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William Y. Adams
The Philosophical Roots of Anthropology.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xii + 466.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-57586-129-1);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 1-57586-128-3).

The reader who approaches this book expecting a discussion of the epistemological or ethical issues facing ethnologists will be disappointed, at least at first. They will not find the sort of direct and muscular confrontation they might find (for example) in the work of Ernest Gellner, or William Clifford or Jean and John Comaroff. To begin with, Adams wishes to discuss the North American version of the discipline (xi), where 'North American' applies better to the subject as it is practiced in universities in the United States than it does to the Canadian version. Thus he is not primarily interested in ethnology wherever it is practiced. What is more, Adams is explicit about his desire to account for the traditional fourfold division into Social and Cultural Anthropology, Linguistics, Archaeology, and Physical Anthropology, an institutional division found frequently on the North American continent but rarely elsewhere (401), so his concern extends beyond ethnology even as it is done in the United States. He holds that the linking of these four fields in single departments is not merely a matter of historical accident, but has its roots in an outlook that can be called common to practitioners in all four fields as they have developed in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless the principal focus of the book is on the social and, particularly, the cultural studies done by American ethnographers and those in a much broader intellectual tradition who can be reasonably regarded as their predecessors.

In Adams' view, Anthropology is both a field of philosophy operating by empirical means (416) and a form of natural history (415) aimed at studying the full range of habits of what he calls *Homo sapiens alter* in a quasi-biological fashion (414). Its most significant ideological accomplishment in the recent past has been to develop, defend and popularize a view of the human species as legitimately plural in culture, though fundamentally similar in capacity (407), but it has done so by working through a discussion that has not always been data-driven and has employed data that often have been ambiguous in interpretation.

As a natural history, the discipline seeks out evidence for all the patterns of life that humans can manifest in response to their variable environment, whether these patterns involve anatomy and physiology, linguistic behavior, material and ideal culture or social relations. It seeks these patterns whether the evidence for them is manifest in the immediate present, the recollectable past (as was the case with the salvage ethnologies of Native societies done by the early Boasians) or in the archaeological or palaeontological record. As a kind of philosophy it takes up a variety of speculations about human nature which have had a long history in Euro-American intellectual life, but seeks confirming evidence for them in cross-cultural study.

This study, says Adams, is properly a study of the *other*, that is of people noteworthy by their difference from their studiers, and selected for investigation precisely because they are different. The natural subject-matter for the anthropologist is groups of people who are lumped as species of the exotic, perhaps because of a remoteness in time or place or history. In American anthropology, the prime candidates for this study are the Native people of the continent, geographical neighbors to those who have intruded upon them but vastly different in culture, and — as it has turned out — persistent in their distinctiveness even after years of contact and many attempts to induce assimilation. This study of the strange in human life forms is undertaken at least in part, says Adams, for a pay-off in self-knowledge. By considering exotic groups and how they are judged to differ from us, the investigators also learn something about their own characteristics. Obviously, much depends on the sort of difference involved.

The lessons to be drawn from such difference vary from study to study, in part because of facts about the people subject to investigation, but also in large part because of the assumptions made about what differences to expect and which ones should guide the examination. Most of Adams' book is an attempt to describe the main forms of assumption made and to trace their history to origins at various depths in Western thought. He identifies five major approaches to the other governed by variation in their assumptions: Progressivism, Primitivism, Natural Law studies, Indianology, and German Idealism, as well as a number of significant but lesser influences, such as Marxism and Structuralism.

Adams sees the first three of these as having themselves undergone a process of development and refinement since their origins in that first of Western philosophical cultures, ancient Greece. Progressivism has, since Empedocles, treated the present as an improvement upon its rude and simple antecedents and is reflected in the categories of much archaeology and neo-evolutionary theory. Primitivism sees that simpler past, or contemporary small scale societies, as better or happier or preferable to those of the primitivist. Natural Law theories seek a common normative structure behind cultural variation in behavior, and often regards it as an indication of some shared understanding of what is right and wrong. The two remaining approaches, Indianology and German Idealism, are more recent in appearance and were themselves responses to novel situations in Western history. The first came as a result of European encounters with a whole new (for them) group of societies on what they soon made their own doorstep. The second arose in the politically disunited but culturally successful German society of the 18th and 19th centuries and emphasized the importance of the mental and spiritual (and its temporal and geographical variability) to human life.

While Adams' book is careful in documenting the entry of each of these approaches into the anthropological tradition, and offers a very broad account of their history, he sacrifices depth and accuracy in doing so. As he admits, he relies heavily on secondary sources for his doxography — too heavily. What is more, he leaves unexplored the most interesting implication

of his study. By regarding Anthropology as a cultural product rather than as a science, he suggests that it is a peculiarly Euro-American way of studying the other. This biases the resulting self-understanding, and the associated account of Anthropology.

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Anthony C. Alessandrini, ed.
Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives.
New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xii + 292.
Cdn$103.00: US$75.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-18975-6);
Cdn$32.99: US$24.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-18976-4).

There is little doubt that the works of Frantz Fanon, and in particular *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), occupy a privileged position within the fields of post-colonial and cultural studies. A brief survey of works by the major thinkers in these areas, a list that includes Edward Said, Benita Parry, Henry Louis Gates, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha, and Abdul JanMohamed, reveals their indebtedness to Fanon's thinking on such related matters as national culture, revolutionary violence, psychosexuality, and identity. The level of interest in Fanon's work has increased steadily over the last twenty years, with the most notable gains in scholarship occurring in the 1990s following the publication in *Critical Inquiry* of Gates's pivotal essay, 'Critical Fanonism' (1991). In addition to Gates's work, the nineties saw the publication of a number of excellent single-author studies including those by Ato Sekyi-Otu (1996) and Nigel Gibson (1998), as well as of several worthwhile anthologies, in particular *Fanon: A Critical Reader* (1996) and *The Fact of Blackness: Frantz Fanon and Visual Representation* (1996).

Fanon appeals to the contemporary critic biographically as well as intellectually. Born to middle-class black parents in colonial Martinique in 1925, Fanon relocated to France following World War II and studied medicine in Lyons before specializing in psychiatry at the Hôpital de Saint-Alban in the early 1950s. His first position, upon passing his residency exams, was as the *chef de service* of the Blida-Joinville Psychiatric Clinic just outside Algiers, which was then, in 1953, the largest psychiatric hospital in Algeria. Fanon's experiences at Blida-Joinville were decisive in shaping his thinking both about psychiatry and about French colonialism, the legitimacy of which was

being violently tested by the revolutionary Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). So severe was France's response to the Algerian liberation struggle, especially insofar as the legal and psychological alienation of Arab Algerians was concerned, that Fanon publicly resigned his post in 1956 and began working full-time for the FLN as a doctor, ambassador, ideologue, and editor of the movement's newspaper *El Moudjahid*. He died prematurely of cancer in 1961 after completing perhaps his most controversial work, *The Wretched of the Earth*, in which he traces the outline of a revolutionary cultural and political project favourably disposed towards violence as a form of political resistance and sharply critical of European involvement in the developing world.

A brief list of keywords applicable to Fanon's work — *nationalism, multiculturalism, identity, revolution, recognition, blackness*, and *colonialism* — goes some considerable way towards explaining its ongoing relevance to poststructuralist thinking about culture and politics, and thus to much of what constitutes postcolonial and cultural studies today. This relevance is in no way diminished by Fanon's reliance upon psychoanalytic concepts and vocabularies to account for the political and social perversions intrinsic to European colonialism. And yet despite these obvious affinities there remains little unanimity in the way that Fanon's work is approached, understood, or valued by contemporary critics. It is precisely on this intellectual dissonance which Anthony Alessandrini hopes to capitalize in his recent anthology, since, as he puts it in his introduction, foregrounding the friction between contradictory views can productively inform subsequent works in Fanon studies: 'the task [of the anthology] is to generate the kinds of critical conversations that will allow these debates to move forward in a more productive manner. That is, rather than be satisfied with what might be identified as a "for or against" attitude towards Fanon's legacy, the point of this collection is to consider what this legacy might contribute to future cultural, political, and intellectual work' (10).

With this in mind Alessandrini has organized his collection of fourteen essays into three sections entitled 'Re-reading Fanon's Legacy', 'Fanon and/as Cultural Studies', and 'Finding something different: Fanon and the future of cultural politics'. Among his contributors are some of the most prominent recent commentators on Fanon: Françoise Vèrges, John Mowitt, Nigel Gibson, and T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting. Additionally, Alessandrini has included representatives from Comparative Literature (E. Ann Kaplan, Rey Chow), English (Gwen Bergner, Samira Kawash, Neil Lazarus), Queer Theory (Terry Goldie), Intellectual History (Michael Azar) and African-American/Postcolonial Studies (E. San Juan Jr., Kobena Mercer). With the exception of the essays by Chow, Sharpley-Whiting, Lazarus, and Mercer, all of the contributions appear here for the first time.

All of those invited to discuss Fanon, even such relative newcomers as Bergner and Kawash, have in other contexts contributed meaningfully to Fanon studies and one might reasonably expect them to do so again. Thus my surprise at the unevenness of the articles on offer here: some are

excellent, some are poor, but by far the majority of them are simply adequate, offering too little new to be of serious interest to scholars committed, along with Alessandrini, to seriously 'contributing to the future of cultural politics' (12). The anthology as a whole fails to hang together — the issues addressed and theoretical orientations adopted by its contributors overlap far too much, too much even to enable 'critical conversation' — and the result is a text marked by frequent repetition and a profound lack of surprise. More serious, perhaps, is the tendency of contributors like Kaplan and Mowitt to force Fanon to speak only for (and through) causes of concern to them: trauma in Kaplan's case; the institutionalization of cultural studies in Mowitt's. This invidious decontextualization ultimately prevents us from gaining clearer insight into Fanon's significance either for his contemporaries or for scholars working today since it reduces his complexity, homogenizes his contradictions, and ignores the terms and trajectories of his intellectual development.

This point is addressed in what for me is easily the best essay in the anthology, one which is, I think, destined to influence work on Fanon for some time to come. I am referring to Nigel Gibson's 'Fanon and the pitfalls of cultural studies', and while there are other worthwhile contributions to this volume such as those by Goldie and Lazarus, Gibson's essay stands apart. For in it he offers a vigorous indictment of those scholars like Bhabha, Vèrges, Mowitt, and Axel Honneth who construct various 'Fanons' in their own image at the expense of adequately reckoning with Fanon's unique intentions, affiliations, and historical context. Gibson argues that these constructions 'domesticate' Fanon, and his criticisms (in particular of work by Vèrges and Mowitt) are revealing and bluntly put. For Gibson a domesticated Fanon risks irrelevance, and his concern seems reasonable given the relative insignificance of the Fanon found in Mowitt's and Vèrges's essays in this anthology. Indeed the latter offer precisely the kinds of self-confirming decontextualizations against which Gibson rails, and the fact that his charges are allowed to remain unanswered belies Alessandrini's claim to respect the significance of Fanon's actual political commitments. So much for critical conversation.

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Joseph Bobik
Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements.
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press
1998. Pp. xviii + 325.
US$39.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-00653-9);
US$19.00 (paper: ISBN 0-268-02000-0).

E.M. Macierowski
Thomas Aquinas's Earliest Treatment of the Divine Essence.
Binghamton, NY: Global Publications, Binghamton University 1998. Pp. vi + 230.
US$17.00. ISBN 1-883058-22-8.

Aquinas scholarship continues to dominate the field of medieval philosophy, and two recent books — Joseph Bobik's *Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements* (hereafter, *Elements*) and E.M. Macierowski's *Thomas Aquinas's Earliest Treatment of the Divine Essence* (hereafter, *Essence*) — provide the non-specialist further access to Aquinas' physical and metaphysical views. Just as each work treats of a distinct subject matter, so too each approaches Aquinas in a different way. Macierowski's *Essence* is a generously supplemented, critical translation (with facing Latin text) of Aquinas' *Sentences Commentary* discussion of God's nature. The supplementary material includes a concise introductory treatment of Aquinas and his philosophy, as well as a thoughtfully-constructed, extensive bibliography. This is especially helpful for novices to the field, but also aids those with more specialized interests in Aquinas' views. Bobik, by contrast, provides a more personalized discussion of Aquinas, readily admitting that the aim of his *Elements* 'is not a scholarly one' (xvi). Instead, he adopts the running commentary style prevalent among medieval authors themselves, presenting an 'unencumbered' (xvi) meditation on and explication of Aquinas' theory of the physical world. Though translations of Aquinas' brief *De Principiis Naturae* (DPN) and *De Mixtione Elementorum* (DME) are included, Bobik devotes much of his effort towards modernizing Aquinas vis-à-vis twentieth century physics.

Bobik's *Elements* is divided into four parts. The first two consist of piecemeal, yet complete translations of the DPN (1-100) — Aquinas' summary of his views on (e.g.) prime matter, the elements, and change — and the DME (103-26) — a more philosophical, argumentative treatment of elemental change that uses the medieval *quaestio* format found in his *Summa Theologiae*. Typically, brief Latin passages precede English translations, which in turn precede two-page commentaries that often tend towards paraphrase. Despite some degree of license (e.g., singular subjects are rendered as plural on p.1, and '*veritas*' is translated as 'true' rather than the more accurate 'truth' on p.120) the translations themselves are very good. When Bobik does stray from the literal, he usually does so for good reason, and the juxtaposition of the Latin and English texts makes such shifts

unproblematic. Though a continuous translation with facing Latin might be more amenable to modern tastes, Bobik's choice of presentation style does have its benefits: it allows the reader more time to develop a clear understanding of the manner in which Bobik's interpretation builds off of Aquinas' original text. Above all, Bobik's treatment is faithful and authentic throughout.

This fidelity gives his commentaries an apologetic, exegetical tone, and thus they read less as detailed philosophical analyses than as lecture notes. This is seen, for example, in the fact that Aquinas is not considered to any significant degree against other philosophers or interpreters, past or present: this is truly an uncontextualized reading of Aquinas, to the point that many references to Aristotle are not fully footnoted. This unconventionality is heightened by Bobik's liberal use of boldfacing to highlight key terms, and is coupled with typesetting irregularities, especially with respect to spacing.

