Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus philosophiques

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Giorgio Agamben
Profanations.
Trans. Jeff Fort.
New York: Zone Books 2007.
Pp. 200.
US$25.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-890951-82-5).

Agamben's book presents us with a typically eclectic mix of ten essays. While it is difficult to discern a unifying movement, it is as usual impossible to deny the brilliance, analytic clarity and magisterial intellectual sweep which Agamben has at his disposal. His range of reference and its philosophical deployment is as astounding and surprising as ever. Agamben has always been a philosopher who finds inspiration in odd places; and like Walter Benjamin he is a master of the oracular fragment. Hence this collection engages with very miscellaneous subject matters indeed. We find Agamben discussing everything from Charles Foster Kane to Pinocchio, Foucault to Mozart, from Proust to Cartier-Bresson. If one suspects Agamben of wanting to create a miasmic effect then one is mistaken. His intention is quite the opposite. If anything Agamben aims to distil the detritus of contemporary culture into self-contained redemptive fragments or epiphanies. Performatively, he attempts to enact the redemption of the most small, the phoenix in the dust so to speak, all of which he imbues with an undeniable lyrical and poetic beauty. If, however, we are to ask what the structure of these fragments is, it is less clear what he means. Agamben is hard to pin down both theologically and philosophically. He attempts to construct miraculous minutiae out of un-miraculous things. Hence this work is the act of profaning the unprofanable. What ontological stature, what imaginative configuration and what spatio-temporal coordinates this move articulates are less than forthcoming. Indeed it is possible that Agamben disavows these entirely in favour of a Benjaminian eternal 'as if' structure, one which sees in the most mundane the traces of an eternal and secular redemption. But this remains problematic; this idiosyncratic moment seems devoid of any real comprehension or description of themes concerning the rest of us mortals, such as temporality, finitude or the spatial and imaginative presentation of that which promises to redeem us.

As noted, this collection contains ten essays. The first, and one of the most interesting, is 'Genius'. Genius defines not the modern virtuosic sense (although that is not irrelevant), but more precisely the idea of the inner *daimon*. Characteristically rich in historical analysis, here Agamben traverses Dorian Grey, Ariel and Prospero, angels and devils on the shoulder. Genius is the expression of life at the threshold of the impersonal and individual, two forces which dissolve and intersect and which gives voice to the vagaries and tensions of perpetual dissolution in everything from artistic anxiety to the conscience of morality. However it is in an exhausted and suspended time where we find the hope of a 'purely human and earthly life, the life that does not keep its promises' which 'can now give us infinitely more' (18). The

vanquishing of time as a prerequisite for redemption seems a pathological concern of Agamben. This is evident in the next three essays. 'Magic and Happiness' gives a brief discourse on magic, trickery and its necessity for happiness. Magic provides the key to overcoming the opposition of hubris and happiness where the immortal and the blissful coincide in a secluded and eternal moment. 'Judgement Day' presents a brief treatise on photographs. It meditates on a time beyond chronological time with photographs presenting a demand not to be forgotten. Every photograph grasps what was lost in order to make it possible again. Hence a rather perturbing by-product of Agamben's work is the desire to jettison the time of lost memory and the loss of the past in favour of some form of eternal messianic moment. 'The Assistants' presents an insightful account of the role of helpers in children's literature. Pinocchio, 'half-golem' and 'half-robot', exemplify the eternal archetype of congealed time, condensed into the promise to be 'good from now on'. 'Parody' presents another thought of profanation, with parody defining the comical removal of majesty from sovereign themes (divinity, love, the good) in favor of language alone. 'Desiring' is a short essay, so concentrated that it is as impenetrable as the eternal shroud with which Agamben attempts to beatify us. 'Special Being' deals with medieval philosophy's effort to define specific regions of being in relation to images. 'The Author as Gesture' defines gesture as instantaneous epiphanies which exceed opprobrium 'with the luminous traces of another life'.

It is ironic, since Agamben clearly follows the aphoristic tradition of Benjamin and Nietzsche, that we find the most rewarding and philosophically original essay in the relatively lengthy 'In Praise of Profanation'. This is the jewel in the crown and the most philosophically wide-ranging of the collection. Agamben argues for an understanding of the profane beyond the dichotomy of the sacred and profane, the result being a fascinating mix of sociology, politics and theology. Following Debord, Agamben attempts to clear a space beyond the society of the spectacle which as ultimate hubris owes its existence to the self-perpetuation of capitalism, whereby all things may be considered sacred and where all people may become gods. Alternately Agamben proposes to profane the un-profanable, profaning the mundane sense of profane which makes worldly something holy. Agamben intends this configuration to overcome the malaise of modern commodity identification. What this may look like we are left unsure. 'The Six Most Beautiful Minutes in the History of Cinema' provides a fitting tragic-comic conclusion with a vignette of Don Quixote's full scale assault on a cinema screen.

One of the most exciting things about reading Agamben, aside from his innovative topical deployment of ontology in ethical and political spheres, is the sense that a radical departure is about to take place. With Agamben one always has the impression that previous prosodic work paves the way for more substantial philosophical description, one which boldly attempts to redefine the coordinates of ontology, ethics and politics. But while Agamben delivers elegance, range of reference and scholarly acumen, the promise of a singular and messianic eternal community is slow in materialising. This may

of course yet happen, but seemingly Agamben is as guilty of deferring promises as Derrida. Profane politics still waits.

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Ralph Baergen
Historical Dictionary of Epistemology.
Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 2006.
Pp. 312.
US$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8108-5518-2).

This single-authored dictionary is a welcome addition to the many reference books, companions and handbooks available nowadays for undergraduates in philosophy and epistemology. In his second book, Baergen (from Idaho State University) provides an A-Z section with rather short entries (usually half a page, up to one and a half pages), although the entry on scepticism is almost three-pages (201-4). Entries are made for authors, concepts, domains, but not for book titles. An extensive bibliography can be found at the end (221-55).

In his substantial, 50-page introduction, Baergen gives a chronology in epistemology research, beginning with the mention of Plato's *Republic* (ca. 385 BC), and ending with Paul Coates' book *Metaphysics of Perception* (2005). In the succeeding paragraphs the author discusses 'the nature of epistemology' and some influential authors like Plato, St. Augustine and Kant, and provides a short presentation of the main movements of thought from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. As one might guess, only a few of the main epistemological ideas are given for each philosopher introduced in this section (Berkeley, Hume, Moore, Russell, etc.).

Since we have here to do with a dictionary of epistemology, we should begin by looking directly at the entry on epistemology itself. In this half-page entry Baergen begins by presenting this discipline as 'the core area of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, justification, evidence, and related concepts' (69). Then, after a short discussion and a few unanswered questions, three epistemological theories are introduced in a few words with some cross-references to specific entries on related concepts like foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism (70).

In order to give a useful evaluation of any dictionary, one should measure how clear definitions can be, especially for hermetic concepts. Among many hard-to-define terms, 'postmodernism' is presented here as 'a diverse, multidisciplinary movement opposed to foundationalism, realism, essentialism,

and other aspects of modern philosophy' (169). Among the many philosophers included within the post-modern movement, Baergen mentions only Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, and Ferdinand de Saussure, adding that, 'In this area of epistemology, postmodernism rejects the possibility of an objective or transcendent standpoint for observation or knowledge' (169). The reader should understand this is a reference book that is not related to philosophy in general, but specifically to epistemology. There is neither an entry for 'Imaginary', nor for 'Imagery'; but we find an entry for 'Imagination', defined in near-psychological terms as 'the mental capacity to think, often in a quasi-perceptual way, about that which is novel, contrary to the fact, or not currently perceived' (99).

Among many other concepts presented here, there is 'realism', 'the view that which (types of) entities exist and what they are like is independent of our minds and observations' (185). Elsewhere, 'science' is presented as 'the careful and organized study of the natural world', and that entry discusses some related terms like observation, experiences, doubt, hypotheses (194). There is also a separate entry for 'scientific method', 'the set of strategies and procedures employed in acquiring scientific knowledge or evidence' (195). Another entry on 'theory' indicates that it is 'a conceptual model of a body of phenomena; a set of principles, rules, or generalizations regarding the existence, nature, or interaction of a specific set of entities, systems, or events' (211).

We find as well variants and sub-domains of the discipline, with entries like 'Continental epistemology' and 'naturalized epistemology', the latter of which 'regards human beliefs as a natural phenomenon and employs the sciences in addressing epistemological questions' (146). Likewise 'social epistemology' is 'the branch of epistemology that studies the social dimension of knowledge and belief and the ways in which education, religion, social institutions, and other social factors promote or hinder the growth of knowledge' (204). I was glad to find a specific entry for 'sociology of knowledge' (204).

Despite its strengths, there are two major omissions in Baergen's book. First, the absence of the French philosopher Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) is unforgivable. While we find here many less important French philosophers like Antoine Arnauld (18), and a few American professors like Wilfrid Sellars (196), I was surprised not to find any mention of Bachelard's numerous books in epistemology, *The Poetics of Space*, *Formation of the Scientific Mind*, and *Psychoanalysis of Fire*. Bachelard was a major influence on the works of Pierre Bourdieu in France and Fernand Dumont, the latter being in my view Canada's foremost philosopher. Perhaps Baergen did not have access to the English translations of Bachelard's works. But there is another shortcoming in this book: I was shocked not to find any mention of French sociologist Bruno Latour, who remains a major author on science, technique, and epistemology, in the proximity of Bachelard's thought. In English, Latour's most celebrated books include *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society* and *Laboratory Life*. In France, works by Bachelard and Latour are even seen as more important than, say, those

by Thomas Kuhn, and their books have been translated in many languages. For the sake of greater credibility, these two authors ought to be accorded individual entries of their own, if there is ever a second edition of this book. Beyond this, core entries such as culture, essentialism, and interdisciplinarity are also missing, although some of these concepts are briefly discussed in other entries.

In sum, this dictionary is a useful source of numerous short definitions; it has no encyclopaedic ambition. Entries are concise and therefore more suitable for advanced readers who are already familiar with philosophical studies, as opposed to those newcomers who would need basic definitions in order to discover and articulate some new concepts. For these reasons, this book would suit better in universities than college or public libraries, alongside other reference books in epistemology.

Yves Laberge

Robert F. Barsky
The Chomsky Effect:
A Radical Works Beyond the Ivory Tower.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2007.
Pp. 416.
US$29.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-262-06264-6).

In this ambitious and unabashedly partisan book, Barsky sets out to document and spread the word on the 'Chomsky Effect', which for him describes Noam Chomsky's role as a decisive force of 'de-foolery' and as a catalyst for a popular movement that questions the status quo and official doctrine. Following his *Noam Chomsky: A Life of Dissent* (1997), Barsky's new book constitutes his second stab at a biographical study of the public intellectual Chomsky, which he combines with a plea for empowerment of the people 'to change the current situation of systemic inequality' (xiv). Unlike Barsky's previous book, it is not the personalised framework or the nitty-gritty details of biography which are accorded centre stage; rather, the focus is on the unifying themes in Chomsky's approach and contributions to fields as diverse as linguistics, politics, education, cultural studies and literature.

For Barsky (and perhaps for Chomsky himself), Chomsky is first and foremost an anarchist, and, given that anarchy, often reduced to the idea of creative violence, does not have a universally good name, Barsky goes to great lengths to show the 'red thread' that connects classical liberalism, whose tenets are far more palatable to the middle classes, to anarchist thinkers like Michael Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin and Rudolf Rocker. The discussion of

classical liberalism also provides the link to Barsky's portrayal of Chomsky as quintessentially American. Tracing the influence of classical liberalists on the founding fathers of the American Constitution, in the course of which he reclaims the founding fathers as part of an anarchistic tradition, Barsky rallies his readers with the statement that 'unrestrained faith and unconditional support for, say, U.S. government policies is by definition un-American, as is any form of unrestrained, patriotic flag-waving' (120). Chomsky's objective of a 'radical overturning of society, as we know it today' (6), on the other hand, represents true American values; anarchism, notwithstanding the discourse imposed by the ruling classes, turns out to be as American as apple pie.

Proclaiming Chomsky to be representative of America's radical origins acquires additional meaning in the context of Barsky's discussion of how Chomsky's political and linguistic work has been received in France. Inexorably associated with the Faurisson affair, which describes the controversy ensuing from Chomsky's endorsement of the Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson's right to freedom of expression and the subsequent inclusion of an essay by Chomsky in Faurisson's *Mémoire en défense contre ceux qui m'accusent de falsifier l'histoire: La question des chambres à gaz* (1980), Chomsky is, according to Barsky, the victim of a culture clash between American pragmatism and lofty French standards of interpretation, as well as of his own Chomsky Effect. In France, the defence of freedom of expression entails 'that we not only defend one's right to express his or her view, but that we become interested therein so as to refute it' (81) — an entirely unreasonable expectation, as Barsky suggests, albeit one that is part of the Chomsky Effect, given Chomsky's indefatigability and erudition, which give the impression of his 'simply having read everything' (82). The different cultural climate and the unassailed position enjoyed by the homogeneous 'French intelligentsia,' which aims (or at least aimed) to keep Chomsky's views of dissent off the air, are furthermore, Barsky asserts, the reason for the relative unpopularity of generative linguistics in France, which in turn ensures 'that key texts by Chomsky and his disciples are not translated into French in a timely fashion, if at all' (62).

While Barsky's analysis of the state of generative linguistics in France is questionable, carrying at least a whiff of conspiracy and ignoring the status of English as lingua franca in the field of linguistics — there are similarly no Dutch or German translations of Chomsky's linguistic key texts — it points to what is a central theme in Barsky's book, viz. the relationship between Chomsky's pursuits in linguistics and in politics. Here, Barsky enters uncertain and unauthorised terrain, for Chomsky himself has always professed little interest in this question and maintained a clear conceptual distinction between his linguistic work and political activism. Yet, Barsky suggests that Chomsky's view that innate knowledge constrains language acquisition betrays the influence not only of Cartesian rationalism but also of Rudolf Rocker's anti-authoritarian, organic conception of language, just as Chomsky's linguistic concept of the creative use of language leads to educational

practices that foster creativity and growth rather than mechanically dictate direction, and so also leads ultimately to the fight for an anarchist society that will 'allow all persons to explore the innate qualities with which each person is endowed' (138). These ideas are not unconvincing, but whether they in fact go beyond the 'tenuous connection' (acknowledged by Chomsky in *Language and Politics*, 1988: 113) that 'anyone's political ideas or their ideas of social organization must be rooted ultimately in some concept of human nature and human needs,' is doubtful, not least because Barsky at times misunderstands or at least misrepresents technical aspects of linguistics (as, for example, when he equates linguistic rules with the constraining system of the dominant socio-political context).

In a world where indoctrination 'without parallel in history' (232) has become the norm, the space for creativity is increasingly under threat, and Barsky's book recognises and celebrates the internet for providing an unfettered public arena of debate. He cites widely, if not mostly, from online sources, both 'to allow the reader a sense of how important Chomsky has become on the Internet' (326, note 1) and also, presumably, to empower the reader to assess and question Barsky's argumentation for herself, since it is his stated objective to present us with a 'dialogic' text, a multi-voiced work in which the reader can participate. In adopting Bakhtin's concept of dialogism, Barsky sets his study apart from the postmodernist, chaotic aggregate of voices — postmodernism does not get a good press in this book — but also from Cartesian monologicality and its concealed authorial voice. This is all very well, were it not for the fact that Barsky's voice, in its hagiographic mode, at times just plainly stifles dialogue: what space is there for the reader when Barsky writes that Chomsky inspires 'genuine amazement' (11), 'gratitude' (11) and is admired for his 'triumphs' (11) as well as for 'the incredible speed of his typing, phenomenal memory and extraordinary generosity' (203)? While Chomsky may possess all these attributes and more, the effect of this string of superlatives can only be described as grating. Barsky's turns of phrase also get him into trouble elsewhere in the book, when closer editorial attention might have prevented the verbatim repetition of entire sentences in two separate chapters (132, 257).

Part of Barsky's motivation in writing this book was to elevate Chomsky, a marginalised figure in the U.S. media, to 'the place that would normally be accorded to someone whose accomplishments are so overtly important' (48). For Barsky, Chomsky's primary achievement lies in the effect that he induces: he serves as an inspiration to challenge authority, to trust our common sense when making rational and informed decisions, and to take responsibility for our own actions and inaction. The book's focus on the Chomsky Effect counteracts Barsky's tendencies to idealise Chomsky, but it also raises the question as to whether the biographical genre is an appropriate medium in which to explore and articulate activist achievement — a question which Barsky *confronts, citing Chomsky's pronouncement that 'it's the wave that matters'* (33), not the individual figurehead. Nevertheless, he devotes his considerable enthusiasm and energy to presenting Chomsky, '[e]ver the optimist, ever the

hard worker, forever the champion of the underdog' (323), and thus runs the risk that readers who are not already riding the wave will feel swept away and drained rather than swept upwards to emerge on a new journey.

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Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, and John Searle, eds.
Neuroscience and Philosophy.
New York: Columbia University Press 2007.
Pp. 232.
US$25.50 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-231-14044-7).

This book, with an introduction and a conclusion by Daniel Robinson, is a text produced by one neuroscientist (Bennett) and three philosophers (Dennett, Searle, Hacker) as a follow-up to Bennett and Hacker's *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience* (2003). The main thesis is presented by Hacker and Bennett, to which Dennett and Searle respond. The central issue concerns the psychological predicates of consciousness and whether they could properly be applied to the brain instead of the whole person. The discussions deal with the question of the role that philosophical analysis should play in an age when areas traditionally constituting the bailiwick of philosophy are being increasingly usurped by the special empirical sciences.

Once it was recognized that human consciousness is directly connected to various kinds of brain activities, it was a relatively easy next step for the new science of neuroscience to assign itself the double task of examining not only the physical components of the brain but also its intentional correlates. This meant that neuroscience could extend itself into the area known as cognitive neuroscience. Its practitioners could then determine for themselves the conceptual terms and language they would find appropriate for research purposes, and the ontological reach of such research. This is the context in which the relation between neuroscience and philosophy should be understood.

Bennett and Hacker present their thesis that between these two disciplines there is a direct division of labor: 'investigating logical relations among concepts is a philosophical task' while 'guiding that investigation down pathways that will illuminate brain research is a neuroscientific one' (3). The investigation of these logical relationships is defined as the conceptual task for philosophy, and such 'conceptual questions antecede matters of truth and falsehood. They are questions concerning our *forms of representation,* not questions concerning the truth or falsehood of empirical statements ... Distin-

guishing conceptual questions from empirical ones is of the first importance. When a conceptual question is confused with a scientific one, it is bound to appear singularly refractory' (5). The distinction between 'conceptual' and 'empirical' analysis is crucial for the thesis proposed by Bennett and Hacker, because it differentiates between the research proper for philosophy and the one proper for cognitive neuroscience. According to Bennett and Hacker sense or nonsense result from conceptual analysis, while only truth or falsity derive from empirical research.

The upshot of this intellectual division of labor, according to Bennett and Hacker, is that the language of cognitive neuroscience has become conceptually confused because 'talk of the brain's perceiving, thinking, guessing or believing, or of one hemisphere of the brain's knowing things of which the other hemisphere is ignorant, is widespread among contemporary neuroscientists' (7). The core of Bennett and Hacker's thesis is that these qualities, erroneously ascribed to the brain, are in fact properly ascribed to the whole individual. This misapplication of attributes is referred to by Bennett and Hacker as 'the mereological fallacy', according to which neuroscientists mistakenly apply to 'the constituent *parts* of an animal attributes that logically apply only to the *whole* animal' (22). Thus 'psychological predicates which apply only to human beings (or other animals) as wholes cannot intelligibly be applied to their parts, such as the brain' (22). The authors would want to reserve these colloquial predicates only for philosophical discourse, implying that researchers in neuroscience commit a conceptual error when they seek to appropriate such intentional language for analysis of brain activities. In other words, to proceed from an analysis of the specific operations of the brain to their putatively psychological correlates is just not conceptually acceptable, according to Bennett and Hacker. Hacker makes his position clear when he argues that synaptic networks in the brain just cannot logically be ascribed psychological attributes (66). But the question then is how then should one account for the intentional products of brain activity? If colloquial language that refers to intentional states is not allowed, then what technical terms should be used?

Given the close cooperation between some researchers in cognitive philosophy and cognitive neuroscience, it is to be expected that noteworthy critiques of the Bennett-Hacker model would follow. Thus, this volume includes the critical responses of Dennett and Searle. Dennett argues that his views on the topic are similar to those of Bennett and Hacker, except that understanding the brain and its conscious expression requires two levels of explanation (79). As Dennett puts it: 'the recognition that there are two levels of explanation gives birth to the burden of relating them and *this is a task that is not outside the philosopher's province* ... . There remains the question of how each bit of the *talk* of pain is related to neural impulses' (79). Hacker would disagree with this, because for him Dennett's approach signifies a commingling of the conceptual and the empirical. For Bennett and Hacker conceptual issues apply to philosophy while empirical questions properly to science (79); as discussed, they argue for a strict divide between philosophy as conceptual analysis and science as empirical analysis.

Searle's response to the Bennett-Hacker program is much more acute than Dennett's, in that he has 'not found it possible to make a really sharp distinction between empirical questions and conceptual questions, and consequently [does] not make a sharp distinction between scientific and philosophical questions' (123). And given that sensations and thoughts that characterize behavior are generated in the brain, there should be no restrictions on applying psychological predicates to the brain itself, as Searle sees it. On the contrary, questions such as 'What are the NCCs (neuronal correlates of consciousness) and how exactly do they cause consciousness?' are not to be countenanced in the Bennett-Hacker program. Searle make the same kind of point when he defends the notion of subjectively experienced qualia as having specific ontological status, *contra* the Wittgensteinian stance assumed by Bennett and Hacker.

It would seem that the debate between the four theorists represents not much more than the old Cartesian mind-body issue repackaged as the brain-body issue, with Bennett and Hacker seeking to retain a qualitative autonomy for philosophy, while Dennett and Searle have no objections to cooperative work between neuroscience and philosophy. They appear to be correct in this assessment, granting philosophy can be both an empirical and a priori discipline. Natural philosophy and philosophy of the moral sciences have both sought to establish the foundations for the natural and social sciences, so it is to be expected that philosophers would have an important role to play in unraveling the perennial puzzles associated with connecting human consciousnesses with their putatively corresponding brain states.

