the present account is that the extensions (and anti-extensions) of vague terms ... vary in the course of a conversation, even after the external contextual features, such as the comparison class, are fixed. A central thesis of the view is that, in some cases, a competent speaker of the language can go either way in the borderline area of a vague predicate without sinning against the meaning of the words and the non-linguistic facts. I call this *open-texture*, borrowing the term from ... Waismann' (vi).

One might wonder why Shapiro's account is a contextualist one, for he speaks of a variation in extension even after the external contextual features

are fixed. This becomes even more puzzling if one takes into account the following: 'It is perhaps getting common to use the term "contextualist" for views that the *meanings* of the terms in question ... vary from context to context. No such claim is made here. ... I continue to use the term "contextualist" to characterize the informal, philosophical elaboration of the present account. Nothing turns on this, however, and I will be glad to give up the term' (vi). Yet, in a footnote Shapiro clarifies his position: 'The present "*contextualists*" speak only of the extensions of vague predicates.' Again: 'It is just that the truth values of the sentences in question shift with context' (3).

Besides the open-texture thesis and his contextualism, Shapiro advances 1) the principle of tolerance leaning on Crispin Wright's concept of tolerance, and 2) the judgment-dependence of borderline sentences. With regard to the first claim, Shapiro proposes the following principle of tolerance: 'Suppose that two objects a, a^* in the field of P differ only marginally in the relevant respect (on which P is tolerant). Then if one competently judges a to have P, then she cannot competently judge a^* in any other manner' (8). With regard to the second claim, this is taken over from Raffman's 'Vagueness Without Paradox' (1994, 69–70): '[A]n item lies in a given category if and only if the relevant competent subject(s) would judge it to lie in that category' (37).

With these key points in mind, here is an overview of the book. Chapter 1 deals with the nature of vagueness, pointing out that the presence of borderline cases is necessary for vagueness to arise, while being prone to sorites paradoxes is sufficient for vagueness. Shapiro defines vague as follows: 'A word is vague if it is relevantly similar to "bald", "heap", and "red"' (5). In Chapter 1, Shapiro introduces his four key theses, but he neglects to distinguish vagueness from lack of specificity and ambiguity. In Chapter 2, the place and role of model-theoretic semantics for a formal language containing vague terms are determined. In particular, Shapiro points out that his model theory is set in set theory. Chapter 3 starts to develop a model theory, expounding a similar structure to the supervaluationist approach by employing the notion of a sharpening of a base interpretation. Moreover, Shapiro adds a Kripke-structure to the system in order to have a more adequate model of the open-texture view of vagueness. Chapter 4 develops the model theory further by defining various connectives and quantifiers and by determining a local notion of validity. In Chapter 5, the problem of higher-order vagueness is tackled, that is, whether for instance the term 'borderline' is vague. Chapter 6 refines and extends the account to objects, deals with identity conditions for vague objects, and handles vague abstract and quasi-abstract objects by means of abstraction principles. In Chapter 7, metaphysical matters are pursued, such as whether the world itself is vague. In order to determine that, Shapiro makes use of Crispin Wright's axes of objectivity. Finally, there is an appendix on Friedrich Waismann's account of open-texture and analyticity.

Shapiro's main philosophical claim is the open-texture thesis. He simply takes over this idea from Waismann (10–11), without giving any independent justification or motivation for it, except that one can find the open-texture thesis already in Wright, Sainsbury, Soames, Kamp, and Gaifman. Shapiro

admits (11), however, that he calls it a premise, and that he doesn't have much to offer in its favor except that he thinks that his overall formal framework is an adequate account of vagueness and therefore speaks in its favor.

With regard to the open-texture thesis, Shapiro makes it precise: 'The open-texture thesis is that in some circumstances a competent speaker can ... go either way without offending against the meaning of the terms, the non-linguistic facts, and the like. As above, the open-texture thesis does not entail that he will always be conscious of the fact that he can go either way. Second, even if a is a borderline case of P, it is not true that the rules for language use allow a speaker to assert Pa in any situation whatsoever. For example, one is not free to assert Pa if one has just asserted ... $\neg Pa$. This would offend against logic ... . Similarly, ... one is not normally free to assert Pa if one has just asserted ... $\neg Pa^*$, where a^* is only marginally different from a. That would offend against tolerance' (11–12). Shapiro also points out that open-texture is mostly an empirical claim about the proper use of vague terms (11).

