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Publications Mail Registration No. 08491 – ISSN 1206-5269
Agreement number 40032920

Published six times a year

Volume XXVIII, No. 1
February • février 2008

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Mailed in March/April 2008.

Arif Ahmed
Saul Kripke.
New York: Continuum 2007.
Pp. 190.
US$110.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-9261-6);
US$29.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-9262-3).

This book is an insightful and thorough analysis of Kripke's major contributions to philosophy. Ahmed examines Kripke's views on description theory, essence and materialism, skeptical paradox, and private language as they are presented in *Naming and Necessity* and *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Guided by the notion that deeper understanding is achieved through critical analysis, Ahmed subjects Kripke's arguments to a systematic, premise-by-premise assessment.

In Naming and Necessity, Ahmed identifies three arguments — modal, semantic, and epistemological — in rejection of the Frege-Russell Thesis (FRT). The modal argument concludes that the FRT is false because it implies that it is necessary that the referent of a name satisfies the associated definite description, which runs counter to our intuitions. Ahmed denies that the FRT has this implication by questioning the assumption that synonymous expressions can be substituted within sentences without changing their meanings. Drawing on Dummett, Ahmed argues that expressions mean the same subject to the convention that definite descriptions take wide scope in modal contexts; and this blocks the counterintuitive conclusion. Finally, Ahmed argues, the modal argument fails because it misconstrues FRT as implying that e.g. 'Aristotle' means the same as 'the teacher of Alexander', rather than 'the actual teacher of Alexander'.

The semantic argument maintains that if FRT is true, then whether or not a name refers to a thing depends on whether it satisfies the associated description, e.g. 'Columbus' refers to 'the first man to realize that the earth was round'. However, since the person that satisfied this description might turn out to be someone other than the actual Columbus, FRT would imply that 'Columbus' does not refer to Columbus. But intuition suggests that 'Columbus' does refer to Columbus; hence, FRT must be false. This argument fails due to conflicting premises. If a name is used knowingly as part of the common language, then the deference to expert knowledge will have greater weight than the association of the name with a given description; in this case 'Columbus' does not refer to 'the first man to realize that the earth was round'. However, if in someone's idiolect the association between a name and some description has maximum weight, then in that idiolect the name refers to whatever satisfies the associated description, contrary to the intuition.

The epistemological argument maintains that if FRT is true, then we should know a priori that the referent of a name satisfies certain associated descriptions. Since this is not known a priori, FRT must be false. Again, the premises are in conflict. The reason to reject the evidence that Schmidt discovered the incompleteness theorem as evidence that Gödel is Schmidt is that

we associate additional descriptions with 'Gödel' other than 'the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem'. If there were no such additional descriptions then there would be no reasons to hold that Gödel is not in fact Schmidt. The grounds for accepting the first premise of the epistemological argument are the grounds for rejecting the second. Ultimately, Ahmed's criticisms of the modal and epistemological arguments also apply to Kripke's views on the meaning of predicates.

Drawing on Quine, Ahmed also argues that the distinction between essential and accidental properties is made relative to a certain description. He rejects the essentiality of human ancestry by arguing that the intuitions on which the argument is based are sensitive to descriptions and prompting questions. Furthermore, contrary intuitions, grounded in such modal judgments as blame or regret, exist, and preference for one intuition rather than another must be either arbitrary, or circular. However, Ahmed's latter objection raises a question whether the discussed intuitions are on a par: one might regret things that on reflection are not only metaphysically but even logically impossible. Nevertheless, Ahmed uses his criticism of intuition to question the essentiality of material origin and material constitution, and undermine the argument for the essential properties of natural kinds. Finally, Ahmed rejects Kripke's argument against the materialist approach to the identity of mental and physical states as unsound. The distinctness of mental and physical states does not follow from the intuition that one can exist without the other; such intuition could be explained by Kripke's own account of the illusion of contingency. Furthermore, Ahmed argues that a mental state of pain could exist and not be sensed as pain. Drawing on functionalists like Lewis, Ahmed also criticizes Kripke's argument against type-materialism by denying that pain designates rigidly.

Ahmed credits Kripke's skeptic with highlighting a tension within the prephilosophical concept of meaning. The tension is between the intuitive view that meaning is revealed in use and the intuition of meaning as something that guides use. The skeptic argues against sensationalism by appealing to the first intuition, and against dispositionalism by appealing to the second. However, the skeptic's arguments fail against the hybrid sensationalist-dispositionalist view of meaning. While it is not clear how a sensationalist state can tell someone how to proceed, the skeptic fails to show that it is impossible. Drawing on Hume, Ahmed argues that the skeptic fails against someone who identifies meaning with a disposition to have certain sensational states in response to queries.

Ahmed argues that the skeptical solution is characterized by a shift from truth conditions to assertability conditions, which need not consciously guide but only bring about the assertion of a given sentence. He draws a distinction between the first-person assertability conditions based on brute inclinations, and the third-person assertability conditions. This grounds a distinction between first-person and third-person meaning-ascriptions. According to Ahmed, Kripke's argument against private language amounts to the claim that meaning-ascriptions cannot be done solely on the basis of first-person

assertability conditions. However, since Ahmed's first-person meaning-ascriptions are based on brute inclinations and lack standard of correctness, it is questionable that they can qualify as meaning-ascriptions at all.

Arif Ahmed's book is a good example of analytical work which combines critical analysis of Kripke's arguments from *Naming and Necessity* with more discursive analysis of his skeptical argument, and a more interpretive treatment of the skeptical solution. As Ahmed admits, his aim was not to refute Kripke's views, only to present objections to them. Without a doubt, this aim has been fully accomplished.

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Karl Ameriks
Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 359.
US$99.99 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-920533-2);
US$39.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-920534-9).

By the late eighteenth century, there had arisen a philosophical split between 'the largely ahistorical and systematic orientation of modern metaphysics from Descartes and Leibniz through Kant, and the new historicist orientation arising from . . . work by Lessing, Herder, and others fascinated by newly discovered complexities in the development of classical and Judeo-Christian culture' (4). Overcoming this division is key to Ameriks' enterprise in this book; he believes it has been present within philosophy ever since, and that moreover it is pernicious, because neither orientation is adequate by itself. It is in the history of responses to Kant that he finds the possibility of 'a more complex and moderate invocation of historical considerations', one that avoids the reductionism inherent in both the historicist and the ahistorical orientations (7).

This third way is the essence of what Ameriks means by the 'historical turn', the prospect of a reconciliation between the analytic and hermeneutic aspects of philosophy. It was pioneered, he argues, by Karl Reinhold, whose *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* popularised Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Reinhold made Kant intelligible by setting him in context and presenting his work as a rational answer to a series of historic disputes, thus setting an example followed, for example, by Hegel's *History of Philosophy*. But

Ameriks also offers plenty of examples of recent 'outstanding' philosophical writers who have 'turned to largely historical investigations without giving up their distinctively philosophical and highly analytic approach,' including Bernard Williams, Charles Taylor, John Rawls, Alaisdar MacIntyre, and Stanley Cavell (13-14). All have accepted that 'philosophy . . . cannot progress (in at least many of its essential areas) without a systematic historical reflection upon itself' (50).

The remainder of the book illustrates this historically informed style of philosophical interpretation in action. In the first section, Ameriks attributes the philosophical fertility of Kant's theory of apperception to its 'modest doctrine of the "I"' that remained agnostic over the ultimate nature of the self; distinguishes Kantian transcendental idealism firmly from the subjective Berkeleyan variety, in opposition to the reading given by Van Cleve's *Problems from Kant*; claims that Kant's theory of morality as autonomy leaves room for considerations of motivation that Humeans frequently regard it as lacking; and aligns Kant with Reid as the author of a philosophy that, at the empirical level, is intended to be fully compatible with common-sense realism.

The second section is given over to *Rezeptionsgeschichte*. It begins by recognizing the fundamental ambiguity of Kant's attitude towards metaphysics. The central issue is what Kant's dialectic should be taken to exclude; and at best, Ameriks believes, it 'excludes only a very specific set of claims and not the truth of all traditional metaphysical doctrines' as has sometimes been thought (142). Thus, the notion of the 'unconditioned' remains what he calls a 'smoking gun' in Kant's text, though 'it does not follow that this unconditioned is anything . . . mental, absolutely necessary, or God-like' (150-1). But Kant's obscure handling of the subject left scope for a variety of reactions; Jacobi, Reinhold and Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, the early Romantics, and the neo-Kantians all responded to it in different ways. Reinhold receives the lion's share of the attention here, as is only natural considering his importance for the 'non-radical' and 'post-positivist' historical style of philosophising that Ameriks is developing.

The third section examines the era of Hegel and after. The essay on Hegel deals with his aesthetics. Ameriks rebuts Hegel's charge of subjectivism against Kant as based on an 'inaccurate and unfair' reading of the early Romantic authors who developed his ideas on beauty; and he argues that Kant, at least at the empirical level, defended a thoroughly objectivist theory of aesthetics. He then goes on to examine 'The Legacy of Idealism' in the work of Feuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard, effectively bringing his account up to the end of the nineteenth century.

The fourth and final section, on 'Contemporary Interpretations', opens with a discussion of Frederick Beiser's *German Idealism* which underlines Amerik's opposition to the notion of Kant and the early Romantics as naively subjectivist, before going on to connect the emergence of aesthetics with the contemporaneous 'historical turn' in philosophy in a chapter on 'The Key Role of *Selbstgefühl* in Philosophy's Aesthetic and Historical Turns'. The same 'mysterious phenomena of qualia and intentionality, both of which are

closely connected to the peculiar feature of the apparently irreducible direct self-referentiality of subjectivity' are at the heart of both history and aesthetics (273).

The stage is thus set for a reconsideration and elaboration of the themes in the opening section of the book in a final chapter on 'Historical Constellations and Copernican Contexts'. *Konstellationsforschung* or 'constellation research' is a form of contextualism which aims to rediscover the forgotten connections between groups of philosophical contemporaries. If done properly, it can transform our appreciation of the major texts in the canon by highlighting how much of their supposed meaning is in fact the product of an accretion of layers of received interpretation, as Ameriks has already demonstrated in the case of Reinhold and Kant.

Stripping away these layers, Ameriks argues, reveals not a single fixed meaning but the original historical context of a work, and has the additional benefit of rendering it newly significant for the present day. However, this 'Copernican' or post-Kuhnian contextualist approach, which treats the world as 'not a wholly independent and fixed object but something determined only through our own interpretations,' need not entail a radical historicism; rather, it is 'part of a process that leads, in an especially complex way, back to a form of self-discovery that is uniquely philosophical' (297, 305).

This book is at once a manifesto for the practice of philosophy in the twenty-first century, a major addition to the English literature on Kant, and an illuminating guide to the history of post-Kantian Idealist philosophy in late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Germany. That it has been pieced together almost entirely from essays previously published in a variety of scholarly journals and edited works, and still makes a major contribution on all three fronts, testifies to the rigour of argument and depth of knowledge on which it rests.

Luke O'Sullivan

Craig Bourne
A Future for Presentism.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 253.
US$55.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921280-4).

Presentism, the view that what exists only exists in the present, has generally received more criticism than support from philosophers of time. Bourne's book argues that we ought to take presentism very seriously not only because it can overcome the objections often raised against it, but because it is the

only plausible tensed theory of time. While this leaves open the possibility that presentism is false, on the grounds that all tensed theories are false, Bourne is justifiably content that if his arguments are successful then the battle between tensed and tenseless theories will be waged over presentist territory. To make his case, Bourne divides his book into three main sections: an introduction designed to define key concepts and positions in the philosophy of time; Part 1 (comprising Chapters 1-4), designed to show why presentism and particularly his own brand of it is the only plausible tensed theory of time; and Part 2 (comprising Chapters 5-8), designed to show how his presentist theory avoids objections derived from modern physics.

The introduction provides a helpful primer to those unfamiliar with the core positions and ideas prevalent in contemporary discussions about the nature of time. While those familiar with the discussion are unlikely to find anything new in the first two sections of the introduction, they will find its third section useful as Bourne articulates there his conditions of adequacy for a theory of time. Briefly, Bourne takes an adequate theory to accord, as well as possible, with common sense intuitions about time, while also explaining how these (remaining) common sense beliefs are correct. If the theory succeeds on these counts while avoiding obscurity, then the theory is at least minimally successful. While these conditions might not seem noteworthy, Bourne uses them with effect to show how many contemporary theories of time are inadequate in Part 1 of the book.

But it is not the adequacy conditions alone that Bourne uses to undermine his rival tensed theories. The primary destructive piece, introduced in Chapter 1, is what Bourne calls the Present Problem, a problem he believes only presentist theories can adequately address. The problem simply is this: 'Although we know by immediate acquaintance which time is our own, how can we know that our time is *present*?' (23), where the '*present*' indicates the privileged position of the tensed theory. The difficulty other tensed theorists have in handling the problem is in supplying sufficient epistemic or ontological grounds for identifying any moment as *present* rather than *past* or *future*. In contrast, because the presentist commits herself only to the reality of the present, her ontology admits only the *present*. From this, Bourne concludes that only the presentist has the theoretical resources to handle his problem, and consequently what should really matter to a tensed theorist is which version of presentism to adopt.

In Chapter 2, Bourne begins by examining rival versions of presentism before offering his own ersatzer view. These versions are dispatched because they violate one or more of the adequacy conditions stated in the introduction. For example, A.N. Prior's presentism is found to be wanting because it lacks a transparent account of truth-makers for past and future propositions. As those familiar with ersatzer interpretations of possible worlds might expect, Bourne uses abstract entities, namely maximally consistent sets of propositions, ordered by an earlier-than relation, to represent claims about the past, present and future. Where we see an important ontological difference in Bourne's theory is where we should expect it: what plays the role

of truth-maker for a sentence. To represent the presentist insistence that only the present exists, concrete entities serve as truth-makers for sentences about the present, while (ordered) sets add the role of truth-maker to their representative role for sentences about the past and future. Bourne goes on to develop his account to capture the intuition that the past is closed, while the future is open. This is accomplished by utilizing a branching structure, with maximally consistent propositions on each branch to represent the indeterminacy of many future states of affairs, while allowing only a single branch to represent the past.

The rest of Part 1, chapters 3 and 4, are devoted to handling many of the common challenges raised against presentism generally, but with a mind to developing responses to versions that target Bourne's ersatzer view. Some of the more important challenges addressed include McTaggart's argument against the reality of time, the alleged need for times other than the present, and the concern that presentism cannot adequately represent transtemporal relations like reference and causation.

Once the more familiar philosophical problems have been tackled, Bourne tackles what appears to be the most daunting challenge to presentists in Part 2: modern physics. While this part invokes Lorentz transformations, Minkowski space-time diagrams and mathematical formulae many philosophers haven't seen since their undergraduate days, Bourne produces a marvelously clear introduction to all the necessary terminology and concepts in Chapter 5, 'Physics for Philosophers'. With the conceptual stage set, Bourne moves to a challenge posed by the special theory of relativity (STR) in Chapter 6. Rather than giving up traditional understandings of tense or (STR) — both of which are often seen as key obstacles to presentism — Bourne argues that the problem is with Einstein's verificationist interpretation of simultaneity; an interpretation he believes we can plausibly give up. In Chapter 7, the attention shifts from (STR) to examine the general theory of relativity (GTR) and how some presentists use it in overcoming challenges posed by (STR). The short story is that while (STR) threatens the possibility of absolute simultaneity, (GTR) makes such absoluteness possible given the planes of homogeneity created by an expanding universe. Bourne, having dissolved worries produced by (STR) in Chapter 6, not only believes that the presentist does not need (GTR) to align her theory with modern physics, but that the planes of homogeneity (GTR) licenses are insufficient to capture the needs of the presentist. The book concludes in Chapter 8 with a discussion of a modal argument by Gödel for the unreality of time. Bourne sees this last challenge as ultimately unsuccessful yet yielding the interesting result either that time is tenseless or that tense is a contingent fact.

While Bourne's book is not for the faint of heart, it is engaging and chockfull of arguments and analyses that metaphysicians and philosophers of time especially will find rewarding.

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C. A. J. Coady, ed.
What's Wrong with Moralism?
Malden, MA: Blackwell 2006.
Pp. 102.
US$34.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-1-4051-4948-5).

'Moralizing', 'moralistic' . . . no one wants to be accused of moralizing, or of being moralistic. Every introduction to philosophy of law waxes loud on the evils of legal moralism. So moralism must be a Bad Thing, mustn't it? Well, things can't be that simple. Not only do we study the British Moralists (Hume, Shaftesbury, Cudworth, Hutcheson and co.), worthies all, and full of good sense about matters moral; more mundanely, as Benjamin Lovett comments in his contribution to this volume, 'castigating the dinner guest for not washing her hands may be perceived as excessive, but similar treatment of the surgeon who does not wash his [*sic*] hands before performing an operation would probably be perceived as more than justified' (64). Obviously, 'moralism' in the pejorative sense is more than the mere giving of moral advice, but a specific kind of giving of moral advice. What kind?

This definitional project is one of the two projects that are taken on in this compact volume. Four of the seven essays have this aim, those by Robert Fullinwider, Julia Driver, and Craig Taylor as well as Lovett. The results are mixed. The papers produce quite an array of accounts, not all compatible with each other, and as a consequence the definitional project can hardly be said to be much advanced. Fullinwider parses moralism in the pejorative sense — from now on I will drop the qualifier, as this will be the only sense at issue — as 'judgmentalism', 'the habit of uncharitably and officiously passing judgment on other people' (9). Driver identifies moralism as 'the illicit introduction of moral considerations' (37). The illicitness comes down to excessiveness — being too demanding or perfectionist, or taking non-moral rules to be moral ones. For Taylor, moralism is 'excessive or unreasonable indulgence in moral reflection or judgment' (53). Lovett, a psychologist, tries to find a neutral definition of moralism, and proposes 'the public judgment of others' actions as morally wrong' (62). His motive for doing this is interesting. As a psychologist interested in good mental health, he defends the view that, given the appropriate context and sensibilities, moralism defined as he defines it has a valuable role to play in human flourishing. It is an effective strategy for changing others' behavior, especially when it comes to specific problems of weakness of will and moral ignorance. This is an illuminating paper — the cynic might say because of, rather than in spite of, its not being philosophical.

Driver also tries to position the casuistical method in moral reasoning as the antidote to moralism. I don't find her thesis convincing. I should have thought that axiomatic or principled moral reasoning is fully capable of being unobjectionable, and reasoning from cases fully capable of being obnoxious. Ironically, however, the papers by Fullinwider and Taylor seem to give her some support. They make excellent use of particular cases, Pecksniff from

Dickens' *Martin Chuzzlewit* and Dimmesdale from Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter* respectively. The vividness of each portrayal makes moralism come alive in a way that the philosopher's definitions do not. However, the effect is due more, I believe, to the vividness of the portrayal, than to any formal argument by means of cases.

The other three papers pursue the issue of moralism in an altogether different way. They all revolve around the thought that there seems to be a specific kind of inappropriate introduction of moral considerations that is of contemporary *political* significance — the use of moral reasons to justify political action where such reasoning oversimplifies or marginalizes the importance of the political values at stake. The favored target of course is U.S. President George W. Bush, and to some extent former U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, for their discourse of moral evil to justify such disastrous political actions as the invasion of Iraq. Any time, however, one tries to dismiss moral considerations from political decision-making, the spectre is raised of political realism about international relations, the idea — surely also unacceptable — that issues of moral worth have no place in political decision-making at all: political decision-making should be all about national self-interest and nothing else.

Formally speaking, there does seem a structural isomorphism to the two issues of moralism. In each case, we want morality to weigh in the balance just exactly as much as it should weigh, no more and no less. Otherwise, the two kinds of issue are very different. The goal of the conference from which these papers derive was to explore possible commonalities, but it does not seem to me they were found.

That said, the three papers by Tony Coady, Duncan Ivison and Arthur Kuflik on moralism in politics are of some interest. Coady investigates directly the opposition of moralism and realism. He disentangles a number of complaints about political moralism that have some legitimacy: seeing things as moral that aren't, interfering for moral reasons in ways that disrupt autonomy, adherence to ideals that are too lofty and unrealistic, and so forth. However, he argues that realism is not thereby proved to be the only alternative left. 'The right replacement for moralism is not national self-interest, but a suitably nuanced and attentive international morality' (34). This is a very sensible and sensitive paper, the best in the book in my view.

Ivison gives a multicultural twist to the issue of moralism. Moralism is the name to give to one, perhaps even the, prime way of giving offence in a multicultural environment, the intolerance of difference. Ivison is opposed to moralism so understood. The paper, however, is really just a defense of governmental policies that promote multiculturalism as an ideal. The deployment of the term `moralism' is just a pretext for a familiar kind of liberal political argument, which argument would stand or fall as the case may be regardless of whether its rivals deserved to be called `moralistic'. Arthur Kuflik focuses on legal moralism, the view that everything that is morally required should be legally required. As he rightly points out (86), legal institutions are specialized instruments for the enactment of public policy, and rather

blunt ones. It's hardly surprising if they turn out to be unsuitable for the advancement of some moral values. This is a valuable defusing of the usual heated rhetoric about legal moralism. That said, there is little that is new in the paper about the relationship between liberalism as a political theory and legal moralism.

The volume fails, then, in its goals of defining moralism and linking moralism about individual action to moralism in politics. The papers were originally published as an issue of the *Journal of Applied Philosophy*. There are enough insights in them to justify their being made available to a wider audience in the form of a book, although with so many journals being readily available on-line this justification doesn't have the force it once did. I have to say, though, that while as a Canadian I appreciate the recent pricing parity between the Canadian and the U.S. dollars, $34.95 for 102 pages seems outrageous in either currency.

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Elizabeth F. Cooke
Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry: Fallibilism and Indeterminacy.
New York: Continuum 2006.
Pp. 192.
US$110.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8899-2).

