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Seyla Benhabib
Another Cosmopolitanism.
Ed. Robert Post. Toronto and New York:
Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 220.
Cdn$28.50/US$19.95
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-518322-1).

In this book Benhabib presents a revised version of the Tanner Lectures, which were delivered at the University of California in Berkeley, March 2004. This volume also includes the comments of three critics, namely Jeremy Waldron, Bonnie Honig, and Will Kymlicka, as well as Benhabib's responses to these.

In these Tanner lectures, Benhabib's primary concern is with how we can govern ourselves, collectively, through our political and legal institutions, especially in ways that are democratic, that respect both cosmopolitan ideals and, simultaneously, the values of particular, situated, bounded communities. She believes that since the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have moved from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice, that is, from norms of justice that arise through agreements among states that regulate relations between states, to ones which give individuals certain rights and arise through 'treaty-like obligations, such as the UN Charter' (16).

While the evolution of cosmopolitan norms of justice is to be welcomed, it gives rise to a number of difficulties, which she explores in these essays. Two questions deserve special attention here. The first involves the tension between cosmopolitan norms and republican self-governance: How can we reconcile the will of democratic majorities with norms of cosmopolitan justice? The second involves the issue of the authority of cosmopolitan norms: 'How can legal norms and standards, which originate outside the will of democratic legislatures, become binding on them?' (17). In answering these questions Benhabib claims to uncover a paradox of democratic legitimacy which involves an inescapable limitation in democratic forms of representation and accountability, namely, a formal and unavoidable distinction between members and nonmembers. She identifies this as 'the core tension, even if not contradiction, between democratic self-determination and the norms of cosmopolitan justice' (17). Her way of grappling with these difficulties is through a series of mediations. We need to mediate moral universalism with ethical particularism, legal and political norms with moral ones. So, for Benhabib, cosmopolitanism is a 'philosophical project of mediations, not of reductions or of totalizations' (20).

Her analysis draws on Kant's doctrine of cosmopolitan right, especially the duty of hospitality. Kant's duty of hospitality involves a duty to provide temporary residency to strangers who come to our land when failure to do so would involve the demise of the stranger. The right to universal hospitality should prohibit states from denying refuge to those who have non-aggressive intentions and if failure to admit them would involve their demise.

According to Benhabib, '[d]emocratic iterations are complex ways of mediating the will- and opinion-formation of democratic majorities and cosmopolitan norms' (45). Here Benhabib makes use of Jacques Derrida's concept of iteration in which every use of a concept does not simply replicate the concept but rather varies and enriches it. Democratic iterations are dialogues in which cosmopolitan principles and norms are re-appropriated, reiterated, reinterpreted, and contextualized by participants in a series of interlocking conversations and interactions. She illustrates how democratic iteration works in practice by considering, as one example, the contentious issues of Muslim women wanting to wear head coverings in schools in France (which has a strong tradition of commitment to secularism and did not favor the wearing of religious symbols in schools). Democratic iteration provides the key concept in how to reconcile cosmopolitanism with particular legal, historical and cultural traditions. Basically we are to 'respect, encourage, and initiate multiple processes of democratic iteration' (70). Such processes may not yield outcomes we favor, as happened with what she calls 'The French Scarf Affair', in which the result was the passing of legislation that banned the wearing of all religious symbols in schools.

As she also notes, the dismantling of sovereignty, the fraying of the social contract, and the disintegration of the nation-state do not mean that changes are going in a cosmopolitan direction; instead, they are going more in the direction of the privatization and corporatization of sovereignty, which endanger democracy by, as she puts it, 'converting public power into private commercial or administrative competence' (179). She hopes her concept of democratic iterations can signal ways in which people can reclaim empowerment and thereby better appropriate 'the universalist promise of cosmopolitan norms in order to bind forms of political and economic power that seek to escape democratic control, accountability and transparency. The interlocking of democratic iteration struggles within a global civil society and the creation of solidarities beyond borders, including a universal right of hospitality that recognizes the other as a potential co-citizen, anticipate another cosmopolitanism — a cosmopolitanism to come' (177).

Jeremy Waldron and Bonnie Honig both question Benhabib's special commitment to positive law, while Will Kymlicka questions her attachment to the nation-state. Here I will have space to discuss only one critic and I chose Waldron for this purpose, because of his intriguing alternative analysis.

Waldron argues that when we reflect on the emergence and status of cosmopolitan norms we should pay at least as much attention to quotidian norms — such as postal and telephone conventions, airline safety and navigation standards, and transnational banking arrangements — as the more high profile cases typically discussed by political theorists themselves. While Waldron thinks Benhabib's notion of democratic iteration is useful, he pursues different answers to the questions that concern Benhabib. Paying attention to the more mundane examples of ways in which people come into contact with others leads us to demystify several of the difficulties. The example of repeated patterns of commercial interaction serves as a useful prototype in

which we see how the growth of repeated contact between different people 'can lay the foundation for the emergence of cosmopolitan norms, in a way that does not necessarily presuppose a formal juridical apparatus' (94). This analysis also helps to make sense of the authority of the emerging norms.

It seems that there is a good deal of misunderstanding between Benhabib and her critics. This is especially evident in the exchange between Benhabib and Waldron. Benhabib's responses to Waldron seemed uncharitable and to miss the point of his useful alternative analysis (which struck me as just as plausible as her own account).

Benhabib's major contribution here is undoubtedly her account of democratic iteration which provides some useful insights into how to resolve the tensions which arise in harmonizing cosmopolitan norms with those that arise in particular, situated communities. The analysis of examples used to illustrate the concept provide further helpful insights into this important topic.

However, a major presupposition of Benhabib's analysis is that cosmopolitanism inevitably collides with the boundaries essential to democratic authority, and this assumption is one which can and has been challenged by, for instance, David Held (*Democracy and the Global Order*, Stanford University Press 1995). There is exciting work to be done on this issue, and a number of options for reconciling these are worth pursuing. In addition, as Weinstock ('The Real World of [Global] Democracy', *Journal of Social Philosophy* 37/1) and Kuper (*Democracy Beyond Borders*, Cambridge University Press 2004)) have shown, re-examining the central tenets essential to democratic forms of government is also yielding interesting new forms of democracy that reduce and even eliminate the core tension identified in alternative ways.

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Ernst Bloch
Traces.
Trans. Anthony A. Nassar. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press 2006.
Pp 192. US$50.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-4118-7);
US$19.95
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-4119-4).

This is a collection of observations, One Thousand and One Nights tales and stories from Chassidic, German, Russian, and Chinese sources, punctuated from time to time with terse reflections and generalizations. Originally published in 1930, it was written between 1910 and 1929, partially coinciding with the writing of *The Spirit of Utopia*.

In the section entitled 'The "Mark!" ' Bloch elaborates on the rationale underlying the book: 'What is slight and odd often leads the furthest' (5). 'Out of incidents comes a "Mark!" ... that takes little incidents as traces and examples ... [T]hey point out a "less" or "more" that will have to be thought. ... [S]ome things can be grasped only in such stories' (6). The stories are invitations to a personal experience which in turn becomes raw material for a philosophical elaboration. Their smallness and apparent triviality set them apart. They have 'some of the smallness of the true end that is dispersed into every true beginning' (42). While Bloch is most likely echoing here kabalistic language, his intentions are thoroughly secular: '[they] give the sign for the exit from the series ... for the entry into a potential fatelessness, at least a workable fate' (42).

The book is organized into an introduction and four chapters. These are not to be taken as a progression or order: 'sections ... only divide up the frame. In the end, everything one means and notices is the same' (6). The first chapter contains more historical and political references. One of the sections refers to a minor incident. On Bastille Day a car driven by a man with a straw hat tries to cross a street where people are dancing. A confrontation ensues; the dancers grab the car and pull it back, a girl curses mockingly at the driver, the straw hat falls into the hands of the crowd. Finally the driver decides to flee the scene and the dancers go back to celebrate their symbolic victory against a 'very slight, very allegorically trampled representative of the Bastille' (12). So nothing really happened, and even the 'rebel street' forgot that they re-enacted in their own way the history that the whole city was celebrating that day. Only this 'little, expectant story' preserves the event for us to ponder. Of even more marked political content is the section 'Disturbing Whim', in which Bloch stages a dialogue between a communist and a sympathetic but 'mournful' and 'irascible' intellectual. Bloch seems to side with the Communist against the well-meaning critic: 'if something worse happens [i.e., Stalinism] the table will at least be cleared, and we will have at face value what free men and women are about, or not yet' (18).

In 'Triumphs de Misrecognition' Bloch braids together a chain of short tales dealing with expectation and deception. This is a technique that Bloch uses in some of the longer sections, putting together stories from different origins, one illuminating the other. In the first story a man comes back to town after a long absence. He is told that his old girlfriend is at the hospital. When he goes to look for her, he discovers that she is a doctor at the hospital. In another story, a father looks for his eloped daughter. After a long time he discovers that she is in another town, but when he finally gets there is told that she has just passed away. Looking for her former address, the father learns that she is alive. He goes to her apartment, sees his daughter and asks her: why aren't you taller? Then finally, a Chassidic tale about an old man living miserably in a garret, who learns that there is a war and that the townspeople are about to surrender. He follows some of his fellows out of town but the whole group is taken prisoner. They are taken in front of the Emperor who, when he sees the old man throws himself to the ground and kisses his hands. The old man was the Master of Prayer.

According to Bloch, the pleasure we derive from these stories is based on the impulse, first repressed, and then gratified, to be somebody. 'Literary and legendary fate slightly corrects ... the reality where people live and that is not really theirs' (35) while 'a future society will have no such sorrows and triumphs of personal misrecognition' (36).

On a different register, Bloch inquires into the meaning of our daily expressions: 'How goes it ... all right?' Why are we asking and answering at the same time? Is it not because usually it is not going so well? We may explain this usage as a way not to take a real interest in our fellows, but Bloch proposes a different, more optimistic, almost mystical one. Such greetings are anticipations, as if something is greeting us from a better world (137).

Another example of his peculiar combination of mysticism and realism are Bloch's comments on an otherwise minor Chassidic tale in which a small piece of candle offered by a rabbi to a traveler as an amulet would have a role in saving the traveler's life: 'Here is no technology in some quantifiable sense, but also no old magic ... when the rabbi ... reaches into the things of this world in order to break of a talisman (the piece of candle), he is hardly trusting in cosmic powers and laws ... Instead he is testing a strange, almost messianically selective hand so as to bring things out of their dispersion' (158).

Anthony A. Nassar, who also translated *The Spirit of Utopia,* added to this volume notes identifying some of Bloch's sources. Though useful, they may not be enough for the casual reader. An introduction and some bibliography would have been useful. In all, this is an important addition to the corpus of Bloch's writings in English.

Michael Maidan

Geoff Boucher, Jason Glynos and **Matthew Sharpe, eds.**
Traversing the Fantasy: Critical Responses to Slavoj Žižek.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2005.
Pp. 268.
US$99.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7546-5192-5).

There is a wonderful irony that occurs towards the end this collection, which features a series of often very critical readings of the Slovenian philosopher and social theorist Slavoj Žižek (the 'fantasy' to be 'traversed' here refers as much as anything to Žižek himself). In the midst of a long, impassioned defence of his work, Žižek recommends as the most radical strategy of all in the face of the urgings of contemporary capitalism always to 'be active': 'People intervene all the time, "do something," academics participate in meaningless "debates," etc., and the truly difficult thing is to step back, to withdraw from it' (253).

Of course, Žižek does not follow his own advice, not only responding to his critics, but — as a cursory perusal of the web will reveal — 'intervening' all the time, offering all manner of criticisms and commentaries on such things as 9/11, the Iraq War, films from *300* to *Children of Men*, genetic engineering and the latest advances in brain science. Žižek's thought is profoundly 'dialectical', not only in the sense that it is structured as a series of responses to powerful interlocutors (Laclau, Butler, Badiou, Derrida), but also because it is caught up in a constant debate with itself. Žižek, as he admits in 'Concesso non Dato', the essay that concludes this collection, has decisively changed his own position from an early emphasis on the 'Lacan of symbolic castration,' who was a supporter of democracy, to a 'Lacan of the drives,' who can be used to argue for a revolutionary, post-democratic politics (219-22).

In addition to Žižek's long reply, this book features eleven responses to Žižek's work, by the three editors of the volume and by, amongst others, Peter Dews, Russell Grigg, Yannis Stavrakakis, and the one woman in the collection, Sarah Newbold. These responses are grouped into six sections: Psychoanalysis, Culture, Ideology, Politics, Ethics and Philosophy. Most of the contributions take the familiar academic approach to major thinkers, which is to accuse them of misreading the texts on the basis of which they make their signature arguments. Thus Boucher argues that Žižek misinterprets Lacan's well-known 'Graph of Desire' as part of an attempt to recover a 'non-Cartesian' Žižek (24). Dews, in the single reprinted essay of this volume, argues that in his discussion of German Idealism in *The Indivisible Remainder* Žižek misunderstands Schelling's conception of Ground. And Grigg and Stavrakakis argue that Žižek gets both Sophocles' *Antigone* and Lacan's reading of Sophocles in his *VII* and later *Seminars* wrong in employing the character to elaborate a notion of the act that would 'suspend the symbolic/legal network and effect a shift in the existing power structure' (173).

Žižek responds to these and other accusations in his rejoinder at the end of the book (although again, typical of his style, even in the midst of a detailed defence of his work, he cannot help simply cutting and pasting in excerpts of whatever new material he is working on at the time, thus introducing a whole new series of concepts and examples). But, in a way — and this is where Žižek might be right in claiming we should opt out of intellectual debate — reading the respective arguments, we get the sense that no real exchange has actually occurred. Even the most ferociously and logically argued rebuttal of Žižek's work is unable to convince us that he is not worth reading or is fundamentally wrong. Even when Žižek does specifically address his accusers he does not manage to convince us that their allegations are substantially misplaced, that he has not somehow misread those texts he refers to, or at least forced them to say what he wants them to.

Indeed, the possibility of both an internal reading, in which Žižek is judged in his own terms and is right, and an external reading, in which he is judged in other terms and is wrong, is exactly an example of what Žižek has recently begun to theorise as 'parallax'. The fact that Justin Clemens can argue that Žižek mistakenly inverts the proper historical order in saying that there is 'no Duchamp without Malevich' (11) and that Žižek can claim that he is referring merely to a 'logical temporality', that, 'My God, who doesn't know that Malevich's black-square-on-a-white background comes after Duchamp's readymade displays' (230), ultimately suggests that Žižek is never able to be grasped 'as such', that he *is* the very split between internal and external approaches to his work. (In fact, Žižek himself speaks of this necessarily divided relationship to all transferential bodies of knowledge — those towards which we could have a 'fantasy' — in the essay 'Why is Every Act a Repetition?' in *Enjoy Your Symptom!*.)

As always in these instances of desiring to 'traverse the fantasy', we might ask of Žižek's critics the question we put to hysterics: what is it that they really want? Is there anything that could finally satisfy them? That is, if there is certain 'oscillation' (20) at stake here, it is to be found just as much in Žižek's critics as in Žižek himself. Although virtually every essay begins with an obligatory nod to Žižek's importance, nearly all insist on such changes in his argument, such wide-ranging problems with his thought, that one wonders if it is really Žižek they're talking about. Žižek might argue with himself — he might even make mistakes — and yet his position *is* whole or consistent. Like any significant thinker, and this is perhaps one of the 'Hegelian' lessons that Žižek himself teaches us, we cannot have the 'good' Žižek without the 'bad'. His errors are not fixable, or able to be incorporated into a revised conception of his work — assuming that this is what his critics want — without losing Žižek himself.

As Žižek made clear some time ago — he was referring to Benjamin, but was in fact speaking of himself — there is always a certain interpretive violence in getting at the 'core' of a thinker's thought. Or, as Deleuze, whom Žižek has been reading more closely of late, once said, philosophy is not a matter of solutions but of better and better ways of formulating the problem.

And this is the real test of the 'correctness' of Žižek's readings, which is very rarely realised by the assembled interpreters here: not so much what they are useful for but what they allow us to see. In this sense, the higher quality essays in the volume — whether they are actually 'right' or not is another matter — rather than merely criticise Žižek open up some new perspective on to him. They often appear 'eccentric' in their approach, and hence often pass by Žižek in his concluding remarks, or are something he is unable to respond to (or rather are something he at once cannot respond to and must respond to). Thus Justin Clemens in his essay on Žižek's writerly style points out the inability of Žižek to speak about 'lyric poetry' as a sign of his 'limit romanticism' (6). (Žižek, we think, has attempted to respond to this in his recent *The Parallax View* with commentaries on Wordsworth and the Argentine poet Alejandra Pizarnik.) Or Robert Pfaller, in giving a seemingly straight exegesis of his relationship to Althusser, has in fact deeply influenced Žižek's account of ideology. (Pfaller's *Die Illusionen der Anderen* is not only acknowledged in this collection, but is mentioned in a number of Žižek's other books, for example *The Plague of Fantasies*.)

Following the monographic studies of Žižek's work that have already appeared, this book is the first of the omnibuses that feature the responses of several authors. (There are at least two others known to be forthcoming: *The Truth of Žižek* from Continuum and a book based on a conference held last year at Cardiff University.) They are all the first and partial attempts to come to terms with an *oeuvre* that is precisely defined by its philosophical range, the diversity of its cultural references and the sheer speed and volume of its production. The better among these studies at least try to show us first of all what makes Žižek worth reading, namely, the fact that like any 'act' his work would seek to bring about entirely new symbolic co-ordinates, which means that it can be evaluated only in its own terms (246). The reader is forced to *choose*, in other words, whether to follow Žižek or not, before objectively evaluating the merits of his work. It is this that must be understood in any encounter with Žižek: that in a sense we are always *too late* to properly assess or evaluate him. By the time we are in a position to do so, we have already made up our mind.