While I admit that a competent speaker can go either way without offending against the meaning of the terms, in our practice we wouldn't say of a borderline bald person that s/he is bald or that s/he is not bald. We would either say that s/he is neither of them or we would rather say that s/he has thin hair, thinning hair, has a Roman tonsure, is balding, or is partially bald. Yet, if one assumes a forced march series of 2,000 men, starting with Yul Brynner on the one end and Jerry Garcia in his prime on the other end, as Shapiro does with only two possibilities as answers (17–19), namely that someone is bald or not bald, then of course the experimental subjects will apply bald or not bald even to the borderline cases. Yet, this is then really an idealized version of the natural language of English.

However, if meaning is use, and if we want to stay as close as possible to the natural language, English, then quite clearly we wouldn't represent the meaning of bald correctly by saying such borderline cases can either be called bald or not bald. For if person C were to describe the respective borderline person A, to a third person B, and this third person were supposed to identify A given this description, then B would have problems identifying A and would probably accuse C of having given a misleading description, because B would have expected a different looking person, given that description. Furthermore, Shapiro doesn't specify under which kind of circumstances a competent speaker can go either way. In addition, Shapiro states that he is talking of most or typical competent subjects (37-8, 202), but this leaves open the possibility for exceptions and for an account that cannot be falsified. Finally, Shapiro doesn't specify what a competent subject actually is. While in general one can imagine a native adult speaker of at least average intelligence to be competent, one would also think that the words chosen would make a difference as to whom one would consider to be competent.

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Jeffrey Strayer
Subjects and Objects:
Art, Essentialism, and Abstraction.
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Until recently, little has been written in philosophy about very abstract artwork. In this book we have a welcome addition to research into this topic. In addition to being a philosopher — he is a Continuing Lecturer in Philosophy at Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne — Strayer is also an abstract artist, holding an M.F.A. from the Art Institute of Chicago; so he is ideally qualified to write this work. In fact, this book could be a propaedeutic for the making of future abstract artworks. At times it reads like an elaborate theory of art, though where art theories tend to start from common properties shared by already existing artworks, Strayer instead lays a groundwork for a metaphysics of artworks. This is an extraordinarily ambitious work.

Throughout the book, 'Abstraction' is capitalized to highlight Strayer's specific meaning. Where 'abstract' can have many somewhat different meanings depending on the context, the capitalized version, 'Abstract', is Strayer's term of art for minimalizing or reducing inessential elements of an artwork. The 'Essentialism' of the title refers to the artistic agenda whereby the artist seeks to remove everything possible from an artwork while leaving the essential aesthetic elements intact. 'Abstraction' is the action performed by the 'Essentialist', hence, the full term for the artistic project of relentless reduction of elements to bare essentials is 'Essentialist Abstraction' — 'Essentialism' for short. Strayer further distinguishes between the artistic project, which is to actually create Essentialist artworks, and the philosophical project, which is to examine conceptually what the boundaries would be of such an artistic enterprise. Strayer thus links philosophy and art together: the philosopher lays the groundwork for the artist. He seeks nothing less than to provide the philosophical side of that link.

The book is very meticulously planned and organized. After an introduction defining and describing the project, there are four parts, each dealing with major dimensions, with Parts 2 and 3 having four divisions each, all arranged into numbered sections. This makes it very easy to refer back to previous sections, and the index is also helpful for this purpose. Part 1 deals with terminology as well as the way Essentialist Abstraction arises historically through the gradual development toward more and more abstract artworks. Part 2 treats the making and apprehending of artworks in general. Part 3 analyzes a myriad of possible relationships involved with 'artistic complexes', another term of art for the connection between the subject's awareness and an art object. The book here reaches new levels of complexity as Strayer painstakingly examines the many forms of awareness a subject can have. Part 4 then pulls together all that has been said previously and includes further discussion on the effects of language on specification and comprehen-

sion of art objects. Following the four parts are four appendices which deal with various aspects of objects as such (e.g., Leibniz's Law, laws of identity and difference, impossible objects).