Charles S. Peirce's pragmatism is increasingly receiving attention among scholars of American philosophy. Although Peirce is generally recognized as a pioneer of fallibilist epistemology and philosophy of science, Cooke's thin volume is (as far as I can tell) the first book-length study primarily focusing on fallibilism in Peirce's thought. The book is accessible for those beginning with Peirce: Chapters 1 and 2 offer a lucid introduction to Peirce's anti-Cartesian, anti-foundationalist views and his pragmatic 'doubt-belief' theory of inquiry, including abduction. However, the book is not merely an introduction, as Cooke also sharply engages in debates over the meaning of fallibilism and its compatibility with other aspects of Peirce's philosophy. Her main goal is not the final historical truth about Peirce's actual views but a coherent picture of what Peirce ought to have thought (2).

Fallibilism, claiming that 'one's current beliefs could be in error' and that, therefore, 'there may be good reasons to revise one's current beliefs in the future', is 'at the very heart of all human inquiry' (1). It is not only an acknowl-

edgment of humility and human finitude but also the attitude of an active, dynamic inquirer: it makes us open to new questions and real doubt (instead of the 'paper doubt' Peirce ridiculed in his 1868 anti-Cartesian papers). Fallibilism is required for the growth of knowledge; infallibilist, dogmatic inquirers would not be prepared to critically question their beliefs (28-9, 76, 142-3). It should, moreover, be extended to all areas of knowledge and inquiry.

In Chapters 3-5, Cooke explores areas of Peirce's thought that might seem to assume infallibilism: mathematics, the (in)famous theory-practice distinction, critical commonsensism, and synechistic metaphysics. When distinguishing between different kinds of fallibilism, such as internal and external (61), Cooke might have considered Isaac Levi's suggestion that Peirce (and pragmatism in general) is committed to 'corrigibilism' (viz., the corrigibility of beliefs held true) instead of fallibilism — though this may be a terminological issue. On the whole, these chapters are informative and illuminating, though not as original as some other recent commentaries. (As noted by Alexander Klein in *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, October 2007, it is not always clear how Cooke's proposals differ from, or improve upon, proposals of previous Peirce scholars.)

Occasionally, a broader perspective would have placed Peircean ideas in their pragmatist context(s). When Cooke concludes that science is 'a rich interpenetration of knower with known, a mixing of mind and world, where the world shapes the mind, and the mind shapes the world' (99), it would be helpful to refer to similar ideas in William James, John Dewey, neopragmatists like Hilary Putnam — and Immanuel Kant. Furthermore, when Cooke wisely rejects coherentist interpretations of Peirce's theory of truth (100-7), it would be worthwhile to acknowledge those Peircean scientific realists (e.g., Ilkka Niiniluoto) who, assuming the correspondence theory, construe the 'long run' as an increase in the verisimilitude ('truthlikeness') of theories.

In Chapter 6, Cooke defends a conception of the long run as an ideal guiding inquiry — preferring Carl Hausman's reading to Joseph Margolis' in one recent controversy — but avoids Karl-Otto Apel's infallibilist account of the long run as a necessary transcendental condition for the possibility of meaning. She joins Kenneth Westphal in maintaining that the fallibilist pragmatist can advance transcendental arguments if they are considered fallible (125). Fallibilism, then, extends not only to mathematical reasoning and metaphysics but to meaning, too (126-7). The chapter is a well-structured piece on a key Peircean issue; Cooke mainly comments on other interpreters, skillfully navigating between positions she finds problematic in different ways.

Cooke's truly original views are presented in Chapter 7, which invokes 'transcendental hope' as a condition of inquiry. Cooke argues that hope plays a transcendental function in thought and inquiry as a necessary condition for the possibility of asking questions initiating inquiry (129). Christopher Hookway's work on Peircean hope is an obvious reference (132-5), as is Richard Rorty's anti-Peircean pragmatist account of hope (145-7), but Cooke goes beyond Hookway (and criticizes Rorty) in interpreting hope as a transcendental concept (135). Her pragmatic transcendental argument is this (136):

'(P1) If we ask a question, we necessarily presuppose that the question will be answered. (P2) We do ask questions. Therefore, we presuppose that our questions will be answered'. When posing 'real questions', instead of insincere questions based on paper doubts, we must hope that they are answered; we presuppose they are answerable. Generally, not just questions but 'all utterances presuppose a hope for a response' (138).

As Cooke defends a quasi-Kantian transcendental argument, she might perhaps have been careful in her statements about Kant. Although Peirce found Kant's 'thing-in-itself' incoherent, it is unclear whether what he criticized was really Kant's idea. Kant could have agreed that 'to have a conception of anything is to have a conception of it as a possible object of knowledge' (19). According to 'one world' ('double aspect') interpretations of transcendental idealism (e.g., by Henry Allison), the thing-in-itself *is* the object of experience (cognition, representation) considered in abstraction from the conditions of human cognition. There is no separate realm of noumenal objects. Appearances and things-in-themselves are two ways of considering the *same* objects, the same world. In order to (re)connect Peirce's pragmatism with its Kantian background, this interpretation should be explored. If transcendental idealism is not understood as naïvely postulating otherworldly noumena, it is inaccurate to claim that it is, for a Peircean, as incoherent as skepticism (19, 98).

Finally, Cooke is silent on the pragmatic, fallibilist character of *ethical* inquiry. Couldn't fallibilism be employed in morality, too, as it is effectively applied not only to empirical (scientific) but also to mathematical, metaphysical, and even semantic inquiries? A further, more reflexive question is whether fallibilism, as a second-order claim about knowledge (2), is itself known, and whether it is known fallibly. This can be continued: is the claim that fallibilism can (only) be known fallibly *itself* fallible, etc.? If such a reflexivity challenge is overlooked, it may seem that fallibilism is invoked as a new 'infallible' foundation of knowledge — which, obviously, it cannot be.

I warmly recommend Cooke's volume — especially its final chapter on hope — to Peirce scholars and philosophers of science. It is a clearly written, though not always particularly original, study of a fundamental theme in Peirce and in pragmatist theory of inquiry generally.

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Ronald de Sousa
Why Think? Evolution and the Rational Mind.
New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 196.
US$25.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-518985-8).

An attractive, naked woman looks back at us from the cover of de Sousa's book. Just like the title, her presence challenges us to consider a question: Why is she on the cover of a book about rationality? The issue that focuses de Sousa's efforts is the relation between the natural world, as understood in evolutionary terms, and rationality. Traditionally, the differences between the two were played up to justify a dualist view that placed people outside the natural order. The naturalist reaction has been to downplay the differences and to attempt to show humans are just like other animals. While wholeheartedly sharing the naturalist view of humanity, de Sousa is concerned that what is special about human reason is not being properly considered; Plantinga's theist objection that evolved minds would not have the capacity to understand their own nature is the flip side of this worry. So, the question de Sousa deals with is, Why do humans, the result of evolutionary processes, reason? This goes in two directions: What do humans gain from reasoning that natural selection does not offer? and, What were the evolutionary processes that led to us being able to reason?

The picture of human reason de Sousa presents is essentially a double-aspect account: evolution has provided us with mental modules which underpin our ability to make rapid intuitive judgements, while our ability to think analytically is dependent on the invention of language allowing us to represent information independently of specific modules. Furthermore, according to de Sousa, language makes possible human values that, at times, run counter to evolutionary considerations. In effect, the apparent difference between humans and animals is explained in naturalistic terms. The view is similar to those put forward recently by Epstein, Evans, Sloman and Stanovich, among others. As such, it is surprising that de Sousa does not make use of their work in the area. It is particularly surprising considering that in his small book de Sousa manages to bring up an overwhelming amount of work from a number of disciplines.

Starting with Aristotle's definition of humans as rational animals, de Sousa makes the very useful distinction between 'rational' as opposed to 'irrational' on the one hand, and 'rational' as opposed to 'arational' on the other, where the most irrational human is still rational in the second sense. The remainder of the introduction is used to explain some of the basic concepts, laying out the course de Sousa follows in the book's remaining four short chapters. The first of these is concerned with various aspects of normativity, which de Sousa thinks central to rationality. His aim is to show how things such as functions and values can be explained in purely naturalistic terms: biological function is to be explained in etiological terms, as suggested by Millikan, but human values require something more, namely thought and lan-

guage. The relationship between values, thought, and language is the topic of his second chapter. At the bottom of de Sousa's account lies the last major transition in evolution — the transition to language — that Maynard Smith and Szathmáry discuss in their highly influential book. This transition ties de Sousa's picture back to evolution. Language (in a view taken from Carruthers) is then seen to make possible thought and, in turn, the 'multiplicity of values' humans exhibit, the opposite of which is a strict adherence to seeking evolutionary advantage. With language and a multiplicity of values comes the need to consider the conflict between what is rational for an individual and what is rational for the community, and this is de Sousa's focus in the next chapter. This allows him to examine the naturalist underpinnings of human morality and the way that culture fits into this picture, and de Sousa bases his suggestions on the work of Boyd and Richerson. Finally, in the last chapter de Sousa turns to truth as the main intellectual value, and to the question of how to reconcile it with the natural history and fallibility of human reason. Here, de Sousa's answer appears to be fairly traditional: judgments of irrationality assume the normativity of rationality, and '[t]he norm of rationality . . . is analytically tied to the criterion of success for belief, which is truth' (124) — the point being that the elements of this picture can be spelled out in naturalist terms.

For whom is de Sousa's book intended, however? Given that he begins it by explaining basic concepts, it may seem to be an introduction to the area of biologically informed cognitive theory. Yet, the emphasis he puts on his argument belies the merely expository aim. Is it then a book for fellow philosophers, presenting his view of rationality? Probably not; the way de Sousa presents his argument is too terse, so that he ignores countless philosophical 'niceties' along the way. Indeed, at times his style is so telegraphic as to make it difficult to follow his line of reasoning even when you know the material. What he has done, in fact, is to assemble out of contemporary research an impressionist sketch of rationality. Which brings us back to the woman on the cover. The work is *Olympia* in which Manet depicts a self-assured prostitute in a pose traditionally used in paintings of the goddess Venus. To Manet's contemporaries the painting was shocking, particularly since the woman stares at the viewer, forcing them to consider their own role. Perhaps, then, this is de Sousa's aim: to confront the traditionalists (including Plantinga) with a frank depiction of his Olympia, a thoroughly naturalised but non-reductionist notion of rationality. Where others sought to deify reason, de Sousa shows it to be made of flesh and bone. And all the more alluring for it.

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Alexander García Düttmann
Philosophy of Exaggeration.
Trans. James Phillips. New York:
Continuum 2007.
Pp 182.
US$110.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-9562-4).

Alexander García Düttmann's newest book, which originally appeared as *Philosophie der Übertreibung* (2004), defies easy classification. Though clearly indebted to the continental tradition of philosophy, it treats this tradition as a springboard as much as a relevant philosophical trajectory. The ambiguity is not fortuitous. It is just the first of many expressions in this book of the 'single thought of philosophies of exaggeration:' 'the thought that limits are everything *and* nothing' (4). For Düttmann, limits are everything because they define what it is we can think about — continental philosophy versus analytical, for instance — but they are nothing because one must have already transgressed them (and thus proved their obsolescence) in order to gain the perspective needed to have anything to think at all — only because we recognize that there is something more to philosophy than continental philosophy do we bother to delimit it. Both the impulse to delimit and the move to transgress are exaggerations of thought. They make thought possible. However, because their dialectic also risks stalling in paralysis, philosophy — now as a philosophy of exaggeration — must step in to rescue thought by identifying 'disruptions' that 'clear the way' for new questioning (6). Each of the chapters of this book takes up one of these avenues for disruption, of which we will consider three: factuality, truth, and art.

Though nothing would seem further from exaggeration than factuality, the chapter entitled 'Being Guilty: Factuality and Exaggeration' is one of the more compelling of the volume. On the one hand, it reminds us of the 'scandal of exaggeration' (82), namely, that exaggeration presents itself as fact. This is evident to the extent that we often do not respond to exaggeration by simply pointing out its exaggeratedness — for example, by measuring the discrepancy between the 'factual' fish and the outstretched hands telling the tale — but rather counter with our own competing version of what is factually possible. However, in doing so we underscore the degree to which facts themselves are exaggerations — that they, in their turn, force us to accept that *this* is the way things are, when of course everything could be otherwise. The significance of factuality's relation to exaggeration is most evident in politics, and what Düttmann calls, following Hannah Arendt, the 'modern lie'. Unlike the 'traditional lie', which operates by 'hiding' the facts, the 'modern lie' plays on facts' exaggerated irrefutability (80). The most elaborate example of the 'modern lie' is the Holocaust, where the very 'incredibility intrinsic to the fact of the camps' shielded them from disclosure (83). For Düttmann, however, such deception is not unique to the Holocaust. Because facts exaggerate how little things can change, even ostensibly 'honest' politi-

cians find it expedient to control the limits of factuality, thereby delimiting truth by appeal to untruth.

This 'complicity of truth and untruth' is a central concern of the first chapter on exaggeration and philosophy. Coupled with 'the idea that truth is essentially "un-truth" ' it provides Düttmann one of his many pronouncements on the nature of deconstruction (25). The nature of deconstruction is of concern because it, along with the philosophy of Adorno, constitute the two primary precursors to his own 'philosophy of exaggeration'. From Adorno, Düttmann gains the notion that 'an exaggeration [is] constitutive for every thought aiming at truth' (20). According to this logic, thought left to its own devices will miss truth in favor of systematic rigor, dogmatically closing itself off from the world it is supposedly describing (19). Only if inherently linked to exaggeration and its tendency toward 'exposure', (20) does thought remain open, a 'gesture' — rather than a methodological procedure — that can renew disclosure of the truth of the world. Derrida's role is then 'to set out [this] gesture as such' (21). As grandiose as this seems, it yields very little, only endless repetition of the gesture itself, which Düttmann himself links in a concluding anecdote with the endless repetition of sex. Nevertheless, even if 'in the end Derrida says nothing' (25), precisely by privileging the *gesture* over discursive results Derrida exhibits the other truth of exaggeration. By exposing itself to the world, the exaggerated gesture of thought exposes itself to philosophy, and critical reflection in the name of the *concept* of truth that still eludes it.

As the notion of 'gesture' indicates, art is an ever-present potential for the philosophy of exaggeration. This means that, in contradistinction to traditional aesthetics, art is understood here in terms of particular artistic forms *only* to the extent that these practices are exaggerations, rather than realizations, of art's potential. The case Düttmann considers at length is opera. Its 'crisis' — its abrupt emergence and subsequent ageing (123) — reveals that the other side of art's emphasis upon innovation is obsolescence. Art overshoots current forms only to be surpassed by ever more outrageous spectacle. By outliving both its original aristocratic audience and its subsequent bourgeois one, opera reminds us that all innovation within art is tied to a simultaneous reaching beyond art — to dependence on an audience that will 'love' its immoderate excess (124), even as this excess violates the artistic effort to achieve self-sufficient unity. For Düttmann, this 'pact of semblance', in which 'truth' and its 'parody' are intertwined (126), is significant because it reflects on the troubles facing all attempts (particularly philosophical) to reveal and populate the world (74).

At the very limit of the philosophy of exaggeration, therefore, lurks the art of exaggeration. Many traditional philosophers will be unimpressed by Düttmann's artistic 'pretensions' — something Düttmann self-consciously thematizes in the introduction and final chapter — and for this reason, the book will almost certainly prove of marginal interest for those doing academic research in philosophy. Rather, its strength lies in the insights it offers

about philosophical questioning itself. If you are looking for a book to shake up your way of doing philosophy, it is a productive read.

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Keith W. Faulkner
Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time.
New York: Peter Lang Publishing 2006.
Pp. 185.
US$61.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8204-8115-9).

With this book Faulkner has certainly produced an excellent piece of scholarship. He attempts to illuminate the progression between the connective, conjunctive, and disjunctive syntheses which Deleuze elaborates in *Difference and Repetition*, while also integrating relevant discussions from *The Logic of Sense* as well as many other texts. Deleuze's three syntheses are a notoriously difficult problem in his early philosophy, especially concerning the conceptual technicalities of the third synthesis and how it instantiates the *caesura* of Being. The core argument of Faulkner's book is that the passive syntheses of the organism, which Deleuze finds in Freud, provide a better model for the generation of time than do the active syntheses of Kant's transcendental subject. As Faulkner asks, 'Are things synthesized the same way they are represented?' It is precisely upon a synthesis distilling the actions and passions from their limiting representation that we encounter the phenomenon of the dissolved subject, or the third synthesis of time.

The key novelty of Faulkner's book is its sustained engagement with Freud's *Project for a Scientific Psychology* in reworking the problematic of Kant's three syntheses. Faulkner admittedly offers a closer reading of Freud than Deleuze himself does in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, where his engagement with psychoanalysis is often presented in a condensed, abbreviated form. Faulkner's book will be extremely useful to those who want to broaden their knowledge of the psychoanalytic theories which are integral to Deleuze's project yet which he doesn't often elaborate upon at any great length, theories such as facilitation, anaclisis, deferred action, and translation. In this way Faulkner's book goes beyond Deleuze, and while it remains faithful to the path laid out in *Difference and Repetition* for a new, pseudo-Freudian understanding of temporal synthesis, it also embarks upon some new paths after exhausting the directions indicated by Deleuze.

One difficult instance of this is when Faulkner claims that for Deleuze the becoming-active of thought requires the sadistic 'suspension' of the law

(129). While Faulkner is relating this 'suspension' to Hamlet's ability finally to 'suspend' his worries about the debts he owes to his dead father, how it becomes 'sadistic' is not entirely clear. In *Coldness and Cruelty*, Deleuze had elaborated disavowal and suspension as features of masochism, not sadism. The sadistic negation of the law for being secondary relative to the primary law of nature would seem to have more to do with Faulkner's idea than would suspension, which in Deleuze's text refers to the masochistic suspension of reality which creates the 'frozen moment'. Unless Faulkner means to go back to the tendency of deriving masochism from sadism or *vice versa*, which Deleuze specifically rejects in *Coldness and Cruelty*, his idea makes little sense.

The most glowing omission in Faulkner's book is any discussion of Deleuze's engagement with Spinoza. This is strange, given the importance of Spinoza for both Freud and Lacan, who form the strongest influence on Faulkner's reading. One can only guess that the reason for this is the concerted exclusion of the symbolic dimension in Deleuze's study of Spinoza's concept of expression, which would require some explanation, given the emphasis on the symbolic in Faulkner's reading of the three syntheses. Spinoza would see the order of composition and decomposition between relations as expressing good and bad actions prior to any prophetic act of symbolisation. There is nothing symbolic about the revealing aspect of nature in Spinoza's expressionism. Yet in *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze combines the symbolic with expressionism in his concept of the infinitive verb, whose sense symbolises all possible actions as well as all their possible juxtapositions univocally, on the metaphysical surface of language. Deleuze takes expressionism one step further in this sense, but in so doing alters the meaning of the symbolic. Repetition may in essence be symbolic, but not in the sense of being at the service of repression. As Deleuze says, we don't repeat because we repress, we repress because we repeat. Repression is merely a repetition that has lost its transformative spontaneity. Similarly, Deleuze sees the death instinct as a possible escape from regressive and neurotic repetitions, while Freud sees regression and neurosis as its symptoms. To destroy the asylum of stupidity, as Spinoza would have called it, which prohibits us from thinking the conditions of thought and the nature of Being, could indeed be seen as a form of intellectual sadism, as Faulkner suggests — but then the reorientation of the symbolic as the essence of the process of repetition which energises this destructive synthesis would be the highest of ironies in Spinozist terms.

Whatever omissions there may be in his book, Faulkner more than compensates with his excellent scholarship. He offers sustained readings of authors who are hardly ever mentioned in similar studies, such as Harold Rosenberg, the American art critic and sociologist whom Deleuze cites in his discussion of Hamlet's transformation and the emergence of the static genesis of time. Rosenberg's discussion of Hamlet provides Faulkner with a dramatic context in which to elucidate more broadly Deleuze's reworking of the eternal return as an ethical and selective doctrine belonging to the third synthesis. But in elucidating the dense writings of Deleuze on the three syntheses, Faulkner has also produced a work almost equally as dense. The

brevity of his discussion doesn't hinder the lucidity of his reasoning however, and as he himself says in his conclusion, the discussion he has produced offers limitless opportunities for further analysis.

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Alexander W. Hall
Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus: Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages.
New York: Continuum 2007.
Pp. 186.
US$130.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8589-2).

Although the title specifies only two names, Hall could easily have included Aristotle as well, for this book presents a fine exposé of how the latter's logical treatises influenced both Aquinas and Scotus. Hall's main objective is to show how the doctrines of predication and analogy were absolutely fundamental to the natural theology of these medieval thinkers, and how each tried — albeit in markedly different ways — to steer a course between extreme forms of Platonic idealism and Aristotelian empiricism.

Hall begins by sketching the historical background for the various disputes over the possibility and limits of natural theology in the late thirteenth century, paying equal attention to the speculative and polemical issues surrounding the debate. This is followed by three chapters examining Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and other relevant texts that deal with the notions of *scientia* and *anologia,* as well as the role these notions play in Thomas' five demonstrations for God's existence in the *Summa Theologiae.* Relying on the certitude of faith, but refusing to deny the human intellect's capacity to attain imperfect knowledge of God, Thomas aims to delineate a theory of analogy that would allow for positive knowledge of divine attributes. Hall highlights the centrality of Question 13 in Part 1 of the *Summa,* in which Aquinas insists that naming God 'good' involves more than merely the attribution of cause or the absence of evil in the divine essence. Rather, Aquinas is convinced that by moving from effect to cause — that is, by using *quia* demonstration — we are able to make meaningful, positive assertions about the supereminence of transcendental 'goodness' in God conceived as substantial being.

Scotus, on the other hand, was particularly wary of what he considered an overly facile application of analogical predication to theological discourse. Hall fleshes this out in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Unlike Aquinas, Scotus holds

that speech can be meaningful only if it is based on some basic, underlying univocity. In the *Ordinatio,* he argues that a single term may apply both to God and creatures only if there is no shift in signification. Hall clarifies an important and often overlooked historical point: Duns Scotus' main opponent on this issue is not Thomas Aquinas but Henry of Ghent. Henry argued that knowledge of God — and even the certainty of sense knowledge — could only be attained through some type of divine illumination. Because Aquinas was famously implicated in the Parisian condemnations of 1277, his view of analogy is often presented as Scotus' main point of contention, whereas Scotus was primarily intent on countering Henry of Ghent's skepticism toward the construction of an empirical basis for theological discourse.

