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Barry L. Whitney
Members of religious traditions need to argue fruitfully in public with each other and with those who are non-religious. Since Jürgen Habermas articulates one valuable position in support of public argumentation in his theory of communicative action, many Christian theologians have with some justice adopted Habermas’ views. Observing this phenomenon, Habermas does not think that Christian theology would abandon its commitments and tasks if it were recast in the terms of his theory (189-200). Adams agrees with Habermas: he claims that adopting Habermas’ theory amounts to the destruction of Christian theology as such since Habermas’ views of reason, reflection, and communication displace any tradition-bound argumentation. Adams argues that post-metaphysical theologians can successfully engage in public activity without abandoning their traditions, meeting the challenge that Habermas provides by articulating the practice of ‘scriptural reasoning.’ Any scholar concerned with public discourse and the role of tradition in it should consider this book. Christian thinkers would especially benefit; Adams challenges those who follow Habermas to take instances of public argumentation seriously as he shows how the practice of scriptural reasoning could function as an alternative to Habermas’ theory of communicative action. Theologians and philosophers alike should attend to this work, though Adams largely aims his essay at Christian theologians.

In order to focus attention on specific traditions and their practices, Adams explicates Habermas’ readings of religion and theology. Philosophers ought to heed Adams’ careful identification of what Habermas considers Christian theology to be. According to Adams, Habermas never intended to be a theologian (200). Much theological writing on Habermas exists, but this book sets itself apart by its attention to his claims about theology and by showing the limited range of modern theologians that Habermas has in mind. In the end, Habermas identifies religion with metaphysical thinking and tradition with self-authenticating authority rather than the authority achieved by consensus.

Adams focuses on a practice of public argumentation rather than a theory about its possibility, since he contends that one cannot theorize its grounds. He points out that there is a ground for public argumentation but, drawing on Schelling’s critique of Hegel, he contends that it is impossible in principle to specify that ground (201). For him, one does not need to ask if thinking is possible in order to think. Despite the importance of Habermas’ theory of argumentation in the public sphere, Adams holds that Habermas attempts to prove too much, and just so rules out the kinds of practices that members of traditions can use in order to argue successfully (224-6). If the ground of pub-
lic argumentation could be given, Adams would have to face what it made possible and what it did not.

Arguing that Habermas proves too much does not mitigate his suspicion of tradition and narrative, so Adams still needs to address the difference between narrative and argument. The focus of Adams’ concern in the third and seventh chapters is the positive use of traditions in public by their members. He takes up the position of the theologian John Milbank in order to consider narrative in the tenth chapter. Milbank champions the role of specific narratives and traditions, since he considers public argumentation in the manner of Habermas and others to be completely bankrupt. There are, according to Milbank, only traditions; since no apparent ground for public argumentation can be articulated, all traditions are in some way incommensurable. Habermas’ position puts a premium on argumentation and sees narrative as something that can only be criticized. For him, narrative is the supreme form of tradition and self-guaranteed authority. Narrative belongs to ‘world disclosure’ and argument to ‘problem-solving’ according to Habermas. Adams concludes that the unavailability of a ground for argumentation does not mean that it does not exist or that we cannot articulate it. For Adams, that argumentation is possible should be enough, and therefore the distinction between ‘world disclosure’ and ‘problem solving’ can be blurred. Such a position only needs the observation that argumentation occurs and is sometimes successful.

None of Adams’s criticism implies that Habermas should be ignored. It seems to me that [Habermas’] theological colleagues have rightly grasped that something like Habermas’ theory of communicative action is vitally needed. There needs to be some way for members of traditions to be intelligible to their neighbors...’ (200). Adams proposes scriptural reasoning as this way. This is a practice undertaken by members of religious traditions to read each other’s authoritative texts and interpret them with each other. No further conditions are required for scriptural reasoning than that the members be committed to reading together as members of their traditions. He devotes the last chapter to a description and defense of scriptural reasoning as an alternative to Habermas.

Adams’ argument depends upon the extant but inaccessible ground of public reason in order to clear space for his attention to practices. But this also seems to allow him to address critical distance from within traditions. When Habermas articulates the distance that a person experiences upon reflection on tradition, experiencing the failure of a tradition, or some such other crisis, Adams articulates that this distance can be undertaken on theological grounds. Adams thinks a similar form of critical distance accompanies the Christian claim that no society properly embodies the Kingdom of God. No Christian can identify the two and therefore must maintain a critical distance from any given society, comparing it to the Kingdom of God (85-90). Critical distance might also be expressed by theological consideration of the otherness of God; this otherness could call all human claims into question. Adams argues that the self-criticism available to Christian theology can suf-
fice for the sort of criticism that Habermas desires. This is a very interesting claim but it deserves more explication and warrant.

Adams has a fine account of Habermas and a firm grasp of the issues facing contemporary theology. His attention to theology, narrative, and argumentation as well as practices, combines many of the strengths of theological traditions. Scriptural reasoning seems to function as a way to engage across religious traditions. Can this commendable practice be adapted to other circumstances or fields? Can jurists read their authoritative texts together? Is scriptural reasoning only possible for monotheistic traditions? As a specific, historically situated practice, it is no failing to say no to the first and yes to the last questions. For Adams’ proposal to have the fruit he wishes it to bear, other practices that engage non-religious traditions need to be imagined. Nevertheless, Adams has written a book worthy of attention and response.

Gregory A. Walter
St. Olaf College

Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield, eds.
The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy.

This book, originally published in hardback in 1999, is without a doubt the most important recent product of the notable reevaluation of Hellenistic philosophy that has been taking place particularly since the mid-1970s. The wide range of subjects, the high quality of the essays, and the fact that among the contributors are several of the leading specialists in Hellenistic philosophy make it an indispensable reference work for specialists and non-specialists alike. Given the length of the volume and its multiplicity of topics, it is possible here to provide only an outline of the contents and to offer a few general comments.

In between the editors’ preface and an extensive epilogue by Michael Frede, there are twenty-two chapters grouped into five parts: Introduction, Logic and Language, Epistemology, Physics and Metaphysics, and Ethics and Politics. The general organization of the work is thus by topic, whereas within each part the discussion is structured by philosophical schools. As a
result of this organization and the fact that each chapter is deliberately self-contained for the sake of utility, a given subject may sometimes be discussed by different authors proposing rival interpretations.

Part 1 contains three chapters. In the first, Jaap Mansfeld analyzes the extant sources for the Hellenistic period and their different genres. In the second, Tiziano Dorandi examines the chronology of the philosophical schools and, in the third, deals with their organization and structure.

Part 2 likewise consists of three chapters. In the first, Jonathan Barnes offers an introduction to Hellenistic logic. In the second, Barnes, Susanne Bozien, and Mario Mignucci examine the logical theories of the Peripatetics, the Megarics, and the Stoics. The third chapter, by Barnes and Dirk Schenkeveld, is devoted to language, focusing on linguistics, rhetoric, and poetics.

Four chapters make up Part 3. The introductory chapter, by Jacques Brunclusvig, examines the origin of Hellenistic skepticism and the views of Pyrrho, Timon, and the Cyrenaics. The following three chapters offer a detailed discussion of the epistemological views of the Epicureans (Elizabeth Asmis), the Stoics (Frede), and the Academics (Malcolm Schofield). It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that present-day epistemologists may find in the views of the thinkers and schools discussed therein some interesting and challenging ideas.

Part 4, the longest section of the work, contains eight chapters. The first, by David Sedley, bears on physics and metaphysics. Then there is a chapter on cosmology by David Furley, followed by a chapter on theology by Mansfeld. R. J. Hankinson is responsible for the next two chapters, one on explanation and causation, the other on determinism and indeterminism. There follows a chapter on Epicurean psychology by Stephen Everson and one on Stoic psychology by A.A. Long. Finally, Giuseppe Cambiano writes on the relationship between philosophy and the sciences.

Part 5 consists of four chapters. In the first, Long examines the Socratic legacy, and discusses the positions of the Cynics and the Cyrenaics. The second chapter, by Michael Erler and Schofield, bears on Epicurean ethics, and the third, by Brad Inwood and Pierluigi Donini, addresses Stoic ethics. The final chapter, by Schofield, is devoted to an examination of social and political thought.

The contributions are on the whole accessible, but the reader, in accordance with his or her own expertise, will of course find some parts more comprehensible than others. Untranslated Greek or Latin texts and technical terms have as a rule been excluded from the main text, and this enhances the volume’s accessibility to non-specialists. It is also worth noting that the discussion of the topics is enriched by the fact that, although each author presents his or her own interpretation, he or she usually takes into account competing views.

The volume also contains a synopsis of the most important historical events, a list of editions of sources and fragments, a list of abbreviations, a
bibliography which runs to forty-eight pages, an index locorum, and a general index.

The reader will probably be surprised to find that although the Hellenistic age is conventionally deemed to extend from 323 to 31 BC, the volume ends its survey in about 100 BC. This is likely to disappoint those readers interested in, e.g., Aenesidemus' revival of Pyrrhonism early in the first century BC. In the epilogue, Frede justifies that cutoff date by arguing that it is at the end of the second century BC, not late in the following century, that the revival of Aristotelianism and Platonism began within the Stoa. It was then and early in the first century BC that the negative reaction against Plato and Aristotle which had given rise to the Hellenistic schools was replaced by an emphasis on continuity between classical philosophy and Hellenistic philosophy. In response to Frede's argument, it must be emphasized that neo-Pyrrhonism took no part in that revival. Aenesidemus left the Academy because, in his eyes, the Academics were not real skeptics but Stoics fighting Stoics, and it was Pyrrho whom he adopted as a forerunner of his radical skepticism. Hence, his neo-Pyrrhonian stance was intimately connected with the figures and the controversies of the Hellenistic age. If one accepts this as a compelling reason for including a discussion of Aenesidemus' position, one may also be moved to regret the absence of a discussion of the Pyrrhonism expounded in Sextus Empiricus' surviving writings. For even if from a chronological point of view the latter does not belong to the Hellenistic period — he most likely lived in the second century AD — he certainly does from a philosophical point of view. First, Sextus' main dogmatic rivals are the Stoics and the Epicureans of that period. Second, Aenesidemus' arguments, which are Hellenistic both chronologically and philosophically, constitute an important part of Sextus' skeptical arsenal. Thus, both the neo-Pyrrhonists' adoption of Pyrrho as their figurehead and the agonistic connection between their movement and the Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic schools of the Hellenistic age make one feel that something is missing from the present volume's picture of the philosophy of that period. The absence of a detailed discussion of Pyrrhonism after Pyrrho and Timon is to some extent mitigated by the fact that, in their contributions, Brunschwig and Cambiano refer to some arguments and subjects that are expounded in Sextus' extant works.

To be sure, the previous remarks do nothing to undermine the superb quality of the essays that make up the present volume. Hence, anyone interested in Hellenistic philosophy, or ancient philosophy more generally, should include a copy of this book in his private library.

Diego E. Machuca
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (Argentina)
This is the kind of philosophy book that should no longer exist. Far from accepting that the age of metaphysics is over, and that all we should be concerned with is refining our critiques or nuancing our ethics, Badiou proposes a radically novel philosophical system that encompasses mathematics, metaphysics, arts, love, science and politics. In order to do this he calls upon the resources of the whole of the metaphysical tradition (Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Hegel) as well as innovations in mathematics (particularly Cantor, Gödel and Paul Cohen). To describe *Being and Event* as a difficult text would be an understatement. However, for all its fearsomeness, Badiou is a kind and patient teacher, leading the reader through both the intricacies of set theory and the history of philosophy with a calm and steady hand. As he puts it, ‘mathematics has a particular power to both fascinate and horrify which I hold to be a social construction: there is no intrinsic reason for it’ (19). To that end, it should be required reading, not just for all those concerned with the current fate of philosophy, but equally for anyone with an interest in the philosophy of science, particularly mathematics.

Originally published in France in 1988, *Being and Event* is without doubt Badiou’s *magnum opus*. However, Badiou’s reception has been a long time coming in the Anglophone world (though it should be noted, he has been a central theoretical figure in Latin America, among other places, for decades). Noting this time-lapse, in the preface to the present edition Badiou makes clear the circumstances surrounding the original publication: ‘We were at the end of the eighties, in full intellectual regression … A kind of flabby reactionary philosophy insinuated itself everywhere; a companion to the dissolution of bureaucratic socialism in the USSR, the breakneck expansion of the world finance market, and the almost global paralysis of a political thinking of emancipation’ (xi). Twenty years later, it is certain that nothing much has changed, either for politics or for philosophy. Badiou proposes instead to resurrect some rather unfashionable terms in the name of a renewed theoretical and political militancy: truth, universality, subject, fidelity, as well as an analysis of how ‘newness’ can emerge (what Badiou calls the ‘Event’). Badiou suggests that there are three main strands of argument in the book, which consists of thirty-seven Meditations (and it should be noted that Badiou’s rationalist deference to Descartes permeates the text). One can, he suggests, stick to the conceptual and mathematical meditations alone, or to the textual meditations (those that discuss a particular philosopher by name), or to what he calls the ‘meta-ontological’ meditations, those that synthesise the philo-
sophical and mathematical claims. However, even for those who feel that their mathematics is not up to scratch, there are extensive explanations in the appendices to help the reader along (albeit with a modicum of patient work). Oliver Feltham’s neat translation does much to aid comprehension in this regard.

With Badiou’s contribution, we are far from our typical idea of what ‘Continental philosophy’ looks like. Indeed, Badiou speaks of the ‘nullity’ of the opposition between analytic and continental thought, desiring to move beyond both the narrowness of a linguistic or scientistic approach, and the aestheticism of an overly literary attitude. In order to do this he turns initially to the question of ontology (the ‘Being’ of the title), that most classical of concerns, in order to make clear the architecture of his system.

Badiou thus begins by acknowledging that Heidegger is ‘the last universally recognisable philosopher’ (1) and goes on to assert that ‘it will be maintained that philosophy can only be re-assigned on the basis of the ontological question’ (2). What is most innovative in the way Badiou proceeds to do this, however, is the fact that he gives ontology exclusively over to mathematics, turning away completely from any phenomenological, archaic or poetic conception, such as Heidegger’s, in favour of ‘a pure theory of the Multiple’ (5). Whatever mathematics can say about being exhausts being: ‘mathematics ... pronounces what is expressible of being qua being’ (8). This assertion might seem to undermine philosophy’s pretension to be the sole access point into questions of being. However, Badiou argues, this centrality of mathematics actually allows philosophy to move beyond ontology, away from the phenomenological quest for the fundamental openness onto being, towards an investigation of what happens when breaks occur in the system, that is to say, in a Badiouian register, when events occur. For Badiou, these events take place under four different conditions: love, art, science and politics. These, he states, ‘generate — infinitely — truths concerning situations; truths subtracted from knowledge which are only counted by the state in the anonymity of their being’ (340). Philosophy’s job, put another way, is not to outline what is, as mathematics can perfectly well do this, but rather to ‘protect’ and comprehend the truths specific to each condition: ‘Philosophy can aid the procedure which conditions it, precisely because it depends on it ... philosophy is thus at the service of art, of science and of politics’ (341).

When a truth occurs in one of Badiou’s domains, the question arises as to who or what can have access to this truth. Here, Badiou’s innovation with regard to the history of metaphysics comes to the fore once again. Constructing a theory of the subject that manages to sidestep Kant’s transcendental conception, and can account for collective groups much as Sartre attempted to do in his later work, Badiou declares that ‘A subject is not a result — any more than it is an origin. It is the local status of a procedure, a configuration in excess of the situation’ (392). This configuration ‘in excess’ of the situation marks the point at which a decision can be taken on an event, and it is this decision which determines the truth of that which has purportedly taken place. Whilst this analysis might seem to allow for illegitimate decisions — what if
someone declares something to be ‘true’ for nefarious or politically dubious reasons? — Badiou is in fact continuing a strand of French epistemological thought (that of Cavaillès, Canguilhem and Bachelard in particular) that argues that scientific progress is always conducted against previous systems of thought, that, in some sense, all genuine scientific insight is impossible to understand from within the current order. As Badiou puts it: ‘How could [Galileo] ... have supposed the veracity of his principle for the situation to-come that was the establishment of modern science; that is, the supplementation of his situation with the indiscernible and unfinishable part that one has to name “rational physics”? ’ (401).

Badiou’s attempt to come to terms with the radically new in science, art, politics and love, and to construct a theory of the subject on the basis of the event, rather than conceiving it as an underlying substance, pre-existing transcendental function or phenomenological entity, distances him quite substantially from all of his philosophical predecessors and forms perhaps the most intriguing part of his whole edifice. It should be noted that in his more recent work, Logiques des Mondes (subtitled Being and Event II), Badiou continues this work on the question of the subject, comparing his own project in more detail with that of Kant and phenomenology in particular.

Throughout Being and Event Badiou proposes intricate yet extremely bold conceptions of the categories of being, the event, the subject, and truth, inaugurating a new idea of philosophy itself, though he claims that there is nothing in his analysis that can’t already be found in the history of philosophy and mathematics: there is no difference between what I have done and what such philosophers as Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, or Hegel have done, a hundred times over since the very origins of our discipline: reorganising a thorough, if not creative, knowledge of mathematics, by means of all the imaging powers of language’ (xiv). Whether Badiou takes credit it for it or not, it is clear that Being and Event brilliantly performs this synthesis of philosophy and mathematics against a backdrop of a theoretical environment grown stale with in-fighting and a debilitating fear of grand ideas. Badiou’s Being and Event lays waste to that timidity with an astonishing force.

Nina Power
Roehampton University
This is a very rich book that details the hitherto untold history of conventionalism. Its key message, summarised neatly in Chapter 1, is twofold: convention has emerged as a novel epistemic category (mostly in the writings of Henri Poincaré) but qua epistemic category, it is distinct and disjoint from truth. Not only can there not be truth by convention, but (Ben-Menahem tells us) the very idea of truth by convention is an oxymoron (3). The true history of conventionalism, then, is the history of how convention cannot be masqueraded as truth. To a great extent, this view is revisionist, though Ben-Menahem documents her claims carefully. For instance, she argues that the very idea that there can be truth by convention is not something we get from a proper reading of the writings of conventionalists; rather it is largely the product of Quine’s reading (and criticism) of conventionalism, a criticism based on the (presumably false) premise that truth and convention are not disjoint categories (253).

Undoubtedly, in Poincaré’s writings convention is introduced as a new epistemic category — in particular one that captures the status of judgments (or propositions) that, though they may well have some kind of empirical underpinning, are neither a posteriori (empirically) justified, nor a priori demonstrable (and neither simply contingent, nor necessarily true). Ben-Menahem rightly parallels this move to Kant’s own Copernican revolution. Yet the judgments to which this novel epistemic category applies are held true, and there is nothing more to their being true than their being held to be true. Conventions may well be definitions (though they are a lot more too), but definitions can well be true; what places them apart, qua conventions, is that their truth is neither a matter of what the world is like nor a matter of demonstrative proof.

Ben-Menahem rightly identifies two versions of conventionalism. The first is as necessary (logico-mathematical) truth, the other is as exploration a consequence of the alleged underdetermination of the theories by evidence. The two versions need not coincide. Actually, they highlight an important distinction between two conceptually different problems: on the one hand, there is the problem of separating the empirical (factual, synthetic etc.) from the non-empirical (rational, a priori etc.) either in general, or within a theory (or a conceptual framework). On the other hand, there is the problem of grounding the choice between alternatives (theories or linguistic frameworks) when empirical evidence and other theoretical reasons (answerable to truth in a straightforward way) are exhausted.

Chapter 2 is about the so-called French conventionalism of the beginning of the twentieth century. We are offered a careful study of Poincaré’s conventionalism, focused mostly on his theory of geometry. Ben-Menahem’s central
point in this chapter is that for Poincaré ‘necessary truths cannot be conventions’ (44). Poincaré did indeed think that the principles of arithmetic were not conventions (since they were synthetic a priori and necessarily true). But it is arguable that he operated with an idea of relative (framework-dependent) necessity: the basic conventions (principles of geometry and of mechanics) are not on a par with synthetic a posteriori propositions. They cannot be falsified by experience (a) because if they were to be tested they would be tested holistically, and in any case (b) they are not really testable because they do not apply (at least directly) to the world of experience. Rather they constitute the framework-dependent object of knowledge. Besides, the claim that the same facts can be represented in two different geometrical languages does not imply that there is no truth by convention (66). Facts, that is, empirical (physical) facts, are metrically amorphous, for Poincaré. No geometry (of those within the constant curvature family) is dictated or forbidden by them. But they become the object of knowledge only after they have been placed in a geometrical framework. Within it, the interesting task for Poincaré is to separate those claims that are genuinely empirical from those claims that are stipulative; but this does not imply separating truths from non-truths. Actually, the truth of the stipulation (geometrical principles and the principles of mechanics) is presupposed for making intelligible and testable empirical claims.