This text is to be recommended for presenting an important scientific-philosophical topic as a lively debate between four scholars in the field.

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Francisco Benzoni
Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul: Aquinas,
Whitehead and the Metaphysics of Value.
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press 2008.
Pp. 296.
US$35.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-268-02205-1).

Benzoni's book is aimed at developing an ecological ethic in the neoclassical tradition. One of its central tenets is that ideas, including metaphysical ones, are efficacious in shaping how we live. Benzoni believes that one of the basic

ideas underlying current attitudes and practices in our relation to the environment is the background belief that human beings are ontologically and normatively separate from the rest of creation in a way that falsely justifies the reduction in value of non-humans to the merely instrumental level. By presenting an alternative metaphysics of value that sees humans as ontologically and normatively continuous with the rest of creation, Benzoni hopes to contribute to the emergence of a new vision of our place within the general scheme of things that will come to be widely shared and permeate our very way of thinking about, talking about, and, especially, walking on, the earth (182).

Benzoni divides his book into three parts. Part 1 outlines the central elements underlying the currently dominant background belief in the moral bifurcation of human and non-human creation. To this end, Benzoni focuses on the work of Aquinas, largely because of the lucidity with which the Angelic Doctor demonstrates the centrality of a certain understanding of the human soul to the moral bifurcation in question (4). Part 2 offers a more detailed discussion of Aquinas' metaphysics, with the stated aim of demonstrating how his conception of the human soul is philosophically untenable (6). Part 3 presents an alternative to the traditional metaphysics of moral bifurcation, and it draws heavily on Whitehead's metaphysics of creativity. Benzoni presents Whitehead's metaphysics of value as an ethically rich, philosophically tenable alternative to the traditional idea of moral bifurcation, a revolutionary world view that extends moral worth to human and non-human creatures alike.

Benzoni's account of Aquinas' metaphysics in Part 1 is well developed, carefully articulated and clearly explained. Benzoni is very good at explicating some of the more subtle and occasionally troublesome distinctions within Aquinas' work. Of particular note is the way he argues for the distinction between *intrinsic goodness* in Aquinas' metaphysics and the related but separate question of *moral worth*. Benzoni takes great pains to show that Aquinas' arguments for the intrinsic goodness of all creatures at an ontological level (where goodness is convertible with being) do not entail that all creatures have moral worth. He later shows how this same problem reappears in the work of Rolston, a problem that he claims is best addressed by supplementing Rolston's theory with Whitehead's metaphysics of value.

In Part 2 Benzoni focuses on Aquinas' account of the human soul as the basis of the moral bifurcation between human and non-human creatures. He tries to show that Aquinas' claims for the immortality of the soul as a subsisting entity fail because the attempt to move from the epistemological account of how we know (formally) to what we are (substantially or ontologically) lacks a necessary, mediating middle term. The discussion here, while certainly comprehensive and detailed, is also very finely tuned and difficult. One has the distinct impression that Benzoni is addressing a long-standing debate amongst Thomists and Thomist scholars rather than readers of ecological ethics per se. Nevertheless, Benzoni presents a strong case that supports his overall claim that the account of the human soul upon which Aquinas' moral

bifurcation rests is highly problematic, and that at a systematic level it may indeed be philosophically untenable.

Part 3 shifts gears away from the critical focus on Aquinas toward the positive articulation of an alternative, Whiteheadean metaphysics of value. Of particular note here is Benonzi's presentation of Whitehead's metaphysics as a more philosophically tenable basis for articulating and defending a Christian theological ethic compatible with the convictions that all creatures have moral worth and that God is truly affected by — and indeed truly loves and cares for — the world, convictions that Benzoni argues are systematically incompatible with Aquinas' metaphysics of moral bifurcation (127). Unlike the moral bifurcation in Aquinas' metaphysics, within a Whiteheadean metaphysics of value the difference between the human and non-human creatures turns out to be one of degree rather than kind, with all metaphysically fundamental entities standing as intrinsically valuable entities possessing varying degrees of moral worth.

Benzoni does an admirable job once again in managing to present very challenging and complex material in a clear and accessible way. As might be expected of such an introductory work, parts of the discussion may leave the reader asking for further elaboration and clarification, particularly with regard to such notoriously difficult metaphysical topics as *creativity*, *prehension*, *concrescence*, *intensity* (understood as non-conscious feeling or enjoyment of experience), and other technical notions. Benzoni's struggles somewhat in his attempt to make Whitehead's account of redemption — understood as God's savoring, everlastingly, what fragmentary value we do achieve — compatible with the traditional Christian belief in the eschaton (179f.), but at least he is honest in his struggles. It is clear that much work remains for Benzoni to make his alternative metaphysics tenable, not only philosophically but theistically as well, but he seems fully cognizant of the task.

Benzoni's focus on the metaphysics of the soul as the primary basis for the bifurcation of humans from non-humans is both interesting and suggestive. His critique of Aquinas should interest anyone concerned with the metaphysics of value and its history, and his sketch of a Whiteheadean alternative will also be helpful to anyone interested in rethinking our place within nature and the general scheme of things. Some readers may need to make a few imaginative leaps here and there, but this is perfectly in keeping with a Whiteheadean approach, and Benzoni does a fine job preparing the ground for the kind of rethinking he is trying to promote.

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Why do you refrain from picking your nose when a train is passing by, despite the fact that no one else is on the platform and you know no one on the train, and will see none of them again? Why do we tip taxi drivers in one-off encounters, knowing we'll never see them again? Such *prima facie* puzzling behavior is the subject matter of the social sciences. Many deep philosophical issues (e.g., concerning rationality, action, beliefs, desires, etc.) are raised in trying to answer even such seemingly silly and trivial puzzles as those just posed.

Elster and Bishop have written two very different books on the social sciences — in terms of their *approach*, at least. Bishop's is more obviously philosophical than Elster's (the latter's book contains the charming examples I began with). Bishop's is a textbook. Elster's is more akin to a manifesto, perhaps even a credo — an 'Elster manual' if you like! In fact, Elster's is not really a philosophy book at all, though it steps on the toes of many philosophical issues. He defends, through a series of sparkling examples, the view that social phenomena are reducible to individual psychology. Bishop defends a similarly subjectivist view according to which one cannot gain a value-neutral 'outsider's perspective free from all ethical commitments' in the social sciences (356). They are not so very different, then, in terms of their agenda. Bishop is by far the more radical and ambitious, though: he seeks to break down the barrier between individualism and holism. Elster retains this barrier and firmly ensconces himself on the individualist side.

Elster has written many books on social phenomena and behavior in a variety of contexts. He pioneered the use of game theory and other concepts and tools from economic theory to political science, for example. His work is characterized throughout by a devout adherence to methodological individualism: the view that social phenomena are explainable only by reference to the behaviour of individuals (their psychological states, for example). Rational-choice theory is another mainstay of Elster's work. The two frameworks

are not unconnected, of course: rational choice theory is often thought to be underpinned by methodological individualism. His work is also characterized by an adept marshaling of classic literature to make contemporary points. All of these aspects feature heavily in the present book; though he is here, as he admits (given the very many examples of irrational social behavior), rather more skeptical of rational-choice explanations of action (164).

The book is in five parts. In the first part Elster presents his own view on explanation and mechanisms. The subsequent parts apply this view to various puzzling cases: 'The Mind' (with chapters covering motivations, self-interest and altruism, myopia and foresight, beliefs, and emotions); 'Action' (caused by the desires and beliefs of agents — an analysis based on rational choice theory and problem cases for rational choice); 'Lessons from the Natural Sciences'; and (Social) 'Interactions' (between agents, based on game theory). The mind is clearly fundamental to action and the interaction of people, and so to social behavior: Elster unpacks the mind using 'introspection and folk psychology' (67). This 'methodology' is called upon throughout the book.

Explanations of the various ideas Elster is trying to get across are often carried out by utilizing classic literature — Montaigne, Proust, and Tocqueville figure highly — and proverbs, i.e., folksy wisdom. This is certainly enjoyable and widens one's knowledge. There are indeed many truths to be found in the works of the great authors; that is to be expected — and is surely why they are great! — but nice quotations, however apposite, are no substitute for real argument. Of course, that's Elster's point: this is a 'nuts and bolts' account, building up social behavior in whatever way is possible. It is not a formal treatise. The formalists will, therefore, not find much to whet their appetites here: however, they will find some exceptionally clear examples on which to hang their beloved formalism.

Given his individualism, Elster is against functionalist explanation in the social sciences, i.e., explaining social phenomena by appealing to their outcomes or consequences (1, 5). Elster also claims — not argues: a recurring practice! — that every explanation must specify a causal mechanism, i.e. some causal regularity such as one billiard ball hitting a stationary one and the stationary one's moving off. The discussion omits vast swathes of recent work on causation and explanation. What of accounts of explanation that involve unification or the best balance of systematization and simplicity? These can surely play a role in the social sciences? There will be some explanations that cohere better with well-established knowledge. In this sense, Darwinian-type explanations of social phenomena provide a promising account; more so, perhaps, than Elster's causal/mechanistic account. The treatment of causation is even worse: it simply assumes a regularity account, with no defense or mention of other possibilities. Yet this account plays a central role in his notion of mechanism.

Also absent is a considerable amount of recent work on social behavior: Steve Durlauf and William Brock's 'social interactions models' for example. There has also been much work, including work by Kenneth Arrow, on the modeling of social phenomena under the assumption of zero rationality. This

is anathema to Elster, yet it fits the stylized social facts very well, and thus surely demands some discussion. The omissions are, unfortunately, relevant and numerous. Alternatives that aren't omitted are briskly dismissed, with virtually no reasons. He dismisses a dynamical systems model of an arms race with no real argument whatsoever (460).

What bothers me most about Elster's book is the insistence that social science cannot explain or predict. It is perfectly true that individual behavior is a problem. There is, as Elster points out, 'complexity and instability' in human behavior (467). This is true of most systems involving large numbers of interacting parts. But the aggregate behavior of such systems is often predictable, in a coarse-grained sense. One can at least often predict distributions of values of properties over the individuals (just not which individual gets which value). Elster argues that even if this is possible, it does not deliver any explanatory gain for it neglects 'context'. The aggregation necessarily involves abstracting such details as the desires and beliefs of individuals. For Elster, of course, these are the true explanatory factors. But this begs the question. If we want to explain social behavior, then a possible strategy is to model the social system as an individual in its own right (a complex system), with its own properties. Elster gives no argument to the contrary.

Whereas Elster adopts a hard-line methodological individualism, and eschews holism, Bishop is suspicious of such clean distinctions construed as mutually exclusive and exhaustive positions: a little of both is Bishop's conclusion. The book is organized into four parts. The first part is, naturally, background material. Since this is intended for social scientists and philosophers, key ideas from both fields are introduced in the first part. Part 2 focuses on value-ladenness in social research, and finds it in a wide variety of situations. This is then (in Part 3) applied to a number of cases where decision and action are involved: psychology, rational choice, political science, and economics. Part 4 deals with some traditional philosophy of science issues using the earlier material.

Bishop's book is a very well executed textbook, perfectly suited for undergraduate courses or, if supplemented with additional material, graduate courses. It is geared towards students all the way through — i.e., rather than being a textbook written to impress one's colleagues! There are useful 'further study' questions at the end of each chapter that are both perfect for self-study and for use by instructors (to base tutorials around, for example). Recommended readings, pitched at the right level, also follow each chapter (though there should have been more and varied suggestions, in my opinion). It describes itself as 'the definitive companion', and I think it really is. But it does have its problems.

Like Elster's book, it misses much that is of contemporary relevance. I suppose Bishop has a possible excuse: the desire for clarity and coherence. The contemporary debates require a good grounding in the classic foundational problems, and that is just what Bishop gives. By no means does he sit on the fence though: this is not an impartial introduction. There is an almost evangelical zeal running through the chapters, giving the book a coherence

not often found in textbooks. The glue is a belief that the attempt to force social phenomena into the mould of the natural sciences creates problems: the findings of social sciences are inextricably value-laden. Bishop argues that social science should reject the natural science template and the models of explanation and prediction that are associated with it and forge its own style. However, at times I would have preferred it if he had kept the book more agenda-free.

Like Elster, Bishop does not think that the social sciences are like the natural sciences. He does not think that the methods and theories of natural science should be applied to social phenomena: such a move serves to 'distort the social world we are trying to understand' (8). Bishop takes one of the central philosophical problems of social science to be the question, 'Are social sciences and their subject matter different as a matter of degree or as a matter of *kind*?' (27). A major part of the problem I have with both books is the lumping together of all social sciences as if they face identical problems and ought to be dealt with in the same way. I see no reason to assume this is so. Economic behavior might well demand a wholly different conceptual and methodological basis than psychology or anthropology. Indeed, there do seem to me to be essential differences between these: economics (financial economics, certainly) involves vast numbers of interacting agents, while anthropology does not. Given the numbers of interacting agents one can make a case that financial economics is closer (in some sense) to (statistical) physics than anthropology is. One can then test this hypothesis (the statistical physics analogy) by inspecting the time series data and looking for such things as positive auto-correlation and non-Gaussian distributions of changes. The case against the use of natural science methods in social science has not been made in either book.

To sum up, as background reading on the concepts and methods of social science for philosophy undergraduates, Elster's book would make a good first choice: it contains many interesting puzzles and examples, and excellent elementary discussions of the major concepts of the social sciences. (Indeed, I think lecturers on a variety of philosophical topics, such as political philosophy and ethics, would find the book a treasure trove of suitable and interesting case-studies and examples.) It is certainly a book that gets you thinking hard, which has to be a good thing. As a philosophical text, however, it is sadly lacking and should only be used as a supplement to a more pedagogically responsible text like Bishop's. I shall certainly use Bishop's book for courses on the philosophy of social sciences. However, though a thoroughly superb textbook, given its lopsidedness, Bishop's book would best be used alongside a book defending an opposing view, such as Harold Kincaid's *Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences* (Cambridge 1995).

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Andrew Brook and **Kathleen Akins, eds**.
Cognition and the Brain:
The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. 440.
Cdn$103.95/US$104.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-83642-5).

This book may be thought of as a progress report on the neurophilosophy movement that Patricia Churchland put on the map in 1986. In the introduction, Andrew Brook and Pete Mandik highlight important previous work connecting philosophy and neuroscience, and discuss issues — particularly reduction and elimination — in the philosophy of science as they relate to neuroscience. They provide overviews of each paper in the context of broader issues that motivate their choice of organizing the volume into five sections: data and theory in neuroscience, neural representation, visuomotor transformation, color vision, and consciousness.

The 'Data and Theory in Neuroscience' section begins with Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart arguing that bottom-up lesion and single cell research in neuroscience challenges the cognitive sciences' current methodology of attempting to localize the brain area in which putative independently established cognitive functions are realized. As a case study, they consider the vestibular system, which is of interest because small lesions to structures in the ear can result in initial profound loss of posture and control of locomotion followed by recovery to a near normal state. The recovery exploits existing but unnoticed pathways providing visual information, suggesting a general model for brain plasticity that is not the growth of new connections, as recovery occurs too quickly. The relevance of pre-existing connections to localization studies is that *the* function of a structure may not exist. What a structure does, even its modality, may depend on what else is going on in the brain, e.g., visual information being used by the vestibular system. One issue Hardcastle and Stewart do not discuss is the methodology used to discover the vestibular function that their argument presupposes.

Evan Thompson, Antoine Lutz, and Diego Cosmelli provide an overview of neurophenomenology, a research program, informed by phenomenology, which includes developing first-person methods of data collection and interpretation in an attempt to make progress on bridging the explanatory gap between our grasp of phenomenological and neurophysiological features of consciousness. The overview offers background and motivation for the program, as well as outlining procedures for its advancement. It must be stressed that neurophenomenology is intended to contribute to work in cognitive science and analytic philosophy. Neurophenomenology offers an extension of the range of evidence and a rethinking of the Cartesian conceptions of mind and body that generate problems of consciousness. The paper is far too thorough to attempt to summarize here, but for anyone moved by the explanatory gap, the view it presents should be considered. Similarly to Thompson et al, Victo-

ria McGeer endorses first-person reports as data, in this case to gain insight into the nature of autism. She contrasts two models of subjective report: the neoperceptual model in which subjective reports are the direct expression of second-order beliefs about first-order states that produce them, and the reflective-expressivist model according to which they are subjective expressions of first-order intentional states; she opts for the latter. It requires a change in model to take such reports seriously, since autistic individuals are taken to have a deficient theory of mind module, and hence under the neoperceptual model are deemed unable to report on their mental states. As one example the new perspective offers, autistic individuals may fail to make eye contact not because they find others' gaze uninteresting but because it overwhelms them.

The section 'Neural Representation' begins with Chris Eliasmith's case that the dominant computational models of mind, namely symbolicism, connectionism, and dynamic system theory rely on metaphors in providing both explanations and concepts for understanding the mind. In place of metaphor, Eliasmith proposes representation and dynamics in neural systems (R & D theory), which takes seriously minds as 'complex, physical, dynamic, and information processing systems'. R & D theory synthesizes and extends previous approaches, offering a control theoretic procedure for producing models to be compared with actual neurobiological systems to see if they work as modeled, thereby moving beyond metaphors.

Rick Grush and Sean Kelly both discuss our subjective experience of time. Grush relies on our better understanding of spatial representation to develop a parallel temporal account. Spatial representation is egocentrically oriented using measures tied to bodily movement, and similarly temporal representation must be equally subjectively measured in terms of behavioral capacities. The key is that a momentary representation is not a representation of a moment, but rather of an extended process with a trajectory from the past to the future. Grush presents the manner in which neural spatial representations come to have spatial import for a subject, arguing that temporally extended representations have temporal import in a similar way, i.e., by being implicated in the temporal features of sensorimotor dispositions. Kelly's aim is to make clear the puzzle of temporal experience, the puzzle of how we experience a unified duration. Kelly argues that current empirical approaches are inadequate but that the problem is not an intractable special case of the hard problem of consciousness. Rejecting specious present theory and retention theory, Kelly argues for an unfamiliar type of short term memory. The goal is to characterize it so as to make it amenable to empirical investigation. Interestingly, all of the papers in this section discuss representation in terms of neural dynamics, and when taken together the case is quite compelling. A related topic, not included in the volume, is that of temporal binding.

In the section 'Visuomotor Transformation', Pierre Jacob presents a dual-route model of vision, according to which a single visual stimulus can be processed in quite different ways, producing a percept (involved in awareness) or a visuomotor representation. Jacob reviews three sets of data to support

his model, including results from single cell recordings in monkeys, evidence of double dissociation between the two visual pathways in brain-lesioned human patients, and dissociations from psychophysical studies in healthy human subjects. Jacob's model is similar to David Milner and Melvyn Goodale's dual-route model, which posits a dorsal stream that guides real-time action and a ventral stream that underlies recognition and conceptualization. Jacob differentiates the two vision systems differently in terms of egocentric and allocentric representations, the latter of which are necessary but not sufficient — *pace* Milner and Goodale — for awareness. From studies on hemisphere neglect patients, Jacob concludes that objects must be represented so as to be compared with other objects for us to be aware of them. Pete Mandik's position is motivated by the insight that often underdetermined visual information can be disambiguated by motion, a view traditionally advanced in support of non-representational accounts of perception. Instead, Mandik posits action-oriented representations, which include motor commands as part of their representational content; what states cause, in addition to what causes them, can determine their content, thus perception is still a kind of representation. Mandik presents results from robotics, artificial life research, and neuroscience to support the plausibility of action-oriented representations. It will be interesting to see how the view can handle standard worries for causal theories of content.

The most compelling paper in the volume is Paul Churchland's. He presents the standard model for color phenomenology, the color spindle, and a neuroscientific account intended to explain it, the Hurvich Net. What is truly compelling about Churchland's account is that he derives empirical consequences for the model based on fatigue states that should produce surprising afterimages, such as self-luminous green (it seems to glow) and blue that is as dark as black, and provides plates so that the reader can experience these impossible colors for herself. After making such a jaw-dropping case for the empirical model, Churchland concludes by arguing that color inversion is only possible if there is some empirical fault with the model. Zoltan Jakab also presents empirical results regarding color vision, such as the nature of opponent processing, the reflectance theory of color, and color constancy, to reject color realism. Jakab allows that colors are in some sense 'real physical properties of environmental surfaces', but that our perceptions can misrepresent the stimulus structure, often to our evolutionary advantage, by making contrasts much more salient. Color perception depends as much on how we represent color as on the environment.

Jesse Prinz offers an optimistic assessment of the progress being made toward finding the neurocomputational basis of consciousness. Following Jackendoff (who follows Marr), he argues that perceptual systems are hierarchical and that we are only conscious of some intermediate level representations; the lowest levels are too discrete, the highest too abstract. In particular, we are only aware of attended representations, where attention results in further processing by working memory. Prinz suggests his AIR — attended intermediate-level representations — theory of consciousness

can lead to an understanding of the functional role of consciousness and of whether creatures sufficiently like us are conscious. It should be noted that AIR deals only with perceptual consciousness. Finally, Andrew Brook tackles the hard problem directly. He gives an excellent overview of the antiphysicalist worries and then offers responses to the arguments that lead to them, such as the inverted spectrum and zombie arguments. The key idea is that self-representing representations underlie consciousness and in the imagined cases of unconsciousness such representations are present, so the zombie must be conscious after all.

Given the wide variety of empirical considerations, it is surprising that a common theme emerges in the volume, namely that of neural representation and its connection with experience. The book is an excellent resource for someone interested in representation, though it leaves out the binding problem. Some knowledge of neuroscience and computational modeling is required to get the full force of many of the papers. How does neurophilosophy fare given this progress report? Much of the hard work still lies ahead, but clear paths of research are emerging.

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This is a collection of essays that have established Burge as a leading philosopher of mind in general, and a defender of anti-individualism in particular. The volume includes a lengthy introduction, three postscripts, a substantial new essay on consciousness, as well as Burge's influential series of papers in which he develops anti-individualism. The introduction offers great insight into the progression of Burge's ideas over the years. The postscripts address criticisms Burge's view has received over the years, but they also reconstruct important arguments that might have been initially obscured. The order of the essays in defense of anti-individualism is not historical; instead, it reflects the evolution of his view.