Hall consequently performs a valuable scholarly service in drawing attention to the similarities between Aquinas and Scotus rather than the often overemphasized differences. Both were firmly committed to a theoretical framework that would absolutely respect and preserve divine simplicity. At the same time, both were equally attracted to an empirical approach to natural theology based on principles enunciated in the freshly translated works of Aristotle. Moreover, they agree that ideas are ultimately traceable to things in the world, though their respective methods of resolving the difficulties associated with metaphysical realism diverge considerably. The difference between them comes to light particularly in the case of the transcendentals and the way transcendental predicates apply to God and creatures. 'While Aquinas insists that theological discourse account for God's supereminence, Scotus claims that transcendentals do not refer to God until joined with the notion of infinitude' (74).

This difference between Aquinas and Scotus is expounded in the seventh and final chapter, which is the most original and stimulating. Whereas Aquinas dwelt on analogy, Scotus devoted his energies to unpacking the thorny issue of unity in diversity within God. Because unity is utterly primary, the diverse ideas we attribute to the divine essence are 'imperfect abstractions' at most (111). This implies that our knowledge of God is always confused, insofar as we are incapable of comprehending how a multiplicity of denominations can retain their primary significations if they are absolutely identical with the essence to which they are predicated. We are forced to admit, argues Scotus, that the notion of infinity must be superadded to these predicates before they can be applied to God's nature. Consequently, whereas Aquinas allows for a peculiar type of *per se* (*kath' auta* according to Aristotle) knowledge of God, Scotus maintains that *per se* intellection of the divine essence is impossible. Natural knowledge of God is necessarily abstract in that it must conceive each of the divine transcendental attributes in isolation from one another.

In teasing out the hermeneutical and speculative differences between Aquinas and Scotus, Hall sharpens our view of the similarities between them. He also persuasively advances a more nuanced understanding of the questions driving natural theology at the height of the Middle Ages. Neither Aquinas nor Scotus would settle for the extreme intellectualism of John

Scotus Eriugena. Moreover, completely bent on safeguarding the harmony between revelation and reason, both of them deemed Siger of Brabant's suggestions of incompatibility thoroughly unreasonable. Aquinas and Scotus are comrades in the battle to articulate a coherent justification for theological discourse that leaves both the unity and simplicity of God intact. They differ, however, in their opinion of how terms are able to signify similarities in God and creatures. 'Aquinas asserts that terms said of God retain their meaning but signify in a mode unbefitting the divine essence, while Scotus insists that these terms preserve their original signification . . . but must be joined with the notion of infinitude' (120).

Thomistic scholars will be particularly interested in Chapter 2 of Hall's book, for it contains a highly synthetic, *ad litteram* exposition of Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle's theory of predication. Hall includes a synoptic comparison of the respective Greek and Latin texts without burdening the reader with excessive lexicographical information. Overall, speculative issues remain at the forefront of Hall's discussion so that philosophers can engage the arguments on their own turf.

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Sandra Harding
Science and Social Inequality: Feminist and Postcolonial Issues.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press 2006.
Pp. 224.
US$40.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-252-03060-4);
US$20.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-252-07304-5).

This book is a collection of essays, most of them previously published in one form or another. They chart the most recent developments in Harding's exploration of the ways in which science and notions of 'scientificity' are major contributors to social inequality: 'The vast majority of the world's peoples who were already economically and politically most vulnerable have had to bear most of the costs and have received fewest of the benefits of the advance of modern Western science and their applications and technologies' (52). Harding has a special interest in how those of us who work in universities provide, often inadvertently, 'the conceptual resources . . . through which our governments and corporations can justify their disproportionate com-

mand of material resources and social control on a global scale' (ix). One of her claims is that we are in denial about the extent to which our work in the humanities and social sciences, as well as work in the natural sciences, provides crucial support to the role of science in creating and maintaining social inequality.

Could this possibly be true? Harding suggests in her preface that readers who are already anxious about the relativist implications of bringing feminist and postcolonial considerations to bear on the analysis of science, epistemology, and philosophy of science may wish to start with the book's final essay, which is 'designed to allay exactly those anxieties' (xi). It is one thing to subject literature, visual arts, religious beliefs, and even some of the social sciences to postcolonial analyses, but the special glory of natural science is supposed to be grounded in its ability to transcend any specific cultural context, thus laying claim to universal scope. If we argue that the natural sciences are irreducibly culture-bound, how can we hope to make epistemic progress of any kind? Because many readers of this journal are likely to be at least a little concerned about the threat of relativism, we shall follow Harding's advice by starting with the book's final essay.

That essay is called 'Does the Threat of Relativism Deserve a Panic?' This is a sometimes frustrating essay because Harding refuses to be pinned down in certain ways. She seems to want to follow Clifford Geertz in not defending relativism 'but rather resisting the lure of anti-relativism' (147). This mode of expression is not likely to allay readers' anxieties in the way that was promised. It is also potentially misleading. 'Anti-relativism' in this context refers to Absolutism, a bogeyman position that seems to require a unique, unified, value-neutral, representational account of the world that is true always and everywhere, completely determined by the way the world is, and independent of any and all knowers. Since that is not what most readers are likely to understand by 'anti-relativism', the rhetoric is somewhat distracting.

Later in this chapter, however, Harding returns to her own version of standpoint epistemology and its attendant rejection of traditional notions of scientific objectivity on the ground that they are *far too weak*. Standpoint epistemology not only requires us to pursue science from the standpoint of the disadvantaged, it also requires us to pursue science *for* the disadvantaged. This requires us constantly to take into account the contextual (or 'external') values that permeate science: values that influence our choice of problems to investigate, hypotheses to consider, background theories to accept, data to count as evidence, experiments to run, further applications to pursue, and so on. By attending to the interaction between cultural context and scientific practice, we make science *more* rather than less objective, argues Harding. By introducing standpoints previously neglected, we bring valuable resources to science and come to see more clearly both the negative and positive roles played by contextual values. Those scientists, philosophers, government officials, and entrepreneurs who falsify the situation by pretending that science is value-neutral support the production of less objective science through their refusal to take full advantage of available epistemic resources.

This version of standpoint theory was developed by Harding in the context of her earlier feminist work, but it transfers easily to studies of racialized groups and postcolonial cultures. It is a very attractive position with much to recommend it. If one takes into account the way that 'universal Western science' tends to reflect the interests and cultural values of its creators, it becomes easier to understand how an enterprise with so much potential to improve the human condition and enhance social justice could have become a chief cause of *and justification for* social inequality. Harding argues that '[n]ot only are the benefits and costs of modern science distributed in ways that disproportionately benefit elites in the West and elsewhere, but science's accounting practices are also designed to make this distribution invisible to those who gain the benefits.' Benefits are attributed to science; negative consequences are attributed to external factors (46-7). Philosophers of science often play an insidious role in this cooking of the books by responding to every case study that demonstrates the role played by contextual values in science by saying, 'That just proves it isn't really science', thus turning the alleged value-neutrality of science into an unfalsifiable piece of dogma and endorsing the very myth that helps create, sustain, and justify 'scientific' social injustice.

There are other of Harding's arguments that are less attractive than this central argument. Some are simply difficult to evaluate because of philosophical or terminological slippage (even a little geographical slippage: Japan is allowed to slip south of the equator). Other claims seem clear enough but unconvincing. Harding, although she promotes strong objectivity, is less keen on truth claims. She maintains that in science truth claims are dysfunctional, that the ideal of truth obstructs the production of knowledge and promotes anti-democratic tendencies, 'because a democratic social order in a multicultural world should not provide the necessary conditions for the kind of strong universal agreement among scientists that the truth ideal requires. The truth ideal in science supports tendencies toward inequality' (133). All science, on this account, must be ethnoscience. It is hard to know what to make of this argument (or indeed whether there is an argument). If the claim has to do with specific philosophical accounts of 'Truth', it seems irrelevant in the present context. If, on the other hand, Harding's assertion that the truth ideal in science supports tendencies toward inequality refers to our everyday practice of making scientific truth claims, then it seems bizarre, especially since women, impoverished peoples, people of color, and others who have suffered at the hands of science would be denied their most powerful weapon: the ability to claim truth for their alternative accounts and to show how racist, sexist, imperialist science is permeated by lies. The truth alone cannot set people free, but denying the oppressed the right to make very robust truth claims seems to condemn them to fighting with both hands chained behind their backs.

Similarly unconvincing is Harding's attempt to lay much of the blame for science's role in promoting social inequality on 'the unity of science program'. After very briefly acknowledging that 'unity of science' has had many

meanings, Harding proceeds to discuss only a late logical empiricist version of the program that was both ontologically and epistemologically reductionistic. She claims that the 'unity ideal', thus understood, 1) supports devaluation of forms of knowledge-seeking that are crucial to the survival of people in other cultures; 2) thereby devalues the peoples and cultures that use them; 3) supports models of rationality, objectivity, progress, civilization, and humanity defined by their distance from the non-European, the female, the economically frugal; and 4) elevates authoritarianism to a social ideal by insisting that everyone accept the legitimacy of one culture's claim to provide the one true account of the world (123). This seems to be rather a lot to lay at the doorstep of Oppenheim and Putnam (especially since it is hard to find much support for such a model now, even as a 'working hypothesis').

More seriously, scholarly debates about the nature of truth and the role of unification in science do not seem to rank among the chief causes of scientifically supported social inequity. The answer seems to lie much more obviously in the *power* of science and in the appropriation by the few of what should have been a universal resource for creating better lives. This appropriation of science has been facilitated by claims about its neutrality, purity, and transcendence. This, however, should not blind us to the positive role that is often played by the *constitutive* values of science or to the tragedy that results when these values are replaced by the profit motive, political expediency, or dogmatic commitment. Again, we as academics are culpable insofar as we participate in the privatization of science (and other forms of knowledge) and insofar as we fail to speak up about the tragic consequences of arrangements that create and justify inequality. However much one may disagree with some aspects of Harding's analysis, she continues to be one of very few philosophers who has worked consistently and courageously to make science live up to both its epistemic and its emancipatory potential.

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Graham Harman
Heidegger Explained:
From Phenomenon to Thing.
Chicago: Open Court 2007.
Pp. 193.
US$19.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8126-96217-2).

The fourth in an expanding series from Open Court Press called 'Ideas Explained', Harman's book aims to present the difficult work of a notoriously difficult philosopher in the most lucid terms. Most works of Heidegger schol-

arship are knotted with long discussions of German etymology, stilted by English translations of Heideggerian language that have a benumbing effect on even the most dedicated of readers, and give the impression that the writer mistakes repetitions of Heidegger's forbidding writing style as a replacement for philosophical insight. In this book the reader will find no footnotes, no use of any terminology that is not defined and examined in full, and a refreshing turn to everyday examples in order to lead the reader better from Heidegger's early phenomenology to his later work on the 'the thing'. Despite — or perhaps because of — this, Harman offers one of the best books on Heidegger in recent years, and certainly the best among a growing number of introductory texts on Heidegger. It includes a helpful, though not exhaustive, glossary of terms, as well as a guide to Heidegger's later 'numerology' (the four-fold, six-fold, etc.).

Harman would appear to be at once the best and the worst choice of a new generation of Heidegger scholars to write this text. His work in *Tool-Being* and his later *Guerilla Metaphysics* (Open Court 2005) are marked by continuous attacks on all manner of mainstream Heidegger scholarship, all from a 'realist' position that identifies Heidegger's notion of equipmentality as the *sine qua non* of a new thinking of the existence of things in the world and, more particularly and controversially, as the lens through which all of Heidegger's texts should be read. Any readers familiar with these works may worry that the Heidegger 'explained' here might be one no other Heidegger scholar would recognize.

These readers should fear not. Though Harman's own approach to Heidegger comes out in later sections of the text, he is able to lead the reader through Heidegger's major works with his ax a good distance from the grindstone. At each step through Heidegger's oeuvre, he is careful to mention and elucidate those texts important to different approaches to Heidegger. Where the form of the text calls attention to a claim implicit in his approach, Harman is mindful enough to let the reader know, and to mention opposing views. For example, taking a biographical approach that moves from Heidegger's earliest texts to his last, Harman eschews the developmental approach to Heidegger's thought that sees a fundamental turn or *Kehre* between Heidegger's early work (the period of *Being and Time*) to his later texts, such as the 'Letter on Humanism', in which Dasein is notably absent from the discussion. Instead, Harman follows Heidegger's own dictum that each great thinker has but a single thought that permeates his or her works in various ways. For Harman, Heidegger's great thought is that 'being is not presence, because *being is time* — and time is something never simply present, but constantly torn apart in an ambiguous three-fold structure' (1). This 'thought' is broad enough to be shared by most Heidegger scholars, and Harman is deft at showing not just how the 'metaphysics of presence' is attacked in each of Heidegger's writings, but also how the three-fold structure of time (the so-called *ekstases* of past, present, and future) is to be found in each of his major works.

In the first two-thirds of the book, Harman takes the reader adeptly through, first, Heidegger's relationship to Husserl ('A Radical Phenomenolo-

gist'); then his period in Marburg (Chapter 3, the first section of which is 'The Dragon Emerges'), where Harman provides an excellent discussion of Dasein's transcendence. Next comes a whole chapter dedicated to *Being and Time*, or rather the first division of *Being and Time*, since Harman, echoing Hubert Dreyfus, argues that the second division of *Being and Time*, on temporality, is rather unimportant and repetitive, a judgment that I think is quite wrong, given that (in my view) one should read the first division as but a preparation for Heidegger's discussion of the relation between *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität* that *ex post facto* gives a better understanding to the entirety of the preparatory analysis in division one. In Chapter 5, 'Freiburg before the Rectorate', Harman provides exacting descriptions of Heidegger's 1929/30 course on the notions of world, boredom, and animality, as well as his turn to the notion of truth as deconcealment or unveiling in his essay on Plato (1930). Harman's ability to summarize difficult ideas of Heidegger without oversimplification shines, especially as he defends Heidegger's work on 'nothingness' against the logical positivism of Rudolf Carnap. Harman is an adept writer, showing that nothing is really something to think about, and he brings out what he describes as the three levels of boredom in Heidegger's 1929/30 lecture course without seeping into any of the three levels.

In his preface and his closing chapter, Harman argues for the continued relevance of Heidegger's thought, moving from his early work on phenomenology through to his work on language to this thinking of the 'thing'. Though more space could be given over to critiques of Heidegger (given a scant two paragraphs in the last chapter), Harman manages to go over Heidegger's work in such a way that he reminds me of my own enthusiasm, that I still retain, whenever I open the first pages of *Being and Time*, or the later lecture 'What are Poets for in a Destitute Time?' or other works. The struggles of Heidegger's thought often occur within the metaphors of shadows and light that perfuse his texts. And the struggle for thinking about Heidegger occurs within the shadows of his darkest periods along with the brilliance of many of his texts. Harman's book, which takes up these problems straight-on, marks an excellent beginning for any reader looking to delve into this oeuvre for the first time, or even for seasoned scholars who want to be reminded why they set out to read Heidegger in the first place.

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Vittorio Hösle
Woody Allen:
An Essay on the Nature of the Comical.
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 2007. Pp. 112.
US$18.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-268-03104-6).

Hösle's essay has two concerns: one is stated in the subtitle, the other is the challenge posed by Allen's work to the philosophy of comedy. On the latter score, arguably Allen has recovered a fullness of the comic not seen since Rabelais and Shakespeare (7). Hösle refers to some philosophers on humor, especially to those who argue that it stems from superiority, and from incongruity. He inclines towards Bergson's theory about what makes us laugh, though Hösle has a narrower interest, namely, laughter that is 'morally acceptable', laughter at what 'an intelligent person is allowed or even invited to laugh at' (15), something justifiable and different from 'the often cruel or dirty forms of laughter' we engage in as children (12). Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Freud are also invoked. With a few tweaks they can encompass Allen's work, which turns out to be within the morally acceptable.

The key to Allen's humor is seen as his comic persona (carefully differentiated from the filmmaker/actor), hence an entire section is devoted to its 'essence', which Hösle sees as 'astonishingly consistent through all the movies'. The persona has such traits as tormented relations with women, the use of inflation and deflation as humorous devices, being intellectual and anti-academic, ineptitude, suffering disappointment that there is no god, and enjoyment of a strong sexual appetite. The persona is used for humorous effect but also is the means by which some of Allen's films are 'philosophically profound' (7). Allen is compared and contrasted to Aristophanes.

Allen's philosophical problems are said to concern authenticity, in the existentialist sense, and especially the question why one should be moral if there is no god (69). In a godless world Allen sees art as consolation for the artist, and it may be consolation for the audience too. Hösle affirms that only rational theology can answer Aunt May's challenge to optimistic theism (of the orthodox Jew in Allen's *Crimes and Misdemeanors*). This seems to run counter to Allen as writer: he never endorses any theological claims.

Hösle has an impressive command of Allen's work, including the short stories and secondary literature, and he weaves in and out of different textual examples with aplomb. That said, the book is hard going. Consider Hösle's final sentence: '[Allen's] very European excess of reflexivity paralyzes him on the vital level; but he makes with grace and force the anti-Bergsonian point that this speaks more against life than against reflexivity, a quality of which Allen's work as a whole can stand as a valorization' (87). The book begins with an equally opaque quotation from Kierkegaard; and more generally Hösle deploys 'vitality', Bergsonian 'essence of life', and quite a few other opaque concepts, in order to address a filmmaker who is nothing if not directly accessible.

Hösle holds that in times of ideological uncertainty comedy becomes 'inevitably more philosophical' (85). He writes, 'Allen's philosophical vision corresponds exactly to a certain moment in the history of philosophy, namely that moment in the late twentieth century when French existentialism's concept of freedom and its ethically motivated atheism had become profoundly problematic because they seemed to undermine any belief in an objective ethics' (6). That there was a 'moment' in the twentieth century when atheism was seen to undermine ethics will be news to quite a few readers. Moreover, Hösle never mentions that the problem of the foundations of ethics was fully discussed by philosophers like Kant, who said (for example) that theism was a false and deceptive 'basis' for ethics if used to shuck off responsibility.

Without a doubt Allen's movies are very much of their time and place. To relate them to 'the crisis of monotheism in the Western masses', however, requires independent evidence of such a crisis; otherwise, invoking it throws little or no light on the films. Allen offers a simple philosophy of life: enjoy it whilst you can, remembering that it doesn't last long. From this he has spun a large oeuvre of brilliant films, some but not all of them comic. Hösle's address to them is speculative, confident. *Match Point* 'must' be taken together with *Scoop* because they share a leading actress, for example. It is disappointing that a writer so sensitive to reflexivity in Allen's art avoids the meta-questions of film interpretation as a medium for philosophy, and of the standards or criteria involved in answering such questions. Instead, Hösle frequently offers mere readings — not problematizations — of film scenes and sequences from Allen's work.

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Mazhar Hussain and
Robert Wilkinson, eds.
The Pursuit of Comparative Aesthetics: An Interface between East and West.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2006.
Pp. 273.
US$99.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-5345-5).

This compilation of essays represents a welcome source of ideas for anyone who has ever attempted to compare the art and the aesthetics of different cultures. Hussain, from Jawaharlal Nehru University in India, and Wilkinson, from the Open University in the UK, have put together a book that

aspires to function as a fundamental statement in favor of an intensification of East-West comparative aesthetics. It contains four comparative articles on India, four on China, four on Japan, and an interesting paper by Mara Miller comparing agricultural motifs in Western and Asian art. Eight of the thirteen articles have already been published in journals and other books.

In an instructive introduction, the editors depict the history of comparative aesthetics through accounts of the role of the empirically minded Max Dessoir, or the importance of the International Association of Aesthetics. The outcome of intercultural aesthetics should never be 'universal philosophy', and it is 'possible to be both rationalist and pluralist' (3). There are also illuminating East-East comparisons: Liu Xie is reflected against the dhvani-theorists and the 'experience of a work of art which resonates endlessly in the imagination' turns out to be important not only for the Chinese and the Indians but also in the 'classical period of Japanese literary criticism' which prizes this kind of experience as yugen (6).

The chapters, however, are extremely divergent with regard to quality and importance. Classical essays by Ramdra Kumar Sen, Hsin Kwan-chue and Karl-Heinz Pohl create a strange contrast with some weaker papers. Moon-Hwan Kim's 'Schopenhauer's Aesthetics Seen from the Buddhist Point of View', for example, demonstrates that 'Schopenhauer's critique or modification of Kantian philosophy appears to be influenced and intensified by Buddhism. [Schopenhauer] regards Kant's appearance and the Indian Maya as one and the same' (40). As such, this point does not need to be taken up for discussion because Schopenhauer spells this out himself in *World as Will and Representation* (I, 156). Apart from Schopenhauer's texts, Kim uses only three nineteenth century books, a general introduction to Indian philosophy, and Nanajivako's book *Schopenhauer und Buddhism* (1970).

Given the book's intended character as a source of inspiration accessible to readers coming from a wide range of disciplines, the reasons for the inclusion of Keijo Virtanen's 'The Concept of Purification in the Greek and Indian Theories of Drama' remain obscure. Though Virtanen makes some interesting points, he is lost in details and does nothing over long distances but summarize English standard literature.

Ramendrar Kumar Sen's 'A comparative study of Greek and Indian Poetics and Aesthetics' is fascinating as he claims that, so far, 'no one in India or in Europe has taken up as yet the study of Indian drama and Indian dramatic technique side by side with that of the Greeks' (86). Still, I have the feeling that he goes over the top when he claims that 'Jowett, Gomperz, Sandys, Butcher, [and] Bosanquet' did not recognize 'the principles of Greek medicine and Greek philosophy' because certain philosophical and medical concepts had 'escaped their notice'.