Chapter 3 is a deep and interesting attempt to re-evaluate Einstein’s reaction to geometrical conventionalism and his debt (redeemed or unredeemed) to Poincaré. Chapter 4 (in my opinion, the best in the book) tells the conceptual history of implicit definitions. Perhaps, the best case that can be made in favor of stipulative truth is by virtue of implicit definitions of concepts. This idea is present in Poincaré, but was developed by Hilbert and by Carnap. Ben-Menahem’s main point is that implicit definitions cannot serve their purpose of explicating the idea of stipulative truth (or truth by convention) because their very possibility relies on considerations of consistency and satisfaction, which are non-conventional (161). This is debatable; not because consistency is a conventional matter, but because the whole idea of implicit definition is based on the claim that — in certain cases — consistency is the sole requirement for satisfaction. In any case, the attraction of implicit definition is that the stipulation of the truth of certain conditions determines (that is, creates) the meaning of certain concepts — hence there is no possibility that the relevant concepts have a meaning that violates these conditions. Though in Section 6 of this chapter Ben-Menahem does discuss Carnap’s later work, I would have expected a more detailed investigation of Carnap’s attempt (based on his re-invention of Ramsey-sentences) to split a theory into two components, one (conditional in form) that implicitly defines the theoretical concepts and the other empirical. The conditional form of implicit definitions is a good way to make sure that they are non-arrogant, that is that they do not have (or generate) any empirical consequences — a thing that would be detrimental to their being stipulative.
Chapter 5 is a careful analysis of Carnap's early conventionalism, as this is expounded in *Logical Syntax of Language*. Here again, the main point is that for Carnap too 'the categories of truth and convention are mutually exclusive' (180). There seems to be a change of emphasis at this chapter: truth and convention are disjoint because convention is a category applied to *rules* and these cannot be said to be true (or false) (196-7, 214). But isn't it the case that rules can be part of the implicit definition of a concept? And then, don't we go back to truth by stipulation? This shift from propositions to rules is examined in greater detail in Chapter 7, but as Wittgenstein is quoted as saying there, the boundary between rule and proposition is not very sharp (291).

Chapter 6 details Quine's battle with conventionalism. He made a name by criticising (among other things) the very idea of truth by convention, but he was also adamant that conventions are parts of our 'fabric of sentences.' Ben-Menahem analyses the role in Quine's philosophy of the argument from the underdetermination of theories by evidence. It is this kind of argument (together with the thought that confirmation is holistic) that guides Quine to argue against the possibility of a priori (and hence unrevisable) knowledge; and hence against the possibility that conventions capture the valid residue of the traditional conception of the a priori. As Ben-Menahem highlights, Quine plays one route to conventionalism (implicit definitions as an account of necessary truth) against the other route (conventional choice between competing theoretical systems). The thrust of a possible objection to this line of thought is given, but not explored, in footnote 35 (240). Commitment to holistic confirmation does imply that everything that is confirmable from experience is confirmed, when the theory as a whole gets confirmed; but it does not imply that every part of a theory (including logic and mathematics) is confirmable on the basis of experience. Carnap would never have conceded the latter, though he might well have toyed with the former.

Chapter 7 is on the later Wittgenstein and his critique of rule-following. Ben-Menahem puts forward a rather challenging interpretation of Wittgenstein as an iconoclast who, on the one hand, criticises conventionalism (and convention-based responses to the rule-following problem) on the grounds that it tries, in vain and in a wrong-headed way, to justify and explain rule-following, while on the other hand, admits that, descriptively, conventions are part of a practice of following rules. The discussion of Wittgenstein is subtle and invariably interesting. Drawing on the difference between justifying a practice and describing a practice from within, Ben-Menahem's Wittgenstein denounces the alleged need to offer 'a foundationalist understanding of conventionalism' (299).

*Conventionalism* should be read by anyone interested in a variety of central philosophical issues: in a certain sense, it is a treatise on the core themes of analytic philosophy and their conceptual development.

**Stathis Psillos**  
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Many readers of Plato's *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and other middle dialogues have been tempted to think that Plato is unqualifiedly opposed to empirical science and that his ethics too is driven by an antipathy to the empirical and the natural. But such readings of Plato and Platonism run headlong into the evidence of the *Timaeus*, the *Laws*, and other late dialogues, not to speak of the gap that then seems to separate Plato from the natural philosophy of the early Greek philosophers, Aristotle, the Stoics, and much else. Whereas Socrates seems to sit comfortably in that gap, Plato does not, and yet such anti-naturalist and anti-scientific readings of Plato are common enough.

Carone's provocative book builds a case for reading Plato otherwise, namely as a serious cosmologist, i.e. a natural philosopher, with equally serious ethical and religious interests. While there is recent work on Plato's later ethical and political commitments, Carone's book is distinctive. In her hermetic-ulo u s examination of the cosmological and mythical passages in the *Timaeus*, *Philebus*, *Politics*, and *Laws* she argues that Plato held a kind of panpsychism and organicism that marries a teleological view of nature to a notion of the 'imitation of god.' On her reading, the Forms stand for order and unity, but the real engine of Plato's later ethical cosmology is the soul whose roles are both cosmological and personal.

Plato of course does not simply canonize a vocabulary and employ it in dialogue after dialogue. Rather each account of the creation of the cosmic order by the Demiurge in the *Timaeus*, of the four elements in the *Philebus*, of the myth of the age of Cronus and the cosmic drama in the *Politics*, is articulated in its own terms. Carone's strategy is to work through each text patiently and then eventually to assimilate them to a single cosmological picture of the cosmos as an interplay of several features, *nous* and *ananke*, a cosmic teleology, the presence of the world soul in nature, and the identity of the cosmos with the divine.

Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the *Timaeus*. Carone argues that the Demiurge represents the force of rationality and goodness in the cosmos, a teleological force that must contend with the resistance of necessity. This mythical image of 'the mind or principle of organization of the universe' (28) which requires embodiment in the physical is a model for human conduct. In the imagery of the *Timaeus* the Demiurge is the world-soul, 'immanent to the universe... rather than extrinsic to it' (45). This Demiurge or world-soul is the primary cause of the cosmos, imitation of which is possible for every human being; it is a model for human reason as it seeks to control the passions and attain *eudaimonia*. Moreover, astronomy provides a kind of 'popular therapy' to this end by helping non-philosophers to understand the consistent order of nature and the way in which reason can govern 'necessity' (74-6).
Chapters 4 and 5 turn to the *Philebus*. Carone examines the dialectical setting for the four-fold metaphysical discussion of *apeiron*, *peras*, the mixture of the two, and cause, and then analyzes the text in detail to show that the same picture that we found in the *Timaeus* is also present here: an immanent world-soul that seeks to impose order on a recalcitrant material universe. She then argues that Plato endorses a mixed life of intellect and pleasure. 'In a life ruled by intelligence, it is more likely that one will rightly experience pleasures of anticipation based on the true nature of things, and correctly estimate the net size of pleasure to be obtained from mixtures of pleasure and pain,' and hence there is 'good reason to view pleasure, insofar as it is *peras*, as at least one aspect of the human good' (110). Like the Demiurge, individuals should create lives marked by the right mixture of pleasure with moderation and wisdom (122).

Chapters 6 and 7 move on to the *Politicus* and the myth of the 'age of Cronus' and its political implications. Carone's radical proposal is to 'reverse' the standard interpretation and to argue that 'the myth tells us that god is after all in charge of our universe; but also that, even if god, or an idealised past golden age, functions as a model, it is not at the expense of individual autonomy at all' (125). One result of this 'reversal' is to show that 'in our actual world ...*nous* and necessity coexist' (141), which brings the *Politicus* into line with the *Timaeus*. Carone then interprets the cosmic drama of the dialogue as symbolic of a 'human drama, that is, an ethical conflict that is in general absent from the world but common in humans, considered either individually or collectively,' and treats it as normative rather than simply descriptive. It is an invitation for human conduct to imitate that of the god that rules in our age: ‘intelligence, philosophical life, and the happiness they entail, are not a mere gift but a task or ethical challenge’ (158-9).

In Chapter 8, Carone turns to the *Laws* X, its proof for the existence of a providential god, and the role of evil in Plato's teleological conception of human life. The chapter's central point is that human beings, not some cosmic soul are responsible for evil, both natural and moral, and hence that human beings have the ultimate responsibility for accomplishing their own good and the good of the universe conceived as a cosmic, organic whole.

This brief sketch of the edifice of Carone's argument cannot do any justice to the scrupulous analysis of the texts that supports it. And it is surely at this level of detail that her case must be engaged. In order for Carone to expose a single cosmological vision with ethical implications, she must do some very hard work, and readers will find that some of that work strains the texts considerably. But a careful consideration of the details of her argument is deserved. Carone's project is driven by twin passions, for human dignity and respect for the natural world. There is in it a kind of courage that is worth our attention.

Michael L. Morgan
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Aristotle's *Physics* IV 10-14 comprises the first sustained study of time in the Western philosophical tradition. Starting in his customary manner from some choice puzzles concerning time and the questionability even of its existence, Aristotle goes on to show that time is in fact 'the number of change in accordance with the before and after,' as the celebrated formulation goes (219b1-2). Aristotle's ruminations centre on the intimate connection between time and change; they take in a number of points on the way concerning our experience of time in both its objective and its phenomenological aspect. The section, taken as a whole, provides the starting-point to twenty centuries of speculation, with only the post-Newtonian era establishing a clean break with the Peripatetic tradition. Even then, the draw of the Aristotelian approach has proven irresistible to some (famously Heidegger).

Taking into account both the historical significance of Aristotle's remarks on time and the intrinsic philosophical interest of what he has to say, full-length studies on these passages of the *Physics* have been surprisingly thin on the ground. Coope's compact monograph fills a clear gap in the contemporary English literature. Among other things, it complements Edward Hussey's frequently excellent annotations to his Clarendon Series translation of *Physics III and IV* (1993), providing as it does a more comprehensive look at Aristotle's aims and argumentative strategies in developing his views on time. It also provides a companion piece of sorts to Ben Morison's *Aristotle on Location*, similarly published in the Oxford Aristotle series and likewise focusing on an individual issue within the *Physics* III-IV complex of texts.

After 1) an introductory section dealing with Aristotelian puzzles and problems, Coope deals with the following themes, roughly corresponding to the order of Aristotle's presentation: 2) time's relation to change and the 'before and after,' 3) time as a number, and 4) the now. A fifth section on being in time and the consequences for Aristotle's psychology rounds out the volume.

In Part 2, Coope digs deep into the dependency of time upon change and the further relation of change to magnitude. On an ontological level change is more fundamental than time, as it is tied up intimately with the description of things in the world and their varying properties. Coope nicely develops this theme in terms of potentiality and actuality (5-9), although a more straightforward route would pass through *Ph III* 1, where Aristotle bluntly states that 'there is no motion apart from things' (*ouk esti de kinesis para ta pragmata*; 200b32-3). Coope's preference is explained by a very clever line of thought developed in Chapter 4, where the asymmetry of time is treated in terms of the attendant change's interpretability. In the case of the celestial
rotations, talk of a ‘before’ and ‘after’ makes only limited sense, since any given stellar constellation is both before and after any other one, given an infinite time-frame (75-7). By contrast, changes for finite beings can be analyzed in terms of their completion, which has to do with the states of potentiality and actuality that a thing enjoys. This is certainly promising, though Coope does not take the idea very far. (Is it because the heavens’ life consists in their very rotation — an eternal activity or *energeia* — that they stand in a way outside of time, or at least not in it? This is what some medieval commentators thought.)

Against those who would paraphrase Aristotle’s definition of time as saying that time is a measure of change, or something by which change is measured, Coope defends a literal interpretation of time as number. This theme occupies Part 3 of the book. Time measures change, true, but this according to Coope does not amount to a definition of time. For us to notice that time has passed, it is enough to distinguish between two nows as occurring ‘before, after’ (as we are wont to do). Coope’s interpretation requires some fancy footwork, inasmuch as she must come up with a broader notion of number according to which one may call anything countable by that name; still, the overall explanation for Aristotle’s insistence on calling time a number is convincing and elegant. It additionally allows Coope to make some interesting claims in Part 5 about the ways in which time requires the existence of ensouled beings, although change does not. The explanation hinges on a difference between Aristotelian essentialism and possible-worlds theory which is highly intriguing, but left largely up in the air (161-3).

The ellipsis is characteristic of Coope’s prose, which is clipped and sometimes demanding, though never less than lucid. Coope references other existing literature sparingly, keeping her aim squarely on the explication of Aristotle’s text. On the one hand this lends Coope’s prose a focus that could not otherwise be achieved, and the principal resources on the main topic of Aristotle on time are well covered. On the other, some of Coope’s more curtailed remarks regarding general issues in Aristotelian interpretation are left to stand without support, even when major scholarly positions are clearly in the background. To take another example, Coope introduces but does not develop the crucial theme of how Aristotle’s problems often act as aids in philosophical orientation. Though she may not yet have had access to Jon McGinnis’ important recent article on this topic (‘Making Time Aristotle’s Way’, *Apeiron* 2003), what is clearly on her mind is Aristotle’s much-discussed program of ‘saving the appearances’: Owen’s seminal essay ‘Tithenai ta Phainomena’ is accordingly found in the bibliography. Not in the main text or footnotes, however: one rather suspects that a too-meticulous weeding of references deemed surplus to requirements has taken place. In a similar vein, a highly intriguing digression on the infinity and finitude of colour (50-3) might have benefited from a more detailed discussion in light of the commentary tradition, even if it is a side issue from the point of view of the volume as a whole.
These are niggles. Ursula Coope’s book presents in compact form a most comprehensive analysis of five chapters that are dense even for Aristotle, demonstrating how here, as in so many areas of philosophical analysis, we would do well to make time for him. The volume comes recommended for all scholars of Aristotle’s natural philosophy.

Taneli Kukkonen
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Benjamin D. Crowe
Pp. 296.

Thanks to the groundbreaking research of such scholars as Thomas Sheehan, Theodore Kisiel, and John Van Buren, the religious influences of Heidegger’s early thought have been well established. But as Benjamin Crowe demonstrates in this book, the riches in this field of Heidegger scholarship are not yet exhausted. In addition to presenting a very helpful account of these religious sources, Crowe focuses specifically on the theme of ‘destruction’ and its place in Heidegger’s account of authenticity. It is no secret that Heidegger appropriates his notion of \textit{Destruktion} from Martin Luther, but few scholars have gone beyond noting this connection to investigate it more deeply. This is Crowe’s task here.

Part 1 shows how Heidegger looks to ‘primitive’ Christian religious life for the concrete basis to orient his ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ (21). Crowe challenges those who read Heidegger as giving a strictly formal or secular interpretation of Christian phenomena, which would be compelling on the basis of reason alone, as in Kant or Hegel (19). In his view, such a reading underestimates Heidegger’s objection to objectivism and his overcoming of metaphysics, both of which preclude the possibility of a neutral, universal philosophy. Instead, Heidegger’s insistence on the separation of theology and philosophy is meant to prevent a particular religion or worldview from intruding and dictating the tasks and results of philosophical questioning (20). (I do, however, think Crowe overestimates Heidegger’s modesty here, especially given philosophy’s task of ‘correcting’ theology, as Heidegger’s lecture ‘Phenomenology and Theology’ puts it.) Heidegger opposes the ‘system’ of Catholicism and
the ‘worldview philosophy’ that was popular during the 1920’s (212-6) — as well as the ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science (209-12) — because they all hinder the true task of thinking by leading away from philosophy as a concrete praxis that must be enacted, toward an abstract, theoretical posture. Philosophy conceived according to this theoretical model tends to be unduly confident in its ability to capture the flow of existence in static, controllable concepts.

This is where Luther’s notion of destructio appears. Crowe recounts Luther’s battle against the soteriology of late-medieval scholasticism, which used Aristotle to propose that human beings can merit God’s grace through their own powers (46-7). Luther opposed this vehemently, insisting on the ‘alien work’ (opus alienum) of God, which destroys ‘the false self-estimation of human beings so that God may effect His “proper work” (opus proprium), the shaping of the person into a “new creation”’. This insight also has a corollary in theological methodology, in a ‘theology of the cross,’ which remains faithful to the concrete struggles of sin and repentance, the hiddenness of God, and the limitations of finite human understanding. The cross destroys the hubris, self-righteousness, and false security so characteristic of the ‘theology of glory,’ which employs speculative metaphysics to conceptualize our knowledge of God and salvation in stable, safe, reliable form.

What Heidegger found so promising in Luther’s theology was the destruction of abstract theorizing for the sake of concreteness (69). But whereas Luther was concerned with philosophy’s inappropriate influence on theology, Heidegger tries to harness this impetus to ‘destroy’ the predominant type of Western philosophy. Secondly, where Luther was concerned with sin and salvation, Heidegger is concerned with ‘inauthenticity’ and ‘authenticity.’ In Part 2 Crowe uses this background material to demonstrate how the various formulations of inauthenticity (chapters 3-4) and authenticity (chapters 5-6) that Heidegger develops through the 1920s trace back to his early study of primitive Christianity (100). What is most illuminating about his discussion, which might otherwise seem like adding a pebble to the extant mountain of scholarship on authenticity, is his demonstration of the influence Luther’s destructio had on Heidegger’s Destruktion.

In Part 3 Crowe sketches Heidegger’s vision of authentic philosophizing. When it comes to thinking, we human beings are always tempted to go easy on ourselves (81-5), to avoid struggling with the difficulties of concrete existence. Thus we gravitate toward the stability and comfort of familiar language, expressions, and concepts — which acquire a certain ‘self-evident quality’ that keeps us from struggling to understand (i.e. enact) their meaning in our own lives (232). We assume that we understand the meaning of things because we are acquainted with words and concepts, and can speak them without expending any effort to grasp the concrete, existential history from which they arise. But this thoughtless ease is precisely the problem. Philosophy’s ‘alien work’ is therefore to destroy inauthentic thinking and raise the possibility of taking responsibility for our own lives (230). Destruktion does this by stripping ‘commonly used concepts and expressions
of the veneer of self-evidence,' and by uncovering 'once again what is “genuine” about these expressions as a possibility for the future' (247). Crowe concludes on this note, with the implication that Heidegger's philosophical destruction brings out the sedimented meanings of the past, and with them the possibility of authentic existence in the future (5, 263).

Since Crowe is primarily concerned with understanding Heidegger's early thought 'in its own right and ... for its own sake' (4), he does not offer his own estimation of its relative merits and deficiencies. He is surely correct to maintain that any evaluation must begin with 'a clear, accurate, and comprehensive grasp' of Heidegger's work (5), and he succeeds in providing an erudite, at times fascinating, presentation of Heidegger's religious origins. But questions arise as this volume closes: What should we make of Heidegger's re-interpretation of Luther (and other Christian thinkers)? What should contemporary philosophy and theology take from this period of Heidegger's thought? Is it significant that Heidegger later departs from these Christian roots in favor of a self-consciously pagan poetics of Being? These questions might require another volume. But given the depth of Crowe's understanding of this material — not to mention his admirable skill in presenting Heidegger's notoriously abstruse prose in readable English — it would be interesting to read a sequel to this book, in which Crowe takes stock of Heidegger's accomplishment here. Perhaps that book is yet to come, but for now Heidegger scholars have reason to be grateful, since Crowe's work makes a significant contribution to their world.

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G. Elijah Dann
After Rorty:
The Possibilities for Ethics and Religious Belief.
Pp. 209.

Richard Rorty advocates a markedly different conception of philosophy. His position, predictably, has generated abundant criticism in the philosophical literature, with reactions ranging from thoughtful critique to thoughtless rebuff. Refreshingly, Dann's book approaches the context from an alternate angle. Rather than investigating the degree to which Rorty is correct, Dann concerns himself with extending Rorty's position to the ethical
and religious spheres. For brevity’s sake, I will confine myself to the religious sphere, which constitutes the bulk of the book.

The book is separated into four chapters. The first chapter sets the stage. Chapter 2 is a solid exposition of Rorty’s metaphilosophical position — his rejection of the correspondence theory of truth as well as his recontextualizations of objectivity as intersubjectivity and rationality as a set of moral virtues. Dann traces how Rorty’s rejection of philosophy as adjudicator, as science, and as the discoverer of the Way Things Really Are leads to a conception of philosophy that is thoroughly therapeutic and edifying. Rorty’s contrast between systematic philosophy and edifying philosophy is introduced here; it is the crucial distinction in Dann’s position.

Systematic philosophy is principally interested in epistemology and metaphysics; the success of it arises ‘by applying the success achieved in the sciences to philosophical problems’ (30). Systematic philosophy is constructive in that it erects a conceptual framework (or vocabulary) that proffers accurate representations of nature. By contrast, edifying philosophy is suspicious of attempts to represent nature. It warns against falling prey to the allure of a particular vocabulary. Contra the constructive hopes of the systematic philosopher, the edifying philosopher wishes to disentangle herself from the traditional distinctions. With philosophers like Dewey, Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein in mind, Dann writes, ‘The “great” edifying philosophers are therefore “reactive and offer satires, parodies, aphorism”’ (31). But how is all of this applicable to religious belief? The distinction cashes out this way: if systematic philosophy can be fruitfully replaced by edifying philosophy, then the same move is also available to theology reconceptualized as a distinction between systematic theology on the one hand and edifying theology on the other.

Chapter 3 is the crucial chapter. First, Dann analyzes Rorty’s philosophy of religion. The well-known public/private distinction is the focal point. For Rorty, religion is a private matter and thus does not belong in public projects of mutual cooperation. It is private because evidence is not required to hold a religious belief. Even more forcefully, Rorty contends, ‘no argument or evidence is even possible’ (60). Generally sympathetic to Rorty’s metaphilosophical position, Dann temporarily parts company in this case and questions Rorty’s strong claim that evidence is not even possible in cases of religious belief. Certainly we cannot provide strong justification for our beliefs because that would commit us to a realist, or foundational, picture, which is precisely what is avoided in the edifying, post-Philosophical culture. However, Dann argues that there are cases, such as religious experience, where minimal justification is possible. A religious experience, short of trying to robustly establish a connection between the experience and an external deity, nevertheless establishes, in a minimal sense, why a theist happens to hold a belief in the divine.