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Earl Conee and **Theodore Sider**
Riddles of Existence:
A Guided Tour of Metaphysics.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2005.
Pp. 224.
Cdn$24.95/US$18.95
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19- 928226-5);
Cdn$15.95/US$9.95
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921518-8).

In this book Conee and Sider have done the seemingly impossible: provided an introduction to contemporary metaphysics which is accessible to the student and educated layman yet does not insult the professional philosopher. The book is a collection of ten essays on major issues in metaphysics. The volume includes papers on personal identity, time, free will and determinism, and universals. The final essay takes up the eternally controversial question of what the proper content of metaphysics actually *is*. Each essay represents a collaborative effort while bearing the distinctive stamp of its individual author. Conee and Sider state the hope that the contrast in their individual styles will '... make for a pleasant and stimulating variation in tone' (3). Their hope has been realized.

In Chapter 1, Sider explores the philosophical issues surrounding personal identity. His opening gambit is a familiar one: an accused murderer argues that he is not the same person who committed the crime because he has changed in several ways (age, tastes, physical qualities of various sorts) and, hence, cannot be held responsible for his crime. This opening scenario is an old one, but its very familiarity serves to draw in the philosophical novice. Sider uses this example to introduce the problem of personal identity and to explain the distinction between quantitative and qualitative identity. He then uses the rest of the chapter to provide a more than adequate summary of various historical approaches and their associated strengths and weaknesses. This chapter contributes nothing new for philosophers but is an appealing and clearly written introduction for students and the general reader.

In Chapter 2, Conee takes on the topic of metaphysical fatalism. He does a nice job of dispelling misconceptions the layperson may have about this term by carefully and humorously denying that fatalists (of the philosophical sort) are affirming beliefs in mythical Greek goddesses, resignation, or platitudes such as 'everything happens for a reason'. Equally important, he offers a simple yet coherent explanation of the distinction between fatalism and determinism: 'Determinists hold that the present and future are causally determined by the past and the physical laws, but there could have been different past or different laws. The metaphysical fatalist's view is that, even if determinism is not true, there are no open possibilities at any points in history. Their claim is that each thing in the past, present and future has always

been fixed and settled, whether or not it was causally determined' (23-4). Conee establishes a foundation for fatalist doctrine by using Aristotle's Sea Battle case. He then uses this case as scaffolding for the fatalist's general conclusion: Whatever will be, has to be. Along the way, he provides a useful discussion about the truth values — or lack there of — of propositions about the future. The last portion of the chapter is devoted to an examination of arguments for fatalism which rely on divine knowledge. The basic claim here is that, since God knows everything, God must possess present knowledge of all truths about the future. Conee portrays both sets of arguments fairly but ultimately concludes that all of them fail. This chapter would be particularly useful when taught in conjunction with the chapter on determinism.

Hippographs, absolute voids, and maximally perfect beings: in Chapter 5, Conee takes up the perennially perplexing question of why there is something rather than nothing. Although there are other chapters that may have more appeal to a mass audience, this is one of the most entertaining essays in the entire collection. The opening section is devoted to explaining the question and distinguishing it from similar-sounding non-philosophic ones. The remainder of the chapter provides a straightforward analysis of several attempts to answer this most fundamental metaphysical question. Conee correctly points out that there are two issues at stake; therefore he poses two questions. The first (Why is there something rather than nothing?) leads to an exploration of necessitarianism. Conee includes both 'Godly' and 'Un-Godly' necessitarian arguments and explains how and why they fail. Conee's second question (Why are there things that might not have existed?) naturally leads to a critique of arguments concerning contingency. Both topics are well done and together provide a welcome addition to the book. While many students seem to find the problem of being *qua* being either unintelligible or trivial, Conee shows that it is neither.

The ontological status of universals constitutes one of philosophy's most enduring debates. In Chapter 8, Conee investigates many of the alternative positions and provides a critical appraisal of their respective prospects. He opens this discussion with a discussion of what a universal is and an explanation of what is at stake in this debate. His discussion may be divided into appraisals of various types of realist versus anti-realist positions. Not surprisingly, he focuses the majority of his attention on attempts to rehabilitate universal realism. Conee does an exemplary job of showing the reasons why universal realism has historically carried such weight. He also provides fair and critical examinations of the problems associated with each attempt to salvage universalism. This discussion includes both self-instantiating and non-self-instantiating universals, theories of sparse universals, tropes, and sets. Anti-realist views represented include both classic nominalism and conceptualism. These, too, are represented clearly and succinctly.

This review is obviously not an attempt to provide an exhaustive summary of this book. The high quality of Conee's and Sider's writing does, indeed, extend throughout this work. Taken separately, the chapters could be used effectively in introductory courses on general philosophy, philosophy of

religion, or epistemology. It would, of course, be a welcome addition to any undergraduate metaphysics course especially at institutions where students must be gently introduced to technical philosophy. In addition, this would be a great gift for anybody who is curious about how philosophers make their living!

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Richard Fafara, ed.
The Malebranche Moment: Selections from the Letters of Étienne Gilson and Henri Gouhier (1920-1936).
Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press 2007.
Pp. 210.
US$27.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-87462-671-1).

This is undoubtedly a good time for a book like Fafara's, as the number of studies of Étienne Gilson (1884-1978) and of Malebranche has increased recently, and this work lies at the intersection of both. In 1920, Gilson received a paper on the subject of faith and reason in Descartes by a young man named Henri Gouhier (1898-1994). The next year they met in person and Gilson agreed to be Gouhier's adviser for his doctoral thesis on a topic that had been proposed by Gilson himself: Malebranche as a late Augustinian scholastic. It was the beginning of a lifelong friendship and a fruitful academic collaboration, one giving rise to, among other things, Gouhier's influential theses on Malebranche, *La vocation de Malebranche* (1926) and *La philosophie de Malebranche et son expérience religieuse* (1926). Fafara's book gives a sense of this interaction by bringing together in one place a number of documents: twenty-nine letters from Gilson to Gouhier, two letters from Gouhier to Gilson, a student paper on Malebranche by Gilson, and an excerpt from Gouhier's personal notebook. As one would suspect with such a diverse collection, how strictly accurate the translation is varies slightly, but in general it strikes an excellent balance between the accuracy and the tone of what is being translated; and as the texts are presented in the original French as well as in English translation, those with questions about the translations can easily check the original. The letters are given extensive and detailed footnotes, many of which are interesting in their own right. To the student essay is attached an extensive commentary. It may seem odd to devote so

much attention to a student essay, but it does provide Fafara with a useful occasion for discussing Gilson's lifelong interest in Malebranche.

One difficulty with reading this book as it stands is its disconcerting disunity. Despite the title, it is not really about Malebranche. Gouhier makes a showing, but only in two out of thirty-one letters and a brief description of Gilson from his notebook. The description on the back cover treats the book as wholly about Gilson, and, while this is closer to the truth, it is not quite right either. Perhaps the best way to express the purpose of this work is to say that it is an attempt to paint a picture of Gilson by presenting texts relevant to his Malebranche-sparked relationship with Gouhier. This it certainly does, but Fafara is not wholly successful in giving a unified framework for handling the diverse documents he has brought together.

It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that this weakness vitiates the work. It is a weakness that arises not from failure of scholarship but from the ambition of Fafara's goal for it. Correspondence, which in general tends to be both occasional and miscellaneous in the topics covered, is difficult to present in a unified way. It would have been possible, and no doubt tempting, to present the Gilson-Gouhier letters as little more than a collection for reference, without trying to draw larger conclusions from it. Fafara, however, has attempted in this work to present the texts in such a way that they advance our understanding of the role of Malebranche in Gilson's thought, and at the same time shed light on the role of the Gilson-Gouhier relationship in the development of twentieth-century study of Malebranche. This is an attempt as admirable as it is difficult. That the work's chief weakness is an unevenness in its success at illuminating these obscure topics is unsurprising; that it succeeds as well as it does through Fafara's attention to detail and judicious selection is impressive.

This book, then, is a valuable resource for those interested in Gilson's thought and those interested in the history of Malebranche scholarship alike. If a second edition is ever made, however, there are ways the book could be made even more valuable than it currently is. Two ways in particular come to mind by which such an edition might be able to more fully and consistently succeed in illuminating the Gilson-Gouhier relationship, and Malebranche's role in it. First, what should be the introduction to this book, or a good part of it, is in another book entirely. While the introduction in the present work is serviceable, it is barely more than an outline. Fafara, however, has an article, 'Gilson and Gouhier: Approaches to Malebranche' (in Redpath, ed. *A Thomistic Tapestry* [Rodopi 2003]) that thoroughly examines the context of the interaction discussed in this book. Something along the lines of that article would be a stronger introduction than the book currently has. In the meantime, readers of *The Malebranche Moment* will find that article to be useful background. Second, Gouhier is somewhat shortchanged in the book as it stands. This need not be the case. The letters, particularly Letter 14, discuss Gouhier's work on Malebranche, and it would be wholly appropriate in a future edition to present selections from Gouhier's theses on some of the topics discussed: Malebranche's Augustinianism, union with God, 'the philoso-

phy of the serpent' (46), and so forth. Another possibility might be to include some of the reviews Gilson and Gouhier wrote for each other's works.

Some books build, point by point, arguments for interpreting a philosopher's thought. Others are better seen as bringing together materials in order to make possible such construction in the future. Fafara's work certainly belongs to the latter category. Such books, however, vary in how much they are capable of contributing to our understanding of their subjects. Fafara has managed to make this one a valuable resource for understanding of both Gilson's thought and Gouhier's approach to Malebranche. Anyone interested in either should take the time to pore over it because, despite its disunified character, it is a goldmine of information and commentary.

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Yan Huang
Pragmatics.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 366.
Cdn$144.00/US$110.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929837-2);
Cdn$45.95/US$35.00
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924368-6).

This is an excellent up-to-date introduction to much, but not all, of pragmatics from a predominately linguistic point of view. The book divides into two parts: Part 1 surveys four central topics in pragmatics, while Part 2 looks at pragmatic interfaces. There are exercises and essay questions, further readings, and key concepts for each chapter — as well as a useful glossary of common terms in pragmatics. As it is a textbook, I will be more expository than critical, alerting the potential user to its virtues, but occasionally mentioning a disagreement.

Chapter 1 is an introduction to pragmatics: what pragmatics is, some historical notes — although J. Katz is not a generative semanticist (3) — why one might study it, and what some basic terminology and distinctions look like, e.g. speaker vs. sentence meaning, sentences (with truth conditions) vs. their utterance, the proposition expressed vs. its truth value relative to a context, etc. Chapter 2 is devoted to implicature. It begins with the classical Gricean system of conversational implicature based on the Cooperative Principle and the Maxims of conversation. It then follows up with two 'Neo-Gricean' devel-

opments: Horn's system of 'Quantity' and 'Relation' principles, and Levinson's 'Quantity', 'Informativeness' and 'Manner' default heuristics. It ends with a discussion of conventional implicature. This is a useful discussion to have in one chapter. The author suggests that Grice would have approved accounting for Moore's paradox using the second submaxim of quality, which is given as 'Don't say what lacks evidence' (26) (rather than the correct, 'Do not say what you lack adequate evidence for'). This is controversial; not only does the maxim not mention believing, but assertive meaning-intentions already express beliefs, and so Grice has machinery in place to do the job.

Chapter 3 covers presupposition: what it is (and is not), what its properties are and major theories of it. Chapter 4 takes up speech acts, first in the guise of Austin's performative-constative distinction and the doctrine of locution, illocution and perlocution, then in its reincarnation as Searle's constitutive rule theory. Finally, indirect speech acts and the relation of speech acts to culture are discussed. According to Huang, 'the central tenet of speech act theory is that the uttering of a sentence is, or is part of, an action within the framework of social institutions and conventions' (65). This may be true of the Austin-Searle line surveyed in this chapter, but it is not true of the competing Grice-Schiffer-Bach and Harnish line, for whom intention and inference, not rules and conventions, are central. Huang thinks Austin saw performatives and constatives as 'special subcases' of 'a general theory of speech acts' (100), whereas in reality performatives just swallowed up constatives as a special case. Huang also claims that, with Searle, (Austinian) 'felicity conditions are the constitutive rules ... of speech acts' (104), when actually Searle extracts his rules from these conditions on speech acts. Huang characterizes an indirect speech act as one where 'there is no direct relationship between a sentence type [mood] and an illocutionary act' (110). This is true for some authors, such as Sadock, but not for others, such as Searle or Bach and Harnish, who characterize indirect speech acts in terms of the number of, and relation between, the speech acts being performed. Chapter 5 is an interesting cross-linguistic discussion the phenomena linguists call 'deixis', much of which philosophers call 'indexicality'. Five categories of deixis are discussed in some detail across many languages: person, time, space, social and discourse.

Chapter 6 begins Part 2 of the book, a discussion of pragmatics and cognition. It starts with a short survey of Relevance Theory (RT), then a short discussion of Fodor's Modularity theory, and ends with a comparison of RT with classical Gricean theory. Huang appears to endorse the view that Fodor's modular view 'plays no role in processing accounts of how language is produced [sic!] and understood,' and goes on to mention evidence for 'parallel' processing (199). But there is a mountain of research in psycholinguistics surrounding modularity, and of course a module can itself compute in parallel and in parallel with other modules. Although there is passing allusion to some work in experimental pragmatics, this substantial and interesting body of literature is inexplicably ignored. Chapter 7 is the most distinctive contribution of this text. It is presented as a survey of major issues at the

semantic-pragmatic interface because that is the way it is often presented in the literature, but that is a terminological way of framing the issue. The core controversy is over the nature of information (which many see as neither clearly 'semantic' nor clearly 'pragmatic', at least not in the sense of being worked out by flouting Gricean maxims of conversation) and the mechanisms that provide it. This type of information goes by a number of labels: enriched saying, explicature, impliciture, unarticulated constituents and even generalized conversational implicature. The views of some of the players, such as Grice, Relevance theorists, Recanati, Bach, Levinson are conveniently summarized in a chart (241) that is unfortunately almost unreadable due to the choice of printing hues and labeling. Others, such as Perry, Stanley, Cappelen and Lepore are omitted. Huang takes up the issue of pragmatic 'intrusion' into what is said — an issue related to what is variously called 'Grice's Circle' ('Paradox'): 'How what is conversationally implicated can be defined in contrast to and calculated on the basis of what is said, given that what is said seems to both determine and be determined by what is conversationally implicated' (203). This needs to be sorted out, since what is said is fixed by linguistic conventions and *speaker* intentions, while what is implicated is fixed by the *hearer's* construal of the utterance (with qualifications). Finally, Chapter 8, entitled 'Pragmatics and Syntax', is devoted almost completely to anaphora. The author sets out Chomsky's Binding theory, then criticizes it, and finally offers a pragmatic alternative based mostly on Levinson's default heuristics. This is an interesting proposal, but to be used with novice students the chapter will require someone independently acquainted with the literature.

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Paul Kahn
Out of Eden:
Adam and Eve and the Problem of Evil.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2007.
Pp. 240.
US$29.95 (cloth: ISBN-13: 978-0-691-12693-7).

Paul Kahn accuses modern society of failing to understand evil. While this charge is familiar as a partisan political accusation against liberals, Kahn attempts to give it some philosophical foundation by critiquing the contemporary conception of the human person. The model of man as self-interested

rational calculator, a dogma in the fields of economics, game theory, rational choice theory, social contract theory, and sociobiology, is woefully inadequate to understand the complexities of the human person. Kahn insists we need to return to the language of the sacred, of man as a finite being with infinite aspirations, with a need for transcendence. Evil, he claims, is a misguided response to this need for transcendence, not a self-interested strategic choice. But none of this will make sense in the constricted vision of *homo economicus* which has taken over modern culture. And in particular, Kahn thinks, it will not explain the phenomenon of the terrorist suicide bomber.

It is indeed refreshing to see a return to the kind of ideas that are no longer fashionable in academic discussion: transcendence, the infinite, self-sacrifice, the sacred. Kahn is correct to point out the ineptitude with which rational choice thinkers try to make sense of morality or even the concept of war, which cannot be explained by cost/benefit analysis but essentially involves the idea of sacrifice. Biology has long been flummoxed by the problem of altruism, while economists continually try to reduce morality to just another kind of preference, with absurd results. Kahn makes a powerful case for the reality of good (which he calls 'love') as a form of self-sacrifice, and of its opposite, evil, which constitutes a denial of one's finitude, and an attempt to dominate or control the other as a means of escaping the acknowledgement of one's mortality. This can be summarized by saying we need to recognize the primary fact of free will, the choice between good and evil.

All of this is an important contribution to the contemporary discussion. It is unfortunate however that Kahn chooses to present this account in the form of a polemic against liberalism. Kahn never tells us just what he means by a liberal, but it includes economists, philosophers, scientists, postmodernists, rationalists, and even religious fundamentalists. He surely cannot mean a *political* liberal, since economists and game theorists tend to be rather conservative politically. Yet Kahn seems willing to play on this ambiguity, irresponsibly quoting Karl Rove's infamous attack on liberals that their response to 9/11 was to 'prepare indictments and offer therapy and understanding to our attackers' (2). For Kahn it is a good illustration of the liberal response to evil: look to legal solutions and to the social and psychological causes of violence. Both Rove and Kahn of course ignore the fact that most liberals supported the war in Afghanistan; what they questioned was whether going to war with Iraq was justified on strategic or moral grounds. But the deeper problem is Kahn's nebulous conception of liberalism. What sort of category is it that comprises rationalists and postmodernists, scientific naturalists and fundamentalists? Indeed, few of these accept the idea of man as a rational calculator.