Karl-Heinz Pohl's well-argued piece, 'Chinese Aesthetics and Kant', focuses on the eternal problem of the 'rule' in art by making a clear statement about differences and parallels: 'Where the Chinese theorists emphasize adherence to rule, that is, imitation of models, but ultimately transcending them in the concept of "living rule" or enlightenment . . . , we have in Western

thought the concept of mimesis as the imitation of nature in art' (133). Pohl argues that 'Kant's genius finds its analogy in the Chinese concept of "vital force" (qi)' (*ibid*), but also remarks that so far Chinese philosophers have missed the chance to develop a truly 'modern Chinese aesthetics which is able to not just adopt but also to challenge Western theoretical positions' 135).

Among the less engaging chapters is Allan Casebier's four-page note on 'Japanese Aesthetics' which introduces basic terms by using only six references. The tone of this note is the generalizing one that 'many writers [who are these writers?] commenting on the Japanese aesthetic have argued that Western sensibility has not been attuned to a quality like yugen (230)' or that 'in the West, the beautiful is often an attention-getter, [while] for the Japanese sensibility the ultimate beauty, shibui, is anything but a quality that will attract attention' (227).

Wang Keping's macro study of intercultural comparisons does not fare much better as it reinstates old, questionable wisdoms: 'Culture is capable of exerting influence upon the content and structure of language, such as the advent of new terminology and vocabulary, the variation of grammar and sentence pattern. Language can modify the connotations of cultural concepts in a new setting composed of the symbols of a second language' (116). The very interesting table about cultural differences between ancient Greeks, modern Westerners and Chinese seems to fall from the sky in the text, and is not really discussed.

The highlight of the collection is certainly Hsin Kwan-chue's profound study of Confucian and Western Aesthetics. The discussion here is of things philosophically more fundamental than aesthetics, as Hsin engages in a reflection upon the difference between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions. The latter has its origin in Socrates, but over two thousand years it has turned away from free rational inquiry to develop into something narrower and more limited. This 'cataleptic rigidity' is most obvious in ethics, and has hindered the free movement of Western ethical speculation to the point where it has finally lost 'pertinence to the actual conditions and needs of society' (148). While method killed any Western philosophical interest in more methodologically less encumbered perspectives, Confucius' thought is weakened by lack of method. It is against this background that Hsin explains Confucian aesthetics. He regrets that 'Confucius' philosophy of art has been misinterpreted by most commentators and has been diminished by the generalizations of students of Chinese philosophy at home and abroad' (161). Hsin believes that the Confucian idea of harmonization 'is a much more wholesome idea than the somewhat austere and uncompromising view of Buddhism, and to a certain degree also of Christianity, that our natural self must be eliminated' (164).

Yuriko Saito's comparison of Japanese and American landscapes is insightful in many places, and Mark Meli reveals valuable parallels between Onishi and phenomenology. But when he systematically misspells das Schöne as 'das Shöne' though his article focuses on this notion, one thinks that this piece should have been edited with more care. Peter Leech's essay on Japan

and the West suffers from confusion because it attempts too much: to 'draw attention to a rarely-observed feature of Kant's aesthetics in his remarks on the idea of "intellectual beauty," elegance, and geometry' (234); to work on Kant's and Okakura's common aesthetic convictions; to 'draw upon . . . Shuzo Kuki's The Structure of Iki, including his . . . false claim that "the study of . . . iki can only be constituted as the hermeneutics of ethnic being",' and to compare all this with the American painter Ad Reinhardt. It is difficult to do all this on twelve pages, especially when the analysis remains extremely general. A selective reading of this volume is the best one can recommend.

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George E. Karamanolis
Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 432.
US$90.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926456-8).

Every reader of philosophical literature from the final phase of antiquity will soon come across a very curious phenomenon. The able, erudite commentators of the schools of Athens and Alexandria behave as though the intricacies of Aristotle's texts would somehow be explicable by reference to the doctrines of his onetime teacher Plato; conversely, in elucidating Plato's dialogues, Aristotelian concepts and explanatory tropes are deployed with little heed and no apology. The practice seems widespread and generally accepted. How did such a state of affairs come about?

This is the question Karamanolis sets out to answer in this fine, expansive monograph. The standard story here recounts how Porphyry of Tyre, Plotinus' (205-70) student, dug deep into the latter's use of Aristotle in his school and undertook to show that this was no chance appropriation. Karamanolis treats Porphyry merely as the final link in a centuries-long chain of Platonic expositors who all saw in Aristotle a valuable resource and sometimes a potential ally. Not everyone in this continuum worked from the same script, of course, and so Karamanolis' book assumes the form of several independently crafted studies, each of which purports to delineate the ways in which a specific Platonist tackled Aristotle and/or made use of his philosophy. The individual chapters focus on Antiochus (44-84), Plutarch (85-126), Numenius (127-49), Atticus (150-90), and Ammonius Saccas (191-215) before coming to

the afore-mentioned Plotinus (216-42) and Porphyry (243-330). The volume is rounded out by one appendix that addresses the Platonism of the first Peripatetic school and another (more of a bibliographical note) listing pre-Porphyrean Platonist works concentrating on Aristotle and his philosophy.

Part of the challenge for anyone purporting to tell the story — any story, really — of Platonism before the dominance of the schools of Plotinus and Syrianus is that the Platonists of the Hellenistic era by all accounts were a heterogeneous lot. The range of authors they addressed, the kinds of texts they produced, and the sorts of viewpoints and approaches they took to be broadly compatible with Platonism varied considerably, making of their examination an exceedingly complex affair even before taking into account the fact that for all but a few of these authors, we possess mere fragments of their works. Fortunately, Karamanolis is well up to the task. He wisely refrains from any temptation to homogenize these disparate materials, and explicitly eschews conventional labels like 'Middle Platonism' and 'Neoplatonism' (27). Similarly, despite the fact that all chapters (save perhaps the one on Plotinus — see below) are weighty scholarly contributions, they are constructed to reflect the individual subject's social context, intellectual preoccupations, and mode of literary production, among other things. All this points to a wide spread of self-understandings among the Platonists: Karamanolis' book thus makes overall the most detailed case for eschewing the term 'Middle Platonist' since the first appearance of John Dillon's *The Middle Platonists* (paradoxically enough). Alongside such variety, the work also offers a compelling portrait of the ways in which Pythagorean, Stoic, and Peripatetic tropes and approaches all could bring to light different aspects of the Platonic heritage.

Of course, treating such disparate thinkers over a time-span of four centuries will necessarily result in some unevenness. Among classicists, the chapters highlighting Ammonius Saccas and Plotinus are those most likely to arouse controversy, albeit for opposing reasons — Ammonius because we know so little of his views, Plotinus because we know so much. (Of Numenius we know little as well, but Karamanolis' treatment of him is accordingly curt and largely sticks to a script established in more detailed studies — Numenius as a dogmatic Pythagorean valued even Plato mostly for his purveyance of Pythagorean wisdom, and consequently would have had little time for Aristotle.) Because chapters 5 and 6 are of almost equal length, this leads to a marked disparity in tone between the two. Regarding Ammonius, Karamanolis has a fair deal to say, based on rather scant hard evidence, and therefore much of what he says is of necessity speculative; whereas the passages on Plotinus will equally necessarily amount to no more than a sketchy outline, chiefly concentrated on well-worn catalogues of affinity and difference in matters of psychological (218-29), ethical (229-33), categorical (234-38), and physical (238-41) doctrine. Furthermore, because the very great attention given to Plotinus' *Enneads* has left current debates surrounding his philosophy in flux on so many issues, summaries such as Karamanolis' will inevitably raise some eyebrows. (The same goes for the brief comparison

of 'Platonist' vs. 'Aristotelian' doctrines [28-35], although here the fact that what Karamanolis is sketching is a caricature is part of the point.)

This would not be so bad, were it not for the fact that some basic questions remain entirely unaddressed. Most pertinently, Karamanolis fails to give any detailed account of the way in which Plotinus — or for that matter, any of the thinkers in question — appropriated Aristotelian terminology, as opposed to Aristotelian doctrine, for his own uses: what went into such acts of appropriation, what was gained thereby, and what might have been lost. In the case of Plotinus, this would require a monograph of its own, and so it is not difficult to see why Karamanolis would forego such a task in favour of a more traditionally doxographical approach. But the task is no less vital for its omission, and represents perhaps the greatest lost opportunity in terms of the way the monograph is framed.

These criticisms and a host of smaller niggles — with a work this deep, each scholar will form her or his own list — should not be allowed to detract from the great value of the monograph as a whole. Karamanolis' book is a first-rate contribution to ancient intellectual history, providing both an introduction to the subject that will serve a general audience for a long time and a launching-point for a host of more detailed studies to come. It is rich in argument and materials and meticulously and carefully documented; on it, much fine work will undoubtedly be built. As such, the work belongs in every research library.

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Frederic R. Kellogg
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Legal Theory, and Judicial Restraint.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.
Pp. 219.
US$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-86650-7).

There has been a great deal of focus recently in the philosophy of law on the issues of constitutional interpretation, judicial review, and in general on the role of the judiciary in a representative democracy. As insightful as much of this work is, what is truly enlightening is a glimpse into how judges see their task, how they envision the scope of their authority, and how their judicial philosophies play out in the courts. In this vein, a portrait of an important

and influential jurist is invaluable to the discussion. In this book Kellogg attempts to provide just such a portrait.

Kellogg undertakes several tasks. First, he wishes to elucidate a Holmesian judicial philosophy, that is, a coherent and consistent thread of reasoning that both explains Holmes' decisions and provides the bedrock for a fully elaborated jurisprudence. Secondly, Kellogg juxtaposes this Holmesian jurisprudence against such theorists as Antonin Scalia and Ronald Dworkin. Finally, Kellogg promotes a Holmesian position over these theories, which are currently in ascendance. Kellogg, therefore, has set for himself a series of difficult tasks. He must not only construct a judicial philosophy out of Holmes' decisions and writings, he must then situate this theory within contemporary debate and defend it. This is, in fact, a Herculean task.

Kellogg begins with an attempt to refurbish Holmes' reputation; a reputation he claims is unfounded and based on selective readings and misinterpretations. In his effort to reframe the common perception of Holmes, Kellogg focuses almost exclusively on Albert W. Alschuler's *Law without Values*, and the way in which Holmes' 'The Path of Law' has traditionally been read. In this regard Kellogg's major target is the common perception of Holmes as a legal realist or moral relativist who views the role of the judge as the handmaiden of power or the instrument through which arbitrary public policy is legitimated and enforced. This misreading of Holmes, Kellogg argues, is due to a misapprehension of the way in which Holmes implements a notably idiosyncratic common-law approach to judicial law making. Kellogg thus attempts to present Holmes as a common-law theorist offering a theory of judicial restraint rooted in contemporary moral norms and practices. He believes Holmes' unique approach threads the needle between the restraint of positivism and the unrestrained activism of traditional common-law approaches. In effect, Kellogg presents Holmes as a pragmatic jurist pointing quite frequently to his intellectual connection and indebtedness to William James and Charles Pierce, among others.

Defining the jurisprudence of Holmes is difficult given the variety and number of decisions he wrote, his intellectual development as a judge, and ironically, the fact that he saw himself as not merely a judge but also a theorist. So it is easier to describe Holmes with reference to what he is not. Kellogg does a solid job of clearly stating why Holmes is not a positivist, natural law theorist, textualist, or originalist. With regard to natural law or even some strains of positivism — if one would so deem Dworkin — and the claim that moral truths legitimate or clarify the meaning of the law, Kellogg points out that Holmes was skeptical at best regarding the existence and accessibility of such moral absolutes. He quotes Holmes: 'It is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law, and forgets that what seems to him to be first principles are believed by half his fellow men to be wrong' (6). In place of such absolutes Holmes promotes a fallibilism, consistent with the pragmatic method of inquiry, as the appropriate method for the law.

Holmes feared absolutes as undemocratic, thus presaging Learned Hand's concerns regarding judges becoming Platonic guardians. Instead, Holmes maintained that democracy required social experiments which demanded that the law be flexible in all regards, even when issues of constitutional interpretation or rights were involved. With respect to substantive due process, Kellogg quotes: 'There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important part of the community desires . . . even though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most respect' (146). Holmes thus concludes that law is an uncertain practice that must be tested within a historical framework. There is a time for law.

Holmes' fallibilism and belief that the law must be responsive to social needs and open to social experiments lead him to adopt a common law approach to law even though he still demanded judicial restraint. Thus there is a moral guide to the law but not an absolute guide; it is the changing moral tone of history consistent with the notion that law is part of the social experiment of democracy. Kellogg summarizes: 'Holmes abandoned the positivist effort to gain a comprehensive analytical understanding of the law in favor of a naturalized historical one' (172). Thus, Holmes is not a positivist, nor is he a natural law theorist, or an originalist, or a textualist. Rather, he is arguably something new; a pragmatic critic of the law, one whose theory is more a methodology than a body of knowledge or set of principles. Unfortunately, how this method can be anything other than destructive is left unanswered by Kellogg. Instead it appears as though any assertion by Holmes is equally as unjustified as the counter-claim in virtue of its failure to be grounded in the absolutes he dismisses.

Overall, Kellogg's work is laudable for its comprehensive approach and ambition, but by the end the reader is left with a mere glimpse into the mind of Holmes. Kellogg's book is an interesting and important snapshot of an important jurist, but it remains a mere snapshot.

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Søren Kierkegaard
Fear and Trembling.
C. Stephen Evans and Sylvia Walsh, eds.,
Sylvia Walsh, trans.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. xxxvii + 115.
US$55.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-84810-7);
US$16.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-61269-2).

For good or ill, this is probably Kierkegaard's most widely read work, and the text through which many readers encounter him for the first time. Written under the name of the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio, it grapples with the issue of faith through a meditation on Abraham's 'trial' in being commanded by God to sacrifice his son Isaac. Abraham is an exemplar of faith before whom Johannes' 'brain whirls', and the drama of his trial gives the book what Kierkegaard later referred to as its 'frightful pathos'. This new translation by Walsh in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy series is the fifth English translation of the work; at least two of the others — by Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton University Press 1983) and Alastair Hannay (Penguin 1985) — are still in widespread use.

Does this latest translation bring anything new to the table? Overall, my answer would be yes. First, the book has a clearly written introduction by Evans that I suspect will prove more useful to the student reader than the equivalent sections in either the Hannay or Hong and Hong editions. Evans briefly introduces the reader to some central questions of the text: the status of Johannes as a pseudonym; the distinctions between faith and 'infinite resignation' and between the 'knight of faith' and the 'tragic hero'; and the problem of justifying Abraham's silence, his refusal to explain his action. Evans' introduction is especially clear at pointing out, through a brief discussion of sin and guilt, the relevance specifically to Christianity of this book on the Hebrew Bible's 'father of faith'. However, one brief word of caution. The student who, naturally enough, reads the introduction *before* grappling with the text may find that he or she is being given a little *too* much guidance through some of the thornier issues in the text, such as exactly what Abraham believes at the point of drawing the knife. Evans notes, as have other commentators, that this is a work that in some respects gets more baffling the more often one reads it, and since no introduction can substitute for the experience of following Johannes' own thought processes as he tries to imagine the paradox that Abraham allegedly embodies, it might have been beneficial explicitly to warn student readers of the desirability of trying to wrestle with Johannes themselves before taking Evans' helpful guiding hand. One misses much in reading this work if one seeks too quick an answer to the text's many mysteries.

Following the introduction and a chronology of Kierkegaard's life and work, we get the translation of this 'dialectical lyric' itself. The most immediately obvious differences from competing translations concern the titles of

some of the book's sections. Walsh renders *Stemning* ('Exordium' in Hong and Hong and 'Attunement' in Hannay) as 'Tuning Up', which (like Hannay) nicely captures the term's musical dimension. *Lovtale over Abraham* ('Eulogy on Abraham' [Hong and Hong], and 'Speech in Praise of Abraham' [Hannay]) becomes simply 'A Tribute to Abraham'. *Foreløbig Expectoration* works well as 'A Preliminary Outpouring from the Heart' (the Hongs' 'Preliminary Expectoration' being perhaps too pedestrian, while Hannay's 'Preamble from the Heart' doesn't quite capture all of *Expectoration*'s sense of coughing up or pouring out from [*ex*] the breast or heart [*pectus*]).

One of the strengths of this edition is the translator's footnotes. Walsh strikes a good balance between her two competitors: the footnotes are slightly more extensive than Hannay's, but less so than the Hongs': the latter, while useful for the scholar, are found somewhat excessive by some readers. Walsh's notes are also more user-friendly in being located at the bottom of the page rather than the back of the book — a small but significant detail. To the reader whose familiarity with the Bible is not that great (that is, a significant proportion of the likely student readership), Walsh's notes to Biblical references are especially useful. The same is true of her clarificatory references to Scandinavian literature that is likely to strike many a contemporary English-language reader as obscure, and to Greek mythology.

As to the translation itself, the experienced (if slightly nerdy) reader can have fun spotting some differences that have no import save reminding us of the national origins of the translators: the passionless academic *Docenterne* the British Hannay calls 'lecturers' were 'assistant professors' at the time of the Hongs' translation, but now, over twenty years later, have been promoted by Walsh to 'associate professors'. But there are one or two more substantial issues. Walsh's translation seems excellent to me, though I have a quibble about two points on which I prefer Hannay. One decision the translator has to make is what to do with the term *tro*: to 'believe' or to 'have faith'. Though the different translators make different judgments about how to render this according to the context, Hannay's Johannes tends to tell us that Abraham 'had faith', whereas Walsh's regularly says that he 'believed'. I think the former is generally to be preferred, since central to this work's conception of 'faith' is *trust*: Abraham's trust in God in the most demanding of circumstances. 'Abraham had faith' contains this element more obviously than does the bald assertion that 'Abraham believed'. That is, in ordinary English, to say I have faith in you seems to have trust built into it in a way that talk of belief (with its default meaning of assent to a proposition) arguably does not: 'Abraham believed' is ambiguous between 'belief in' and 'belief that'.

A second quibble concerns Abraham's *Angest*, translated as 'anguish' by Hannay and 'anxiety' by Walsh. It is true that this is the term found in the title of Kierkegaard's 1844 book *Begrebet Angest*, translated (by Reidar Thomte) as *The Concept of Anxiety*. But — as has sometimes been pointed out in relation to Heidegger's use of the closely related German term *Angst* — 'anxiety' sounds a little too feeble to capture that term's full resonances. 'Anxiety' seems a more appropriate word to use to describe a concern that

one might miss one's bus rather than the prospect of sacrificing one's son to God, so I think Hannay's 'anguish' is to be preferred. (For a similar reason, I still have a soft spot for the earlier translation of *Begrebet Angest* as *The Concept of Dread*.)

But these are minor quibbles about a book that is, in terms of its translation, introduction and notes, a very worthy addition to the series of which it is a part.

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Ari Kohen
In Defense of Human Rights: A Non-Religious Grounding in a Pluralistic World.
New York: Routledge 2007.
Pp. 207.
US$120.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-415-42015-0).

The world of contemporary politics is struck by a peculiar predicament. It seems that just at the time when a robust conception of human rights is most needed to address the horrors of human cruelty, our ability to generate this very thing is precluded by our growing diversity in religion, worldviews, and comprehensive doctrines. In some sense, this concern has been fueling much of the robust political philosophy of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. John Rawls' 'justice as fairness' is only the most famous attempt to grapple with this vexing problem. That approach, however, is less focused on human rights, per se, than a broader notion of justice. Rawls generally avoids the language of rights, whose very determinacy Hobbes once viewed as a straight-jacketing of the state. It seems, however, that in a world where individuals and governments alike exercise great violence against the fundamental dignity of humanity, this kind of straight-jacketing is just what our age most requires.

It is in this spirit that Kohen offers this work. Like Rawls, Kohen acknowledges the great pluralism defining the contemporary political arena. Most notably, this pluralism characterizes the practice of religion. Whereas thinkers from the Western past relied on a general consensus of religious views, we must recognize two things: 1) to consider human rights as merely a 'Western' concern is provincialism, and 2) the West is itself characterized by a deep pluralism. For this reason, Kohen appeals to the reader to abandon religion as a starting point for consensus on human rights. Appeals to religion, he argues, are more likely to effect even more turmoil and conflict than to stem it.

Kohen's book is systematic. The first five chapters are dedicated to discussing variants of other defenses of human rights. To be sure, Kohen is absolutely sympathetic with their ends — it is only with their specific arguments that he dissents. These chapters are dedicated respectively to Michael Perry, Alan Gewirth, Ronald Dworkin, evolutionary biology, and Richard Rorty. The sixth and final chapter lays out Kohen's own solution to the problem of human rights in a pluralistic culture. What is notable is that while Kohen is critical of all these approaches in one respect or another, he ultimately borrows from all of them in his aspiration to provide a multi-faceted, multi-cultural approach. With Perry he agrees that human rights must have a foundation. They cannot be mere castles in the sky. Nevertheless, he is persuaded by Nietzsche's description of God as dead, or at least by the claim that a belief in the Christian God is no longer universally-shared. This leads Kohen to consider the secular views of Alan Gewirth and Ronald Dworkin. He draws from them the goal of finding a set of human rights grounded on a non-religious foundation. Yet he finds flaws in their respective approaches. Gewirth is burdened by placing too much faith in rational consistency, that is, in the belief that all agents will consider others equally to themselves. Likewise, Dworkin's secular account of human dignity — while admirable in intent — is too ambitious. He seeks a 'transcendent foundation for rights' that accomplishes more than is possible or desirable from a metaphysical perspective (84).

Next, Kohen turns to evolutionary accounts of human nature and assesses what they might have to offer theories of human rights. He finds studies by, e.g. Steven Pinker, to be promising compared to the likes of Michael Perry, insofar as they are completely removed from religious questions. The conception of the person emerging from evolutionary accounts — and one that Kohen endorses — is of the biologically self-conscious individual. This presumably sets stage for who is and is not eligible for possessing human status and hence human rights.