For Dann, the public/private distinction also needs slight adjustment. He argues, ‘it is quite unlikely that religious, private beliefs can be entirely separated, or sealed off from social, public concerns’ (64). But this does not give
people cause to advocate for overtly religious positions in the public square. Rather, they are required to translate their position into the shared language of democracy. Dann cites the example of pro-life advocates who appeal to the sacredness of life as evidence to support their position. Instead of appealing to the sacredness of life, which is a religious category, these advocates should translate this into a discussion of human dignity. Discussing the issue in terms of human dignity encompasses the whole community.

Analyses of Alvin Plantinga and Kai Nielsen constitute the end of the third chapter. Plantinga, a well-known Christian philosopher, takes the position of many philosophers who see Rorty's rejection of correspondence truth as woefully unworkable. Plantinga's criticisms are the same sort that Rorty has been defending himself against for twenty years. To my mind, there is nothing new here. Nielsen provides a more interesting example. As Dann cleverly displays, there is a disconnect between the Nielsen who has spent the bulk of his career debunking religious claims (or God-talk), and the Nielsen who has embraced Rorty's critique of philosophy. If Nielsen agrees with Rorty, then his militant atheism is problematized. He no longer has available the conceptual machinery to discredit religious beliefs as incoherent. As Dann argues, Rorty's position liberates religion 'if the God-talkers are willing to drop robust claims to truth, metaphysical musings, and concentrate on increasing intersubjectivity and solidarity' (135).

In the final chapter, Dann fleshes out the distinction between systematic and edifying theology. For Dann, the New Testament was a clear example of edifying theology, but was infiltrated by systematic philosophy, which engendered systematic theology. Thereafter, systematic philosophy and systematic theology formed a symbiotic relationship in the thought of Augustine, Anselm, and others. Dann urges that edifying theology's main goal should be the increase of solidarity, which it shares with edifying philosophy.

Dann's thesis about the viability of theology conceived along edifying lines is quite reasonable. Also, his minor disagreements, particularly the notion of translation, are persuasive. That said, I would have liked to see more attention paid to these disagreements, particularly with reference to the public/private constraint on religious belief. If edifying theology is about increasing social solidarity, and if religious beliefs are consigned to private self-development, then a more thorough exposition is required to show how they can mutually subsist. Nevertheless, the book is a thoughtful exploration of Rorty's metaethics and philosophy of religion. It is well researched in that it offers abundant quotations and footnotes to support its claims. It is best suited to philosophers who have an interest in contemporary theology, metaphilosophy, and Rorty.

Aaron Landry
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In a posthumous picture of Derrida, *Jacqui Derrida: Ritratto a memoria* (Torino 2006), the Italian philosopher Maurizio Ferraris, writing about him in the present tense as if his friend were still alive, reminds us that toward the end of his career Derrida seemed to draw just as much from the present-day as from the history of thought: hints, movements, materials, and occasions for thinking which strengthen the sense of his radical, new, rigorous, and sometimes abstruse way of doing philosophy. In his hands philosophy can be studied and practiced like literature, just as literature can in turn be approached as philosophy. What results is a kind of writing that defies the conventions of philosophy by what can seem a willful focus on the obscure and the paradoxical, but also exercising a kind of playfulness and wit that can either amuse or dismay the reader with conventional philosophical expectations.

The key words of this book, which arrives in a rash of recent translations of the extensive corpus of Derrida, are: gift, Hélène Cixous, Bibliothèque National de France. In short, the book is about literature, about the theoretical and human significance of literature.

Martin McQuillan in the foreword takes a hint from a page of *The Future of the Profession or the University without Condition*, in which Derrida affirms: ‘I will call the unconditional university or the university without condition: the principal right to say everything, whether it be under the heading of a fiction and the experiment of knowledge, and the right to say it publicly, to publish it. The reference to public space will remain the link that affiliates the new Humanities to the age of Enlightenment’ (vi-viii). It deals with a reflection on one of Derrida’s leading themes at work throughout most of his books, wherein Derrida stresses that literature represents that rare human space which stands in a non-submissive and non-competitive relation to the sovereignty of power (the state, capital, the media, religion). For Derrida literature is, in sum, a space resembling the Greek αὐτόν, in which the impossibility of the democracy-to-come might be possible; literature is the event of an ongoing deconstruction, in which a self-deconstructive force is at work within democracy.

According to Derrida the figure, the literary personality who perhaps embodies this possibility-impossibility is the poet and writer Hélène Cixous, who is a genius of the university without condition, a genius of the genius for her magical use of French language.

As usual Derrida poses a set of questions: What is a genius? What is the genius of the genius? And he replies thus: ‘Indeed the genius of the genius, if
there is any, enjoins us to think how an absolute singularity subtracts itself from the community of the common, from the generality or genericness of the genre and thus from the shareable' (1). First, apparently, he plays with the absence of the word genius, looking for it; second, he feels that he is at a sort of crossroad or in the presence of a chorus that demands to exercise his Greek memories, from Oedipus to Antigone, from the Eumenides to Hélène. At last he observes that generosity, close to geneses, genealogies, genre and the mentioned genius, is another word from the same family in g.

Cixous has generously bequeathed her archive to the BNF, but now the attention is addressed to the family of words, the drama of a family and the drama of origins. The family of words recalls precisely the family, birth and filiation, and recalls, too, the payment and the respect to the heritage of the name. Geneses, genre, genealogy, generosity and genius — everything seems contained in the letter g. 'In the manner of the logos proverbially considered to be in the beginning of everything, the letter g puts in writing the absolute initial of a first name and proper noun' (9).

The Bibliothèque is a place, a tomb and conservatory monument that represents the other, the omnipotent other. But what is reality? What is an event? What is a past event? These are the 'many uncertainties or aporias for whoever claims to set a library’s contents in order, between the library and what’s outside it, the book and the non book, literature and its others, the achievable and non achievable' (18). Therein lies literature’s secret. And the library is the secret place in which it establishes itself as the very possibility of the secret.

And then what does Cixous really bequeath? She intends to leave all or part of her dream memories to BNF, the dreams or part of her dreams which are nothing but her books, while as a Freudian scholar she knows that it is im-possible to give dreams, to give secrets. All that Cixous will give to the BNF will be sealed, readable and not readable, opened to love of the Omnipotent other of literature that is not only but also dreams. At the same time by this gesture she will show the other power and the right to choose between reality and fiction, between fiction which is always a real event, like the phantasm, and so-called reality, which may always be nothing but a hyperbole of fiction.

The invitation to the reader is, in conclusion, to reflect on the value of literature as a gift of genius, a gift that genius gives generously in the act or fiat of creation; and obviously to reflect on the necessity that the gift would be promptly cancelled out in capitalistic economy. When the gift is given, first of all there cannot be gratitude proportionate to it. Genius acts in a regime of absolute unconditionality; whether it be a gift, hospitality or love worthy of its name, genius remains improbable, irreducible to the order of proof. Its truth does without proof: 'Genius is not a subject, nor an imaginary subject, nor a subject for laws or for symbolism, a possible subject, genius is what happens' (78).

Francesco Tampoia
This contribution to Imprint Academic’s series ‘British Idealist Studies’ is adapted from a book published in Italian in 2002. De Sanctis tries to show how a deeper understanding of T. H. Green’s metaphysics and moral-political philosophy can be gained from examining his writings, lectures and speeches as expressions of a cultural politics informed by a particular view of the history of Protestantism and of the English nation. Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) was widely acknowledged by Anglo-American political commentators until the 1950s as perhaps the single most influential British philosopher of the period ca. 1880-1940. His major philosophical writings, Prolegomena to Ethics and Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, were posthumously published adaptations of lectures he delivered as White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University. Green was a town councilor, educationist and temperance enthusiast and was widely recognized as a radical or ‘advanced’ liberal. Liberal theorists have located his teachings about self-realisation, the common good and political obligation along a trajectory leading up to the welfare state or social state; some socialists and conservatives too were impressed with his theory of individuality in community. William Temple, the ‘red’ Anglican bishop of Manchester during the 1920s who coined the term ‘welfare state’, was deeply influenced by Green’s teachings, as were dozens of prominent Liberal and Labour politicians and theoreticians during the twentieth century. While few British (and imperial) social reformers and politicians after Green were activated by very exact understanding of his philosophy, historian Fred Inglis is undoubtedly correct in connecting various efforts of British social outreach and amelioration ca. 1880-1930 with Green’s ‘radical earnestness.’

Meanwhile, academic philosophers associated with analytic philosophy and logical positivism impugned Green and other British Idealists as muddle-headed metaphysicians. A. J. Balfour, Bertrand Russell and A. J. Ayer were interested in demarcating theology from logic and (scientific) ethics and were uncomfortable with Green’s theological writings and the ‘theological’ terms and concepts that appeared in his purportedly philosophical statements. To them, it seemed regressive for an English philosopher of the era of Herbert Spencer and J. S. Mill to give weight or explanatory power to concepts such as the Absolute, divine immanence, the rational will, and so forth; contemporary Englishmen like Henry Sidgwick had (in their view) decisively marginalized the theological residue of Kant and Hegel. Yet Green’s thought was clearly influenced not only by Kant and Hegel but also by Fichte and practitioners of the German ‘Higher [Biblical] Criticism’ such as F. C. Baur.
Green helped naturalize German philosophical and theological teachings, making them more palatable to subsequent generations of British Anglicans and Nonconformists.

It is to the relationships among Green’s philosophical, theological and historical ideas that de Sanctis turns his attention in this book. He identifies ‘Puritanism’ as a driving intellectual and spiritual force in Green’s thought as revealed in undergraduate essays, letters, speeches, lectures and publications. In *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age* (1964), Melvin Richter concluded that Green’s (and Greenian) ‘Puritan’ earnestness could be understood as a psychological adjustment to a sense of class privilege and guilt shared by men of similar backgrounds. It is worth noting, though de Sanctis does not make enough of the point, that British Nonconformists, who were proud to claim their continuity with Puritanism and even with more radical sects of the seventeenth century, were the stalwarts of the British Liberal party from the 1830s, were courted from the 1860s by W. E. Gladstone and subsequent Liberal leaders, and were a major force behind the ‘politics of reform’ into the twentieth century.

Italian scholars since the 1920s have discussed Green’s ethics and his theory of political obligation, and many of them have defended Green from the charge of British empiricists that he was in thrall to German idealism. Focusing on indigenous roots of Green’s philosophy, de Sanctis follows a lively tradition of Italian scholarship. He views Puritanism of the seventeenth century as characterized by anti-formalism and he argues that Green used Puritan philosophy to balance or correct the abstractionism of German idealism. In exploring ‘Puritanism’ and its impact on the development of Green’s thought, de Sanctis focuses on Sir Henry Vane the Younger, who was executed for his role in the English Civil War. This is understandable given Green’s own attention to Vane and Cromwell in his ‘Four Lectures on the English Revolution’ (1867). However, Green was attracted to many forms of religious enthusiasm (and to mysticism) and he was attentive to other figures and movements in seventeenth-century philosophy, such as Cudworth and the Cambridge Platonists. De Sanctis somewhat overstates his case about Green’s ‘empirical’ concerns, and his conception of the respective in-the-world-ness of idealist and empirical philosophies might strike readers as overly simple. He observes in Chapter 3: ‘Founded on the interplay of “matter” and “form”, his [Green’s] philosophy had an empirical basis and his positions were consistently moulded in light of the facts. Green’s philosophy had to reflect the problems of daily life and, instead of abstracting from reality, had to develop a continuous dialectical interaction with it’ (75). This is unobjectionable and would seem to be true of most political philosophies, including ‘idealist’ ones. Many critical assessments of Green have claimed that he rushed into social and political philosophy (and activity) without a clear understanding of first principles, not that he was impractical or unworldly.

De Sanctis offers some insightful re-readings of Green’s writings — particularly the English revolution lectures and the undergraduate essays, a previously unpublished selection of which he appends to the study — that will be
much appreciated by scholars of British Idealism. The force of these readings is diffused by the fragmented structure of the book, which intersperses biographical observations within a chronological excursus of Green's writings. His account of Green's political activities also seems redundant in the wake of studies by Richter, John Morrow, Peter Nicholson, Colin Tyler and others (including myself). Green specialists will locate many valuable nuggets here, but non-specialists might have difficulty in appreciating the full significance of Green's engagement with his 'Puritan' inheritance.

Denys P. Leighton
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Troy Dostert

Beyond Political Liberalism:
Toward a Post-Secular Ethics of Public Life.
Pp. 256.

Emerging most prominently and famously in the writings of John Rawls, the concept of political liberalism represents one of the most engaging and provocative developments in modern political philosophy; it is a concept that has altered the landscape and the vernacular of the discipline.

Essentially, political liberals contend that contemporary polities are characterized by an ineliminable diversity of 'reasonable' yet often conflicting and incommensurable religious, moral, and philosophical beliefs. Given that reasonable people will disagree about the nature of ‘the good,’ only a conception of justice that remains minimal or 'thin' in terms of its moral character and demands can hope to obtain the voluntary and reliable support of all ‘reasonable’ citizens and thereby secure political stability. The required thinness can be achieved only by a conception that confines its concerns to 'political' (i.e., public) matters, such as questions concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. However, satisfying that criterion demands that citizens refrain from using ‘controversial’ personal beliefs — i.e., those that cannot secure the free and willing support of all reasonable citizens — to justify the development or implementation of public policies. Unsurprisingly, that requirement will prove particularly burdensome (if not impossible) to those who believe that there exists a single, correct path to realizing the good life, and that it is proper to use the resources of the state to require all citizens to follow that path. Such a burden is perfectly acceptable, according to politi-
cal liberals, because doctrines of the good that promote such a belief — such as those affirmed by members of religious communities — constitute an impediment to the establishment and maintenance of justice and political stability in morally diverse societies.

The purpose of this book is 'to contest the fundamental logic of political liberalism — that religion as such constitutes a distinctive threat to political order — and instead argue that religious communities themselves have a great deal to offer in approaching the challenges of religious diversity, and moral diversity more generally, in a responsible manner' (3). In pursuing that project, Dostert focuses on Rawls' concept of public reason (though there is also a limited but noteworthy engagement with the arguments of Stephen Macedo) and challenges its ability to respond effectively to genuine religious pluralism.

According to Dostert, 'For societies such as ours in which religious diversity represents one of the dominant forms of moral difference, how we decide (if at all) to accommodate citizens' religious differences through public action has tremendous implications for religious communities whose way of life might hang in the balance' (33). In that context, Dostert identifies 'two central difficulties' troubling political liberalism. First, its focus on securing sociopolitical stability undesirably inhibits democratic engagement, especially for religious citizens; and second, its corresponding 'insistence upon the secular as a way to regulate public discourse' (9) renders 'unreasonable' and, subsequently, unavailable many useful insights that communities of faith could contribute to efforts to resolve public policy dilemmas.

Dostert asserts that Rawls and other political liberals believe it is necessary to manage the significant moral diversity that characterizes contemporary liberal democracies if one is to secure and sustain justice and political stability. However, according to Dostert, those efforts to manage diversity demand acceptance of a specific conception of justice and 'the core presuppositions that sustain it' (30), and, subsequently, actually narrow the degree of diversity tolerated and, by extension, limit the extent of democratic engagement in a politically liberal polity. A more appropriate approach, Dostert suggests, is to seek to negotiate the boundaries of moral diversity. Such an approach requires greater, not less democratic engagement.

He identifies four 'practices and dispositions' the presence of which can produce the environment needed to effectively and meaningfully engage the challenges and opportunities produced by moral diversity. First, when participating in the public realm, people must behave sincerely in that they must offer their views 'honestly and thoughtfully' (168). Second, people must also act with discipline insofar as the views they offer should be consistent and useful in terms of addressing the particular dilemma in question and should correspond to their behavior. Third, people must be willing to employ the range of available 'moral languages' in their efforts to frame public problems and identify effective solutions to those problems; in other words, people must not 'seek to colonize the public sphere with .. [only their] perspective,' but rather embrace dialogic creativity (178). Finally, people must exhibit for-
bearance; they must accept that 'all perspectives are partial and provincial' and, consequently, refrain from trying to 'negate the contributions of other moral traditions, by preemptively cordonning them off as being unreasonable or incompatible with public purposes properly understood' (182). Combined, the above constitute the animating features of what Dostert labels a post-secular ethics.

He examines a number of cases, including Mozert v. Hawkins, the civil rights movement in the United States during the 1960s, and the issues of abortion and international debt relief, in order to illustrate the advantages of his proposal in terms of responding to moral conflict and helping to generate 'new approaches to public dilemmas' (202). Though Dostert believes that the goal of political liberalism, namely, to establish and sustain 'a politics characterized by concord and mutual respect,' is 'a worthy one' (165), he concludes that the means proposed by political liberals for achieving that goal place undesirable (and unnecessary) constraints on political life, especially for members of religious communities. Dostert's arguments are often persuasive; however, they also generate certain questions for which he never offers satisfactory answers. Perhaps foremost among such questions is that of how it is possible to ensure that all citizens affirm and practice the four qualities associated with his post-secular ethics.

This is a very thoughtful and engaging book that addresses one of the greatest challenges confronting proponents of political liberalism, and, indeed, all those who seek to identify the means by which to ensure that the diversity of beliefs and practices that characterize life in contemporary polities are equally and meaningfully respected and properly utilized. Though unlikely to convert the Rawlsian faithful, it is certainly a useful addition to the existing scholarship, and one deserving of widespread engagement.

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R. K. Elliot
Aesthetics, Imagination and the Unity of Experience.
Pp. 195.

In this book Paul Crowther provides us with the first collection of Elliot's essays on aesthetics to appear in one volume. The essays presented here cover a wide range of topics, and in them it is apparent that Elliot has set out to explore and to expand the limits of what we consider relevant to aesthetic con-
sideration, rather than to provide a unified approach to aesthetics based on a concrete theory of the imagination. As Crowther notes in his introduction: ‘The essays arranged herein were written at different times and for different purposes... However, without forming a system, they do formulate and apply a systematic strategy’ (xv). Equally comfortable citing P. F. Strawson as he is Merleau-Ponty or Kierkegaard, Elliot's focus on the importance of the imagination in aesthetic experience embraces a number of far-reaching, typically ‘continental’ concerns, yet all the while strives to maintain their logical integrity. In the tradition of Kant and Wittgenstein, two of Elliot's primary influences (neither of whom, however, he accepts uncritically), he demonstrates how aesthetic experience and the power of the imagination are fundamental to the human condition, with an unmistakable relevance to subjectivity, freedom and morality.

Crowther has selected eleven essays, which are divided thematically into three parts. Part 1 is dedicated to foundational concepts, covering the central role of the imagination in Elliot's work, his Kantian roots, and his particular adaptation of Wittgenstein's so-called 'conceptual' methodology. Part 2 takes the notions outlined in Part 1 and applies these to problems of criticism and appreciation in the arts and aesthetic education. In Part 3, through a pair of essays on Wittgenstein and Plato respectively, Crowther sets out to demonstrate 'how [Elliot's work] might enable us to reinterpret key issues and figures in the history of philosophy' (xiv). In addition to the essays collected in this volume, Crowther provides an illuminating 'Critical Introduction,' which places Elliot in a historically relevant context and offers the initiate a fair-handed introduction to Elliot's strengths, as well as his weaknesses. As Crowther aptly notes, however, 'These areas of difficulty are, of course, not dead ends. Rather, they invite us to take up Elliot's insights and develop them beyond their existing limitations' (xvii).

Elliot's emphasis on the imagination is indeed timely. If the relation between imagination and understanding was once dismissed as a hangover from eighteenth-century psychologism, the philosophical importance of the notion has recently been reintroduced in a series of publications on the subject. This volume provides a welcome addition to the literature, avoiding the occasionally quasi-psychological metaphysics of the imagination in favour of the phenomenology of the concrete aesthetic encounter. As Elliot writes in 'Imagination in the Experience of Art', for example, 'a part of the task of Philosophy of Art is to understand the structures of the kinds of experiences which are appropriate ends of our communion with a work of art as such' (45). What results may occasionally be a little too speculative for some readers; nevertheless, Elliot's work generally offers an insightful exploration of a number of diverse aesthetic interests.

Clearly, there is some flexibility in Elliot's use of the term 'imagination' throughout his work, and the various aspects of the imagination that he explores do bear something of a corresponding 'family-resemblance' for him. Such explorations, however, even if they do not ultimately address questions concerning the metaphysical core of imagination, do move in the direction of...
an interesting and unconventional approach to aesthetics. Along the way, however, Elliot does explore a number of loose categorical distinctions from which future investigations in this direction may proceed; for example, the phenomenological differences (and their respective aesthetic limitations) of voluntary and involuntary imaginative acts in ‘Imagination and the Experience of Art’, or the aesthetic relevance of internal and external qualities in ‘Poetry and Truth’ and ‘The Aesthetic and the Semantic’.