Part Three of the *Elements* best exhibits Bobik's skill as an interpreter: here, he carefully weaves together an interpretation of Aquinas that draws not only from the DPN and the DME, but from Aquinas' other works as well. The running commentary style remains, but Bobik takes on a slightly more critical and synthetic stance here than he does in the earlier sections, concentrating especially on Aquinas' notion that the physical elements — earth, air, fire, and water — exist in the compounds composed out of them in a 'virtual' way. In Part Four, by contrast, Bobik attempts to reconcile Aquinas' views with contemporary physics. Though Bobik does show how Aquinas' thought needs only minor modification to become consistent with contemporary notions of (e.g.) quarks, his presentation is often terminology-laden, as evidenced by his extensive list of scientific definitions of the particles accepted by modern physicists (260-8). Were the definitions to figure into his interpretation, such detail would of course be relevant, but Bobik makes no significant use of them in his discussion.

In short, Bobik gives a quick, easily digestible translation and discussion of Aquinas' physical theories, most suitable for those with a prevailing interest in the Thomistic worldview. The few comparisons Bobik draws between Aquinas and others — e.g., when explaining the Jewish medieval thinker Nahamanides' cosmology (227 ff.) — are helpful, but more are needed for a full, fair assessment of the philosophical and historical importance of Aquinas with respect to the subjects mentioned.

Macierowski takes a more conventional approach in his *Essence*, presenting a careful, clear translation of Aquinas' commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, Book I, Distinction 8. A translation of Lombard's original text (23-37) as well as the Distinction and Chapter headings of Lombard's entire first book (221-30) are thoughtfully included, an especially important addition given the dearth of extant English translations of anything at all from Lombard himself. Though the translation of Lombard is less fluid than that of Aquinas, due in large part to the style of the original text, both are quite adequate, especially given the facing Latin. The weaknesses are few and minor. For example, terms are occasionally rendered misleadingly — e.g.,

'*genus*' is sometimes translated as 'category', which is especially problematic given that Aquinas also uses the more standard '*praedicamentum*' at other points in the text. But Macierowski's English-Latin glossary (194-219) not only clearly marks these occurrences, but also gives a full list of all other uses of the terms in the text. An interested scholar would have no trouble amending the translation given the helpful tools provided. Second, Macierowski is at times too honest in his translations, marking all additions, even those necessary for sense, with angle brackets. Since the Latin is included on the facing page, this is unnecessarily distracting.

The content of the book is tightly focused: Macierowski opens with a helpful introduction to Aquinas, his thought, and the historical and institutional context within which he lived and worked (1-20). Though brief, it paints a surprisingly full picture of the thinker. The main body of the book is of course the translation of Aquinas' pro-and-con discussion of various aspects of God's nature, including his being (*esse*), eternity, immutability, simplicity, and relation to the Aristotelian categories. Even in this early work, Aquinas shows a marked ability for the clear, concise argumentation found in his later *Summa Theologiae*, and eschews the daunting lists of arguments and counterarguments so often found in the work of others of his time. An unexpected aspect of Aquinas' discussion is his treatment of the human soul's simplicity, which is of interest for those attracted to the mundane side of Aquinas' thought.

In the supplementary, bibliographical section (134-93), Macierowski breaks the references into subgroupings, including (e.g.) general works on Aquinas, as well as linguistic tools useful for those with a serious interest in studying the subject. Most of Aquinas' citations are thoroughly investigated, and Macierowski often includes extended Latin passages taken from the other works from which Aquinas draws. Though Macierowski's method of marking references in the translation itself is awkward at first — he uses asterisks instead of numbers, and references are listed alphabetically rather than serially in the bibliographical section at the end — the wealth of information provided makes up for any deficiencies in format.

All in all Macierowski's translation, and especially his supplementary materials, are excellent; he has evidently thought through what a first-time reader needs in order to appreciate Aquinas' thought in a critical, philosophical way. Bobik doesn't do this in his *Elements*, but neither does he claim to: his book is meant for a different audience, and it certainly accomplishes the more moderate goals at which it aims.

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Susan Bordo, ed.
Feminist Interpretations of René Descartes.
University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press 1999. Pp. xii + 348.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01857-7);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01858-5).

This title is among the most recent releases in the growing 'Re-reading the Canon' series which offers feminist re-interpretations of major philosophers in the Western tradition. It includes new and reprinted work, all but one published within the past fifteen years. Bordo has organized the articles into four sections, and her introduction is both helpful in providing a overview of the section themes, and valuable as a contribution to the feminist evaluation of Descartes' position in the history of philosophy.

The first section opens with a chapter on Descartes from Karl Stern's 1965 *The Flight from Woman*, the earliest piece by some twenty years in the collection. This section deals with the idea of, in Stern's words, 'a pure *masculinization of thought*' in Cartesian rationalism (46). Stern's own contribution emphasizes the complexity within Descartes' work which has been overly neglected in the 'Cartesian mentality' which has developed since Descartes and which has resulted in a 'devaluation of poetic knowledge' (30) and the rise of modern scientism (44). This represents a flight from woman in the sense that it represents a flight from qualities culturally associated with the female (46). Bordo picks up on the idea that the rise of modern science depended on a model of knowledge 'based on clarity, dispassion, and detachment' (49), and suggests that the Cartesian legacy represents a 'supermasculinized model of knowledge' (50). This flight to objectivity represents a flight from 'that cluster of epistemological values often associated with feminine consciousness' (64).

In her introduction to the book, Bordo notes that positions such as Stern's and hers need to be read carefully. Their emphasis is on qualities that western culture has 'coded' as feminine or masculine, and then devalued or valued; this should not be misread as scholarship 'interested in exploring actual differences in how men and women think ...' (9). Genevieve Lloyd's approach is far less prone to this misreading. She emphasizes the egalitarianism at the core of Descartes' epistemology but also recognizes that this 'did not, in practice, make knowledge any more accessible to women' (78). Quite simply, women's lives did not allow them full participation in the method prescribed by Descartes, most especially not as it was practiced in the public and 'collective' (though exclusionary of women) realm of science (79). This first section is rounded out by Stanley Clarke's defense of Descartes against feminist critiques. Clarke argues both that Descartes' epistemology is capable of taking gender differences into account and that Descartes' own writings in psychology and biology can be fleshed out to provide a decidedly feminist theory of gender (83).

The themes of the first section are echoed in the next two sections of the book, but each of these sections takes a different stylistic approach to the issues. The second section develops these ideas by taking a literary deconstructionist approach to Descartes' texts. The piece by James Winders defends Descartes against some feminist criticisms by arguing that the first two Meditations are 'written in a manner sometimes theorized as "feminine", if not exactly feminist' (119). He also includes an evaluation of Foucault's and Derrida's interpretation of the *Meditations* noting that neither do justice to the feminist issues raised by this text. Adrianna Paliyenko draws some interesting parallels between Descartes and Lacan and indicates the implications of this for feminism. Luce Irigaray's essay looks at Descartes' discussion of wonder in the *Passions of the Soul* in an attempt to rehabilitate by example this aspect of knowledge. Irigaray's language is often lyrical, but the elusive style can, as Bordo notes, 'leave one feeling dazed and confused' (13).

The third section takes an historical-philosophical approach. The papers here concentrate on the impact of Descartes and Cartesianism upon women philosophers of the seventeenth century, and in the process, find early seeds of some of the feminist concerns consciously developed in the late twentieth century. Ruth Perry, for example, does not deny that Cartesianism may have had a long-term negative impact on women, but she does note that women philosophers of the seventeenth century (and she discusses many of these) saw Descartes' method and epistemology as liberating for women (170). Thomas Waterberg concentrates on just one of these early modern women, Elisabeth, and argues that her correspondence with Descartes is important not only for her incisive criticism of the problem of interaction but also for underscoring the belief that 'philosophy is an activity that can be pursued only in a certain setting' (197-8), a point raised by many current feminists, including Lloyd in her earlier contribution to the volume. Erica Harth and Eileen O'Neill get down to the philosophical and historical nitty-gritty, each presenting her own analysis of how the various early modern women philosophers approached Cartesianism. As if taking seriously the philosophical work of these women is not enough, Harth and O'Neill also present important insights into the issues at the core of Stern's discussion of 'masculinized thought' — what is a 'feminist' perspective? how was gender experienced by early modern women? is there a 'feminine' style of thought? (247ff).

The final section brings us back to the twentieth century and some postmodern attempts to grapple with the human subject of modernity bequeathed to the Western world largely by Descartes. In her style, Leslie Heywood, like Irigaray, challenges by example the model of objectivity passed down to us based partly on Cartesianism, but Heywood's approach is far more accessible. Drawing on personal anecdotes and pop culture, she argues that the Cartesian mind-body split is, ironically, at the root of the recent 'cult of the body' which especially impacts women and includes the anorexic's attempt to negate the body (274). Bordo and Mario Moussa analyze three twentieth-century rebellions against the Cartesian subject (the historical, linguistic and feminist turns) to argue that there is a core of traditional

method in all these movements (292). The volume closes with a piece by Mario Sáenz which examine Cartesianism against the backdrop of twentieth-century postcolonial fiction to argue that the Cartesian sense of self misses a great deal (312).

The volume is rich and varied. It is interesting on Descartes; it is even more interesting on Cartesianism, feminism and culture. Bordo herself nicely sums up what is exciting about studying historical figures in philosophy from perspectives such as those found in this book: 'Where would Descartes stand in today's "culture wars"? The answer is not obvious, and that is what makes him such an interesting thinker' (24).

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Kenneth Clatterbaugh
The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637-1739.
New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xi + 239.
Cdn$103.00: US$75.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91476-0);
Cdn$32.99: US$21.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-91477-9).

This book provides an excellent introduction to the debate in early modern philosophy over the metaphysics and epistemology of causation, particularly on the nature of the interactions between body, mind, and God. Covering the period from the publication of Descartes' *Discourse* (1637) to the appearance of Hume's *Treatise* (1739), Clatterbaugh offers a survey of this debate by highlighting the views of some of its main protagonists: Descartes (who instigated the whole discussion), Gassendi, Le Grand (whose philosophy provides a link between Descartes on one side, and Malebranche and Locke on the other), Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, Locke, and Hume. Boyle, Rohault, and Newton are also included, because their work as 'scientist-philosophers' substantially contributes to the philosophical debate. 'Indeed,' Clatterbaugh writes, 'much of the causation debate is a matter of adjustment between an emerging philosophy and an emerging science. Scientists must adjust their thinking to the philosophical conditions placed on causation, and philosophers must adjust their views on the nature of causation to the newest scientific explanations' (8).

Clatterbaugh accordingly identifies three main stages of development: the early debate (second third of the seventeenth century); the scientific impact

(last third of the seventeenth); and the late debate (first third of the eighteenth). In the early debate philosophers were preoccupied with the metaphysical problem of causation and how to solve it in relation to the Aristotelian/Scholastic theological tradition. The scientific impact through the efforts of Rohault, Boyle, and Newton diminished metaphysical speculation about causation and made successful scientific explanation the principal criterion of accepting something as a cause. The late debate accepts many of the conclusions that come from the previous stages, but by this point the Aristotelian/Scholastic legacy is abandoned, as is the metaphysical problem of causation. The late moderns took the problem of causation back from science and shifted the emphasis to the question of how to identify genuine causal connections. This involved distinguishing between the (previously confused) logical and metaphysical connections of cause and effect that arose out of Aristotle's equivocal use of cause.

Aristotle allowed both middle terms of syllogisms and physical things as explanatory causes without drawing a sharp distinction between them. Since premises are necessary to their conclusions, and causes are premises and conclusions are effects, this made it easier, in the early stage of the debate, to defend the view that causes are necessarily linked to their effects. With the focus on epistemology in the later stage, however, this view increasingly became challenged, until Hume effectively destroyed it. The abandonment of metaphysics in favour of epistemology, however, had its own risks, for once one gives up trying to say what causation is, any effort to identify true causal connections becomes problematic. While the debate begins with a notion of cause that is too metaphysically restricted — so that it seems that only God could be a real cause — it ends with most of the restrictions removed so that the extension of the concept is too generous — which makes it useless for scientific explanation. Hence a persistent problem of twentieth-century philosophy of science is to find ways of restricting the too-generous notion of cause that emerges out of the early modern discussion.

The most interesting and original part of the book is the section on the metaphysics and epistemology of causation in Descartes. One of the main problems facing Descartes was how to account for the role of natural agents in causal interactions, given the omnipotence of God. Clatterbaugh reviews most of the secondary literature on this question, noting the difficulties, before offering his own 'concurrentist' reading of Descartes' position. According to Clatterbaugh, Descartes uses the same model of causation defended by Aquinas in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Book III, which states that 'the same effect is ascribed to a natural cause and to God, not as though part were affected by God and part by the natural agent; but the whole effect proceeds from each' (59). Thus, for Descartes, both God and created things collaborate in the production of change. This concurrentist reading allows Clatterbaugh to make epistemological sense of the role of God and created substances in Descartes' view of cause; they operate concurrently, as do premises in an argument. This linking of premises and substances is what makes Descartes' account of causal explanation so 'rich' (62), and it also allows us to understand

what Descartes means in the *Principles* when he says that we understand better how one body can move another, but we cannot understand how the mind can be moved by the body: 'He is simply reminding us that explanatory deductions from cause to effect are more complete in the case of bodies acting on bodies than in the case of minds and bodies' (63). Though this does not, of course, mean that Descartes abandons the goal of providing a more complete deduction in the mind/body case.

There is certainly textual support for Clatterbaugh's position, but he curiously does not discuss Descartes' distinction, in the 'Fifth Set of Replies', between the 'cause of being' (*causa secundum esse*) and the 'cause of becoming' (*causa secundum fieri*). This distinction, which goes back to Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*, surely backs up the concurrentist view. There is also no discussion of the distinction between the absolute and ordained power of God, which might allow Clatterbaugh to deal with the problem of how Descartes' eternal truths can be deduced from the attributes of God and at the same time be freely chosen by Him.

The remainder of the book gives a relatively balanced and analytic overview of the many attempted solutions to the problems set by Descartes, but there may be too much emphasis on the struggle between philosophy and the 'emerging science' of the 'scientist-philosophers'. A less anachronistic approach would be to see the debate as a struggle between several competing versions of natural philosophy; after all the word 'scientist' was coined by Whewell only in the first part of the nineteenth century, and in the seventeenth century 'science' meant something quite different from what it does now.

The book should have been proof-read to remove its many typos. In addition, the first half of the book has numerous citation errors (see, for example, the discussion of Margaret Wilson's 'presentational model' of Cartesian sensation), and there are occasionally minor inconsistencies in Clatterbaugh's argument. All this, however, does not detract from the work's value as an introductory textbook on one of the central themes of early modern philosophy.