In his penultimate chapter Kohen considers the challenge of recently-deceased Richard Rorty. Rorty represents a challenge to advocates of human rights insofar as he denies the existence of foundations for such claims. Foundations, on this view, are the metaphysical apparatus of an outmoded worldview (109-11). Kohen locates the difficulty with Rorty in the predictable — but, in my view, sound — conclusion that a theory rejecting foundations is ultimately granting Nazis and slavery advocates more respect than they deserve (118-20). Some views simply do not deserve a seat at the table — and Rorty's pragmatism is ultimately too welcoming of them. Nevertheless, Kohen is sympathetic to dimensions of Rorty's program — in particular, his belief that individuals must be free to create their own stories, as it were (123).

The final chapter represents the heart of Kohen's book. It offers his argument for a non-religious conception of human rights — one free from the flaws that burden some of those described in previous chapters. The chapter approaches the problem from two perspectives: theory and practice. From

the theoretical perspective, Kohen finds inspiration in the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas. In the practical dimension, he explores the historical origins of the U.N. Declaration of Rights. Habermas' rules of discourse — more or less his ideal speech situation — demand three conditions Kohen finds instructive in 'creating' human rights. First, quoting Habermas, 'the claim to legitimacy on the part of a legal order built on rights can be redeemed only through the socially integrative force of the "concurring and united will of all" free and equal citizens' (146). Second, again following Habermas, those rights should be 'contingent and revisable' (147). Third, a consensus concerning those rights should be achieved through 'a democratic and deliberative process' (148). Kohen finds this process largely respected in the historical developments surrounding the construction of the Declaration on Human Rights in 1948.

Kohen's location of human rights in a deliberative process has much to recommend it. Namely, its construction of rights in a free and equal discourse is by definition more inclusive and respectful of differing practices and traditions than the Enlightenment approaches that Rorty condemns. Further, its flexibility concerning rights respects the likelihood of our learning more about these questions in the future. As science advances and cultures continue to splinter and new ones emerge, it makes good sense not to hand down a set of rights that must exist for all time. Some readers might be disappointed that Kohen does not himself provide a list of lapidary rights. But this is not his mission. Rather, his goal is more modest in one respect and more ambitious in another. It is modest insofar as he does not lay out what our rights are. It is more ambitious insofar as he lays out the process by which we might construct these rights ourselves. In these regards, the book is well worth the careful attention of scholars and those concerned with human rights generally.

At the same time, there are a few unanswered questions. First, what does it mean to have a 'right' that is not transcendent? Is a 'constructed' right sufficient for the purposes of fending off those who might violate human dignity? Second, in what ways does this approach differ from those of scholars like Habermas? (Kohen suggests at various points that he is less fearful of metaphysics than Habermas typically is. It would be worthwhile to explore this question further perhaps in future works.) Finally, what makes us certain that all cultures are willing to engage in a discussion amongst 'free and equal citizens'? To be sure, Kohen's program will be viewed sympathetically amongst many in liberal democracies with robust histories of such traditions. But it is an open question whether or not non-liberal societies — or even newly emerging ones like Russia — are prepared to meet Kohen's challenge. Nevertheless, this book represents a fine contribution to the growing literature on its chosen subject, and it must be regarded as essential reading for all engaged with these matters.

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C. Stephen Layman
Letters to Doubting Thomas:
A Case for the Existence of God.
New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 297.
US$26.00 (cloth ISBN: 978-0-19-530814-3).

In common parlance, a 'doubting Thomas' is a skeptic, someone who refuses to believe something without direct, personal evidence. Readers of John's Gospel (20: 24-9) know the source. Thomas, one of Jesus' original disciples, is told by the others after his death that Jesus has appeared to them. Thomas, who witnessed the crucifixion, doesn't believe them, because he doesn't think it's possible, and so says that until he sees for himself the nail holes in Jesus' hands and the spear hole in his chest he will not believe that Jesus is alive, that he has been resurrected. When Jesus appears again a week later, this time to all the disciples, he shows Thomas the holes in his hands and chest and invites him to verify them. When he does, Thomas weeps, and kneels, and says 'My Lord and my God', perhaps the greatest confession of faith anywhere in the Bible. But Jesus famously replies, 'You believe because you have seen. Blessed are those who have not seen and yet believe,' in what looks like a put down.

Thomas gets a better shake in this engaging new book. The work is a collection of dialogues on various topics in contemporary philosophy of religion. More precisely, the dialogues cover much of the debate in recent years by analytic philosophers concerning the existence of God. The dialogues take place via a series of letters between two characters: Thomas, an agnostic computer scientist who is nevertheless much interested in the question of whether God exists, and Zachary, a philosopher and theist and Thomas' old college friend. Layman never explicitly states that Zach represents his own position, but many of the remarks in the endnotes make that a reasonable assumption.

Throughout the book, Zach controls the dialogical exchange, but Thomas is never manipulated by him nor is he portrayed as a dummy. He is not Simplicio to Galileo's Salviati, or Euthyphro to Plato's Socrates. Instead, Layman has Thomas raising often astute questions, which Zach is sometimes hard pressed to answer. The result is a genuine dialogue that explores often subtle issues in a clear, accessible manner.

The introduction preceding the correspondence provides the methodological format for the dialogues. The case for the existence of God that Layman offers is not intended to be a proof. Rather, it an argument, or a series of arguments, to the best explanation. An argument-to-the-best-explanation begins with a phenomenon or fact to be explained and then proceeds by giving reasons for supposing that one hypothesis explains the phenomenon better than rival alternatives. The evaluation is thus comparative and appeals to such criteria of goodness as the prior probability of a hypothesis, including its simplicity, and its explanatory power. The global hypotheses that Layman

compares are theism (the view that an almighty and perfectly good God exists) and naturalism (the view that physical reality is the only reality). The defense of theism he employs uses a cumulative case approach: No one argument is meant to be conclusive, but many arguments taken together enhance the likelihood of its truth.

The dialogical chapters have Zach and Thomas exploring various forms of naturalism and how they stack up against the fairly classical theism that Zach defends. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the interpretation and reliability of theistic mystical experience (TME). Here Zach argues that religious experience gives theism a higher prior probability than it would otherwise have, even though it doesn't constitute a proof. One cannot prove the reliability of TME, but one cannot prove the reliability of sense experience either. So to demand proof for the reliability of religious experience is to operate with an unjustified double standard. More positively, we often have as much reason for thinking that TME is veridical as we have for thinking that ordinary sense perception is.

The cosmological argument in Chapter 4 is an attempt to show that, as regards the presence of contingent beings, theism has more explanatory power than naturalism. Naturalism can be modified so as to be equal in explanatory power, but only by making it more complicated and so lowering its prior probability. Chapter 5 develops a fine-tuning design argument and compares its explanatory power with various naturalistic alternatives, including the many-universes hypothesis, and has Zach concluding that theism is clearly the better hypothesis.

Chapter 6 offers an argument for theism based on incompatibilist human free will. The argument is another argument-to-the-best explanation: open theism explains the presence of human free will better than naturalism does, so the phenomenon of human free will provides evidence in favor of open theism over naturalism.

In Chapter 7, Thomas goes on the offensive and presents a best-explanation argument for naturalism: if God is both perfectly good and almighty, as Zach alleges, then there should be little or no evil. Zach's efforts at theodicy struggle to show how the presence of evil is compatible with God's goodness. He also argues here, and in Chapter 8, that theism explains natural evil and, in consequence, moral evil at least as well as naturalism does. The last chapter contains a moral argument, namely that theism does a better job explaining the objective moral order than does naturalism.

By the end of the book, the cumulative case is as follows: A consideration of mystical religious experience and the cosmological argument leave theism and naturalism on a par. However, the design argument and the argument from free will support theism more than naturalism. The existence of evil in the world does not, as is commonly assumed, damage theism any more than it does naturalism. And the objective moral order provides additional support for theism. So the preponderance of evidence (in Swinburne-like fashion) supports theism over naturalism.

This book is well suited to an analytically-oriented undergraduate class in the philosophy of religion; but since it clearly focuses more complicated debates by professionals in the field, it may also be read with profit by instructors who are not experts. The best chapters, in my view, are Chapters 2, 3 and 8. Critics of theism generally regard claims to TME as an obvious non-starter, and theists since William James have usually been reluctant to appeal to it. But Layman cogently argues that theists have no reason to be embarrassed and atheists have no reason to be smug. The presence of evil in the world is usually seen to be a special problem for theists, and often as a problem *only* for theists, but Layman's very original chapter on naturalism and evil persuasively argues that this is not the case.

The weakest chapters, I think, are Chapters 7 and 9. Zach gets himself into difficulties reconciling the presence of evil in the world with God's goodness because he embraces the assumption that God is also omnipotent. And there is no attempt to establish the existence of an objective moral order more or less identical with traditional western morality, only the claim that theism would explain it better than naturalism. These reservations aside, I highly recommend Layman's book for its clarity, honesty, and intellectual rigor.

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Alphonso Lingis
The First Person Singular.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 2007.
Pp. 144.
US$54.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8101-2412-7);
US$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8101-2413-4).

In this, his thirteenth book, Lingis introduces the reader to the fact that bacteria and viruses are constantly invading our susceptible bodies. Disease and death always linger around the corner, confronting us when we least expect them. Philosophical discussion — from Socrates to existentialism — has focused on whether and to what extent mortality and finitude give us a rational or deliberate sense of purpose. Here, Lingis circumvents that discussion.

One of the central themes of this work is that the hectic life of micro-organisms in human bodies indicates how seldom our lives are directed by reflections of death, final ends such as happiness, or even free will. Not only did our lives begin as accidents, but some of the most memorable and remarkable

things catch us by surprise. The sperm that hit the ovum and became me was a lucky hit. Indeed, as the author likes to remind us, when our biological parents got sloppy drunk one night, their erotic tangle hardly envisioned me, or you. Despite the media attention to celebrity babies and engineered fetuses, most of us have arrived on this planet by chance.

That hardly proves our lives' lack significance. To the contrary, this book investigates the many fortunes and curses, joys and sorrows that arise from the chance of being you or me. For those familiar with Lingis as a commentator on or translator of central figures in contemporary thought — Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Heidegger, Deleuze/Guattari, Husserl — the investigations and arguments that comprise this book might surprise. Lingis does not rely on personal consciousness or intentionality to account for the excessive moments in our lives. Clearly he eschews variations of utilitarianism. These accounts too often dwell on negative aspects — need, want, long-term interest.

A more fruitful study of the excesses of life can be guided by positive ideas and passions such as justice, vision, imperative and laughter. The book's poignant conclusion about honor illuminates moments of excess. Lingis presents this more fruitful account in a series of intense, terse and contentious chapters, some of which are one or two pages in length; the longest is ten pages. While readers of Lingis' other writings will recognize some familiar figures, e.g. the dancer, sequoia trees, the fighter for lost causes, and on-going themes, e.g. expenditure, embodiment, and language, this book reconsiders and revises many of the topics addressed in his previous works. This is a distinct and innovative work, essential to those who have followed Lingis' intellectual development or who are contemplating future directions of philosophical inquiry.

Unlike *Excesses, Dangerous Emotions,* or *Trust,* where Lingis presents a collage of descriptive encounters juxtaposed with theoretical discussions, this book is cohesive. Sections announce and chapters sustain philosophical study on being oneself. Whereas his more scholarly tomes, such as *Deathbound Subjectivity*, *Sensation* or *Libido*, investigate ideas through the views of prominent philosophers, this book is eclectic – 'multidisciplinary', in today's parlance — in highlighting its sources, which range from anthropology and autobiography to psychology and zoology. Yet the eclecticism belies an underlying coherence. In that sense this book is closer to *The Imperative*, Lingis' most systematic work. Only here the chapters are more compact and lyrically written.

This work has ten parts comprised of twenty-nine chapters, some of which are so concise that they could be considered extended aphorisms or vignettes. For example, Chapter 19, 'When I Have to Speak', concludes: 'The collective sows words that constrict us, lacerate us, humiliate us, sicken us, mortify us' (91). This is one of many pithy insights that should encourage numerous philosophy students to develop their own reflections on language or social groups. But this book should also be accessible and evocative to a variety of audiences.

After highlighting the biological rarity of our existence, Part 1 addresses the many ways we engage the world. One prominent way is our voice. It makes contact with others, for better or worse. That is, the voice helps explore and explain, but it also organizes words in such a way that they become commands and directives. Words contain a fascist potential, but they can also bring transcendence and wonder.

As elaborated in Part 3, words perform numerous functions. They communicate intentions or satisfactions, but also register deceptions and complaints. They propel or convince us about the situation before us, pushing us to do what we must. This 'must' is positive rather than negative. For people of honor the 'must' creates their options or choices. The objection that 'must' diminishes our individual freedoms is answered by the realization of many characters who enliven these pages: the urgency of a situation in fact conveys what we wind up wanting to do. A rebel tortured by government thugs and the nurse who stops pampering the dying rich in order to help starving children in a distant land answer Lingis' question, 'Do we not discover what we want to do only when we discover what we have to do?' (36)

Though we prefer individuals who live by their word, men and women of honor often die by their word. Some of the most notable exemplars of honor have failed. How can intelligent and courageous individuals fight for what they should know is a losing cause? Lingis postulates two reasons. First, these exemplars were convinced that the enemy was ignoble. Second, they offered something that their friends, protégés and adherents could continue to study, search, or live for: a vision.

Part 4 elaborates the way in which visions are manifest in bodies and words. Visions illuminate, and sometimes direct, moments of ecstasy or joy. Such moments are aroused by or charged with an oracular word. Part 5, playing on Georges Bataille, is titled 'The Story of the I'. Lingis considers the difference between a chronicle and story, for each presents a perspective that tells of someone's life. Unlike a chronicle, which relates the normal timeline and rites of passage that make much of our lives, the story recounts the marvelous and unexpected moments that often carry greater impact.

Part 6 extends these considerations to one aspect of our environment that is also quite singular: you. To you I declare who or what I am. We meet by chance in a certain time and place. From you I learn about or respond to realities heretofore nonexistent. Thus is trust established. Recapitulating key points made in previous chapters, Lingis observes, 'Trust is a bond with the word and vision of another' (79).

Parts 7 and 8 deliberate more closely on the ambivalent powers of words and visions. Here Lingis distinguishes the words spoken by a representative of a group, nation, or profession, from those spoken amid unique circumstances. On the one hand, our voice represents the collective, whose words 'constrict us, lacerate us, humiliate us, sicken us, mortify us' (91). On the other hand, no matter how much our words slavishly appeal to the demands of self-consciousness arising from teachers, preachers, parents and pundits, words still have the power to 'excite, agitate, soothe, hypnotize, and stupefy

our bodies' (96). This strange ambivalence stirs Lingis to address the significance of myth and then dispute Slavoj Žižek's efforts in relating myth to fantasy at the expense of diminishing the reality — the passions, the truths, the stories — of those who speak and act from a vision or an oracular word.

Lingis concludes by examining honor and dishonor. Chapter 26, 'To Thine Own Self Untrue', is introduced with one of Lingis' trademark photographs, this time of a female impersonator. The joke winds up being about the delusion so many of us have about ourselves. A footnote reports, for example, that over ninety percent of college professors believe they are better than their colleagues.

The underlying point is that honor and dishonor illuminate how we act on our word. Many of the words we proclaim are subsumed by an official or recognizable discourse. How discouraging to find one's discourse parlayed for dishonorable causes, as evident when intellectuals such as Alan Dershowitz or Jean Elshtain proffer arguments legitimizing the use of torture. In contrast, some of the most compelling instances of honor are found among outcasts. Outcasts are often anonymous, fighting for a losing cause. Yet outcasts also include professionals who know the official discourse; their word of honor announces the conviction that their official discourse has betrayed justice and beauty.

Lingis' focus on honor extends his insights into Nietzsche, without the controversial baggage brought on by Nietzsche's discussions of the noble. Honor has little to do with class, breed or mastery, terms of perennial dispute among Nietzsche commentators. Instead, it is affirmed in those courageous individuals who make contact with the violated and downtrodden. In a sense, they embody moments that are beyond good and evil. For an act of honor arises in a moment of chance, much like our birth and death.

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Hendrik Lorenz
The Brute Within:
Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
US$ 74.00 (cloth ISBN-10: 0-19-929063-6;
ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929063-5).

Plato and Aristotle inherited a philosophical legacy from Socrates the like of which hasn't been met with since, viz., the view that all human action is rational: given Socrates' economic account of the soul, there is quite simply

no mechanism from which non-rational action may spring. As Plato embarks upon his own work, then, Socratic intellectualism is paradigmatic among the philosophical elite. In fact, it is not until his 'middle period' that the first thorough account of non-rational action is presented, viz., the 'tripartite' account of the soul of the *Republic* IV, which Plato promotes as the demise of intellectualism (*Rep.*, 438a1-5).

Lorenz' volume is an attentive, spirited study of this tripartite account of the soul as it is presented in the *Republic*, developed by Plato in the *Theaetetus, Philebus* and the *Sophist*, and subsequently taken up by Aristotle in the *De Anima, De Memoria, De Insomniis, Nicomachean Ethics* and the *De Motu Animalium*. His fundamental problem is to determine how such a non-rational account of action (i.e., an account according to which at least some human action is accomplished without the aid of the sort of thinking that accompanies, say, means-ends cognition) can adequately explain the particularity of goal-directed human behavior (e.g., smoking this particular cigarette right now). A strictly intellectualist account of the soul, such as Socrates', has no difficulty with this task. But an alleged instance of non-rational action needs to explain the action without recourse to thought. After all, how does the non-rational agent manage to smoke the cigarette without the aid of, say, basic means-ends reasoning? Focusing upon appetitive desire (*epithumia*), and less so upon spirit (*thumos*) — Plato and Aristotle's two non-rational desires — Lorenz explains how Socrates' successors are able to give non-rational desires just enough content (cognition without thought, or, as Lorenz sometimes puts it, 'motivating conditions') to explain such action.

He begins by arguing that Plato's position in the *Republic* is in fact a parts-of-the-soul account of desires, each desire (rational wish, appetite, and spirit) being housed in a separate part of the composite soul. A contrasting interpretation of Plato's passage instead has it that the soul is a non-composite thing with three distinct kinds of motivation. So Lorenz' work here is no matter of simple textual exegesis, but of disarming other, extant, plausible lines of interpretation. A highlight of this part of his work is his thorough examination of Plato's 'Principle of Opposites', that idea which bears the brunt of the load supporting tripartition.

Lorenz then contends that Plato's appetitive desire is indeed the sort of desire that is non-rational in the sense of lacking any reasoning ability whatsoever. This, too, is an idea over which interpreters have disagreed (largely on the basis of evidence from *Republic* IX), some maintaining that Plato makes appetite in some sense rational. Lorenz's study, then, has Plato facing the intriguing and, quite arguably, more difficult, philosophical task of keeping appetite fully reason-less while enabling it to be the cause of purposive action.

In accounting for the cognitive, but non-rational, features of appetite, Lorenz provides a thorough and enlightening interpretation of *Republic* X, according to which, he argues, Plato attributes to appetite the capacity for holding beliefs. This discussion (a modification of the1902 interpretation of *Republic* X by James Adam) is among the most philosophically gripping of the volume, and will likely be the focus of both critical and supportive reactions

among scholars. Nonetheless, Lorenz thinks that Plato eventually comes to reject the view that appetite can hold beliefs. His arguments here, focusing upon rather complicated passages in the *Timaeus* and the *Theaetetus*, are very satisfying demonstrations of interpretive skill.

Ultimately, Lorenz' account of Plato has it that the non-rational parts of the soul respond to occurrent perceptions which, he shows, provide sufficient motivating conditions for appetite to cause action.

The third part of this volume is a masterful study of *phantasia* — roughly, 'imagination' — as it figures in Aristotle's account of non-rational action. The aim of this nearly 100-page discussion is to demonstrate that Aristotle is further developing his predecessor's theory of non-rational action. Lorenz begins by showing that *phantasia* includes the animal's ability to represent to itself sensory representations not presently perceived. The idea here is that *phantasia* enables the animal to imagine future scenarios and thus bring about goal-directed behavior. This is something that perception alone cannot accomplish. It is the machinery of perception and *phantasia*, according to Lorenz, through which Aristotle is able to account for specific, goal-directed, non-rational action — action, that is, in which no rational capacity is active. Between them, Lorenz thinks, Plato and Aristotle have created and developed a forceful account of non-rational action. Subsequent scholarship will no doubt emerge on the question of whether or not Lorenz's view of Plato and Aristotle succeeds in answering their intellectualist predecessor.

Throughout, Lorenz demonstrates a meticulous awareness of the problematic passages uncovered by all the preceding scholarship. These are passages notorious for posing serious interpretive challenges to so many past attempts to provide coherent accounts of the dialogues and of the lecture notes. Lorenz shrinks neither from acknowledging these passages nor from offering plausible and original ways of disarming them.

This book is not easy reading. Lorenz is quite comfortable in discussing multiple passages and different dialogues simultaneously as he tries to locate ways in which various texts can inform other ones. In addition, his presentation is relentlessly energetic, as he ardently introduces interpretations, arguments and counterarguments in sometimes rapid succession (though all the while sustaining contact with his main thesis). Readers will thus appreciate his well-placed, helpful reminders and summaries of what has already been established and of where his discussion is headed. The volume includes a bibliography, general index, and an *index locorum*.

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Alasdair MacIntyre
The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays (Vol. 1).
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 244.
US$70.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-85437-5);
US$24.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-67061-7).

Alasdair MacIntyre
Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays (Vol. 2).
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 252.
US$70.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-85438-2);
US$25.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-67062-3).

In an age where morality is increasingly defined by an irresolvable tension between the demand to a right to do anything that does not cause direct harm to innocent people and the impulse to promote the good without necessarily honouring it, MacIntyre's body of work serves as a calm reminder of the fact that serious ethical enquiry is only ever possible on the backdrop of both a properly developed philosophy of psychology and a related account of the forgotten world-views underpinning the various competing frameworks which we have inherited from past traditions.

According to MacIntyre, all ideologies find expression through conceptual frameworks that give rise to notions and dogmas which, considered independently of the contexts which originally gave them meaning, are either senseless or unjustified. Thus, whenever we embrace an ideology without the appropriate contextual knowledge we stand accused of committing ourselves to a fragmented view (or set of views) that does not cohere with all those other fragments which we have inherited from rival traditions. This infelicitous situation gives rise to moral dilemmas which condemn both particular individual agents and general moral theories to ethical failure (Vol. 2: essay 5).