The focus of the first three essays is on issues concerning the philosophy of language. 'On Knowledge and Convention' (Chapter 1) is one of Burge's earliest essays, in which he criticizes David Lewis's theory of convention. What is most interesting about this essay, by Burge's own admission, are his cautions 'against hyper-intellectualized accounts of meaning and representational practice' (7). 'Kaplan, Quine, and Suspended Belief' (Chapter 2) focuses on the priority of belief *de re* over belief *de dicto*. Burge elaborates this distinction in 'Belief *De Re*' (Chapter 3) as it applies to propositional attitudes. This essay marks the shift in focus from language and reference to mind and representational content respectively. As such it is the closest antecedent to the essays on anti-individualism. In the post-script to 'Belief *De Re*', Burge stresses that his primary interest in the initial essay was the logical form of the representational contents of the beliefs themselves, not the nature of belief ascription in natural language (although he acknowledges that this point was not clearly articulated). Burge also affirms that the tacit assumption concerning the relation between his semantic and epistemic accounts (the latter being the more basic) of the *de re* / *de dicto* distinction, in the original essay, was that by studying ascriptions descriptive of propositional attitudes one could gain insight into the nature of these attitudes. He further explicates the relation between his two epistemic accounts, which differ in a subtle but important way: one takes successfully applied indexical or demonstrative elements in a belief content to be the main characteristic of *de re* attitudes, while the other leaves room for *de re* attitudes lacking such elements in their representational contents. Burge emphasizes that the fundamental idea is that representational contents include occurrent applications.

Burge urges the reader to see the following papers as stages dealing with different aspects of anti-individualism associated with a different type of thought experiment. Although 'Other Bodies' (Chapter 4) was written after 'Individualism and the Mental', it marks the beginning of Burge's defense of anti-individualism — the thesis that many representational mental states and events are constitutively what they are partly in virtue of relations between the individual in those states and the physical environment. The primary aim in this essay is to show that natural kinds are not indexicals. The argument that dominates 'Other Bodies' and 'Individualism and the Mental' (Chapter 5) is that the representational (conceptual) contents of mental states about natural kinds like water depend constitutively on causal relations to specific aspects of the environment, social or otherwise.

In the postscript to 'Individualism and the Mental', Burge reaffirms his belief that differences in types or natures of thoughts depend on the individual's wider social environment. He agrees with Putnam that the reference of the word, e.g., 'water' is different for the person on Earth than it is for his *doppelgänger* on Twin-Earth, but he argues, *pace* Putnam, that the person on Earth and his *doppelgänger* on Twin-Earth have different thoughts. Burge attributes the difference in their thoughts to the differences between their physical environments. The same strategy in deployed in the thought experi-

ments about aluminum and arthritis. In the latter, Burge asks us to compare a patient who has misconceptions about arthritis and thereby comes to form the belief that he has developed arthritis in his thigh, with the same patient in a counterfactual situation in which 'arthritis' designates arthritis *and* other rheumatoid ailments, including thigh ailments. According to Burge, the patient has a false belief about his thigh ailment while his counterpart in the counterfactual situation has a true belief. Since their beliefs differ only in their conventional meaning of the word 'arthritis,' Burge concludes that the natures of the individual's thoughts, as marked by their representational contents of their thoughts, constitutively depend on the social environment.

In the postscript to 'Individualism and the Mental', Burge states that even when he wrote it he regarded 'the physical environment as more fundamental than the social environment in determining the natures of mental states,' but he focused on the social environment because he thought that its role was less easily recognized. He also clarifies the distinction between individualism and anti-individualism as well as their relation to mind and language. Individualism applies to 'any view that takes *the nature of mental states to depend entirely on physical factors in the individual or psychological resources cognitively available to the individual*' and as such it is concerned with 'denying a constitutive role to any factors beyond the individual' (153). Anti-individualism, on the other hand, is simply the view that the natures of the individual's thoughts 'constitutively *depend* on relations that are not reducible to matters that concern the individual alone.' Viewed as such, anti-individualism concerns neither the nature of representational content nor the natural-language ascriptions of propositional attitudes. Rather, it is about the nature of thought and propositional attitudes. Burge cautions us that anti-individualism entails neither that thoughts are 'outside the head' nor that they are relations to something external: 'Their natures constitutively *depend* on relations that are not reducible to matters that concern the individual alone. But the natures are not themselves relations, and their representational contents are not themselves (in general) relational' (154). In retrospect, Burge finds his emphasis on issues in the philosophy of language to be unnecessary and potentially confusing, since it obscured the more important issue regarding the nature of thoughts and propositional attitudes. 'Two Thought Experiments Reviewed' (Chapter 6), is a short essay in which Burge addresses Jerry Fodor's criticisms of his thought experiments and reaffirms that the thought experiments are not about meaning but rather about propositional attitudes.

In 'Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception' (Chapter 7), Burge addresses his critics, arguing that anti-individualism applies to perceptual states and is compatible with authoritative self-knowledge. In 'Descartes on Anti-individualism' (Chapter 19) he discusses the reasons he mistook Descartes to be an individualist about thoughts and further explores Descartes' views on mental substance and attributes. These ideas are further articulated in 'Authoritative Self-Knowledge and Perceptual Individualism' (Chapter 8), where Burge argues that anti-individualism is compatible with knowledge

of our own mental states. In 'Individualism and Psychology' (Chapter 9), Burge attempts to show that individualist considerations cannot equally fix or co-fix the natures of perceptual states, since they are partly fixed by the environment. (In the introduction Burge cautions that his argument is not, as he had wrongly indicated, an argument against individualism.)

In 'Wherein is Language Social?' (Chapter 11), 'Concepts, Definitions, and Meaning (Chapter 12), and 'Social Anti-Individualism, Objective Reference' (Chapter 13), Burge elaborates issues concerning conceptual explication and social dependence. He stresses that his arguments for anti-individualism do not rely on having shared concepts but on the objective reference of our thought (Chapter 11), and he offers support for the claim that concepts are aspects of mental kinds (Chapter 12). Minimal conditions for objective representation and thought, which, according to Burge, are fulfilled independently of language use are discussed in Chapter 13.

The volume also includes three well-known essays on mental causation: 'Individuation and Causation in Psychology', 'Intentional Properties and Causation', and 'Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice' (chapters 14, 15, and 16 respectively). Burge agues that anti-individualism presents no problems to our understanding of causation. According to him, the notion of causal power 'must be understood in a way that allows for variations in types of power that the various special sciences are concerned with' (29). Burge maintains that the support for epiphenomenalism — the view that mental states have no causal powers — and other such materialist views stems from metaphysical assumptions that are incompatible with actual causal explanations. In the postscript to 'Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice', he addresses Jaegwon Kim's response to his argument against epiphenomenalism. Burge claims that Kim misunderstood his argument, since Kim wrongly attributes to him the view that 'the problem of mental causation would "melt away" if one shifted perspective' from metaphysics to psychological explanation. Burge argues that the issue is not whether we should choose between doing metaphysics and doing science, but rather that 'certain forms of metaphysics do not keep in perspective what we know and what we do not know' because they 'rely on metaphysical principles that are not rationally or empirically supported.'

'Reflections on Two Kinds of Consciousness' (Chapter 18) is an extension of the argument Burge originally made in 'Two Kinds of Consciousness' (also included in this volume). Burge accepts Block's distinction between phenomenal consciousness (a matter of phenomenal feeling or sensing) and rational-access consciousness (involving the occurrence of rational, cognitive attitudes), but he rejects Block's treatment of access consciousness as a disposition. In 'Reflections on Two Kinds of Consciousness', Burge reaffirms his claim that phenomenal consciousness is basic, while rational-access consciousness is an occurrent condition. Both types of consciousness are 'necessarily occurrent states of the *whole individual*' (394). Phenomenal consciousness is essential in having a conscious mental life while the exercise of 'autonomous rational cognitive powers' requires rational access conscious-

ness (395). Thus, both types of consciousness are constitutive of what it is to be a conscious individual.

The last essay in this volume, 'Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000', is an interesting and informative journey through the development of a variety of positions that dominated the philosophy of mind, including behaviorism, naturalism, materialism, etc., as well as their effects on major philosophical figures, including Quine, Ryle, and Davidson.

This volume is essential to anyone doing work on the philosophy of mind. Burge's contribution to this field of philosophy is of the utmost importance and must be carefully considered if we are to make progress with respect to the nature of mental states and events.

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Jill Vance Buroker
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: *An Introduction.*
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Pp. 336.
Cdn$88.95/US$79.00.
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-85315-6);
Cdn$28.95/US$25.99
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-61825-0).

This book stands out in what has recently become a crowded field of introductions to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Unlike some competitors, Buroker covers the whole *Critique*, Kant's critique of speculative metaphysics in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' as well as his positive theory of knowledge in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Analytic', and she even includes a chapter on the positive role of pure reason in theory and practice, which discusses Kant's Appendix to the 'Transcendental Dialectic' and the 'Canon of Pure Reason' in the 'Doctrine of Method', sections ignored by many other introductions. Buroker provides definitions of Kant's key terms, while alerting the reader to his often complex usage of those terms. She provides concise expositions of many of Kant's key arguments in numbered steps followed by incisive commentary on each step, while refraining from an excessive formalization of these arguments that would be alien to Kant's own thought. She provides a good range of reference to recent scholarship on Kant, drawing especially on work by Henry Allison and Lorne Falkenstein, but not ignoring others. And she provides a number of brief but useful discussions of rela-

tions between Kant's ideas and more contemporary positions in analytical philosophy.

On the whole, I found Buroker's treatment of Kant's theory of space, time, and mathematics in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' interesting and sound (this did not come as a surprise, given Buroker's important 1981 monograph *Space and Incongruence*); in particular, I found her interpretation of Kant's argument that space and time are necessary conditions of the experience of objects in the 'Metaphysical Expositions' of space and time particularly useful. I was less taken with her treatment of transcendental idealism, some of her discussion of which is reserved for her conclusion (perhaps unwisely, since this means that her positive account of transcendental idealism comes after her discussion of the indirect proof of it in the 'Transcendental Dialectic'). I agreed with her interpretation of the 'epistemic necessity' of space and time as forms of intuition, that is, with the claim that 'space and time are necessary features of objects of experience, although the fact that they are our forms of intuition is not necessary' (63), but I found her concluding attempt to steer a path between the 'two-aspect' and 'two-world' interpretations of transcendental idealism too compact and obscure: as far as I could tell, Buroker starts by aligning herself with something like Rae Langton's approach that 'Things in themselves are whatever exists (taken collectively) considered *non-relationally*' (307) — and I have yet to see how this approach can make sense of Kant's conception of things in themselves in general as the grounds of appearance and of noumenal character in particular as the grounds of phenomenal character, since *being the ground of* is certainly a relation. But she then backs off her initial suggestion, and instead concludes that 'things in themselves are the ontological *ground* of appearances', where grounding of course *is* a relation, and things in themselves are thus essentially relational, not non-relational. Buroker stresses that 'we have only a minimal *logical* conception of this relation, an indeterminate notion of condition to conditioned' (308), but nevertheless, it seems to me, she ends up with some version of a 'two-world' approach after all — the right place to end up, as far as I am concerned, but she has not gotten there by a very clear route.

Buroker interprets the 'Transcendental Analytic' as an extended argument with four stages: a proof in the 'Metaphysical Deduction' that the understanding produces pure concepts; a proof in the 'Transcendental Deduction' that these pure concepts are necessary conditions for the possibility of experience; the provision of 'sensible conditions required to apply pure concepts to objects of intuition' in the 'Schematism'; and 'detailed demonstrations of the pure principles of the understanding, the synthetic *a priori* judgments based on the categories' in the 'System of Principles' (73). Her account and defense of the 'Metaphysical Deduction' is exemplary, and her treatment of the 'Transcendental Deduction' should prove very helpful to students, although here I have several reservations. She rightly regards the first edition version as a failure, particularly because Kant's way of introducing the transcendental unity of apperception ('t.u.a.') as a condition of the possibility of experience of any particular objects does not explain why

t.u.a. should be equivalent to a self-consciousness extending throughout the entirety of any subject's experience, and because it does not establish a clear connection between t.u.a. and judgment, and thus between t.u.a. and the use of the categories (115). These criticism are well-taken, but Buroker does not discuss what seems to me the core argument and, since it is flawed, therefore the deepest failing of the first-edition 'Deduction', namely, its inference from our alleged *a priori* cognition of t.u.a. to the existence of an *a priori* synthesis that must proceed in accordance with *a priori* rather than empirical concepts (A 116-19). It seems important to me to emphasize this argument and its flaws because Kant clearly invokes it again in the second-edition 'Deduction' (e.g. B 134), and one must recognize this fact in order to steer around it if one is to find a salvageable argument in that version. Buroker's failure to criticize Kant's attempt to infer the necessary use of the categories directly from the apriority of apperception is connected with the weakest point in her otherwise exemplary exposition of the second-edition 'Deduction', namely her tolerance of the argument of §19, with its argument that a judgment is always the assertion of a necessary connection and that a judgment must use the categories in order to express that assertion of necessity. The 'Metaphysical Deduction' has already shown that any judgment, regardless of whether it asserts a necessary or a contingent connection, must use the categories in order to refer to objects at all, and this should have permitted Kant a more straightforward argument from the assumption of §§15-16 that t.u.a. is essentially a judgment connecting all of our representations to the application of the categories to all of our representations, without the introduction of the dubious theory of §19 that all judgments are assertions of necessity. Presenting the core argument of the first half of the second-edition 'Deduction' (§§15-20) in this way would also have led to the recognition that the second half of the 'Deduction' (§§21-27) cannot be regarded as a second stage of proof, in which it is demonstrated for the first time that the categories must apply to all of our representations because they are all representations of a unitary spatio-temporal world that can be cognized only by means of the categories, for the comprehensive character of t.u.a. in the first stage of the argument already implies that if the categories are necessary conditions of t.u.a. then they apply to all of our representations. The second stage of the argument can instead only be regarded as specifying the particular role that the categories actually play in establishing the unity of experience, namely grounding the unity of its spatio-temporal structure — the role that is then explored in detail in the 'System of Principles'. At the same time, of course, the fact that the actual role of the categories is to ground the unity of the spatio-temporal structure of our experience also means, for Kant, that they yield cognition only of appearances, not things in themselves. In other words, in the second edition, Kant's critique of transcendental realism begins in the second half of the 'Deduction', a point that Buroker does not emphasize.

Buroker's discussion of the 'Axioms of Intuition' and 'Anticipations of Perception' is outstanding. My chief reservation about her discussion of the 'Analogies of Experience' is that she presents them as Kant's answer to an

undifferentiated 'skepticism', without distinguishing between, on the one hand, the 'Humean' skepticism about first principles that Kant attempts to refute with his demonstration of the necessity of the principles of substance and causation and, on the other hand, the 'Cartesian' skepticism about the existence of external objects that he attempts to refute in the 'Refutation of Idealism'. (Both of these forms of skepticism should in turn be distinguished from the 'Pyrrhonian' skepticism engendered by the appearance of equally good arguments on both sides of key metaphysical questions that Kant is attempting to resolve in the 'Antinomy of Pure Reason'. I have distinguished these three forms of skepticism in my *Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume*; Michael Forster offers a similar tripartition of Kant's conception of skepticism in his *Kant and Skepticism* [both Princeton 2008].) Apart from this general concern, my only reservation about the details of Buroker's account of the 'Analogies of Experience' is her interpretation of the first argument of the first 'Analogy' as an argument that enduring substance is a necessary condition for the *measurement* of the duration states in time (169-71). As Strawson had already shown, the necessary conditions for measurement of duration cannot possibly include the existence of truly sempiternal substances; but since Kant's first, 'substratum' argument is not about measurement, it is not actually open to this objection (although it is certainly open to others). Buroker's account of the second 'Analogy', by contrast, convincingly shows, as Arthur Melnick, Michael Friedman, and I have argued, that it proves the necessity of the general principle that every event has a cause through the necessity of cognition of particular causal laws for the cognition of particular events, although Kant does not provide (at least within the second 'Analogy') any account of how we come to know particular causal laws.

Buroker puts her finger on the key moves in Kant's 'Refutation of Idealism': if cognition of some enduring substance is a necessary condition of time-determination, even of the determination of the temporal structure of our own experience (i.e., empirical self-consciousness), this substance cannot be the empirical self, for that is itself first constituted by the determination of the temporal structure of our experience; and if such a substance is therefore to be represented as distinct from the empirical self, it must be represented in space, because space is our means for representing the distinctness of an object from our representation of it (190-1). I quibble only with Buroker's characterization of this as an *'ad hominem'* argument against Descartes (190): it is of course an argument against 'Cartesian' skepticism about external objects (that is, the skepticism that Descartes entertains in the second *Meditation*, but which he himself thinks he has refuted by the sixth), but it is not *ad hominem* in the sense of finding some flaw only in Descartes's own exposition of skepticism; it is directed against any epistemology that would credit us with determinate cognition of the temporal order of our own experience, without recognizing that we could not have that without knowledge of an external world. I also quibble with Buroker's remark that Kant's 'argument has never been taken seriously' (191). She says that commentators

have raised three questions about the argument: 'first, why the enduring objects required to know oneself must be spatial; second, how the argument guarantees that these objects exist as opposed to being merely imagined; and third, in what sense experience of spatial things is immediate' (191-2). I have raised precisely these questions in my own work on the 'Refutation' and shown how Kant attempts to answer them, although unsuccessfully in the case of immediacy.

Buroker's extended treatment of the 'Transcendental Dialectic' provides a reliable introduction to the half of the *Critique* that I (at least) run out of time for in a one-semester course. For that reason and many others I certainly intend to assign this book in future courses on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and I am confident that all other teachers of Kant will find their students deeply grateful if they do so as well.

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Julian Dodd
Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University
Press 2006.
Pp. 304.
Cdn$100.95/US$75.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928437-5).

Dodd's *Works of Music* provides the most sophisticated, rigorous and well-developed ontology of music recently or, perhaps, ever developed. Although I disagree with Dodd's position, it is difficult to refute. In saying this I mean, in part, that his position is admirably defended and internally coherent. But I also mean that I wonder whether questions about the ontology of music are pseudo-questions, in Rudolf Carnap's sense of the term. I wonder, that is, whether any number of accounts of the ontology of musical works is consistent with all of the empirical facts about music. If such a Carnapian position is accepted, no alethic basis exists for choosing between ontologies of music. This is not to say that there is no basis at all: pragmatic criteria are available and these count against Dodd's position.

Dodd provides an answer to the categorical and individuation questions about musical works. That is, he tells us what works of music are and how they are to be individuated. According to Dodd, a work of music is a norm-type that establishes what properties a sound-sequence-event must have in

order to count as a token of a work-type. Works of music are, on his view, abstract, eternal, incomposite and temporally and modally inflexible (that is, they possess their intrinsic properties necessarily). Dodd is also committed to the existence of property associates. For every type T there is a property-associate *being a T*. A consequence of Dodd's view is that musical works are discovered, not made. Types are individuated by how their tokens sound. Dodd maintains 'that work of music W = work of music W^* just in case [tokens of] W and W^* are acoustically indistinguishable' (249). He calls this 'the simple view', but it actually carries with it a rich and complex Platonic ontology, complete with an infinite number of uninstantiated types.

After an extended defense of his ontology of music, Dodd rejects two recently developed alternatives to his position. According to the first of these, 'a work of music is the composer's compositional action' (167). Gregory Currie has defended the view that musical works are action-types. David Davies takes the view that they are individual compositional actions. Dodd also argues against the view that works of music are 'continuants', that is, a sort of particular that is not a material object and which has 'occurrences'. This sort of position is associated with Guy Rohrbaugh. Dodd finds the compositional action and continuant positions less satisfactory than his own.

I have my doubts about all of these positions. Carnap famously distinguished between what he called internal and external questions. He wrote (in 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology') that, 'If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules.' The introduction of a new way of speaking about entities Carnap calls the construction of a *framework*. Internal questions are questions about the existence of entities within a framework. When we are concerned with the ontology of music, the following would be internal questions: 'Was Mozart's Piano Concerto No. 21 performed at the concert last night?', 'Was there really a mandolin concerto by a Captain Corelli or was it simply imaginary?', 'Can one pianist perform Gould's Wagner transcriptions, or are they only realized in engineered recordings?' External questions would be questions such as 'Was the performance of Mozart's Piano Concerto last night a token of an abstract, modally-inflexible type?' and 'Is a performance of Brandenberg Concerto No. 5 an occurrence of a continuant?' According to Carnap, internal questions can be settled by empirical investigation. External questions are decided purely on the basis of convenience.

Dodd provides us with a textbook case of someone who is engaged in the construction of a framework. At a number of places in his book, he is quite explicitly introducing 'new ways of speaking' about 'a new type of entities'. For example, we often speak as though musical works are structured and have parts. Dodd's theory leads us to believe that works are incomposite. Consequently, he must adopt Wolterstorff's doctrine of anological predication. This doctrine requires us to adopt a particular reading of a predicate such as 'ends with an A minor chord'. When this predicate is applied to a work, it 'expresses the property of *being such that a sound-event cannot be a properly formed*

token of it unless it ends on an A minor chord' (4). Elsewhere, Dodd discusses the identity of types in the face of small variations (his example is the Ford Thunderbird). He writes that he doubts that 'any user of ordinary language would complain if this remark [about the change of a type] were unpacked as the claim that the company had developed a new type of car based on the original Thunderbird' (56).

What Dodd does not recognize is that there may be more than one framework available that is compatible with all of the facts that we acknowledge about music. From an empirical point of view, it does not really matter which framework (or way of speaking) we adopt. Dodd notes that sometimes we speak in ways that sound opposed to his Platonic ontology. His response to this is, quite rightly, to say that, 'such cases can be re-described in a way that is congenial to Platonism' (109). That is, we can adopt a Platonic framework. Dodd does not acknowledge that the opposite is also true. While we speak in a Platonic idiom, a nominalist paraphrase can usually be found.