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Arthur Davis, ed.
George Grant and the Subversion of Modernity: Art, Philosophy, Politics, Religion, and Education.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1996.
Pp. xvi + 346.
$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-0668-X);
$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7622-X).

This is a volume of papers by colleagues and scholars of George Grant, highlighted by Grant's unfinished MS. about Céline. His widow, Sheila Grant, has edited a very readable document from the scattered evidence of Grant's long fascination with the final trilogy (*Castle to Castle, North, Rigadoon*) by the novelist whose anti-Semitism has made him anathema to so many others. Grant confronts this issue, concluding that 'whatever his obsessive hatred did to his character, it did not corrupt his art' (40). He traces his being enthralled by Céline's work to 'the very mixture of cynicism and love' (52) with which the characters, all 'losers' straggling through a defeated Germany at the end of the Second World War, are portrayed.

In the section titled 'Art', Gerald Owen and Edward Andrew, the latter taking issue with the claim that Céline's anti-Semitism did not corrupt his art, provide commentary. The most illuminating paper on the question of why Grant was enraptured by Céline, however, is found in the 'Religion' section; Sheila Grant explains what the contrast between triumphalist theology and the theology of the cross meant to Grant. In the church of my childhood, the symbol of the cross was always bare. If confronted by a crucifix, my mother would remind me, 'We worship the risen Christ'. Her deep Protestant disagreement with Roman Catholicism was encapsulated by this distaste for portrayals of the broken body of the crucified Jesus. The Protestant's Christ is risen, is triumphant, and we sinners are saved. Grant, on the other hand, worshipped Christ on the cross. He held that the traditional problem of evil is a problem. No amount of Augustinian metaphysics could explain away the fact that 'human beings are not often very good — we are selfish and devious and broken' (52). To accept the fragility and suffering of the cross, and of human life in general, was a matter of honesty. This is reflected in Céline's 'cynicism'. To carry on despite this is to love the world anyway. Hence the 'mixture of cynicism and love'. Céline's art expressed for Grant his conviction that both God and evil are real.

In the other paper in the 'Religion' section, Lawrence Schmidt makes the plausible case that neither Simone Weil nor Grant was a gnostic, and that neither employed knowledge of the spiritual as a source of otherworldly refuge from the 'darkness of technological society' (265). The 'Politics' section includes Louis Greenspan (a Grant student in his Dalhousie days) defending liberalism against charges of internal contradiction, and Leah Bradshaw's very sympathetic but sensible critique of Grant's views on abortion. Like much Grant scholarship, the 'Philosophy' section is also written by people who work in departments of social or political science: Ronald Biener writes

on Nietzsche, the volume editor, Arthur Davis, on Heidegger, and H.D. Forbes on Leo Strauss, all of them important influences on Grant.

The volume concludes with an 'Education' section. Nita Graham expresses well what Grant understood by 'Teaching against the Spirit of the Age'. A selection (by his biographer, William Christian) of Grant's letters on educational matters includes his account to the then president of York University (1960), of his not taking up the position there for which he had resigned his post at Dalhousie. He discovered that he was required to teach introductory philosophy to a common curriculum and from a common text. He argues that the text in question: (a) pretends not to take sides, but in fact presupposes that 'the assumptions of nineteenth-century philosophy are true in a way that implies that those of classical philosophy are not'; (b) 'is oblivious to nearly all contemporary philosophy'; and (c) 'it is about philosophy; it is not philosophy ... It does not encourage [students] in the real task of trying to make true judgments ...' (315). Even members of departments of philosophy will find here much to agree with.

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Jos De Mul
Romantic Desire in (Post)modern Art & Philosophy.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1999. Pp. vii + 315.
US$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4217-9);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4218-7).

It is good to see a text that departs from the narrowly specialized world of the journal article and aims to give a broadly synthetic perspective on contemporary thought. De Mul tries to do this and more, since he wishes to bring not only philosophy but twentieth-century art — and even technology — under the scope of his thesis. Such an ambitious project is very difficult to execute, however; it requires that the author not only present a strongly compelling, unifying historical thesis, but also give a well-informed account of all the particular figures and movements, and the intellectual connections between them. De Mul's book, though interesting and intelligent, is much more valuable for his close studies of these historical details than for the guiding thesis he believes can unify them.

De Mul's central thesis is that the concept of romantic desire can be used to characterize the fundamental tendency of much twentieth-century

thought and art. Romantic desire involves an enthusiastic belief in the possibility of a totalizing, aestheticized world view and a striving for absolute unity and completion (de Mul calls such enthusiasm 'modernist'), coupled with an ironic awareness of limitation, finitude, and the necessary frustration of such boundless ambition (de Mul elides this ironic attitude with postmodernism). De Mul wants to resist the tendency of other authors to historicize these moments (assigning enthusiasm to the 19th century and irony to the 20th); instead, he argues that these two aspects of romantic desire are linked together throughout much of the post-Kantian tradition, from Romantics such as Schlegel and Schiller on through Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lacan and even the MS-Windows operating system.

Not only does a skeptical irony haunt the modernist enthusiasm from the beginning, de Mul wishes to argue, (as a sort of 'guilty conscience of modernism' [19]) but a postmodern suspicion (always already) presupposes a modernist quest for totality and meaning. Indeed, de Mul interprets this presupposition transcendentally, such that modernism is the condition for the possibility of the postmodern. This framework allows him to discuss the structure of romantic desire within a loosely Heideggerian framework of Dasein revealing and concealing Being, or a Derridean sense in which postmodernity supplements modernity. Indeed, de Mul betrays a vaguely Heideggerian orientation throughout the text, in his explicit methodology of a 'hermeneutic circle' (30), the privilege he gives to aesthetics, and in his conviction that unprejudiced meaning 'emerges from concealment during a fruitful conversation' (2). Finally, this perspective is reflected in his ultimate conclusion that in (post)modern culture 'we have become conscious of the eternal contradiction between human finitude and the desire for eternity, which for many centuries has been concealed by a metaphysical hope that this desire actually can be satisfied' (236).

I doubt that anyone who does not share de Mul's Heideggerian and Derridean sympathies will find this last claim convincing, and it is perhaps fortunate that this general thesis is somewhat lost in the course of the particular studies that occupy most of the book. Many of the thinkers de Mul selects for analysis do not easily conform to his guiding concept of self-conscious Romantic longing. (The fact that he considers Schiller a Romantic already shows that he does not have a particularly nuanced account of this movement.) Particularly troubling is the pride of place given to Nietzsche as a postmodern ironist, a positioning that loses sight of Nietzsche's fundamental hostility towards the Idealist tradition with which the Romantic movement entertained such close intellectual ties. If Nietzsche was in favor of an aestheticized worldview, it was not in order to try to approach or obliquely refer to the Absolute, as was the case with Schelling and perhaps Schlegel.

Also problematic is the role de Mul gives to metaphor in developing his thesis. He believes language is emblematic of our modernist ambition to render the world universally meaningful but that we need to maintain a self-conscious awareness of 'the inherently metaphorical character of language' (171). De Mul argues for the foundational character of metaphor in

the metaphysical construction of reality by pointing to Descartes and de la Mettrie's description of man as a 'machine,' which (he claims) is the metaphor upon which modern empirical anthropology and medicine is based (123). But against de Mul, we might question whether this was indeed a metaphor; these philosophers had a technical notion of the nature of a machine, which included the human body. The machine might have been a bad model for a research program, but it was no metaphor. And the failure of de Mul's example raises the suspicion that language is perhaps something other than a set of metaphors that need to be regarded ironically. But de Mul is convinced that any other attitude is naive and symptomatic of philosophy's rivalry with poetry and a poetic irony that it ignores at its peril. And so de Mul is critical of Freud and even Heidegger for insufficient sensitivity to the playful exigencies of language and the postmodern pluralism it reveals.

A reader who is already sympathetic with this perspective will probably find de Mul's discussion quite valuable. But for the more skeptical reader, the real strength of the book emerges when de Mul leaves behind some of these overarching themes and concentrates on specific examples of the interplay between philosophy and art. (Particularly welcome is the introduction he provides to Dutch artists and philosophers who are perhaps not as well known on this continent.) So, for instance, he uses the psychoanalytic notion of the fetish to analyze Magritte's *La trahison des images*, and compares Barthes' death of the author thesis with the breakdown of the classical (music) episteme (i.e. sonata form) and John Cage's aleatory musical compositions. Elsewhere, he analyses Steve Reich's repetitive music in light of Schopenhauer's aesthetics and Freud's notion of repetition-compulsion. Perhaps most interesting is the way in which he explores modern doubts about autonomous subjectivity with reference to the development of surrealism and abstraction in modern art, and the vicissitudes of the Frankfurt School. Some of these comparisons are highly original, and de Mul discusses them with great erudition and insight. Ironically, the lesson of de Mul's own quest for historical totality is the virtue of limited ambitions.

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Michael DePaul and **William Ramsey, eds.**
Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 1998. Pp. 228.
US$68.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8795-3);
US$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8796-1).

This engaging and significant volume is an exceptional illumination of the problem of intuition, and its place in the fierce agon between philosophy (ph) and cognitive psychology (cp). Thanks to an excellent foreword by the book's editors and Gary Gutting's fine 'historical and metaphysical introduction' (5), this collection of sixteen essays is refreshingly clear and straightforward. The work takes up the contemporary chasm among intellectuals in regard to the role empirical psychology can/must hold in philosophical discussions of psychology, a rift emphasized by the structure of the book itself. The work is divided into three sections that roughly follow the following types of arguments: psychological research on intuitive judgments, rethinking intuition and the philosophical method (an attack on traditional analytic methods, especially those that base their finding on empirical results), and defending the traditional role of philosophy when dealing with psychology.

Since the death of Wittgenstein, analytic philosophy has suffered an immense decline in intellectual favor, and as such, has lost its traditional role as a meta-narrative to psychology, engendering much discussion concerning philosophy's relationship to empirical science. Discussion centers on whether or not analytic philosophy can dissipate the view that intuition is irrelevant. That is, it 'has no cognitive resources beyond those of empirical science and should simply be regarded as a subdivision of science' (11). In fact, in order to be given any validity whatsoever, intuition 'has become the name for whatever it is that might provide philosophy with a distinctive method and hence preserve it as a separate (in principle) intellectual domain' (7). As such, intuition may be the last refuge for those that cannot see their way to reducing intuition to science.

This is precisely the view the antinaturalists propagate, although the arguments here make it clear that contemporary views of intuition represent it as freer in form than its antecedents. Gone are the days of intuition as a priori truth or necessity, instead recent approaches name themselves, 'propositional attitudes' (Bealer), 'spontaneous judgments' (Goldman and Pust) or 'noninferential beliefs' (Sosa). Today, intuition is grounded in 'historical sensibility' and functions as a corrective to irresponsible a priori claims made in the past (203). Bealer puts it this way, 'I believe that, *collectively, over historical time, undertaking philosophy as a civilization-wide project*, we can obtain authoritive answers to a wide variety of philosophical question' (italics his, 203). Said another way, intuition is important for questions not having to do with the validity of psychology.

In contrast, methodological naturalists see both analytical and historical claims about psychology as superfluous, principally as scientific conceptions are too advanced to be properly critiqued by any method less than empirical testing (Rosch and Mervis). Shafir puts the problem this way: 'should we strive for arrangements that improve things according to intuitions that emerge from concurrent evaluation, or should we instead, contrary to our intuitions, strive to create a world that ameliorates experiences in between-subject conditions?' (73) His answer is simply that 'psychology' will 'entertain' a *different* view than ph, although this answer is not without its pomposity (73).

Theoretically straddling both positions are those who believe that intuition may be the ground in which both philosophy and psychology can interdependently grow. Such individuals, like Gopnik and Schwitzgebel, suggest that 'philosophical work has a real contribution to make to the enterprise of understanding the nature of the mind, a contribution that is sometimes under appreciated by cognitive psychologists' (76). This straddling of both positions, however, is not without its difficulties. For example, Gopnik and Schwitzgebel's essay immediately thereafter starts to malign Putnam, Kripke and Searle, actually insinuating that analytical ph stands in relation to cp, as a child does to an adult: 'children know less about the mind than adults do ... And quite naturally, as they learn more about the mind, their conceptions about the mind, and so their intuitions, change' (90-1).

Direct confrontation between science and metaphysics is harder to avoid as one progresses through the work; most notably in chapter seven, where after a preliminary examination into the 'probable sources of philosophical intuition' Robert Cummins concludes not only that philosophical intuition is epistemologically 'useless' and 'valueless,' but that *any* type of ph other than that which Stich (1983) and Paul Churchland (1981) are executing, 'just do[es] not cut it in epistemology' (125-6). In other words, analytic philosophy is dead or may as well be. 'Philosophers of physics interested in space and time do not consult their intuitions anymore,' Cummins teases us, 'they ask how we must understand space and time if the physical theories that appeal to them are to be true and explanatory. I do not know if *something* analogous will replace intuition in every branch of philosophy, but *something* better replace it' (italics his, 126). Enough said.

The book also makes it clear that naturalists and antinaturalists will have to side together in the creation of philosophy's new relationship to psychology. Kornblith suggests that 'philosophical questions are continuous with the empirical sciences' and that 'the constraints science presents for philosophical theorizing should be welcomed, for philosophical theorizing unconstrained by empirical fact loses its connection with the very phenomena we, as philosophers, seek to understand' (140). And Bealer ultimately wants philosophy's understanding of intuition simply to supplement the 'two main epistemological traditions — rationalism and empiricism,' not replace them. And this may be the best way for analytic ph to see itself in the future, seeing

reflective equilibrium as one part in a triumvirate of knowledge. Surely, this is the most superior way intuition will be able to see itself in the future, especially if it is to be practiced as it is in southern fundamentalism, where the modals are constructed on 'arm-chair obtainable data' (284).

On the whole, the book engages its reader with its clear presentation of arguments both for and against intuition, as it relates to cp and ph. If there is a weakness here it is that the work does not enough consider the role of computation in the cp-ph debate. Nevertheless, students and scholars in both psychology and philosophy will find this book compelling and educating for some time to come.

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C. Stephen Evans
Faith Beyond Reason:
A Kierkegaardian Account.
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company 1998. Pp. viii + 167.
US$20.00. ISBN 0-8028-4555-X.