On such a picture, it is our duty as human beings to try to better understand the sorts of social practices (be they legal, religious, economic, political, etc.) which have collectively generated this confusion. Accordingly, the tasks of philosophy involve an engagement in socio-linguistic palaeontology aimed at unearthing previously hidden meanings and connections. As these become uncovered we gradually find ourselves in a better position to favour the practices of one fully-formed tradition over those of its rivals. Since none of the liberal or conservative moralities currently on offer have emerged from one single tradition, they should all be rejected in favour of a more coherent view involving a developed account of the practices that foster and sustain it.

Whilst he remains best known for his work on ethical and political issues, the two volumes under review clearly demonstrate that MacIntyre can easily hold his own against specialists in almost any area of philosophy. Starting a few years after 1971's excellent collection *Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy*, and taking us no further than 2002

(notwithstanding four previously unpublished pieces, one of which is misidentified in the acknowledgements as Vol. 1: essay 8, when it is actually Vol. 1: essay 7), these thematically arranged essays centre on issues in meta-philosophy, ethics, and socio-political philosophy, yet they also frequently bear testament to how use of the aforementioned methodology reveals parallel dogmas (to be rejected) in fields such as epistemology, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, philosophy of science, and philosophical theology (Vol. 1: essays 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10; Vol. 2: essays 3, 4, 9). MacIntyre effortlessly moves from one subject to another without ever sinking into the unpalatable technical jargon that largely dominates both analytic and continental philosophy today. The resulting picture is that of a sustained effort in analytical Thomism which adds both depth and breadth to the ideas surrounding his magnum opus *After Virtue* (1981) and its two sequels: *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (1988) and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (1990).

The opening essay of the first volume dates back to 1977 and serves as a narrative bridge between MacIntyre's earlier Marxist work and the increasingly Thomistic Aristotelianism which followed his conversion to Roman Catholicism in the early 1980s. This transformation is no incidental fact but the result of an epistemic crisis which resulted in the conviction that he lacked the schematic resources to make any further progress in philosophy.

MacIntyre adapts a version of confirmation holism inspired by (but also partly critical of) Lakatos, Kuhn, and Quine's philosophy of science. On MacIntyre's adaptation of this radical view, beliefs can be fully understood — and by the same token accepted or rejected — only holistically (viz. in relation to an entire tradition), rather than in isolation. *Rationality* may consequently require us to readily abandon our commitment to any worldview which comes to face an overbearing obstacle. The conversion which separates MacIntyre's first collection of essays from these two volumes is thus best described as a paradigm shift undertaken for theoretical reasons in a moment of epistemic crisis.

This epistemological holism constitutes a crucial component of MacIntyre's attempted anti-relativism, according to which 'the languages in use of some social and cultural orders are more adequate than those of some others in this or that respect,' and 'the existence of continuing disagreement, even between highly intelligent people, should not lead us to suppose that there are not adequate resources available for the rational resolution of such disagreement' (Vol. 1: essays 2, 3). Paradoxically, MacIntyre's objectivism remains grounded on the idea that one can only make normative judgements from within the standpoint of a particular practice one is engaged in (a view which he inherits from Wittgenstein's notion of a form of life, though traces of it may also be found in Hume).

The worry can also be raised in perspectival terms: if there is no normative view from nowhere — no Hegelian absolute standpoint — then one can never be in a position to evaluate all practices impartially and, consequently, any activity that is considered an excellence by some one practice would appear to be on an equal footing with any other activity when considered by

another practice. Consider, for example, the Nietzsche-reading fictional community of Camden College in Bret Easton Ellis' cult novel *The Rules of Attraction*. With practices centred on nihilism, escapism, inertia, drug-taking, mindless promiscuity, various extreme forms of private and public debauchery, and standards of excellence such as the 'Dress to Get Screwed' and 'End of the World' parties, nothing could contrast more perfectly with the kind of Christian community endorsed by MacIntyre, where virtues of honesty, humility, integrity, fidelity, patience, and charity are encouraged to flourish. Yet if Camden can be criticised only from the standpoint of places such as Rome (and vice versa), how is it ever possible to objectively justify a preference for one over the other?

The holistic answer is simply that some practices are pragmatically far more attractive than others: they have greater coherence, simplicity, explanatory and predictive power, and — last but not least — a normative order and structure best suited to sustaining their own survival and development. As Bret Easton Ellis' own work elucidates, world-views such as that of Camden are not only anti-social and non-co-operative but ultimately self-defeating and as such cannot foster any excellences. Indeed, Camden doesn't even qualify as a MacIntyrian practice at all — let alone a good one — given the famous definition of a practice (first outlined in *After Virtue*) as 'any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.' More importantly, given that coherence, order, and co-operation come in varying degrees, no qualifying practice is immune from holistic rejection either.

Be that as it may, MacIntyre refuses to extend this coherentism regarding justification to the theory of truth, wisely resisting the temptation — indulged in by Quine and early Putnam (and, to a lesser extent, also Dummett and Brandom) — to claim that 'truth is to be identified with idealized justification' (Vol. 1: essay 3). Despite the merits of this last move, the juxtaposition results in the unnerving suggestion that reasoning will at best be related to truth probabilistically. On this picture, one can aim for truth only by aiming for justification, and the latter is in principle always open to revision.

I am unlikely to revise my view that many of the essays here outshine works on which other philosophers have staked their entire reputations. They touch upon a variety of topics and figures from the history of ideas without ever losing sight of the bigger picture to which they contribute, and by which they are also largely motivated. Despite these strong ties to MacIntyre's great — yet sometimes also overbearing — system, they are sufficiently self-standing for the uninitiated reader to engage with directly.

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Andrew Mason
Levelling the Playing Field:
The Idea of Equal Opportunity and Its Place in Egalitarian Thought.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 256.
US$45.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-926441-4).

Mason's book is a careful and nuanced attempt to articulate and demarcate a moderate, practicable version of equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity has of course long been considered to be central to an adequate conception of distributive justice, and attempts to flesh out its scope and range have been an ongoing concern of liberal theorists. Some conception of equality of opportunity seems requisite if a society of unequal social positions is to be considered justifiable, but exactly what conception that may be varies. A 'levelling the playing field' conception of equality of opportunity requires that privileged social positions are subject to open competition, and that there is fair access to obtaining the qualifications for such positions. In general, levelling the playing field conceptions of equal opportunity aim to neutralize or eliminate unchosen inequalities from consideration in distributions, while leaving intact inequalities which arise from the choices of individuals. In other words, a levelling the playing field conception of justice requires rendering everyone's opportunities equal in an appropriate sense, and then letting individual choices dictate distribution outcomes.

Mason's account may be considered to be moderate in the sense that he argues that levelling the playing field may best be conceived as an attempt to mitigate, rather than to neutralize, unchosen inequalities, where, as he puts it, 'mitigating would mean preventing them from having an undue impact on their access to advantage.' It is the task of this book to flesh out the meaning and implications of this moderate approach to levelling the playing field.

This is achieved, at least in part, by a critique of the more radical neutralization approach. Here, Mason argues that the attempt to neutralize the effects of differences in people's circumstances runs counter to some basic moral intuitions. For instance, Mason argues, it would seem to require that we refrain from such actions that advantage our children relative to others, which would include such basic activities as the spending of quality time with them. Such a result is of course highly counterintuitive, and suggests that the neutralization approach must be on the wrong track if this is what it entails. Mason seems on strong footing here, and his successful argument against the neutralization approach to levelling the playing field raises the bar on the expectation that the mitigation approach will be a more fruitful alternative.

In the later chapters, as Mason begins to cash out what principles he feels the mitigation approach might consist in, the book takes a hands-on and quite refreshing turn toward concrete social policies. Here, Mason suggests that a mitigation approach might contain a 'basic skills principle', wherein

each child is entitled to receive an education that enables him to acquire a set of skills which will give her an adequate range of options later in life, and an educational access principle designed to rule out the possibility that differences in social circumstances might entitle some to better educational opportunities than others in lesser circumstances. So far, this seems obviously on board with what a meritocratic approach to levelling the playing field requires, insofar as it is targeted towards levelling the playing field with respect to access and towards balancing opportunities which result from unchosen differences in people's circumstances, and not targeted toward levelling the differences between people based on their own choices.

An adequate meritocratic approach, however, needs to address when one's choices are really one's own. Mason's answer to this question is perhaps the most interesting and controversial aspect of the book. Here, Mason holds that traditional answers are inadequate because they do not recognize the full range of reasons we might have for not requiring a person to bear the full costs of her behavior for some choices. Mason defines 'choices' broadly, to include any outcome over which an agent exerted some interest. By 'costs' he means the consequences of a person's actions that are a burden to themselves or to others in terms of access to advantage.

The puzzle that arises, of course, is that different conceptions of the good life, which ought in a liberal egalitarian society to be pursued, have different costs. It seems at once unjust to others to expect them to bear these costs and also unjust to require the agent to do so. So the question for any adequate conception of justice is: how ought those costs to be apportioned? Mason's response to this perennial problem of egalitarianism is perhaps the greatest advance of this book, in that it uses the levelling the playing field approach to fruitfully address a larger, and indeed fundamental, problem in egalitarianism.

He uses as a test case the situation of mothers who decide to give up their careers in order to take care of their children, even though they are not, strictly speaking, forced to do so. In such cases, according to Mason, these women make these choices against the backdrop of a widely held social norm that dictates that they should look after their children personally, and thus fairness requires that they should not be required to bear the full burden of such a choice.

Mason should be commended both for taking on such a difficult scenario, and for addressing its complexities honestly. The obvious question, once we level the playing field to include the choices of stay-at-home mothers, is what other groups and choices deserve such accommodation? Mason treats this issue with integrity, and illuminatingly discusses the distinctions between ways of life that are merely choices based on 'expensive tastes' and those which are the products of limiting and broadly-based social constraints — in the case of career sacrificing mothers, the choice is made against the social background of the norm that mothers should take care of their children personally. Mason's approach offers a significant advantage over other attempts to deal with this problem, in that it offers a principled way to distinguish

between cases of legitimate social constraint and those which could merely be categorized as 'expensive tastes', for which the agent should reasonably be expected to bear the burden. It is in this regard that this book makes its most original contribution to the egalitarian literature on equality.

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Tim Maudlin
The Metaphysics Within Physics.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 197.
Cdn$66.00/US$49.95
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921821-9).

This is a collection of six papers on a range of metaphysical topics, including causation, counterfactuals, laws of nature, and the passage of time. Though the chapters can be read independently, the book is best read as a sustained attack on the popular 'Humean' metaphysics championed most prominently by David Lewis. Maudlin repeatedly argues that despite any ambitions Humeans might have to be defenders of a metaphysics particularly well-suited to physics, closer analysis shows that contemporary physics is distinctly 'un-Humean'. This is a rich book with many provocative discussions and I would recommend it to anyone interested in the metaphysics of physics (obviously), and in scientifically informed accounts of laws, causation, and counterfactuals more generally.

The cornerstones of Humeanism are the principles of *separability* and what Maudlin calls *physical statism*. Separability is the claim that the total physical state of the world is determined by the intrinsic properties of point-sized entities, together with their spatio-temporal relations, while physical statism is the claim that the physical state of the world determines all of the facts about the world, including modal and nomological facts. Together, these two principles entail that the fundamental facts about the world are intrinsic, non-modal, and non-nomic facts about point-sized things. The project for the Humean is to defend this claim by providing an analysis of all other facts in terms of this Humean basis. Maudlin's anti-Humean project is to show how separability and physical statism are ill-suited to the world described by contemporary physics.

Chapter 1 begins the attack on Humeanism with an extended defense of primitivism about laws of nature: rather than trying to analyze nomic facts in terms of non-nomic facts, as Humeans do, we should treat lawfulness as a

primitive notion in our ontology. Laws are simply 'the patterns that nature respects' (15), with no further analysis needed. The chief benefit of this proposal is the analysis of possibility and counterfactuals it allows. For example, to answer questions about counterfactuals, we find a suitable set of boundary conditions and examine how the universe would have evolved, given the laws of nature, if those conditions had been perturbed in various ways.

It is in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 that the book really earns its title. Chapter 2 reviews various difficulties in reconciling the principle of separability with quantum physics, in which non-separable states are abundant. This conflict has already been widely discussed, and here Maudlin is mostly interested in uncovering the roots of the commitment to separability. Chapter 3 presents a difficulty of a different sort for reconciling properties from fundamental physics with standard accounts of properties in terms of universals, tropes, or 'natural' classes. For instance, properties such as quark color cannot be understood as independent intrinsic features that two entities might simply share or not share; instead, facts about the sameness of quark color are dependent on the path used to draw the comparison between two entities. And in Chapter 4, Maudlin turns to the problem of time and argues against the view that realism about a four-dimensional 'block' universe precludes realism about the passage of time. He argues against the widely held claim that the supposed 'time reversal invariance' of physical processes shows that the passage of time has no physical significance. His own proposal for temporal passage mirrors his earlier account of laws: the direction and passage of time is to be adopted as a primitive notion, instead of being analyzed in terms of non-temporal notions.

Chapter 5 extends the argument about laws from Chapter 1 to give an account of causation and counterfactuals. Maudlin first tries to undermine the connection between causation and counterfactuals by describing situations where we clearly have knowledge of causation without having knowledge of the relevant counterfactuals, and situations where we have knowledge of the relevant counterfactuals but lack knowledge of causation. He then argues that laws of nature, in particular those that fit what he calls the 'quasi-Newtonian' form consisting of laws describing inertial states and laws describing deviations from those inertial states, are particularly well-suited to our understanding of both counterfactuals and causation. Finally, Chapter 6 tries to unite the preceding chapters by emphasizing the common threads running through each: primitivism about laws, the association between laws and temporal evolution, and primitivism about the direction and passage of time.

A prominent principle guiding this work is that metaphysics must learn its lessons from physics, and thus that 'the proper object of most metaphysics is the careful analysis of our best scientific theories' (104). Given this commitment to the close study of science, this book is admirable in being technically informed without being overly technical in presentation. However, the significance of 'our best scientific theories' for Maudlin's argument is sometimes unclear. For example, in defending his primitivism about laws, Maudlin makes much of his rejection of the traditional understanding of laws as a

species of universal generalization, noting that while physical laws such as Schrödinger's equation can be 'tortured' into the form of a universal generalization, 'it is hard to see what the purpose of the exercise would be' (11). But Maudlin's own account of laws as 'fundamental laws of temporal evolution' draws little from any special features of contemporary physics, and could just as easily be presented within the framework of classical physics. Maudlin does mention considerations of symmetry and conservation principles as important features of contemporary physics, but only to dismiss them as of secondary importance next to laws. Here Maudlin risks facing exactly the sort of difficulty that plagues Lewis' Humeanism: superficially, the conflict between classically inspired metaphysics and contemporary physics might seem surmountable (thus Lewis' optimism that quantum physics might someday be replaced by a theory compatible with Humeanism), and only detailed analysis reveals how deep those conflicts can run.

Another recurring theme is an unwillingness to be bound to any preconceived commitment to simplicity. Maudlin treats the metaphysical reductionist as something of a fetishist, over-obsessed with simplicity and desert landscapes, when the theory and practice of physics calls for a more abundant, non-reductive ontology. At least in the case of *laws*, though, it seems quite reasonable to ask for an explanation of lawfulness regardless of one's tastes in simplicity. That's what makes reductive accounts of lawhood so attractive: they promise to explain the difference between logically indistinguishable facts — true universal generalizations — that play quite different roles in our explanatory practices. Ultimately those reductive projects may fail, but their motivation is deeper than a longing for simplicity. That said, Maudlin's arguments are important and should be of interest to reductionists and non-reductionists alike.

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Stephen Mulhall
Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations, *§§243-315.*
New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 148.
US$35.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-920854-8).

In this book Mulhall picks up where he left off in his earlier *Inheritance and Originality*. As he states in the book's introduction: 'That initial reading began with the opening of the *Investigations*, and continued unbroken to §242,

where — instead of following the text's shift from rule-following to the idea of private language — I shifted instead to the much later discussion of seeing-aspects . . .' (13-14). Returning now to the private language argument, Mulhall sets out to demonstrate that the guiding themes of his previous work (namely the internal relation between form and content in Wittgenstein's writing, the literary dimensions of his language, and the nature of Wittgenstein's 'therapeutic' relation to his readers) have a central importance to the private language argument as well.

It would be impossible to cover all of the diverse subjects touched upon in Mulhall's latest work here; however, he does select one axis in particular which continually serves to orient the text: the 'resolute' vs. 'substantial' understanding of nonsense. The resolute reading (indebted largely to Conant, Diamond, and the 'New Wittgensteineans') takes its bearing from Wittgenstein's remark in the introduction to the *Tractatus*, 'in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of that limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of that limit will simply be nonsense.' With no way to identify the logically significant parts, according to the resolute reading, nonsense can only ever be gibberish. On the other hand, the substantial reading would have it that some nonsensical propositions, those exemplified in Wittgenstein's writing for example, may be distinct from mere gibberish by directing our attention to otherwise ineffable metaphysical truths.

Mulhall favours the former (but gives both sides a fair and thorough exposition), and thus maintains a certain resolute continuity between the *Tractatus* and the private language argument of the *Investigations*. As he writes, 'In the light cast by resolute readings, one might characterise this fundamental point as that of identifying and aiming to overcome our attraction to the idea that there is something we cannot do in philosophy' (8). The point, for Mulhall, is that the attraction we find in such grammatical gibberish results from a *psychological* tendency, rather than a deep metaphysical insight into the truly ineffable. This is a novel insight into the debate, and one which then allows Mulhall to formulate the extremely important question missed by majority of commentators: even if the substantial position is deeply flawed, how does one disabuse the 'substantialist' (in this case, the private linguist) of this tendency? I leave it up to Mulhall's readers to decide for themselves whether he has performed adequately here, but I will say that those sympathetic to Cavell's rather idiosyncratic use of 'acknowledgement' will be pleased. In any case, what it may mean to 'disabuse' someone here is certain to engender a lively, and undoubtedly polarising, debate.

Any disagreements one might have with Mulhall's reading aside — and there are many points upon which one might fruitfully take issue with him — there is only one real problem with the book: it is bound to be misunderstood by many of its readers. There are perhaps several reasons for this, but chief among them is the book's all too clever self-consciousness, which tends to obscure the point. Consider the title, for example, *Wittgenstein's Private*

Language. The majority of readers who pick up this book will expect it to be about the private language *argument*, typically considered to consist of some position on the possibility or impossibility of a language which can, in principle, be understood only by the person speaking it. This question is in fact given minimal attention. Instead, the book takes this language's impossibility as a given and continues to investigate how it is that Wittgenstein uses his language in the relevant passages to subtly disabuse his readers of their psychological tendency towards such grammatical illusions. And the language Wittgenstein uses here is, quite literally, Wittgenstein's *private language* (read: *gibberish*). It is as if Mulhall has laid a trap for those philosophers already bewitched enough to think that nonsense is something one could argue for or against; a point gratuitously easy to miss upon an initial reading.

This, and other such remarks — about being unable directly to assert the inevitably self-destructive character of direct philosophical assertions (20), or how Wittgenstein 'acts out' ('traffics in', some might say) the very nonsense that is to be overcome (57) in order to subtly 'invite his reader to acknowledge' their tendency towards nonsense (which some might call 'leading his readers on') (66), not to mention his passing remarks on the-hand-is-faster-than-the-eye magician (of PI §308) who directs our attention away from the first, really efficacious move of the conjuring trick (127) — all these suggest pretty decisively that Mulhall has attempted to affect (or entrap?) his readers with a similar subtlety.

Naturally, this all works into the book's decidedly self-reflective aim, and if Mulhall has purposefully misled his readers, it is only meant to be in the service of a greater goal. Fans of the 'show, don't tell' school of writing will appreciate it. Unfortunately, if Mulhall turns out to lack Wittgenstein's ability to compel his readers to return to his texts time and again, then one can expect that many of Mulhall's readers will simply walk away with an erroneous understanding of the book after an initial reading.

Perhaps those already familiar with Mulhall's work will grasp the book's more inconspicuous points immediately. However, given the popularity of the private language argument, even among those who otherwise know little of Wittgenstein, this book could have given Mulhall a solid platform to expand his already substantial and deservedly well recognized contribution to Wittgenstein scholarship. That said, there are plenty of clear, insightful remarks on the particular nuances of Wittgenstein's language, and despite the risk that many of Mulhall's readers will walk away misunderstanding this book, they will still have walked away with much. Still, given the book's fundamental insights regarding the psychological foundations of grammatical bewitchment and the nature of philosophical therapy, it would be a real shame if Mulhall's genuinely novel contribution to the meta-philosophical *mise en scène* of the private language debate is missed by any of his readership.

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Wayne Norman
Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 271.
US$85.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-829335-4).

This book is an admirable and welcome contribution to the burgeoning philosophical literature on nationalism. Its aim is to provide a liberal theory of federalism for a multinational state, and along the way it also takes up important questions concerning the legitimacy of nation-building and the conditions under which secession may be justified. Norman's point of departure is the recent wave of liberal political theory addressing the normative dimensions of nationalism in general, and minority nationalism in particular, and his evaluation of rival schemes of institutional design in multinational political communities both builds upon and pushes forward these increasingly sophisticated theoretical foundations.

Nationalist politics are most divisive when rival nationalisms compete within a single political community. Resolving these conflicts through a 'globalization of secession' strategy would not only be implausible (the 'too many nations not enough states' problem) but also unacceptable, because it would require the involuntary transfer of substantial numbers of people. Norman recommends an alternative 'negotiation' of nationalism that aims to accommodate rival nation-building projects within the democratic structures of a single (federal) state. Thus, instead of seeking to defuse nationalism's divisive capacity by removing its influence from the public realm, he proposes that the key to managing national rivalries consists in identifying fair institutional solutions to enable a plurality of national cultures to flourish alongside (through probably not amongst) one another. The credibility of this proposal rests heavily upon the claim that nationalism finds its political expression not only in the pursuit of exclusive national self-determination, but also in more inclusive nation-building projects. If it is true that satisfying this second strand of the nationalist impulse will largely mollify the exclusionary potential of the first, then Norman's federalist accommodation strategy has a great deal of plausibility.