From the viewpoint of more traditional aesthetic concerns, if there is a weakness in Elliot’s analysis it is primarily that his framework offers us no criteria for distinguishing those works that are deserving of aesthetic admiration from those that are not. One might argue that this goes without saying, particularly after reading his ‘The Critic and the Art Lover’, where he heavily critiques the notion of any objective aesthetic value. However, it is not always clear who ‘The Critic’ he attacks here is (whose antagonistic, and ultimately indefensible ideals should be replaced by the ‘aesthetic empathy’ which takes root in the more receptive imagination of ‘The Art Lover’), and whether, in the end, it is really so easy to determine who the critic is and who the art lover. Given the prevalence of this discussion throughout the history of aesthetics, the claims advanced in this article are certainly worthy of a more extended discussion. Even so, Elliot does provide a number of valuable phenomenological insights, here and throughout his writings, and his unflinching faith in the primacy of concrete aesthetic appreciation — whatever its object may be — remains admirable nonetheless.

With essays taken from such diverse sources as The British Journal of Aesthetics, Kant-Studien, and Journal of Philosophy of Education, as well as handful of limited print academic series, this collection provides an in-depth look at Elliot’s complex and timely aesthetics for readers who might otherwise be unfamiliar with his work or lack the resources for accessing each of these articles individually. Many of the essays in this book, especially those on the aesthetics of Kant and Wittgenstein, provide an ideal introduction to these difficult philosophers in relation to contemporary issues in aesthetics. The essays on aesthetic experience and criticism, however, reach far beyond the level of an introductory survey, and yet they remain interesting and accessible.

James M. Fielding
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Robert Hanna

*Rationality and Logic.*


Pp. 344.


Here Hanna tries to defend and re-vitalize the more or the less Kantian thesis that all rational human beings share a faculty of logic, which is governed by normative principles. This faculty is protological in the sense that it is operative in constructing logical systems. It is a priori by being innate. Hanna takes up main elements of current cognitive linguistics and tries to combine them with ideas of the (Neo-)Kantian tradition. Just as universal grammar is understood in generative grammar as a set of principles by which individual languages are learned, so Hanna conceives of the protological faculty. Individual logics are then a collection of separated systems which nevertheless share abstract common features, just as the collection of all human possible languages shares the common features of universal grammar. The Kantian mentalistic talk about faculties of reason is transformed into the cognitive science idea of innate capacities. Hanna thus brings together traditional mentalism with mentalism in the tradition of Fodor and Chomsky. He tries to integrate the idea that humans are essentially rational beings with current theories of cognition and the modular mind. This in itself is a fruitful approach, since either it provides us with the opportunity to integrate traditional theories about reason into current theories of cognition — or, precisely because it fails this attempt at combination may teach us where the two approaches must part ways.

Hanna divides his treatment of the main thesis into several sub-topics to which the individual chapters are devoted: a proper understanding of anti-psychologism, which does not threaten the idea of a cognitive (i.e. psychological) faculty of logic; the question of whether there is one logic underlying the manifold of logical systems; the relation between language, logic and cognition, especially in light of the cognitive science literature on the limited logicality of common reasoning; the question how we know of logic; and lastly, the sense in which the logical faculty has to be taken as normative.

On his way Hanna advances a couple of highly controversial theses. He gives a modal argument that supposedly shows that the programme of conceptually reducing modal facts (as we find in logic) to natural facts fails. Whether this argument works depends a lot on how one understands the modal concepts involved and on whether one has to understand them uniformly in the object and in the meta-language. Nevertheless, Hanna provides a new anti-reductionist argument, the discussion of which might shed light on some modal issues involved in the debate. Hanna also puts into doubt the psychological theories of limited rationality as being a result of highly artificial circumstances of testing people. Cognitive scientist may not concur. Although he supports Fodor’s thesis of a language of thought, Hanna claims that there may be several languages of thought (not one shared within the
species). This, however, conflicts with a couple of Fodor’s original arguments (for example: that the language of thought is shared by mental modules to transmit information that is not cognitively penetrable).

I would like to highlight two other critical aspects close to the idea of a logical faculty. Hanna justifies the logical faculty thesis by an extension of Chomsky’s learnability arguments for natural languages and by a Kantian argument seeing in the logical faculty the transcendental condition for understanding any specific logical system. Both are strong arguments.

Hanna de facto, although not explicitly, engages in a on-going debate between philosophical logicians whether there is or can be one universal logic or whether there is irreducible logical pluralism. A recent statement of pluralism is Logical Pluralism (Oxford: OUP 2006) by Greg Restall and J. C. Beall. Their critics — and Hanna may join in here — argue that even if there is a plurality of systems, we are able to understand them all, and we are able to argue about them. These arguments have to use, it seems, some common logic. Hanna does not say much about what belongs to the protological faculty. He mentions only some basic principles like the concept of validity, and also the highly controversial principle of non-contradiction. He believes that to identify more is not the task of philosophers like him. Getting to work on this task, however, may be the cardinal way to verify the idea of a universal logical faculty. Thus, apparently unknown to Hanna, logical universalists have begun to work out specific systems that can be used either as universal logic or as a fall-back system while using more than one system. Prominent are several approaches rooted in the development of paraconsistent logics, especially Ross Brady’s Universal Logic (Stanford: CSLI 2006); see also corresponding chapters in Manuel Bremer’s An Introduction to Paraconsistent Logics (Bern et al: Lang 2005). There has even been a first world congress of universal logic in Montreux in 2005, issuing in a new journal, Logica Universalis.

If there is such a universal logic (or something like Hanna’s ‘logic of thought’), it can in at least one crucial aspect not be like universal grammar (or the language of thought). The principles of universal grammar are cognitively inaccessible; at most, some of the rules of individual natural language grammars are open to some limited cognitive access. The linguist comes up ex post with her theory by explaining the verbal behaviour and judgments on wellformedness by competent speakers. This cannot be true with respect to principles of logic and rationality, since we not only follow these rules, we also represent them explicitly in processes of deliberation and argumentation to ourselves. Rules of logic are much more like semantic knowledge, which has to be cognitively accessible in verifying or rejecting statements. Hanna claims that we have a capacity of ‘logical intuition,’ but despite his phenomenological reflections on feelings of ‘doxastic ease’ and ‘a sense of rational guidedness’ in working with imagined symbols, this claim remains as mysterious as similar claims by Gödel or Brouwer. One needs rather a theory that makes our tacit logical knowledge explicit.
Some philosophical logicians may read Hanna’s book as saying much of what they always thought but never dared speak. It may cause those working on theories of rationality to come to see the necessity of combining the issues of rationality, universal logic and cognitive science. Reductionists may also take this book as an invitation to seek flaws in Hanna’s arguments.

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Vincent F. Hendricks and
John Symons, eds.
Formal Philosophy.
Pp. 264.
US$40.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-87-991013-1-3);

Recently analytic philosophers have rediscovered the power and beauty of formal philosophy. Although this trend that can hardly be called new — think of philosophical giants such as Frege, the members of the Vienna Circle or the Polish school — events like the annual Formal Epistemology Workshops in the US, the 2006 Studia Logica conference titled Towards Mathematical Philosophy in Poland, the recent Mathematical Methods in Philosophy conference in Canada, and the upcoming first annual Synthese conference on David Lewis and the Future of Formal Methods in Philosophy certainly constitute a renewal of interest.

Formal Philosophy, edited by two eminent ‘current generation’ formal philosophers, offers a public forum to the who-is-who of formal philosophers of the ‘last generation,’ i.e. the very generation that cherished the applicability of mathematics in philosophy while facing the challenges of a hostile anti-formalist environment. Each contributor was asked to answer five relatively broad questions. This format triggered not just a sequence of insightful and entertaining reminiscences, it also allowed the editors to do something almost unheard of: to take an eclectic snapshot of modern analytic philosophy as a whole.

Where the Logical Empiricists used formal methods to clarify the philosophical presuppositions of scientific theories, modern formal philosophy seems driven by the mathematical structure of the philosophical mundane or, as van Benthem puts it, by the ‘formal patterns in ordinary activities’ (1). For example, modal logic and its analysis of idioms of natural language replaced first-order logic and set theory as the paradigms of logical endeavor,
and accordingly not less than eleven contributors deal with modal logic. (There are exceptions: Fagot-Largeault says about Suppes' remark 'Don't waste your time with modal logic ... go to probability theory' [13], that it was the best advice she ever received.)

On the other hand, the interviewees' to-do list for young formal philosophers is heterogeneous and unclear. For instance, where Paris (151) calls upon the next generation to overcome the dark age in which inductive logic went out of fashion and to bridge the gaps between Carnap's and Kemeny's work and the new results in AI and Cognitive Science, Haack suggests more or less the opposite, guided by the thought that 'supportiveness of evidence does not depend on [logical] form alone' (89). Furthermore, though there are some typical answers to questions about the most important open philosophical problems — the mind-body problem and the understanding of mathematical intuition are mentioned — very few suggestions are given on how to tackle them or what formal philosophy's role might be.

Still, some of the interviews in Formal Philosophy also show remarkable coincidences. For example, I leave it for the reader to decide which of the following two quotations is van Benthem's and which is Fagot-Largeault's: 'collective rational agents are interactive ... The formal methodology available for the analysis of collective rationality may be found in the theory of games;' 'the dynamic stance making action and interactive processes a core topic ... has an interesting synchronicity in philosophy, logic, artificial intelligence, and computer science ... games seem the interactive model par excellence.'

Another point of consensus among the contributors, apart from their obvious support of logical and mathematical methods in philosophy, is the belief that formalisms can easily be abused: van Benthem (2, 'boring people get even more boring when you give them formulas'), Føllesdal (36, 'Formalism may be overused. It is sometimes used to present reasoning or results that can just as easily be presented without the formalism'), Hintikka (112, 'Formal methods are important only when they actually do some work instead of merely being another notation'), Segerberg (164, 'The bad examples arise when formal investigation begins too early, or if the formalism does not have enough structural richness to reward technical work'). Those passages remind us of the dangers of unjustified formalising and that all successful applications of formal methods must 'have a philosophical story at their heart' (Fitting, 29f).

The process of formalisation itself is one topic I wish the interviewees had addressed in more detail. Both Føllesdal (36, 'Philosophy is, like mathematics, concerned with structures') and Williamson (210, 'Little progress is made in mathematics or philosophy without a strong capacity for abstract pattern recognition') defend a structuralist view of philosophy, on which philosophical inquiry ultimately requires formalisation. But only Spohn tries to enumerate some of the presuppositions and features of formalisation. For instance, amenability to formal methods comes in degrees and depends on the philosophical field (170), and formal methods are required at every stage of philosophical activity (180). (Hanson's article, 'Formalization in Philoso-
Contrary to widespread prejudice, formal philosophers can also be funny: When Gaifman (63) knows that "something wrong has happened to "metaphysics"" in view of debates about possible worlds containing only gunk; when Glymour (67) tells us why he threw Toulmin’s *Philosophy of Science* into a deep cavern; when Levi talks about the "unholy marriage of game theory and evolutionary biology" (130); when Parikh laments that brilliant young set theorists are "wasting their time inventing stronger and stronger "large cardinal" axioms" (144); and when Segerberg points to rigor as 'one reason why those of our nonformal colleagues who don’t like us don’t like us' (163), entertainment is guaranteed.

After Logical Empiricism's decline, proponents of logical and mathematical methods found themselves pushed from the core areas of philosophy into the less threatening positions of 'mere' logicians or of scientists working in philosophy-'related' disciplines (typically, computer science). Despite the recent renewal of interest, not every contributor to *Formal Philosophy* is therefore unreservedly optimistic about the future prospects of doing philosophy this way. For example, Segerberg worries that 'beginning graduate students in philosophy increasingly turn to nonformal areas of philosophy' (16). If this is so, then the editors of this volume should not just get credit for putting together a splendid set of interviews; they should also be praised for swimming against the stream. As the sequel *Masses of Formal Philosophy* (Automatic Press 2006) indicates, the number of salmon might be on the rise.

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**Johann Gottfried Herder**

*Selected Writings on Aesthetics.*


Pp. 468.


This collection of some of Herder's writings on aesthetics is a very stimulating and elegantly produced volume. The texts included by the editor are all new in English, with the exception of the short essay on Shakespeare. What we find is predominantly a young man's work — almost three-quarters of the material presented was written before Herder got much beyond his twenty-fifth birthday. This focus on the earlier writings accords with the view that these tend to be his best work. This may indeed be so, but I was also
impressed with the later pieces included in this volume, these being tauter than the earlier ones and no less rewarding. The concentration on the younger Herder means that we miss out on his response to Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, the *Kalligone* of 1800. This is, Moore says, 'interesting, misguided and unfortunately very long' (ix), but then why not give us some excerpts?

The main reason would seem to be Moore's commitment to providing entire pieces. From one point of view this is of course laudable, but some readers will, I suspect, wish that Moore had been more selective (as other translators of Herder have been, for example Michael Forster, Marcia Bunge, and F. M. Barnard). This is especially the case with the two *Critical Forests* included in the volume, the First and Fourth 'Groves', each about 120 pages long. Herder calls these writings 'forests' precisely in order to convey their rather haphazard and rambling character. This quality is exacerbated for the modern reader who is not intimately familiar with Lessing, Winckelmann, Horace, Homer and others, and thus has to keep flipping back to the Editor's Notes to make sense of what Herder is going on about. Herder's sylvan metaphor provoked occasional muttering on the part of this reader about not being able to see the wood for the trees.

Herder's writing style is, as Moore says, 'essayistic, exclamatory and digressive' (6). Some translators manage to iron out quite a lot of the idiosyncrasy of Herder's writing, for example by cutting down on the number of exclamation marks, failing to italicize all his emphases and ignoring Herder's habit of also using quotation marks to emphasize statements of his own. Moore on the other hand does a good job of reproducing Herder's animated style, which as well as being more accurate makes the texts easier and more enjoyable to read.

There are in all nine texts in this collection. The first two, 'Is the Beauty of the Body a Herald of the Beauty of the Soul?' (1766) and 'A Monument to Baumgarten' (1767), are short and help to set the scene for what follows. We then come to the heart of the volume, the first and fourth 'Groves' from *Critical Forests* (written in 1769). The 'First Grove' is a very detailed response to Lessing's *Laocoon* and, as Moore suggests, it 'is best read with a translation of that work to hand' (387). Herder follows Lessing in wanting to articulate the distinctive principles of painting and poetry, but finds Lessing's approach too narrow in scope and often erroneous. Herder instead develops a more comprehensive typology of the arts based on the Aristotelian distinction between work (*ergon*) and energy (*energia*); a work is an artistic product whose parts coexist in space and time, whereas an energy is an artistic product which operates in and through time. The 'Fourth Grove' continues the consideration of the different arts by relating them to the different senses. This enables Herder both to distinguish properly painting and sculpture — previously, following Lessing, he had taken them together — and to develop his fascinating ideas about the tactile character of the experience of sculpture, subsequently elaborated in his 1778 essay on sculpture, which has recently appeared in an excellent English edition, edited and translated by Jason Gaiger (not Geiger, as stated on p. ix).
The remaining five pieces are all much shorter and more specific in focus. In ‘Shakespeare’ (1773), Herder defends the bard against his classicist critics. The historicism Herder is noted for is displayed in ‘The Causes of Sunken Taste among the Different Peoples in Whom It Once Blossomed’ (1775). The next text, ‘On the Influence of the Belles Lettres on the Higher Sciences’ (1781), is an interesting precursor to Schiller’s great work on aesthetic education. In ‘Does Painting or Music Have a Greater Effect?’ (1785), Herder returns to the issue of the respective merits and qualities of different arts. The characterizations here of painting in terms of clarity and serenity and of music as an ocean of emotion in which one sinks and drowns are reminiscent of Nietzsche’s dualism in The Birth of Tragedy. The final piece is ‘On Image, Poetry and Fable’ (1787). This deftly takes the reader from some striking claims about the constructive, indeed creative, character of ordinary perceptual experience through to a treatment of disputed questions about the genre of fable.

Herder insists on both the diversity of art forms and aesthetic experiences and the centrality of art and aesthetic experience to human life. His parallel emphases on the cognitive complexity of aesthetic experience and the aesthetic quality of everyday cognition are very striking. His aesthetic writings are engaging and provide a fascinating contrast to, indeed critique of, the much more famous work of his one-time teacher, Kant. Gregory Moore and Princeton University Press are to be congratulated on providing more of them to the English reader in such an attractive fashion.

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Otfried Höffe
Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace.
Pp. 272.
US$70.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-82676-1);

Otfried Höffe, the author of numerous works on Immanuel Kant, has written a book specifically on Kant’s moral and political philosophy. His aim is to correct what he argues is a failure fully to appreciate Kant within the canon of Western legal and political thought. This might appear odd at first given the resuscitation by contemporary theorists such as Johns Rawls and Jürgen Habermas of a Kantian cosmopolitanism for the establishment of a global ju-
ridical order, not to mention the importance of Kant's *Perpetual Peace* as the foundational text that sustains the democratic peace theory in international relations theory. And yet Höffe's charge is not without merit as he shows throughout his book that contemporary political philosophers have not fully grappled with the important nuances laden within Kant's texts, or have simply neglected important parts to suit their own argument.

Höffe makes four important claims about Kant's moral and political philosophy that structure his work. The first is that Kant is the first philosopher to promote the concept of peace as the foundational principle for philosophy as such. Second, this concept must be intimately tied to the establishment of a republic based on human right. Third, the implication for a cosmopolitan international juridical order becomes explicit and legitimate through this form of republicanism. Fourth, Kant elides the distinction between the Platonic philosopher-king and 'others' by instead emphasizing the 'kingly' quality of the people of a republic to rule themselves.

To demonstrate the validity of these four points, Höffe structures his text into three parts. While the first chapter presents a convincing case for the continued relevance of Kant as a truly cosmopolitan philosopher, Part 1 (Chapters 2-4) juxtaposes Kantian and Aristotelian ethics. By examining the universality of Kantian ethics, the faculty of moral judgment present in both ethical systems and the problem of evil that Kant does discuss at length, Höffe demonstrates that returning to an Aristotelian ethics of the mean is unnecessary. Part 2 reconciles Kant's ethical positions with the conception of right and legality as a way of legitimizing the two within the state. As Höffe shows, any legal order according to Kant, in contrast to the legal positivist position of, for example, H. L. A. Hart or Hans Kelsen, 'must have a moral underpinning' (83). As such, this moral underpinning gives rise to a legal order in which right, justice and freedom enjoy a symbiosis within the state.

It is, however, in Part 3 that Höffe makes his most interesting contributions. As Kant turned his attention to a moral foundation for peace, he first articulated his idea of cosmopolitan right. Chapter 8 deals with the questions surrounding Kant's cosmopolitan law, 'consisting in the authorization to offer engagement in commerce without eliciting hostile treatment' (140). For Kant, such cosmopolitan law is rooted in an evolving conception of reciprocity, but one in which a moral sense through education remains necessary. But such a cosmopolitan intent remains insufficient in the establishment of a peaceful international juridical order. For Höffe, 'the spirit of commerce, however, leads only to a world society and not to a federation of peoples, nor to a world republic' (143).

Thus Höffe engages Kant in a long exegesis as to both the realistic conditions for the establishment of a peaceful global juridical order and the shape such a realistic possibility is likely to take. Indeed, Höffe is consistently trying to demonstrate the remarkable realism that Kant displays in his formulations published in the treatise *Perpetual Peace*. As he writes, Kant's treatise, 'awakens latent utopian energy and overcomes that resigned loss of hope and vision that robs life of all magnificence and impoverishes the world' (151).
One of the ways in which Höffe shows Kant’s realism is through his use of conflict as a motor within history for the sake of progress towards perpetual peace. Kant utilizes self-interest, which has often been taken by liberals as a means to transform society, towards that particular end. Nonetheless, Kant adds a necessary moral element because of the original stipulation that republics embody a moral framework for right. To this Kant adds that because of the moral connection with justice and right, and the fact that citizens must give their consent to such a policy, republics are more ‘hesitant’ to engage in war given that ‘people have an interest in avoiding the misery of war’ (183).

Höffe is also keen on presenting numerous difficulties or ambiguities present within Kant’s framework. One such problem involves the question whether or not the establishment of perpetual peace rests upon the creation of a world federal republic whose powers resemble that of (a) a state, or (b) a minimal world state as a type of confederation, or finally (c) an ultra minimal world state which lacks a state form. The problem Höffe identifies in these formulations remains the fundamental question of the adjudication of legal disputes without an explicit recourse to the ‘sword of justice.’ While Kant desired an accommodation for the plurality of peoples within an international juridical order living in peace without recourse to the establishment of a world state, it remains fundamentally unclear, as Höffe points out, whether he succeeds in the end. That the order of the day is instead a strengthening of state sovereignty by either the state itself or the people voting against further European integration does not bode well for those that argue for the eventual or progressive cosmopolitan intent embodied in Kant.

Höffe’s text is a deep textual reading of Kant’s moral, legal and political philosophy. Alexandra Newton should be commended for provided a lucid and well-written translation of what is often challenging German.