In light of the long, sad history of religious strife — a history that shows little sign of ending soon — Evans's topic could not be more important: Is religious faith rationally criticizable? Any two groups at war because of fundamentally opposed religious commitments have only their shared human reason as common ground. But if, as Evans claims, faith is not always rationally criticizable, then the warring parties may be unable to use that common ground to reconcile their differences.

Evans defends a Kierkegaardian version of what is commonly called 'fideism,' the view that religious faith is at odds with, beyond, or impervious to human reason. While conceding that 'the question of whether this label ["fideist"] does or does not apply to a particular thinker is not a very interesting one' (57), Evans discusses several arguably fideistic views associated with Aquinas, Kant, Wittgenstein, Plantinga, and others before coming down in favor of Kierkegaard's view. He then uses this Kierkegaardian position to argue that natural theology cannot by itself discover truths about God and that the abundance of apparently pointless suffering is not good evidence against theism.

The book belongs to a series meant 'to introduce students and educated general readers' to issues concerning reason and religion, and, accordingly, its clear and accessible text does not pretend to break much new ground. The well-written exposition does, however, contain at least two notable flaws that may mislead some of its intended readers: Evans describes a particular argument as 'formally valid' (118) when in fact the argument commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent, and his discussion of externalism and internalism in epistemology (146-8) confuses the conditions for justified belief (which the internalist claims are entirely internal to the believer's consciousness) with the conditions for knowledge (which *no one* claims are entirely internal to the believer's consciousness).

According to the book's central Kierkegaardian thesis, human reason is radically distorted by sinfulness and is thus especially incompetent in religious matters: '[T]he fideist typically rejects the rationalist assumption that reason is our best or even our only guide to truth, at least with respect to religious truth. The fideist sees human reason as ... damaged in some way ... linked to the *sinfulness* of human beings' (9). More to the point, as Evans reads Kierkegaard, it is because of the sinful 'pride' and 'selfishness' of human reason that rationalists reject the most important element of *Christian* theism: the incarnation of God in Christ (96-100). The problem for religious pluralism, of course, is that not only rationalists reject the incarnation; so do devout theists from the Jewish and Islamic faiths. Evans never asks why pride and selfishness cause those Jews and Muslims to doubt the Christian revelation but not to doubt the uniqueness, personhood, goodness, omniscience, eternality, creative power, and redemptive intentions of God: what about the incarnation makes it unacceptable to their sinful rational faculties when those same faculties manage to accept a dozen other theistic doctrines also embraced by Christianity? He likewise never considers the dialectical consequences, for any dispute between Christians and others, of the *ad hominem* rejoinder 'The reason you're not a Christian is that your thinking is warped by pride and selfishness.' If history is any guide, those consequences are apt to be significant.

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Maurice A. Finocchiaro
Beyond Right and Left:
Democratic Elitism in Mosca and Gramsci.
New Haven: Yale University Press 1999.
Pp. iv + 302.
US$32.50. ISBN 0-300-07535-9.

The fragmentary form of Gramsci's prison writings has ensured that there are multiple 'Gramscis' awaiting discovery by those that come to his work. Finocchiaro takes up the project of exploring Gramsci's relations to Mosca; or, perhaps more accurately, he pursues two projects. The first is to bring Gramsci and Mosca into the same conceptual space, to explore the work of two key figures in Italian intellectual and political life, generally regarded as representative figures of the Left and the Right. The second project is to apply his view of their relationship to the currently fashionable topic of 'beyond Left and Right'. The first of these projects he carries through in a rigorous manner the second is treated rather more schematically in the concluding chapter.

Finocchiaro recognises that there are relatively few direct references to Mosca in Gramsci's writings and the majority of these are brief and tangential. He argues that Gramsci can be understood as conducting a substantive debate, if not with Mosca's texts, then at least with their spirit. To situate Mosca in proximity to Gramsci Finocchiaro first disassociates Mosca from his conventional linkage with Pareto.

Then, in order to establish a link between Mosca and Gramsci, he devotes the bulk of his text to constructing his selected authors in such a way that their work speaks to each other. His central contention is that both were engaged in elaborating a political theory of 'democratic elitism'. Despite the centrality of this concept Finocchiaro is somewhat remiss in not offering a core definition of this concept. Elitism is taken to be any theory which places emphasis on the coexistence of rulers and ruled; the 'fundamental elitist principle' is: 'In all societies that have a government, those who control and exercise public power (the governors) are always a minority, whereas the majority (the governed) never really participate in the government but are merely subject to it' (23). The very breadth of this definition perhaps undermines its utility since it is difficult to bring to mind an important figure who could not be read as accepting this view.

'Democratic elitism' narrows the field to those theories that direct their attention to a relationship between the elite and the masses in which an elite is open to renewal through the influx of elements from the lower classes (42). This definition he argues serves to problematize the idea of democracy itself. While it makes a useful, if albeit rather obvious, point against adherents of the view that democracy is to be equated with majority rule; it might also be viewed that to focus on the recruitment of elites excludes much else that plays an important role in democratic theory, and especially to Gramsci's version thereof.

This conception of 'democratic elitism' is readily compatible with Mosca's argument in *The Ruling Class* (1896/1939). What is far more controversial is whether or not the designation 'democratic elitism' provides a viable encapsulation of any significant dimension of Gramsci's projects. Finocchiaro makes a scholarly attempt to sustain this argument. He exhaustively dissects every mention that Gramsci makes of Mosca and a larger number of passages that might plausibly be treated as indirect engagements with Mosca's thought. He is to be commended for overcoming the increasing textual difficulties of multiple, but still partial, English translations of Gramsci's work. This he does by offering his own translations from the authoritative edition of *Quaderni del carcere* by Gerratana (4 vols. 1975) and then, in an Appendix, providing citations to all available English translations.

The Gramsci which emerges from this exercise is problematic. It is certainly incompatible with the view that Gramsci was centrally concerned with the Marxist problematic of the conditions of possibility of overcoming class domination by means of social revolution 'in the West.' This Gramsci is one who makes a theoretical, if not political break, with the Marxism of Lenin and the Third International and the insurrectionary Bolshevik strategy 'in the East.' In this reading Gramsci's core concept of 'hegemony' is concerned to explore both the mechanisms of political rule under conditions of representative democracy which secure the consent of the governed to the leadership of a hegemonic class in which, in a more or less complex system of alliances, 'organic intellectuals' function to secure lines of connection, representation and translation to the masses; an idea captured by his perceptive comments on the role of rural priests in securing the quiescence of the peasantry and rural labourers.

This Gramsci, the one centered on 'hegemony', is not readily visible in Finocchiaro's account. Finocchiaro is explicit in seeking to distance both himself and Gramsci from the Marxist tradition. The difficulty in assessing such a project is to determine whether the resultant Gramsci is so far removed from Gramsci's own conception of his project as to do violence to whatever degree of authenticity contemporary readers deem it permissible to attach to the self-conception of an originating author. Gramsci was interested in the recruitment from amongst allied class fractions of personnel into the 'power bloc' and similarly in the adhesion of sections of the intelligentsia and intermediate strata into the ranks of the worker's movement. But he was not interested in the replenishing of the elite from the ranks of the 'subaltern' classes. This reading of Gramsci confronts Finocchiaro's classification of Gramsci as a theorist of elite democracy.

One way of approach the evaluation of Finocchiaro's version of Gramsci is to distinguish between two dimensions or levels within Gramsci's texts. The more conjunctural level concerns Gramsci's critical engagement with his contemporary account of the major currents in Italian political thought. As is well known his most direct intellectual engagement was with Croce. Mosca is significant for Gramsci, less for his project of crafting a general political theory, but rather as a representative of a key element of the Italian political

Right, represented by the Liberal Party. At a second level, that of Gramsci's own project to construct a revolutionary democratic strategy, the points of contact between the two become more tenuous. Thus Finocchiaro project secures some purchase at the first level, what might be called the conjunctural Italian history of ideas, but speaks less to the wider significance of Gramsci as a foundational figure of a revolutionary democratic politics.

Finocchiaro's approach works well at the level of a textual analysis of the passages which he selects from Gramsci's prison writings. As suggested, there must be some considerable doubt whether he succeeds in substantiating his strong claim that 'Gramsci's political theory is a critical elaboration or constructive critique of Mosca's' (213).

His approach works less well when he moves onto the wider terrain of seeking to locate Gramsci in terms of the recent post-Cold War period that has taken place under the banner of 'beyond Left and Right' associated with Anthony Giddens' book of that title and important strands of Green politics, such as that captured in Rudolf Bahro's *From Red to Green* (1984). Finocchiaro claims that his interpretation of both Gramsci and Mosca is one which 'transcends the usual distinction between right and left' (213). He offers a strange version of transcendence. He abolishes the problem of Left and Right by definitional fiat. 'If one does not subscribe to such an approach but develops an alternative one, then one's view will be beyond right and left' (214). It is difficult to find any merit in such a contention and as a result Finocchiaro can make no contribution to the wider location and implications of Gramsci's thought. This work succeeds in reducing itself to a narrow history of ideas conversation between Gramsci and Mosca.

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Michael Allen Fox
Deep Vegetarianism.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1999.
Pp. xxii + 226.
US$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 1-56639-704-9);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 1-56639-705-7).

'If you care for animals, why eat them?' Michael Fox quotes a friend with approval. This succinct ethos is one of many grounds underlying his cumulative case for vegetarianism. It may make a good slogan for a T-shirt, but the debate surrounding vegetarianism is a more complex matter. After all, Fox is addressing a dominant culture that sees animal flesh as a normal and essential part of its diet. The decision to change something as psychologically deep rooted as one's eating habits is not made lightly, so he had better come up with some pretty persuasive reasoning.

When faced with questions that threaten our usual *modus vivendi*, it is difficult not to be influenced by our own psychological quirks. Thus, for instance, as a vegan I have been accused of 'sentimentalism' by smug meat-eaters who hastily add 'Of course, I wouldn't *dream* of eating my pet dog!' Why not, I wonder? Conversely, I am well aware that my own sympathy with Fox's polemic may incline me to overlook any philosophical flabbiness. Thus, faced with his array of arguments which to me are familiar enough to seem almost truisms, it is difficult to assess how these arguments may appear to someone meeting them for the first time. Unlike some other philosophers, Fox is well aware of the psychological factors influencing lifestyle decisions, pointing out that a 'motivation' is not the same thing as a 'ground'.

He gives a comprehensive view of vegetarianism, looking not only at philosophical discourse, but also historical, religious and ethnic traditions, health considerations and the symbolic meaning of flesh foods. As such, it gives context to the meaning of vegetarianism, which is often popularly seen as a mere food fad or a crazy urban cult propounded by people who know nothing of domesticated animals. Fox traces the history of vegetarianism from the Stone Age (debunking the boring old 'man as hunter' myth en route) through to modern times.

Fox says (66), 'to appreciate that there are many kinds of vegetarianism is to understand that their corresponding grounds and motivations are equally diverse', and his book supports this assertion. However, I was not entirely happy with the attitude that an eclectic bundle of supporting arguments (some of which may be more compelling than others, according to individual predilection) is sufficient to establish that one is morally obliged to become vegetarian. He claims it as a strength that (66) 'the arguments have a cumulative weight, face and value that can only be appreciated when one ponders them together: The whole is greater than the sum of the parts'.

There may be something in this 'five-legged table' approach, but I prefer my arguments solid, if numerically few, rather than have the conclusion

support itself on a huge rag-bag of plausible, but possibly individually weak bits and pieces.

Fox convincingly argues that the burden of proof lies with the meat-eater, rather than the vegetarian, as the *prima facie* case for vegetarianism is very strong. He rightly points out that (52) 'The expectation is always that ... a minority must justify and defend its position, and ... it may legitimately be called upon at all times and places to do so. We never ask this of those who identify with majority groups, who unreflectively assume they have the right to control the discourse ...'.

The main part of the book deals with fourteen of the main moral arguments in favour of vegetarianism. These include both duties to oneself (e.g. to maintain good health, to cultivate moral sensitivity), duties to other animals (e.g. not to cause unnecessary pain, suffering or death), environmental issues and world hunger. Fox discusses these plausibly, offering insights from Kantian and Aristotelian moral philosophy.

Although he offers the comprehensive overview which is the book's remit, I would have preferred more philosophical analysis. There were many places where I wanted to jump in with 'yes, but ...'. He examines a plethora of philosophical issues, any one of which merits further discussion. For example, the doctrine of the 'replaceability' of animal life (it is acceptable to kill if we replace the life taken with an 'equal' one). Another example is the possibility (apparently seriously scientifically mooted) of (94) 'breeding animals without pain receptors, which would turn these creatures into the insensate machines Descartes fantasised all animals to be'. Would this therefore make it acceptable to breed them for eating? What if they had a human appearance?

In a philosophically laudable attempt at balance, Fox discusses eleven arguments in a (somewhat shorter!) section against vegetarianism. Over-familiarity with the polemic of pro-vegetarian arguments made this a refreshing change. These cover such subjects as feminist critiques, indigenous peoples and cultural imperialism, the requirement of moral sainthood, eating 'schmoos' and other consenting or indifferent animals.

Fox concludes with a summary of his main arguments which lead towards the general adoption of vegetarianism, although he sensibly concedes there are exceptional circumstances, for example where it may be necessary for survival (as cannibalism may conceivably be justifiable *in extremis*). He considers issues of consistency and the extent of moral obligation, for example, should vegetarians become vegans? Where do we draw the line? I was slightly surprised to find that he thought that it was possible to take (129) 'milk from cows that are kept on traditional farms, not in any way tied into the meat or leather industries and allowed to live out their normal life spans'. I would like to know where such farms are to be found, as cows need to calve annually to produce milk, and it is obviously uneconomic to support the resultant offspring as pets.

This book presents a broad view of many of the issues raised by vegetarianism, although often philosophically frustrating as deeper issues concern-

ing the nature of morality were — of necessity — given a passing nod. Would it persuade non-vegetarians to reconsider their eating habits? Although Fox provides strong grounds for vegetarianism, he is rather coy about asking the meat-eating reader to change their diet. His writing lacks the vigour and emotional appeal of the original 'bible' — Peter Singer's 'Animal Liberation'. I suspect that Fox does not wish to antagonise his readership with loud guilt-mongering, relying instead on the quiet force of reasoned argument.

What response does he have to the reader who says 'I see the force of your arguments, but I'm not emotionally drawn to vegetarianism, therefore I'll stick to steaks, thank you.'? There are more philosophical pathways to tread, which is an endemic problem for any book on practical ethics. However, this book has the virtue of offering many ideas old and new, and gives plenty of meat for the mind. A good present for argumentative meat-eaters and vegetarians alike.