It is equally unfortunate that Kahn chooses to frame the debate as a binary choice between Judeo-Christian voluntarism and Greek rationalism. Kahn traces the roots of liberalism back to the ancient Greeks. We are told such absurdities as that the Greeks (in contrast to the Hebrews) lacked a concept of evil or the will at all. Kahn chooses to target his attacks on two Greeks in particular: Plato the rationalist who lacks any concept of 'terror',

and Sophocles the irrationalist who in Oedipus Tyrannus sees man as wholly subject to the whims of the gods. Each of these is of course a caricature. Plato is no rationalist, but insists on the limits of reason; indeed the *Symposium* and *Republic* are often taken as evidence that Plato is rather a mystic than a rationalist. Nor is *Oedipus* a demonstration of the utter futility of human will. Kahn utterly misses Sophocles' irony here: while the gods prophecy his fate, the prophecy is made true only by Oedipus' decisive and willful actions — leaving his family, killing the man on the road, destroying the Sphinx and winning Jocasta as a bride.

For all its virtues, it is unfortunate that Kahn's book fails to engage with the substantial philosophical literature on these issues. Had he done so, he might have learned that both Plato and Sophocles were on his side, critiquing the rationalism of the 'Greek Enlightenment' just as Kahn is critiquing the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Kahn's claim that only the Hebrews but not the Greeks could make sense of sin is a crude distortion. Consider Kahn's attack on the Greek doctrine of '*akrasia*' or weakness of the will (35) as the inadequate Greek explanation for wrongdoing. In fact, Plato explicitly *rejects* the possibility of *akrasia*, in his famous doctrine that no one can do wrong knowingly. Moreover, the most famous expression of *akrasia* is found in the Bible, in Paul's letter to the Romans (7:15). The question is far more complex than Kahn recognizes.

Kahn believes the concept of evil is necessary to understand the suicide bomber, and it certainly seems plausible to reject the game-theoretic approach. But is the liberal wrong to insist on the importance of law enforcement and understanding social causes? Buried in a footnote (136), Kahn concedes the fact that the terrorist is usually a 'young adult' (specifically, a young unmarried male). But if the phenomenon were to be explained purely as a matter of free will, there should be no such predictable pattern. The fact that there is suggests the liberal may be right to look for causal, predictive explanations. Moreover, violent criminals in all societies tend to be young, unmarried males; perhaps the law enforcement strategy might be more applicable than Kahn wants to admit. None of this is to deny the validity of many of Kahn's insights; it is however to wonder whether he has the whole story, and whether it is useful to adopt such a polarizing approach.

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Christian Kerslake
Deleuze and the Unconscious.
New York: Continuum 2007.
Pp. 246.
US$120.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8488-8).

Georges Canghuilhem, upon Foucault's presentation to him of the central argument of *Folie et Déraison*, is reported to have remarked that if Foucault was right, it would already be common knowledge. His surprise that madness could indeed be shown to have a decisive, entire and entirely subterranean history is something like the experience that I imagine almost every reader will also have of Kerslake's *Deleuze and the Unconscious*. This book, beyond being a superior work of scholarship, reveals an entire network of decisive investments and influences, scarcely grasped before, which underpin the entire course of Deleuze's philosophy. Kerslake's book is a landmark in English-language Deleuze scholarship, whose merits are many, and which thoroughly deserves to be widely read and discussed.

At root, the book sets out to demonstrate that a very unorthodox trinity lies at the centre of Deleuze's various engagements with the figure of the unconscious: Bergson, Jung and esoteric thought. At almost every point (e.g. the nature of the unconscious, the genesis of consciousness, the relations between these two regimes and the world more generally), concepts issuing from this trinity allow Deleuze to oppose the orthodox Freudian view of the unconscious and to develop — along with a number of other fellow travellers, perhaps above all Leibniz and Kant — his own novel position.

Kerslake presents his argument in six interlocking and overlapping chapters which move from discussions of a non-Darwinian theory of instinct, Deleuze's investment in various aspects of Jungian theory (above all the theory of the archetypes and of symbolism), differential accounts of the unconscious, and finally (although this thread is pursued throughout) Deleuze's fascination with themes which fall under the rubric of sorcery. The extremely wide range of textual material necessary to elaborate such a complex field is handled by Kerslake with a deft touch.

However, *Deleuze and the Unconscious* is not about the unconscious to the exclusion of all else. If Kerslake shows that Deleuze relies upon a great number of ideas about the unconscious garnered from extra-psychoanalytic sources, he also demonstrates better than almost any other scholarly account so far the extent to which inspiration is found by Deleuze for the elaboration of his own proper concerns from various aspects of psychoanalysis and psychology. For example, the discussion of the Jungian archetypes reveals aspects of Deleuze's theory of problematic ideas — which to the cursory reader of *Difference and Repetition* would seems to be primarily drawn from Kant — which have never to my knowledge been elaborated before. Some of the pages here, precisely on the Kantian schemata and the productive imagination in this context, are among the best in English on the Deleuze-Kant relationship. Kerslake's presentation of the book as 'a series of attempted raids

on Deleuze's hive of ideas about the unconscious' (3) is, however, at least a little disingenuous. While he frequently gestures to interesting lines of thought not pursued, thereby leaving the way open for future studies, what is fundamentally at issue is a combative reading of Deleuze's philosophy as a whole. Its enemies, I suspect, are multiple. Centrally, though, the picture that emerges is one in which the standard currents in psychoanalysis are both irrelevant to Deleuze's project, and (at key points) insufficient on their own grounds.

An obvious omission from the book is any sustained discussion of Lacan. Despite a few critical references in the introduction — references, moreover, which would be my only object of criticism, as Kerslake presents there as normative categories what are rightly understood structural tropes in Lacanian psychoanalysis — Lacan's presence in the text is occasional at best. This is not necessarily a failing: as he notes himself, the breadth and complexity of the topic calls for a partial reading. This absence only becomes problematic insofar as it leads to the conclusion that Lacanian theory plays no role at all in the Deleuzean schema, a conclusion that Kerslake explicitly endorses at least once in the book (189n1) After all, what this book shows better perhaps than any before it is the fact that none of Deleuze's key concepts have a single lineage. It seems difficult to completely deny the impact of Lacan on Deleuze; even leaving aside *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze's first version of his essay on Louis Wolfson could easily be characterised as an orthodox Lacanian approach to schizophrenia.

The same cannot be said for Freud. While Kerslake notes in his introduction that Freudian psychoanalysis will not be extensively treated in the book, he returns time and time again to strikingly contrast Deleuze's (and Leibniz's, Bergson's, Jung's, etc.) position to Freud's. Indeed, on many fronts, Kerslake demonstrates that, far from ignoring Freud, Deleuze engages with him continually, and on a number of fronts finds him wanting: the insufficiency of the symptom in comparison with the symbol in determining the nature of the unconscious, and the weakness of Freud's account of primary process, are important examples. The uses of Freud's name and his concepts figure in Deleuze, on Kerslake's view, as so many problematic sites: death, memory, libido, repetition, etc.

With respect to Kerslake's lengthy and 'stupefying' discussion of the esoteric sources of Deleuze's philosophy (with respect to the unconscious and in general), what can be said? Certainly in no other scholarly work have these connections been so thoroughly examined, or indeed examined at all. Before reading Kerslake's account, I felt justified (no doubt like many) in seeing Deleuze's occasional peculiar references to be of the order of literary flourishes. In light of *Deleuze and the Unconscious*, however, it seems incontrovertibly the case that Deleuze continually drew upon certain esoteric themes, and that their impact can be registered in many places, some of them (like Deleuze's theory of problematic ideas) extremely surprising.

I might note in passing that Kerslake's use of materials written by Deleuze before the publication of *Empiricism and Subjectivity* in 1953, those

which Deleuze himself wished to have excluded from consideration as a part of his mature philosophy, is a cogent argument for the value of these juvenile documents. The swarm of ideas which constitutes Deleuze's philosophy took flight very early, earlier it seems that Deleuze himself was willing to admit. Kerslake shows on a number of fronts that the occasional reference to the figure of the hermaphrodite, for example, can only be properly explained by connecting them with Deleuze's youthful enthusiasm for what Freud once described to Jung as 'the black tide of mud', namely the occult (104).

Deleuze and the Unconscious is not a book which will make many new friends for Deleuze. No one sympathetic to either Freud or Lacan will find anything that will warm them to Deleuze here, even putting aside the antipathy to Jung that often comes with such sympathy. It is also quite likely that certain people who currently consider themselves 'friends' of Deleuze's project may have the relationship strained in the light of many of the insights elaborated here. Proponents of that unlikely position known as Deleuzean materialism, for example, will find it hard to square references to Malfatti's *Mathesis*, a Jungian-inspired consideration of universal sympathy or incestuous parthenogenesis with their view of Deleuze. Then again, nobody at all familiar with Deleuze's work will be ignorant of the enigmatic figure of the cosmic egg, or many other esoteric themes. What Kerslake may have done is finally to remove any grounds for considering this a coherent account of Deleuze's project. In this sense, *Deleuze and the Unconscious* should act as a traumatic encounter.

The Deleuze of *Difference and Repetition* himself insists — in a very non-Freudian manner — on the significance in learning of such traumas. The greatest promise of Kerslake's exceptional book is that Deleuze's philosophy will be turned to in all its richness and paradox. Without a doubt, there have been some very fine contributions to English-speaking Deleuze scholarship, but Kerslake has set a new high watermark. He also poses a challenge to a field which is currently hyper-saturated (and under-cooled) by commentaries and introductions — these look even more feeble in the light of *Deleuze and the Unconscious*. It is past time for contemporary thought to have done with the 'slightly preposterous figure' we are familiar with, and to turn to finally examine Deleuze the philosopher 'about whom curiously very little has yet been established' (4).

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John Koethe
Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2005.
Pp. 176.
US$37.50 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8014-4432-6).

In this book Koethe attempts to resolve an age-old philosophical conundrum: How do we deal with the fact that sceptical arguments seem sound and yet their conclusions contradict what our common sense tells us? What do we do with an argument that takes as its conclusion that, for example, I do not know that I have teeth when my commonsense tells me that I do know that I have teeth? In attempting to solve this problem, Koethe considers whether certain kinds of sceptical arguments are valid and sound, and in light of his analyses of the nature of knowledge and reasoning he argues that the sceptical arguments in question cannot be straightforwardly rejected as either invalid or unsound. He concludes that the problem of scepticism arises from 'a failure to attain a certain equilibrium between rules of inference and the actual inferences we make' (9).

In the first chapter, Koethe describes what he calls the transmission principle — often referred to as the closure principle. The principle states 'that if one knows that p, then one also knows to be true those propositions one *knows* to be consequences of p' (12). From this one can infer that if one does not 'know something that one knows to be a logical consequence of p, one does not know that p' (12). It is this second version of the transmission principle that Koethe is especially interested in because it plays an important role in many arguments for scepticism. The most common argument for scepticism that employs the transmission principle is the dreaming argument. The argument goes something like this: If I know that I am sitting by a fire, then I must know that I am not dreaming. Since I do not know that I am not dreaming, it follows that I cannot know that I am sitting by a fire. Koethe argues that it is the second version of the transmission principle that facilitates this argument. Koethe then goes on to show that the transmission principle plays a role in other types of sceptical arguments as well.

In the second chapter, Koethe discusses the concepts of knowledge and epistemic possibility. He argues that knowledge and possibility are intimately related: '... for something to be possible is for it not to be known not to be so, and for something to be known is for it not to be possible that it is not so' (29). What makes Koethe's conception of knowledge especially interesting is that he argues for a social theory of knowledge and possibility: '... a person can know that p if he inhabits a social context, or belongs to a community, in which the knowledge that p is *available*, and he simply avails himself of it' (39).

In the third chapter, Koethe considers the possibility of refuting the dreaming type sceptical argument by showing that at least one of its premises is false. This, as Koethe points out, would be a straightforward way to refute scepticism. He surveys several possible arguments, including coher-

entism and contextualism, and finds each of them lacking; none provides an adequate refutation of sceptical arguments. In Chapter 4, Koethe revisits the concept of knowledge. Here he suggests that it might be beneficial to reject 'epistemelogical realism' and support nonrealism instead. Epistemological realism is the view that what makes a proposition true or false is independent of our acceptance or rejection of it: there is a fact that makes a proposition true or false. Koethe's support of nonrealism allows him to claim that our acceptance or rejection of a proposition is what makes it true or false. His intention, he claims, is to show that nonrealism offers a way to regard sceptical arguments differently.

Chapter 5 considers the possibility of showing that dreaming-type sceptical arguments are invalid. Koethe notes that the validity of the sceptical argument rests on the validity of the transmission principle. He does not come out and say that the transmission principle is valid, but rather that we use it in our everyday life to make knowledge claims. He argues '... that the transmission principle is implicit in our epistemic practices in the sense that it guides our evaluation and criticism of ordinary knowledge claims, and explains why we accept many of the ordinary knowledge claims that we do' (104). It is in this way that Koethe suggests that we cannot claim that dreaming-type sceptical arguments are invalid.

In the final chapter, Koethe argues that dreaming-type sceptical arguments are 'conceptual anomalies'. He suggests they are anomalous because on the one hand they seem sound, but on the other we do not want to accept their conclusions. Koethe claims that we want there to be an equilibrium between the rules of inference that we find convincing and individual inferences that we agree to. He then argues that there is no a priori guarantee that there will be such equilibrium. In fact, according to Koethe, sceptical arguments are an instance where there is no equilibrium of this kind. It is this lack of equilibrium that makes sceptical arguments anomalous. Further, he claims that this lack of equilibrium makes it reasonable both to think that sceptical arguments are not straightforwardly invalid and at the same time to reject their conclusions. In this way Koethe claims to dissolve rather than to resolve the problem of dreaming-type sceptical arguments.

Koethe's book is an extremely well-written and thought provoking work. It is aimed at advanced students and professional readers; his use of symbolic notation would likely prove problematic for the general reader. The book also provides a good overview of many issues in epistemology and logic, and it could serve as a text for a graduate course in epistemology. Overall, Koethe has provided a cogent discussion of issues central to epistemology and philosophical logic.

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Heikki J. Koskinen, Sami Pihlström,
and **Risto Vilkko, eds.**
Science: A Challenge to Philosophy?
New York: Peter Lang 2006.
Pp. 340.
US$62.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8204-7757-2).

'A bag of mixed nuts' is a phrase often used to describe conference proceedings. It certainly suits this collection of articles on the broad theme of the relationship between philosophy and science. As such, the book has many of the weaknesses that proceedings generally have but, at the same time, contains interesting individual papers while giving an overall picture of the nature and strengths of English-language philosophy in Scandinavia.

The collection is based on papers presented at the XV Internordic Philosophical Symposium which took place in 2004, and nearly all of the papers are by philosophers working in Scandinavia. The conference was organised around the topic that serves as the title of the collection, the clear motivation having been to lend coherence to the discussions while allowing individual speakers to pursue their own interests. As always in such cases the hope is that the papers illuminate the one topic from different directions rather than talk past each other. And, as always, the coherence actually achieved is only partial, with many papers off by themselves. What does give the volume more cohesion is that both naturalism and Peircean pragmatism appear time and again, as topics as well as approaches — giving those interested in either, or their interconnection, plenty to think about. It might have been beneficial for the editors to make the hard decision and cut the volume down to just the papers that deal with these particular intersecting subjects. That would have helped in another respect. Due to practical space constraints most of the nearly thirty papers are very short. As a result, some feel like a conference poster session — advertisements meant to intrigue the reader enough to personally approach the authors. I will only mention those articles I found most valuable or promising.

The very first paper in the volume, written by Mats Bergman, serves well as an example of the interesting work on naturalism and pragmatism in this volume. The paper is an admirable outline of Peirce's conception of science and its relevance to philosophy, a conception sophisticated enough to allow that poetry may also be a route to truth without dissolving into neopragmatism. Another example of a seemingly historical paper with clear implications for current work is Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen's article on the relationship between Kuhn and the logical empiricists — the re-evaluation of their work having recently become an increasingly more important avenue of research. Lars-Göran Johansson takes on the topic of the problem of induction and, within a short paper, manages to give an insightful analysis of the vitally changed context in which Hume's problem finds itself once naturalism is accepted. Cheryl Misak argues that Peirce's concept of truth as that 'which would stand up to the rigours of inquiry' (278) is the only one that can be ap-

plied within science as well as ethics, with important consequences for both. Among other interesting papers are Jussi Haukioja's defence of naturalist theories of meaning against Kripke's Wittgenstein-derived arguments, as well as the paper in which Jonathan Knowles raises arguments against what he calls 'non-scientific naturalism', i.e. a rejection of supernatural entities without accepting a thoroughly scientific world-view.