**Alexander D. Barder**  
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Much of the difficulty students encounter in studying formal logic arises from their expectation of learning something about everyday arguments, while having to do so through a system very far removed from ordinary language. The approach of R. E. Jennings and N. A. Friedrich in *Proof and Consequence* is thus to encourage students to ‘rid themselves of the intuitive notion of logic as the science of correct inference’ (*Simple Simon* 5) and to approach formal logic as an entity in its own right. They contend that ‘logical theory should be thought of as providing its own objects of study, historically related to those of ordinary speech perhaps, but replacing them,’ and go on to note the applicability of formal logical systems to such areas as information processing and engineering (5).

Their publication comes in four parts: a main text, a ‘companion study guide’ titled *Simple Simon*, and two software packages: *Simon* for students, to complete exercises and assignments, and *Omnis* for instructors, to design assignments, determine their weighting, and generally manage the course.

Both propositional and quantificational logic are covered, with the main focus being on the construction of proofs in a sequent calculus system of deduction.

The main text is extremely concise, devoting two chapters to each logical system. In the first chapter, the basic logical symbols are given along with their introduction and elimination rules. The student is shown the use of these rules in the construction of a proof, and how that is to be annotated. In the second chapter, a formal articulation of the logical language is put forth, including syntactical rules for construction. Theorems are introduced along with the notion of uniform substitution, and more proofs are worked through. After that, semantic issues are discussed, including the notion of an interpretation, and validity. Finally, both sections conclude with a demonstration of the soundness and completeness of the proof system at hand. All of this is presented rather summarily, with minimal explanation and a handful of examples.

The more thorough discussion occurs in the companion study guide, making it a necessary resource for students working through *Proof and Consequence*. In fact, the chapters in the companion go well beyond their self-description as ‘study notes.’ Here one finds not only encouragement addressing students’ possible discomfort with the subject-matter and further explanation of the concepts covered in the main text, but entirely new material. This is where translation is dealt with, as well as important matters such as truth tables, quantifier scope, and the construction of a model. The fact that the companion chapters differ so substantially from their counterparts in the
main text is somewhat disorienting, and might make it difficult for the reader to see how all of the elements presented cohere with one another.

The study guide and main text both include exercises that refer the student to the Simon software. The centerpiece of this application is a 'proof editor' that prompts users to fill in proofs one field at a time, and then provides feedback on their work. Students will find it helpful insofar as it indicates not only whether an entry is correct but, roughly, why. Exercises also exist for translation, truth tables, and constructing models, though not for truth-trees (which are not addressed in the texts), and the exercises relating to syntax appear to be missing. Since the cornerstone of learning logic is persistent practice, the 'over 800 exercises'—all told, for the entire course—are arguably not enough, especially since many of the exercises simply involve filling in annotation on completed proofs.

The Simon software also completes all marking, giving the student quick feedback and reducing the workload for the instructor. For its part, the Omnis instructor software includes a number of convenient features, such as an editor that allows one to create new exercises, and a function that determines whether two given formulas are equivalent. The software packages are user-friendly enough, but have scant help resources.

There is a tremendous amount of material covered in the two books, including identity, definite descriptions, and properties of relations. There are also two appendices to Proof and Consequence: one dealing with normal forms, and the other discussing how the connectives of natural languages ('and', 'or', etc.) relate to logical operators. Both of these sections are well-written, but the inclusion of so much material sometimes seems at odds with the uncompromisingly concise presentation, and the utility of covering it eroded by the lack of exercises for making it fully meaningful to the reader.

Overall, Jennings and Friedrich’s presentation cuts both ways. On the one hand, students will emerge with a good grasp of what provability is and involves—especially, that it is relative to a given system of rules, that these rules should be set out in precise terms, and that they should prove all and only truth-preserving inferences. On the other hand, this focus comes at the cost of a significant discussion of argument. The relationship between truth and validity, the difference between validity and soundness—these are matters about which students are often, at first, confused, and the fact that these issues are not underscored in the book suggests that it falls short of its stated aim to ‘provide a practical means by which a student can assess his own arguments and those of others’ (6).

While Proof and Consequence claims to be suitable for both beginning- and intermediate-level students of logic, it cannot be strongly recommended for the former. In the case of the intermediate student, however, the book’s precision and rigor will challenge them truly to understand what is at stake in modern symbolic logic.

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In *Law and Social Justice*, Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke and David Shier have compiled and edited contributions to the Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference which took place in the spring of 2002. Comprehensive in scope, the collection of essays grapples with a broad range of moral, social and political issues raised when considering the interface between law and social justice.

*Law and Social Justice* contributors tackle jurisprudential issues such as instrumentalist and Kantian conceptions of rights and the defense of an egalitarian principle of distributive justice, as well as specific legal questions such as the admissibility of evidence of causation in toxic tort cases, the place of ‘moral luck’ in criminal law, the implications of deliberative democracy for privacy rights, the treatment of intellectual property in China, and the scope of the concept of initial acquisition of goods in the realm of property rights.

The essays are divided into three sections. The first includes Silverstein’s ‘framework’ piece entitled ‘Law and Social Justice’. However, rather than providing, as one might expect, an overview of questions relating to law and social justice or introducing the less experienced reader to methodological and epistemological questions around the interplay of law and social justice, his text is simply a chapter breakdown, albeit a succinct one. This is followed by twelve chapters whose relationship to one another seems somewhat discordant. They can, nonetheless, be divided into those that deal with abstract political philosophy (Cohen and Christiano) and those that examine more substantive legal and social justice questions (the remaining ten chapters). Cohen asks whether the right to privacy can be protected through notions of ‘deliberative democracy’ that stress reasonable pluralism and the proposition that coercive social force is legitimate only when founded in ‘public reasoning’; whereas Christiano’s piece is a defense of an egalitarian justice that grounds ‘the intrinsic justice of equality’ for a limited but important number of cases. More specific legal questions examined include the use of scientific testimony in American courts (Cranor); the extent to which moral and legal responsibility rests on factors within an individual’s control (Eisikovits); why Chinese law and culture are reticent to recognize intellectual property rights (Ivanhoe); whether initial acquisition grounds a right to private property (Levey); whether a corporation can be liable for harms caused by its defective products even in the absence of negligence or fault (Silverstein); and the value of instrumental theories of rights (Wenar).

The next two sections focus on the treatment of related issues in the work of two philosophers: Wittgenstein and Coleman. Section 2 begins with Lind’s
thoughtful introduction to the ensuing material examining the diverse and sometimes conflicting views on the relevance of Wittgenstein’s theories to legal philosophy. Bix, for instance, cautions against the relevance of Wittgenstein’s work for legal theorists and calls for self-reflexivity when appropriating philosophical theories for legal purposes. Drawing on Coleman’s pragmatism and the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, Patterson asks how legal concepts come to have particular semantic content. He argues that the answer lies somewhere between the rigid extremes of objective and subjective theories of meaning, where ‘understanding of a rule is exhibited in one’s mastery of the technique for its application’ (233). Sebok’s piece on legal process draws comparison between Wittgenstein and certain legal process theories (e.g., Sacks and Wellington), in addition to H. L. A. Hart’s legal positivism.

The third and final section discusses Jules Coleman’s *The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatic Approach to Legal Theory* and includes a contribution by Coleman himself. Himma’s excellent introduction positions *The Practice of Principle* (which outlines Coleman’s view on corrective justice in torts law, the nature and value of an inclusive legal positivism, and the defence of the philosophical pragmatism of, among others, Quine and Sellars) at the centre of conceptual jurisprudence, the area of legal theory that grapples with philosophical analysis of legal concepts. Gardner’s piece outlines two kinds of objections to law-and-economics approaches to tort law: objections that challenge the underlying assumption that economic values are the only ones worth considering, and objections by Coleman that law-and-economics theories advanced by Richard Posner and others cannot account for central features of modern tort regimes. However, according to Gardner, the only plausible way to refute law-and-economics explanations for the central rules of tort law is to establish that they rest on bad value theory. In the next chapter, Zipursky draws on elements of Dworkin’s methodology and urges that Coleman’s understanding of legal arguments is incapable of explaining how judicial decision-makers can disagree in notoriously difficult cases without resorting to devices that are in conflict with the positivist ‘social fact’ thesis. This next essay by Himma evaluates Coleman’s assertion that legal obligation can be explained by conceiving of the rule of recognition as a shared cooperative activity among judges. In his reply, Coleman offers the following: to Gardner, he states that from a law-and-economics perspective fault and responsibility are irrelevant to Torts law, which is a system for allocating costs in the most efficient way; to Zipursky, he argues that his theories of judicial disagreement can be reconciled with the social fact thesis, because social facts can be fixed through shared cooperative ventures; and to Himma he claims that establishing an account of legal obligations should be the work of normative political philosophy.

This collection of essays is a rich contribution to discussions around the interface between law and social justice. However, it is clearly not intended for the neophyte. As noted above, an introduction to the field of law and social justice would have complemented the theoretical discussion that ensues.
Further, few of the contributors are women and none seems to draw on feminist legal theories of social justice — lacunae that could have been addressed in a more thorough and substantive introductory chapter. Moreover, it seems that, like many other published conference proceedings, the collection suffers from a lack of coherence and structure. Nevertheless, the broad scope of jurisprudential issues it broaches is approached with sophistication and sensitivity, and the contributions are likely to interest the more experienced legal philosopher.

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Michael Martin, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Atheism.
Pp. 352.
US$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-84270-9);

This is a long-overdue contribution to the generally exemplary Cambridge Companion series. Under Martin’s guidance, the phenomenon of atheism is examined from a variety of perspectives by writers across the intellectual spectrum. Here, philosophers and theologians mingle with a psychologist, a sociologist, a religious studies scholar, an anthropologist, and a legal scholar. Even the philosophical points of view are, thankfully, diverse.

Martin frames the book at the outset by introducing an important (and frequently overlooked) distinction between positive atheism and negative atheism. Whereas a positive atheist is someone who believes that there are no gods, or believes that a particular god does not exist, a negative atheist simply lacks belief in gods, or in a particular god. Furthermore, Martin distinguishes between broad and narrow forms of each type. The narrow negative atheist lacks belief in a personal God, such as the God of Christianity, while a broad negative atheist lacks belief in all gods; a narrow positive atheist, similarly, disbelieves in a personal God, while a broad positive atheist disbelieves in all gods.

Because Martin’s distinctions are so useful in thinking clearly about atheism, it is a shame that most of this book’s contributors ignore them. Some of their articles would be much less prone to confusion or misunderstanding if they had adopted their editor’s terminology. Several authors, in fact, waste precious space in their articles wrangling over the meaning of the term ‘athe-
ist' when they could have, instead, used Martin's definitions and moved on with the task at hand.

The greatest strength of this book is that it offers readers a primer of more than just the arguments for and against atheism, though such arguments are certainly interesting in their own right. Jan Bremmer and Gavin Hyman provide two fascinating histories of atheism — the former considers its roots in Greece, and the latter its development in the Western projects of enlightenment and modernity, during which the term 'atheist' finally became more of a description than an epithet. Indeed the history of atheism is inextricably bound to the history of philosophy since Protagoras, with the consequence that, for centuries, atheism was little more than a theoretical position on the one hand, and a means of libel on the other. Bremmer's history is careful and compelling. Hyman's is no less interesting, but suffers from some problematic assertions used to frame the entire article — for instance, that 'atheism will always be a rejection, negation, or denial of a particular form of theism' (29). That seems to be a necessity only for narrow positive atheism, not the other three varieties.

Steve Gey examines the progress that has been made in Western nations regarding the legal status of atheism. No longer are atheists put to death for their beliefs, though they still lack some of the religion-based liberties granted to theists. Paul Zuckerman reviews data regarding the prevalence of atheism today, persuasively demonstrating that atheists constitute a larger percentage of the population than is typically recognized (a substantially higher percentage of the population than Mormons, Jews, and Sikhs), and that data demonstrate atheism to be associated with a number of positive social characteristics. Nations with high rates of organic (freely-chosen) atheism tend to have significantly higher levels of education, health, literacy, gender equality and per-capita income than nations with low levels of organic atheism. The more secular nations, those with high levels of atheism, also tend to have the lowest homicide rates. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi complements Gey's contribution with an article emphasizing the positive personal traits associated with atheism, claiming that psychological data demonstrate atheists to be largely the sort of people they hope they are: intelligent, educated, tolerant, law-abiding, compassionate, and responsible independent thinkers.

The philosophical arguments are split between those defending negative atheism by refuting arguments for the existence of God, and those defending positive atheism. Richard Gale focuses on classical arguments for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God. While few people take such arguments seriously anymore, they still circulate among the population (beware the undergraduate with an introductory course in philosophy of religion under her belt), and Gale provides fine refutations of each. More interesting are Keith Parsons' refutations of Plantinga and Swinburne's more nuanced and compelling arguments. Among those authors defending positive atheism, Andrea Weisberger uses one of the oldest arguments against the existence of the Judeo-Christian God, the problem of evil, to argue that the existence of
such a god is, at best, highly unlikely. Patrick Grim takes a step past unlikely to argue that the existence of a traditional theistic God — with the traits of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection — is likely impossible. Relevant to a climate in which people are apparently more distrustful of atheists than any other minority group, David Brink provides an excellent account of the naturalistic bases for ethics, arguing that unless ethics is autonomous, which it cannot be if dependent upon divine decree, it cannot possibly be objective. Though Brink sometimes appears to be unduly devoted to an outdated, rule-based conception of moral philosophy that owes much to unrecognized religious assumptions, his article presents an intriguing challenge to the common assumption that without God, morality is condemned to relativism.

Of course, this book is not without its faults. The most serious of these is the lack of competent criticism of atheist arguments. The closest the collection comes is an article by William Lane Craig, which is less a critique of atheism than a repetition of tired arguments for theism that Craig attempted to resurrect decades ago in new forms (such as the Kalam cosmological argument) accompanied by some snide name-calling. Craig’s arguments hardly differ at all from the traditional arguments they ape, falling victim to many of the same criticisms. Quentin Smith deals with the Kalam argument directly in his contribution to this volume, but he needn’t have bothered. Plantinga and Swinburne’s arguments are much more effective, so it’s regrettable that we couldn’t have had a contribution from either of them (or one of their heirs) instead. A position is best served, after all, by being defended against powerful objections.

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Steven Nadler
Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction.
Pp. 300.

This is part of a new series of Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts, ‘introductory textbooks on what are considered to be the most important texts of Western philosophy’ (ii). So far it contains treatments of Descartes’ Meditations, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and Tractatus, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and now Spinoza’s Ethics.

After the highly engaging first chapter on Spinoza’s life and works, truncated from Nadler’s wonderful Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge 1999), a useful and informative discussion of Spinoza’s method and anatomy of his employment of definitions, axioms, propositions and scholia ensues. The distinction drawn between stipulative definitions (definitions that state how one is using a term in a certain context) and ‘real’ definitions (definitions as bearers of truth value) is very helpful. N suggests that the more one sees what follows from definitions, their status as real self-evident definitions becomes apparent.

Two chapters on God (3 and 4), comprising seventy pages — warranted in so far as understanding God or Nature in the Ethics is indispensable — are thorough and comprehensive summaries that sometimes do not improve much on reading the Ethics itself. When N motivates a problem, or provides interpretation, the book is far more beneficial; perhaps these moments are too infrequent.

The treatment of mind-body parallelism in Chapter 5 is extremely useful. N emphasizes that it is not the case that there is simply ‘a one-to-one correspondence of modes across attributes’ (125) but rather ‘a one-to-one correspondence between the modes of Thought (ideas), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the modes of every attribute’ (126). The treatment of Spinoza’s understanding of mind and body in relation to Cartesian dualism is well-presented. N might have expanded his insightful remarks regarding the superficial relationship between central state materialism and Spinoza’s expressionism.

By the end of Chapter 5 we have received an excellent treatment of Spinoza’s ontology, and are prepared for the treatments of knowledge and will, the passions, virtue and eternity that follow. The section on truth and adequacy in Chapter 5 establishes a clear reading of Spinoza’s correspondence theory of truth, with adequacy as the indicator of the truth of correspondence. N also judiciously engages the secondary literature in the text, to explain why he holds that for Spinoza, consciousness is not an idea of an idea. This would seem to lead to a world where ‘every idea corresponding to every body involves consciousness’ (172). N’s position is that consciousness is simply the expression of the complexity of the human mind that corresponds to the complexity of expression in the human body. This is less than satisfying, but the issue of clarity is Spinoza’s problem more than N’s.

However, lack of clarity on the issue of consciousness can lead to problems regarding the will and the prescriptive status of the Ethics. For Spinoza, the Cartesian notion of the will is illusory and incoherent. If so, and if consciousness is merely a more highly complex mental expression paralleling a more highly complex material expression, to what degree do we have any control over increasing our knowledge and activity? Consider Epicurus’ rejoinder to
determinism: '[The determinist] combats a person on this very point as though it were because of himself that the person were being silly' (On Nature, 34).

The problem (Spinoza's, not N's) that pervades much of the rest of the book is how we are to initiate and pursue a life of activity and overcome a life mired in the passions, as Spinoza prescribes. If we are merely determined expressions of God or Nature, how are we to control whether our mind is more active or more passive? An active mind is active through no fault or control of its own. N (193): 'An active mind is no less a causally determined mind.' We may express higher levels of activity or passivity, and we may even do this as a result of reading the Ethics, but our reading the Ethics, as well as our response to it, really has little to do with our non-existent ability to choose to become more active. Is Spinoza exhorting in a world where exhortation has no efficacy?

Without a clearer assessment, the hortatory aim of the Ethics is lost on N's first-time reader. N's clearest offer of a solution is far too brief for an issue that pervades every page of the book between pages 154 and 274. To assert the lack of room for protreptic in Spinoza, says N 'presumes that moral prescriptions are incompatible with determinism. And while that may seem right to the libertarian, it will not seem right to the compatibilist, who believes that freedom and responsibility can co-exist with determinism' (237). An introductory text where the issue of how we overcome the passions through becoming more active (without any apparent explanation our ability to do so) might offer a more explicit extended treatment; the problem is so pervasive as to distract from appreciating the rest of N's excellent treatment of Spinoza.

The extended treatment of Spinoza's political philosophy in relation to Hobbes, at the end of Chapter 8 is well presented and useful in the context of this book's stated purpose.

Chapter 9 begins with the claim that 'much of the scholarly frustration directed at ...Part 5 is ...due to the failure to appreciate the degree to which Spinoza is engaged with his Jewish philosophical ancestors' (248). Yet N does little to alleviate this frustration, making remarks about Maimonides that are more cursory than those for which he criticizes Wolfson; given the prefatory remark quoted above, I expected some help here.

The profound affect of Neoplatonic Islamic philosophy on Maimonides can be traced ultimately back to Plotinus; this extends far beyond the scope of Spinoza's Ethics, and we are referred to N's excellent Spinoza's Heresy (Cambridge 2002). Given Plotinus' influence on Medieval philosophy, and its influence on thinkers like Spinoza, mysticism is given rather short shrift in this book. Consider, 'Knowledge of the third kind, in particular, seems rather mysterious, and has often given rise to the suggestion that Spinoza is ultimately a kind of mystic ...nothing could be further from the truth; Spinoza is a rationalist through and through' (178).

The association of mysticism and mysteriousness is its own rebuttal; non-demonstrative and immediate insight is the culmination of certain kinds
of non-mysterious mysticism that are grounded in and indeed consequences of monistic rationalism.

N provides a substantial bibliography of books and articles in English. I note the omission of important translations of Deleuze's Expressionism in Philosophy or Negri's The Savage Anomaly.

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Alexander Nehamas
Only a Promise of Happiness:
The Place of Beauty in a World of Art.
Pp. 186.

The philosopher of art ought to function as a type of critic. The arguments that are formed and analyzed in aesthetics exist in those gaps between artist and artwork, between art and critic, between the critic and the public, as well as between the individuals experiencing these things. So this criticism is not the explanation of specific artworks, but rather the exploration of these spaces, allowing aesthetics to exist separately from other elements of art history. Nehamas reaffirms the importance of beauty in these spaces. This is not a contemporary, subjective notion of beauty. This is Plato's beauty. It is a beauty which leads us beyond appearances, instilling in us the strong desire for greater knowledge and cementing together the discussions of art and philosophy. This association with learning brings aesthetics back to the core questions of philosophical study, away from the margins into which it is often squeezed.

The book begins with the claim that beauty's role in our lives has been trivialized and pulled apart from the academic vocabulary of art. Nehamas points out the many strains and inconveniences of losing the traditional concept. With twentieth-century movements constantly rewriting the necessary and sufficient conditions for art, the element of beauty slipped off the list and was trampled under a mound of more 'modern' terminology. If art then becomes reducible to certain formal aspects, i.e., Greenberg's 'flatness' or McLuhan's 'medium', it loses its magic and inspiration. Furthermore, when we lock beauty to the senses, or to a thing's appearance, we are ignoring multiple other layers of our experience. One of Nehamas' simple examples supports this idea. He points out that people cannot see their friends as ugly and also that ugliness is often attached to those who behave despicably. This is
not just a case of terms holding slightly different meanings in different applications. To Nehamas, beauty is not what we see, but what inspires us.

Desire is the word Nehamas uses to identify the transmission of beauty. Perhaps more importantly, he uses desire as the connection of that beauty to our motivation for wisdom. ‘The art that we love is art we don’t yet fully understand’ (76). This is not to say that we are drawn to strange or confusing objects; actually, we are moved by the mysterious qualities within any object. The unknown creates an instant desire of some sort in the viewer. When we want to understand why something is special or intriguing, we must make clear why it stands out from the rest of the world. This means that our path to learning about the source of beauty also includes learning about the world as a whole. Plato talked of our desire to possess the beautiful. Nehamas makes that desire synonymous with beauty itself. People want to make beautiful things a part of their lives, to get to know them, to spend some quality time together. These feelings come suddenly and powerfully. Figuring them out may take time.