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Hans Freyer
Theory of Objective Mind:
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Culture. Trans. Steven Grosby.
Athens, OH: Ohio University Press 1998. Pp. 192.
US$36.95. ISBN 0-08214-1250-7.

Hans Freyer's *Theory of Objective Mind* is both modern and dated: modern in so far as we still lack a thoroughgoing philosophy of culture, but dated because it relies upon fundamental categories that are increasingly questionable. The influences of Hegel and Dilthey are present, although Freyer is as wary of Dilthey's 'psychologism' as he is convinced that 'the Hegelian construction stands with the system of his [Hegel's] philosophy and has fallen with it' (158). Yet Freyer is not ungrateful to his predecessors, insisting that the 'philosophy of culture in the modern sense of the word is the realistic turn of the philosophy of mind achieved in the German movement' (159). The strengths and weaknesses of Freyer's theory rest upon that foundation.

The first of Freyer's books to appear in English, *Theory* in its German form has had a considerable and recognized influence on German social theorists as well as a significant but unrecognized influence on their American counterparts. It presents in a mere 159 pages a comprehensive categorial schema for the analysis of objective mind, or, broadly speaking, culture. As 'the attempt of humanity to find a meaning of life beyond vitality by detouring through the object' (103), the concept of culture is the largest net with which

we might capture the meaningful existence of all the products of human creative action.

The complexity of the concept of culture is considerable, however, and a philosophy of culture (or its propaedeutic) must come to terms with the relation of the individual to his or her society as well as the constitutive components of that society's objective, material existence. Freyer is careful to look at both sides of the individual-society relation, but he first deals with methodological points and establishes the foundational concepts of his analysis. In the first chapter he notes the 'fact of objective mind', namely that 'the human mind has been realised in certain structures and arrangements of the physical world and now dwells within this material housing' (17). This fact is both a necessary presupposition of a philosophy of culture and the object which such a philosophy must explain. (It is fair to say that Freyer is not shy of drawing metaphysical as well as hermeneutical conclusions.) In Freyer's analysis, it is the process of objectification that allows human beings to produce the meaningful forms that consequently acquire a somewhat independent existence in the world — 'somewhat independent' because, however enduring the exterior existence of an objectively meaningful form may be, its meaning requires the participation of subjects to be actualized.

Freyer sketches five main forms of objective mind in its development: enclosed entities, tools, signs, social forms, and character. This 'initial classification of all the various structures that comprise the world of objective mind' is workable and clear, if sparse. Most important, however, is the relation between 'social form' and 'character'. 'Social reality is an enormous sum of disorderly bursts of relation between human beings' or 'a connection of wills for a purpose' (65-6), but such realities lack 'absolute objectivity': 'They are not built out of dead and will-less material; they are built out of living wills, out of human beings. Social forms are not erected as a building — they are performed like music' (68). The 'triumph of subjective mind' is that the objectivity of much of our human world depends entirely upon our subjective participation; conversely, the 'triumph of objective mind' follows from the fact that no one subject is absolutely essential to the continued existence of a social form. Certainly Freyer emphasizes the individual subject rather than the social psyche: 'Every psychological complex of social experience is, and remains, in essence, separable into individual consciousness. Thus, there is a methodological demand to analyze the complex in entirely individually self-dependent actions as the elemental parts of the social complex' (106). There are also ontological truths about the separability of the individual from his or her culture (see chapter five).

The last form of objective mind he sketches is the category 'character', and it is here that the thoroughness and clarity of Freyer's analysis is most obvious. Character, which 'has its existence neither in the objective world nor in the sphere between human beings, but in the personal life of the subject', might be summarized as the influence of one's culture on one's own personality. 'Every educational and political activity, where it is in the deeper sense creative, aims at a definite form of human being that it wants to

produce' (71). However, as previously noted, the social forms that influence the character of individual subjects are themselves dependent upon subjective activity for their continued existence. There is, then, a correlative relationship between social forms and the character of the individuals who uphold them, a reciprocal influence of each upon the other.

Theory is a clear and readable translation, but still a translation, and of a book written nearly three-quarters of a century ago. The reciprocity between one's society and one's character is better expressed in German than in English, for example, since the German word *Bildung* encapsulates the meaning of 'culture' and 'character' and also as the bidirectional process whereby the individual both determines his or her society by participating in its social forms and also is determined by those same social forms, or what we might call 'inculturation.' Thus Freyer is able to emphasize his point by mentioning on p. 73 that 'Wilhelm von Humboldt once defined *Bildung* as "the generation of a world in individuality."' While Freyer is right to take notice of this reciprocal relationship, nowadays we might question whether 'the unity of the classical-romantic education' still exists. We may also be more wary than Freyer of asserting that '[d]espite all the transformations of the concept of the spirit of a nation, this category has survived as the indispensable means of interpretation in the human sciences' (4). Those who apply the pejorative label 'essentialism' may also take issue with Freyer's invocation of 'eternal human traits' (131).

Theory is a dense work, and there are many other interesting points of discussion within the argument: the presence of psychological and objective interpretations of the same phenomena, such that 'each of the two perspectives can be formulated as complete in itself and independent from the other' (51); the tension between life and creative activity, resulting in 'the canonization of the object and the self-sacrifice of the subject to it' (99); and a number of carefully considered methodological points such as the methodological parallels in developing a philosophy of culture and a philosophy of nature (chapter eight). Especially rich with potential is Freyer's discussion of theoretical and practical approaches to culture. A rich account of so-called cultural appropriation and the usurpation of tradition by pragmatic concerns could be drawn from Freyer's account of the difference between merely examining a culture and actually living in it.

On the whole, *Theory* is a clear and forthright attempt to produce the categorial schema required for a philosophy of culture. The text loses no more in translation than is unavoidable, and Freyer exhibits an astute, creative, and useful convergence of ideas drawn from many realms of thought. Despite its age, it holds up well enough to merit serious consideration by philosophers of culture as well as theorists of the social sciences. Having read *Theory*, one becomes hopeful that more of Freyer's work will make its appearance in equally capable translations.

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Susan E. Gallagher
The Rule of the Rich? Adam Smith's Argument Against Political Power.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University 1998. Pp. vii + 141.
US$28.50. ISBN 0-271-01774-0.

With *The Rule of the Rich?*, Susan Gallagher offers an interesting interpretation of Adam Smith's moral and political writings by putting them into context with three eighteenth-century economic and political writers: Mandeville, Bolingbroke, and Hume. Through each of these writers, Gallagher highlights Smith's shift away from rationalizing the rule of a patriarchal, aristocratic, and propertied elite whose duty it was to improve their moral and economic situations and the situation of those under them. In seeking to understand Adam Smith's argument against the political rule of the rich it is crucial, according to Gallagher, that we appreciate that he was writing in the context of such patriarchal duties and of the glaring failure of the Walpole administration to live up to them. It is this insight, Gallagher claims, which enables us to see that Scottish political economy did not evolve merely as an apologia for the Whig regime.

While analyzing Mandeville's use of satire, Gallagher argues that his jokes consistently depend on the assumption that the aristocracy derives its claim to rule from its supposed moral superiority. Mandeville's readers must assume that the people whom he is lampooning ought to behave better: their place demands more of them. What Mandeville left implicit, Bolingbroke makes explicit, according to Gallagher. Bolingbroke's harsh criticisms of the Court, and his belief that society would fall into depravity unless the aristocracy returned to concern for the public good, rested on his belief that the aristocracy had both the power and the obligation to protect the public interest. Hume moves us further away from justifying the rule of aristocrats, though he retains a conservative loyalty to the aristocratic order. Gallagher argues that, though Hume rejected the idea that aristocrats were genuinely morally superior to those whom they ruled, he still believed that the aristocracy should retain the appearance of being morally superior. Property and political power are still linked in Hume, though the genuine moral superiority which both Mandeville and Bolingbroke assume has been jettisoned.

It is into this ongoing discussion of property, political power, and the moral status of the aristocracy that Gallagher places Smith's writings. Smith, she argues, sought to sever the link between the right to own property and both political power and moral superiority. He argued that morality surely applied to all kinds of people but that the wealthy and powerful were likely to be morally corrupt. They were, given the lengths to which they must go in order to protect their wealth and power, likely to be short-sighted, self-interested to the point of greed, and completely devoid of compassion for others. His critique, however, differs from Bolingbroke's in that Smith does not see his indictment of the character of the wealthy and powerful as an attack upon

their claim to wealth and power. Smith argues that, through the invisible hand, the actions of these morally depraved individuals will ultimately benefit everyone. The unintended consequences of the efforts of the wealthy to enrich themselves does not excuse their moral behavior, which, Smith argues, should be condemned. This condemnation implies that aristocracy should be limited in their political power because they cannot be trusted to act for the public good, but that that limitation need not apply to wealth. Gallagher concludes that Smith is arguing against the rule of the rich by indicting their character and undermining their moral claim to rule.

Gallagher's study clearly raises serious difficulties for those who want to read Smith simply as a defender of free markets. It also raises particular difficulties for those interpreters who want to see a relationship between property, morality, and political power. Gallagher limits her comments about the implications of Smith's thought for capitalism to a brief but interesting postscript. Though Gallagher does not examine the further implications of Smith's argument, one can see that his argument, as interpreted by Gallagher, functions as a half-hearted apology for capitalism insofar as it limits the sources of critique. According to Smith, the depravity of the wealthy, their glorification of consumption and greed, and any other vices that may result from commercial activity are simply irrelevant to whether or not an economic or political system is just. Interpreters who claim that a real link between morality, property, and political power cannot be sanguine in the face of Gallagher's interpretation of Smith. It was his severing of these links that allowed Smith to oppose the political rule of the aristocracy. His arguments, as presented by Gallagher, serve as a stern warning that any such attempt will hurt the common good. Even on Gallagher's interpretation, Smith remains an apologist for capitalism, though he does not believe that the behavior of the wealthy is beyond reproach. Instead, Smith argues that there is no need for the wealthy to apologize for their failure to care for those who have less than they do. Their behaviour might be morally unpraiseworthy but it does not indict the larger system within which the wealthy participate. Gallagher's interpretation of Smith leaves us with the immense problem of determining just how far we want to reintroduce the need for an economic system to protect and enhance the morality of its participants. She offers us an invigorating historical account of both the context and arguments of Adam Smith, which leaves philosophers who want to understand the nature of a just property system with a lot to think about.

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Trudy Govier
Dilemmas of Trust.
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press 1998.
Pp. ix + 241.
$29.95. ISBN 0-7735-1797-9.

The philosophical community has come to expect, rightly, that Govier's contributions to the discussion of the moral, political, and epistemic aspects of trust will be well thought-out and informative. This book fulfills that expectation admirably. While this work can stand as a self-contained discussion, it is also a companion-piece to her earlier book, *Social Trust and Human Communities*. Where the earlier work concentrated on the public and social need for (and risks of) trust, this volume extends the discussion to the special rewards and risks of trust in the personal sphere, especially to the relation between self-trust and trust in personal relationships.

The general scheme of the book is to start with the most public of personal relations and move, chapter by chapter, to the most intimate, culminating in an examination of the notion of self-trust. The first chapter addresses why trust is necessary in interpersonal relationships, and why it is risky. Of particular note here is her observation that our trust of others is, and must be, open-ended; that is, that there is no way to state a simple principle correctly capturing the outlines of when trust is necessary and when it isn't. Chapter two discusses the nature of role of trust in friendship. This discussion is a particularly sensitive one, making extensive use of both psychological studies and literary fiction to illustrate her points. Chapters three and four move on to families, especially the problems posed by secrets and lies. The core of the book is chapter five, where self-trust is introduced as the necessary precondition for trust of others. Chapter six sorts out the relations between the concepts of self-trust, self-esteem, and self-respect. With the necessity of an open-ended, yet still conditional, trust established, chapter seven introduces the question of what counts as evidence for trusting or distrusting. Chapter eight explores, again with a great deal of empirical evidence, the consequences of distrust in personal relationships, and strategies for managing distrust when it arises. Chapters nine and ten deal with the problem of restoring trust when it fails, and the role of forgiveness and reconciliation in such restorations. Chapter eleven summarizes her results, and links trust with treating people with respect.

The book's strengths are manifold. Not only is it a thoughtful philosophical exploration of a difficult problem, spanning ethics, politics, and epistemology, but it is also a detailed, practical study of real human problems. In this way it is useful not only to the theorist, but also to the intelligent layperson, in much the same was as Sissela Bok's two books in practical ethics, *Lying* and *Secrets*. It is refreshing to see philosophy put in service to real moral living.

Govier is to be commended for, yet again, applying a sensitive philosophical analysis both to theoretical and to practical concerns.

The book does have a few weaknesses. There is an ongoing discussion in the philosophical literature of whether trust in the testimony of others is a basic source of knowledge, or is to be founded on other epistemic practices; in other words, does the fact that someone told me something give any positive epistemic status to the proposition so reported, or is its epistemic status derived from its being grounded in information gathered by other means? Govier stands squarely in the reductivist camp, saying that if a belief is justified by trust, it must be grounded in a justified belief that the source is trustworthy. The anti-reductivists say that trust in testimony automatically carries with it some prima facie justification, in much the same way as trust in the deliverances of our sensory apparatus. Such prima facie justification can, of course, be defeated by evidence of untrustworthiness, but in the absence of defeating evidence, the belief is rightly taken to be justified; beliefs based on testimony are innocent until proven guilty. While there are standing objections to the reductivist view (see, for example, Coady's *Testimony*), Govier's book does nothing to answer those objections or advance the discussion. This is particularly troubling when Govier arrives at the relation between self-trust and trust of others. In chapter six, she says that even self-trust is based, at least in part, on evidence. This is puzzling, if not outright paradoxical. While it makes sense to say that my trust in my own competencies to act can be based on evidence (I've learned from bitter experience not to trust myself to bake bread or speak French, and also learned that I can be trusted to drive on snow or mow the lawn), it doesn't seem to make sense to say that I have learned to trust my own belief-forming mechanisms. To say that I have acquired evidence of my own competence or incompetence at some specific task is to say that I have acquired justified beliefs to the effect that I am or am not very good at that thing. While I can certainly acquire justified beliefs to the effect that I am not good at forming reliable beliefs about some range of things (identifying bird species, say), how can I be said to have acquired justified beliefs to the effect that my beliefs generally are justified? Did I learn that my sensory beliefs, for example, are mostly accurate? The only evidence I could possibly have would be more beliefs of the same kind that are in question. To use William Alston's termin- ology, any such justification would be *epistemically circular*.