Even if we cannot find a nominalist paraphrase, we ought not to accept the truth of Platonic ontology. Carnap allows that it is often difficult to avoid reference to abstract entities. He insists, however, that, 'the acceptance of a language referring to abstract entities ... does not imply embracing a Platonic ontology.' This is a lesson that Dodd has not taken to heart. Sometimes Dodd's opponents are charged with having to paraphrase undoubted truths in awkward and unmotivated manners. Dodd does not tell us why a manner of speaking should tip us off to the answers to ontological questions.

We need to have recourse to pragmatic criteria of theory (or ontology) choice. In particular, we need to ask which ontology of music is the simplest. Our search for a simpler alternative should begin by reconsidering one of Dodd's crucial assumptions. Central to his position is the view that 'the things that are composed by composers are surely *works of music*, not their scores' (24). So far as I can tell, no argument is provided for this conclusion. (The use of the adverb 'surely' is often a dead giveaway that an author has no argument for some claim.) In any case, Dodd's conclusion is far from intuitive. A composer sits down at a desk with a pen and paper (or, these days, with a computer). When he is done, the obvious way in which the world has changed is that it contains a score that did not previously exist. Surely (if I may use the word) the default position is that the composer has produced a score. Let me suggest that the composer has also produced a type of score and this is the work of music.

This suggestion is not original. It is essentially the account of musical works given by Paul Thom in *For an Audience: A Philosophy of the Performing Arts*, a work absent from Dodd's bibliography. Thom quotes Searle's well-known article on fictional discourse. Searle writes that, 'The illocutionary force of the text of a play is like the illocutionary force of a recipe for baking a cake. It is a set of instructions for how to do something, namely how to perform the play.' Thom suggests that the processes of composing music and composing plays are parallel. In writing a musical composition, a composer is giving directions to performers. A musical work is a recipe for producing

performances. In the terms a philosopher of language might employ, a musical work is a set of propositions with imperative force applied to them. Once we recognize that this is the case, the ontology of musical works is no more puzzling than the ontology of the *Fanny Farmer Cookbook* recipe for shortbread cookies.

One might ask why anyone would favor the ontology of music that I have just sketched over Dodd's. The reason is that is it so incredibly simple. We can give an ontology of music that appeals to only one theoretical entity: propositions. And this theoretical entity is one that is already firmly established as an indispensable feature of any satisfactory ontology.

None of these critical remarks should detract from Dodd's accomplishment. He has produced a comprehensive and rigorous working out of a Platonic ontology of music. His book is a model of philosophical analysis and should be read by everyone interested in ontology of art.

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Madeleine Fagan, Ludovic Glorieux, Indira Hašimbegovic, and **Marie Suetsugu, eds.**
Derrida: Negotiating the Legacy.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2007.
Pp. 256.
US$90.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7486-2546-8);
US$28.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-7486-2547-5).

This book shares with a number of recent collections of articles, notably in *Critical Inquiry, Mosaic* and *South Atlantic Quarterly*, the difficult burden of responding to the death of Jacques Derrida. Lacking the eloquence of Nicholas Royle's 1995 meditation on the connotations of being *after* Derrida, these recent collections have tended to take stock of Derrida's legacy by emphasizing his 'late' work on 'politics' (the titles of the *Critical Inquiry* and *SAQ* collections are 'The Late Derrida', 'Late Derrida'). There are many remarkable and profound contributions in these recent collections, and they are perhaps implicitly in danger both of summarizing Derrida's legacy through his more obvious 'political' writings and of assuming that these 'political' texts encompass his 'late' work. It is hopefully hardly necessary to note that Derrida's preoccupation with the political and the ethical began not in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with *Force de loi, Donner la mort* and *Spectres de Marx*, but with his earliest essays in the 1960s. Derrida's 1964 'Violence et métaphy-

sique', a long meditation on Lévinas, Husserl and Heidegger, is both a reflection on problems that he had grappled with since his 1954 dissertation on Husserl and a springboard for the political and ethical questions he raises in *De la grammatologie*, *Marges — de philosophie* and *Glas*.

Under the auspices of the Aberystwyth Post-International Group, based in the International Politics Department at the University of Wales Aberystwyth, the editors of this volume are to be commended for gathering together a wide range of scholarly contributions. In their introduction Glorieux and Hašimbegović offer, in the wake of Jacques Derrida's death, a fine account of the central importance of inheritance and survival in negotiating with his political and ethical thinking. Heritage is not 'a given' that can be reduced to a present 'is', and living as survival 'involves being more than one where one is no longer one' and where 'the only death which can make possible my learning to live is that of the other' (6, cf. 9-10). At the same time, in part to illustrate the link between inheritance, survival and the political in Derrida's work, they emphasize a 'living-*with*' which, at the very least, could have done with a footnote on Derrida's complex relation to Heidegger's *Mitsein* and on his readings of Lévinas and Nancy (9). As Hillis Miller's recent work suggests, Derrida was weary of the unavoidable good conscience of 'living-*with*'.

In their introduction Glorieux and Hašimbegović note that 'we must always appropriate *a* Derrida in our singular acts of inheritance' (18), and this is amply demonstrated by the contributions of three distinguished readers of Derrida who bring a *gravitas* to the collection: Christopher Norris, Christina Howells and Richard Beardsworth. Norris offers 'a reflective *compte rendu* of some thirty years' fairly sustained engagement with Derrida's work' (24), once again emphasising the importance of the formal aspects of Derrida's work. Derrida, Norris argues, 'is a canny and exceptionally astute logician', and it is his attention to 'logical structure' that distinguishes his philosophical work from literary criticism (34). It is here that Derrida's challenging proximity to the analytical tradition can be appreciated (36). For Norris, there is *a* Derrida who cannot be dismissed as an anti-realist, employs classical logic and remains preoccupied with questions of truth (37-9). One could perhaps add the examples of Derrida's quite formal use of the logic of philosophy to confound the basic structures of philosophy, such as the 'part that is greater than the whole' (*La dissémination*) and *avant et devant*, that which is at once before *and* after, behind *and* ahead (*La carte postale*).

Christina Howells reflects on her twenty-five year interest in Derrida's ambivalent debt to Sartre, and both challenges Derrida's readings of Satre's humanism in the 1960s and celebrates his recognition in the 1990s of the legacy of Sartre's profound meditations on 'the non-self-identical subject' (167). According to Howells, both Sartre and Derrida recognise that the self is always 'still to come': 'That is to say, it will never arrive. But this is not a matter of failure: on the contrary, it is precisely this structure which renders decision-making and responsibility possible' (168). In his essay, Richard Beardsworth challenges the legacy of Derrida from the distinctive perspective of the 're-determination' of 'the material real' and the future 'concrete uni-

versality' of 'world democracy' (58, 63). Beardsworth argues that 'Derrida's late work focuses on aporias between justice, law and force that will always already undermine the practice of world democracy' (62).

While Beardsworth acknowledges the importance of Derrida's political thought, he predicates his analysis of the progress of 'world democracy' — a rather unfortunate phrase which lends itself as much to the right as to the left of contemporary political debate — on Derrida's inadequate reflections on history and his apparent 'return' to reason in his late and 'rather rapid rapprochement' with Habermas (47-8, 53, 58-9, 62). And it is worth noting here that in the last essay in the book Lasse Thomassen offers a comprehensive account of the distance and proximity in the 'discussions' between Derrida and Habermas. In response to Beardsworth's essay, one could argue that from his earliest work Derrida had long been preoccupied with what Beardsworth calls 'the relations between reason, history and matter' (53). As Derrida argued in 'Violence et métaphysique', to think about history without returning to a historicism or retreating to an ahistorcism one must attempt to think of history as 'the history of the departures from totality'.

In the most lively example in the book of the polemical negotiation over the legacy of Derrida's political thought, Alex Thomson offers a persuasive rebuttal of Beardsworth's essay while focusing on Derrida's nuanced response to the relation between Islam and democracy in *Voyous*. Arguing that Derrida's work does not provide a 'methodology' but rather instances of strategic 'political practice' — and this is certainly apparent in the 1987 interview 'Negotiations' which opens the book of the same name — Thomson questions Beardsworth's assertion that Derrida turns towards religion in the mid-1990s and back to reason in his last works (66, 76-7). For Thomson, in his reflections on the events in Alergia in 1992 in *Voyous*, Derrida 'outlines two conflicting duties: to resist the attack on democracy present in some forms of Islam ... but also to allow for the possibility that the future of democracy might itself come from Islam' (77).

In his contribution, Michael Dillon carries on this disputation over the relation between Derrida's writings on religion and politics in the last decade of his life. Focusing on what he calls the 'non-negotiable' aporia of justice as a messianic force of law and transformation, Dillon both accepts a 'turn' to religion in Derrida's work and argues that his notion of the 'messianic' still has a political significance (80, 82, 90). One has only to read the essays collected in *Psyché: Inventions de l'autre* (1978-1988) and, most of all, *Glas* (1974), to appreciate that there were no discrete monolithic 'turns' in the last decade of Derrida's work.

I am sorry to say that I cannot really do justice to the remaining essays in this collection, beyond giving a bare outline of their preoccupations. Maja Zehfuss evokes Derrida's work on memory (and the future of memory) to resist the current American administration's use of World War Two to explain and justify the war on terror. Josef Teboho Ansorge uses Derrida's *Politique de l'amité* to challenge recent writings on international relations, and Don Bulley provides a reading of the agonised choices of President Bartlet in *The*

West Wing in relation to Derrida's work on the responsible decision and the 'negotiation of the non-negotiable' (135). April R. Biccum complements these essays on American foreign policy with an exploration of the concept of diversity in Bhabha, Spivak and Derrida.

Daniel Watt and Jenny Edkins both extend the range of this book with their respective meditations on the fragmentation of the aphorism in Derrida's writing and on the differences between Derrida and Nancy, and a study of the haunting photographs of Salgado. Edkins reminds us of the suspended polemic from the introduction, observing: 'Whereas with Derrida we are led to consider what binds us as singularities to other singularities, in Nancy our attention is directed rather to the impossibility of being on our own without first being with' (188). One can only look forward to Hillis Miller's promised work on Derrida and the *Mitsein*.

The essays collected in this book are a welcome testament to the scope of Derrida's work in helping us to negotiate with war and death in our times. It is also perhaps a testament to the fact that in negotiating a legacy one must also start again, and again, without rest. One of the many burdens of carrying Derrida's legacy — and one must perhaps carry (*tragen*) as much as negotiate with a legacy — is the 'ocean of words' (as Plato's Parmenides called them) that is neither late nor early, but begins in 1953 and has still yet to finish.

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Peter Forrest
Developmental Theism:
From Pure Will to Unbounded Love.
New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 207.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921458-7).

In recent years, work by analytic philosophers on the metaphysics of theism has taken an interesting turn. Some theistic philosophers dissatisfied with classical theism have proposed and defended alternative conceptions of God that deviate to varying degrees from classical theism. This monograph is the latest book-length defense of an alternative to classical theism that aims at being both coherent and religiously adequate.

Forrest offers 'a speculative philosophical theology based on three themes: that a version of materialism is a help, not a hindrance in philosophical the-

ology; that God develops; and that this development is on the whole kenotic — that is, an abandonment of power' (1). He argues in defense of a version of modest non-reductive materialism on which the mental is, of metaphysical necessity, correlated with the physical. But neither the mental nor the physical is ontologically dependent upon the other (23). God *qua* subject of conscious mental states is immanent in all things, with the exception of other centers of consciousness. The result is a panentheism on which all that exists counts as a single system that corresponds to a divine agent (43). God's power is constrained (but not eliminated) by whatever laws of nature govern the material world, and God's immanence is limited by the presence of other conscious beings (28).

Forrest's account of how God develops goes as follows. The Primordial God begins as a conscious agent necessarily correlated with the first moment of time and with whatever abstract entities necessarily exist. On this account, God begins as impersonal, all-powerful, all-knowing, and acts in a consequentialist fashion, from a hedonic motive, in creating the physical universe. God changes both by creating a natural order that restricts divine power (112-15) and by developing a loving moral character (123-7). God changes further by splitting into three divine persons constituted by three different sub-bundles of universe-fibres each has control over. The three persons are one God insofar as they necessarily agree upon any course of action, they jointly act on one universe, and no one of them can exist independently of the others. Finally, God changes by one member of the Trinity becoming incarnate in the human person, Jesus Christ.

In his introduction and first chapter, Forrest presents his readers with the conception of God he develops in the book. He focuses on methodological matters in Chapter 2. Forrest's starting point for doing philosophical theology is what he calls '*properly anthropocentric metaphysics*' (38). Properly anthropocentric metaphysics takes as its starting point both qualities that humans share with many other animals (e.g., being conscious agents) and qualities they share with few other animals (e.g., a first-person perspective, a sense of self, a capacity for reflection on our beliefs and actions, and a sense of persistence over time) (38). Properly anthropocentric metaphysics takes these things and the sciences as the proper starting point for thinking about the nature of things, including God. Our characteristics that cannot be understood in purely scientific terms are ascribed to God. Such characteristics, Forrest claims, 'are not of the right kind to be understood in scientific terms, such as the mysteries of consciousness and agency' (38).

Forrest addresses some objections, but ignores others. For instance, while some features of phenomenal consciousness might escape reduction, most philosophers working on agency reduce the agency relation to a causal relation that obtains between behavior and mental items that are either realized by or token identical to some neural events. Most believe such a metaphysical reduction does not amount to eliminating agency. If it does, those who accept the reductive picture of agency need to know why a reductive view of agency implies its elimination. Unfortunately, while Forrest says a good bit

about consciousness and his modest materialism in much of Chapter 2, and further in Chapter 3, he says very little in defense of his favored nonreductive conception of agency.

In Chapter 4 Forrest defends his account of the Primordial God's power, knowledge, and motivation. In Chapter 5, he considers the case for the existence of the Primordial God, arguing that 'although, given enough universes, we could explain why there is one suited to life, it is still improbable that we should be in such a beautiful one' (102). If we start by assigning a non-negligible probability to the divine, the evidence increases the probability of a putatively simple explanation such as the Primordial God as the explanation of the universe. Of course, it is not obvious that the Primordial God is the simplest personal cause, if we assume that a personal cause provides a better explanation than a non-personal cause. Forrest addresses such concerns. But I expect many readers will not be satisfied by his arguments.

Chapter 6 is devoted to the question how the Primordial God acquires a loving character and undergoes an abdication of power. The loss of power is a consequence of creating a natural order set up such that God could not overrule it. The kenotic development of God provides resources for Forrest's response to the problem of evil in Chapter 7. He argues in defense of the claim that, 'For the sake of the joy that love will give, the unloving Primordial God does something that probably no one would do out of love: puts both itself and creatures in a risky situation and limits its power to do anything about it' (140). I expect that Forrest's argument will be appealing to theists who have rejected classical theism; but it will no doubt prove unsatisfying to both classical theists and critics of theism. Still, both his reply to the problem of evil and his reply to possible objections warrant the attention of philosophers working on the problem of evil.

Chapters 8 and 9 are devoted to some of the philosophical problems raised by the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Forrest's proposals are original and ingenious and should be of interest to both Christian readers and non-Christian readers alike. Perhaps one of the most stimulating and original portions of Chapter 9 is Forrest's attempt at making sense of the doctrine of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

I cannot recommend this book strongly enough to readers interested in philosophical theology. It deserves the careful attention of anyone doing serious work on the metaphysics of theism, especially theists who are dissatisfied with classical theism.

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Harry Frankfurt
Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2006.
Pp. 133.
US$15.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-5298-5).

Frankfurt's book is based on the Tanner Lectures that he delivered at Stanford University in 2004. It also includes the responses to his lectures presented by Christine Korsgaard, Michael Bratman, and Meir Dan-Cohen. To a great extent Frankfurt's lectures are a summary of what he has established in earlier books and papers. But, as is typical of Frankfurt, he presents his arguments carefully, eloquently, and with considerable wisdom and sincerity.

The title of Frankfurt's lectures neatly describes their theme and purpose. 'Taking ourselves seriously' involves asking important evaluative questions about our loves, desires, projects, and ways of life. When we take ourselves seriously, we direct our gaze inwards and try to settle upon a way of being with which we can identify wholeheartedly. And 'getting it right' suggests success at this endeavor. When we 'get it right', we become wholehearted, unified, or internally harmonious (2). Many of the evaluative questions that we ask concern the things and persons that we love or care about. For Frankfurt, loving is a species or 'mode' of caring (40). And both loving and caring provide our lives with a structure and set of 'final ends' (42-3). Given the centrality of loving and caring to our lives, it is important that we love and care about the *right* things. It is important, as Frankfurt puts it, that we 'get it right'.

In addition to providing us with a structure and purpose, what we love provides us with reasons. The love that I possess for my mother provides me with a reason to promote what I take to be in her interests (42). This may involve tending to her emotional and physical well-being, or helping her complete a project that is deeply important to her. But although my love for my mother provides *me* with reasons for treating her in various ways, it need not provide *you* with reasons for doing the same. Unless you happen to care about my mother and me, you will have no reason to come to our aid, or to further our various projects. Practical reasons are therefore agent-relative and derived from the objects of our love (48). Still, due to natural selection (or so Frankfurt speculates), we all tend to care about the same *kinds* of things (37-8). While you may not care about my mother and me, you probably do care about your mother and yourself.

Frankfurt's analysis of love and practical reason presents us with several challenges concerning the very enterprise of moral philosophy. If your reasons are relative to the objects of your love, and my reasons are relative to the objects of my love, then how can we hope to share many important reasons in common? For example, if I am indifferent to the fact that my neighbor physically and emotionally abuses his spouse, then I will lack a reason to do anything about it. Indeed, if Frankfurt is right, then this is precisely what we should expect. It is only natural that our reasons are grounded in the objects of our love, i.e. our friends, spouses, children, etc.

Frankfurt's analysis of love and reason is in my view largely correct. Sadly, we are generally indifferent to the suffering of those who are not integrated into our personal lives (especially if they happen to live in distant parts of the world). And it is probably the case that natural selection, among other things, can help us understand why this is so. However, I am not convinced that our reasons are wholly determined by what we love and care about. After reflecting upon the sorry state of humanity, a person may *force* herself to act in the interests of others. Although she does not *care* about these individuals, she may feel obligated to help them. Frankfurt might respond to this challenge by claiming that the person just described *does* care about others, and thus possesses reasons concerning their well-being. But, if this is true, then the 'love' or 'care' in question will be rather weak and formal. She may have a reason, say, to donate money to UNICEF, but it does not follow from this that she identifies with this act, i.e., that it provides her life with meaning and structure. On a related note, even if Frankfurt is correct in thinking that all of our reasons derive from love, it may be the case that reasoning in response to factual matters engenders love, and thus, reasons. If I can learn to see others as relevantly similar to myself, then I may learn to extend my love and care to them as well. This does not show that 'bare reason' itself produces reasons. But it does show that 'bare reason' may *indirectly* provide us with reasons by expanding the horizons of our sympathy and love.

This wise and engaging little book deals with issues that are profoundly important to us as human beings. Frankfurt effortlessly weaves together his various thoughts on love, agency, and practical reason. The commentaries that accompany Frankfurt's lectures provide readers with a broad and critical look at his work and its relevance to contemporary debates on these topics. Scholars interested in Frankfurt, or the philosophical issues discussed in his lectures, will enjoy reading this book.

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Ido Geiger
The Founding Act of Modern Ethical Life:
Hegel's Critique of Kant's Moral and Political
Philosophy.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2007.
Pp. 192.
US$55.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-5424-8).

The difficulty of Hegel's political philosophy often shapes the aspiration of his commentators, with the result that many new books on Hegel are either

introductions to his thought or guides to his most well-known works, instead of new interpretations. Our expectation, then, ought be high when Geiger tells us that he has found something that 'has remained undiscovered in Hegel's text' (144), something previously 'overlooked by his readers' (48) until now, and that this discovery will newly illuminate not only Hegel's critique of Kant (the narrow and slightly misleading scope the sub-title promises) but also the other salient features of Hegel's thought which Geiger traverses in the book's course: Sophocles' *Antigone*, the French Revolution and Terror, the dictum 'what is rational is actual', and the ethicality of war. So, what is his discovery and how well does he carry off his project?

Geiger's discovery is that the 'idea of a *founding act* of a form of life' (4) or, more specifically, 'founding the realm of freedom ... [i.e.] the founding act of ethical life' (128) is an organizing concern of Hegel's philosophic project. The Kantian legacy of Hegel is to see freedom as rationality, but then to supercede Kant by seeing that this abstract freedom must be transformed, through an act, into a concrete world: a form of life that is fundamentally shared. Geiger's claim, though, is not that the various shapes of ethical life are founded and destroyed within a larger historical process (which he accepts [e.g., 30]), but that this *'founding act'* must be logically and phenomenologically distinguished from both the actions and processes within an established form of ethical life and the actions and processes that lead to its destruction. The values present in the founding act cannot be derived from what came before, nor can they be explained by the way of life it founds. For this reason the founding act is the province not of a way of life but of an individual — the world historical individual, be that individual Antigone in the ancient world or Napoleon of the modern one. The radical newness of these values *necessarily* makes the founding act both violent and one whose significance must pass unacknowledged by the community and by the individual carrying it out (128-9).