Perhaps the key paper of the volume, however, is Kenneth R. Westphal's longer article. Westphal's vision of philosophy is both broad, in terms of the paper's scope, and deep, in terms of his historical scholarship as well as his understanding of the intellectual underpinnings of modern thought. The article, which rewards re-reading, argues that modern philosophy has tended to lack self-awareness, a facility that Westphal sees as essential for avoiding arid theorising, and one that he believes may be found in Hegel's work. Although Westphal never mentions Peirce, his paper is actually quite reminiscent of that version of pragmatism: similarities between Hegel and Peirce have often been remarked upon and the conclusions that Westphal reaches, as well as his concern for what actual scientists do, are all very much in tune with Peirce's own attitude to science and criticisms of post-Cartesian philosophy. As such, the changes Westphal calls for in his richly textured article fit well into the Peircean and naturalist tenor set by many of the other papers.

The overall impression one gains from reading the collected papers is an awareness of the healthy state of English-language philosophy in Scandinavia. Given the relatively small size of the philosophical community there, the volume shows a vigour of which many other supposedly larger regions would be envious. At the same time, one comes to have the impression that much of that energy is focussed upon work within the broadly Peircean tradition, particularly the naturalist form it has taken on in the last few decades.

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Jonathan Kvanvig
The Knowability Paradox.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 226.
Cdn$96.00/US$65.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928259-3).

In the last twenty years the Knowability Paradox, originally developed by Frederic Fitch in the 1960's, has been at the centre of the debate about so-called anti-realism with respect to truth, i.e., the position that a sentence can only *be* true if it can be *known* to be true. Kvanvig's book on the one hand sets out several versions of the Knowability Paradox (KP) and reviews the prominent proposals how to work around it or how to defend anti-realism against it. On the other hand, Kvanvig's main thesis is that the KP has been widely misunderstood. According to him the KP is not concerned especially with anti-realism, but the KP shows — if the argument is sound — that the modal distinction between truth and possible truth breaks down. If that is right, then the whole debate around the KP misses the target. Kvanvig finally puts forth his own solution to the paradox so diagnosed.

The KP argues from the two assumptions: 1) 'All truths can be known' ($p \supset \Diamond Kp$), and 2) 'There is some truth that is not known' ($p \wedge \neg Kp$) to a contradiction. So the two assumptions are incompatible. Since we would rather take the second assumption as obviously true, we have to give up the first, thus rejecting anti-realism. So argue the realists. Anti-realists have to find a flaw in the premises or rules used in the derivation or their presuppositions.

Now, if two claims are incompatible, endorsing one normally means negating the other. Thus the KP establishes the conditional: $(p \supset \Diamond Kp) \supset (p \supset Kp)$, the consequent being the negation of the second assumption. Given normal modal logic it is a theorem: $(p \supset Kp) \supset (p \supset \Diamond Kp)$. Putting these two conditionals together establishes $(p \supset Kp) \equiv (p \supset \Diamond Kp)$, the astonishing claim that every truth is knowable (possible to know) if and only if every truth is known. That, according to Kvanvig, is the real result and point of the KP, a point that has been missed in the literature: 'The paradox is not a local problem for anti-realism, it is a global problem that affects everyone. The reason is that the claim above specifies a context in which the distinction between actuality and possibility utterly disappears' (53).

The argument developing the KP employs standard modal logic and two rules governing the knowledge operator: 'To know something implies this to be the case' (3) and 'To know a conjunction implies to know the conjuncts' (4). Furthermore at some point the second assumption is substituted into the first. Solving the KP requires finding a fault with one of these ingredients. Kvanvig groups the proposed solutions into those that may find fault with modal principles or principles of knowledge, and those that attack standard logic. Devoting a chapter to each of these approaches, he tries to argue that

the proposed solutions either fail completely or fail at least in addressing the proper reading of the paradox.

Kvanvig's own solution of the KP attacks the move involving substituting one proposition into the scope of a knowledge operator of another proposition. He proposes a theory of propositions according to which propositions are non-extensional, because quantifiers carry an index to a specific possible world. That is so, according to Kvanvig, because possible worlds may have different universes, so what is said about 'all things' cannot be taken from one world to another. Both the first and second assumptions involve quantification, and thus are not free for unrestricted substitution. The derivation of the KP becomes blocked: 'If quantifiers are indexical, the proof relies on an illegitimate substitution into an intensional context' (164). Kvanvig understands quantifiers not as expressing properties (of properties) but as referring expressions which refer to their respective domain!

Kvanvig's solution to the KP involves an unusual understanding of quantification and substantial ontological assumptions. These may be interesting in their own right, but they certainly are highly controversial. Several participants in this debate will also have difficulties with Kvanvig's rejection of the proposed solutions of the KP. One weak argument by Kvanvig, for example, directed at Neil Tennant's defence of intuitionism and anti-realism, is basically that standard logic cannot be given up as meta-theory since otherwise no debate about different logics will be possible. Kvanvig thus maintains that there has to be some universal logic, and this has to be standard logic. This, however, is just what intuitionism denies. Even a universal logic need not be standard logic. Therefore Kvanvig needs additional arguments against Tennant's solution to the KP, which solution employs an intuitionistic understanding of negation and implication.

There is another weakness somebody might see in Kvanvig's formalization of the first assumption. The formula '$p \supset \Diamond Kp$' and the formalizations of similar claims in the KP interpret the phrase 'a truth' simply by a propositional variable 'p', but the first assumption involves the concept of truth and thus may rather be 'True(p) $\supset \Diamond Kp$'. This difference can turn out to be important since '$p \equiv$ True(p)' need not be accepted by an anti-realist, because she rejects '$p \supset$ True(p)': that something is the case does, for the anti-realist, not imply that it is true, since knowledge requires justification. In Kvanvig's formalization the first assumption is thus far too strong a representation of the anti-realist's claim. If this version of it is refuted by the KP this does not tell us anything about anti-realism in general.

The KP is one of the important and fascinating arguments involving our understanding of truth and knowledge. Kvanvig's book provides a detailed treatment of it and is certainly a must read for participants in these discussions.

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Larry Laudan
Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 254.
US$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-86166-3).

American evidence law is without question an epistemologically questionable assemblage, constructed over an extended period of time by different courts, under a variety of rationales, with differing understandings of the effect any given rule will have. With this book Laudan has undertaken to reform this epistemological mess, so as to increase the probability that the guilty will be convicted and the innocent freed. Unfortunately, due to his failure to truly grasp the subject matter on which he is writing, a persistent pro-prosecution bias in his argumentation, and some highly sloppy legal commentary, he almost uniformly fails.

Laudan's primary argument is that many of the evidential rules operating in criminal cases fail basic epistemological standards, often being designed to benefit the defendant rather than assist the alleged truth-finding purpose of the trial. Unquestionably Laudan makes a significant contribution by highlighting the surreptitious adjustments made to the standard of proof in a criminal trial with the adoption of evidence rules favoring the defendant. This is an important point that needs to be directly addressed by those defending such rules.

However, while Laudan's epistemological arguments are themselves consistently strong, his project is undermined by his lack of appreciation of the actual practice of law. While this might be understandable given that Laudan is not a lawyer, evidence law is fundamentally concerned with practice, and any discussion of it must appreciate the practical context in which the rules operate. By approaching evidence rules without understanding this context Laudan fails to understand the rules themselves.

Laudan's difficulty arises from the fact that there are two types of contextual issue that must be considered in evaluating the epistemological approach of evidence law. While he clearly acknowledges the socio-political context in which criminal trials take place, which requires a willingness to accept a less-than-perfect rate of convicting the guilty as a means of avoiding convicting the innocent, just as important is the institutional context of the inquiry, including the centrality of untrained and inexperienced jurors in the fact-finding process, and the partisan presentation of evidence by trained and experienced attorneys.

Yet this institutional context is an element to which Laudan gives little real recognition. Instead, he repeatedly treats legal rules of evidence as mere variations on rules of scientific inquiry. Law, however, is concerned with persuasion and intuition to a degree that the sciences simply are not. Juries are fundamentally treated by the courts as a 'black box', whose reasoning should be almost absolutely exempt from examination. Yet top trial lawyers are suc-

cessful not because they always have great evidence, but because they can present that evidence in a persuasive form. Courts, then, do not impose constraints on the admissibility of evidence due to a presumption that jurors are 'simpletons' (217), but because they recognise that good lawyers spend their careers honing persuasive modes of presentation. Courts must therefore control the evidence that reaches the jury if they are to allow the jury its traditional freedom to evaluate that evidence, while still ensuring a fair trial.

The jury's freedom to evaluate the evidence is not a mere tradition, however. Rather, it is an essential part of the epistemological process of a criminal trial. It should hardly need stating that jurors are not incorporated into criminal trials due to a belief that selecting twelve random individuals is the best way to assemble a reliable fact-finding body. Rather, while the original motivation for incorporating juries into the criminal process may largely have been to protect the individual against prosecutorial abuses, juries have come to play a central and distinctive epistemological role as well. They are, that is, not employed for their rational fact-finding capabilities, but for their substantive intuitions and hunches. This point is illustrated by the different treatment given in Federal courts to the reasoning processes of juries and of scientists, when the latter are brought into court as expert witnesses. While juries remain a 'black box', under the Federal Daubert standard the reasoning of any scientific expert is subjected to a mandatory evaluation by the judge before it can be presented to the jury (including the judge's own evaluation of the applicability of the experimental evidence to the case at hand). That is, while the expertise of scientists must be backed up by reasoning explicable even to a non-specialist, jurors may rely upon hunches and intuitions to the extent they find it necessary.

It is because of this distinction between the epistemological roles of juries and scientists that epistemological criticisms appropriate to scientific inquiry are often simply misguided when transferred to evidence law. Of course, even within science there is room for personal interpretation and intuitive leaps. However, science manages to restrain these differences in intuition through such mechanisms as repeated trials and ongoing experimentation, whereby evidence can gradually be accrued until one theory is significantly more plausible than its competitors. In a criminal trial, however, the evidence is presented to a single jury, with appeals against factual findings almost totally precluded. Moreover, should the plaintiff or defendant subsequently discover new evidence, or a more compelling alternative theory, no retrial is available. Additionally, rarely is the *credibility* of evidence a central issue in a scientific inquiry. Witnesses in criminal trials, however, often have a vested interest in presenting a favourable picture of events. It is in this complex context that the ability of a jury to move beyond the evidence through the use of intuitions becomes essential to trials as an epistemological process — and it is this difference between trials and scientific inquiry that undercuts Laudan's critique.

Indeed, even Laudan's strongest argument, directed at the formulations courts use to instruct jurors on the standard of proof, is undercut by this

same misunderstanding. American courts usually give an instruction that emphasizes the juror's subjective confidence in the defendant's guilt, rather than giving practical advice on how to evaluate evidence (79-80). Laudan criticises this approaching, noting that 'in every area in which proof is called for outside the law,' strength of conviction is recognized as an inadequate substitute for actual weighing of evidence (80). Unfortunately, Laudan himself encounters the importance of subjective evaluations by jurors in the purportedly 'objective' alternatives that he suggests, which themselves refer to 'credible ... evidence' and 'plausible story' (82) — terms that invoke a subjective evaluation by the jury. As discussed above, it is precisely due to this centrality of subjective evaluations to the epistemological process of a trial that such evaluations are both endorsed and embraced by the rules of evidence, rather than excised so that a properly 'scientific' inquiry can take place. Appealing to the subjective confidence of jurors, then, is not a failed attempt to match scientific inquiry, but a formulation devised for individuals with an entirely different epistemological role. Recognizing this distinctiveness of the epistemological process of evidence law is good epistemology, not, as Laudan would have it, 'a travesty of a system of proof' (79).

Laudan's superficial understanding of law also causes problems for his analysis when he addresses specific legal doctrines, such as his criticism of the notion that a 'presumption' of innocence attaches to the accused throughout a trial. Laudan argues that, for example, a judge who rejects a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty 'has already determined ... that it would be entirely reasonable to believe firmly that Jones committed the crime and therefore unreasonable to believe [firmly] that he did not' (96). However, a legal presumption simply does not implicate belief, contra Laudan (101). It is a finger on the evidential scales, not a conclusion. It is therefore quite possible to give Jones the benefits of a legal presumption of innocence while quite steadfastly believing in his guilt.

The weakness of Laudan's grasp of law as it actually operates also results in a major structural problem for the book, as he insists on ignoring all policy arguments in his main discussion, relegating them to a concluding chapter. Yet policy is such a central element of the criminal law that this often leaves him with nothing but straw men to deride. Moreover, his concluding 'policy' discussion is one-sided and lacking in empirical support. Indeed, even where empirical evidence is available, in the form of decades of real-world experience by trial judges, Laudan merely rejects this as 'folk mythology' that falls short of a true empirical study (122, 215) — except where this accumulated experience is useful for his own conclusion (207).

Laudan also experiences problems in his use of caselaw, which upon inspection can turn out to be seriously flawed. At the most basic level, in one instance Laudan criticises the Supreme Court for inconsistent decisions even though the cases he cites as representing one side of this inconsistency are not in fact by the Supreme Court (92). More troubling is that a close reading of the cases Laudan cites sometimes demonstrates a sharp inconsistency between Laudan's summary, or even quotation, and what the case actually says

(92, 99, 101, 133, 154). The implausibility of any reader personally checking each citation makes these errors highly troubling.

Cross-disciplinary work is often difficult, and requires at minimum a respect for the discipline being studied. That is distinctly lacking here. While Laudan's epistemological expertise is unquestionable, his failure to understand the nature of legal epistemology undermines almost all of his arguments. A strong epistemological analysis of American evidence law is unquestionably needed. Unfortunately, this book does not provide it.

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Stephen Law
The War for Children's Minds.
New York: Routledge 2006.
Pp. 198.
US$29.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-415-37855-0);
US$19.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-415-42768-5).

Nietzsche, commenting on Ralph Waldo Emerson's essays, once wrote that he had never 'felt so much at home in a book'. A similar feeling wraps itself around a liberal such as me when reading Law's book. In this polemical work, Law presents a sustained argument for a liberal, as opposed to authoritarian, approach to the moral education of children. Where the authoritarian demands blind obedience to a doctrine, god, or authority figure, the liberal endorses an approach taken directly from Kant's notion of enlightenment with its emphasis on critical thinking and reflection. Law argues that the moral malaise, supposed rampant relativism, rise in crime, and the breakdown of traditional sexual values are not caused by liberalism; rather that liberalism or more specifically, a liberal moral education, is the best response to these issues.

Law begins with an account of the Kantian notion of enlightenment that comprises the core argument for a liberal moral education. According to Law, 'Individuals should be raised and educated to question and think critically and independently rather than defer more-or-less uncritically to external authority' (14). It is this core idea which is defended throughout the book.

In Chapter 2, Law offers an analysis and clarification of the concept of liberalism. According to him, there are two types of liberalism, namely, liberalism with a small 'l' and Liberalism with a capital 'L'. The former refers to

freedom of action, the latter to freedom of thought. Law argues for the latter, Liberalism with a capital 'L', when it comes to freedom of thought and moral education, while simultaneously holding a more authoritarian (with a small 'a') position as far as freedom of action is concerned. Thus he is not endorsing the idea that children be given the freedom to act in any manner they please, only that they be taught to think freely and critically about the moral rules they are expected to follow.

Chapter 3 addresses the different methodologies employed by those that would endorse a more authoritarian approach to moral education. Authoritarians ask people to turn off their 'filter of reason'. On the other hand, Liberals encourage individuals to do things like question underlying assumptions, weigh evidence fairly and impartially, and look at various points of view (35). In Chapter 4, Law presents some fairly standard defenses of Liberalism. He draws upon the idea that Liberalism is good for democracy and as a check on authoritarianism. He also draws upon Mill's arguments for a marketplace of ideas. Finally, he notes how a Liberal moral or religious education can help guard against the sort of Muslim extremism promulgated by terrorist groups.

Chapter 5 presents a further clarification of Law's view of authority, and his rejection of the idea that Liberalism in some way implies or is identical with selfish individualism. Before turning to the critics of Liberal forms of education, Law is careful to emphasize it is not always bad to trust authority, so long as it is authority with a small 'a'. The authority of superiors such as parents, teachers, police etc., in questions of action is not in dispute. Liberals can accept that actions must be restricted or regulated, while also holding that the same restriction should not apply to an individual's beliefs.

In Chapter 6, Law introduces the criticisms of Liberalism found in mainstream and conservative media, namely, that Liberalism is responsible for both the moral malaise and the moral relativism that appear 'rampant' in our society. He is particularly interested in refuting the idea that the solution to our current social problems are to be found by returning to a more religiously authoritarian social arrangement. In Chapter 7, Law counters the idea of authoritarians that the last 50 years have been morally bad, by noting the advances in race relations, the status of women, and an increased concern for the environment. Furthermore, he agrees that relativism is bad and that Liberalism is both not synonymous with relativism, and a check on relativism.

Chapter 8 builds upon the previous arguments by drawing an analogy with science. Science is not relativistic, but embodies a liberal sort of approach. Liberal schools can combat relativism by pointing out exactly what is wrong with it. Chapters 9 and 10 address the issue of whether reason can do the work Law claims it can do in morality. In Chapter 9, Law provides the reader with a general primer on reason (much like one would find in a critical thinking or logic class). In Chapter 10, Law demonstrates how reason can be applied to both morality and character development.

In Chapter 11, Law addresses communitarian critiques of Liberalism that revolve around the importance of traditions, particularly religious traditions.

Although Law concedes that religion can act as a social glue, it can also be a source of tension between groups. Furthermore, even if religion is held to be a social good, this does not preclude critical reflection from within a religious tradition. Consequently, Liberal education still has role to play within a religious society. Chapter 12 addresses the idea that religion and authoritarian strains of religion are necessary to keep the masses in line. In response to this condescending idea, Law again notes the lack of a correlation between societies that are more religious and fewer incidences of crime and delinquency.