Other problems with the book are far less significant. In the first chapter, Govier slides back and forth between a psychological thesis, that trust is always based on evidence, and an epistemological thesis, that justified trust is always based on good evidence. She also often cites cases of trust confirmed or betrayed, and we are not told where these cases come from. Are they from psychological literature, do they concern personal acquaintances of hers, or are they fictional and illustrative? We need to know before we can evaluate their evidential force.

In spite of these flaws — and what book is without flaws — Govier has written a thoroughly useful book, worthy of being read, used in classes and seminars, and discussed by philosophers and laypeople alike.

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Wayne Grennan
Informal Logic: Issues and Techniques.
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press 1997. Pp. 308.
$60.00. ISBN 0-7735-1542-9.

Wayne Grennan's project is to develop a system of argument evaluation which relies on expressing inference strength and premise acceptability in probability ratings. The task in argument evaluation, as he sees it, is to provide a judgement in the following form: An argument with the premise conjunction P and conclusion C provides the following support for C: p(P) x p(C/P) (i.e., the probability of P times the probability of C, given P).

On the theory that the proof is in the pudding, we will look at three issues. (1) How successful is his system in the sense that it can be used as claimed, over the range of intended cases? (2) How usable is his system by the relatively uninitiated as a method for arriving at appropriate evaluations? And (3) how advantageous is it compared to existing methods? I will proceed seriatim.

There are many argument types that are problematic for Grennan's system despite his attempt at a comprehensive typology. Grennan's system settles on the following formula for inductive inference evaluation: p(C/P) = 1 - R_1rating - (0.1 x N) where R_1 is the most plausible rebuttal factor ≥ 0.3, and N is the total number of such rebuttal factors ≥ 0.3. However, such a system cannot handle conductive practical arguments (and arguments to practical conclusions are included in the inductive argument typology). The rating of the rebuttal factor is a rating of the probability of its truth, where it is assumed that if the probability of the truth of a rebuttal factor is 100%, the conclusion is completely uninferrable from those premises. But in conductive reasoning the probability of the truth of a rebuttal factor is independent of the degree of importance that that rebuttal factor has in weakening the inferrability of the conclusion.

This defect in Grennan's system will be regarded as particularly acute by anyone who thinks that inference to the best explanation is pervasive in our descriptive reasoning. I say this because there is a parallel between conductive practical reasoning, and reasoning to a theoretical conclusion. In both cases there is a weighing of degrees of satisfaction of final factors. In typical

inference to the best explanation, these final factors are simplicity, predictive strength, predictive power, capacity to be filled in by an intelligible narrative, internal coherence, and consistency with other beliefs. In inference to the best explanation cases, inference ratings cannot plausibly be established by subtracting from 1 the probability that the lead rebuttal factor is true and subtracting further an adjustment based on the number of important rebuttal factors. Here too, as in practical reasoning, the probability of the truth of the rebuttal factor is not the key issue. Rather its importance in weakening the inference if true, taken together with the probability of its truth, is what's important.

There is another defect in the system. In his section on premiss evaluation, Grennan holds that the best way to establish a probability for most premisses is to list those factors that are pro the premiss; list those factors that are con the premiss; and then make an intuitive weighing. In giving this prescription for premiss rating, Grennan oddly undercuts his system.

The problem of evaluating the probability of a premiss given the background beliefs of the evaluator is parallel to that of providing an inference rating. Then if the best way to establish the probability of a premiss given the background beliefs of the evaluator is to list pros and cons and make an intuitive weighing, one begins to wonder about the system given for establishing an inference rating. For consistency sake, shouldn't the pros and cons be organized in some way that enables one to classify the cons as rebuttal factors, and shouldn't one then use the formula? On the other hand, if pro/con weighing is the best way to establish the probability of a premiss given one's background beliefs, then an intuitive conductive model is, implicitly at least, being regarded as preferable or on a par with the official Grennan rating system.

Is Grennan's system usable by the relatively uninitiated? Grennan informs the reader that he uses the system in his classes, and the clear implication is that it works. However, if Grennan is to convince the instructor in informal logic or critical thinking to take up this system, he really ought to have provided the textbook, rather than to leave it up to the reader to figure out how to handle the pedagogy. The reader — this reader anyway — suspects that much managing, finessing, and ad hocking has to be done to get this system to work in practice. Equally important is the question of whether the Grennan method, expressed in a usable textbook, would provide the students with methods much better than the more standardly found methods. The comparison would be with the far simpler method which asks the student to distinguish truth-acceptability of the premisses from relevance of the premisses and from sufficiency of the premisses, and to use some form of pass-fail system in relation to these features. The advantage of Grennan's system is that there is a more finely delineated gradation of appraisal in the final probability judgement. The cost of getting that delineation may, however, be prohibitively high. The student is asked to use a complicated deductive-inductive typology; and it may well be that the only student who can use such a system is a student who doesn't need it.

Of course it may be that one of the ways to get students not to need such a system is by having them go through the ropes of learning to use it as best they can. Whether this is so or not depends on how, if at all, the pedagogical issues, which Grennan does not pretend in this book to solve, can be managed. If he does have such a system worked out, then it will be a system worthy of close study.

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Phyllis Berdt Kenevan
Paths of Individuation in Literature and Film: A Jungian Approach.
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 1999.
Pp. x + 123.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-7391-0016-5.

Paths of Individuation in Literature and Film is a thin volume that interprets examples of film and literature from a Jungian perspective. Given Jung's largely debunked reputation in academic circles, Kenevan demonstrates courage and commitment in her analysis. She begins her introduction with an apt characterization of contemporary nihilistic culture. She writes, '... we have even become bored with the reiteration that we live in a spiritual vacuum' (1). We are no longer disturbed by religious and moral breakdown. Indeed, we see it as the banal reality of our time. However, 'in Jung's view, the preoccupation with psychology, so predominant in our time, is an indication that we expect something from the psyche that we have not found in the outer world, something which our religion ought to contain but no longer does' (2). Thus, although we have turned away from religion we have not lost the essential 'religious' impulse to look within. We have shifted from reflecting on symbols of our religious system to investigating the symbols of individual dreams. However, while we have moved away from a collective focus to an individual one, the aim to balance two opposing psychical forces, remains fundamentally unchanged. Kenevan writes: 'It is the integration of conscious and unconscious that is crucial for Jung, and that involves both an openness to the unconscious and a critical intelligence' (2). Jung calls this journey toward integration 'the path of individuation' (3).

The book is divided into two parts. The first addresses issues and examples of individual individuation, and the second of collective human individuation.

In the first part we see Zorba, in *Zorba the Greek*, as an individual who has achieved individuation naturally unaided. We witness Trueba, in *The House of the Spirits*, after long painful resistance, come to terms with his own internal anima through his relationship with his granddaughter, Alba. In *Crime and Punishment*, we see Raskolnikov, the intellectualizer, as a foil to Zorba, the feeler, and his development consequently runs in the opposite direction. We also see, in *Bagdad Cafe*, the emergence of the archetypal charismatic and transformational *Rainmaker* in the individuated character of Jasmin. In the second part, *My Dinner with André* prescribes universal 'spiritual' awakening through either the dramatic means of André or the kind of awakening Wally argues for, 'down on earth' amidst the mundane. Kenevan also draws on examples from Dostoyevsky's fiction. Through it she addresses the global divide between east and west and the challenge of westerners to avoid mimicking the east but rather to find 'the east in us' (85). Finally, in the film *Wings of Desire* we see, through the angel Damiel's human incarnation, the reciprocal relationship between spiritual and material reality that exists despite our belief in or awareness of it.

All in all, *Paths of Individuation in Literature and Film*, as an academic publication, is a self-reflexive example of its own implicit prescription. Academe, with its unbalanced intellectual approach and antagonism toward all things 'spiritual', is a somewhat unlikely venue for Kenevan's message. The inclusion of Kenevan's work in academic philosophy is, therefore, a heartening step in what might be the discipline's own individuation process.

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Imre Lakatos and **Paul Feyerabend**
For and Against Method.
Ed. Matteo Motterlini.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1999.
Pp. xii + 451.
US$34.00. ISBN 0-226-46774-0.

In the Preface to *Against Method*, Paul Feyerabend recalls the conversation with Imre Lakatos that started him working on his book. 'In 1970, Imre Lakatos, one of the best friends I ever had, cornered me at a party. "Paul," he said, "you have such strange ideas. Why don't you write them down? I shall write a reply, we publish the whole thing and I promise you — we shall have a lot of fun." I liked the suggestion and started working.' Unfortunately, Lakatos died of a heart attack in 1974, before he had the chance to write his reply to Feyerabend, although he did promise from his hospital bed that,

should he die, he would send his reply to Feyerabend as a 'Postscript From The Third World' (373).

For and Against Method is an attempt to reconstruct that reply from the third world of objective contents of thought, as expressed in Lakatos's letters to Feyerabend and in his lectures. Thus this book prints, for the first time, extensive portions of the 1968-74 Lakatos-Feyerabend correspondence, Lakatos's 1973 *Lectures on Scientific Method*, and Feyerabend's 'Theses on Anarchism' (prepared for a conference that he and Lakatos were to attend). Also included are some other previously unpublished letters of Lakatos and Feyerabend, and, in its first English translation, Lakatos's famed 1956 address to the Petöfi Circle in Hungary in which he defends the right to dissent.

In fact, in spite of Feyerabend's recollection in his Preface, the letters show that the plan for a joint work was on the cards from at least 1969. *'Lakatos and Feyerabend: For And Against Method'* was proposed by Lakatos as one possible title for their joint work. Other proposals include two works:

> Feyerabend: *Against Method*
> Lakatos: *For Method*
> And, if you wish,
> Feyerabend: *Lakatos's research programmes. An obituary.*
> (Lakatos to Feyerabend, 8 January, 1972: 270)

Furthermore, in 1970 we see Feyerabend toying with the idea of a single volume containing two essays and *'a final dialogue* which we might write together' (Feyerabend to Lakatos, 24 November, 1970: 222).

Thus, editor Matteo Motterlini (whose extensive references make for a very accessible collection) introduces the book with an imagined dialogue between the two figures, taking his material from their published writings, as well as from the contents of the letters. Motterlini's dialogue brings out the substantial points to be found in the letters regarding the debate for and against method, but it is a revealing aspect of the dialogue that most of its references are to previously published works.

Although Lakatos and Feyerabend do discuss items of substance in their letters, and in particular Feyerabend frequently charges Lakatos with being an anarchist in sheep's clothing, most of their specific discussion of the 'For and Against Method' project regards practicalities — who to publish with, how to lay out the work, and so forth. Although Lakatos jokingly boasts that he demolished Feyerabend in his 1973 lectures — 'I delivered my final refutation of everything that you can ever say in your life. I also pointed out that Lucifer denoted the chap who brings false light, while I am *shrouding them in the darkness of truth*.' (Lakatos to Feyerabend, 25 January, 1973: 312-13) — he in fact gives a very sympathetic presentation of Feyerabend's 'epistemological anarchism'.

It is perhaps not surprising that the impression given by the correspondence in *For and Against Method* is that Lakatos has failed to respond to Feyerabend's challenge to distinguish his position from that of the epistemo-

logical anarchist. After all, the letters cover the period when Feyerabend was most involved in writing *Against Method*, (a manuscript was produced in 1972, though Feyerabend continued to redraft after publication — 'final corrections' are announced, for the umpteenth time, in December 1973), whereas Lakatos's reply is much less well formed during most of the time covered. One wonders, though, how much Lakatos's lack of a response is due to a genuine difficulty in answering Feyerabend's charge that his position reduces to anarchism — '[the Devil] may choose the shape of a rationalist from London with a Hungarian accent and *not* the shape of an anarchist from Berkeley with a Viennese accent' (Feyerabend to Lakatos, 15 July, 1971:257).

While there is no evidence that Lakatos would be ready to give up his rationalism, his last letter is a poignant nod to Feyerabend's anarchism. In a postscript in which he announces his decision to discharge himself (against advice) from hospital, he writes, 'The doctors were very amused by my statement that beyond electrocardiogram and X-rays I prefer witchcraft. They will all now read *Against Method*' (Lakatos to Feyerabend, 31 January, 1974: 373).

Poignant moments aside, once one abandons the hope of gleaning much of substance regarding Lakatos's response to Feyerabend from *For and Against Method*, the real attraction of this collection is the sense one gets of the fun the two friends enjoyed in sparring with each other, and in particular in uniting in a teasing contempt for others. Kuhn, for example, is dismissed in Lakatos's lectures as 'really a rather ad hoc footnote to Polanyi and Merton' (30); Ayer's *Language Truth and Logic* is 'a sort of journalistic account on the level of *The Sunday Times* colour supplement, of what was going on in Vienna in those days' (53), and in spite of their clear admiration for Popper, both writers are also quick to produce plenty of irreverent comments about him.

For and Against Method also serves to paint a picture of Lakatos and Feyerabend as people, and as men of their times, engaged in fighting everyday battles of the academic profession (problems with sub-editors, manuscripts going missing, student revolts, and, for Feyerabend, what seem to be constant attacks by John Searle on his position), as well as intellectual battles. It is as men of their times that we see in their letters a somewhat disquieting attitude to the women around them. These two self-confessed womanizers joke about sending each other female graduate students, apparently as playthings. One particularly cringeworthy moment is Lakatos's statement that '[t]he lady was graciously readmitted to the LSE; but this is only for the M.Sc. Her bosom qualifies her for her own M.Sc., but her legs rule her out from the Ph.D.' (Lakatos to Feyerabend, August 1968: 150). Reading this collection as a female graduate student of the 1990s, the book's most lasting impression is not of any great insight into Lakatos and Feyerabend's disagreement, but rather, a renewed appreciation of the women's movement.

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Oliver Leaman
Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy.
New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. ix + 319.
Cdn$90.00: US$60.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-17362-0);
Cdn$25.99: US$17.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-17362-9).

This is a welcome addition to a field of philosophical studies which has been neglected until now, especially by Western philosophers. It is also a very valuable reference text for the non-specialist interested in knowing about Eastern philosophies, their relationship to Eastern thought generally and to Eastern religions in particular. It is written in clear and accessible language, as the author states in his Introduction (x), and this makes for easy reading and understanding. Leaman advises the reader to pursue a 'cross-referencing' approach when reading the text, a useful suggestion, since, not alone does this allow the reader to explore various inter-connected themes but it also reveals the more general philosophical and religious contexts which situate the various issues being considered.