The fifteen-page deconstruction of Manet’s Olympia almost seems out of place in this book. It appears to cross the line between being an example and being a scholarly study of a single painting. However, the somewhat obsessive detail and the number of historical comparisons does give the reader a specific look at just what Nehamas has been discussing. This is his story of desire, inspired by the beauty in a specific work of art. It drives him to seek a greater understanding of the piece and, in the process, to search for many other things as well. Through his example, we see the links between studying the painting and looking for more knowledge of the artist, the time-period and works of similar composition.

Nehamas does not attempt to define art or argue its objectivity. This is not a book that is taking sides on critical choices and defending the value of certain works over others. The goal is to expose the obvious utility of beauty in the experience of art. It is not art itself that is causing our philosophical problems as much as it is the rhetoric of art. According to Nehamas, the first step to correcting this problem is to remember that ‘Beauty is part of the everyday world of purpose and desire, history and contingency, subjectivity and incompleteness. That is the only world there is, and nothing, not even the highest of the arts, can move beyond it’ (35).

Taking what is usually treated as a broad and complicated concept and reducing it to such a natural reaction allows this argument to appeal to common aesthetic experiences. The arguments here are targeted and passionate. Reading Nehamas, it is easy to pick up these passions. Good arguments serve as a call to action. What action can be taken to bring back the awareness of beauty’s great value, now that it has drifted from the conversation of art? This book contains no advice on how to proceed after agreement with its thesis. Good arguments serve as a call to action, but seldom offer advice on what action to take.

Finally, the physical appearance of the book itself cannot be ignored in this review. The content of the book is an attempt to restore attention to the
importance of beauty, and the design of this edition serves as an interesting example. With a wrap-around color reproduction of *Olympia* and a semi-transparent, die-cut dust jacket, it invites curiosity about what might be inside. The desire to find out a little something more is created.

**Adam Melinn**
Philadelphia University

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**Wendy Olmsted**
*Rhetoric: An Historical Introduction.*
Pp. 184.

This is not only a useful introduction to the history of rhetoric, it is also an important contribution to contemporary legal and political theory. The first part, devoted to the ‘Classical Rhetorical Tradition,’ examines the authors and works on which the discipline was founded. As Olmsted points out, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and Cicero’s *De Oratore* suppose that ‘we deliberate without full knowledge of the things relevant to our decisions,’ and despite the persistent desire for ‘a perfect science or expertise that can disclose the particular, always shifting, partly unknown things that we apprehend from apparently “subjective” points of view in ordinary life and in politics’ that has dogged Western philosophy since Plato criticized rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, this remains our situation. (7)

Aristotle’s *Logic* encapsulated the difference between rhetoric and the kind of demonstrative reasoning Plato sought to apply to politics in the distinction between enthymemtic and syllogistic propositions. While the syllogistic approach was capable of yielding certainty, it was inappropriate for the practical business of politics, where one was necessarily concerned with contingencies and probabilities. Insofar as one is concerned about what ought to be done, that is, one necessarily inhabits a Machiavellian world of *fortuna*, and it is no surprise to see *The Prince* treated as a critique of Cicero’s *On Duties*.

A classical Machiavelli makes a refreshing change from the medieval Machiavelli so prominent in recent interpretations like Viroli’s, but at the same time something is lost in viewing *The Prince* exclusively from this point of view. Machiavelli was shocking not simply because of his subversion of the Ciceronian rhetorical tradition, but because of his patent indifference to Christianity and his insistence that the ancients had been right to view poli-
tics as an autonomous sphere of action. Religion, however, receives its due in the chapter on Augustine, which shows how On Christian Doctrine and the Confessions adapted classical rhetoric to the hermeneutic task of Biblical interpretation and the pedagogical need to persuade the members of the Church of the truth of faith so that they were receptive to instruction.

The second part, on 'Classical Rhetoric and Literary Interpretation,' examines how the late Renaissance and early modern period adapted rhetoric to scientific knowledge, epic poetry, and the novel, in the writings of Bacon, Milton, and Jane Austen respectively. If Austen seems an odd choice for inclusion, one need only remember that one of her novels was entitled Persuasion. However, Olmsted's employment of her as a stalking horse for the themes of the third part, 'Rhetoric and Contemporary Disciplines,' colours her judgment somewhat and produces a confusion between the historical and theoretical parts of her own enterprise. She argues that Austen 'differs from her predecessors ... by construing rhetorical communities as plural,' and that 'Whereas Aristotle, Cicero, and the others base rhetorical arguments on the beliefs of a single polis, republic, or political commonwealth, Austen traces the different ends and discourses that shape a diversity of social milieux' (97).

The point Olmsted wants to make about 'Rhetoric and Contemporary Disciplines' is that modern scholars (particularly practitioners of New Historicism such as Greenblatt, and writers on jurisprudence such as Garver, Allen, and Levi) have shown that rhetoric is a valuable tool for building the trust essential for political co-existence, because it is capable of producing consensus over the right decision in particular cases without presupposing any broader agreement within modern states composed of a plurality of often conflicting groups. This is a fundamental insight of great importance for contemporary political theory. But to see Austen as prefiguring it seems an historical anachronism.

The real difference between Austen and her predecessors is not that she was aware of diversity and they were not, but that they were concerned with the public and the political whereas she was interested exclusively in the private and the personal. Perhaps it might be argued that because in our own era these divisions have become much more blurred, Austen does indeed anticipate more modern times. But unless we are prepared to treat the declaration by Anne, the heroine of Persuasion, that 'All the privilege I claim for my own sex ...is that of loving longest, when existence or when hope is gone' (109) as itself a subtle piece of rhetoric designed to disguise political ambition, it seems rather tenuous to do so.

Furthermore, Olmsted's claim that 'contemporary thinkers in literary studies, politics, and law draw on the classical ideas of ethos, logos, and pathos ...to redefine the boundaries and relevant materials of their disciplines' is rather too strong, as well as strictly unnecessary to her argument (113). Booth's The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) may indeed have forced a reconsideration of the standards of literary criticism by making distinctions between authorial and narrative voices that had escaped the attention of other writers, and no doubt Greenblatt does succeed in using anecdotes to bring home
the strangeness of the historical past to his readers; but whether these unquestionable achievements amount to genuine shifts in disciplinary boundaries is at least arguable. Some might feel, like Kuhn, that any genuine disciplinary revolution entails a shift in the very structure of reality itself, in which case New Historicism fails to qualify, being no more than the astute application of historical judgment to literary sources.

Though Olmsted sometimes briefly gets sidetracked by such questions of genre, she nonetheless makes a powerful case for rhetoric as something we absolutely cannot do without. If we ignore it, as we have increasingly done since the nineteenth century when the formal teaching of rhetoric went out of fashion, we do not get rid of it, we simply end up with a debased form of it—so-called 'spin.' She states this point admirably when she says that ‘whenever we equate deliberative rhetoric with manipulation and demagoguery, we deprive ourselves of...the power to investigate, to test the presentations of facts, to articulate our commitments, and to interact fairly and respectfully with others’ (8). On this vital topic, Olmsted could hardly be more persuasive; what she has to say is most certainly worthy of a hearing.

Luke O'Sullivan

William Outhwaite
The Future of Society.
Pp. 184.
US$69.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-631-23185-1);

This book illustrates the problems of the increasing popularity of 'minimal editing' books, in which publishers give a prominent author largely free reign to opine at will on the subject of his or her expertise. The book appears as part of the Blackwell Manifestos series, described by the publisher as 'timely interventions' by 'major critics' that will 'challenge the broadest range of readers, from undergraduates to postgraduates, university teachers and general readers.' There is nothing inherently wrong with the goal of reaching such a broad audience, or of asking an undoubted expert to write something substantive and accessible. However the differing requirements of such a diverse audience make the project difficult. It is, then, perhaps not surprising that this book does not achieve its ambitious goal.

Outhwaite addresses 'the nature of our social relations, and whether these relations continue and will continue to be shaped by processes and ideas centered on what people came to call society or societies' (vii). That he
has not succeeded in reaching the broad audience desired by his publisher can be seen in the potentially confusing description of the book’s theme. Non-specialists will rarely be aware that ‘the nature of our social relations’ raises any kind of metaphysical question, and will instead understand this broad thematic statement as indicating an intent to address ongoing disputes regarding the alleged breakdown of contemporary society. They will, then, be surprised by an extended discussion of the validity of methodological individualism, the plausibility of Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism, and other theoretical concerns.

Such theoretical points are certainly foundational for broader political questions, and a clearly written survey could usefully clarify these issues for non-professionals. However, while Outhwaite has an admirably lively writing style that indicates a clear ability to reach a broad audience, he never explains why the theoretical questions on which he focuses are important. Moreover, when he ultimately turns to practical questions, in his discussion of the possibility of a European society (108-24), he undercuts any connection with the preceding theoretical discussion by only addressing the possibility of a European civil society, something that Outhwaite himself has previously described as a form of ‘society lite’ (99).

Further difficulties arise from the lack of clarity in the theoretical discussion. While a philosopher unfamiliar with sociologists’ work on the nature of the social will benefit from the breadth of Outhwaite’s coverage, the difficulty Outhwaite encounters in balancing his audience’s widely divergent needs makes the substance of his discussion often unclear, to the point that even philosophers actively working on these questions will sometimes have difficulty discerning his meaning. Thus, while the book includes a well-written and valuable historical introduction, the remainder will be largely incomprehensible to general readers, and difficult even for professionals. The breadth of Outhwaite’s knowledge of social theory is apparent; but his chaotic presentation, which at times deteriorates into something resembling stream-of-consciousness writing, seriously undermines the book’s value for readers of any level.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to regard this work as a total, if well-intentioned, failure. While Outhwaite’s discussion is often unclear, he surveys an exceptionally broad range of theoretical writing on the nature of the social — sociological literature likely unfamiliar to philosophers. Thus the book serves as an excellent resource for philosophers.

Substantively, while Outhwaite’s own argument can be difficult to discern, it is ultimately an attempt to defend the concept of society against the charge that it has become irrelevant or is theoretically useless. Outhwaite argues that a defensible conception of society is available once one recognizes the constant feedback that occurs between social interaction and self-identification: a society can be seen as existing not only when there is regular contact between a distinct group of individuals, but when those individuals also self-identify as a member of that group. Each of these levels reinforces the other, with individuals choosing to interact primarily with those who share
their social conventions, and the conventions that unite the group being generated by un-self-conscious everyday interaction.

Outhwaite is surely right in this conception. However, his focus on the ongoing viability of the traditional, politically-based conception of society prevents him from recognizing the extent of society's ability now to extend beyond its traditional bounds. A recent Australian immigrant to America who rarely interacts more than superficially with Americans, but every night spends hours online with friends in Australia, is realistically more part of Australian society than American. Yet recognition of this non-political understanding of society indicates that the question of the 'future' of society need not focus solely on whether there is an increased detachment from one's neighbors, or from the political system one inhabits. Rather, we must recognize that our interest in 'society' is truly an interest in a kind of interaction, not in an historically or geographically contingent assemblage of individuals. Thus, while it is possible to speak of nation-based societies, it is just as accurate to speak of smaller groupings as societies, in which each member meets the kind of consistent social-rule-governed interaction characteristic of societies generally. Once this is recognized, however, any pessimism caused by the increasing distancing of individuals from their geographic and political surroundings must be tempered with full consideration of the degree to which new societies are forming, albeit of a radically different nature than have traditionally existed. Outhwaite addresses many of the concepts relevant to this debate, but by missing the true complexity of contemporary society he ultimately fails to address its possible future.

While Outhwaite should be praised for attempting the difficult job of addressing such a wide audience, he has been ill-served by his publisher, who appears to have been more intent on securing sales through invocation of Outhwaite's authority, than on ensuring a disciplined and successful book. Nonetheless, Outhwaite's familiarity with his subject matter is unquestionable, as is his desire to cover it thoroughly, and the book will serve well as a guide for philosophers to the most important work done by theoretical sociologists on the nature of society — even if they must turn to those works themselves to get a clear understanding of what is actually being said.

Tony Cole
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University of Warwick
Both leaders and writers on leadership generally believe that leaders can sometimes be morally justified in excepting themselves from 'generally applicable moral requirements,' (a phrase Price uses repeatedly). In making such exceptions for themselves, leaders can make serious moral mistakes. The central concern of Price's book is explaining how and why leaders can make such mistakes. His argument is that the volitional account of the leaders' mistakes is inadequate; he believes that only a cognitive account will give us the understanding we need, and that leaders need to assess accurately the moral merits of justifications for leader exception-making. I will say up front that I find Price very persuasive—he is on to something important. His conclusion that leaders ought to be very careful when making exceptions, and that they should observe some basic constraints, seems to me both true and significant.

On the volitional account that Price rejects, leaders are aware of their moral obligations but fail to live up to them because temptations—primarily temptations of self-interest, but possibly of sympathy—are too great. This is, of course, a weakness of will approach. Price rejects the volitional account not because it is false, but because it is seriously inadequate. No one can deny that positions of leadership can be abused for egoistical purposes; the extent of corruption in business and politics (especially in some parts of the world) make it seem strange that Price has little to say on the phenomenon. Price argues that such egoism is not of much interest to leadership theory because corrupt egoists do not recognise (either at all or adequately) the moral claims of leadership. Price is interested in how the justification of leader exception-making can go wrong, and neither egoists nor leadership theories offer a justification for egoism. Price's central point here is correct, but his near complete omission of egoism ignores how leadership theory might discourage egoism and promote proper attention to the legitimate obligations of leaders.

Price's cognitive account of moral failure centres on the beliefs of leaders, not on their will. However, readers should note, especially when reading the early part of this book, that Price is not talking about factual beliefs of any sort. His concern is for the beliefs that leaders have, or ought to have, regarding the values and moral obligations connected with their role as leaders. This, of course, makes Price keenly interested in leadership theory as discussed in the academic literature on leadership, a literature that Price is thoroughly familiar with.

Leadership theories can be either empirical or normative. Price has little interest in empirical information about leaders—he is interested in understanding why moral failures occur. Insofar as he cites empirical studies, his concern is
to show that the evidence on leaders supports his view that they can make cognitive errors. Price is more concerned with normative theories of leadership, especially utilitarian, deontological, trait based, transactional, transformational, and authentic transformational accounts of leadership.

Normative theories of leadership offer moral justifications for leaders being leaders. They specify the obligations leaders have to the group they lead, to their followers, to other leaders, and to outsiders. These theories also offer justifications for how and why these obligations can sometimes justify leaders in excepting themselves from 'generally applicable moral requirements.'

How moral errors arise when leaders try to justify making exceptions for themselves is the central concern of this book. Price tackles each of the leadership theories in turn. In each case, he is not trying to show that the theory is wrong, or should be rejected; his agenda is to show that the theory allows or even encourages erroneous beliefs about exception-making. For example, transformational leadership theory might justify exceptions based on obligations to the group that is being led, or to specific followers, or even to the leader's own authentic transformation. However, such an exception might be a moral error when judged by 'generally applicable moral requirements;' it may be a failure of content, inclusion or scope. That is, it may be a failure to consider the moral claims of outsiders, individual followers, or others. The failure is cognitive in that the leader believes she is justified, but the belief is a false one.

Price does not want to claim that every leader exception is a moral error — sometimes exceptions are justified from all perspectives. But he does think that leaders need always to recognise severe constraints. Using Martin Luther King's analysis of justified civil disobedience as a model, Price argues that 'we can derive moral reasons for leaders to restrict exceptions they make of themselves to the pursuit of inclusive ends, to make both the exception-making behavior and the arguments for it reasonably public, to reserve the use of violence for those cases in which there is widespread support for these means even among outsiders, and to be willing to accept the penalty for their exception-making behavior' (150).

Price has made a valuable contribution to leadership theory by showing that moral failure can arise not just when egoism triumphs over the obligations of leaders, but can also arise out of the leader's beliefs in those very obligations. I have no doubt his central point is basically correct. We need now to consider how to get this message out to leaders and to those of us who teach ethics to future leaders. Price's analysis has considerable implications for how we teach, for example, business ethics. However, I should note in passing the Price's book is too philosophical to be easily read by most leaders, and I would not use it with students other than upper-level or graduate students in philosophy. This book is aimed at academics who work in the area of leadership ethics. It will be up to such academics to disseminate the message further.

John Douglas Bishop
Trent University
As Reidy and Sellers claim in the first sentence of their introduction, 'human rights talk is now ubiquitous.' The moral and practical significance of these rights, together with difficulties inherent in explaining their nature and in specifying their content and their justification, make it desirable for political philosophers to participate in the conversation. Nine philosophers and two legal scholars contribute articles to this volume, and several contribute significantly to this discussion. However, I would not concur with the editors that they achieve a substantial consensus on the nature of universal human rights.

The nature of human rights is the focus in Part 1 in articles by Alistair Macleod, Rex Martin and David Duquette. Macleod's 'The Structure of Arguments for Human Rights' explains clearly and insightfully the conceptual framework within which human rights are to be understood and justified. Human rights are moral rights and hence institution-determining rather than institution-determined. While there is some room for cultural differences providing content for human rights, Macleod explains that there is 'fixed-content' related to the fundamental conditions for human well-being. His explanation of the connection between human rights and distributive justice is particularly informative since it is typically missing from accounts of human rights.

Rex Martin asks whether human rights exist prior to and independently of conventional rules or only as socialized practices. His conclusion that they are the latter is at odds with Macleod's claim that human rights are moral rights. However, in response to Martin, it might be countered that moral rights exist whether or not they are acknowledged or respected; otherwise they would come into existence whenever respected and disappear whenever violated. Only social recognition of human rights permits one to exercise them, so Martin correctly accords value to practices which respect human rights; nevertheless, maintaining that human rights exist only when particular practices exist is problematic. The exercise of human rights presupposes social recognition; but, their violation does not. Hence, there is a very important sense in which human rights can be claimed when they are not recognized by a society. Those oppressed by racism or sexism do not have their human rights socially recognized. However, they speak truthfully when they insist that they have human rights which are being violated and which ought
to be socially recognized. Human rights are valuable moral property largely because they provide the basis for justice judgments in such contexts.

In 'Universalism and Relativism in Human Rights' David Duquette defends a 'pragmatic-historicist' account of human rights. He claims they are both universal and culturally diverse: everyone has these rights, but, content is necessarily and significantly variable. Like Martin, and unlike Macleod, recognition is an existence condition for human rights. Moreover, Duquette rejects Macleod's argument that some interests are universal and hence basic needs and interests reasonably provide the starting point for an analysis of the content of human rights. Since our understanding of their content can evolve, it should be presumed to be revisable. However, Macleod provides good reasons to resist Duquette's generous relativity with respect to the content of human rights.

Unlike the other sections of the book, Part 2 has no unified thread. William Nelson's article discusses the obligations of governments based on political and social-economic human rights. Acknowledging the importance of context in determining what is morally required, he argues that democratic rights are conditional upon a favorable culture and that wealthy nations are obliged to support nations needing assistance to implement the economic right to subsistence.

In her article examining the potential benefits and problems of employing human rights to implement women's rights, Lucinda Peach critically examines two feminist approaches (liberal universalist and feminist contextualist) and defends her own pragmatic feminist stance. Her article is a valuable reminder that a human rights 'argument is not always the best means to achieve human rights' recognition.

Helen Stacy provides an account of the 'respectful-listening' which she argues is an obligation of those adjudicating human rights claims. She also reveals that basic presuppositions about the content of human rights are built into the adjudicating process. So, for example, the judge respectfully listens Muslims' claims regarding their values and practices, but does not rule in favor of the human right to female genital modification.

Part 3 places the discussion of human rights in the context of the right to sovereignty. Steven Lee engages the important question regarding the moral force of human rights in the context of the right to sovereignty. He argues that when human rights violations shock humankind's moral conscience, intervention in violation of state sovereignty is morally permissible. Kenneth Henley argues that an international court is necessary to ensure the enforceability of human rights claims. However, it is questionable whether the constraints he imposes to ensure this court does not diminish state sovereignty are consistent with the moral significance of human rights. The constraints may ensure state buy-in, but only by compromising the human rights the court aims to protect. Larry May's article on individual responsibility for genocide neither furthers understanding of human rights nor applies human rights theory. Like the two articles in Part 4, it does not fit well with the aims of the anthology.
Part 4 asks about the morally appropriate response to terrorism. The reader anticipating an application of Part 1's comprehensive analysis of human rights will be disappointed. Stephen Nathanson barely mentions human rights in his discussion. Jonathan Schonsheck claims, without benefit of argument, that there are no human rights. Being human does not provide the basis for moral entitlements. One's membership in the moral community is conditional, based not on what you are but upon what you commit to do. This social contract account of moral rights becomes the basis for claiming that terrorists do not have them. Hence, they have no rights which torture violates. Preserving one's moral character is the only moral concern in decision-making about torturing terrorists. While I accept the duty to maintain moral integrity in all decision-making, Schonsheck's explicitly Bentham-like rejection of human rights does not contribute to understanding how the notion of human rights figures in decisions about how to respond to terrorism. Since the editors aim 'to promote and more fully realize human rights as the universal rights of all particular persons within the human moral community' (13) an 'applied' article employing this understanding of human rights would have significantly enriched this section.