Three broad and contentious arguments underwrite these claims. First, that Hegel models his conception of freedom on Kantian morality, but differs merely on whether the motivations for action can be abstract and internal or must be concrete and social (Chapters 1, 2). For Geiger, Kantian rationality becomes Hegelian actuality (Chapter 4). Now, this interpretation well fits the *Philosophy of Right*'s (*PR*) transition from 'Morality' (Hegel's interpretation of the Kantian morality) to 'Ethical Life', articulated in the long remark to *PR* § 140 (which is, oddly, not analyzed and barely mentioned), but it is not clear that Kantian morality *itself* survives this transition. To know this would require an analysis of freedom not present in the book. Second, however, Geiger suggests that it is not just the founding of *modern* ethical life modeled by Kantian morality, but *all* foundings, beginning with Antigone's founding of Greek ethical life (Chapter 3), and that this problem of the founding act of ethical life exists not just for Hegel but is as old as Plato's *Republic* (144–5). To find this Kantianism within Sophocles and Plato is one thing; but Geiger underplays how immensely challenging his reading is to *Hegel's* own interpretation of Sophocles and Plato. To argue that Antigone is a bearer of Kan-

tian morality — e.g., 'we would describe her as obeying the law commanding the right of burial to every human being' (56) — who *founds* Greek ethical life is difficult to reconcile with Hegel's own consistent understanding that the Greek world is one in which the moral subject was beyond its ontological horizon. Indeed, Plato's genius, Hegel frequently reminds us, was to have intuited that moral subjectivity was the force that would break into, and break apart, Greek ethical life. And it is for this reason that nearly all interpreters understand Antigone's acting on a socially unacknowledged law (as Geiger skillfully brings out) to be *destructive* of Greek ethical life — an interpretation that Geiger acknowledges as 'not wrong', but sees as but 'a small part' of Hegel's project (51). Third, he argues that the ethical significance Hegel attributes to war should be explained by grasping war, not as a response 'to the past whose destruction it completes but' instead 'to the future it founds' (121; see Chapters 5 & 6). This argument affirms the founding act as something distinct from the internal dynamics of collapse that heralds the birth of a new ethical world. While his analysis of war is very sharp, Geiger again underplays how this internal collapse — i.e., *why* an ethical world fails — sets the direction for the founding that comes afterwards. Without an examination of this dynamic of internal collapse — here, again, *PR* §140 would be handy — the case for the ruptural place of the founding act requires further support. If the logic of the founding moment is not shaped by the past, then it is unclear how we should then understand Hegel's claims (which Geiger accepts) about the unfolding of history.

In conclusion, Geiger's are provocative claims and interpretations, worthy stimuli to further thought on the origins and conditions of ethical life, especially because they ask us to see Hegel's political philosophy as primarily prospective and alive rather than retrospective and dead (52-3; see also Chapter 7). Yet, the book's greater contribution lies not so much in the claims as in the *way* it attempts to prove them. This is not, however, because he always provides the detailed and thorough interpretation they require. Attempting to cover so much terrain in 158 pages (including notes), it is no surprise that some interpretations seem too brief; indeed, occasionally the work of linking analysis to conclusion seem done more with adverbs than arguments, e.g., passages in different Hegelian texts are 'incontestably the equivalent' (153), other passages 'very strongly suggest' Geiger's conclusions (110), and frequently those conclusions are 'clearly' more present than robustly demonstrated. While not quite basic enough to be an introduction, nor detailed enough to serve as a reference guide, Geiger's book nonetheless takes us on a remarkably compact and interesting interpretative tour of some of the most salient and important aspects of Hegel's political thought.

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Walter Glannon
Bioethics and the Brain.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University
Press 2007.
Pp. 348.
Cdn$50.50/US$45.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-530778-8);
Cdn$27.95/US$24.95
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-537194-9).

Glannon addresses a number of issues relating to neuroscience and medical ethics. After his short introduction, he examines the relation between self and brain, neuroimaging, pharmacological and psychological methods of changing people, direct interventions in the brain, and brain death. Glannon does not identify himself with well-known ethical theories, but rather examines issues on their own terms. His philosophy of mind tends more towards materialism than substance dualism, but he does not provide a label for his view. In his epilogue, he sums up his view of the relation between mind and body by saying 'the mind emerges from the brain when it reaches a certain level of complexity, and ... the brain and mind are influenced by the ways in which a human organism interacts with the environment' (179). So this book does not set out a central philosophical thesis and systematically defend it. Rather, it examines the views staked out in its selected topics, and then comments on them. Aside from being about bioethics and the brain, there is not much to connect the different chapters.

The great strength of Glannon's examination lies in his knowledge of neuroscience and related technological developments. He manages to summarize large portions of technical knowledge in terms accessible to lay readers. He avoids jargon and minimizes scientific terminology, and explains it when he has to use it. So he is an excellent guide to neuroscience for readers who have not taken courses in the subject. However, the question arises, who is this book aimed at? Neuroscientists will already be familiar with the science that he summarizes. Yet Glannon also writes about philosophy in an introductory way. He introduces philosophers to the reader as if they may not have heard of them before: for example, he refers to 'the seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke'. Furthermore, it is enormously difficult to pin down Glannon's central philosophical claims. The book is full of discussions and explorations of ideas, but it is hard to know what he actually believes. For example, he says he adopts 'the second, richer, concept of the self' (32). This is confusing because he has not contrasted two concepts of the self before this, but rather has said that self is a richer and more complex notion than mere conscious awareness of one's persistence through time. He seems to endorse V.S. Ramachandran's definition of the self as involving first-person conscious awareness of persistence through time, of internal coherence, of embodiment, and of agency. He also says that he would add to this account a fifth component: 'the ability to perceive and respond appropriately to the

external world' (33). Glannon explains that he will give an account how the capacities that constitute our selves correlate with brain processes.

Philosophers of mind will wonder what work Glannon's concept of self is doing here, and how we might assess its accuracy. He says neuropsychiatric disorders can 'disturb, disrupt, or shatter the self' (32), but this sounds more like a metaphor than a literal truth. Glannon does not seem to be aiming to provide any necessary and sufficient conditions for having a self, and he does not provide any clear criteria for what counts as disturbance or shattering of the self. Rather, his discussion rushes through Capgras syndrome, Asperger's syndrome, schizophrenia, near-death experiences, and a fictional character in a novel who has religious experiences. This all occurs in the space of a few pages. So philosophers of mind will not recognize this as scholarly work within their field, but conclude it is setting out some basic ideas for later discussion.

Glannon's discussion of neuroimaging first explains the basic science and techniques, and then proceeds to explore some of the philosophical issues it raises. He addresses some arguments that knowledge of the brain processes behind our actions may lead people to deny that we have free will, and he counters these views with some familiar arguments. He says that he defends a capacity-theoretic conception of free will and responsibility, and spends a paragraph explaining what he means, and then moves on. He proceeds to discuss some legal cases of the relevance of brain science to holding people responsible for their actions, and comes to the sensible conclusion that brain imaging should play a limited supplementary role in our current practices. In the process he has kicked up a great deal of dust, and it is far from clear what his central argument is or what items in his discussion are peripheral.

In the chapter on pharmacological and psychological interventions, Glannon again does a good job of summarizing recent scientific developments. He surveys therapeutic psychopharmacology, placebos, forced behavior control, and cognitive and affective enhancement. He outlines some of the ethical concerns that arise in connection with these issues and again makes sensible suggestions, urging caution and emphasizing the dangers of over enthusiasm for new medications and technology. Yet these issues have been discussed previously, at length, and Glannon's overview rushes by, passing from one issue to another without ever examining any of them in great detail. Similar remarks apply to the subsequent chapter on brain surgery and neurostimulation.

By far the most coherent chapter in the book is the last, in which Glannon argues that people are characterized essentially by their higher cognitive faculties, and so we should reject whole-brain death as our definition of death and adopt a higher-brain definition, or what he calls a 'narrow neurological criterion' (149). Here his philosophical argument is more sophisticated and better integrated into the science and the particular recent and classic cases he discusses. His discussion of false neurological assumptions made by defenders of the whole-brain definition is particularly interesting. Philosophically, Glannon's argument is very familiar, but he does a good job at relating it to current neuroscience.

As a whole, this book will be informative to both neuroscientists and philosophers about areas outside their areas of expertise, but will not advance their knowledge within their areas of expertise. It would work well as a text in an upper level interdisciplinary undergraduate course, and it should be helpful in interdisciplinary studies such as medical ethics and neuroethics.

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David Goldblatt
Art and Ventriloquism.
New York: Routledge 2006.
Pp. 195.
US$130.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-415-37059-2);
US$39.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-415-37060-8).

In the final chapter of *The Problems of Philosophy* Bertrand Russell states that, unless the human intellect becomes considerably more powerful than it is now, many questions of philosophy will remain unanswered. If Russell is correct, then it would seem likely that several of the unanswerable questions of philosophy pertain to art and its objects. Although David Goldblatt does not maintain that the model of ventriloquism will help answer all questions of philosophical or critical interest about art, in his book he states that 'the idea of ventriloquism can belong to a set of ways we come to locate and understand art-world phenomena' (x). Goldblatt speaks of ventriloquism as a metaphor for engaging with and interpreting artworks to which the Greek idea of *ecstasis* — meaning being next to oneself, or stepping beyond oneself — is key (x, 33,107). Thus a ventriloquist, such as Edgar Bergen, can be understood to step beyond himself in animating his dummy, Charlie McCarthy, with apparent talk; and oddly enough he might be understood to be beside himself, given that he is listening to language for which he is himself responsible.

The application of the 'ventriloqual' model to art and artists in Goldblatt's work is varied and insightful, and the range of application of the model and the depth to which it can be understood to function are intriguing. Although this is a novel model in philosophical aesthetics, the work is imaginative and scholarly in its consideration of such philosophical figures as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida, Foucault, Danto, and Cavell; and such artists and their works as Duchamp, Klee, Magritte, Johns, Rauschenberg, and Peter Eisenman, as authors, artists, and artworks pertain to ideas of the book and to its main theme, which is the relevance of ventriloquism to philosophical aesthetics and to certain artworks. Given the centrality of the notion of

ecstasis to the ventriloqual model, and the views of thinkers that Goldblatt examines in relation to that notion, it is pertinent to note that he does not maintain that it is used in the same way by the different philosophers and artists that he considers (117). The breadth and complexity of the essays of this book and the space limitations of a review make an attempt to summarize each essay less appropriate than focusing on some key ideas of the work.

One artworld phenomenon that receives interesting treatment is the work in progress. It is implicit in talk about an artwork that it is a completed entity of some sort, and it is typically so discussed. While he does not maintain that all artworks have histories of development characterizable as 'a period of interplay between artist and the artistic project's "raw materials"' (46), Goldblatt rightly notes that the work in progress has not received the attention that it deserves, and he makes a good case that the ventriloqual model can be profitably used to understand the progression of works that have such histories of development. As Goldblatt indicates, ventriloquism can be understood to have two ontological levels, corresponding to two ways in which the conversation of ventriloquism can be characterized. On one level the ventriloquist talks to a dummy, and on the other the ventriloquist is engaged in self-conversation; but in each case an entity other than the ventriloquist is involved. The application of these different ventriloqual levels to an artwork in progress means that, on the first level (of talking to an other), the artist 'talks to' the work as it develops from an inchoate to a completed stage. On the second level (of talking to oneself through an other), the history of an artwork from inception to completion can be seen as a conversation that an artist has with herself as a stage of the work 'talks back' to the artist, and so informs what she will 'say' next to, and through, the work in doing whatever she does next. The work in progress is then a kind of dialogue partner with the artist who is responsible for the work. As such a partner, the work not only plays a role in its own development, but plays a role in the development of the artist, at least until, but perhaps beyond, the dialogue ends with its completion.

The pertinence of the ventriloqual model to the work in progress is thus linked by Goldblatt to the Heideggerian notion of the 'symbiotic relationship between artist and work' (42) that indicates that, as the identity of the work is determined by the artist, the identity of the artist is partially determined by the work. The self-conversation that characterizes the work in progress is a major element that Goldblatt examines in Cavell's work, and he finds the ontological levels of the ventriloqual act to correspond to Dantonian levels of understanding artworks where paint on canvas, for instance, is distinguished as material from an image that the material is used to construct, such as that of an apple. Further, for Goldblatt, the conversational dynamic of the work in progress is analogous to the interpretation of artworks, in that the work has an effect on our understanding as we try to interpret it, and then our interpretation of the work affects how we approach the work.

In emphasizing the exchange between artist and artwork that occurs in the creation of many works, the ventriloqual model might seem insular, since the process that is the affecting of the artist by the work being effected must

be situated within a larger context that includes, as it is informed by, art history and any other history that is relevant to that process. Thus, if it is serious, no conversation between work and artist is private. However, Goldblatt's recognition of the relevance of histories to works in progress is perhaps implicit in such language as 'intention-in-the-context-of-practice' (46), if the context of practice is understood to include any history that is relevant to that context. It may also be recognized in Goldblatt's talk of 'an institutionalized intermediary' as another voice that informs the work in progress (46).

For Goldblatt, Peter Eisenman's work is a 'dislocation of an architectural self' since, as inventive, it 'must resist the very process of institutionalizing what he/she is commissioned to do' (108). Goldblatt examines ideas of Derrida's and Danto's in addition to Eisenman's in his analysis of Eisenman's work, and he relates that work to the notion of an 'arbitrary text' that 'works by the architect's choosing some *materially applicable* aspect of that text, by juxtaposing it to the usual texts of architecture and assigning it more or less equal influence in the final design' (125, Goldblatt's emphasis). Such an approach has the effect of undermining 'the usual opposition between essence and accident' (124) that characterizes the search for 'metaphysical essentials' in traditional architecture, and results in a building that is less an object in a place than something between the two, and locates the architect between himself as a being who is 'co-implicated in the institutional theory of architecture and an other if non-characterized self ...' (125). This state of affairs resembles the ventriloquist's being between herself and her dummy.

The 'ventriloquist effaces himself ... by the logic of his act' (70), and to the notion of self-plagiarism in art Goldblatt applies the concept of effacement in the ventriloqual model that he finds in the distancing of the author from the literary work in Nietzsche and Foucault. For Goldblatt, artistic self-plagiarism occurs when an artist 'takes from the aesthetically significant features of his/her previous work, and presents them under the false assumption that they are creatively original and that aesthetic progress has been made ...' (131). 'Self-plagiarism is a special case of *ecstasis*' (132), since the artist steps outside of herself in looking back on and repeating previous work ... echoing the once creative properties that were produced earlier' (132). It is immoral since 'successful self-plagiarism is received, discussed and evaluated by art-world members' as if it were original (131). Although Goldblatt says that self-plagiarism 'works best ... [and] perhaps only, under a modernist notion of the arts where originality is held at a premium' (132), it is not clear that an artist could not purposely engage in self-plagiarism and claim it to be an original gesture whose possible interest and value might be assessed in relation to, and perhaps to further subvert, modernist notions of progress and originality. One must also ask when working in a series ceases to be valid and becomes self-plagiarism. Is it possible to state necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient for each kind of activity that will distinguish one from the other? If one interrupts a series in favor of different work, how does one distinguish coming back to continue earlier exploration from the morally repugnant act of self-plagiarism?

This collection of seven fertile and provocative essays is a welcome addition to the literature of philosophical aesthetics. It is preceded by an excellent critical commentary by Garry Hagberg, and is succeeded by two outstanding art-critical essays by Goldblatt on artworks about ventriloquism by Paul Klee and Jasper Johns.

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Peter Gratton and **John Panteleimon Manoussakis, eds**.
Traversing the Imaginary: Richard Kearney and the Postmodern Challenge.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 2007.
Pp. 224.
US$59.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8101-2377-9);
US$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8101-2378-6).

In *Poetics of Imagining* (1991) Richard Kearney writes, 'Imagination lies at the heart of our existence, we would not be human without it.' Without, that is, 'the power to convert absence into presence, actuality into possibility, what is into something-other-than-it-is' (1-4). Gratton and Manoussakis gather together the genealogy of Kearney's philosophy of imagination (including themes of narrativity, possibility and storytelling), along with central aspects of his work with colleagues old and new.

Part 1, 'The Dialogical Imaginary', contains Kearney's 'intellectual itinerary' of 'formative influences' (x): Charles Taylor, Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida, Martha Nussbaum and Noam Chomsky. As his teacher and thesis director (1975-76), Taylor oversaw Kearney's first work on the philosophy of imagination and proved an inspiration for his combination of philosophical and political questions. 'On Social Imaginaries' sees Taylor look at the 'stories, images, ideologies' (30) presupposed by agents in the social world as they have operated in recent crises such as 9/11. Both he and Kearney promote the need for dialogue and mutual understanding between the 'multiple modernities' (social imaginaries) that constitute different political and cultural identities and practices.

Just as influential as a 'teacher, guide and friend' (xi) was Paul Ricoeur, Kearney's doctoral supervisor and director. Writing in response to Kearney's recent work, *On Stories*, Ricoeur seeks to 'enrich and reinforce' its conclusions 'by adding the adjective *acting* to that of *suffering*' (5). Ricoeur hopes

that by widening the referential base of narrative to recapture the theme of 'mourning' we might endure and work through the loss, fragmentation and chaos of our 'time of crisis' (of imagination, legitimation and authority') and begin anew (without obsessive and compulsive repetition, melancholia or amnesia) as *homme capable*, keeping the future open to the impossible.

'Terror and Religion' sees Kearney question a man synonymous with the (im)possible, Jacques Derrida, as to whether his apparent preference for difference over reconciliation is justified in the wake of 9/11, Northern Ireland *etc*. Derrida's reply lays bare the differences between the two men, as, in contrast to Kearney, he argues that in thinking the most rigorous relation to the other one must be ready to give up (without simply renouncing) the hope of a return to salvation, resurrection and even reconciliation. It is thus that Derrida contrasts Kearney's faith in something determinable with his own faith in the absolute powerless indeterminacy of *Khora*.

Kearney's final dialogues with Martha Nussbaum and Noam Chomsky continue discussions begun in *States of Mind* (1995). In 'Ethics of Narration' Nussbaum details her Aristotelian vision for effective cosmopolitan narratives which respect both local attachments (lovers, sports teams, nations) and 'what we owe all human beings, and, indeed, all animals' (49). Emphasizing the connections between 'education, immigration and social justice' (xxi) she argues we must develop narratives that warn of the dangers of partisan loyalties, give insights into lives in other times or predicaments, and enhance our understanding of suffering wherever it occurs (49). It is a matter of constant dialogue between narrative and theory, which raises for Kearney the vexed question of criteria.

The manufacture of narrative is also the concern of Chomsky in 'Intellectuals and Ideology' as he argues that without a belief in fundamental human nature — including a need for and a right to freedom and independence' (53) — there is no barrier to the kind of social engineering effected by dominant discourses and their intellectual apologists. Chomsky's analysis of the role of political imagination in ideology, propaganda and the media's 'manufacture of consent' has clearly been incisive for Kearney, despite his unease at Chomsky's 'innate speak'.

Part 2, 'The Political Imaginary', contains five essays by thinkers who share Kearney's concern with the 'function of narrative imagination in both the history of politics and its contemporary practice,' in particular how it pertains to 'current problems of sovereignty, nationalism, globalism and the crisis of the nation-state' (xiii). 'Intellectual Adventures in the Isles' by Dennis Dworkin, and 'Reimagining Ireland, Britain and Europe' by James M. Smith, both examine Kearney's theoretical and practical interventions in the Ireland Peace Process as they pertain to Ireland's political imaginary and British studies and politics. Focusing on Kearney's *Postnationalist Ireland*, both men affirm his attempt to map out a post-nationalist, post-modern space attuned to the globalisation process, 'in which overlapping local, national, and regional identities are given expression through multiple sites of sovereignty inside and outside the Isles' (61). Kearney is enjoined, however,

to think more about the role of British nationalist ideologies in the Irish troubles, and Smith in particular points out that the Republic of Ireland is less likely than its Northern counterpart to embrace a postnationalist future for Ireland. This pessimistic view is shared by Anne O'Byrne, who in 'Traumatized Sovereignty', regards the political phenomenon of 'sovereign trauma' to be a limit to plotting a common narrative and facilitating 'justice' for both sides.

Taking a more comprehensive, theoretical overview, in 'Imaginings, Narratives and Otherness' John Rundell examines Kearney's transition from poetics to ethics, contrasting his 'hermeneutics of possibility' with a rather churlish, inaccurate version of the postmodern imagination evinced by Kearney himself in a mis-reading of the implications of Derrida's conception of *khora*. Recalling Kearney's dialogues(s) with Derrida, Rundell sees it as a question of whether 'the poetic dialogue between the self and the other issues in the 'collapse and self-absorption of meaning' (quoting deconstruction) or an 'openness toward world relations' (Kearney).

Also concerned to resist 'the slide from narrativity to relativity' (117), Jerry Burke in 'I Tell You No Lie' endorses Kearney's view that the narrative imagination is not inimical to truth, though he finds Kearney reticent on the details. Supplementing Kearney with Gadamer and in particular Georgina Warnke's 'interpretive openness', Burke argues that we *can* establish better from worse interpretations of history and '"turn the page without closing the book"' (126).

Part 3, 'The Narrative Imaginary', 'continues the inquiry into the more specific areas of literature and culture' (xiii). The first two contributors, David Wood and Terry Eagleton, explore the role of narrativity and history in Kearney's novels *Sam's Fall* (1995) and *Walking at Sea Level* (1997). In 'Double Trouble' Wood argues the narrative success of both books is also their philosophical weakness, as the 'question of the double' pervading these books which could have led to 'another kind of time, a time transversal to that of narrative, and perhaps also another kind of [disruptive] imagination' (135) is, to their detriment, subordinated to the narrative logic of will to truth, giving the illusion of resolution. Eagleton also focuses on the double in Kearney's novels in 'Heretic Adventures', but this time in order to affirm Kearney's distrust of traditional notions of identity he shares with eighteenth century Irish philosopher John Toland, name-sake of the fictive twins in his 1997 work. Eagleton argues that he here continues 'an honourable lineage of Irish letters ... that is sophisticatedly cosmopolitan yet rooted in moral reality' (141).

It is just this rooted-ness that Jeffrey A. Barash applauds in Kearney's trilogy *Philosophy at the Limit*. In 'Beyond Postmodernism' Barash argues it is precisely Kearney's focus on empirical otherness which enables him to develop a credible postmodern ethics, i.e. one opposed to yet another badly drawn caricature of relativistic postmodernism. 'Kearney's work, he says, provides hermeneutical standards by which to recognize the differences between gods and monsters, between hospitality and fanaticism' (xxiv).

Also drawing on Kearney's trilogy via a reading of Gabriel Marquez's *Story of a Shipwrecked Sailor*, Eileen Rizo-Patron argues that testimonial literature cannot be easily separated from imaginative fiction, given the oneiric dimension of both narrative forms. She argues that (private and collective) dream-filled testimonies such as Velasco's, bear witness to the '"critical utopian" potential of narrative imagination' (156) which can transform cultural politics and consciousness in more open, democratic ways.