What is extremely interesting is the way in which many Eastern concepts find echoes in Western philosophy, although in culturally different ways, and it is salutary for the Western reader to observe the way in which certain issues have been investigated and argued about in the East long before Western minds felt it necessary to explore these same topics. One striking example of this is to be found in the concept of the self, *atman* (27-30), where a Humean treatment of the topic is anticipated centuries before, by Buddhism. The elusiveness of the sense of self and the illusions involved in self-knowledge, by contrast with the status of the 'real' self as defined by 'permanence, immutability, the absence of suffering, and being unaffected by prior events' (29) in the context of self-abnegation, as the ultimate aim of Buddhists, suggest a much richer picture of self and the role that self-consciousness plays, rather than the account popularised by David Hume. Indeed, there is a strong argument for complementing the latter's treatment of self-identity with the Buddhistic view.

This is only one example of the value of this excellent source book for anyone interested in the rich noetic traditions of the East. The concise and accessible summaries of such texts as Bhagavad Gita, I Ching, and the Chinese philosophies and the interesting position that Islamic philosophical thought occupies in the Eastern and Western traditions, all make for a fascinating and readable compilation of approaches that may be largely unfamiliar to Western contemporary thought, even in the global context of today. This book is a classic of its kind and Leaman is to be congratulated for completing such a successful project that can only enhance philosophic scholarship generally and broaden the horizons of Western philosophers in particular who are sometimes over-confident about the perceived importance of Western philosophy.

It is salutary for all of us, philosophers and the interested public East and West alike, to bear in mind that the longing for the transcendent is not necessarily confined to any one tradition anywhere but inclusively involves everyone who, in Wittgenstein's words (*Culture and Value* 15e) keeps 'stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties which no explanation seems capable of clearing up'.

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Ron Leonard
The Transcendental Philosophy of Franklin Merrell-Wolff.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1999. Pp. xiv + 389.
US$65.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4215-2);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4216-0).

This book addresses the relation between philosophy and mystical experience in the context of a thinker, Franklin Merrell-Wolff (1887-1985), who was both a Harvard-trained philosopher and a mystic. Readers interested in both accounts of mystical experience and the manner in which we can meaningfully philosophize about the same will find this book rewarding. Leonard focuses on Merrell-Wolff's central thesis that, paraphrasing Kant, mysticism without philosophy is blind and philosophy without mysticism is empty. The heart of the book is its analysis of Merrell-Wolff's claim that 'mysticism functions as an inexhaustible source of renewal for philosophy and [shows] the need for philosophy to acknowledge this source' (290). In analyzing this point, Leonard focuses on Merrell-Wolff's claims (1) that there is a primary form of consciousness transcending the subject-object structure of 'everyday' consciousness, (2) that this form of consciousness is exhibited in mystical experience, and (3) that the content of mystical consciousness is a way of knowing that is neither conceptual nor perceptual.

Throughout, Leonard places Merrell-Wolff's thought in its proper conceptual context, his method being one of comparing and contrasting Merrell-Wolff's thought with philosophers from Pythagoras and Plato to Husserl and Sartre. Leonard writes clearly and gracefully, and his ability to make use of a remarkably diverse array of thinkers (from Sartre to Samkara) in discussing Merrell-Wolff is admirable. More detail in his analyses of some of Merrell-Wolff's ideas would be useful, though the nature of the material

certainly poses a formidable obstacle. Of particular interest is the discussion of Merrell-Wolff's initial interest in Kant's 'Copernican revolution' and his claim that a second Copernican revolution must occur; i.e., Kant's focus on the subject merely points the way to mystical realization, a way that is attained only if *both* subject and object are transcended in what Merrell-Wolff calls the 'High Indifference'. Though at times exasperating in its lack of clear argumentation, Leonard does manage to offer tantalizing insights into how the post-Kantian philosopher may make sense of the unconventional claims of mysticism.

Yet, perhaps the most interesting portion of this book is Leonard's discussion of mysticism and language. Leonard offers a nice overview of contemporary approaches to understanding the seeming absurdity of using language to communicate an ineffable experience. Moreover, Leonard's critiques of the approaches of Stace and Katz (among others) are particularly persuasive, and are certainly a resource for the contemporary philosopher of religion. However, Leonard's task of making sense of Merrell-Wolff's own attempt to communicate his mystical experiences, though admirable and often thought-provoking, suffers from a general fault of the book, namely a rather loose use of language. Key terms, e.g., are often introduced and given a gloss that leaves the reader in no small doubt as to precisely what such terms mean.

Leonard's attempt to discuss such difficult issues is indeed admirable; moreover, his discussion is at times remarkably insightful. However, there is an occasional lack of depth and clarity, a problem that may indeed be inevitable given the subject matter. Yet, this is odd for a book that purports to show that something of definite philosophical interest can be said of mystical experience. Nevertheless, Leonard has indeed provided an intellectual history and philosophical analysis of one of America's most renowned mystics.

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Michael P. Lynch
Truth in Context:
An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1998.
Pp. x + 184.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-262-12212-X.

For philosophers interested in notions of conceptual schemes, theories of truth and objectivity, and the realism/antirealism debate, Michael Lynch's *Truth in Context* is certainly an engaging read. It is recommended reading for those who think that there is only one true picture of the world (those who Lynch calls 'absolutists'), or for those who think that Davidson has once and for all closed the door on the intelligibility of the idea of incompatible conceptual schemes. Lynch attempts to develop a theory that has, as its basis, a pluralist metaphysics coupled with a realist theory of truth. This is obviously an ambitious task, and Lynch presents a very persuasive case.

Pluralism is the view that there can be more than one true account of the world. These various true, and possibly incompatible, views of the world are relative to conceptual schemes. Lynch's version of a 'conceptual scheme' differs from what he regards as the two most common models in the literature: the Kantian and Quinean models. The Kantian model treats conceptual schemes as systems of categories that shape our experience of the world. But according to this model, there can only be one conceptual scheme — which, of course, is a denial of pluralism. The Quinean model identifies conceptual schemes with languages, entailing that different conceptual schemes manifest themselves in untranslatable or incommensurable languages. Of course, Davidson has shown that this notion of a conceptual scheme is a non-starter. Lynch's theory, which draws heavily on the work of Wittgenstein and Putnam, finds a middle road between these two models, allowing that there can be multiple, intertranslatable conceptual schemes which have philosophically significant differences. According to his theory, conceptual schemes are identified and demarcated by their basic concepts, these being the foundationalist concepts, or absolute presuppositions, of substance, morality, personal identity, mind, objectivity, space, time, etc. Two schemes differ if they do not share the same basic concepts. Lynch refers to this view as 'relativized Kantianism.'

The central thrust of Lynch's argument is the claim that our concepts are fluid and malleable, not rigid or crystalline as many absolutists hold. Accordingly, different applications of a concept share a family resemblance which allows for the possibility that a concept can be used in incompatible ways while still being that very same concept. Lynch's theory is that many of our basic concepts are both minimal and robust. A minimal concept is '... a way of thinking about something that is neutral with regard to issues about its ontological nature' (68). On the other hand, a robust concept is a way of thinking about something which is an extension of that minimal concept, and does entail a commitment to certain metaphysical theses. Pluralism arises

when two schemes share a minimal concept, but extend that shared concept in ontologically different directions. Lynch argues that we could have two conceptual schemes which share a minimal concept, and are therefore translatable, but would nonetheless have to be regarded as fundamentally distinct schemes because of the difference in their robust concepts.

Armed with the distinction between robust and minimal concepts, Lynch maintains that there can be two true, yet incompatible, accounts of the world. For example, if we were to ask, say, Smith and Johnson to look into a bag and count how many objects they see, we could get two different, and therefore incompatible, answers to the question if they had different robust concepts of 'object.' E.g., if Johnson was a merelogist (one who holds that every pair of objects is itself an object), she would say that there were seven objects when Smith says there are three. Both statements would be true, both would be distinct and incompatible, and both Smith and Johnson would be using the same concept of object (minimally speaking). At the minimal level, they both share a conceptual scheme because they share the same basic concept of 'object' (that which is referred to by the singular terms in true propositions), but at the robust level they occupy different schemes because their robust extensions of this concept differ.

Lynch anticipates a possible objection: it is not the case that Smith's and Johnson's statements are both true (pluralism), but rather that they are both true-relative-to-a-scheme (relativism). In order to show that this objection does not hold, Lynch spends considerable time analyzing various theories of truth, and their relation to the debate between pluralists, absolutists and relativists. Making use of the distinction between minimal and robust concepts, Lynch argues that different theories of truth, e.g., epistemic, deflationary, correspondence, etc., are robust extensions, with the accompanying metaphysical implications, of a shared minimal conception that we find in all conceptual schemes. This minimal conception of truth, which Lynch calls 'minimal realism', is a close ally of Tarski's T-schema. It states: '*The proposition that p is true if, and only if, things are as the proposition p says they are*' (126).

There are, however, at least two significant problems with Lynch's thesis that pluralism can be coupled with a realist theory of truth.

First, if the minimal concept of truth must 'float free' of all metaphysical commitments, as in the case of the minimal concepts of 'object', we should avoid calling it a 'realist' theory, as realism is clearly a commitment to a certain metaphysical position. Of course, if this objection holds, then Lynch's thesis that pluralism is consistent with realism about truth should be replaced with the thesis that pluralism is consistent with minimalism about truth, but, unfortunately, that is hardly as exciting.

Second, Lynch's argument that Smith's and Johnson's statements can be both true, incompatible, distinct, yet non-equivocal may seem to be the result of a slight of hand. In order for all four conditions to be met at the same time, we have to switch back and forth between minimal and robust, shared and distinct conceptual schemes; they cannot all be met in the same conceptual

scheme. In a conceptual scheme where the basic concept of 'object' is minimal, Smith and Johnson unequivocally share that same concept; but then their respective statements cannot both be true. They can only both be true when we move to their distinct conceptual schemes containing the robust extensions of the concept 'object', but now they are no longer sharing the same concept!

Despite these shortcomings, Lynch's analysis of the Kantian, Quinean, and Wittgensteinian models of conceptual schemes, and the distinction he proposes between minimal and robust concepts, enhances the existent philosophical literature and provides a genuine contribution to our understanding of pluralism and the relationship between concepts and the world.

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David MacGregor
Hegel and Marx After the Fall of Communism.
Cardiff: University of Wales Press 1998.
Pp. xviii + 246.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7083-1429-5);
US$25.00 (paper: ISBN 0-7083-1430-9).

William L. McBride
Philosophical Reflections on the Changes in Eastern Europe.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1999.
Pp. viii + 139.
US$68.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8797-X);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8798-8).

Both David MacGregor and William McBride bring a philosopher's perspective to their reflections on the fall of the so-called Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Despite a number of shared topics, including the nature and importance of civil society, philosophy's role in politics, and political/philosophical conversion, their books differ markedly in their agendas. MacGregor uses the changes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as an object lesson pointing us toward a reevaluation of Hegel's political philosophy. McBride's agenda is both more concrete and less focused. Reading more like a collection of essays, his book takes on a variety of themes all connected in some way with his long standing personal/political/philosophical interest in Eastern Europe, an interest that began with a 1960 motorcycle journey through Yugoslavia, and has included extensive travel in the area as well as substantial engagement with East European

intellectuals ever since. In fact, much of his book was written while living in Bulgaria.

MacGregor hopes to rescue what is of value in Marx by finding it in a somewhat different setting in Hegel. He bemoans the fact that recent years have seen a near abandonment of Hegel to the right wing. While in the 1960s and 1970s an Hegelianized Western Marxism flourished, the 1980s and 1990s saw the growth of an anti-Hegelian 'analytic Marxism' as well as, and more dramatically, an anti-Hegelian, anti-totalizing postmodernism. MacGregor's own position is reflected in his approving quotation of Errol Harris: 'My contention is that had Marx understood Hegel aright he would have found in him much that he was seeking, including a basis for socialism that would not have led his followers astray into totalitarian repression of human liberty.'

MacGregor proceeds by arguing for a fundamental unity in Hegel's writings. He does this by arguing that Hegel was rarely free to state his views. Consequently, Hegel's political philosophy can, according to MacGregor, best be understood through what he did not publish, specifically the *Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science*, delivered in 1818-19 prior to a crackdown on academic life, but only discovered in the 1980s. MacGregor relies heavily on these lectures to make sense of Hegel's published work.

The first chapters of MacGregor's book are weaker than the rest. He attempts to deal with Marx's relationship to Hegel. But, he mainly contrasts the *interpretations* of this relationship given by Engels and Lukács. Though Engels's account is often dismissed as simplistic, MacGregor sees it as helpful, arguing that Engels correctly identifies a Hegel concerned with progressive politics and a Marx who consistently employs Hegelian themes. The weakness of Engels's approach, for MacGregor, is that he ignored 'the social and economic factors underlying Hegel's theory and omitt(ed) the concept of freedom' (10). Lukács, in contrast, correctly discerned Marxian themes in Hegel's early works but mistakenly endorsed the widely held view that Hegel abandoned these ideas in his maturity. This leads to a very poor argument in which MacGregor tries to rebut Lukács's two Hegels view along with Althusser's two Marxs view (where an 'epistemological break' separates the early Hegelian Marx from the later scientific one) by appealing to Hegel's account of life's stages. MacGregor begins: 'The idea that a crisis in the form of an epistemological break marked the development of both Marx and Hegel is based on the psychological argument that as people get older they turn away from their youthful ideals' (41). This seems wrong. Lukács and Althusser base their arguments on the *texts* (interpreted rightly or wrongly) of Hegel and Marx. MacGregor's extensive account of Hegel's understanding of youth and maturity is beside the larger point.

Things become more interesting as MacGregor pursues his interpretation of Hegel and argues for its contemporary relevance. The former Soviet bloc has, according to MacGregor, been a place of extremes. Prior to the fall, we saw the abolition of private property through state ownership, while afterward, there was an almost complete transition to the market. Here is where Hegel can be of use. The major difference between Hegel and Marx, according

to MacGregor is that Hegel didn't seek to abolish private property or eliminate the market. Ultimately private property is needed to limit state power: 'The former Soviet Union had a fine constitution but it was unenforceable in the absence of a source of private power that could compete with the awesome might of the state' (119). But neither Hegel nor MacGregor are supporters of an unbridled market. In fact, for Hegel, civil servants are the embodiment of the universal. Through this class, individual and common interest come together. Marx, of course, ridicules this notion, proposing that the proletariat can better serve this purpose. MacGregor defends Hegel's idea, arguing that the educated middle classes (Alvin Gouldner's 'New Class') have deep attachments to local, state, and federal governments and are the source of much that is progressive on the road to the Hegelian realization of freedom. This, he claims, is the real counterforce to the business class.