Finally, Chapter 13 concludes with a recap of the arguments in support of Liberal moral and religious education. In the end, his recommendation is to have school programs that 1) have a syllabus that includes periods in which open, philosophical discussion of important moral, cultural, political and religious questions can take place, 2) present pupils with a broad range of different political, moral and religious beliefs and arguments, and 3) where religious education is given, include at least some basic philosophy of religion.

For those with formal training in philosophy, particularly social and political philosophy, Law's book will have little in the way of original argument. Its value will be primarily for those who want a well-organized and well-argued response to religious fundamentalists and authoritarians.

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Matthew S. Linck
The Ideas of Socrates.
New York: Continuum 2007.
Pp. 140.
US$110 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-9451-1).

This concise study is not a book about the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues, nor is it a book about Plato's Forms. Instead, Linck (hereafter 'L') has isolated the figure of the young Socrates in Plato's non-Socratic dialogues, where Plato shows us the inchoate ideas, as they gestate in Socrates' early dialectical encounters. The book consists in a series of running commentaries on central passages in the *Symposium*, *Parmenides*, and *Phaedo*, all of which offer portraits of the young Socrates. L astutely notices that these portraits contain important adumbrations concerning the Forms, and from there he tries to argue that the person of Socrates is central to the configuration of Plato's nascent theory. Or rather, for L, these passages collectively show that

the 'theory' of forms must also be understood as entailing Socratic self-examination, insofar as they develop as a result of Socrates' reflections upon his own approach to the phenomena of philosophy. L attempts to build his account of the 'eidetic' from the ground up, working from his chosen passages and creating a verisimilitude that the forms are a work in progress. In principle, this method could be salutary. Why not take Plato seriously when he makes Socrates the author of the forms, at least in the sense that L does? That is, they are the ideas thought up by the persona of the young Socrates in the Platonic dialogues.

The first chapter on the *Phaedo* 97-99 has Socrates groping for an incipient ideality in response to his disappointment with Anaxagoras' theory of *Nous* and *Diné* as the explanatory mechanisms of cosmic differentiation. Socrates is forging a path of inquiry that proceeds by way of refining itself. The story Socrates tells in his autobiography is one of self-transformation: in studying the causes of things, Socrates learned to investigate his own mind, for it was the source both of the abstraction and of the teleology that he had sought in vain in the work of Anaxagoras. Socrates creates an art of *logoi*, an art that treats the method of inquiry in itself as its object for investigation.

Chapter 2 continues with this theme, the education of Socrates. In Parmenides and in Zeno, Socrates finds the kind of teachers he was seeking. It is they who clarify for Socrates his own relationship to the art of logos that, we find, Socrates is coming to embody. By means of the challenges of the third man and worst difficulty arguments, Parmenides teaches Socrates to navigate between the Skylla and Charibidis, respectively, of materialism and of subjective idealism, in searching for the truth of the Forms. A truer understanding of the forms is conveyed through Parmenides' gymnastic (*Parmenides* 137-157): what are the consequences for the form, with respect to its unity, if in fact it is one? If it is one, it cannot be whole; it cannot have parts; thus form is non-spatial. Through the second and third hypotheses, Parmenides shows that the one (i.e., the form) stands for the limit of spatio-temporal existence; it marks the boundaries of being in time. Because the soul draws the forms out of the world, Socrates cannot leave himself out of the account of the ideas; the forms appear to him. At the same time, the being of the forms is discovered only within space and time.

In Chapter 3 we meet the young Socrates under the tutelage of Diotima at *Symposium* 203-211. For L, the *Symposium* adds another element of self-transformation to Socrates' quest for form, one that is essentially ethical. Because of Socrates' philosophical orientation toward the world, he begins to be at odds with his own being; it is because of his as yet unsatisfactory grasp of the nature of form that Socrates is in the true sense a lover of wisdom. Because forms and things are separate, the philosopher's study of transcendence is erotic; another name for eros is receptivity to logos, to truth.

Chapter 4 returns to the *Phaedo*, to the mature Socrates, indeed to Socrates on the last day of his life. At *Phaedo* 100 Socrates now updates us on his method, in which he invokes the forms as the only satisfactory cause for a particular's possession of a given quality. Yet despite the apparent safety and

cogency of Socrates' explanatory apparatus, it is precisely here that L suggests that Socrates uses it more as an arsenal in the war against sophistry, than as an independent metaphysical theory.

In Chapter 5 L concludes that the 'eidetic' is built into the persona of Socrates *qua* dialectician. Thus Socrates' self-reflection on the activity of philosophy, as performed in conjunction with his critics and or mentors, is bound up with the metaphysics of forms. The tentative status of this theory derives from its associations with Socrates' biography.

I wonder whether the method that L claims for his reading of these dialogues best serves his interests. It is one thing to ignore basic scholarship on the Forms (cf. Silverman 2002: *The Dialectic of Essence*) and on character in Plato (Blondell 2002: *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues*) in favor of a purportedly philological reading. Yet when the results of this reading are expressed in Heideggerian terms, and we are told that such a reading shows us that 'precisely in our being within and of phenomena, we can start to read the Platonic corpus as nothing but the explication of the eidetic, as coming to account for the immanent, yet latent, articulation of phenomenal being,' we have to see L's method as tendentious in the extreme. We are also left with questions for which L does not provide the resources for an answer. What is L's ubiquitous 'phenomenal being', evidently the kind of being the forms enjoy? When L tells us that the self is an ensouled body, does he hope to reconcile this definition with the *First Alcibiades'* definition of the self as 'soul using a body as an instrument' (129)? What kind of philology does L attempt when he ignores the import of crucially relevant Platonic texts for his interpretation?

L's work has some interesting, original threads that merit serious consideration. There is something as yet unexplained about the adumbration of Plato's 'eidetic' by a philosopher who (cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1078b 22-33) was not even acquainted with them. For me, it is disappointing that a promising project is abandoned in favor of the slogans of Heidegger's and Bernadete's Plato.

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Christoph Menke
Reflections of Equality.
Trans. Howard Rouse and Andrei Denejkine.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2006.
Pp. 256.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-4473-7);
US$24.96 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-4474-4).

It is not unusual to find philosophical monographs that ostensibly bridge the presumed gap between continental and analytic philosophy. We are told that since both sides aspire to roughly the same philosophical goals, philosophical dialogue is both possible and desirable. However, since an increasing number of philosophers are trained in the analytic tradition, much of this bridging takes place from a methodologically closed, almost monological, position. Of course, there are philosophers sincerely interested in so-called continental philosophy. However, their formation is almost inescapably analytic even when their concerns are directed elsewhere: those seeking to avoid the continental-analytic divide frequently do so as analytic philosophers who happen to be concerned with continental philosophy. In contrast, those who are continentally trained and those few who have been able to overcome their professional formation tend to avoid analytic philosophy altogether. This is all to say that it is in unusual (though not unprecedented) to find a properly continental philosopher who engages the analytic tradition. Without ever addressing this so-called divide, which is likely the best way to overcome it, Menke's book has accomplished just this in the field of political philosophy. Informed by Hegel, Derrida, Adorno and others, he speaks to both sides of the ideological channel by addressing what is arguably the most common theme in analytic political philosophy: political equality.

Menke's text is divided into three parts, each containing two chapters. The two essays in the first part serve to orient the reader to the problem of political equality as a questioning and challenging of equality. In effect, the first part serves the purposes of suturing the disparate essays that follow by articulating the implicit problematic that moves Menke's analyses throughout. In the first chapter, Menke 'presents, in an interrelated form, some central structural determinations of the undertaking of a "questioning of equality" ' (xii). Here he examines the modern dialectic between the justification of egalitarianism and the opposition to equality in the name of individualism. Though by no means simply favoring the latter, Menke challenges and questions equality, but does so in order to show that both justification and questioning are essential to equality. In the second chapter, Menke 'offers a comparative profile of three varieties of this questioning' (xii), namely, deconstruction (Derrida), critical theory (Adorno) and genealogy (Nietzsche). In what remains, Menke presents careful elucidations and assessments of influential writers on both sides of the debate over equality. Through confrontations with Hegel, Luhmann, Habermas, Taylor and Rawls, the second part seeks to 'clarify the opposition to individuality which the reflection of equal-

ity leads to,' whereas the third part, considering the conservative thought of Burke and Schmitt as well as Babeuf and Marx's radicalism, assesses two political solutions to this opposition: revolution and mercy (xi-xii).

Though the bulk of this book is interpretive, Menke's studies are all in effect concerned with the 'struggle concerning equality' inherent in modern ethics and politics (1). The modern debate about equality can be described as a conflict over the value of equality. On the one side we find defenders of equality whose basic assumption is that all are equal, and as such, a just political world is one in which equality is expanded towards total inclusion. On the other side we find those for whom equality restricts individuals by presuming that perfect equality (i.e., identity) is both possible and morally defensible. The one side seeks to restrict individual particularities in the name of equality whereas the other condemns equality precisely because it omits such particularities. In both cases, however, equality reveals itself as the basic category of modern political theorizing and of modern political thinking generally.

Menke's thesis is that both positions are false, though correct in their condemnations of the other side. Menke holds the view that neither side understands itself correctly, by which he means that neither side understands equality correctly. His goal is, thus, to question equality, to see what it reflects as the operative category of modern thought, but in a way that also simultaneously justifies equality. Menke is no anti-egalitarian. In fact, his position is that the justification and questioning of equality dialectically turn into their opposites; as such, equality shows itself to be both self-justificatory and self-questioning. Moreover, he seems to believe that questioning equality resuscitates it by clarifying the concept. Ironically, the clarification of equality requires a careful attention to its own unclarity, to its dialectical ambiguity, to its constant movement towards the inclusion of questioning. Equality does not stand still; rather it constantly transforms itself by responding to new claims to equal treatment, including ever new members under its umbrella. However, it can only do so by questioning itself, by challenging its present and past criteria. In this way equality perpetually both justifies and problematizes itself.

Menke's contribution to the debate over political equality is significant. He offers a roughly Hegelian framework that at once draws from continental traditions and refracts onto Anglo-liberal ones; he develops an original account of equality that speaks to both strands of contemporary political philosophy. It is no small feat that Menke has incorporated the work of Rawls into his Hegelian studies; for this alone he should be commended. This simple move invites a wide readership that will undoubtedly make his work of interest to many. However, the text is also somewhat deceiving. His presumption to the contrary notwithstanding, it lacks sufficient cohesion and continuity. The first essay is the only part of the text that offers a substantive analysis of equality. What follows, though to some extent elucidating and expanding the first and central chapter, are discrete and self-contained studies of specific authors. Those readers interested in Rawls, Adorno, Schmitt etc. will

find individual essays relevant. In contrast, those looking for something to further the debate on political equality may be disappointed and left wanting much more.

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Timothy Nulty
Primitive Disclosive Alethism: Davidson, Heidegger, and the Nature of Truth.
New York: Peter Lang 2006.
Pp. 202.
US$67.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8204-8164-7).

Analytic and continental philosophers in the twentieth century were usually divided by style rather than interests, but the stylistic differences were often so extreme that this fact was frequently lost on those involved. Over the last two decades or so, attempts to highlight areas of common concern, even agreement, between these two strains of thought have been growing in number, and Nulty's *Primitive Disclosive Alethism* is a contribution to this ongoing effort.

Nulty admits he is not the first 'to show a conceptual similarity' (84) between Donald Davidson and Martin Heidegger, two of the most famous representatives of these contrasting approaches to philosophy; he gives that honour to J. E. Malpas' *Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning* (Cambridge University Press 1992). But he is the first writer to focus so closely on the parallels discernible in their treatments of the vexed question of truth. Nulty sees the contemporary philosophical debate about truth as split between advocates of a robust theory who seek a definition of truth, and defenders of the redundancy theory — the view that truth is indefinable and that the truth predicate has only a logical role in language.

In the robust camp Nulty places 'correspondence theories, coherence theories, and pragmatic theories,' united by their attempts to define truth despite their many other differences. Robust theorists include Aristotle (and his medieval followers), the Absolute Idealists, and pragmatists (William James, Richard Rorty). On the other side lie what Nulty calls the 'deflationary' views, including redundancy theorists (Quine), indefinabilists (Frege) and (perhaps surprisingly) Tarski. In Nulty's view these deflationists eschew the metaphysics associated with the robust views of truth, and highlight its

logico-linguistic nature, best expressed in the Disquotational Schema: 'P' is true if and only if P.

Nulty argues, controversially, that despite their disagreements over the possibility of a definition of truth, both the conventional positions rely ultimately on the metaphor of truth as 'picturing or representing'. Breaking the deadlock between them and finding a compromise that falls short of a formal definition but that explains and justifies 'our correspondence intuitions', while allowing us to 'make generalizations about the nature of truth beyond what the deflationists claim,' requires changing our fundamental metaphor for truth (177). We should, Nulty claims, think of truth instead as fundamentally a kind of 'pointing or revealing' (191).

Nulty argues that Davidson and Heidegger, taken together, provide the materials for fleshing out this metaphor. Both, he asserts, treat truth as primitive. For Davidson, truth expresses 'the notion of a shared world that acts as a necessary condition for the possibility of meaning and belief,' and it emerges in a process of 'triangulation', which requires a self, at least one other, and 'some third object or event in the world' (17, 61). However, Nulty concludes that Davidson's account remains incomplete because it does not fully explain the shared practical and largely pre-linguistic ways of non-propositional coping with the environment involved in triangulation that still seem to imply some notion of truth.

Nulty finds this missing element in the 'analytic of *Dasein*', the phrase Heidegger used to denote his philosophical inquiry into the unique character of human being. Nulty admits Heidegger is often seen as 'a wordy mystic with nothing to offer serious analytic philosophers' (89), but in the second half of the book he does his best to argue that Heidegger views truth as just as objective as Davidson does. In describing truth as an existential of *Dasein*, Heidegger meant that truth is a necessary condition of human existence.

But Heidegger did not mean truth in the propositional sense; this belonged to a Cartesian account of knowledge in which an individual knower, a subjective mind, was set over and against an objective world. *Being and Time* proposed an alternative account in which lived experience took primacy. *Dasein* involves being one embodied self amongst others, and always already finding oneself immediately involved in coping with a shared world. Any division of truth and knowledge along subjective and objective lines, for example for scientific purposes, was dependent upon this prior 'being-in of *Dasein* ... a non-propositional, intentional involvement with its environment' (123).

Heidegger's claim that 'the essence of truth is freedom' poses Nulty considerable difficulties of interpretation. While the idea of truth as 'primitive' is Davidsonian, the description of it as 'disclosive alethism' is Heideggerian, and relates closely to Heidegger's idea that truth emerges by 'letting beings be' (129). The phrase may smack of a passive mystical reverie, but as Nulty explicates it, it denotes a process of active engagement with the world in which we strive to remain open to all possibilities and avoid succumbing to unexamined presuppositions, like, for example, those that lead to the Carte-

sian ontology. By maintaining such an attitude of openness, things disclose themselves as they are, and consequently, particular regions of truth — ethical, mathematical, or physical — become possible.

Nulty emphasizes that 'while the particular perspective may be the choice of the viewer,' Heidegger insists that 'what shows up or reveals itself by that perspective is not a choice' (139). As Nulty reads Heidegger, there is nothing 'subjective' about truth; Heidegger 'shares with the ancient Greeks the metaphor of light or illumination ... . Human understanding lights up aspects of reality' (116). Furthermore, Heidegger's use of this metaphor is 'a re-appropriation of the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena' which relies on there being 'objective, yet undetermined ... patterns [the noumena], in order for disclosedness [of the phenomena] to be possible' (135, 137).

So, neither Heidegger nor Davidson 'deny a relation between true propositional structures and the world; they only deny treating this relation as primarily one of correspondence to facts as robust entities' (171). Put another way, both philosophers ultimately agree that 'the essential function of truth is to point something out and exhibit it in some way' (185, 188). The analytical audience at whom this work is aimed may find this concluding view of truth rather vague, and moreover wonder whether, even if Nulty is right in saying that Davidson needs to be made more Heideggerian, the reverse is not also the case; but hopefully they will recognize the virtue of such an effort to bring together these two leading lights of their respective traditions.

Luke O'Sullivan

Francis Oakley
Natural Law, Laws of Nature, Natural Rights: Continuity and Discontinuity in the History of Ideas.
New York: Continuum 2005.
Pp. 143.
US$39.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-1765-7).

If I were to ask why you were talking about the weather, here are two ways you could answer. Answer 1: 'Because a dark cloud just appeared on the horizon'. Answer 2: 'Because, millions of years ago, my pre-human ancestors had a weather preoccupation that gave them an advantage in survival and reproduction'. The first answer would give me an immediate, empirically verifiable reason. The second, more speculative answer would be a more powerful reason in this sense: knowing Answer 2, I could conceivably predict Answer 1.

This tension between explanatory power and empirical verifiability is the philosophical space Oakley tenuously inhabits in this book.

In sketching a history of the ideas surrounding physical laws of nature, moral natural law, and individual natural rights, Oakley is aware of both the distinction and the relationship between these two types of answers when doing historical research. Using Whitehead's terminology, he calls these approaches Speculation (Answer 2) and Scholarship (Answer 1). Speculation, he says, presupposes an ultimate rationality in the events of history (and it assumes that the inner logic of an idea has a powerful, long-term effect on the thinking of a culture), while Scholarship is more empirically minded, focussing solely upon the facts of history. While sympathetic to Speculation and the guidance it can offer historians, Oakley attempts to limit himself primarily to Scholarship.