The claim that nationalism is about more than making the political and national units congruent is a strong one, since there is clear evidence that distinctively nationalistic political cultures persist, develop and flourish subsequent to the attainment of self-determination; the discussions of Iceland and the United States are particularly instructive on this point, as are the references to Billig's 'banal nationalism' thesis. On Norman's account, what marks a political culture out as nationalist are the pervasive appeals to nationalistic sentiment in political discourse and justification, and his analysis of the ways in which these can potentially marginalise minority-nations is typically clear and insightful. Norman's response, a kind of minority-na-

tion 'self-defence' strategy, has much to be said in its favour, and the institutional solutions he proposes are well-defended. However, the plausibility of these proposals is marred by an ambiguity over the justification provided, which runs together two distinct arguments. On the one hand, sometimes the thought seems to be that since majority nation-building is inevitable, federalist political arrangements are required to protect minority distinctiveness. On the other hand, Norman also invokes a stronger claim about the desirability of nation-building for minority nations. If, as I shall suggest, the inevitability thesis is false, then either Norman's argument must rest upon the desirability thesis, or it is only weakly justified. In either case, the federalist solution is only one alternative amongst others, and may have less widespread applicability than Norman supposes.

The inevitability thesis holds that political communities are necessarily nationalistic, and Norman cites two categories of cases in support of this view. First are those matters in which the state cannot be neutral about national identity in the way it can be about (for instance) religion. Thus, it cannot avoid implementing policies that will have a significant impact upon the linguistic identities of citizens (such as requiring children to learn one language rather than another). Second is a wider spread of policy domains in which nation-building practices have been pervasive in modern political communities, and Norman discusses numerous routine state functions and activities that have identity-shaping results. The inevitability thesis trades on the fact that both of these categories of justified state activity have unintentional identity-shaping consequences, but only for the first set are non-neutral consequences a necessary corollary of state action. If this category is a narrow one (and the ubiquity of linguistic examples in this context suggests that it may be), then the inevitability thesis is (at best) a weak one. Furthermore, not all non-neutral consequences are nationalistic. To stick to the language case, the promotion of overlapping linguistic competences amongst citizens might be accomplished with little or no effect upon the national identities of those citizens; here the future development of the European Union might be a pertinent case study. Accordingly, a political culture characterised by a commitment to justificatory neutrality, one in which appeals to nationalistic sentiment in political discourse were not widespread, might avoid much of the marginalising nation-building that Norman treats as inevitable, and may offer greater fairness for minority nations than Norman's own federalist alternative, especially if these national communities are not geographically concentrated.

Nevertheless, for national minorities struggling against an exclusionary backdrop of persistent appeals to majority national identity, Norman's diagnosis may seem especially apposite. Indeed, his federalist alternative seemingly offers much for helping resolve 'soft' multinationalism, enabling neighbouring national communities to come to terms with one another by encouraging nation-building as a fair and satisfactory alternative to national self-determination. Constitutional (rather than policy) measures to discourage minority resentment serve not only both the majority's interest in sta-

bility and the minority's interest in self-preservation, but also the ends of justice. In cases of 'hard' multinationalism, however, where bitter and festering divisions amongst majority and minority nations have eliminated any serious prospect of peaceful co-existence, the need for a theory of secession is evident, and this is a challenge that Norman meets in the closing parts of his book. Focussing on arguments in favour of incorporating a secession clause at the constitutional level (rather than leaving the matter to international law), Norman notes that a key advantage of a rigorous clause — one making political divorce difficult but not impossible — is that it could simultaneously appease belligerent minority nations and discourage their representatives from 'playing the secession card'. Here, again, the concern with stability comes to the fore, and the tendency of this worry to displace other normative issues, especially in a work framed at a high level of generality, is something of a shortcoming. Despite this, Norman makes significant progress in setting out the key ingredients for a moral theory of multinational constitutionalism.

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Andrew Norris, ed.
The Claim to Community: Essays on Stanley Cavell and Political Philosophy.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2006.
Pp. 400.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-5129-2);
US$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-5132-2).

This new book edited by Norris brings together a collection of papers examining the relationship between Stanley Cavell and political philosophy. It is comprised of twelve essays by various authors with backgrounds in philosophy, political science, anthropology and social science. Ten of the essays have never before been published, while the two essays by Norris are slightly altered versions of previously published papers. It also concludes with a chapter by Cavell who skillfully combines many insightful remarks regarding political philosophy with a personalized response to each of the authors. For those interested in the work of Cavell, this is a valuable asset. For those whose interest is in political theory, it offers a perspective and approach that is both innovative and intelligent. One does not need to be a Cavell expert to appreciate this book, for the bulk of the essays are straightforward, written with a degree of clarity and sobriety that is often identified with Cavell himself.

As Norris points out in his introduction, Cavell is not one typically identified with political theory, likely because he rarely directly engages in questions concerning the state, power or citizenship. As such, there is a dearth of material examining Cavell's potential contribution to political thought. Norris' edition not only attempts to make up for this lack, but also hopes to open up new avenues for both political philosophers and Cavellians alike. The organization of the text loosely reflects this dual interest, moving from essays that attempt to clarify why Cavell ought to be considered as a political thinker, to papers that compare his work with other philosophers, and finally to pieces that elucidate Cavell's unique contribution to political philosophy. Readers should note that almost all of the essays focus on questions of political theory, and rarely confront specific questions of social policy or governance. However, some papers do suggest intriguing ways in which Cavell's original approach to philosophy could help orient and illuminate prominent American debates such as those involving questions of human rights or the war in Iraq.

Though there seems to be a fair amount of overlap and repetition between the essays, as a whole this collection provides a rich and fecund perspective on Cavell's work, successfully demonstrating the tremendous resources he provides to political theory. The repetition seems to be a consequence of the perceived need to justify the existence of such a text, one that speaks of Cavell in the same breath as political philosophy. Thus, a number of essays introduce their topic by demonstrating the inherent political bent of Cavell's innovative approach to ordinary language philosophy: that to speak to another human being is to make a claim upon that person, or, in the words of Andrew Norris, 'the claim of reason that is Cavell's central theme and the title of his magnum opus is itself a claim to *community*' (2). This fundamental point of Cavell's philosophy is sufficiently made by Norris in his compelling and thoughtful introductory essay, so it is a wonder why it is so often repeated throughout the rest of the book. At the same time, it must be admitted that this underlying theme is also enriched and enhanced by the following essays, bringing it into contact with other key Cavellian ideas such as 'acknowledgement' and 'skepticism'.

The second essay by Sandra Laugier expands upon Norris' introduction through an examination of Wittgenstein's similar understanding of the political undertones of ordinary language philosophy. Through Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein, Laugier argues that while rules are essential to agreement, there is no final rule that can govern the application of rules. The rules that organize and make possible agreement are themselves informed by our shared practices — our forms of life. Thus, our forms of life ought not be taken as the solution to the problem of agreement (as though the meaning of our agreement can always be interpreted against some context or background, which is assumed to be given), because these forms of life are precisely what demand examination. Laugier thus sets the tone for all of the essays to come, that Cavell's concern with politics is a concern with the ordinary, the near and the familiar.

Piergiorgio Donatelli compares Cavell's treatment of Wittgenstein with the work of John Stuart Mill in order to clarify a central problem of 'moral perfectionism'. This is the problem of 'bringing truth home'. It is not enough that an idea simply make sense, but that it be made real and that it speak to our experience of the world. What we then find true must in a sense already belong to us. Through moral perfectionism the search for truth is to be seen, in the words of Cavell, as a process of becoming remarried to our world. Joseph Lima and Tracy Strong's essay, 'Telling the Dancer from the Dance', returns us to Cavell's ordinary language philosophy and his contribution to the work of J. L. Austin and Wittgenstein. They examine the political implications of the 'ordinary' in ordinary language philosophy by looking at Cavell's inheritance of this school in relation to the bastardized form found in positivism.

This is followed by Norris' second contribution to this volume, an essay that works to reconfigure politics by expanding Cavell's notion of revision to social practices. It also offers some heady insights into the relation between self-transformation and the transformation of the state in ancient philosophy, as well as Cavell's own take on social contract theory. Richard Flathman juxtaposes the work of Cavell with that of Michel de Montaigne with hopes of enriching his conception of moral perfectionism. Continuing with the theme of moral perfectionism, David Owen places Cavell alongside Michel Foucault. Again, the focus is primarily on their respective ethics, though Owen does draw out some of the political implications of perfectionism near the end of his piece.

Ted Cohen offers a short and pithy paper that extends Cavell's notion of acknowledgement to his work on aesthetics. This provides him with a framework that is extended from aesthetic disagreement to moral disagreement with the hope of establishing a way in which people can acknowledge disagreement and yet live together beyond a separated existence of mere tolerance. The question of abortion is briefly treated in this way. Espen Hammer treats Cavell's work on political philosophy as a form of political romanticism. In so doing, he analyzes its strengths and weaknesses in relation to the critique of romanticism offered by Hegel and Carl Schmitt, one that claims there is an element of arbitrariness to the romantic conception of freedom. It is a criticism, Hammer argues, that Cavell survives, though the ambiguous state of his politics leaves him vulnerable to further attack.

Hans Sluga, in a wonderfully engaging essay, examines the place of politics in Cavell's work on the comedy of remarriage. Sluga argues that by examining the dramatic structure of these films we are better situated to 'get away from reflecting on political principles and to attend, instead, to the political aspects of everyday practice' (186). Sluga also relates Cavell's work on the comic with his work on the tragic to further enrich his precarious sense of the political. This treatment of tragedy through Lear is continued in Thomas Dumm's contribution, 'Cordelia's Calculus'. Dumm examines what he calls the 'dissolution of sovereignty' (213) that has arisen with the death of God and abandonment of an absolute authority in terms of Cavell's essay

'The Avoidance of Love'. Through Cavell's reading of Cordelia and the treatment of love and loneliness in *King Lear*, Dumm sees a way of 'rethinking who we are and how we may be present' (235). The final commentator is Robert Gooding-Williams, who offers a discussion of Kant's concept of receptivity, and the way it is inherited and transformed by both Nietzsche and Cavell. These two figures show that Kant had repressed race and gender in his treatment of receptivity. The essay concludes with a critique of Cavell's conception of the origin of American philosophy, one that is said to find its roots in Emerson. For Gooding-Williams, this is also a form of repression, one that represses 'other African American thinkers (who) have had a hand in Emerson's destiny' (262).

Finally, the collection concludes with Cavell's response to the previous essays. This chapter is what makes this book a real gem. Rarely do we get to hear Cavell speak so lucidly on such a diverse area of philosophy and political theory. As one would expect, his comments are introspective, generous and profound. Though it is comprised as an individual response to each essay, Cavell has somehow been able to produce a work that can be read entirely on its own terms. It marks a fitting conclusion to the book, turning as it does to an exciting new page in Cavellian studies.

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Dorothea Olkowski and **Gail Weiss, eds.**
Feminist Interpretations of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 2006.
Pp. 290.
US$85.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-271-02917-7);
US$35.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-271-02918-4).

This is another volume in Penn State's 'Re-Reading the Canon' series, the aim of which is to contribute to the progressive transformation of the Western philosophical canon by critically re-examining its representatives from feminist perspectives. While the series has addressed many standard canonical figures, along with figures of the feminist 'canon' such as Wollstonecraft and Beauvoir, the largest number of volumes have dealt with continental figures whose work, while not necessarily 'canonical' in either sense, have played a notable, if contested, role in the recent development of feminist philosophy.

Such is how Merleau-Ponty fits in. On the one hand, his phenomenology prioritized the embodied nature of consciousness and the intercorporeal nature of social relations. Despite his own lack of (explicit) concern for feminist issues, this emphasis on pre-cognitive and pre-personal anonymity has resonated forcefully with many theorists, beginning with Beauvoir herself, for whom sexual difference can be traced back to some fundamental level of undifferentiated sameness.

On the other hand, there are powerful doubts concerning the appropriateness of this approach for feminist concerns. These stem in large part, although not exclusively, from the critique of Merleau-Ponty's ontology of 'flesh' developed by Luce Irigaray beginning with her *l'Éthique de la différence sexuelle*. The general idea behind this scepticism is that models of corporeal anonymity are ineluctably fraught with (hetero)sexist assumptions that occlude the particularities of sexual difference, thereby reinforcing the very patterns of domination that motivate feminist critique in the first place.

Recent feminist debates concerning Merleau-Ponty's work have thus basically centred on the question as to whether some form of pre-personal subjectivity can be posited prior to gender, or else whether such could only be a deleterious masculinist illusion. Given the high *potential* value of Merleau-Ponty's work to feminist concerns, one of the general aims of the series — to examine 'whether a philosopher's socially inherited prejudices concerning woman's nature and role are independent of her or his larger philosophical framework' (ix) — is especially salient in this volume.

Co-editors Olkowski and Weiss have gathered twelve essays (three of which were published previously), including one each of their own. Overall, the collection makes an important contribution, and this is by no means limited to feminist philosophy, narrowly construed. For what is fundamentally in question is the possibility of establishing a genuinely inclusive intersubjectivity. Beyond its immediate significance, then, this work is of direct relevance to on-going efforts to rethink the viability of phenomenology — Merleau-Pontian and otherwise — in general.

The specific essays cannot be considered in detail here. Beyond the common issue of relating sexual difference (and the ethics thereof) to corporeality and intercorporeality, however, there are some general approaches in terms of which the contributions may be roughly situated. Several essays aim to deepen existing interpretations of Merleau-Ponty's work, in order to show that it does indeed offer useful resources for feminism. Sonia Kruks explores the complex dialecticity of Merleau-Ponty's account of intercorporeality, in particular its dimensions of affectivity, to challenge the idea that the pre-personal level of existence is neutral, without claiming that solidarity has any ontological guarantee. Arguing against 'foundationalist' interpretations of Merleau-Ponty's account of corporeality, Johanna Oksala emphasizes the intersubjective and historical constitution of body-subjects, in the ambiguity of which she grounds the possibility of the freedom implied by the idea of women's emancipation. Jorella Andrews aims to rehabilitate Merleau-Ponty's embodied account of visual perception as indeterminate and non-objectiv-

izing, with the implication that it provides an attractive model for thinking about the ethics of difference and alterity. In her evocative discussion of 'the intercorporeal dynamics of violation and resistance', Laura Doyle suggests that Merleau-Pontian phenomenology can support a critical account of the bodily logic of oppression and domination, and of resistance as well.

Other essays take up Irigaray's critique of Merleau-Ponty in various ways. On the one hand, Beata Stawarska's contribution 'rejoins' and 'completes' this critique by arguing that beyond sexual difference, the entire social dimension of existence is lost in Merleau-Ponty's ontology, which as it stands reflects a subjective *intra*corporeality. On a related note, Olkowski argues that Merleau-Ponty's transitivist understanding of infancy makes the problem of psychological differentiation insoluble on his terms, and suggests that an Irigarayan take on the affective intersubjectivity of the maternal bond might be able to redress this.

Conversely, Judith Butler takes issue with Irigaray's critique, maintaining that it is ultimately complicit with its object, that Merleau-Ponty's account of flesh can be taken as providing the 'intertwining' with alterity that Irigaray's position seeks to uphold. Vicki Kirby offers an even stronger defence of Merleau-Ponty against Irigaray, emphasizing the ethical 'reversibility' of the flesh in terms of its instability and indeterminacy. Ann Murphy's paper takes up the main issues in the debate between Irigaray and Merleau-Ponty, but also brings Levinas into the fray, a move that lends support to a qualified defence of Merleau-Ponty's work in ways that also lessen the force of the Irigarayan critique.

The remaining contributions aim to extend aspects of Merleau-Ponty's thought into new areas. David Brubaker offers a defence of Carol Gilligan's 'ethics of care' on the basis of a Merleau-Pontian notion of 'care for the flesh'. In her contribution on 'urban flesh', Weiss brings Merleau-Ponty's ideas to bear upon the multifaceted political issues, including violence, that arise in the context of contemporary urban dwelling. Helen Fielding pushes Merleau-Ponty's account of perception to a higher critical level by addressing the question of the sedimented structures underlying racist and sexist phenomenality, and linking their transformation to 'lived corporeal creativity'.

General approaches aside, there are many significant thematic overlaps across these essays, e.g., 'ambiguity', theoretical indeterminacy, as well as important points of debate, especially concerning subjectivity and ethics rethought in the light of sexual difference. Exhibiting well the scope and diversity of feminist readings of Merleau-Ponty, the volume is an important contribution that will be of interest to theorists in many fields, while at the same time encouraging further specialized work in the area — something that may well benefit feminist philosophy, but will certainly enrich Merleau-Ponty studies.

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Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid and **G. Lynn Stephens, eds.**
Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007.
Pp. 369.
US$70.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-262-18261-4);
US$34.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-262-68169-2).

Some words of warning: the title is multiply misleading. If, like me, you take 'distributed cognition' to refer to the multiple ways in which information is represented and manipulated using resources external to individual agents (from artifacts to social structures), then you may be disappointed by this book. In that sense of the term, distributed cognition is largely absent from it. Instead, as used here, the 'distributed' of distributed cognition refers to intra-agential, not extra-agential distribution. Most of the authors represented here share the view that agents lack a single central control system; that instead cognition is distributed across different, mostly subpersonal, mechanisms within the brain (and perhaps beyond) of people. The challenge these papers seek to address is this: given that cognition is distributed, can we preserve the idea of biological individuals as selves, exerting their will through exercises of agency? However, given that that is the question, and that distributed cognition is clearly no threat to agency, it is not even *cognition* that is really in question in this book. In fact, the challenge the authors *actually* address concerns the bearing of distributed *agency* on the will, where the 'will' is understood as reflecting the choices and values of apparently unified persons.

These quibbles aside, this is a strong collection of papers. It gathers together work by most of the major figures working on distributed agency, including such well-known thinkers as Daniel Dennett, Andy Clark, George Ainslie and Daniel Wegner. Most of the contributors promote the view that distributed agency is genuine agency; it represents no particular obstacle to naturalizing the will. There are, however, exceptions. Prominent among them is Daniel Wegner, well-known to philosophers of agency for his 2002 book *The Illusion of Conscious Will*. Here, together with Betsy Sparrow, he builds on his previous claims that the experience of acting is illusory; that what he calls the phenomenal will is dissociated from action causation. Unfortunately (and oddly), his claims go uncontested here. It has been shown repeatedly that though Wegner's experimental results are valuable, his interpretation of them is off-base. At best, he has shown only that the sense of conscious will is far from an infallible guide to mental causation, and that claim is no threat to the naturalization of the will.

The next chapter, by Paul Sheldon Davies, criticizes Wegner's claims in his 2002 book. Essentially, Davies criticizes Wegner on internal inconsistency grounds: given that he has shown that conscious will is an illusion, Davies claims, Wegner is not entitled to claim that the experience of will is a good

guide to our responsibility. This may be true, as far as it goes, but Davies takes himself to doing more than simply pointing out an internal inconsistency; he also takes himself to be establishing truth claims, specifically the claim that we ought to give up the notion of responsibility. Given, however, that his case rests on the belief that Wegner has established that conscious will is an illusion, Davies has done no such thing. His criticisms of Wegner all depend upon the claim that we are only entitled to take the feeling of conscious will as a guide to our role in action if that feeling is infallible; clearly, however, no such hyperbolic standard is required.

Most of the remaining chapters are devoted either to working out the details of how distributed agency might be implemented, or to considering its suitability for a naturalistic successor to the notion of volition. Many of the authors aim to explain how distributed mechanisms might bring about actual unity of agency, at least temporarily and in some contexts. George Ainslie explains the unification of the self as a result of intrapersonal bargaining between sub-agential components. So far as I can tell, however, his solution can only be a partial one: it requires the existence of the agent whose emergence it is trying to explain. It is integral to his theory that the sub-agents are temporary: they go out of existence. Hence they cannot be rewarded for cooperation or punished for defection. Such rewards and punishments require the existing of persisting sub-agents, with persisting interests. That said, Ainslie's suggestion might be a powerful, if partial, explanation of why discount curves tend to flatten.

Lengbeyer presents an account of how human beings deploy cognitive resources somewhat similar to, but even more radical than, Ainslie's. Rather than seeing human beings as composed of sometimes competing sub-agents, he sees changes in situations as triggering different sets of representations. As he shows, this view neatly explains the ways in which we all too commonly depart from ideal standards of rationality. However it may be that his view fractures agency too much, leaving it unable to account for the ways in which we do, after all, approximate to rational agents in most circumstances. Consider Lengbeyer's claim that his theory accounts for why agents are susceptible to framing effects: presenting options in terms of losses triggers a different set of resources from those triggered by presenting them in terms of forgone gains. But as Lengbeyer recognizes, these ways of seeing the options remain compelling even when they are presented simultaneously and the fact that the options are equivalent is pointed out. Surely we cannot switch between sub-agents so swiftly. Langbeyer also leaves creative thinking, in which agents deploy cognitive resources from many perspectives simultaneously, somewhat mysterious.

Tamler Sommers argues that the belief that we have free will is based upon the phenomenology of agency, and that we have this phenomenology because it is adaptive. Sommers follows Robert Frank in arguing that we are susceptible to certain emotions because experiencing them disposes us to perform actions, the *actual* performance of which is often not in our interests. Since having the relevant dispositions — for instance to rage — is our best guaran-

tee of cooperation, we are better off with them, even though actually acting on them is risky. But whereas simpler creatures can be motivated to act on these dispositions simply by their emotions, reflective animals like humans need an additional push to overcome a reluctance arising from their ability to calculate their interests. A belief in desert provides that extra push.