Not all articles in this anthology contribute equally to furthering our understanding of human rights; however, they all contribute to discussion of some of the most important questions pertaining to them. I will use it in my seminar on human rights.

Sandra Tomsons
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Burkhard Reis, ed.
The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics.
Pp. 288.

Reis' book celebrates the extensive and influential scholarly contributions of Dorothea Frede, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hamburg and Mills Visiting Professor at the University of California Berkeley. Paying tribute to Frede are eleven scholars, each of whom, like Frede, enjoys a very strong reputation in the field. Suitably, Reis has appended a seven-page listing of Frede's publications, a document which is by itself of great value to students and scholars.

Papers focus upon the work of Plato, Epicurus, Empedocles and, mostly, Aristotle. Contributors focusing upon Plato include James Allen, who deftly
explores a number of the central arguments of the *Protagoras* in order to reveal a progression from 'merely dialectical arguments toward demonstrative or didactic argument' (7). Allen's analyses include, 330b8-332a3 (justice and holiness); 332a5-333b6 (temperance and wisdom); 333b7-334c6 (temperance and justice); 349a6-351b3 (courage and wisdom); 351b4-358a1 (pleasure and *akrasia*); 358a1-359a1 (a transitional passage); and 359a2-360a6 (courage and wisdom).

Julia Annas' contribution pursues a new direction in a previously established on-going debate between herself and Frede. The debate, well-known among Plato scholars, is between the interpretive strategies known as developmentalism and unitarianism. Annas' aim is to 'unsettle' developmentalism (Plato's work is to be read as an overall development of his thought), though she does not therefore endorse an 'all-out' unitarianism (Plato's work is to be read thematically across the dialogues). Her work focuses upon the *Theaetetus* 'digression' passage (172c4-177c4), *Euthydemus* and *Alcibiades*.

Agathon's speech in the *Symposium* (194e5-198a1) is the theme of David Sedley's innovative contribution. Contrary to one rather common scholarly view, *viz.*, that Agathon's speech is merely a 'vacuous show of rhetorical self-promotion' (65), Sedley argues that Agathon's intuitions about love are in fact philosophically well-informed (Sedley calls them 'sub-Socratic'). Moreover, he contends, the speech prepares the way for Diotima's superior account of love by reminding us of a young Socrates' views and their limitations.

Mary Margaret McCabe considers how Plato's conception of philosophical conversation (*dialektike*) enables its practitioners to philosophically mature — that is, increasingly to 'reject what they see before them ...and to resist fixed assumptions ...in favor of being able to give an account of what they are considering' (72). McCabe's absorbing work shows that *dialektike* functions as a 'bridge' between 'the soul of the dialectician and the reality of the good' (97), thus transforming the life of the agent.

There are four papers devoted to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. First, Christof Rapp re-evaluates Bernard Williams' (*ELP*: 36) remark that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean 'is one of the least useful parts of [his] philosophy and ...is better forgotten' (99). After all, Rapp points out, the doctrine is no 'marginal thesis', and so his account of virtue and the doctrine 'stand and fall together' (100). Rapp's position is that the doctrine is making a conceptual point and not offering a rule for virtuous action.

The *Ethics*, Aristotle tells us (as early as I 2, 1094b10-11 and as late as X 9, 1181b14-24), was conceived as the first of two interconnected works, the second being the *Politics*. This fact is Gisela Striker's motivation for considering how we might get to the bottom of some scholarly controversies besetting the *Ethics*, by approaching it as a volume one, of sorts. Among the controversies that Striker's stimulating approach purports to solve is whether or not there is a 'gap' in Aristotle's account of practical reasoning with regard to how we determine what constitutes acting well in particular situations.
The subject of Christoph Horn's intricate study is *epieikeia* (equity), a competence that Aristotle actually ranks higher than justice (*EN*, V 10). Horn attempts to unify two features of this competence: being able to interpret written law (*to epieikes*), and being merciful and lenient (*ho epieikēs*). While many scholars advise that we carefully distinguish these capacities, Horn points out that Aristotle himself tends to unify both features and that we therefore need to work out such an account in our reading of him.

Jan Szaif tackles some renowned problems in *Ethics* scholarship, *viz.*, how to reconcile Aristotle's praise of the philosophical life with his view that the (practical) virtuous life is choiceworthy for its own sake (esp. *EN*, X 7); and what to make of the tension between the altruism and the egoism of friendship (*EN*, IX 8). Although the extant scholarship on these matters is imposing, Szaif's entry sheds original light.

In one of the book's two offerings on Epicurus, David Konstan argues that Epicurus' conception of the passions (*pathē*) is rather narrower than his contemporaries'. Through careful analyses of both terminology and texts (mainly Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Rhetoric*; Lucretius' *De rerum natura* and Epicurus' *Letter to Herodotus*), Konstan presents an account according to which human passions are irrational, but reliable, indicators for us of the affective value of things. These indicators are sullied mostly by false belief.

Susanne Bobzien's work contends that Epicurus' account of moral responsibility is 'based not on the agent's ability to do otherwise, but on the agent's causal responsibility' (207). She then presents a thorough account of his views of human moral development in light of this view. Praising and blaming human behavior is not in need of justification for Epicurus; instead ethics properly concerns moral progress. Bobzien's central texts are Epicurus' *De natura*, 25 and *Epistula ad Menoeceum*; and Lucretius' *De rerum natura*.

The Strasbourg papyrus of Empedocles is the basis of Brad Inwood's fascinating essay on personal identity. Not only was Empedocles deeply interested in this issue, according to Inwood, but his interest provides strong philosophical reasons for accepting the readings of the primary scribe of the papyrus rather than that of its corrector (specifically, for accepting 'θ' rather than 'v' at three critical points).

In addition to a general bibliography, there is both an *index locorum* and an *index nominum et rerum*.

**Patrick Mooney**  
John Carroll University
As the title suggests, *Elements of Justice* does not attempt to articulate a complete theory of justice. What it does do is illuminate and argue for the various pieces that would constitute a complete pluralistic approach — that is, an approach that does not give a privileged status to any single principle, but views justice as a balancing of several different and often mutually exclusive moral principles.

The overall structure of the book is based upon the map metaphor Schmidtz introduces in Part 1. Just as different maps offer different perspectives of the geographic terrain they describe, so too do theories of justice highlight different aspects of the terrain of justice. As Schmidtz writes: 'If justice is a neighborhood, then a theory of justice is a map of that neighborhood. The best theory will be incomplete, like a map whose author declines to speculate about unexplored avenues, knowing there is a truth of the matter, yet leaving those parts of the map blank' (4). Schmidtz' goal is not to capture the specifics of justice, but to illuminate the neighborhood. The neighborhood of justice consists of four principles: desert, reciprocity, equality and need. These four principles along with a fifth section dealing with Rawls and Nozick, constitute the structure of the book.

In Part 2, Schmidtz makes the case for desert being given the status of a fundamental principle in liberal moral theory. Skeptics of desert hold that individuals cannot be said to deserve based upon their effort, since effort is a characteristic often instilled by one's arbitrary starting place in society. Natural talents and abilities can arbitrarily advantages some individuals over others, and therefore, desert cannot function as a principle of justice. But, notes Schmidtz, arbitrariness or luck does not per se rule out desert based upon individual effort. We can make a distinction between one's 'being lucky' (which does not preclude deserving) and 'Being merely lucky' (which does preclude one from deserving). The latter case does preclude deserving because it suggests that we have not provided inputs (effort, excellence) that ground desert claims.

In Part 3 Schmidtz discusses the role of reciprocity in a theory of justice. Reciprocity deals with the question of how we should respond to people who have done us a favor. The principle of reciprocity states that 'when you can, return good in proportion to good received' (80). According to Schmidtz, reciprocity has an important role to play in a theory of justice. Since justice deals with what people are due, the principle of reciprocity provides some guidance as to how we repay those who have done us some good. Reciprocity is also important since a society in which the value of reciprocity is instilled in its members is clearly better than a society in which this value isn't encouraged.
Part 4 is broken up into a number of topics surrounding the nature, extent, and limits of equality. Also, a connection is drawn between equal treatment and justice. The central thrust of Schmidt' argument throughout this part of the book is the lack of any deep connection between equal treatment on the one hand, and equal shares on the other. Assuming that individuals receive equal treatment, and given that the principle of desert doesn't rule out effort as a basis of desert, then what one receives ought to be a function of merit.

Following the discussion of merit, Schmidt proceeds to the most contentious chapter of the book, namely Chapter 22, which deals with social mobility. Moving away from theory and into the realm of statistics, Schmidt uses census data and economic studies on social mobility to argue that the United States is an increasingly upwardly mobile society. While he acknowledges that the U.S. might not be a land of literal equal opportunity, it is a land of opportunity (126). While Schmidt' sources support the idea that individuals regularly move up the income quintiles measured by the Census Bureau, other studies indicate that both the gap between rich and poor as well as the opportunities needed for social mobility are on the decline. Schmidt himself notes that this section contains data that he does not fully trust. Although this chapter may be controversial, it does provide readers with ample food for thought and does serve as an excellent starting point for a discussion on equality and opportunity.

The final stop on the roadmap of justice is a brief 'meditation' on the nature of need. Schmidt's views on need are consequentialist without being utility maximizing. As he writes: 'The kind of consequentialism I have in mind asks us not to maximize utility but to respect existing customs and institutional arrangements that truly have utility' (174). Needs are more than just the things required for subsistence, and extend to things such as a developed economy, a peaceful culture, a culture of personal responsibility and rudimentary benevolence. This list of needs is used to reinforce the idea that people need to know what to expect from one another.

While Part 4 ends the discussion of a theory of justice, Part 5 is added as a tip of the hat to the 'intellectual debt' owed to Rawls and Nozick. The majority of Part 5 is well-worn material that can be culled from any number of sources, though the discussion of the role arbitrariness in Rawls's theory is a nice addition to what was already discussed in the section on desert. Schmidt's discussion of Rawls and Nozick, while better classified as an appendix than a part of the text, does help round out the discussions found in previous parts of the book.

The similarities between this book and James Rachels' *Elements of Moral Philosophy* are not accidental. Schmidt acknowledges the 'masterful simplicity' of Rachels' book and hopes that his own efforts can speak to justice in the same way Rachels' spoke to ethics. In this regard Schmidt has been successful. Schmidt offers a clear, straightforward, and relatively compact account of principles central to a conception of justice. The map metaphor referred to throughout the text is most appropriate and should be taken seri-
ously by the reader. As a map of the terrain of justice, one need look no further for a well-written overview of the central topics of justice.

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Dominic Scott
Plato’s Meno.
Pp. 248.

Scott’s book is a welcome addition to the series, Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato. It deserves to be read by scholars and would serve well in a course on the Meno. Scott translates a good deal of the dialogue, and provides a continuous commentary on its philosophical aspects that is consistently illuminating. His commentary will, of course, be controversial. Here are some examples.

Scott is prepared to discuss characterization in the dialogue. He argues that Meno’s character in fact changes over the course of his discussion with Socrates, from relative dogmatism and conceit to some degree of pliancy, partly in response to the obvious intransigence of Anytus. This will not appeal to all interpreters; Scott argues against some who disagree, and his arguments are at least plausible.

Still, Scott talks as if Socrates were representing the views of Plato himself, so some will ask: doesn’t this inexcusably fail to recognize the dialogues as drama? But the Meno, on Scott’s account, remains properly dramatic: he speaks of it as putting Socrates himself on trial, and maintains a distance between Plato as author and Socrates as character. It’s just that the questioning of Socrates is Plato’s self-questioning.

But it goes with this heresy that Scott is ready to think in terms of Plato’s development, and this is even more widely subjected to anathema. Scott makes a case for saying that the Meno antedates the Gorgias; in this way he can disarm the apparent conflict between the admiration Socrates shows for Themistocles and Pericles in the Meno — they may not have been able to teach virtue to their sons, but it is conceded that they had true beliefs and thus had virtue in an attenuated way — and his condemnation of them in the Gorgias, by claiming that the latter rests on a ‘deeper’ analysis of political virtue than was available to him in the Meno.

Once again, what Scott says is at least plausible. It may trouble some readers that his basis for his ordering is what is often referred to as a ‘subjec-
tive' criterion — the idea that the Gorgias is providing a 'deeper' or 'more sophisticated' analysis of virtue — but it is not plain that this is all that subjective: Scott tries to show that there are considerations offered in the Gorgias that are not offered in the Meno but would have been relevant there, and that's pretty objective.

The reordering has, for Scott, a substantive result. It is often claimed that, given the conflict between the Meno and the Gorgias, the conclusion of the Meno, in which Socrates expresses his admiration for Themistocles and Pericles, is best seen as ironic. On Scott's reading, it should not be seen that way: rather, Plato has changed his evaluation of these politicians between the two dialogues. This reading is, indeed, pretty persuasive.

Scott is prepared to speak of the historical Socrates, and here perhaps a complaint is in order. Scott simply assumes that the 'Socratic' dialogues are Socratic: that is, they purport to discuss the views and methods of the historical Socrates. He does not, in particular, comment on the case Charles Kahn has made for regarding those dialogues as not historical fiction, but simply fiction. It would have been instructive to see how Scott might rebut this.

Scott isolates episodes that share a common pattern, in which, as he sees it, the historical Socrates is 'on trial': 'The pattern ... includes at least three elements: first, the Socrates of the dialogue espouses a position that we can safely ascribe to the historical Socrates. Second, this position is subjected to a serious philosophical challenge .... Third, although the challenge comes from Meno, it is far from clear whether he understands its true significance' (27-28).

He applies this to four passages:

1) 73a-c, where Socrates is forced to argue for the claim that there is a unified definition that covers all cases of virtue. This, according to Scott, was simply assumed in the Socratic dialogues (and thus, on his view, by the historical Socrates). 2) 79e-80d (with 84a-c), where Meno likens Socrates to a stingray, paralyzing his interlocutors by refuting them; Plato here is reflecting on both the benefits and dangers of Socratic refutation. 3) 80d-81a, where Meno presents his 'paradox' to the effect that no one can ever learn anything. Scott's handling of Plato's response to this is difficult. First, Scott is a bit irresolute as to how Plato does want to respond. His discussion ends: 'I shall rest content with a position of which we can be confident: the historical Socrates believed adamantly in our duty to inquire, and it is at least for this claim that Plato is putting him on philosophical trial in the Meno' (91). This leaves things slightly up in the air. Second, the Doctrine of Recollection, which Plato brings in apparently in connection with Meno's paradox, is not, according to Scott, intended to respond to this paradox, but to a related problem he calls 'the problem of discovery'. It is unclear how Scott takes the dialogue to hang together at this point. 4) 86c-87c, where Socrates is made to back off the assumption that we must have a definition for virtue before we can settle whether it is teachable, and to provide a method (the 'method of hypotheses') for approaching the latter question.
Finally, to pick just one of any number of points that deserve attention, Scott sees a tension between a) the discussion of true belief at the end of the dialogue and b) the use of the notion of true belief in the sub-dialogue with the slave boy and Socrates' commentary on that sub-dialogue: 'The problem ... is that in the later discussion of knowledge and true belief, Socrates talks as if the difference is one of kind, in the earlier as if it is one of degree. Also, the two passages seem to differ on the question whether recollection is involved in the formation of true belief' (184).

And then immediately, 'In response, I would suggest that we should not expect the later discussion to map too neatly onto the earlier one.'

His few sentences explaining why he says this are not very satisfying; once again, the dialogue seems not quite to hold together. The tension he sees between the two passages is entirely too interesting, and the matter deserves more discussion.

But in all, this is a good, clear, stimulating book.

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Jessica Spector, ed.
Prostitution and Pornography: Philosophical Debate about the Sex Industry.
Pp. 448.
US$70.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-4937-4);

As its title suggests, this is a collection of essays about two of the main arms of the sex industry: prostitution and pornography. It would be an excellent text for an advanced undergraduate or graduate class on the issue, as well as for anyone interested in probing the issues that sex work poses in the debate between radical feminists, who question both the autonomy of the choice of prostitution and the expressive value of pornography, and liberal feminists, who tend to defend prostitution as a viable economic choice for women and champion pornography for its expressive value and promotion of diversity of lifestyles.

Where pornography is seen by many liberals and liberal feminists to raise issues of freedom of expression, and is the subject of perennial and often vigorous academic and popular debate, prostitution, on the other hand, is seen as an economic transaction that raises issues of choice and autonomy, and is much more rarely the subject of academic or popular debate. Spector, along
with many of the non-academic authors included in the collection, thinks that these distinctions between prostitution and pornography do not hold, and her selection of pieces, as well as her own essay in the volume, are dedicated to arguing for the conclusion that pornography and prostitution are treated disparately in liberal discourse without justification, since both raise autonomy issues.

The volume is notable for its inclusion of writings by academics, as well as sex workers and activists, on both sides of the debate between the liberal and radical feminist camps. Combining authors from these two spheres in a way that does not treat the non-academic pieces as mere fodder or ‘color’ for the academic pieces is not an easy feat, but this collection achieves it. In so doing, it makes a point that would be much more difficult to make in a strictly academic collection: the discrepancy within strictly academic feminist liberal thought in its treatment of pornography on the one hand and prostitution on the other is unfounded, and not held by most sex workers.

The collection is divided into four parts, each of which takes a different angle on the debate surrounding the feminist implications of prostitution and pornography. Part 1 is composed of essays from the radical feminist camp. This part contains such classic reprints as Catharine MacKinnon’s ‘Equality and Speech’ as well as some interesting non-academic pieces published for the first time here, such as Christine Stark’s ‘Stripping as a Form of Prostitution’.

Part 2 is composed of liberal responses to the radical feminist critique of prostitution, while Part 3 deals with liberal responses to the radical feminist critique of pornography. Separating Parts 2 and 3 on this basis may undercut Spector’s chief concern of illuminating and problematizing the liberal’s tendency to consider pornography as an issue of expression while considering prostitution to be an issue of economic choice. By treating pornography and prostitution in separate sections of the book, Spector makes a structural choice that may reify the very idea she is trying to challenge.

Part 4 is composed of pieces devoted to reconciling the debate between liberals and radical feminists about prostitution and pornography, and to showing how the debate itself reveals deeper tensions within the liberal conceptions of autonomy, freedom, and expression. Spector’s essay here makes her case that liberalism attempts to read pornography and prostitution too distinctly.

Where pornography, according to liberals, is seen as having merit for the third-party viewer in providing a greater range of options about lifestyle choices, prostitution is seen as not being instructive for any third parties, but rather as being strictly about the individual prostitute and client’s economic transaction. Spector argues, convincingly, that this distinction cannot hold, for the simple reason that it ignores the fact that pornography also involves paid sex for the participants and is thus an economic transaction with consequences for the individual parties involved, not just for the viewer. Therefore, the liberal’s conclusion to privilege pornography over prostitution as raising important expressive issues for third parties, rather than raising economic
issues between the two primary people involved, fails to hold. In other words, the liberal position on pornography as at least tolerable, if not as an overall social good, because of its benefits to third parties, achieves its mileage at the expense of the very worker whose body is needed for the production of the pornographic images.

If that is correct, Spector continues, pornography must in fact be treated, at least in part, as an arm of prostitution — in other words, as part of those activities that raise issues of economics, autonomy, and coercion. Once we include the conditions of the worker in pornography in the assessment of its merits, she argues, we find that the equation is muddied — not only does pornography raise issues of expression, it also raises issues of economic coercion, and thus we find that the distinction between pornography and prostitution becomes much less clear than the liberal position would have us believe.

This is convincing, as far as it goes, but neither Spector nor the other authors in the collection address the issue of how the liberal ought to respond to this convergence of prostitution and pornography. Do the expressive merits for third parties outweigh the costs to the actor in pornography? While Spector is not to be faulted for leaving such a large question unresolved, the paper seems to assume that taking the actor into account in pornography would be obviously damning to liberalism. This seems less than obvious, however. Could not the liberal maintain the same thing about the actor in pornography as many do about the prostitute: that she is making a meaningful, autonomous, choice, albeit under structurally limited conditions? If this is a defensible liberal view — and it seems to be — then perhaps Spector’s insight does not change the contours of the debate as much as she supposes.

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Laurence Thomas
The Family and the Political Self.
Pp. 198.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-85417-7);

Leading liberal theorists have not provided a systematic analysis of the family and its significance for political philosophy. Thomas’s book is a valuable contribution to the emerging body of work that seeks to address this lacuna. It is an elegantly written and thoughtful meditation on lessons for contemporary political philosophy that can be derived from reflection on the special
character of the loving relationships that lie at the heart of successful families.

Thomas examines the character of the relationship between parents and children with a view to rethinking core suppositions of liberal contractarianism. He argues that the conception of the self as essentially self-interested that animates contractarianism is defective and that the allied project of conceiving justice solely in terms of mutually advantageous co-operation should be resisted. Inspired by Rousseau, Thomas claims that the family can provide a fruitful model of a just society in which members of a diverse but unified political community can flourish while giving full recognition to the moral personhood of all. A society bound together by special sentiments rather than a contractarian logic of sophisticated self-interest is morally attractive and psychologically feasible. The key to this striking idea lies in what Thomas's calls the majesty of parenting.