Finally, in 'Truth, Ethics, and Narrative Imagination' Mark Dooley rides to the rescue of Derrida and (also) Rorty, both of whom he sees misrepresented in Kearney's work as pernicious moral relativists. Despite a rather spiteful and vacuous attack on Baudrillard, Dooley's intervention — though left till late — is rather a relief for 'pro-Derrideans', even though his equation of Derrida as a linguistic nominalist in line with Rorty perhaps oversimplifies his work. Dooley's point here is that narrative imagination can survive the loss of *all* metaphysical foundations and *still retain its ethical power*.

As Kearney states '[m]y afterword to this volume, "Traversals and Epiphanies in Joyce and Proust", seeks to show how narrative imagination may, through a series of repetitions and retrievals, lead from trauma and disenchantment to insight and equanimity ... the terrain toward which my current thinking is heading.' And, indeed, the sentiment of this afterword perhaps sums up Kearney's work as it is comprehensively laid bare in this book: interesting, insightful, cross-disciplinary, but at the same time, one feels, almost hopelessly optimistic about the progressive, synthesising force of narrative in a world in which discontinuity and chaos increasingly appears to be our lot, in a polemical moral universe *without foundation*.

Sally Hart
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The well-known tension between the seeming triumph of liberal democracy as the default standard of political legitimacy and the deep scepticism, cynicism and indifference that citizens show towards their democracies in the

Western world is the backdrop for Hiley's book. Hiley accepts that this cynicism is best accounted for not in terms of the attitude of citizens towards the actual institutions of democracy — after all, voting is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of a healthy democracy — but in terms of the characteristics of citizens themselves. Any effective response to our democratic malaise must therefore take place at the level of a proper understanding of the demands of democratic citizenship. Hiley believes that the problem with contemporary debates about these demands is that they usually take place on a liberal/communitarian landscape, with one side affirming the centrality of rights and voting while the other emphasises the civic virtues necessary for citizenship and which can only be fostered via those social attachments that liberals seem to want to undermine. Hiley's claim is that both liberals and communitarians fail to account for the essential role that doubt plays in democratic citizenship, and it is the aim of his book to address this omission in the current literature.

The book's central argument is that 'doubt is integral to democracy in the sense that its absence would diminish democratic possibilities and risk democracy' (46). This is because there are three 'modes of doubting' which are 'essential' for democratic citizenship. First, doubt and uncertainty represent the epistemic conditions in which democratic politics takes place. 'Democratic politics is necessary because, in the realm of human affairs, certainty is not possible' (48). Secondly, doubt performs a necessary defensive function by providing a 'generalised wariness and particularised dissent and resistance in the face of the undemocratic tendencies inherent in democracy' (46). Finally, citizens of a robust democracy would foster what Hiley calls 'deep doubt': 'Conviction about things that matter deeply and the capacity for self-doubt at the deepest level about those convictions are both requirements of democratic citizenship' (61). Hiley seeks to highlight the nature of the relationship between doubt and democracy mainly by means of a series of historical case studies, examinations of how Socrates, Montaigne and Rousseau married these two concepts in ways which provide models of citizenship or more general insights useful for resolving our current malaise.

While these case studies are in themselves interesting, it is not obvious that they really serve the purpose to which Hiley wants to put them. On the one hand, Hiley relies upon unconventional interpretations of these thinkers which require him to dedicate much time and space to exposition. Most of the chapter on Socrates, for example, is spent defending him as both a sceptic and democrat. As such, the substantial argument — that the deep doubt exemplified by Socrates is a necessary characteristic of democratic citizenship — is left underdeveloped. Even if one accepts that Socrates was both a democrat and a sceptic, the potentially valuable 'pay-off' of accepting that interpretation in terms of tackling our cynicism is really only suggested, not demonstrated. The same goes for his discussions of Montaigne and Rousseau. The actual argument lurks somewhere in the background, and often the reader is left unclear as to how the discussion at hand relates to the book's general thesis. The addition of a conclusion which sought to bring

together and highlight the main points of Hiley's argument would have gone some way to remedy this problem.

Yet on the other hand, one often wonders, when reading these case studies, why Hiley uses these particular thinkers in the first place. Why, for example, do we need to turn to Socrates as an example of someone who combined scepticism with a commitment to democracy — which is a contentious reading — when Rorty's liberal ironist is much closer to home and more easily fits this bill? Socrates' own life, or more specifically his death, might throw some important issues into sharp relief, but that does not mean that his philosophy is the best way of exploring the relationship between doubt and democracy in the twenty-first century. Indeed, Hiley says very little about how he thinks his account of deep doubt is different from and superior to similar accounts like that of Rorty's irony. This gives the book a somewhat disconnected feel from its wider academic context, which further leaves the reader unclear about the real substance of Hiley's argument.

Insofar as Hiley does make his case against certainty and for doubt, it is nevertheless still overstated. Liberal theorists need to recognise that certainty is not the exclusive characteristic of the fundamentalist nut. There are many religious believers who hold their religious convictions with absolute certainty, yet are full participants in liberal democratic life. Indeed, there are many liberals democrats who hold their fundamental beliefs to be absolute moral truths and cannot fathom thinking otherwise, e.g. human beings *are* morally equal irregardless of race, gender, religion, sexuality, etc., I *must* tolerate other religious beliefs. It may, of course, be better if individuals who hold illiberal and undemocratic beliefs with absolute certainty would swallow a large dose of scepticism, but we think that only because we hope that in doing so they might be more willing to engage in the deliberative process and come to abandon those beliefs. But such individuals are the exception rather than the rule, and to say that deep doubt is an *essential* characteristic of democratic citizenship is to risk excluding huge swathes of democratically engaged individuals for whom certainty is not just an epistemological thesis which can be readily discarded, but a necessary and integral feature of their conception of the good. Doubt comes easily to the liberal theorist but at a price for most others.

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David Hume
A Treatise of Human Nature:
A Critical Edition (2 vols.).
Eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University
Press 2007.
Pp. 1090.
Cdn$360.00/US$199.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926385-1).

This is a golden age for editions of the works of early modern British philosophers. The Oxford Francis Bacon, the Clarendon edition of the works of John Locke, the Clarendon edition of the works of David Hume, and the Edinburgh edition of the works of Thomas Reid are all well underway. The remarkable Clarendon edition of *A Treatise of Human Nature*, a fitting tribute to the greatest British philosophical work of the eighteenth-century, sets a standard to which editors of works of philosophy should aspire.

Apart from a brief 'Note on the Texts', Volume 1 consists of the critical texts of the *Treatise*, the *Abstract*, and the *Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh*. A critical text 'has its beginnings in a document or documents [the "copy-text(s)"] that are then emended by, among other things, the elimination of errors, the normalization of accidentals ... or the incorporation of authorial revisions' (589, n. 2). This process, detailed in the essay in Volume 2, 'Editing the Texts of the *Treatise*, the *Abstract*, and the *Letter from a Gentleman*', has resulted in some substantive emendations.

The texts of the *Treatise* and the *Abstract* included in the Clarendon edition are identical to those in the eleventh and all subsequent (i.e., post-2006) impressions of the Oxford Philosophical Texts (OPT) edition of the *Treatise*, which does not include the *Letter*. One feature shared by these impressions of the OPT and the Clarendon edition is especially noteworthy: the inclusion of the pagination of the Selby-Bigge edition of the *Treatise* in the margins of the text. This feature is particularly useful because a considerable amount of scholarly literature refers only to the Selby-Bigge edition, and *Hume Studies* has adopted the convention of referring both to the Selby-Bigge edition and to the Nortons' edition. (The Nortons have compiled a concordance between their edition and Selby-Bigge, the 'Guide to Parallel Paragraph and Page References in Oxford University Press Editions of Hume's *Treatise* and *Abstract*', which was included in the sixth through tenth impressions of the OPT and remains available at http://www.humesociety.org/publications/guides, but it is somewhat difficult to use.) Henceforth, serious students of the *Treatise* need only own the Nortons' edition.

The second volume reflects nearly twenty years of editorial labor. The volume opens with the substantial 'Historical Account of *A Treatise of Human Nature* from its Beginnings to the Time of Hume's Death', which traces the *Treatise* from its intellectual genesis to its publication, critical reception, revision, and defense, and closes with a judicious assessment of Hume's own

attempts to distance himself from the *Treatise*. The essay concludes, justly — albeit unsurprisingly, given where it appears — 'that, despite Hume's efforts to distance himself from the *Treatise*, the work is a philosophical classic worthy in its own right of continuing and rigorous study' (588). 'Editing the Texts of the *Treatise*, the *Abstract*, and the *Letter from a Gentleman*' explains the principles according to which the critical edition was constructed, documents the editors' fine historical detective work in establishing that 'the first edition of the *Treatise* had only one printer ... John Wilson' (608), and details the textual variants discovered in the process of compiling the critical edition. Appended to the essay is a reproduction of the only extant manuscript of the *Treatise* (Book 3, Part 3, Section 6), a list of textual variants derived from this manuscript, and the original text of the Appendix to Volume 3 of the *Treatise*, which includes Hume's famous 'second thoughts' about personal identity and passages emending parts of the text (674-84). The 'Editors' Annotations' are the longest section of this volume. These annotations, 'intended to illuminate, but not interpret Hume's texts' (685), are most illuminating: they explain both Hume's explicit and implicit references to other works and authors, and even clarify the intellectual context in which Hume wrote. Although the editors modestly remark that 'the greater the scholarly accomplishment of any given reader, the more likely it will be that he or she will find these annotations expendable' (684), these annotations considerably expand the contexts in which the work is to be understood, especially by identifying allusions to classical and contemporary literary sources and bringing out Hume's engagement with the views of his own teachers and lesser-known contemporaries. The extensive bibliography does not merely provide references to the works cited in this edition: sections 2 and 3 of the bibliography cite, respectively, works that would have been available to Hume in the Physiological Library in Edinburgh, and works that might have been part of Hume's own library, and thus give the reader 'a sense of the written resources available to Hume in the years leading up to the publication of the *Treatise*' and 'add a bit of credence to suggestions that he had read particular works by the time he was writing the *Treatise*' (980). The volume concludes with two indexes: the first to the interpretive essays included in Volume 2, the second to the annotations and to the texts included in Volume 1 themselves. The second index is considerably more detailed than that of the OPT *Treatise*, and will be far more useful to scholars than both that index and the one in Selby-Bigge.

These two volumes constitute unquestionably the best edition of *A Treatise of Human Nature*: henceforth it will undoubtedly be the starting point for scholarly work. Due to this edition's exorbitant price, unfortunately, many readers who would benefit from it will have to check out the volumes from a library while hoping and waiting for the prompt release of a sturdy paperback edition.

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This book is the second of three volumes by May concerning the normative foundations of international criminal law. The first volume dealt with crimes against humanity and the projected third volume tackles the important question of crimes against the peace. As in the first volume, May is keen on developing a 'minimalist moral position' that takes its inspiration from the seventeenth-century just war tradition. In the present volume, Grotius and Pufendorf become the main philosophical inspirations for devising a moral ground for the rules of warfare as the basis for the legal frameworks that define international criminal and humanitarian law. The book itself is constructed along four parts. Part A is concerned with structuring the philosophical arguments central to understanding the basis for conceiving war crimes *qua* crime. Part B develops an understanding of what constitutes violations during warfare that can become the basis for war crimes prosecutions. Part C applies the principles developed in Part A to the traditional problems of acts during warfare or *jus ad bellum*, i.e., necessity, discrimination between combatants and noncombatants, and proportionality. Lastly, in Part D, May synthesizes his arguments to tackle the problem of prosecuting war crimes and the implications that acts of terrorism have within his framework.

In Part A, the principal concern of this review, May sets forth a 'normative grounding' for defining the rules that are to govern war. Such rules have historically been devised as a way of restraining the parties to a conflict even when one party can be perceived as having just cause. For May, however, the important point is to ground such rules of conduct neither through an evolution of practice or custom, nor by reducing them to principles of judiciability or even of prudence or utility, but rather through an intrinsic conception of humane treatment towards the other. Thus, May is less concerned with the question of justice than with elucidating a concept of honor. Following Grotius, he argues for 'a higher sense of what is owed' (34) and of mercy ('what we owe each other as fellow members of the human race with equal dignity and deserving of the same respect' [81]) than has otherwise traditionally governed the soldiering profession. Following Bentham, he argues that this concept of honor is established and maintained by a sense of self-respect, and more importantly by a society's collective responsibility toward the welfare of those it sends in harm's way. This idea of collective responsibility is rooted in a state's or society's collective obligation to set rules of behavior that minimize the potentiality for indiscriminate killing or acts of cruelty. May is careful, however, to explain that such collective responsibility is 'nondistributive', or that not every member of a society can be held personally liable for particular acts of an individual. Instead, military leaders should be held criminally accountable for actions of soldiers that violate the humaneness of another individual.

May's next task is to situate this concept of humane treatment, and the importance of honor and mercy, within the natural law tradition that governed the *jus gentium* or laws of peoples. Here Grotius becomes the key stepping stone toward May's desire for a 'minimalist natural law theory' (49) that defines a series of duties during war. Though May admits that his reading of Grotius is 'nonstandard' (53), by emphasizing the importance of 'sociableness' and 'friendliness' as the fundamental concepts for Grotian natural law, he makes a good case for accentuating their importance for the purposes of developing an idea of humanity that restrains individual actions during conflict. Thus, May argues that 'the principle of humanity is minimalist in the sense that it is supposed to represent what any person would accept and that [quoting Grotius] "no one can deny them without doing violence to himself"' (56-7). Here one might have expected May to gear the discussion towards Kantian, or even Rawlsian, deontological ethics, in order to emphasize the universality of humane treatment of those vulnerable individuals caught up as prisoners of war. Indeed, it is not quite clear that, by relying simply on a Grotian understanding of the concept of humanity, May fully captures a minimum universal principle reflective of different conceptualizations of humane treatment.

May is undoubtedly correct in seeing this concept of humane treatment as fundamental to understanding the basis of international humanitarian law captured today in the Geneva Conventions, violations of which constitute the basis for the prosecution of war crimes. However, he readily admits that, in structuring the basis of these war crimes as 'crimes against humaneness', the very notion of humaneness is what he terms 'context-specific' and 'also varies from one historical time to another' (71-2). This issue becomes clearer when the question of what constitutes 'humane treatment' for those individuals who are considered terrorists in the global war on terror. The Bush administration has denied that certain of its captives are entitled to the benefits set forth in the Geneva Conventions, while arguing that it does treat these individuals humanely. It has obviously been a matter of debate as to what constitutes the minimum standard of humane treatment, and May is emphatic that, in the case of captured terrorists, what is 'honorable' is that they should be granted the same due process consideration that other prisoners of war would benefit from. But the problem remains as to what the specifics of this minimum standard look like. Though the very notion of 'humane treatment' appears rather vague at times, the important question is why certain historical periods, such as eighteenth-century Europe where war was fought like a duel between gentlemen, placed much greater emphasis on 'honor' and a recognition of the legitimacy other parties to a conflict, while other periods witnessed a virtually hellish descent into absolute war and enmity.

For anyone interested in a substantive, clear-sighted philosophical discussion of international humanitarian law, May's volume is a must read, particularly at this juncture in time.

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Charles O. Nussbaum
The Musical Representation:
Meaning, Ontology, and Emotion.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2007.
Pp. 392.
US$38.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-262-14096-6).

To argue conclusively that music is (or is not) representational has debatably become the Holy Grail of the philosophy of music. With this book Nussbaum wades into that morass of a debate. Nussbaum provides a challenging, thought-provoking and highly contentious account of musical understanding and musical meaning, built largely on a unique theory of the perceptual representation of musical experience. There are two central claims of Nussbaum's theory: that the content of musical experience is a mental representation formed of a hierarchical mental map of physical movements; and that music is itself representational: it is 'a symbolic system that carries extramusical content' (1) that represents physical movement. Now, when Nussbaum talks about 'musical movement', what he means is quite strong. He is not talking about ordinary feelings of tension and relaxation in music, e.g. the feeling that the tune 'moves along'; rather he means a phenomenally rich (illusory) experience of physical movement. He claims that such feelings of physical movement are rather common and familiar to music listeners. Indeed, he maintains that 'this tendency to hear motion in music is central to the experience of the Western art music under discussion here ...' (50). While each of the six chapters of this book make unique contributions to the field, the arguments of Chapters 2 and 3 are deserving of special attention, and so will be the focus of this review. Chapter 4 is a very interesting and insightful modification of Wolterstorff's theory of the ontology of musical works; chapters 5 and 6 develop the claims made earlier in the book to address our emotional and religious engagement with music.

In Chapter 2, Nussbaum presents a modified version of the Lerdahl and Jackendoff generative theory of tonal music, according to which mental representations of music are hierarchically structured contents that have their own Chomskyan-style grammatical deep structure. Nussbaum's contribution is to claim, by highlighting certain similarities between the experience of music and the mental representation of task-level action plans, that these hierarchically structured contents actually represent action plans for movement in acousmatic space: 'The internal representations employed in recovering the musical structure from the musical surface specify motor hierarchies and action plans, which, in turn, put the listener's body into off-line motor states that specify virtual movements, through a virtual terrain or a scenario possessing certain features' (47). In this chapter Nussbaum also provides a very interesting and compelling evolutionary story hypothesizing why auditory experience sometimes results in a feeling of movement: because the human cochlea may have evolved out of the more primitive organ of balance in amphibians. Musical understanding consists in a listener's being able to 'feel

[the music] correctly', where this means that the motor areas of the brain become activated and the listener 'acts out' the music in some appropriate way (99).

Chapter 3 seeks to explain how music is capable of carrying extramusical meaning. Nussbaum's answer, in short, is that the musical surface — the actual sequence of notes or 'sound-structure' that the listener hears — describes as well as prescribes physical movement. Nussbaum argues that contents of musical experience are Millikan-style 'pushmi-pullyu' contents, which are capable of both representing external facts about the world as well as prescribing certain actions in relation to these external facts. Remember: on Nussbaum's view, the musical surface is represented in perceptual experience as a mental map of some hypothetical movement through acousmatic space; this is what the musical surface describes. However, this representation of movement also puts the listener into a state of off-line physical engagement, which is to say that the motor control areas of the brain become engaged even though the listener might restrain herself from actually moving to the music — the prescribed actions are simulated imaginatively for the listener. As Nussbaum says, 'During a musical experience a performer sends a pushmi-pullyu representation the listener's way that both communicates [a] plan structure and enjoins him to implement it and to construct an appropriate set of mental models in his own head, models which are themselves action-oriented' (99). His point is that music listening seems to require a particular kind of physical engagement in response to the music. The most basic example of physical engagement Nussbaum offers is simply tapping one's foot along with the music.

There is a general worry circling both of these chapters, namely that Nussbaum's theory of musical content is not fine-grained enough to work. Consider that if these mental representations from Chapter 2 consist of a mental map of imagined movements in acousmatic space as proposed, then any perceptual experience of music that does not possess this feeling of physical movement would be captured by identical contents, contents that represent no movement. It would appear on Nussbaum's view that musical works that provide no experience of movement (or, the representational contents for individual listeners who fail to experience this feeling of movement) would be perceptually indistinguishable, which is absurd.

Furthermore, for the same reason Chapter 3 seems to fall far short of the promised theory of musical meaning. The stumbling block for any theory of musical meaning is typically music's lack of fine-grained representational contents. For Nussbaum's claim to work, we need to be shown that these extramusical meanings are fine-grained enough to distinguish the meaning of one work from the meaning of another, which he does not do. Leaving aside those cases where no sensation of movement is associated with the experience of listening to the music, are these contents really fine-grained enough to provide a robust theory of extramusical meaning, even in strong cases?

This is a demanding and very densely argued book that requires some familiarity with a wide range of topics from musical aesthetics, cognitive sci-

ence, philosophy of biology and philosophy of mind. (It wouldn't hurt if you could read music too!) It is a scholarly book that would be suited neither for lower-level undergraduate courses nor for the casual reader. That said, it would be immensely beneficial, while being highly contentious, for serious researchers in musical aesthetics and music cognition.

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David Owen
Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality.
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens
University Press.
Pp. 192.
Cdn$80.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7735-3348-6);
Cdn$27.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-7735-3349-3).

Bernard Williams wrote that Nietzsche's *Toward a Genealogy of Morals* has 'the property of being at once extremely compelling, in particular because it seems to hit on something with great exactitude, and at the same time of being infuriatingly vague' (143). While it is widely considered to be Nietzsche's most important work, the *Genealogy* has only recently been a major subject of scholarly interest. Several book length treatments have appeared in the last decade, the first ones in English. Owen has benefited from these works while making an important contribution of his own.

Owen's work includes an introduction, eight chapters, a conclusion, end notes, a valuable annotated guide to further reading, a useful index, and a bibliography. The chapters are grouped in two parts. The first three make up Part 1, titled 'The Project of Re-evaluation and the Turn to Genealogy'. The other five appear in Part 2 under the heading 'On the *Genealogy of Morality*'.

Part 1 traces the development of Nietzsche's thinking about the project of revaluation. For Owen, as for many theorists, Nietzsche's work in the *Genealogy* is taken to be situated within a broader interest in the rise and fall of values in general. He believes that Nietzsche moves from devaluing moral concepts and propositions to revaluing them. His first two chapters are devoted to that thesis. The third addresses Nietzsche's caveats regarding the terminology and methods of description involved in attempting to describe moral histories. These three chapters rely on works from the early and middle phases of Nietzsche's career, and for that reason should prove useful to students and those seeking to become familiar with the context out of which the *Genealogy* arose.

In Part 2, Owen seeks to establish that Nietzsche's genealogical thinking functions as a mode of critical reflection. In particular, 'Nietzsche's genealogical investigations of "morality" aim to provide accounts that perform *internal* criticisms of "morality" ' (71). To do so, these investigations must invoke some of the commitments involved in the morality they criticize. These commitments need not be those of their author, of course. Rather, the commitments of morality, such as the belief that hatred and resentment are low motives, or that honesty is morally obligatory, form the standards of acceptability set by 'morality', and Nietzsche's genealogical thought gains much of its critical traction by suggesting that the history of moral conceptions is thoroughly unacceptable to morality. 'Each of the essays' that make up the *Genealogy* 'seeks to loosen the grip of "morality" by providing a psychologically realistic account of the formation of its central features, which, in virtue of its naturalistic form, undermines the self-understanding of "morality" and which, in virtue of its psychological content, mobilizes our affective dispositions against "morality"' (131). If morality has conditioned us to reject resentment, lies and misrepresentations, then the *Genealogy* offers to turn those moral results against morality, by demonstrating the pervasiveness of resentment, lies and misrepresentation in our everyday moral thought. Owen is not the first to offer such a reading, but he is the first to offer one within a well established developmental context that strongly suggests such a reading. The first four chapters of Part 2 develop his interpretation and offer close readings of important passages.