Another distinction Oakley borrows from Whitehead concerns two ways of thinking about laws of nature: as Immanent or Imposed. Immanence, says Oakley, is the view that the laws of nature are part of the rational structure of reality; it presupposes an immanent and rational God, nature-as-organism, and an essentialist epistemology. Imposition, meanwhile, is the view that the laws of nature are imposed on reality from without; it presupposes an external and transcendent God, nature-as-machine, and a nominalist epistemology.

With these two distinctions established, Oakley pursues his main argument, which, as the subtitle suggests, is two-fold: 1) the thinking about natural law in the modern era, rather than being a radical break from the past, actually flowed from the thinking of the medieval period, and 2) the *truly* revolutionary moments in the story of natural law involved the movement from Immanence to Imposition that occurred primarily in the medieval period through the rise of nominalism, as part of a much larger story whose beginning can be traced back to the tensions created when Christian theology joined the western philosophical tradition through the work of Augustine. According to Oakley, it was Augustine who attempted to reconcile 'the personal and transcendent biblical God of power and might, upon whose will the very existence of the universe was radically contingent, with the characteristically Greek intuition of the divine as limited and innerworldly and of the universe as necessary and eternal' (47). This ultimately unstable synthesis led to the medieval theological/philosophical debates that produced the Imposed versions of natural law used by the scientists and moral philosophers of the early modern era. This two-fold argument is pursued over the course of three chapters, covering the realms of science ('Laws of Nature'), moral philosophy ('Natural Law'), and subjective human rights ('Natural Rights').

These chapters, which began as a series of lectures, suffered in the transition to print. The book has a stumbling, flowery prose ('For what, willy-nilly, they did was in effect and in a fashion ...' [54]) that one hopes was less distracting in the lectures. Also, while Oakley offers up plenty of quotations to support his arguments, they are short and often fragmentary. This is understandable in a series of lectures but frustrating in a book, and, as attribution

often does not appear in the main body of the text, the frustration is magnified by the use of endnotes rather than footnotes. The lack of footnotes is even more troubling when Oakley quotes *himself* but with vague attribution, setting up the quotation with, 'And more than one historian of early modern science has now been led to suggest ...' (57). (To be fair, Oakley does list a series of references in the endnote to support his claim.)

The argument itself is open to at least three criticisms. First, while Oakley argues that the developments concerning the physical laws of nature led the way for developments in the other two realms, he ends his book with a chapter that traces the origins of natural rights back to the twelfth century, two centuries *earlier* than the important events in his account of the evolution of the physical laws of nature. Oakley *could* explain this, I believe, but he does not; it is an obvious question left unanswered. Second, Oakley's Speculative argument is nearly identical to one Michael Foster made in the mid-1930's in the journal *Mind*, but Oakley — who is aware of Foster's work and has written of it elsewhere — only mentions Foster briefly in the epilogue and an endnote, with no description of Foster's argument. In a book on the history of ideas, this is a surprising omission. Third, although Oakley announces at the book's beginning that he intends to move from Speculation to Scholarship, he in fact fails to make that move decisively.

But that failure is also one of the book's strengths: the energy found in the tension between Speculation and Scholarship propels Oakley's argument forward. Through Scholarship, certainly, he shows the reader *how* laws of nature, natural law, and natural rights can be traced back into the Middle Ages; indeed, the majority of the book is spent on this 'paper-chase of ideas' (60). But as important as the exercise is, Oakley seems to find it a bit thin (like your pointing to that dark cloud on the horizon). So, while Oakley-the-historian feels he should leave Speculation behind in favour of Scholarship, Oakley-the-philosopher is repeatedly drawn back to Speculation and a discussion of *why* these ideas appeared in the Middle Ages, and it is when he allows himself this guilty pleasure that Oakley's short book is at its most compelling.

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Catherine Osborne
Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers: Humanity and the Humane in Ancient Philosophy and Literature.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 276.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928206-7).

When it comes to the perennial question of what separates humans from animals, ancient philosophy continues to provide food for thought, not least because the main line in ancient philosophical psychology readily acknowledges just how much the two have in common. As a consequence, recent research in the field has produced some fine studies, notably Richard Sorabji's landmark book *Animal Minds, Human Morals* and Stephen R. L. Clark's many monographs on biology and ethics. Both incorporate a widely informed historical perspective with an eye for contemporary concerns: to this group we may now add the volume under review. Like Sorabji and (more markedly) Clark, Osborne writes from a strongly held personal perspective; as with Clark, how much one gets out of Osborne's book ultimately depends on how congenial one finds her position.

After a methodological introductory section, the work takes the form of a series of closely argued readings of passages in ancient philosophy and literature. Some of these are established classics in histories of human-animal relations; others, such as the ruminations of the atomists and the plays of Sophocles, are less known or else underappreciated. It is in introducing and explaining these to a contemporary readership that Osborne does her strongest work. As a running theme, Osborne elucidates her version of the is-ought distinction, showing how little in the ancient philosophers warrants drawing values from facts, and how the philosophers nonetheless saw fit to assign value to a wide range of creatures. This 'humane' outlook Osborne contrasts with the 'sentimental', while taking a stand against all amoral attitudes towards nature (which she blankly equates with rank immorality). Figures taken in along the way include Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the desert fathers; themes range from the presence or absence of hierarchies in ancient understandings of the chain of being (which Osborne handles with admirable finesse) to the correct and incorrect attribution of moral value to animal behaviour (which receives more fanciful treatment). Overall, there is an impressive breadth and depth to the book.

In the preface, Osborne apologizes for not situating her metaethical ruminations in a contemporary setting (viii). In the introductory part, echoes can be heard of Moorean intuitionism, as well as of Wittgenstein's saying-showing distinction (5) and the latter's equation of the way in which ethical and aesthetic statements function equivalently (12-14). Osborne self-identifies with a kind of Platonism: goodness and beauty to her are real properties of

things, out there to be discovered, recognized, and brought into ever more full-fledged being (15).

What might 'Platonism' mean here? Osborne's ruminations can usefully be compared with Christopher Coope's amusing putdown of modern virtue ethics in a recent eponymous essay ('Modern Virtue Ethics', in Timothy Chappell, ed., *Values and Virtues: Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics* [Clarendon Press 2006], a collection to be reviewed in the next issue of *PIR* by J. Klagge). Coope notes that laudatory epithets such as 'benevolent, altruistic, generous, compassionate, kind' — the list is from Hursthouse, *Ethics, Humans, and Other Animals* (Routledge 2000, 147) — do not make the grade in classical accounts of virtue; his made-up virtue of 'ameliorance' (35) represents the absurdity of selling as a virtue (in the ancient sense) the promotion of the 'flourishing and integrity of ecosystems, species, and natural objects (sentient and non-sentient) for their own sake.' (The definition is Swanton's, *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View* [Oxford University Press 2003], 94; the term 'ameliorance' is not.) Osborne endorses all these things. How? Because while Coope accepts Peter Geach's claim that such charitableness can only make sense in a theological perspective, Osborne adopts 'the perspective of heaven' as her yardstick and can thus claim objectivity for her recommendations, with or without God. As with any Platonism, either you see the world in such terms or you don't: some will consequently struggle with Osborne's claims, while others will find them inspiring. But it is important to note that for her, the correct moral outlook is *not* a social construct, but a reflection of the world outside. Her project thus differs in a fundamental way from, say, that of most contemporary Aristotelians.

A certain didacticism marks the prose, mainly in the form of unnecessary repetition. The book also proceeds in fits and starts: five pages are spent on a minute analysis of a single line from *Henry IV Part One* (16-21), while Osborne's distaste for the term 'speciesism' only receives passing mention in a footnote (23n26) and no explanation — this despite the large implications this has for the following discussion about whether a given organism (or nature, or its own nature) strives to promote its own ends or those of its kind. These are quibbles, but they reflect a generally uneven pacing that is sometimes wearying.

Despite a typically careful approach, Osborne is also not above occasionally stretching her interpretations right to the limit, in order to make the texts say what she would prefer them to say. And the book ends regrettably, with an ill-considered diatribe against the presumed moral superiority of vegetarianism. Chapter 9 takes its cue from Porphyry's seminal treatise *On Abstinence from Killing Animals,* and one rather wishes Osborne had stuck with the structural analysis so promisingly begun on its first four or so pages. As it stands, the chapter's failings are many; it is perhaps enough to highlight a closing comparison made between 'traditional local home produce, honourably raised by compassionate farmers' and 'artificially processed factory-made veggie burgers ... in their sterile shrink-wrapped packets' (238). As a rhetorical technique, comparing the worst possible take on one's opponent

to the best face one can put on one's chosen party is woefully transparent; as a philosophical and political tool, it is singularly unhelpful. The passage, regrettably, is not alone in its tendentiousness.

This is a frustratingly uneven book, then, one in which genuine insights rub shoulders with laborious and at times belaboured interpretations, and where sympathetic developments of thought can at any moment be cut short by an abrupt remark. The work unmistakably bears the voice of its author, and that, in this day and age, to my mind is a good thing. But there is a price to pay, in that the acceptability of the book as a whole will largely depend on whether the reader finds that voice — sometimes lucid, on occasion shrill, often engaging, always idiosyncratic — agreeable or not.

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Tom Rockmore
Kant and Idealism.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2007.
Pp. 286.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 978-0-300-12008-0).

Nobody defends idealism anymore. Hyperbole aside, idealism is rarely adopted currently, and, as Rockmore notes, not often is it even seriously studied (2). *Kant and Idealism* is thus a welcome and timely book, written by a philosopher widely knowledgeable of and sympathetic to idealism. Books such as Rockmore's are necessary to refocus historians of philosophy on idealism and force a reevaluation of the twentieth century's unproved 'refutation of idealism'.

Rockmore avoids explicitly detailing the tenets of a 'common idealist position' (23). There is no 'idealism in general' (3), he states, no shared principles characteristic of all idealists. Rockmore even doubts, wrongly I think, that there are family resemblances among idealists, but without some minimal description, one wonders how the subject can be broached. Rockmore's response is that, while 'idealism as such ... does not exist' (3), there are various kinds of idealism. His study aims to classify them, evaluate objections to them, and defend a type of constructivism associated with Kant and post-Kantian German idealism. Without a criterion of discernment, however, Rockmore's classifications become arbitrary and problematic. Yet his conclusion about constructivism's importance cannot be ignored.

Rockmore identifies three main forms of idealism: Platonic idealism, the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century new way of ideas, and German idealism. Platonic idealism is a metaphysical realism that eschews representationalism for direct realism: ideas reveal what is truly real. The new way of ideas (continental rationalism and British empiricism) is also metaphysically realist, but it opts for an indirect realism or representationalism: ideas represent what is real. Kant is the link between German idealism and earlier idealisms: his 'categories are a variant form of Platonic ideas' (203); he was committed to the representationalism of the new way of ideas; and his 'Copernican Revolution' inaugurated the constructivism that characterized German idealism. Hegel, spurred on by Fichte and Schelling, broke completely with representationalism to complete the Kantian constructivist project. Rockmore analyzes these movements in detail, then explores Marx's idealism, Neo-Kantianism, British idealism, and more recent strands of idealism represented by Royce, Croce, Collingwood, Blanshard, and Rescher.

As intimated, Rockmore views idealism and realism as compatible theories. Yet some idealist theories of knowledge are not, in his view, worth defending. Those which adopt metaphysical realism should be shelved; those most worth retaining are the constructivist theories of the tradition of Kantian German idealism. Rockmore frequently refers to the 'decline' (2) or 'failure' (56, 223) of metaphysical realism, but his argument for this claim is almost nil. I doubt metaphysical realists will be convinced of their error.

Philosophers sympathetic to idealism, on the other hand, may not accept Rockmore's classifications or his contention that idealism is indefinable. He suggests, referring to Plato's idealism, 'a theory of knowledge based on ideas qualifies as idealism' (38). Contra his own thesis, he provides criteria. The above criterion delineates a loose definition of idealism, however, one too comprehensive to provide a meaningful, substantive definition. The resulting designation of idealist to Plato is largely anachronistic — a modern imposition on the theory of ideas — and Rockmore does little to relate Platonic and modern idealism. By also designating the new way of ideas 'idealist', Rockmore adopts the paradoxical position that two philosophies with contradictory views about ideas are both idealist. Platonism advocates an anti-representational direct realism; the new way of ideas is an anti-Platonic, representationalist indirect realism. Ideas are real for Plato, not for the new way of ideas. These philosophers share not a sophisticated theory of ideas, but, with the exception of Berkeley, a belief in metaphysical realism and a real which can be known as it actually exists. One doubts they are *best* seen as idealists.

Such worries prompt a concern about Rockmore's unwillingness to give idealism any definition. Yet his practice belies his theory: he occasionally slips into descriptive mode, e.g., he states, 'Idealism in all its forms turns on epistemological claims' (215). This assertion undercuts the evidence for Plato's idealism, given its largely metaphysical nature. A skeptic about the idealism of representationalism might reasonably conclude that the best description of idealism Rockmore provides is one summarizing the view of Rescher: ide-

alism insists 'that the mind necessarily and always contributes to what we know' (120).

This constructivism characterizes Kant and post-Kantian idealism. Rockmore also attributes representationalism and metaphysical realism to Kant, confusingly arguing first that these incompatible views were held simultaneously in the critical philosophy (49), and later stating that Kant abandoned representationalism and metaphysical realism (200). The historical sequence of these positions is not clarified, and Rockmore's evidence that Kant was committed to a new way of ideas in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is thin. There is also little evidence provided of metaphysical realism after the 'Copernican revolution' of Kant's transcendental idealism. We can know there *is* an empirically real world, but we cannot know representations *represent* that world as things in themselves. Rockmore calls the Kantian view that we know only 'what is given in experience' 'empirical realism' (26), a form of realism compatible with idealism. But 'empirical realism' is a specious concept, a misnomer, an idealism masquerading as realism whose only similarity to any other realism is its belief in an external world.

I am sympathetic to Rockmore's reevaluation of idealism and constructivism, but I fear my review seems unduly combative. Perhaps this lends credence to Rockmore's claim about the diversity of idealism. I have a remaining concern about Rockmore's disservice to British idealism. He perpetuates analytic philosophy's common wisdom that British idealism is not worth studying and can be ignored. He calls it 'the least significant' (7) form of idealism, maintaining it 'has little now to teach us as concerns knowledge' (110). These assertions go largely undefended, and, as I have demonstrated, *as idealism* neither Plato nor the new way of ideas offers much. However, British idealism, like German idealism, rejected metaphysical realism and representationalism, adopting post-Kantian constructivism. In the coherence theories of truth propounded by Bradley and Joachim and the historicism of Croce (so influential on later British idealism) and Collingwood, we see a proliferation of unorthodox, Hegelian epistemological views. Rockmore leaves their views uncriticized, their complicated relationships to Hegel unanalyzed. The question he poses — 'What is idealist about British idealism?' (111) — is a question that deserves a more adequate response by historians of philosophy. One might hope Rockmore reconsiders extending his vast knowledge of post-Kantian idealism to this untapped resource.

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Donald Rutherford, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 438.
US$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-82242-8);
US$29.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-52962-4).

In the past few decades considerable scholarly work has been done to set the classic texts of early modern philosophy — roughly, texts written in the period from the Reformation to the French Revolution, by authors from Montaigne to Kant — in their varied contexts. Contextualization includes the reinterpretation of classic texts in light of other works by the same author, including minor works and unpublished writings, or in light of other works by non-canonical authors, or in light of intellectual or social settings, including those of science, religion, and politics. Various approaches to contextualization are on display in the fine essays in *The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*.

Although these essays could profitably be read by specialists on early modern philosophy, nearly all are accessible, and should prove valuable, to the non-specialist audience for which they were intended. There are two respects in which the publication of this volume is especially significant. The history of early modern philosophy is central to the undergraduate curriculum — almost all philosophy departments in the United States require a course in the history of early modern philosophy for the major — and this book could serve as a secondary text in an introductory course on the subject: it thus serves the philosophical and pedagogical end of making contextual approaches to the history of early modern philosophy accessible to beginning students. A further pedagogical virtue of this volume is that, although most introductory courses on the history of early modern philosophy focus on metaphysics and epistemology, the topical essays at the heart of the volume are divided equally between metaphysics and epistemology and value theory. There is, unfortunately, no essay on aesthetics, but this is understandable, because few courses on early modern philosophy treat aesthetics, and the study of the history of aesthetics remains in its infancy.

Like much recent contextual work, this volume emphasizes the complicated interplay between tradition and innovation in early modern philosophy. Nicholas Jolley gives memorable expression to this theme at the beginning of his contribution: 'According to the Gospels, men do not put new wine in old bottles. Metaphorically speaking at least, philosophers of the early modern period tend to be exceptions to this rule' (95). Nearly all the essays in this volume bear out Jolley's remark, and illuminate different ways in which early modern philosophers engage with their predecessors.

There are five essays on topics in metaphysics and epistemology: Stephen Gaukroger on the new methods for gaining knowledge pioneered by Bacon and Descartes and manifest in the work of Galileo; Dennis Des Chene on

the transformation of natural philosophy into natural science, focusing on the rejection of scholastic matter and form in favor of 'mechanical' matter, and on the move away from explanations in terms of powers to explanations in terms of laws; Nicholas Jolley on the method of and particular topics in metaphysics — substance, causality, the mind-body problem, and the nature of space and time; Tad Schmaltz on the invention of the modern concept of mind, manifest in approaches to the metaphysics of mind (the mind-body problem), accounts of cognition, and accounts of freedom; Michael Losonsky on the turns from Aristotelian logic towards modern mathematical logic, and from formal logic towards natural language as a source of illumination of philosophical problems. These essays all focus on canonical figures; with the exception of Losonsky's paper, all concentrate on the Rationalists and devote particular attention to Descartes. A more extended discussion of Newton and Hume in particular and the Empiricists in general would have been welcome in this section of the volume.