The majesty of parenting — the idea that parenting is an activity worthy of special esteem — is rooted in three dimensions of parental love. First, the commitment to the care and development of children expressed in parental love, though it generates a sense of achievement and satisfaction, is not a commitment rooted in the self-interest of parents. Loving parents do not give up on their children if caring for them proves expensive or incompatible with the pursuit of other valued projects. The bonds of family are grounded in a form of altruism. Second, the expression of parental love to children is crucial in the development of an appropriate sense of self-worth. When it is properly displayed — and Thomas concedes that not all families are models of love worthy of emulation — parental love towards children generates 'a sense of cherished uniqueness without invidious comparisons' (20). Children who are loved come to have a sense of themselves as having a basic moral standing and they can begin to appreciate what it is to have intrinsic worth before they are able to grasp any putative philosophical rationale for this worth. Each child is recognized as unique and the particular ways in which love is expressed to different children can vary. Yet variation in the modes in which love is expressed is compatible with parental affirmation of equal value and importance of their children. Third, although love is a natural sentiment, it is not completely self-regulating. Parental love must also be guided by a conception of right that acknowledges that the cherished uniqueness of children means that children are not mere extensions of their parents. Loving one's children properly is partly a matter of respecting their independent moral status and the rights that flow from that.

Thomas's depiction of the majesty of parenting is interesting, plausible and even inspiring. The question is whether the admirable model of the family provides a suitable model for envisaging relations between citizens in a political community. Thomas recognizes that citizens cannot be expected to love their fellow citizens as parents love their children and his vision of political community is not one in which citizens are bound together through powerful sentiments of unthinking or xenophobic nationalism. A robust sentiment of fellow feeling with three dimensions provides the societal ana-
logue of parental love. First, it involves a genuine and strong affective connection between citizens. One feels connected to one’s fellow citizens in the sense that one really cares about the opportunities others have to flourish. Second, the commitment to the flourishing of others displayed in fellow feeling is altruistic. Citizens of goodwill are concerned about how well the lives of others go even where their own interests are not advanced or adversely affected by the success or failure of others. Self-interest is not the lynchpin of society. Third, fellow feeling affirms the equal dignity of citizens and its fundamental importance. Citizens of goodwill recognize that no one is subordinate to another and that denials of dignity should occasion outrage by all and not just by those whose rights have been denied. Thomas contends that fellow feeling secures trust between citizens and provides a context in which morally appropriate gratitude between persons with different social standing can be freely, as opposed to grudgingly, expressed.

The parallels Thomas draws between the family and society are intriguing and his approach to loosening the grip that self-interest has on some strains of contemporary liberalism is novel. However, a natural concern is whether Thomas’s model of society involves a kind of bad utopianism. Contractarians have traditionally been suspicious of how much weight altruism can carry in the design of real political institutions. To assuage these sorts of doubts, Thomas needs to say more about the substantive content of the norms that he thinks should structure both the family and social institutions. Thomas tells us very little, for instance, about the legitimate extent of parental authority over children. Similarly, he does not explain how core matters of political justice are to be tackled if we adopt the family as a model of society. Would Thomas’s ideal society embrace Rawls’s difference principle or can a society of goodwill tolerate significant economic inequality? Thomas also needs to explain how institutions can foster fellow feeling. Is the cultivation of fellow feeling compatible with recognition and protection of reasonable pluralism about the good? Or does adoption of the family model move us in the direction of a strongly perfectionist state? The love displayed in families can be a wonderful thing but families also have a dark side where enforced conformity, alienation and oppression lurk. If we are to adopt the family as a model of society, we need assurances that the actual institutions we seek to create are feasible and just. Thomas has not answered these challenges yet but his book provides a refreshing perspective from which to address them.

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Bernard Williams  
*In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument.*  
US$29.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-691-12430-8);  

This is one of four volumes of Bernard Williams’s work being released by Princeton since his death in the summer of 2003. Readers disappointed with the suggestive but obviously unfinished monograph, *Truth and Truthfulness*, will be relieved to find in this collection of essays a more familiar and polished Williams. Williams was in many ways always more of an essayist than a writer of big books, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* and *Shame and Necessity* notwithstanding. Indeed, even those books contrast sharply with the programmatic tomes of someone like Rawls. But if Williams the essayist is a familiar face, Williams the political philosopher is considerably less so. As Hawthorn notes in his helpful introduction, though he had been unusually politically active for a philosopher throughout the course of his career, Williams did not start writing in a sustained way about politics until the later 1980s. When he did, he was emphatic in his insistence that political philosophy be more than applied moral philosophy.

The title of this volume, which was presumably chosen by either Hawthorn or Williams’ widow, Patricia Williams, is thus an apt one. The phrase appears repeatedly throughout these essays, and its spirit pervades the volume. *Im Anfang war die Tat* is perhaps less closely associated by most philosophers with Goethe’s *Faust* than it is with Wittgenstein, who famously remarked that the phrase could serve as a good motto for his later work. Williams suggests that Wittgenstein’s reading of the phrase as the assertion of ‘the primacy of practice’ bears the salutary lesson for political philosophy that no foundationalism can ever achieve what it wants, for any theory makes sense to us ‘only by virtue of the historical situation in which it is presented, and its relation to that historical situation cannot be fully be theorized or captured in reflection’ (25) — an idea so important to Williams that he grants it its own acronym, MS. If Wittgenstein’s reading thus focuses on the necessary background intellectual conditions for a theory’s acceptance, Goethe’s own sense of the phrase, which Williams considers ‘more important,’ is that a theory’s historical conditions also determine how valid it will be as a matter of ‘empirical realism’ (25). In both theory and practice, ‘no political theory, liberal or not, can determine by itself its own application’ (28). Political philosophy — or at least good political philosophy — is thus of necessity more reactive, engaged, and compromised than many of its practitioners like to think. (In one amusing aside Williams recalls drinking bourbon with a colleague in a melancholy hotel bar in a run-down upstate New York town, musing on the extent to which their work consisted of reminding other philosophers of truths about human life that only they, professional philosophers, had managed to forget.)
This is as important as it is to Williams because he is anxious to avoid the unspoken fantasies he thinks guide the writings of too many contemporary liberals. In a characteristically astute observation, Williams notes that the audience that Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and other liberals might actually expect to read their work is considerably different from the listeners they seem to assume will heed and act on their words. The disconnect between the two is, in the absence of an account of how the theory might indirectly reach the intended listener, a gauge of the degree to which the political theory succumbs to fantasy; and it is also, Williams suggests, reflective of the ‘Manichean dualism of soul and body’ that he believed characterizes American politics and political theory in particular — a dualism in which the moral purity of the latter is matched by the Realpolitik of the former, ‘and the existence of each helps to explain how anyone could have accepted the other’ (12). It is no surprise that the listeners for both Dworkin and Rawls — respectively, an idealized U.S. Supreme Court and a group of Pilgrim Founding Fathers — are alone, and all but completely released from the pressures of political contest and calculation. This in part accounts for the moralism that characterizes this type of political theory. Whereas a text like Machiavelli's Prince addresses the actual situation of its intended audience, a prince who desires to remain in power, political philosophy such as that written by Rawls and Dworkin can trade in ideals that are unlikely to be achieved any time soon in part because it addresses 'a listener who is supposedly empowered to enact just what such considerations enjoin' (58).

In contrast to such moralistic political philosophy, Williams advocates his own brand of realism. This begins with Hobbes' appreciation for the constant need for political order. Before any liberal rights can be granted and acknowledged, the 'first political question' needs to be answered: Is there sufficient order, protection, safety, trust requisite to secure the conditions of sustained cooperation?' (3) But Williams argues that this does not mean that any order will do; in particular, he is adamant that might does not equal right. It is not so simple as Protecto ergo obligo. For an order to be a successful political order it needs to answer the Basic Legitimation Demand (or BLD) of its subjects: 'any state that maintains its power must offer its citizens some legitimation of its power' (63). If this is a moral principle, it is, Williams maintains, one that does not precede and direct politics so much as it constitutes the political. 'The situation of one lot of people terrorizing another lot of people is not per se a political situation; it is, rather, the situation which the existence of the political is in the first place supposed to alleviate (replace)' (5). The BLD is, first and foremost, an explanation of how the solution is distinguished from the problem; and, as such, it entails commitments regarding liberty and rights.

But this does not imply that the requirement that the BLD be satisfied is a distinctively liberal principle, as Williams is perfectly open to the possibility that numerous non-liberal regimes met these demands. Non-liberal states have throughout history been correctly recognized as legitimate by people who did not expect of their state what liberals now do of theirs. This is a difficult idea to accept in part because of the assumption that political and moral
philosophy make atemporal demands: if liberalism is right for us, it must be right for everyone, everywhere, and throughout history. As Thomas Nagel puts it, ‘To reason is to think systematically in ways that anyone looking over my shoulder ought to be able to recognize as correct.’ Williams replies, ‘Any-one? So I am reasoning, along with Nagel, in a liberal way, and Louis XIV is looking over our shoulder. He will not recognize our thoughts as correct. Ought he to? — or, more precisely, ought he to have done so when he was in his world and not yet faced with the task of trying to make sense of ours?’ (66)

The absence of the intellectual and empirical preconditions for liberalism make this not just unlikely, but absurd. And the fact that this is so regularly overlooked by liberal theorists demonstrates, Williams argues, that they lack a ‘theory of error,’ an explanation for how so many have failed to recognize liberalism’s allegedly timeless truths for so long. Williams grants that his own contrasting position entails a kind of relativism, but he is careful to distinguish this ‘relativism of distance’ from the crude, standard relativism of Philosophy 101. And, as is clear throughout the volume, Williams’ embrace of a kind of relativism hardly keeps him from articulating a remarkably principled political philosophy.

Williams’ realism does at one point at least seem to go a bit too far. In a defense of his version of Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear, one that is distinguished from Shklar’s largely by its incorporation of the Frankfurt School idea that people’s acceptance of a political order may itself be the product of illegitimate power relations, Williams claims that this liberalism ‘speaks to humanity. And it has a right to do this, a unique right, I think, because its materials are the only certainly universal materials of politics: power, powerlessness, fear, cruelty, a universalism of negative capacities’ (59). But this sits ill with Williams’ own insistence that the political as such raises questions of legitimacy. For legitimacy is a complicated conceptual and relational matter that involves language, rhetoric, and an entire array of symbolic resources — as Williams himself appears to grant in his discussion of freedom of speech (74). To deny that these are also among the ‘certainly universal materials of politics’ is an uncharacteristically reductive move, one that makes Williams’ repeated criticisms of ‘left Wittgensteinians’ appear considerably more persuasive than they might otherwise be.

That said, this is a remarkably rich volume. Space does not allow for an adequate presentation of the contributions Williams makes to our understanding of toleration, the role of truth in politics, human rights, liberty, equality, censorship, and the difficulties attending humanitarian interventions in foreign countries. In his discussion of each, Williams brings a familiar disciplined, ironic, skeptical, and wise intelligence to bear. The reader can only share Patricia Williams’ regret that he did not live to complete the book on politics he was writing at his death.

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Ever since Homer, one of the timeless questions in philosophy concerns the good life and how to attain it. The mystical tradition, among others throughout western philosophy of religion, has defended a view that one must be aware of, and cultivate, feelings and emotions in order to fully live the good life. Here Wynn considers the significance of emotions and feelings in the good life by defending a 'soft rationalist' view of the self that is intimately involved in a heartfelt relation to God, the world and other human beings.

One of Wynn's asides concerns Homer's character Odysseus, who arrives on Calypso's island and must make an important choice: whether to remain with Calypso and become immortal, ageless and invulnerable like a god, or return to his wife Penelope and remain mortal and vulnerable. One factor in Odysseus' decision is his desire and longing to return home — to the extent that, even if he were to fail, he could bear death knowing he kept his bold heart within him. Wynn describes Odysseus' choice as one for an intrinsically emotional life, and claims that this differentiates him from the Greek gods. For us humans, successes and failures prove to us that we are vulnerable, and that the calm pleasures of a deathless, ageless state are not even worthy of striving after. For Odysseus, then, the value of Penelope is in part constituted by his felt attachment to her: his feelings mark her out as special in his life, and mean that she cannot easily be replaced (60). What emotions reveal is the significance of something over against the 'shapelessness of the life Calypso offers ... a life that is devoid of vulnerability' (84).

For religion or persons to matter in one's good life, one must have a felt connection to them, like Odysseus' connection with Penelope even after more than a decade apart. His entire world consists of his longing for home. Without this underlying theme, the character, epic, story falls apart — it would just be a series of unconnected episodes having no thematic unity — but must this desire and longing require vulnerability? The Stoic tradition sees invulnerability as the ideal — one should not subject oneself to emotional disturbances — but a neo-Stoic such as Martha Nussbaum suggests that 'only someone who is vulnerable can love deeply ... a love will run deep if it implies sinking one's own good in that of the beloved, so that one's own well being is tied to that of the other, and thereby put at risk' (86). For Wynn, who states that love is a real defining divine attribute, it is intelligible, if not reasonable, that God may express a love for his creatures that is equally vulnerable, or dependent and conditional, upon his creatures. A God who is vulnerable is better than a God who is stoically invulnerable.
It seems that what was once a discussion of the traditional arguments for and against the existence of God has now become a discussion of how a belief in God might affect one's personal emotional life, and how in turn God himself is affected by human beings. There is a growing trend, exemplified by Wynn, that focuses on religious experience and how such experience might be considered holistically. Wynn's basic position is that one's perception of moral or aesthetic values works in the same way as one's perception of religious values. What Anselm once called 'that which nothing greater can be thought' has now become in the philosophy of religion an object not of thought but of emotional feeling. However, even if this discussion convinces one of the value of emotions for the good life, it does not convince one of God's emotional nature — nor of his existence. But that is not Wynn's aim here. His primary aim, as seen in the following synopsis, is elusive.

Chapter 1 defends the value component of affective experience and specifically the cognitive significance of religious experience, in reference to John McDowell, William Alston and John Henry Newman. Chapter 2 surveys the ethical commitments of this view in dialogue with Raimond Gaita in particular. Chapter 3 deepens the discussion of a 'non-discursive, affectively toned assessment of the goodness of the world' using the models of Quentin Smith and Friedrich Scheiermacher. Chapter 4 defends four further models (those of John Deigh, Peter Goldie, Ronald de Sousa and Geoffrey Maddell) in relation to recent psychological and neuro-physiological literature on the emotions. Chapter 5 expands upon these four models by means of William James and Newman, the latter of whom 'emerges as the hero of this discussion' (147). Chapter 6 discusses Mikel Dufrenne's theory of aesthetic experience in light of the 'representations of the gods' or making figurations of the divine. Chapter 7 then tries to counter some of the arguments against having this wider passionate view of the religious self in which the good life must be theologically and doctrinally sound before examining one's emotional life.

If Wynn's book argues for an affectively toned perception of God and other human beings, a perception that is analogous to an affectively toned perception of the world, then the way he goes about this seems altogether disjunctive. Although each chapter by itself is able to stand alone, the book as a whole lacks the unifying theme that Homer's Odyssey, for example, contains. As Wynn discusses the seemingly disparate views of Cottingham, McDowell, Alston, Gaita, Deigh, de Sousa, Dufrenne et al., one is left wondering how such a medley could be used to support an approach to emotion and religion. Nevertheless, each chapter by itself is a thought provoking, if not sensitive, treatment of emotion's nature in relation to religious experience. But if one chooses the good life that escapes what Wynn calls Proustian solipsism, then this choice may be as simple as choosing the desired faithful spouse Penelope over the goddess Calypso.

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The process philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead and his intellectual associates, Charles Hartshorne, Charles Peirce, William James, Samuel Alexander, and Henri Bergson, have become increasingly influential in the international philosophical and theological communities. *Whitehead and China* bears witness to this recent and explosive interest. This book is the fourth volume in the Process Thought series published by Ontos Verlag in Heusenstamm, Germany, edited by Nicholas Rescher, Johanna Seibt, and Michel Weber. These books and many others represent the depth of interest in Whitehead’s thought in Europe and, more recently, in the East. Europe, Australasia and eastern countries (Japan, Korea, China) have seen the rise of centers and journals dedicated to process thought. The recent Sixth International Whitehead Conference in Salzburg, Austria (2006) attracted hundreds of scholars from an impressive variety of countries, a conference which followed those held in Germany (1981), Japan (1984), China (1988 and 2002), Claremont (1998), and South Korea (2004), with future conferences slated for India (2009) and Japan (2010).

*Whitehead and China* presents 15 of the dozens of papers presented at the 2002 International Whitehead conference in Beijing, sponsored by Beijing Normal University and the Center for Process Studies in Claremont. The latter has been pivotal in encouraging East-West dialogue by supporting, for example, Chinese and Korean projects under the leadership of Zhihe Wang and Sangyil Kim, respectively. More than 180 scholars attended the Beijing conference, 120 of whom were Chinese. Claremont’s Chinese project has overseen the translation of two dozen texts by Whitehead, Hartshorne, Griffin, Cobb, and others. The Center for Process Studies also has been instrumental in inspiring the establishment of affiliated centers for process studies, a dozen of which exist in China alone. Leading process studies scholars like Cobb and Griffin, among others, have lectured widely in China, and there is an active scholar exchange program at Claremont.

The first nine chapters of *Whitehead and China* explore some of the important interconnections of Whiteheadian thought and Chinese traditional religions and society. John Cobb makes a case for Whitehead’s relevance to Chinese philosophy and culture, based specifically on Whitehead’s constructive postmodernism as providing a valuable alternative to both modernism and destructive postmodernism, an alternative which could greatly aid China’s emergence into the modern world. David Griffin argues that China has an important role to play in developing a postmodern politics, a
Whiteheadian based global democracy which avoids the anarchy of modernism, taking the form of a ‘communitarian cosmopolitanism’ by which China can avoid the mistakes of western countries by embracing such a constructive postmodernistic view.

The remaining chapters discuss a variety of issues which further demonstrate the affinities of Whiteheadian and Chinese thought. Catherine Keller discusses the complexities of process thought, deconstruction and postcolonial theory, noting the similarities of Chuang Tzu’s Taoist concept of ‘not yet beginning’ with Whitehead’s understanding of beginnings. Joseph Grange argues that Confucian values support his argument that ‘the good’ must be reshaped in terms of ecology as nature’s way of pursuing excellence, and that since democracy most closely approximates nature’s ecological structure, it is the best form of government. Ronald Phipps, writing with Meijun Fan, demonstrates how Chinese traditional arts have much in common with Whiteheadian thought, aesthetically and philosophically. George Derfer considers the promising implications of Whitehead’s philosophy of education for educational reform in both China and in the West, noting that Whitehead’s largely ignored concern for ‘deeper faith’ is an ideal shared by Chinese thought’s notion of ‘Qi’ or ‘spiritual breath.’ Michel Weber considers Whitehead’s concepts of creation, creativity, ‘creative creation’ and ‘co-creation,’ concluding with an assessment of the proximity between Whitehead’s views and Taoist ‘eventfulness.’ Brook Ziporyn compares process thought and Tiantai (T’ien-t’ai) Buddhism, focusing on the concept of eternal objects and the Buddhist concept of Three Thousand. Finally, Wang Shik Jang challenges Roger Ames and David Hall’s view of transcendence in the western religious sense (God as transcendent with respect to the existence, meaning and import of the world) as not recommendable in interpreting Chinese religions. Wang’s concedes that while an immanent-transcendence is a valid interpretation of Chinese religions, strict transcendence must not be ignored. He finds Whitehead’s theism (God as both transcendent and immanent) helpful in explaining how this can be the case. Whitehead’s view is not a ‘naturalistic’ but a ‘theistic’ immanent-transcendence: the transcendence is not merely a continuation of what is transcended, but causally independent of it despite the fact that its meaning and existence are internally dependent on what it transcends.

These chapters are followed by six others written exclusively by Chinese scholars, giving us insight into the impressive high level of understanding and utilization of process thought and its supplementation by traditional Chinese perspectives. Wenyu Xie presents a critical philosophical analysis of the Whiteheadian concept of ‘actual entity,’ specifically with respect to non-sensuous perception; Guihuan Huo critically evaluates and extends Whitehead’s philosophy by utilizing his own ‘social individual growing-up’ theory; Zhine Wang evaluates the contributions of process thought to the postmodernism in Chinese philosophy as a means to overcome the mentalities of Western cultural imperialism and Chinese self-centralism; Zhen Han discusses the value of ‘adventure’ in Whitehead’s thought as the essence of
human society and its positive implications for Chinese culture; Shiyan Li addresses the value of process thought for the consideration of environmental and resource protection; and Nini Zhang argues that process thought can aid in the development of a Chinese ecofeminism.

Whiteheadian thought has encouraged the importance of East-West dialogue on many levels. The Whiteheadian concepts of 'creativity' and 'process' are common to much eastern thinking (Confucianism, Taoism, Mahayana Buddhism, Hua-yen Buddhism, the I-Ching, etc.). Indeed, Whitehead made a point of noting that his metaphysics approximated 'more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought than to western Asiatic or European Thought.' Hartshorne likewise noted the similarities, and Cobb more recently has predicted that China will become a leading world center for process thought. Whitehead and China testifies to this prediction. This is a book well-worth reading for both seasoned process thinkers and those not fully conversant with this important movement in twentieth-century philosophy and theology.

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