The final chapter in Part 2, 'Debating the *Genealogy*', will probably be the most important part of this work for scholars working to understand Nietzsche's moral thought. It defends Owen's thesis against three prior interpretations that, to varying degrees, found Nietzsche's genealogical thought lacking in critical power. On the whole, Owen's opponents fail to appreciate Nietzsche's commitment to the intrinsic value of truth in his writing — a value his writings share both with their intended audience and with the 'morality' they critically engage. This chapter is especially indebted to Owen's earlier studies of Nietzsche's deeply cautious approach to describing moral histories. What Williams took as a 'fictive' element, and a flaw in the critical apparatus of Nietzschean genealogy, proves for Owen to be one of its chief virtues. Describing moral changes and the development of moral perspectives through the dramatist's device of psychological processes occurring within human types — priests, knights, aristocrats, masters, slaves, philosophers, artists — engages the affects of our moral make up, and allows Nietzsche to depict the history of morality in an 'ethically salient' way (143). Morality is concerned with humans and human well being, not abstractions. Hence its history is of interest to it only when humans are at stake.

Owen strikes many interesting chords in his conclusion as well. In general, Nietzsche's mode of thinking about morality is hardly to be found in the analytic school of philosophy, a fact that Owen believes is explainable on the thesis that 'much, perhaps most' of the analytic school of moral philosophy is committed to 'an *ahistorical* conception of their philosophical activity, in

which *morality* is taken as a given' (145). Needless to say, Nietzsche's thinking was always historically and developmentally based, and he treated the ahistorical frame of mind as a manifestation of the ascetic ideal, which always creates a perspective from nowhere due to its deep immersion in a view it aims to protect from criticism. This brief portion of Owen's work could provide critics of the analytic school plenty of ammunition, so long as they are willing to conceive of themselves and their opponents in a naturalistic and historically informed way. Owen outlines five ways that historical thinking has scratched out a place for itself in recent moral discourse. Readers can surely discover more. In his conclusion Owen also provides his thoughts on the positive contributions to ethics found in Nietzsche's *Genealogy*. For the most part, these elements are understood in terms of an epistemological gain: the elimination of obfuscating concepts, and a naturalistic orientation toward the self and the world that is difficult to maintain within traditional, *ahistorical* moral thinking.

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In this book Pates offers a rigorous argument against institutionalized punishment, especially that form of punishment most favored in the West, prison incarceration. One by one, Pates offers a comprehensive explication of each of the traditional theories of punishment, from Jeremy Bentham's consequentialism (that sees the justification for state punishments in their pragmatic effects on the citizen population, reduction of crime rate, moral reform and education of social offenders, and deterrence of law-abiding citizens) to retributivist theories of punishment (that see the ends of punishment in the re-equalization of social benefits and burdens through the dole of just desert to offenders and the restoration of peace in the community by granting closure to the offended).

In both theoretical paradigms, consequences are all that matter. However, if consequences are all that matter, then, Pates argues, we ought to be highly disturbed to learn that there exists overwhelming evidence to demonstrate that, quite simply, 'Nothing works' (Garland, 1993, 7). Institutionalized pun-

ishment fails to produce the good effects that might justify it. Indeed, not only do prisons fail, they actually exacerbate social problems. Prisons isolate offenders from their moral communities. The bare facts of prison life — large numbers of persons with criminal skill sets, antisocial attitudes, and disruptive behavior patterns held in close quarters for long periods of time and controlled by frustrated administrators employing coercive measures — prove prison communities to be most effective training grounds in antisocial behavior.

Pates' study of institutions of punishment explains the contradictory effects — the bad 'ends' — that prison environments effect. New inmates must harden themselves against their fellow prisoners and the guard community to survive this tough authoritarian environment. The processes of socialization in the new world of the prison, with its high degree of violence, sexual abuse, extortion, intimidation, and drug trafficking, causes inmates to revert to an alternative survival mode, 'a highly refined "con code"' (13) that not only hones their skills of combat, deception, and brutality, but forces them to become crafty at forging strategic alliances with the most dangerous among the population. Pates states, 'the prison environment in particular is plagued by the very problems that society expects the penal system to prevent' (17).

Another crucial reason that penal institutions fail is that the moral enhancement of the prisoners is not the overriding value governing daily routines. Rather, prisons, as all bureaucracies, are machine-like organizations that function according to generalized standards of professional performance. Guards and administrators are concerned about such factors as efficiency, cost-effectiveness, wages and securing tenure. They do not see it as their charge to initiate dangerous men into the moral life.

'The evidence for the non-effectiveness of the criminal justice system as it now stands is overwhelming,' affirms Pates (20). Pates argues for an end to punishment as the system currently practices it. Since a huge industry has grown up around state punishment — 'probation officers, lawyers, judges, prison officers, therapists, case managers, their secretaries and office managers and trade unions' — the state is highly invested in maintaining the current system (1). The mammoth bureaucratic apparatus surrounding state punishment practices is founded upon a fundamental dilemma: societies are committed to an efficient and professional juridical body that deals objectively and rationally with social offenders, while they are also committed to the value and necessity *to justice* of a full consideration of all relevant moral particulars of the individual case of each social offender.

To illustrate the paralyzing nature of this foundational dilemma, Pates closes her book with a case study of a particular criminal, a repeat sex offender, Carl. As the reader follows the chronology of Carl's heinous attacks on his young victims — 'a six-year-old girl cousin, repeatedly; an eight-year-old girl, some four or five times; a five-year-old boy, once; a nine-year-old girl, once; a same-age girlfriend, several times; and two little girls, aged four and six' — the reader is disposed to agree with any 'objective observer' that punishment should be swift and harsh (95). But as the details of Carl's particular

case are unfolded — Carl, only 15 when he is on trial for his crimes, is one of five children raised in a remote rural area bereft of the least of human comforts or sanitary facilities; he grows up watching his father, in drunken rages, beat and rape his mother, until he too is submitted to these cruel acts — the reader's passion for a harsh justice is very suddenly paralyzed. The more we know about the perpetrator, the more he begins to resemble a victim.

Current juridical practices are hardened coercive structures of domination and submission that turn individuals with particular needs and problems into 'criminals' defined only by their criminal deeds. It is a small wonder that there is such a strong correlation between being imprisoned and further criminal behaviors. Individuals are not reformed, deterred, rehabilitated, treated, corrected, or trained through being incarcerated in modern prisons. Current punishment practices work only to improve the art of crime in the criminal population. Moral agents require a distinct degree of independence and social support to develop the qualities of compassion and empathy that allow them to evolve into moral agents and make their own sound moral judgments. Coercive institutions, argues Pates, do not help people to develop their powers of moral judgment; they do not contribute to the development of the moral and communal good of the society at large; nor do they promote the evolution of the society as a community *of ends*, that is, as a community that treats the least of its members as *ends in themselves* and not means to their ordered streets or their balanced state budgets.

This fine little philosophical book will be important to any educated adult. It would also make a fine introductory text for a university class in philosophy of law. Pates' argument is compelling: if it is the purpose of state institutions to help its citizens to become rational beings capable of self-discipline and self-legislation, it is high time for an end to the counterproductive punishment practices currently in use.

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In this book Pluth works through Lacanian theory to map the potentialities for freedom for the subject of psychoanalysis. The Lacanian subject is for

Pluth several subjects, all of which 'are contingent products of a particular configuration of language' (2), and the subject's freedom is not 'a condition for action but would serve as a name for a particular type of action' (3) that produces a new signifying practice. These 'several subjects' emerge from the several stages of Lacan's developing theory, and Pluth considers the differing emphases of Lacan's development to chart the subject's constitution in each.

Pluth follows the emergence of the subject as an effect of language in the first stage and, in the second stage, beginning with *Seminar XI*, the development of several subjects in relation to the real, produced by a resistance to signification, encountered in the Other's desire and in jouissance. The treatment of the subject of language reviews Lacan's emphasis on the symbolic register, language, or the Other, that confers identity on a subject seeking recognition and a place in speech. Pluth reviews Lacan's definitions of the trace, the sign, and the signifier, and provides formulations of metaphor and metonymy that nicely underscore the gap between signifier and signified (or meaning): metaphor 'creates a verbal incarnation of a signified effect in a signifier by conflating a signifier with this effect, making that signifier act as a signified,' while 'metonymy creates an absent or a withdrawn signified effect' (35-6). Put otherwise, metonymy gives the elusive effect of an absent signified, while metaphor gives the illusion of the presence of a signified. The imaginary subject of the mirror stage is likewise framed in the symbolic by means of the unary trait, the ego ideal that identifies the form in the mirror, the ideal ego, as a subject for the Other; the proper name as the trace or metonym of the subject is 'a model for the unary trait' that constitutes 'a subject-as-meaning, despite the fact the name itself is meaningless' (55). While Pluth insists that the subject is not an identity, his use of the term 'the subject-as-meaning' and his description of the subject 'as a signifier representing a meaning to another signifier' (50), as well as his emphasis on identification, attribute imaginary signification to the subject of language. This fixes the imaginary in the symbolic, which thereby minimizing the notion of a split subject of lack, divided between the enunciation or the act of speech, and the enunciated or the statement. Lacan's formations in fact evacuate meaning from the symbolic subject: a signifier represents a subject (not a meaning) for all other signifiers, and a subject (not a meaning) is what is represented by a signifier for another signifier. This distinction matters, since the subject as an effect of language is ultimately empty, open in a kind of negativity that itself suggests freedom.

The subject in Lacan's second stage is constituted in an encounter with an impasse to signification; this subject, or subjects, appears in the fantasy and in the act. Here a subject is a relation to the real. Pluth goes over the oral, anal, and genital phases of development to plot the growth of a subject confronted with a resistance to signification before the *'chè vuoi'*, the Other's question, 'What do you want?', to which the subject responds with the fantasy, 'the positivization of jouissance and a subject' (76), answering the enigmatic, traumatic desire of the Other. The fantasy is 'something like a window on the real' that allows 'access to a colonized, tamed real' (88). The logical operations of alienation and separation result in the structure of the fantasy, the disjunc-

tion of alienation giving 'effects of lost being on the symbolic' (90) and the conjunction of separation providing 'some kind of symbolization' to the 'real's presence in the symbolic' (91). Thus, 'something of jouissance continues to escape the fantasmatic situation of jouissance' (87), and that loss results in 'the possibility for a different structuration of the subject, in an act' (87).

Freedom, then, is possible with a traversal of the fantasy in an act. Pluth discusses the concept of the act as radical negativity in Žižek, as event in Badiou, and as performance in Butler, to arrive at a free subject using signifiers without the guarantee of the Other, not bound to identification or a desire for recognition. The subject of the act transforms unconscious law or determining structure to 'bring about a transformation' in the structure and thereby to 'inaugurate a new subject' (102). The fort-da game of the child, introduced by Freud, becomes for Pluth, in an original and useful reading, a prototype of a new use of the signifier, an 'address to the event', a 'declaration of the fact that something *is*' (104), which is not a representation. Freedom, consequently, is a new use of signifiers, and the 'subject of an act is a product of particular type of signifying process' (117) without link to signification. Such a practice is typified by the pun, the nonsensical verbal configuration that, Lacan claims, makes a 'lack of meaning present' (109). James Joyce's writing is Lacan's exemplar of a punning, innovate language, playing with jouissance and substituting writing for the Name-of-the-Father that structures discourse. So one sense for 'freedom' is the subject's potential to renovate language in an original speech and writing, and the subject of such a language would be reconfigured, escaping from the determination of past history and of a dependence on the Other. However, the effective consequence of this kind of textual freedom remains unclear.

The discussion of examples taken from Badiou of public signifying acts, in contrast, suggests a potential for social change in statements lacking sense in the context of existing discourse because they have 'no representation in the political, or the state' (151), for instance Marx's declaration 'There is a revolutionary movement' (150), or French migrant workers' statement, 'We want our rights' (152), or the introduction of the signifier 'grace' in St. Paul's announcement, 'You are no longer under the law, but under grace' (136). None of these enunciations make demands for they do not require the recognition of the Other, but each simply declares an existence performed in the statement. These assertions organize a new politics, because they cannot be recognized as meaningful within any given social arrangement.

Finally, Lacan suggests several outcomes for the end of analysis that envision freedom following the traversal of the fantasy in the act. The analysand would give up belief in the Other as the subject-supposed-to-know, the analyst, who provides knowledge and identity. A reconfigured subject would identify with the sinthome which, like the Borromean knot, the topological figure for the imbrecation of the real, symbolic, and imaginary, provides consistency to a subject without meaning. Alternatively, a subject in identification with the desire of the Other would reduce and tame the real; identification with the Other's desire or with the sinthome gives the freedom of a

subject in relation to real jouisssance, a subject with a *savoir faire*, knowing how to manage unconscious drive. Pluth productively manages a tension between this subject of the act, touching on the real, and the subject of language to maintain freedom in relation to desire and therefore to social exchange and community.

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Michael Ruse
Darwinism and its Discontents.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 326.
US$45.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-82947-2);
US$19.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-72824-9).

Ruse, philosopher of science who taught for thirty-five years at the University of Guelph and currently teaches at the Florida State University, has published around 20 authored or edited books, nearly 150 scholarly articles and more than 150 book reviews. The prevalent topic of this opus is evolutionary theory, especially its defense against a range of criticisms developed by philosophers, social scientists, theologians and biologists themselves. *Darwinism and its Discontents* is a sort of 'digested Ruse', in which Ruse presents criticisms of Darwinism without omitting to highlight the strengths of those criticisms (if there are any). Nevertheless, Ruse does not hide his loyalties, and argues that Darwinism is not in the least compromised by any of the objections discussed. The book touches on numerous topics, from the highly technical (such as the relevance of Hardy-Weinberg law for understanding natural selection, the importance of *Hox* genes for development of particular organisms) to the rather speculative (such as the would-be implications of Darwinism for fatalism or the philosophical problem of evil). Ruse's central points are probably best presented if grouped around the following three questions: What are the basic claims of the theory of evolution? What are the major objections to it, and how serious are they? What are the implications of Darwinism for 'human affairs' and for some non-biological areas of inquiry?

According to Ruse (Chapter 2), the clearest fact about evolution is that it is a fact. He supports this thesis by invoking various types of direct evidence, e.g., the power of natural and artificial selection to produce changes in diverse populations of organisms, and various types of indirect evidence, e.g., findings from paleontology, biogeography, embryology and other biological disciplines. Contrary to the idea of special creation of life a few thousand years ago, Ruse shows (Chapter 4) that phylogeny of life started much earlier

(some 3.5 billion years ago). Against the trendy opinion which takes fossil record as crucial for unearthing life's history, Ruse's emphasis is on other mutually consistent methods for reconstructing evolution's path and duration: radioactive dating, comparative studies of physical traits of organisms, or calculating the mutation rates of DNA molecules (especially of the 'junk DNA'). The fact and the path of evolution are best explained, argues Ruse (Chapter 5), if one assumes that there is a unique (not the only) cause behind them. This cause, originally proposed by Charles Darwin, is natural selection. And as Ruse shows us (Chapter 1), although only few were originally convinced that natural selection can be the cause of evolution, the 20th century integration of Darwinian selectionism and Mendelian genetics definitively confirmed that Darwin started the major revolution in our thinking about the nature of evolutionary process.

Ruse also (Chapter 6) deals with a number of scientific charges against Darwinism, e.g. it overemphasizes the power of natural selection ('adaptationism'), it underemphasizes cases of conflict between natural and sexual selection, and it ignores situations of genes having pleiotropic effects (maladaptive features evolving due to their genetic links with adaptive ones). Ruse dismisses these and similar charges by showing either that they make a 'straw man' out of Darwinism or that they actually are not alternatives to Darwinism, but quite consistent with it. He also discusses (Chapter 8) one 'external' criticism to the effect that Darwinian theory is a 'social construction' or a reflection of values of a particular society, especially of the one in which it was conceived. Ruse concedes that a particular *Zeitgeist* may have influenced the inception of Darwinian theory. However, as he argues, the social context of its appearance or maintenance does not preclude its objectivity, since the theory has proven to be predictively fruitful regardless of any social context. As for the idea that Darwinism is compromised due to some of its proponents being involved in plagiarism, fraud or charlatanism (Chapter 9), Ruse claims that, even if some charges of scientific dishonesty within evolutionary camp are in place — and some definitely are — to argue that they somehow taint the entire field is simply a gross *non sequitur*.

A particularly interesting set of Ruse's considerations concerns religion and philosophy. As Ruse illustrates (Chapter 12), the relation between Darwinism and religion usually was and still is one of mutual exclusion. A paradigmatic example of this is the replacement of traditional 'argument from design' (explanation of organisms' design-like features as created by God) with explanations in terms of natural selection. For Ruse, the winner of this clash is Darwinism: after Darwin, most religious views lost their authority and cannot be restored in spite of cunning attempts of contemporary Intelligent Design theorists. However, Ruse does not want to suggest that the clash between Darwinism and religion is inevitable, especially as they both agree that we humans are beings of limited knowledge about the world we live in. As for the philosophical side of the story, Ruse focuses (Chapter 10) on impact of Darwinism on epistemology and ethics. Against the *tabula rasa* tradition, Ruse's recommendation to epistemologists is to focus on the idea that we

have certain innate knowledge which was probably adaptive during our evolution and which is now part and parcel of our nature. In his descriptive ethics, Ruse sees morality as the product of evolution, selected to prompt us into biologically useful cooperative action. In his metaethics, he argues that our belief in objective morality is just a collective illusion created by our genes. In short, Darwinism entails metaethical subjectivism or at least skepticism.

Ruse is skilled writer able to present the most intricate details of evolutionary theory in an understandable way. He is more than well-informed; in fact, there are few philosophers today as familiar as Ruse is not only with history and current state of evolutionary theory, but also with its fate in areas as diverse as philosophy, social science or literature. This book is suitable for an inexperienced reader, with opening chapters dealing with the essentials of evolutionary theory and with later chapters touching on more speculative issues. Ruse takes care to provide brief explanations of particular notions (from history, philosophy of science or theology) he introduces, whereas his candid and often humorous style adds a special spice to the book. Although it is likely to provoke reactions as varied as there are people interested in evolutionary theory, the book should be evaluated primarily for what it is: a guide to standard 'Darwinism vs. anti-Darwinism' debates, and an ardent defense of the former. In fact, some complaints may be expected from Darwinians, e.g. that some critical voices were taken more seriously (social constructivists) or treated more gently (defenders of compatibilism of Darwinism and religion) than they deserve to be. Be that as it may, this book offers a good selection and a relatively fair picture of standard criticisms of Darwinism, and it seems quite persuasive in its refutation or at least neutralization of them. It should be read by anyone wishing to be introduced to or reminded of the 'state of the art' of the 'Darwin wars'.

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Rohit Sharma
On the Seventh Solitude:
Endless Becoming and Eternal Return in
the Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche.
New York Peter Lang 2006.
Pp. 293.
US$57.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-3-03910-582-3).

Sharma's book is mainly a study of movement in Nietzsche's poetry. Its argument could be re-stated as follows. Humans are only able to cope with change from a position of stasis. Here psychology and metaphysics intersect:

our limited ability to cope with movement is a fact about the human psyche *and* a starting point for thinking about the nature of human knowledge. The being/becoming antithesis needs to be replaced by the dichotomy of being/becoming and individuation. All language plays a role in mediating between these two poles (the self and the world) of one's search for knowledge. It arrests the movement of life by verbalizing it. It also enables one to overcome the stage reached at a given moment by objectifying it (e.g. in a word, or in a poem). Nietzsche's poetry dramatizes this process of freezing and thawing of life and vision, of movement momentarily arrested and re-launched once again. So does Nietzsche's aposiopetic philosophy. *Is* there a difference between the two?

Sharma identifies the movement between a solitary life and a life shared with others as the one with the greatest transformative potential for Nietzsche. In chronological terms he presents Nietzsche's poetry as moving from visions of various productive and unproductive solitudes to a singular divine solitude. This so-called 'seventh solitude' signifies an unconditional affirmation of the endless movement into and out of solitude, and of the metamorphoses that an encounter with oneself in solitude sets in motion.

There is something to this picture of Nietzsche's writing. However, its effectiveness is greatly diminished by Sharma's overall presentation. The study of movement is framed by the question of Nietzsche's position in the poetry-philosophy debate. 'The one general hypothesis' Sharma wants to 'establish ... is that Nietzsche's poetry is also his philosophy' (26). The thesis sounds more radical than it is. Partly it has the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy. All poetry sounds like philosophy when it has been paraphrased in philosophical prose. Nietzsche's poetry as Sharma reads it is no exception.

It is unclear that Sharma knows what he means by his thesis. He tells us in the introduction (22-3) that philosophy departs from poetry by arresting poetry's flow and subjecting it to conceptual criticism. But this insight is nowhere evident in his writing. He seems unable to sense the distance between poetry and philosophy conceived as polar opposites: the one all conceptual clarity and logical reasoning in prose, the other all immediate vision and irrational leaps of faith effected through various sound effects. One symptom of this is that he uses the words 'motif', 'notion', 'keyword', 'concept' and 'idea' as if they were interchangeable. Another is the ease with which he subsumes diverse kinds of physical motion (walking, sailing) as well as activities such as play or creation, under the abstract heading of 'movement'. But is Nietzsche's poetry not dedicated to the opposite task: to diversify in visions what philosophy unifies in concepts?