There are also five essays on topics in value theory, which cover many more figures than most of the essays on metaphysics and epistemology: Susan James on the nature and ethical significance of the passions; Stephen Darwall on the search for the sources of normativity; A. John Simmons on political philosophy, focusing on changing attitudes to 'political naturalism' — the view that politics is part of the natural or divinely directed order — and on the development of the concept of the modern state; Thomas Lennon on conceptions of God in particular and philosophical approaches to theology in general; and M. W. F. Stone on the intrinsic interest of early modern scholasticism, which is somewhat orthogonal to the rest of the volume.

The opening and closing papers are the most substantial contributions. Rutherford's 'Innovation and Orthodoxy in Early Modern Philosophy' splendidly opens the volume by elaborating its overarching theme, the interplay between tradition and innovation. Rutherford examines the strategies employed by Galileo and Bacon in order to reconcile novel ideas in natural philosophy with religion, and then devotes particular attention to the limits to Descartes' transformation of modern philosophy manifest in his stated attempt to preserve traditional theological views. Rutherford argues that most early modern philosophers are compatibilists about the relation between philosophy and religion, believing them to be reconcilable. Of the few incompatibilists, only Spinoza, according to Rutherford, is so radical as to challenge traditional religion. J. B. Schneewind's 'Towards Enlightenment: Kant and the Sources of Darkness' is the only sustained treatment of Kant in the volume, and it concludes the volume by locating Kant's views on enlightenment in relation to the views of his early modern predecessors. Schneewind begins by briefly reviewing different conceptions of the Enlightenment, and surveying the views of Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Holbach, and Condorcet, who all identify enlightenment with an increase in *theoretical* knowledge. He then turns to Kant, and convincingly shows that Kant believes that it is difficult for individuals to achieve enlightenment on account of the radical evil in human nature. What is distinctive about Kant's conception of enlightenment,

according to Schneewind, is that it is a *practical* conception: the choice of enlightenment over darkness is a *moral* choice.

The volume itself is well made: it includes handy summary biographies of selected early modern philosophers, and is generally well edited (there are very few typographical errors) and handsomely produced (although footnotes rather than endnotes would have been nice). The volume even has a striking cover, adorned by a lovely reproduction of Poussin's 'Dance to the Music of Time'.

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Daniel Schwartz
Aquinas on Friendship.
New York: Oxford University Press 2007.
Pp. 208.
$55.00 (cloth: ISBN-13: 978-0-19-920539-4).

In his introduction to this slim volume on friendship in Aquinas, Schwartz points out that *philia* had been of great interest to philosophers throughout most of the Western tradition. After Descartes, however, attention shifted to epistemology and a rigorous philosophical methodology patterned after the natural sciences. Consequently, friendship was largely ignored or at most accepted only marginally. Schwartz' synthetic study of Aquinas' views on friendship demonstrates why it would be a serious mistake to relegate it to a secondary status. Aside from any special interest it may have, friendship stands as a point of convergence for several fundamental philosophical themes such as unity, plurality, intellect, will, form, the good, and *telos*. The driving questions are the same for Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, and Schwartz: What does it mean for two or more people to be 'united' in friendship? What is the 'form' of friendship? What does it mean to 'know' and 'will' the good of the other? What are the 'ends' of friendship?

Schwartz begins by laying out these larger themes as they appear in Aquinas. Since Aquinas never dedicated a single work exclusively to the topic, it is just as necessary to look at where and why he discusses friendship as it is to study what he actually says about it. Schwartz explains that Aquinas considered friendship as the ideal paradigm for all human relationships: family, societal, and political. A theory of friendship is also helpful for an understanding of the analogous relation between God and human beings. Aquinas designates three basic acts of friendship common to all its various

instantiations: *benevolentia, concordia* and *beneficentia. Benevolentia* designates a desire for the good of the other. *Concordia* exists when friends will and reject the same things. *Beneficentia* consists in the performance of good deeds toward the other and in refraining from harmful actions. These three elements create a framework in which we can examine the more specific elements unique to each different type of friendship.

After sketching these general themes, Schwartz proceeds to examine more closely Aquinas' approach to the perennial problems associated with love and friendship. Is it necessary to love oneself in order to have friends? In Book 8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle dwells at length on this question and concludes that self-love, correctly understood, is absolutely necessary for friendship. Not surprisingly, Aquinas largely agrees, but not without further developments and modifications. Most significantly, Aquinas links human friendship with the theological virtue of hope. Hope, as the expectation of fulfillment in the life to come, motivates a friend to act beneficently with a supernatural assurance absent from Aristotle's pre-Christian theory. For Aristotle, self-love is a prerequisite for friendship because the agent must desire to be admired and respected for doing to the other what is also truly good for the agent himself. Aquinas, however, patterns perfect human friendship after divine friendship, according to which the human agent performs beneficent acts as one already having been loved with a perfect divine charity in the life of grace. Schwartz explores this difference between Aristotle and Aquinas by teasing out the implications for the respective roles of utility and pleasure in friendship.

Schwartz then proceeds to consider how the general philosophical themes of unity and plurality figure in the Thomistic theory of friendship. Aquinas accepts the traditional axiom that friendship consists in a conformity of wills (*concordia*). He acknowledges, however, that such unity is rendered problematic by natural inequalities among friends, by the fact that friends often concretely will dissimilar or seemingly opposite things, and by the fact that they remain two wholly distinct spiritual beings. To sort through these difficulties, Schwartz reassembles the key components of Aquinas' moral philosophy with a view toward showing how it is possible for two individuals to will the same thing formally (*formaliter*) while holding two different opinions on how to attain that thing as an end. However, further problems arise in the case of friendship with God, for whom there is a perfect simplicity of will only analogously related to the 'deliberative' (i.e., complex) human will. After indicating some ambiguities in Aquinas's position, Schwartz suggests several resolutions through a series of case scenarios and an interesting contrast between Aquinas and Duns Scotus.

The latter part of this book is dedicated to a comparison of friendship and justice. Schwartz begins by showing that Aquinas generally adopts the classic Aristotelian position that justice is strictly necessary only when friendship is lacking. However, Aquinas opens space for justice within the realm of friendship when extreme disagreement or inequality occurs between friends. The analogy with divine friendship, therefore, is bi-directional. Whereas for Aris-

totle a perfect human friendship is possible (since friendship is neither necessary nor possible for God), for Aquinas, the imperfection of human friendship (since perfect friendship is only possible for God) always ties it to the virtue of justice, even in cases where it is relatively successful.

Schwartz' study not only fills a lacuna in recent scholarship on the philosophy of friendship, but adds to the growing number of attempts to critically examine and build upon Thomistic foundations in an original way. In regard to friendship, the central issue is how two limited and imperfect wills can be united and how that unity relates to the perfect and infinite unity of the divine will. As Schwartz argues, in the case of human friendship, an approach to these and related problems — though enriched by theology — remains for Aquinas completely on the level of philosophy. Throughout the book, Schwartz weaves an ongoing examination of the Aristotelian and Platonic (i.e., Dionysian) strains in Aquinas' notion of *philia*. It is always a challenge to pare down a doctoral dissertation into a shorter work without sacrificing a sense of coherence and completeness, but in this regard Schwartz has admirably succeeded. The book also contains a useful bibliography of secondary sources as well as an indispensable *index locorum* for the specialist in Thomistic studies.

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Robert C. Solomon
True To Our Feelings:
What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us.
New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 300.
Cdn$30.95/US$28.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-530672-9).

Solomon's first book on philosophy of emotion, *The Passions*, originally appeared in 1976, when the topic was still a relatively neglected one. He remained a prolific and distinctive voice in the field until his sadly early death this past January. This, his latest book, follows two previous volumes developing his notion of the 'passionate life': *In Defense of Sentimentality* (OUP 2004) and an edited volume, *Not Passion's Slave* (OUP 2002). Like much of Solomon's work, this most recent contribution is written in an explicitly personally engaged, often autobiographical, style. Originally developed as a set of recorded lectures for The Teaching Company, the presentation is clearly

intended to include non-specialist audiences: for instance, the authors discussed are introduced with identifying specifications such as 'the philosopher Nietzsche' or 'neurologist Antonio Damasio'.

This book is divided into three parts. The first, 'Emotional Strategies: An Existentialist Perspective', examines in some detail the ways in which we engage the world through particular emotions. The general Sartrean theme of this section is an ongoing one of Solomon's: emotional reactions can usefully be read as, and ultimately even identified with, strategies we adopt as a way of dealing with the challenges of our lives. So, anger, for instance, is not something that passively comes over us, but a way of approaching the world, based on choices about interpretation and value, and colouring, in the next instance, our perceptions of and motivations about ourselves, the world, and those towards whom we are angry. While Sartrean in its descriptive assumptions about emotions, Solomon's evaluation of emotions also shows the persistence of his other main avowed philosophical influence, Nietzsche, in its embrace of emotional engagement over dispassionate rationalism.

The second part, 'Toward a General Theory: Myths About Emotions', develops these themes, first engaging issues of what emotion-theories do and should aim to achieve. The following chapters target what Solomon regards as pernicious myths about emotions, primarily the idea that they are irrational, 'just feelings' and 'just happen' to us. Solomon's attack here is made both on a descriptive and a normative basis. While the former is the more explicit focus of most of the chapters, it is the latter which is most central to his case, and which most informs his notion of what a theory of emotion ought to achieve. Specifically, Solomon's view is that from the point of view of ethics, and of giving our lives meaning and direction, accounts of emotions that reduce them to brute events, as opposed to meaningful and purposeful doings on our parts, are pernicious.

The worry, though, is that this leads to his rejecting out of hand, and conflating, accounts not compatible with his own strongly voluntarist, 'judgmentalist' view of emotion, whatever light these rival views might have to shed on emotions. For instance, while Solomon is certainly right that such information as we currently possess about the neurophysiology of emotion does not exhaust the existential or ethical significance of our feelings, this hardly supports such claims as that '[n]europhysiological reductionism is but the most current and most exotic of the various theories with which we distance ourselves from our own emotions. (It used to be fate, spells, and love potions.)' (122) Similarly, while he is one of the relatively few philosophers to engage the literature on 'emotional intelligence' in its scientific rather than its popularized version, his critique tends to skate over some of the trickier points both of concepts of rationality and of their application to emotions. Also, folk psychology and phenomenology, Solomon's preferred modes of inquiry into the nature of emotions, may themselves support many of the 'myths' about emotions that he is concerned to dispel.

The third and final part, 'The Ethics of Emotion: A Quest for Emotional Integrity', sets out in some more detail Solomon's own view of the emotions,

their universality across cultures, their evolutionary aspects and bearing on the human condition, and his own notion of the 'passionate life' as the good life. It also seeks to develop his concept of 'emotional integrity', a notion that, albeit in a Nietzschean-Sartrean mode, appears to bear some resemblance to Aristotle's idea of appropriateness in emotions — that the emotion should be right for the person who feels it, and the person or object it is felt towards, both in its kind, its strength, and its time and manner of expression. Solomon, given his influences, naturally has a great deal to say about the ways in which we can fool ourselves about our feelings, and the morally pressing need not to do so. But he is also concerned to reject any suggestion that we would be better off without emotional engagement.

As in his previous works, Solomon's points are consistently thought-provoking, subtle, funny and even touching. However, the general themes often combine a degree of vagueness about the precise content of his own views with a stubbornness about defending them against opposing positions that he sometimes misrepresents, or which have largely been abandoned. While he concedes, for instance, that the Jamesian concept of emotion as awareness of one's own physiological arousal may not be as antithetical to the purposes of his own approach to emotions as he used to think, his treatment of more recent work emphasising the role of biology in emotions still tends towards a quasi-reflexive rejection of empirical science as a way of discovering what emotions are, even where the relevant findings are ones that could potentially illuminate issues such as why and how emotional engagement with the world differs from the non-emotional engagement. There is also a tendency, throughout, to make qualifications, most notably about the voluntariness of emotions, only to reassert sweeping 'no excuses' claims shortly after. The sheer range of challengers he takes on is on the other hand in itself impressive — and makes it again the more sad that he did not live to develop his work further.

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Michel Weber
Whitehead's Pancreativism: The Basics.
Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2007.
Pp. 255.
US$106.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-3-938793-15-2).

In his introduction to *After Virtue,* Alasdair MacIntyre called upon his readers to imagine a culture in which, to begin with, the natural sciences had been destroyed by an anti-science movement, and then, reacting against this movement, people had attempted to reconstruct science from surviving fragments. In this imaginary world adults argue over the respective merits of different theories, and children learn by heart the surviving portions of the periodic table and recite as incantations some of the theorems of Euclid, but 'nobody, or almost nobody, realizes that what they are doing is not natural science in the proper sense at all.' The contexts needed to make sense of scientific arguments have been lost, perhaps irretrievably. This imaginary world is used by MacIntyre to suggest that in the actual world we inhabit moral philosophy and morality itself are in the same state of grave disorder as natural science in this imaginary world. Reading Michel Weber's book makes one aware that it is not only moral philosophy that is in a grave state of disorder, but philosophy itself, and it is not only morality but our entire culture which is affected by this. Analytic philosophy and other anti-philosophy movements have so destroyed the background beliefs and contexts assumed by philosophers in the past that while there are still philosophy departments in universities producing works that are widely read, there is no real understanding of what philosophy is. Weber's book provides not only a sense of what has been lost, but also provides some of the background knowledge required to revive philosophy.

The book is an interpretation of Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy. It focuses on Whitehead's *magnum opus, Process and Reality,* attempting to understand this work as a whole, including its two most difficult sections, Part 3, 'The Theory of Prehensions', and Part 4, 'The Theory of Extension'. Without understanding the work as a whole it might be possible to appropriate Whitehead's insights to different agendas, but the 'rule of such interpretations', Weber suggests, is to '*murder to dissect*' (xiii). The consequence of such murder is that 'Whitehead has *not* been recognized so far as one of the most potent historical figures of Western science and philosophy' (xii). A major component of the work is to show what it means to interpret Whitehead's legacy as whole and how to achieve this in a way that reveals its broader significance. As Weber wrote: 'It is the purpose of this monograph to propose a set of highly efficient hermeneutical tools to get the reader started' (xi). Using these tools, the book proposes an interpretation that re-evaluates the significance of Whitehead's thought to the history of civilization. It is this component of this book which evokes the sense that only now are we beginning to recover from a cultural disaster, the effective collapse of philosophy in the early decades of the twentieth century, and this is the most accessible and convincing part of the book.

Weber's hermeneutical tools are designed to reveal Whitehead's uniqueness. They avoid the 'retroactive illusion' in which we see in a past event nothing but the preparation for the present, and the 'teleological prospective' illusion in which we see the present as merely a preparation for the future, each of these preventing us seeing the present as a 'complete act in itself' (xiii); but at the same time, they reveal the achievement of an author or a work as a 'complete act in itself' by seeing it against the background of the entire history of thought from which it emerged, and in relation its legacy for the future. Contextualization and exegesis are inseparable, requiring us to have a holistic interpretation of this background, but without obliterating the creative advance of the author.

Weber first situates Whitehead in relation to the extraordinary developments within science, mathematics and logic from which his work emerged. These include major advances in mathematics and symbolic logic, the development of evolutionary theory, Maxwell's field theory, relativity theory and quantum theory. Responding to these, Whitehead focussed first on logic, then on the epistemology of science, and finally on metaphysics. There were both continuities and discontinuities in his philosophical development, requiring that each stage be understood holistically. Using Nicholas Rescher's history of process philosophy as a foil to elaborate his own approach to characterizing the history of philosophy in general and the history of process philosophy in particular, Weber then situates Whitehead's work in a far broader context than late nineteenth and early twentieth century thought, showing what distinguishes Whitehead's philosophy not only from the figures associated with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, but also from Greek and medieval philosophy. Revealing the central assumptions of earlier thinkers that were rejected by Bergson and James, Weber shows how Whitehead built on their work to create a radically new synthesis of ideas. This broader perspective also reveals the inter-related concerns of science, philosophy and religion, and the necessity of recognizing this inter-relation to understand Whitehead's goals and achievements.

With this background in place, Weber begins his exposition of Whitehead's work, starting with an account Whitehead's goal and method. This is the most defensible aspect of Whitehead's whole philosophy, its superiority highlighted by the trivialization of philosophy by analytic philosophers, the failure of Husserl's project to develop philosophy as a rigorous, presuppositionless, descriptive science of experience, and the failure of critical philosophy. Contrasting Whitehead's view of philosophy with recent schools of thought, Weber notes that 'Whitehead's organic processism is not the product of a pure intellectual quest; it refects the existential demand for meaning' (83). As is well known, Whitehead characterized speculative philosophy as 'the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.' Weber explicates the meaning of all the terms used in this characterization, and in doing so situates this vision in relation to the whole tradition of philosophy.