Dennett, too, tells an evolutionary story, according to which a unified self evolved to allow for effective communication: we need a central representation of our goals if we are to be able to communicate them to others, and especially if we are to mislead and thereby manipulate others. This unified self need not correspond to anything biologically real; indeed, it is an implication of Dennett's account that the attitudes we attribute to ourselves will be only partially accurate. A more positive construal of the narrative self is suggested by Clark's chapter. He points out that attributing a self to ourselves is likely to be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy: once we are in the business, especially, of self-prediction, we shall impose a unity of action upon ourselves.

There are two dissenting voices in this collection: Mariam Thalos and Wayne Christensen. Thalos argues that something more robust than temporary coalitions of sub-agential components is needed to explain control. Her claim seems to rest on the thought that an executive is needed to prevent conflict between components; if actions are simply the product of the forces acting on the body, and these forces are conflicting, we won't see successful goal-directed behavior. The point that action had better (often) be all-or-nothing is well-taken, but there is no need to postulate an executive to undertake this function: a simple 'or' gate seems sufficient. Even if an executive is needed, we can follow Ainslie and Clark in seeing the emergence of this control centre as a precarious developmental achievement; the result of melding together coalitions of sub-agential mechanisms.

Christensen joins Thalos in arguing that distributed models underestimate the role played by central control systems. His argument is evolutionary: distributed systems, he suggest, are too slow and too imprecise to be able to compete with centralized systems. He also adduces neurobiological evidence that the brain contains hierarchically organized control systems. But Christensen's evidence is not incompatible with any claim made by advocates of distributed agency. Christensen says that such advocates are committed to thinking that there is no significant hierarchical organization in the brain. But as Dennett says in the quote that Christensen himself supplies, the claim is only that there is no single summit to any hierarchies.

What emerges from this collection is the sense that the distributed agency view is a powerful one, which promises to provide the naturalistic underpinnings to vindicate something like the folk psychological view of volition. It is also clear that great opportunities for cross-disciplinary discussion and collaboration exist: researchers from psychology, economics, philosophy and elsewhere in the cognitive sciences are converging on a common view. This view remains somewhat schematic, and it is far from clear that the different accounts of distributed agency are compatible. Nevertheless, this book is a

valuable look at one of the most exciting and potentially fruitful research programs currently underway.

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Richard Rorty
Philosophy as Cultural Politics: Philosophical Papers (Vol. 4).
New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.
Pp. 206.
US$80.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-87544-8);
US$22.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-69835-1).

It is difficult, no doubt, to review a book whose author died only some months ago. Above all, the risk is that one will lapse into rhetorical gesture, i.e., simple praise and celebration of the author's output. To avoid this temptation I shall straightaway address the contents of this book, the fourth volume of Rorty's *Philosophical Papers*. Composed of thirteen papers, it is divided into three parts: 'Religion and Morality from a Pragmatist Point of View', 'Philosophy's Place in Culture', and 'Current Issues within Analytic Philosophy'.

In the opening paper, 'Cultural Politics and the Question of the Existence of God', Rorty writes that the doctrine of the ontological priority of the social that 'quasi-fundamentally' concerns him is also attributable to the 'quasi-pragmatist' philosophical efforts of Heidegger: 'The priority in question consists in the fact that "all matters of social authority or privilege, in particular *epistemic* authority, are matters of social practice, and not objective matters of fact" ' (7). From an epistemological and social perspective this claim can be an invitation to adopt a sound pragmatism in order to negotiate the two controversial domains of language and mind. Related to the polarities of language/reality and subject/object is the issue of God's existence, on which Rorty notes: 'In recent centuries, instead of asking whether God exists, people have started asking whether it is a good idea for us to continue talking about Him, and which human purposes might be served by doing so — asking, in short, what use the concept of God might be to human beings' (16). Nevertheless this is not to deny the concept of God; rather, it is to put it within the purview of cultural politics. Following J. S. Mill, Rorty concludes that religion is our own business, and 'society tries to leave as much free space as possible for individuals to develop their own sense of who they are and what their lives are for, asking only that they obey Mill's precept and extend to others the tolerance they themselves enjoy' (25). In the subsequent

paper, 'Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism', in defence of Dewey's tolerance for religious beliefs he maintains his position against those who think that pragmatism and religion do not mix.

In 'Justice as a Larger Loyalty' Rorty discusses justice from a cosmopolitan point of view and, always attentive to the more intractable issues of social justice, he puts the taxing question: Is justice to keep free societies going for a third of mankind, at the expense of the remaining two-thirds? At this point we are brought to consider Kantian ethics. We see that the extreme positions on universal principles are, on the one hand, the innatist line of Kant, Habermas and Chomsky, and on the other hand the Wittgenstein-Davidsonian empiristic line. In the middle is Rawls' position, who accomplishes a sort of 'mediation', re-affirming the universality of human rights: the right to life, to liberty, and personal property, supported by the notion of rational. But, one way or another, according to Rorty, 'Moral dilemmas are not . . . the result of a conflict between reason and sentiment but between alternative selves, alternative-self-descriptions, alternative ways of giving a meaning to one's life' (45). Rorty is not a transcendental or quasi-transcendental philosopher.

Part 2, 'Philosophy's Place in Culture', contains 'Grandeur, Profundity, and Finitude', in which Rorty criticizes 'the universalistic grandeur' of scientists and some philosophers. He appeals to Habermasian 'communicative reason', grounded on a set of social practices 'found, in some measure, wherever people are willing to hear the other side, to talk things over, to argue until areas of agreement are found, and to abide by the resulting agreement. To think of reason as subject-centred is to believe that human beings possess a faculty that enables them to circumvent conversation, to side-step opinion, and head straight for knowledge. To replace subject-centred reason with communicative rationality is to see truth as what is likely to emerge from free and imaginative conversation' (77). This criticism is clearly directed against Descartes and the so-called 'Cartesian anxiety', the view that without a grounding outside of any particular human perspective we are left adrift in a morass of relativism and nihilism. Rorty, who often worked as an historian, adds that Hegel almost succeeded in correcting the Cartesian line, but failed to take the last crucial step. 'John Dewey, the greatest of the Left Hegelians, heeded this warning. Dewey had no use either for theodicy or for the absolute knowledge. He was interested only in helping people solve problems, and had no wish for either grandeur or profundity . . . . One reason that Dewey is my philosophical hero is that I think it would be a good idea for philosophers to bourgeoisify themselves, to stop trying to rise to the spiritual level at which Plato and Nietzsche confront each other' (79).

In 'Philosophy as a Transitional Genre' Rorty maintains that intellectuals of the West have progressed through three stages since the Renaissance: 'they have hoped for redemption first from God, then from philosophy, and now from literature' (91). The transition from a philosophical to a literary culture began shortly after Kant. During romanticism (according to 'Pragmatism and Romanticism') intellectuals gave priority to the imagination over reason and consequently to literature. In his *Defence of Poetry* P. B. Shelley wrote,

'poetry is at once the centre and the circumference of knowledge', and after him Nietzsche, who saw Parmenides and Plato as all-too-strong poets, asked us to treat 'the true world' as a fable, a myth concocted by Parmenides and Plato. Today it is necessary to enlarge the sphere of literature and poetry, to recover the value of literature by underlining that imagination is the source of freedom, the source of language.

In reference to the familiar quarrel between analytic and continental philosophy, Rorty states his view: 'I prefer conversational to analytic philosophy, so defined, because I prefer philosophers who are sufficiently historicist as to think themselves as taking part in a conversation rather than as practicing a quasi-scientific discipline' (126).

Finally, in Part 3, Rorty presents his pragmatist view: 'We shall be freed both from the subject-object problematic that has dominated philosophy since Descartes and from the appearance-reality problematic that has been with us since the Greeks. We shall no longer be tempted to practice either epistemology or ontology' (133). Referring to A. Fine, T. Nagel, J. Searle, M. Dummett, D. Davidson and R. Brandom, he rejects the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) as such, as he opposes the division of culture into hard and soft areas.

Toward the end of the paper titled 'Wittgenstein and the Linguistic Turn', Rorty comments positively on the *Philosophical Investigations*. He disagrees with the Wittgensteinian quietists or therapists or metaphysicians, claiming that in Wittgenstein's later work no attempt is made to address what Popper called 'the demarcation problem — tracing the border between good science and bad metaphysics.' He explains: 'Admirers of Dewey like myself think that the point of reading philosophy books is not self-transforming but rather cultural change. It is not to find a way of altering one's inner state, but rather to find better ways of helping us overcome the past in order to create a better human future' (169). The last paper of this volume, 'Kant vs. Dewey: The Current Situation of Moral Philosophy', partly revisits the moral problematic. Kant taught us the autonomy of the moral, but 'Dewey thought that it was a very bad idea to think that moral imperatives have a different source than prudential advice. He viewed Kant as a figure whose view of human beings could never be reconciled with Darwin's naturalistic account of our origin . . . . All inquiry — in ethics as well as physics, in politics as well as logic — is a matter of reweaving our webs of beliefs and desires in such a way to give ourselves more happiness and richer and freer lives. All our judgements are experimental and fallible. Unconditionality and absolutes are not things we should strive for' (188).

Like his hero, John Dewey, Rorty sought to displace philosophy from the heavens and bring it down to earth, to make philosophy more germane to the problems of the world. Rather than ask how our political institutions, scientific methods and ethical notions might be philosophically justified, he asked what philosophy might do for politics, science and ethics. As John Caputo put it in his eulogy, he was an American genius: 'He belonged to a tradition of philosophers who made a living out of criticizing philosophy — he once said

philosophy is a discipline in search of a subject matter — which always means philosophy as it had been practiced up to now. The result was to forge a new philosophical view that emerged from a kind of philosophy-against-philosophy, an anti-philosophical philosophy.' It was also, I would add, a new philosophy that accepts the priority of democracy (cf. *Philosophical Papers* [Vol. 1]). The debate on the Rortian corpus is still open, unsettled and controversial, and this important volume of his *Philosophical Papers* is to be recommended as a resource on familiar and unfamilar topics in the Rortian philosophy.

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Jonathan Sutton
Without Justification.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2007.
Pp. 208.
US$60.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-262-19555-3);
US$26.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-262-69347-9).

Many epistemologists and philosophers of science these days think that epistemic justification has the following hierarchical structure. First, we take as the starting point of our investigation some set of empirical observations comprising evidence. Second, by means of inferences we form reliable beliefs based on this set. Third, we apply various empirical and logical methods to justify our most reliable beliefs. Fourth, if a reliable belief passes the test of justification, we accept it as knowledge. One crucial assumption of this hierarchical structure is that justification, whatever it is, should be sharply distinguished from knowledge. The distinction is significant, since there are many justified beliefs that do not constitute knowledge. In Gettier cases, for example, our beliefs are justified only because some kind of luck is involved in the process of justification. The presence of epistemic luck, however, seems to be incompatible with knowledge. This makes clear that there is a difference between the instances of justified belief and the instances of knowledge.

In this book Sutton attempts to show that the ground of this traditional distinction is highly questionable. The root of the problem lies in the fact (according to Sutton) that we cannot believe justifiedly that something is the case without knowing at the same time that it is the case. In every situation justification constitutes knowledge. On Sutton's view, the alleged counterexamples to this epistemic principle are merely apparent. The reason for this is that in considering the consequences of Gettier cases epistemologists and philosophers of science tend to use the notion of 'justified belief' very loosely. 'Justified belief that p' is commonly used in the sense of 'justified belief that

probably p'. Clearly, from the latter notion it doesn't follow necessarily that the believer knows that p. Perhaps she knows that probably p. But probabilistic knowledge incorporates subjective components. One believer may know justifiedly that probably p, another may know that probably not-p. This case is impossible for categorial belief. If one knows justifiedly on the basis of her categorial belief that p, no one can know the opposite. So the moral is that epistemologists and philosophers of science 'should take care to speak strictly about belief' (65).

Even more care is needed in defining the concept of justification. According to Sutton's diagnosis there are at least five different concepts of justification in the contemporary literature. It can be proved that four of these five concepts of justification — evaluative and deontological justification, blameless belief, and warrant — are coextensive with the concept of knowledge. The fifth concept of justification, which is called 'reasonableness', has a somewhat different extension, but it can be defined ultimately as a property of justified belief, that is, as knowledge.

With this conceptual background in place, Sutton starts to develop a rather unorthodox view which he calls 'knowledge-centered epistemology'. Contrary to mainstream epistemology, this view doesn't try to explain the concept of knowledge in more fundamental epistemic terms. Actually, there is a strong tendency among epistemologists to define knowledge as a mental state or a type of cognitive information. For Sutton, the inadequacy of reductive explanations is reflected by the fact that all such attempts rely implicitly on the explanatory power of the concept of knowledge. Thus, instead of following the reductionist trend, knowledge-centered epistemology conceives the concept of knowledge as the most fundamental epistemic concept. It doesn't follow from this anti-reductionist approach, however, that one cannot make intelligible statements about issues within knowledge, but only that what can be said 'will itself ineliminably *employ* the concept of knowledge, and not in a merely preparatory fashion prior to a definition or elimination of knowledge' (73).

In elaborating the details of his view, Sutton concentrates on three important epistemological topics. First is the reliability of testimony. Sutton argues here, with considerable force, that 'a belief derived from testimony is justified if and only if it constitutes knowledge' (85). He claims, in particular, that we are justified in acquiring a belief that p on the basis of what a speaker says, if two conditions are fulfilled: we know that the testifier is a reliable source, and we know that the testifier knows that p.

The second topic is the definition of 'good' inference. For Sutton, inferences are real psychological phenomena rather than abstract logical structures. From a psychological point of view, then, Sutton defines a good inference as a constructive process in which the inferrer proceeds from a set of justified beliefs and comes to a new justified belief. This is a deliberately simple definition of good inference, but it is in accordance with the fundamental tenet of knowledge-centered epistemology, since, in this sense, good inferences yield knowledge when applied to premises which are known.

The third and final main topic concerns the problem of evidence. Sutton draws attention to the fact that 'both epistemologists and epistemologically oriented philosophers of science use the term "evidence" extensively, although their usage is perplexingly dissonant' (128). In spite of this dissonance, both parties agree that justification and knowledge should be explicated in terms of evidence. Sutton reverses the order of explanation and takes the priority of justification and knowledge as its starting point. On his knowledge-based account, something counts as evidence for a given hypothesis if and only if it justifies belief in that hypothesis. This is so, argues Sutton, because the relation between evidence and hypothesis is best conceived as an inferential relation. Good inferences transmit knowledge from their premises to their conclusions. If an inferrer comes to know an hypothesis h by inference from evidence e, then e must play the role of the known premise in that inference. This seems to be a good reason to identify evidence with knowledge.

Sutton argues throughout this book for the need of a new departure in the contemporary theory of knowledge. Should his arguments prove sound, we will be forced to accept that we 'cannot have a serviceable notion of justification that is distinct from knowledge', and that we 'do not need one — we can get by better in epistemology without one' (3).

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Julian Young
Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 242.
US$80.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-85422-1);
US$31.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-68104-9).

Friedrich Nietzsche
Thus Spoke Zarathustra:
A Book for All and None.
Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. Pippin, eds.,
Adrian Del Caro, trans.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 316.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-84171-9);
US$17.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-60261-7).

Young's book is a highly persuasive presentation of Nietzsche as a religious communitarian. As such it takes issue with the common portrayal of Nietzsche as an irreligious, indeed atheistic, individualist. The book is therefore somewhat misleadingly titled, and in two respects. First of all, the focus is entirely on Nietzsche's *constructive* philosophy of religion, and not the more familiar negative aspects, in particular the critique of Christianity. Second, Young engages as much with Nietzsche's social and political thinking as with his philosophy of religion. Indeed, we often get much more of the former than the latter. This may in part be because the claim that Nietzsche is not the anti-social individualist of legend is more likely to provoke skepticism than the claim that he advocated a non-Christian religiosity. But questions remain about quite how the communitarianism and the religiosity are supposed to combine. Another topic which gets treated, if more tangentially, is art, the subject of Young's *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (1992). Readers of that book will want to consider Young's latest thoughts on the matter. (The new book has a very good index.)

As in his 1992 book, Young starts by giving us a brief account of Schopenhauer's thinking on the topic, then goes through Nietzsche's texts in chronological order, extracting and discussing relevant passages. The result is a book which is strong on the continuity of Nietzsche's thinking, but does not ignore the shifts and changes, in particular in relation to the mid-period 'positivist' works. It also seeks to locate Nietzsche within a wider tradition of German communitarian anti-modernism, one with roots in Herder and the romantics and represented in his own time by Richard Wagner. The book closes with a judicious consideration of the relation of Nietzsche's thought to Nazism.

According to Young, Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer in seeing religion as having two main functions. First, religion provides ways of dealing with the realities of suffering and mortality. Second, religion is required in order to bind a community together. This understanding of religion provides the basis

for Nietzsche's account of ancient Greek art in *The Birth of Tragedy* and his hopes for Wagner's Bayreuth project. The idea that 'that religion is essential to life' (34) is maintained in the *Untimely Meditations*, this time with greater emphasis placed on the absence of meaning and community in contemporary societies. Young finds these themes reworked in the mid-period works, from *Human, All-too-Human* to *The Gay Science* (first four books only), though obscured to a degree by the critique of Christianity inaugurated in them. In these works, Nietzsche backtracks from the Dionysianism he espoused earlier; for Young, this goes hand-in-hand with a 'shallow and inadequate' treatment of the problem of death (84, 102). With *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the Dionysian pantheism returns, and returns for good, though this time without the metaphysical Schopenhauerian carapace of the *Birth* and initially without mention of the god himself. Dionysus is explicitly invoked in important sections of *Beyond Good and Evil*, Book 5 of *The Gay Science*, *The Genealogy of Morality*, *Ecce Homo* and *Twilight of the Idols*. What Young refers to as Nietzsche's 'compassionate conservatism' (163, 205) is further developed in these works. Young's commentary remains brisk, deft and entertaining throughout, and does not fail to deal with passages which might be thought to pose difficulties for his interpretation.

Young's case is on the whole very convincing, but a slight reservation remains. Given the recalcitrance of the modern world to his communitarian hopes, might not Nietzsche have been inclined to slip into *faute de mieux* individualism? (Young seems to hint at this at times, e.g. 79, 143.) If this were so, there might be some truth in the standard view of Nietzsche as an anti-social elitist, a truth, moreover, which would be compatible with the account Young provides. This would then enable us to make better sense of Nietzsche's regular disdain for the 'herd' than Young manages (95, 127).

More generally, what are we to make of Nietzsche's religious communitarianism? There are two problems with it. First, it makes Nietzsche just less interesting — we come to see him as just another German anti-modernist. No doubt there is this in him, but his philosophical interest surely rests on other aspects of his thought, in particular his critique of morality. Secondly, his religious communitarianism seems highly questionable. Young tells us that what Nietzsche wants is the rebirth of the medieval Christian church but with 'Greek' gods replacing the trinity and the saints (214), but completely fails to comment on how radically implausible this is — in so many ways! — as a recommendation for a solution to the ills of modernity. A relevant contrast here is with Heidegger, the subject of three previous books by Young (and a recurrent presence in this one). Both Nietzsche and Heidegger were attracted to grandiose plans for political-cultural-mythological revival, as both elicited by and projected onto the projects of Wagner and Hitler respectively. Both philosophers quickly became disillusioned, but in Nietzsche's case only with the representative of the ideal, not the ideal itself. Heidegger, on the other hand, changed tack more radically. Wherever else this took him, it could be argued that it enabled a more nuanced and plausible response to the perceived malaise of modernity.

And so from Nietzsche's 'philosophy of religion' to a new translation of the work he referred to (admittedly to his publisher) as 'a fifth gospel'. Notwithstanding its author's great claims for it, *Zarathustra* has always been his least popular work with philosophers. It now appears again in English as the tenth in Cambridge's set of Nietzsche translations, bringing, one imagines, this series to a close. This translation by Adrian Del Caro is crisp and clear; it respects Nietzsche's very short paragraphs (as for example Kaufmann did not) and the result is both more authentic and more readable. It is an attractive volume and one many will want to have on their shelves alongside the other Cambridge Nietzsche translations.

The editors have provided a scanty twenty-seven footnotes to Nietzsche's text, mainly dealing with issues of translation (sometimes merely pointing out mistakes in Kaufmann's 1953 version). Their practice is in striking contrast with that of *Zarathustra*'s other recent translator, Graham Parkes, who in his 2005 Oxford edition provides thirty-four *pages* of explanatory endnotes. The Cambridge approach is conveyed in the note advising the reader who wants the references to Nietzsche's many allusions to the Bible to consult volume fourteen of the German *Kritische Studienausgabe*, a suggestion which doesn't seem particularly helpful for a reader of an English translation, even one with access to a good library. (Parkes gives references for these allusions, and also the many allusions to Emerson, Hölderlin, and others.)

The respective utility of these translations can also be assessed in relation to a criticism Young makes of the older translations. The penultimate chapter of *Zarathustra* is, he says, called 'The Somnambulist [*Nachtwandler*] Song', but Kaufmann and Hollingdale render *Nachtwandler* (literally: nightwanderer) as 'drunken' and 'intoxicated' respectively. These are, Young says, 'radical departures' from the original (116). So what do the new translations do? Del Caro for Cambridge gives us 'The Sleepwalker Song', and Parkes for Oxford, 'The Drunken Song'. But only Parkes clarifies the issue, telling us in an endnote that the *Kritische Studienausgabe* text (used by Del Caro) relies on a later version of the manuscript, whereas the earlier version of the manuscript (used as the basis for the first printed editions, including the 1894 one Parkes uses) has '*Das trunkene* [drunken] *Lied*. (See *Kritische Studienausgabe*, vol. 14, 343.) Young is therefore wrong in supposing Kaufmann and Hollingdale to be simply inaccurate. On this and similar issues the Oxford edition is demonstrably superior to the Cambridge one.

Further differences can be seen in relation to the issue of religion. Pippin, in his introduction to the Cambridge edition, says that *Zarathustra* 'has nothing to do with a "replacement" religion' (ix), whereas Parkes by contrast sees it as advocating 'a new kind of religion'. Readers of Young will be inclined to side here with Parkes. The Cambridge *Zarathustra* is in its own way very fine, but I imagine that the Oxford version will be more useful to many English readers. Ideally, of course, one will have both!

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