At different points Sharma assumes different criteria for distinguishing between poetry and philosophy. At first we are told that Nietzsche's poetry is his philosophy because it 'is in fact the very fertile area, out of which and in which all of Nietzsche's concepts ... make their first embryonic appearance, and which Nietzsche develops only later in his prose writings' (26). Does the origin of a thing determine its end? All concepts may originate in metaphors that make a word 'carry over' its meaning from a concrete sen-

sual domain to a more abstract one. But if philosophy differs from poetry precisely by the effort involved in transforming metaphors into concepts, how can Nietzsche's unparaphrased poetry be his philosophy? Sharma does not quite tell us.

In the conclusion (218-19) the difference is said to lie with Nietzsche's attitude to metaphor and polysemy in his prose as much as in his verse. Nietzsche is said to transcend this difference 'through the usage of metaphor, which he continually uses poetically as well as theoretically to develop further concepts such as truth and perspectivism' (219). Sharma does not tell us how one develops concepts through metaphors; or whether Nietzsche does this by using metaphor in a specific way, or just by using too many metaphors. Is Nietzsche's poetry his philosophy because Nietzsche's philosophy is closer to most philosophers' idea of poetry than to their prose? Is metaphoricity *the* difference for Nietzsche? Why should one think in solitude, but sing among others, i.e., what about rhythm and sound? What Sharma says about poetic rhythm (119) shows he has misunderstood paragraphs 84 and 92 of *The Gay Science*.

If Nietzsche's poetry was his philosophy, why did he move to philosophical prose to 'develop' his concepts? Why did he choose to confront prose and poetry by juxtaposing them in *The Gay Science*? These questions are missing from Sharma's account. Is Nietzsche the *Künstler-Philosoph* in action that Sharma takes him for (25)? Shouldn't we understand this figure as prophetic, and thus belonging in the same uncertain category with Nietzsche's *Übermensch*?

The above may be subject to disagreement. Where Sharma is at his weakest is in the readings of individual poems and in his treatment of secondary sources. His paraphrases of Nietzsche's poems are sometimes repetitive, verging on platitudes. At best he adds little to the existing literature, especially by Philip Grundlehner on Nietzsche's poetry, by Sander L. Gilman on Nietzschean parody and by Wolfram Groddeck on the *Dithyrambs*. Mostly he falls far short of their scope, thoroughness and scholarship. At worst he is positively misleading. To give two examples. In discussing Nietzsche's juvenilia, Sharma repeatedly gives a reductive account of Grundlehner's *The Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche*, incorrectly implying that he has moved far beyond it. To get the true picture the reader would be well advised to re-read Grundlehner at least with regard to the following passages in Sharma (43, 48-9, 56-7, 59, 61, 66, 155). Sharma's treatment of the 'Lied eines theokritischen Ziegenhirten', too, raises doubts about his work. Never mind that he discusses the poem as if its subject were a shepherd (it is a goatherd). More importantly, he struggles to make any good sense of it while choosing to remain silent on Gilman's interpretation, as revealing the poem's centrality to Nietzsche's pastoral conception of the Dionysian.

Sharma promises to give us an insight into Nietzsche as a poet-philosopher of movement. More often than not he fails to keep his promise.

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When it comes to the canon of significant liberal thinkers, John Stuart Mill ranks near (if not at) the top. This is so for many reasons, most of which are aptly captured in Skorupski's concise and engaging work. Skorupski's text focuses on the political and ethical facets of Mill's thought, and begins with an overview of Mill's upbringing and various biographical details. Next comes a definition of liberalism, understood in part as a doctrine focusing on equal opportunity and free competition, and also as a form of moral doctrine constraining the authority of society and state over individuals, and committed to a conception of the good life (5-6). At root, liberalism just *is* free thought, a point which, Skorupski urges, Mill and also Kant recognized (6). Free thought here is understood as thought governed 'by its own principles' (ibid.). Such thought begins, not with a refusal to make *any* assumptions, but rather with the embrace of a 'critical open-mindedness about everything we take ourselves to know, without any exemptions whatever,' a fallibilist approach here referred to as 'constructive empiricism' (8).

There ensues a shift in focus, towards discussion of happiness understood as enjoyment or pleasure (and suffering's absence), the maximization of which is viewed by Mill as constituting 'the good for human beings' (15). Mill thus holds that everyone should pursue 'their own happiness in their own way, under the limitations set by the equal rights of everyone else' (ibid.). Happiness is therefore bound up with individual liberty, a point which follows, for Mill, from the fact that humans are capable of developing themselves only when free. Moreover, self-development is necessary in Mill's eyes, if happiness is to be realized in its highest forms (18). Note that Mill is no pluralist regarding human ends, something which Skorupski finds problematic: 'Mill is right to analyse a person's good as what is desirable for that person. But what a person may reasonably desire can extend beyond his own enjoyment into outcomes he cannot even know. So if my good is what is desirable for me, as Mill thinks, my good extends likewise' (21).

Skorupski goes on to consider further Mill's liberal ideal of individual self-development and also his conception of different qualities of happiness (25-34). He then proceeds to explore Mill's view of justice and morality. Worth noting here is Mill's apparent effort to 'reduce moral concepts to a theory of the good', an effort which Skorupski deems unconvincing (37). Skorupski proposes a more moderate alternative, one holding that there exist 'many normative principles governing action that are justified in their own terms, without derivation from the final good,' yet which 'must give way if they turn out to be systematically incompatible with that final good' (ibid.).

Next comes discussion of what Skorupski refers to as the 'Liberty Principle', which holds 'that individual freedom of conduct may be constrained by society only on specific grounds' (39). Such grounds are limited and include harm to other individuals, as well as the violation of those manners required of individuals when in public (ibid.). Mill's justification for the so-called liberty principle is, Skorupski indicates, quite distinctive, in that he argues 'for it from the developmental view of human good' mentioned above (ibid.). These preliminary remarks lead into an extended examination of some of the central features of Mill's thought, including its anti-paternalistic strain and tendency towards cultural elitism (43, 46, 53-4). It is also here that Skorupski discusses Mill's view of liberty of discussion and thought, and the place of such liberty in Mill's wider philosophical system (56-61).

Having described certain key aspects of Mill's thought in some detail, Skorupski goes on to contrast him with other prominent nineteenth century thinkers, including Hegel and Marx. One general distinction here is that, while the left communitarian Marx and the right communitarian Hegel both held that conflict — either between classes or within forms of thought — was bound to disappear with the emergence of a kind of modern community, for liberals progress was and remained possible only in light of ongoing conflict of ideas and interests (71). Yet an even more fundamental difference between liberals (Mill included) and communitarians of any stripe, comes, Skorupski argues, in the form of what each camp holds to constitute the good for humans (ibid.). This portion of the text concludes with an overview of Mill's stance towards democracy, a stance bound up with a principled egalitarianism towards political decision-making and discussion, in stark contrast to his elitist tendencies regarding things requiring managerial or technical skill and also regarding cultural or moral distinction (86). This discussion is followed by, among other things, an exploration of Mill's attitude towards equality, specifically his notion of 'equality of respect', which is central to his conception of liberalism and requires, as its lone 'empirical postulate', that people generally have adequate virtue and rationality to belong to the citizenry (102).

The depth of Skorupski's text notwithstanding, there is one reason in particular why Mill's work is arguably of value in the present day, but which Skorupski for the most part touches on only in passing. I have in mind here Mill's quite progressive attitude towards women, as reflected especially through his *The Subjection of Women*. This text has been put to use in recent times to justify (for instance) pro-censorship liberal arguments regarding certain forms of heterosexual pornography; also, some have suggested, in light of (among other things) the aforementioned usage of Mill's text, that there may exist a stronger affinity between liberals and feminists than is often thought to be the case. It would thus seem that, from the point of view of what makes Mill interesting today, more stands to be said with regards to this particular work than is acknowledged in Skorupski's text.

This omission aside, Skorupski's treatment of Mill is a thorough one and as such offers any number of reasons why the latter deserves reading today, well over a century after his death.

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Teichman's ambitiously titled but idiosyncratic book sets out to provide an overview of philosophical issues concerning war, including chapters on the causes of war, the history of the rules of war, war and science, terrorism, torture, guerilla war, pacifism, patriotism, and ethical theory. Her announced method is empirical; she cites Jonathan Glover in chiding philosophers for giving too much attention to a priori theory and not enough to the facts. A large part of the book, consistent with this methodology, involves accounts of historical episodes and personages in war and peace.

While a strength of the book is its detailed historical examinations, a weakness is the neglect of the philosophical debates on many issues regarding war. Teichman justifies this neglect, oddly, by telling us she does not like 'relying on philosophy professors' because 'such people tend to disagree with one another' (94). She flatly condemns area bombing as immoral, giving the reader no hint that some philosophers plausibly argue that area bombing in World War II may have been morally justified (given the lack of alternatives, in an age before precision bombing was possible). She brushes equally rapidly over such questions as the legitimacy of trials for war crimes, nuclear deterrence, and bargaining with hostage-takers, even though all of these topics are very complex. This neglect of philosophy is especially problematic in her discussion of terrorism; the distinction between the terrorist (who deliberately targets civilians) and the conventional bomber (who causes 'collateral damage' to civilians) arguably depends on the highly controversial Double Effect distinction between intended and foreseen harm, of which there is no mention in this book. This oversight undermines her attempted definition and explanation of terrorism on the premise that terrorists necessarily 'terrify or tend to terrify their targets' (96), for it neglects the question of intention and of targeting civilians (all wartime bombing tends to terrify its targets, but this hardly means every war is terroristic).

One of the principal targets of criticism of Teichman's book is Alan Dershowitz. She rebukes him for his 'emotive thinking' (91), making the rather reckless charge that 'the only groups Dershowitz cares about' are Jews and Christians' (100). Her critique of Dershowitz' reliance on utilitarian reasoning to justify torture is more plausible. Yet she seems to take special satisfaction in pointing out that Dershowitz is not a 'proper researcher' (104) in that he does not use primary sources, and that he 'fails to give any references for his claims' (101), in contrast to a book by John Finnis which 'contains a vast number of references'. These criticisms would be more convincing if only Teichman consistently applied the same standards to herself. In her account of the reasons why people torture, she references a 'chromosomal abnormality' in men that might explain why men are more likely to be torturers (107). She gives no source for these assertions, but presumably she is referring to the XYY sex chromosome mutation and its purported connection to male violence. However, this theory has long been refuted; men with XYY syndrome may be taller but there is no evidence that they are more violent or prone to torture. She also mistakenly (and without references) connects this with the 'berserker' phenomenon from the Nordic tradition. But the berserk idea has nothing to do with being tall, nor is it a chromosomal phenomenon; it is a manic state of frenzied violence into which Norse warriors were reputed to enter.

Elsewhere, in her defense of the rather murky concept of 'solidarity', she cites media violence as a cause of declining social solidarity, asserting that the experience of the kingdom of Bhutan proves the connection between media violence and crime. Soon after television sets were allowed in Bhutan, she tells us, 'the Bhutanese started sticking knives into each other just like everyone else' (217). This assertion is presented without any supporting evidence. But even a quick internet search reveals that this explanation for the rise of violence in Bhutan is very controversial. The rise in violence may in fact be an effect of modernization in general, and the suggestion that people watched television for the first time and then immediately commenced sticking knives into each other seems rather unlikely. Teichman further tells us that widespread gun ownership also undermines social solidarity because it 'creates fear'; again, there are no sources cited for this extremely problematic claim (ibid.). In any case, it is doubtful that the debate on gun ownership and media violence can be resolved in half a page.

As a final illustration of some of the problems with the methodology of this book, consider Teichman's discussion of the profound and complex question of the 'ultimate causes of war'. To construct her argument, she relies essentially on just four sources, Aldous Huxley, George Orwell, Lenin, and Freud (whom she characterizes as 'two novelists and two pseudoscientists'). She criticizes all of them, but singles out Freud for his 'real aversion to seeking evidence' (15). Again, this claim would be more convincing if she herself sought out evidence from historians of war, not to mention anthropologists, biologists, and philosophers in order to take on this enormous question, or if she at least presented some statistical evidence of the incidence of war and

violence across cultures and time. Nonetheless Teichman provides her own solution to the problem of the 'ultimate causes of war': the explanation can be found 'partly in the brains of men and partly in the institutions created by men' (16). This rather vacuous explanation is supplemented later in the book by the Buddhist position that the cause of war is 'delusion' (244), though it is unclear how these two explanations are supposed to fit together.

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Paul Thagard
Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition.
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This book brings together a selection of articles written by Thagard, alone and with coauthors, since his *Coherence in Thought and Action* (MIT 2000). The shared theme, 'hot thought', is defined as 'thinking that is influenced by emotional factors such as particular emotions, moods and motivations' (3). The collection draws on the interdisciplinary background of Thagard himself — he is a cross-appointee in philosophy, psychology and computer science, as well as director of the cognitive science program at the University of Waterloo — and of his collaborators, who come from all of these fields, and include postgraduates and new academics as well as more senior researchers.

Hot cognition, consequently, is explored from a broad variety of perspectives. Along the way, there are discussions of the brain as a 'chemical computer', the cognitive effects of brain damage, the role of emotion in scientific discovery, law (including a consideration of the O. J. Simpson jury) and academic hiring, as well as a map of the (hot) cognitive structure of self-deception in Nathaniel Hawthorne's Reverend Dimmesdale (of *The Scarlet Letter*).

Despite the potentially 'flashy' nature of some of the topics, they are consistently explored in a carefully reasoned, level-headed manner, leavened with a welcome light dry humor. The main themes, explicitly set out in the introductory chapter, are consistently developed throughout. 'The primary descriptive aim of this book is to increase understanding of how emotional cognition works ... . The secondary normative aim is to suggest ways of improving thinking by appreciating the difference between cases where emotions foster good decisions and those where emotions get in the way' (3).

Thagard approaches emotions in a self-described mechanistic fashion: 'specify components, their properties and relations, and describe how changes in force, motion and energy propagate through the system' (5). However, he rejects single-level explanatory strategies, favoring an explanatory pluralism 'which rejects both extreme reductionism and antireductionism' (8).

For emotional cognition, Thagard distinguishes four relevant levels of mechanisms: molecular, neural, cognitive and social. In accordance with the promised pluralism, none of these levels is given *a priori* explanatory (or other) priority, and which level is most emphasized depends on the immediate issues at hand in any particular chapter. The first section of the book, 'Mechanisms', introduces the various types of mechanisms, and explores ways they interact. The second, 'Applications', looks at implications for particular domains such as law, science, religion, and individual psychology (the latter albeit of a fictional character), ending in two more specifically philosophical chapters that address normative implications of hot cognition and indicate directions for future research.

The book presents two main kinds of computational model for understanding emotional cognition. The first, and most used, albeit in various forms, is HOTCO (from hot coherence), which models the impact of emotion on cognitive mechanisms. In addition to HOTCO, Thagard also uses a neurocomputational model, GAGE (named after neurophysiological *cas célèbre* Phineas Gage, a nineteenth century railway worker who underwent dramatic personality and behavioural changes after a brain injury), which more closely models the anatomical organization of the brain. GAGE and HOTCO, Thagard argues, are compatible, though GAGE is more demanding to program and run, with HOTCO consequently often used in its stead. A fuller exploration of the degree to which GAGE and HOTCO map onto each other would have been welcome, though presumably this is in the works for future research.

Building on a coherence model of inference, HOTCO extends this to encompass emotional elements. First, in addition to the epistemic acceptance or rejection of representational elements (beliefs, concepts, etc.), they can also have positive or negative emotional valence. Second, elements can have positive or negative emotional connections to other elements: Thagard offers the example of *dentist* acquiring negative valence through its association with the intrinsically negative valence of *pain*. The valence of an element is determined by the valence and epistemic acceptability of all other elements to which is it connected.

HOTCO, however, is not intended to supersede the 'cold' coherence model, Thagard says. The first reason is that hot coherence can be affected by other kinds of coherence, including norms, which go beyond noting what is emotionally desirable. The second reason is that we can have hot and cold judgments that are incompatible with each other. It is not always given that the cold judgments will be right, and Thagard believes that we, as we are actually wired, are incapable of working on cold judgments alone. But feelings, especially 'gut' feelings, are susceptible to 'jonesing' (addictive effects) and to failures to engage all appropriate considerations, due (for instance)

to biases or distortions by vividness. So hot coherence needs to be (further) constrained by procedures that will test our intuitive feelings to see whether they are properly informed, factually and normatively, and that will also aim to structure our reasoning so that informed intuitions can be effective rather than be overcome by the uninformed gut feelings they were meant to replace. Crucially, also, the inner workings of HOTCO inferences will often not be transparent to us; we may only have conscious access to their 'sense of right-ness/wrongness' outputs.

These are all eminently sensible qualifications, though one imagines that readers unconvinced by the coherence theory of inference in its cold ver-sion will not take much more of a shine to the hot version. It would have been interesting, in this connection, to see the defense of HOTCO, *qua* coher-ence account, related more fully to the discussion, in the chapter 'Critique of Emotional Reason', of Susan Haack's 'foundherentist' epistemology, es-pecially given the kinds of constraints on coherence-only criteria Thagard introduces into HOTCO. The discussion of emotion could also usefully be fleshed out regarding the ways, mentioned but not much explored, in which even 'basic' emotions such as anger and happiness are more complex than just 'valence'. There is also little exploration of *why* hot and cold cognition can diverge, for instance when emotions are recalcitrant in the face of consid-ered judgments. Then again, Thagard's abstention from triumphalist claims to have a definitive account of emotions (a common enough feature of much recent work on emotion, from natural and social sciences to humanities) is a welcome feature, and what is here is a rich and fertile contribution to the emotion literature.

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It is relatively easy to cobble together an interpretation of the *Tractatus* from scattered bits of Wittgenstein's book, much harder to stick to the words on the page and figure out the point of it all. All too often commentators dodge

around, close their eyes to difficulties, and quote passages without explana-
tion. But not Roger White. He looks closely at the text, refrains from putting
words into Wittgenstein's mouth and does his level best to clarify what is go-
ing on. There is no trimming to fit a preconceived idea or the latest fad, just a
sustained effort to deal with Wittgenstein's masterpiece on its own terms and
to bring it alive. White has thought long and hard about the *Tractatus*, and one
never feels in anything less than excellent hands. Better still I fancy he cap-
tures the spirit of Wittgenstein as well as the letter of his text. Much is left to
the reader and some of the discussion requires close attention, but anyone who
perseveres, novice or expert, will find the effort more than worthwhile.

The book opens with two short chapters, one on Wittgenstein's life up to
the completion of the *Tractatus* and the intellectual context in which he was
working (1-7), the other on central concepts and themes of the *Tractatus*: the
notion of a proposition, the existence and specification of the general form of
propositions, logical truth, the 'limits of language', and the say/show distinc-
tion (8-15). Next comes White's *pièce de résistance*, a very long chapter on
Wittgenstein's remarks from 'The world is everything that is the case' on
up to 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent' (16-134).
Finally, to round things off, there are short chapters on the fate of Wittgen-
stein's book (135-143) and what to read next (144-148).

The chapters flanking the long middle chapter are nicely done. Perhaps
unsurprisingly — White was a translator of *Philosophical Remarks* — the
material on the reception and influence of Wittgenstein's book is unusually
helpful, while the guide to further reading, besides sampling the literature,
provides useful additional information about how White comes at the *Trac-
tatus*. What impresses most, however, is the core of the book, the detailed
commentary on the text itself (30-118, above all). White works systematically
through Wittgenstein's remarks (with frequent glances ahead), focusing on
passages that have caused readers and commentators most trouble. Though
he does not consider everything in the book — in an introductory guide that
is out of the question — he covers the key sections and central themes, which
on his reading have to do with logic and language. Arguably, 2-2.063 (on ob-
jects) are more naturally studied with the 1s, and 3-3.05 (on pictures) more
naturally considered with the rest of the 2s. But dividing up the material
White's way has its merits, and in any event the important thing is not what
goes with what, but how Wittgenstein's discussion develops and what he says
at each point along the way.

White's comments on individual passages are uniformly judicious, enlight-
ening and worth pondering. I was particularly taken by his insistence that the
remarks about facts at the beginning of the *Tractatus* are 'meant to be read
in a way that is as vacuous as possible' (26), his explanation of Wittgenstein's
argument that picturing the world presupposes the existence of simple ob-
jects (38-44), his discussion of the requirement that sense be determinate
(54-60), his examination of the all-important Tractarian idea of propositions
as pictures (68-74), his survey of Wittgenstein's remarks about generating all
(meaningful) propositions from elementary propositions by means of a single

truth-operator (83-98), and his analysis of how Wittgenstein's view of logical truth does — and does not — fall foul of the undecidability of predicate logic (106-08). But there is much else of interest, and different readers will doubtless applaud White's handling of different topics.

Books on the *Tractatus*, especially ones with their own 'narrative', are bound, as White notes, to 'provoke disagreement at some point or other' (vii). I welcomed the sharp criticism of the so-called New Wittgensteinians' contention that Wittgenstein intends us to come to see that the bulk of the book is out-and-out nonsense (125-30). But I was less persuaded by White's way of accounting for Wittgenstein's claim that his propositions are *unsinnig*, which is to attribute to Wittgenstein the view that nonsensical propositions can show 'a pattern *within* the facts' (133; also 120, 130-34). Is Wittgenstein not more charitably regarded as believing that thoughts are, as he puts it in his preface, expressed in the book, and are his remarks in the body of the book not better understood as communicating truths about representation and logic (as opposed, that is, to truths about the world)? Also I am inclined to think there is more to the idea of Wittgenstein as an 'intuitive thinker' than White allows (viii). Russell and Carnap seem to me to have had it right when they suggested that inspiration played an important point in Wittgenstein's thinking. Nor, I might add, was I able to accept all White's evaluations, for instance his view that colour incompatibility is dealt with at 6.3751 'in a highly unsatisfactory manner' (34).

Mostly, however, I found myself wishing for more. I would have liked the benefit of White's thoughts about the 6.3s on science, the 6.4s on ethics and other passages that he only touches on, to say nothing of the passages he was obliged to skip over. And it would have been good to have had his reflections on the exercises he includes to alert the reader to alternative interpretations. His 'topics for discussion' are tricky and a little help would have been welcome. However unfair it may be to demand more from an author who provides so much, I cannot help hoping there will be a sequel with more discussion, more detail, more stage-setting. On the present showing, nobody is better equipped to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of the *Tractatus*.

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