Weber then proceeds to the more difficult part, the exposition of *Process and Reality* focussing on Parts 3 and 4, although at the same time drawing on all Whitehead's works to provide a background. He argues that the core idea which unites Whitehead's entire philosophy is the notion of 'creative advance'. The radical nature of this concept has already been indicated through his discussion of earlier philosophy. The Greeks understood the world as a cosmos, where Whitehead was conceiving the world as a 'chaosmos', a partially ordered world. In the Greek world change exhausts itself in kinesis and morphogenesis; hylogenesis is unthinkable and there could only be transformation, not real creation of the new. Cosmic growth is unthinkable. Along with Bergson and James, Whitehead rejected this assumption, arguing that nature is never complete; there is a never ending creative re-creation of the world which cannot be understood as a synthesis of pre-existing building blocks. As Weber put it: 'In Greece everything changes and nothing becomes; with Whitehead, everything becomes and nothing changes' (20, 143). 'Creativity' became the '*Ur*-category' giving 'meaning to God, the eternal objects, and the World' (189). Innovatory process occurs at the edges of the continuum. Weber's argument is that it is only through appreciating this radical innovation that it becomes possible to understand why Whitehead embraced a form of atomism of 'actual occasions' to characterize this creative advance, and shows how Whitehead gave a place to subjective, objective and relative time, and revealed the inter-relationship between creative becoming associated with subjective experience, objects and the extensive continuum.

This part of the book is densely argued; but it is also where Weber is most original in his exposition, and most rewarding. Having provided a far fuller background to Whitehead's philosophy than anyone else, he is able to present a more convincing interpretation and defence of Whitehead's philosophy than anyone else. The difficulty of exposition is unavoidable, as what is called for is an immersion in Whitehead's categories and thereby a transformation of the reader. While providing predominantly an exposition and defence of Whitehead's mature philosophy, Weber is also critical of aspects of this philosophy. He argues against Whitehead that there can be no reason for novelty and that Whitehead was wrong 'to give causes to reasons' (169). He also argues that there must be new 'eternal objects'. Allowing this alters the idea of 'God', which can no longer be conceived as a single actual entity (170f.). Weber attributes these defects in Whitehead's work to his 'vicarage atmosphere' (174). However, these revisions amount to an attempt to think through Whitehead's idea of philosophy and his philosophy more rigorously and more coherently, rather than fundamental criticisms.

While Weber offers much insight into Whitehead's philosophy, specifically into the nature and rationale for Whitehead's atomism, he does not answer all objections that might be made to this. Most importantly he has not explicated Whitehead's treatment of societies of actual occasions, showing how relations between actual occasions can generate the high grade actual occasions associated with human consciousness. However, this book is only the first volume of a two-volume work. The second, complementary volume will

focus 'on the correlated issues of the spectrum of consciousness and the scale of existents (*scalae naturae)*' (238). We can only hope that this sequel will be as illuminating and convincing as the present work.

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Holly L. Wilson
Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology: Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical Significance.
Albany: State University of New York Press 2006.
Pp. 165.
US$60.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-6849-4); US$19.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-6850-0).

Immanuel Kant's lectures and writing on anthropology have long fascinated the scholarly world. These lectures and writings deal with the human being principally as he is known through outward signs rather than through introspection, and also principally considered in terms of the average rather than in terms of unique personalities. At the same time, students in philosophy, and even some of their instructors, are not always aware of the fact that there exists a Kant beyond the first three *Critiques*. Luckily, a wealth of recent scholarship on *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and the so-called 'pre-Critical Kant' has appeared in recent years.

In writing this book Wilson has joined this movement in Kantian scholarship. This monograph focuses on *Anthropology*, and also on *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* and *Education*. Wilson makes the case that Kant took anthropology to be an important part of his thinking, and shows that much current scholarship potentially implying otherwise might be misleading. She also shows that Kant's anthropology is in part oriented toward equipping students with the practical, applicable knowledge they need to make their way in their professional, social, and family lives.

Wilson's book contains a wealth of information concerning the many details of *Anthropology*, and concerning connected passages from *Religion* and *Education*. The work is organized into five short chapters, all of whose contents are well-summarized in the introduction, with one exception: Wilson implies that she will go on in Chapter 5 to substantiate the claim that *Introduction to the Critique of Judgment* and *Critique of Teleological Judgment* were written 'for the sake' of judgment rather than knowledge, but there

is very little in the way of argument given for this claim. (To my mind, it is also a false claim, as clearly Kant aims to support our quest for knowledge through clarification of the role of reflective judgment.)

The focus of Wilson's work is on presenting an exegetical overview of Kant's anthropological thinking which hews very closely to the letter of Kant's text. Rather than getting caught-up in philosophical conceptual analysis or controversies centered in contemporary modes of philosophizing, Wilson generates an interesting and fact-filled narrative arranged around what I would term Kant's 'theodicy-centered thought', which is a type of thinking tied to the claim that 'nature does nothing in vain'. According to the sage of Königsberg, we can view both human history and biology, with all their horrors and quirks, as arranged to achieve great purposes. In particular, we are to look to the *Endzweck* of humanity under the moral law; or, as this expressed in *Critique of Teleological Judgment*, the end of 'culture'. Even items such as the coquettishness of the young wife come up for discussion in this regard — according to Kant, we can view the purpose of this behavior to lie in the need of the young woman to maintain ties permitting the acquisition of new husband should the old one pass on. Presumably, such ties are important in that they could further the final end of culture by supporting the education of any children the young wife might have.

Wilson takes up, if not this particular discussion concerning the coquette, then in any case a great number of Kant's remarks concerning marriage, reproduction, and happy living in human communities. She attempts to show how it is that the student could gain pragmatic world-cognition by viewing, through a Kantian anthropological lens, the varied facticity of the *homo sapiens* creature addressed by these remarks of Kant. Wilson also suggests that this world-cognition allows for harmonious and pleasing living with others. Furthermore, she successfully shows that Kant shares with her a valuation of anthropological thinking that finds value in its promotion of communally-focused pragmatic abilities.

Kantian education is a sustained interest for Wilson throughout her book. What type of person is being raised on the Kantian understanding of pedagogy? For one, Wilson points out, he or she is a being who must have a conception of the destiny (*Bestimmung*) of humanity (87). This idea is tied to educating in accordance with an ideal of humanity, which Kant seems to identify with a Christ-figure: as Wilson quotes, 'the divine figure within us, with which we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves ... .' Another central factor: the being to be educated is a being who exists differently at different times over the course of a lifetime. One achieves different levels of insight at different points in the human lifespan, with Kant selecting 20, 40, and 60 as ages of particular importance. Kant's anthropology suggests, on Wilson's reading, that one must take care to overcome the effects of immaturity in younger students whom one is teaching, through development of their judgment, and through the infusion of a proper pragmatic outlook.

These are only a few of the many topics Wilson covers from Kant's sprawling anthropological thought. So far as I was able to determine, Wilson's schol-

arly remarks concerning the contents of *Anthropology* and *Religion* are free of obvious error. However, one item I found questionable is Wilson's claim that 'civilization' is valued over 'culture' by Kant. It is true, as Wilson points out, that 'culture' is portrayed as being at times a trouble-maker; but my impression is that 'civilization' is tarred with much the same brush by Kant (see the *Religion*, Vol. 6, 33 in the standard *Akademie* pagination of Kant's collected works). In any case, we can see that the Kant of the *Anthropology* is a very different Kant than the Kant of *Critique of Pure Reason*, and Wilson's book certainly does hammer home this point.

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John F. Wippel
Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II.
Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press 2007.
Pp. 316.
US$59.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8132-1466-5).

For over thirty years John F. Wippel has produced quality scholarship on St. Thomas Aquinas. In 1984 he published *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (*MTTA*). Now, twenty-three years later, he has published a companion to that volume, the subject of this review (*MTTA II*). These two books, along with *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (*TMTTA*), published in 2000, form Wippel's trilogy on Thomas's metaphysics. Although *MTTA II* is the latest of the three books, none of its chapters, with one exception, are new, and about half of them are older than *TMTTA*. Wippel has, however, updated many of the bibliographical references in the footnotes and has 'introduced certain changes in the text' (1) where he has deemed it appropriate.

Wippel begins *MTTA II* as he began *MTTA*, with an article on Christian philosophy. Here, working within a Thomistic framework, he tries to determine how, if at all, philosophy can be called Christian. Most of the discussion hinges on a distinction that he has employed before, namely, philosophy in the moment of discovery vs. philosophy in the moment of proof. Wippel denies that philosophy can be called Christian in the moment of proof because in philosophy 'nothing borrowed from religious belief or theology can enter in' (24). However, he is sympathetic to calling some philosophy Christian

with respect to the moment of discovery. In this case one's Christian faith is the inspiration for purely philosophical argument.

One of the strengths of this chapter is the consideration Wippel gives to different scenarios, which he uses to clarify his position. For example, he concludes that a philosophical discussion of the relationships between the divine persons of the Trinity would be 'speculative theology, not pure philosophy, and not Christian philosophy' (29), because it presupposes data that can only be known by revelation. Conversely, merely demonstrating that one article of the faith is compatible with another, without consideration of truth, would be nothing other than pure philosophy.

Although this chapter will be useful to those who have studied the notion of Christian philosophy as discussed by Étienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Joseph Owens, and others, there is, in my judgment, one weakness in Wippel's presentation. Wippel does not devote enough space to the epistemic role played by grace in a person's reasoning process. In this regard, it would have been helpful to have asked and answered the following question: Can the same person be both a Christian philosopher (in Wippel's sense) and also a Christian theologian? Based on what Wippel says in the chapter, it seems his answer is 'yes'. However, a deeper discussion of the role played by grace would have explained how and why.

The eleven chapters of this book cover a variety of themes. For example, Chapters 2, 10, and 11 trace different historical roots of Thomas's thought, while Chapter 7 examines whether or not creatures can, in some way, be the cause of being. Despite this variety, there are two threads that tie most of the book together. The first is an examination, in various contexts, of some of Thomas's most important principles. Chapters 4, 5 and 6, treat the following principles respectively: 1) What is received is received according to the mode of the receiver, 2) Unreceived act is unlimited, and 3) Every agent produces something like itself. The second thread concerns the relationship of Thomas's principles and his metaphysics to his understanding of God. For this reason the book should be of great interest to students of natural theology.

A good example of how Wippel ties these two threads together occurs in Chapter 2, on truth, which at almost fifty pages is the longest chapter in the book. Here several understandings of truth in Aquinas are examined, including: 1) truth of intellect (the conformity of an intellect with some thing), 2) truth of being (truth as a property of being), and 3) truth as it exists in God. Wippel traces these understandings, and Thomas's treatment of them, in four works: 1) Commentary on the *Sentences*, 2) *De Veritate*, 3) *Summa contra Gentiles*, and 4) *Summa theologiae*. The ultimate goal of Wippel's textual analysis is to answer seven questions about truth, including 'In what sense is truth assigned to God?' (94).

Here the principle 'What is received is received according to the mode of the receiver' comes into play. For humans the truth of intellect is primary and things are only called true insofar as they are capable of causing truth in the intellect. However, according to Aquinas, truth must be understood very differently in the case of God. Aquinas holds that God is the cause of

all things (and therefore knows all things through himself) and that God's intellect and being are identical. As a result, 'in God truth of being and truth of intellect are one and the same' (95). Wippel's excellent handling of the many complexities and dimensions of Thomas's views on truth make this chapter indispensable for contemporary philosophers interested in the correspondence theory of truth.

Chapter 9, the only previously unpublished piece, examines God's freedom to create or not. Besides Aquinas, Wippel discusses the views of thinkers such as Plotinus, St. Augustine, Peter Abelard, William of Ockham, and contemporary thinkers such as Arthur Lovejoy and Norman Kretzmann. Here we find Wippel at his best, masterfully marshalling the pertinent texts in order to 1) frame the issues clearly, 2) reconstruct Aquinas's arguments as best as possible and 3) determine if those arguments are successful. This is a procedure we find throughout the book, although at times Wippel will also buttress Aquinas's arguments, if he deems it necessary, making this an important book for neo-Thomists.

In the last chapter, Wippel notes that one of Aquinas's greatest gifts was 'his ability to take positive elements from those who had gone before him and to incorporate them into a greater synthetic whole' (288). This, in my judgment, is Wippel's gift too; and it explains why his scholarship, including this book, cannot be ignored even if one happens to disagree with some of his conclusions.

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Onno Zijlstra
Language, Image and Silence: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Ethics and Aesthetics.
New York: Peter Lang 2006.
Pp. 192.
US$44.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-30-3910-842-8).

In this book Zijlstra makes a laudable attempt to synthesize language, image and silence, by exploring the standpoints of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard on aesthetics, ethics and religion. To set the stage for this synthesis, he contrasts Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard on two points. First, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* advocates a 'logoclasm', whereas Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* an 'iconoclasm'. Second, although both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard accept the unity of ethics and aesthetics, the former gives it an aesthetic colour, the latter an ethical

one. Later on, Zijlstra integrates the viewpoints of both philosophers, placing them beyond 'logoclasm' and 'iconoclasm' in support of the said synthesis. Corresponding to this synthesis of language, image and silence, Zijlstra also upholds the integration of aesthetics, ethics and religion.

This book can be divided into four parts, beside its introduction. The first part depicts the early Wittgenstein as a 'logoclast', and the Kierkegaard of *Either/Or* as an 'iconoclast'. Part 2 is a critique of the common, mistaken presupposition of both 'logoclasm' and 'iconoclasm', namely, that image and language are two separate, mutually exclusive highways of presentation. This critique is based on the later Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as use, as well as on Abraham's silence in Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*. Part 3 is on the later Wittgenstein's 'aspect seeing', and it attempts to find 'reasons to relativize the separation of language and image;' it also finds a possible interpretation of Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* and *Fear and Trembling* suggestive of a theory of communication, not a theory of language, enabling Kierkegaard to go beyond 'logoclasm' and 'iconoclasm'. Part 4 is on 'soul-seeing' and attempts to explain the significance of 'the ineffable' in terms of a coherent integration of image, language and silence.

Zijlstra's is a Kantian reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, a work he considers 'unthinkable without Kant' (11). Analogous to Kant's epistemological separation of scientific reason from ethical values, Wittgenstein upholds a logico-linguistic separation between the fields of scientific reason on the one hand, and aesthetics, ethics and religion on the other. For Wittgenstein, within the limits (of tautology and contradiction) of language, whatever a proposition expresses is contingent. Since ethical, aesthetic and religious values are not contingent, no proposition can express them. Zijlstra counts this viewpoint to be logoclastic.

Zijlstra keeps Judge William of Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* as the proponent of 'iconoclasm'. The iconoclasm consists in the aesthetic images' being 'too immediately sensory' as well as 'too much an invitation to detached, disinterested contemplation' (49). Language, not aesthetic images, can represent an ethical life, a responsible and transparent life.

Wittgenstein accepts the unity of ethics and aesthetics on the ground that both are 'ineffable' and 'transcendental'. However, this unity is aesthetic-oriented. The ethical is meant to have a meaningful life, a happy life, and such a life asks to be content with the world as it is and, thereby, requires an artistic way of looking at things. 'The ethical is nothing but the aesthetic seeing of life as a perfected whole' (25).William too accepts the unity of aesthetic and ethical but only if the aesthetic is within an ethical life, not in stories and paintings. The aesthetic must be lived' (51).

Turning to the later from the early Wittgenstein, in Chapter 2.1, Zijlstra highlights on how the mystical is retained in *PI* no less than in *Tractatus*, and how the *PI* is no less about 'meaning of life' than about language. Accounting Wittgenstein's remarks on 'wondering at the existence of the world', on 'the experience of feeling absolutely safe', and on the 'feeling guilty of behaviour disapproved by God', Zijlstra convincingly explains how the later Wittgen-

stein considers ethical language a 'respectable nonsense' (65). Nevertheless Zijlstra maintains the difference between the ineffable in *Tractatus* and that in *PI*. The former ineffability owes to the limits of language, the latter to the fact that 'we never see *the* limits of the city' of language (76).

In Chapter 2.2 Zijlstra elegantly distinguishes Abraham's silence from that of others like Don Giovani (who is ignorant of any language) and Antigone (who cannot show her secrets and share them with others). Abraham is unable to speak, even if he not ignorant of language; nor is he trying to hide any secret. He is so immediately related to the Absolute that language cannot stand as a mediating phenomenon. Abraham's silence in Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling* ultimately proves that 'total communicability and transparency are not the end of human existence' (100).

In Chapter 3.1 Zijlstra puts Wittgenstein beyond iconoclasm and logoclasm. However, here Zijlstra does not talk from the perspective of the totality of Wittgenstein's writings but from a particular perspective, namely, Wittgenstein's discussion of 'seeing an aspect' in *PI*. In respect of the duck-rabbit example, Zijlstra explains that perception is mediated by language, images are mediated by language, and language is related to action. Thus the dialectic of language and image suggests that they are not two separate highways.

The final chapter is entitled 'Ethics and Aesthetics: Silence, Image and Language'. Here Zijlstra provides a critique of Wittgenstein's aesthetic unity of the ethical and the aesthetic from the perspective of Kierkegaard, as well as a critique of the dialectics of image, language and time from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Finally, using the concept of 'soul seeing', 'the inexhaustible', and 'perspectives', he tries to establish the dialectic of image, language, action and time.

Zijlstra makes a commendable attempt to find the significance of 'the ineffable' by linking it with image and language as well as with the ethics and aesthetics of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. His idea of an integrated relation of ethics, aesthetics and religion is in congruence with the thesis that the synthesis of language, image and silence is the hallmark of becoming a human being. The ineffable is 'a symbol of the inexhaustibility of reality and the urge to explore, to overstep the limits' (167).

This book, a scholarly contribution to the comparative literature on Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, is a lucidly written, thought provoking work that implicitly suggests that there is a lot to be said through silence.

Laxminarayan Lenka
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