Early on, Strayer helpfully compares essentialism with modernism, arguing that whereas modernism explores each art form's boundaries, essentialism's mission is to encourage all art forms to become as abstract as possible (30-1). This comparison makes one point of the book come into sharper focus: to delineate and encourage a robust abstract art movement. There are a host of fascinating examples of artworks here, including something from Vito Acconci, who in one work rubbed his arm to create a sore; Robert Barry, whose work frequently specifies thoughts he has and has not been thinking; and Chris Burden, whose *Shoot* called for him to be shot in the arm and whose *Bed Piece* had him lie in a bed in the center of a gallery. In addition, there are many descriptively vivid examples from more well-known twentieth-century art world figures, including Yves Klein, Marcel Duchamp, Kasimir Malevich, Piet Mondrian, Pablo Picasso, Dan Flavin, and Joseph Kosuth. While many methods of artmaking are discussed, one gets the distinct impression that conceptual art is the favored media for Essentialism.

Strayer's presentational style, which is methodically to lay out a definition and follow it with examples, is consistent with his fastidious argumentation. For instance, in Part 2.2 (282) he explains that objects can be continuously dependent on awareness in two ways: first, when the object is that object at two or more contiguous times, and the object is either an event of awareness or an independent existential object; second, when the object is identity-dependent on an event of awareness at two or more contiguous times, but is not metaphysically equivalent to that awareness. Examples of the first kind of continuous object would be pains and trees; notice that pains are themselves events of awareness, trees are independent of awareness, and both are continuous over time. Examples of the second would be paintings and the referent of *the effects of your attending to this for the next six seconds*; notice that paintings depend on events of awareness but are not metaphysically identical with them, and that language is referring to phenomena that are likewise dependent on, but not metaphysically equivalent to, events of awareness.

Reading Strayer's book can be a bit like reading a technical manual; however, the philosophical themes and conceptual illustrations are often very stimulating. About half the examples refer to works by various artists — some widely known from painting, sculpture or theatre, others fairly well known from the conceptual art world — and the other half are Strayer's own conceptual works. The conceptual works are all written in italics. These run from the very simple, almost quaint, like *your current event of comprehending this* for instance, to show how a work of art can be completely dependent on no more than one event of awareness, to the maddeningly complex, like *any object that is in no way dependent on awareness and of which it is neither possible to be aware nor possible to know that some object is that object* (230). In addition to the usual definition plus examples, many sections also extend

and interweave previous definitions to explore further avenues of interest to an essentialist.

Strayer's book is a dense and important work. Until now no one in the histories of philosophy or art has attempted to answer the main questions raised here, specifically, 'Are there limits to Abstraction in art, and if there are, what are they?' This book is a work of art in its own right, in the descriptive *and* the commendatory sense. That is, to understand it properly, to 'get' all there is to get from it, one must appreciate its sheer audacity, precision, and complexity. That someone would even attempt such a thing, pulling together this immense amount of detail with subtle care and exactness, is a little like one of those stories about some quiet, unknown genius who soldiers on alone at the margins, until one day he suddenly explodes onto the scene with a sculpture of a full size Empire State Building made completely out of paper clips. This imaginary example seems an apt analogy for what Strayer has done here. That someone would even do it at all is amazing; that someone could do it so well is simply breathtaking.

Arguably some things had to be omitted that it would have been interesting to include — for instance, some examples from feminist and multicultural artists — but perhaps including such material would have distracted from the book's stated aim. This substantial book, thick with detail and fine-tuned thought, would be too difficult for an introduction to philosophy of art or basic undergraduate aesthetics course. It is an original work of scholarship that should (if there is any justice in the world!) spark interest in an area of aesthetics that has seen too little attention. As such, it would make an excellent text for a graduate seminar in the philosophy of modern art, and an intense experience for any suitably cerebral contemporary artist or conceptual art lover serious about the question of how abstract an artwork can get and still be considered for inclusion in the category 'Art'.

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