MacGregor also proposes a reading of paragraph 62 of the *Philosophy of Right* (for which he argues in other works) in which 'the absolute contradiction between the property rights of the worker and those of the employer can only be mediated ... by the rise of the democratic corporation in civil society, which institutionalizes the rights of both parties' (159). MacGregor sees very limited instantiations of this progressive Hegelian vision in the most advanced welfare states of post-War Europe and theoretically in some versions of market socialism.

MacGregor's progressive Hegel is interesting. However, in opting for Hegel and private property over Marx and social ownership, MacGregor too easily assumes that the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union was attributable to a lack of private property, rather than to a lack of democracy. This is a point that would need to be substantially argued in order to justify his return to Hegel.

Democracy is a major theme of McBride's. He too is interested in the ways that this category intersects with the economic. The fall of the so-called Communist states, while bringing certain sorts of freedoms of speech and assembly, has also brought a harsh, market oriented culture which is undermining of democracy: 'If *the market* were as omniscient and omnipotent as its cultists pretend, it could and of course would establish its hegemony without any serious or lasting opposition. But in order to work, market mechanisms need to be *imposed* on sectors of daily life wherever they are not already in place' (32). In the early days after the fall, McBride tells us, it was possible to hear the brutal Pinochet regime of Chile referred to favorably for its forced imposition of market mechanisms.

McBride is biting in his criticism of this ideologically driven free-market liberalism. Describing the status of pensioners under conditions of rapid inflation combined with the advice from Western experts to regard noninterference in people's lives as a major virtue, he says sarcastically: 'the smaller the pension relative to the actual value of the currency, the less interference there will be in the pensioners' freedom to choose between scrounging for food, clothing, and shelter, on the one hand, and starving, on the other' (27). Also, according to McBride, instead of a growth of the institutions of civil society, sources of local power are all too often undermined by the strength

of transnational corporations, while such public goods as education, healthcare, and transportation deteriorate. Though invoking Marxism in Eastern Europe ranges from unfashionable to dangerous, McBride, unlike MacGregor, asserts that as regards an examination of this region, 'Marx's philosophy ... is an extremely rich lode — probably the richest our global culture currently possesses — from which to mine intellectual resources for such an examination' (72).

Ultimately, however, McBride seeks less to propose and more to describe and analyze the actual conditions, thoughts, and feelings of the people of Eastern Europe, including the intellectuals he has known. In the end this is the most fascinating part of the book written (self-consciously) from the perspective of an informed outsider. In fact, one suspects that McBride could offer more than he does in this very short book. Of particular interest is his discussion of philosophical and political conversions. There seems, says McBride, to have been a massive shift in fundamental beliefs amongst a whole range of people. However, McBride, relying upon his long engagement with Sartrian philosophy, uses the categories of faith and bad faith to analyze both the shifts and continuities of a variety of types populating the East European landscape. Included are discussions of philosophers well known in the West such as Leszek Kolakowski and Mihailo Markovic. In both cases McBride emphasizes continuities in their work.

McBride concludes by reflecting on the renewed emphasis on nationalism, religion, and family in Eastern Europe. While nationalism can be brutal, McBride argues for a cosmopolitanism in which the idea and concrete reality of the nation can be preserved. This is particularly important in the face of the 'despotic transnationalism' of giant corporations. McBride calls this a kind of American nationalism (109) which will continue to give justification to other nationalisms. The role of religion is also, according to McBride, double-edged. While there are dangerous signs of church and state coming together, religion can also provide resources for the spirit in these times of the new materialism. On this latter point, McBride also looks to the family and a variety of other human relationships.

That McBride has to work so hard to find the slightest bit of hope is indicative of his admitted pessimism, which he compares to that of Herbert Marcuse at the end of *One Dimensional Man*. This, of course, is in marked contrast to MacGregor's Hegelian optimism in which recent history is seen as providing the necessary education to allow us to move into the future. However, McBride also looks to the future. While telling us that he refuses 'to engage in idle chatter about hope,' he does in the end look to the critical spirit of philosophy (Marx's 'ruthless criticism of everything existing') which is still available to those who seek 'to transcend the new materialism' within Eastern Europe (131).

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Eric Margolis and **Stephen Laurance, eds.**
Concepts: Core Readings.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1999.
Pp. x + 652.
US$100.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-13353-9);
US$40.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-63193-8).

This excellent anthology introduces, at an intermediate level, philosophical and empirical work on concepts, within the framework of cognitive science. I recommend it very highly indeed.

Let me begin by noting what the book is *not* about. It isn't really about the ontological status of concepts: i.e. the question whether concepts are abstract non-linguistic things (e.g., Fregean functions), abstract linguistic things (e.g., natural language predicates), mental entities, behavioral capacities, or what-have-you. This topic is touched upon, both in the Introduction and within some of the selections. But it is not a central focus. Instead, the volume essentially takes as given that concepts are mental representations. Some philosophers may lament this. But my own view is that there definitely is a place for a volume which considers the various theories of concepts within the broad cognitive science camp. And that is precisely what this book is about: the question of what the best theory of concepts is, within the cognitive science perspective — largely putting aside metaphysical questions about concepts that fall outside this purview.

Part One includes readings within, and responses to, both the Classical Theory and the Prototype Theory. According to the former, lexical concepts are (crudely speaking) definitions, which state both necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept's application to an external object. Readings about the Classical Theory include a selection from Plato's *Euthyphro*, plus a selection from (among others) Jerrold Katz, as well as critiques in the form of Quine's 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' and excerpts from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. This latter reading leads directly to the second positive theory of concepts. According to the Prototype Theory, lexical concepts typically only encode properties which satisfiers of it stereotypically possess. No necessary and sufficient conditions here. Rather, satisfying a concept is a matter of having a sufficient number of features, where some features may be weighted more heavily than others. Thus the concept BIRD might contain the features FLIES, SMALL, SINGS, LAYS EGGS, even though some birds are large, flightless and silent. The volume includes three classic papers which propose this sort of view, one each by Putnam, Rosch and Smith & Medin. It also includes several articles critical of this approach, including the much-cited 'What Some Concepts Might Not Be', by Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman.

Part Two of the volume covers genuinely contemporary work. The four theories presented are: the Neo-Classical theory, the Theory-theory, Conceptual Atomism, and Dual Theories. The Neo-Classical theory, exemplified here by Jackendoff's 'What Is a Concept, That a Person May Grasp It?', holds

that lexical concepts are *partial definitions*, which state necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for application. Theory-theories suppose that, like theoretical terms in science, the nature of a concept is determined by its place within a larger mental theory. This sort of view is represented, in the volume, by Susan Carey's seminal work. Conceptual Atomism, a view closely associated with Jerry Fodor and other information-theoretic semanticists, holds that lexical concepts are primitive, and have no structure: neither definitional, prototypical, or what-have-you. According to the Atomist, the entry for BIRD, for example, says that BIRD applies to birds. Period. Finally, Dual Theories are those which combine features of more than one approach, possibly by contrasting a conceptual core from an associated periphery of ancillary information. (E.g., one might suppose that a concept's core is best captured by a Neo-Classical theory, while its periphery contains, a la prototype theory, information about stereotypical cases.)

As I've said, the central theme of the text is: which of these is the best theory of concepts, within the cognitive science perspective? Space does not permit presentation here of the very many arguments back and forth, between the six aforementioned camps. However, to give some flavour of the debates, let me follow the authors and list three concerns about Prototype Theory. (I don't mean to pick on Prototype Theory, particularly. It simply provides quite clear example objections, which can be stated in relatively few words.) First, that agents are disposed to respond differentially to stereotypical features of, say, birds does not *per se* support the conclusion that BIRD has prototype structure — because, as Armstrong, Gleitman and Gleitman discovered experimentally, even well-defined concepts like EVEN NUMBER exhibit 'typicality effects.' It turns out that, to pick a simple example, 8 is a 'more typical' even number than 46 is. But surely this doesn't suggest that EVEN NUMBER is merely a cluster of stereotypical features of its satisfiers. Second, as Jerry Fodor has urged, many concepts lack prototypes. Thus NON-CAT is a perfectly fine concept, but there is no prototypical non-cat. So not all concepts can be prototypes. Third, as Fodor and Lepore have noted, the prototypes of complex concepts are not compositionally determined by the prototypes of their constituents. To cite their now famous example, the prototypical pet fish is probably something like a goldfish, whereas the prototypical pet is a cat/dog, and the prototypical fish would be a trout or some such. Since concepts must compose, and prototypes don't compose, concepts can't be prototypes. Of course these critiques of the prototype theory don't come close to ending the debate. Again, I introduce them merely to give a sense of the sorts of considerations, experimental and otherwise, which are brought to bear on the question of which theory of concepts is best.

I should also clarify that, though this 'What's the best theory?' question is the central theme of the book, it isn't the only one. Other themes which emerge include: historical issues; philosophical scepticism about concepts; concepts as abilities (and Peacocke's related idea of defining concepts in terms of 'possession conditions'); conceptual change; the metasemantics of

concepts (i.e., how concepts come to have whatever content they do); and, the nature of children's concepts.

Having described what the book is about, and its basic structure, let me turn at last to evaluation. In a word, this is a terrific volume. The Introduction, about 75 pages long, is exceedingly clear and insightful. Pedagogically speaking, it is without doubt the best thing I have read on concepts. It is very student-friendly, usefully summarizing each of the competing theories in a box. (It also summarizes all major criticisms of each theory in the same way. A very wise idea.) With respect to the selection of papers, this too is very well done. On the whole, the papers presuppose relatively little background. And yet they manage to illustrate how a whole exciting array of disparate philosophical and empirical work bears on the nature of concepts. Indeed, what the volume manages to highlight very nicely is the growing overlap between philosophy and empirical work in cognitive science, with influences running in both directions. The coverage, given the emphasis of the volume, is excellent: as Steven Pinker says in a blurb on the back, it 'has all the great papers on concepts.' Undoubtedly any given instructor will want to add one or two of their favourites, if not included here. But, granting the general cognitive science perspective, these really are, as the title suggests, the 'core readings' on concepts.

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Joseph Margolis
What, After All, Is a Work of Art?
University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press 1999. Pp. xi + 143.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01865-8);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01866-6).

This book is the outcome of a series of lectures on art-related topics that Margolis gave in various places, including Finland, Russia, Japan and the USA, from 1995 through 1997. These lectures vividly distill views which Margolis has developed more fully elsewhere. As his readers know, Margolis has an unusually all-encompassing and closely integrated series of views on almost all of the main issues concerning both art and philosophy generally. Thus the task of a reviewer of this book is that of finding something succinct to say on the full sweep of Margolis's philosophy as encapsulated by these lectures.

First, a brief summary of the topics covered by the lectures. In the Prologue, 'Beneath and Beyond the Modernism/Postmodernism Debate', Margolis argues that the debate confronts us with a bogus choice, which should be avoided using the path laid out by his own general views. Chapter 1, 'The History of Art After the End of Art', discusses the views of Clement Greenberg and Arthur Danto on the topic. Margolis finds the positions of both writers to be undermined by the invalidity of their views about the nature of art. Chapter 2, 'Relativism and Cultural Relativity', defends Margolis's own characteristic, constructivist brand of relativism against opposing non-relativist positions.

Chapter 3 is the title lecture, 'What, After All, Is a Work of Art?', in which Margolis explains and defends his own definition of art, according to which artworks are physically embodied and culturally emergent entities. A pivotal issue is his view that the intentional attributes of artworks are not determinate prior to interpretation, but instead that they are determinable through, or as a result of, interpretation. This enables Margolis to allow (with the aid of his rejection of a bivalent logic) for the possibility of incongruent interpretations of what is numerically one and the same artwork, and hence to reject views such as those of Beardsley and Hirsch, who deny such a possibility.

Chapter 4, 'Mechanical Reproduction and Cinematic Humanism', is the most specific and thought-provoking lecture in the book. Margolis offers various perceptive criticisms and alternate offerings on prominent views on cinematic art, including those of Walter Benjamin, Panofsky, and Krackauer. And the book closes with an Epilogue in which the author gathers up some main threads in his views.

My comments on Margolis's views will focus on two critical issues arising from the book which arguably are serious areas of vulnerability, or at least are in need of much further discussion.

First, Margolis is purporting to tell us what a work of art is, or to provide a definition of art. Admittedly he is not attempting to provide an essentialist definition that is immune to historical revision, but any kind of definition should at least tell us both what works of art have in common with other similar things, and how they differ from other such things. (Both the *genus* and *differentia* of art should be provided.) Yet Margolis, while very richly illustrating how art is closely related to other human and intentional activities, has almost nothing to say about how artworks as a class differ from other classes of entities. To be sure, Margolis can be very perceptive in, for example, distinguishing the medium of film from other art media, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. But he tells us nothing at all about ways in which artworks in general might differ from the objects of other human, intentional activities (such as science textbooks). Absent such an account, the definitional part of his project must be judged as at best significantly incomplete, for Margolis says nothing about what is specifically *artistic* about artworks.

My second major concern about Margolis's overall project is as follows. In many of his writings, including this book, he makes much use of the idea that various pervasive aspects of intentional or cultural concerns (including art)

require a many-valued rather than a bivalent logic (chapters 2 and 3 are most relevant to this issue). I do not deny that this may be true, but Margolis's descriptions of his supposed multi-valent logic are so vague and programmatic that he gives us virtually nothing to go on in appraising his suggestion. Moreover, his motivation for introducing this specific line of solution to problems in criticism is very unclear. Certainly, everyone can agree that there is an initial theoretical problem, in that (for example) there do seem to be equally good but apparently contradictory interpretations of some artworks. Nevertheless, several other ways of handling such problems come readily to mind, and do not require Margolis's extravagant hypothesis of a non-standard logical structure for artworks.

For example, a meta-level, consistent analysis could be given, as follows: it is true that interpretation A can be given to artwork X, and it is true that interpretation B can be given to the same artwork. But that statement is consistent whether or not interpretations A and B are contradictory with each other. Hence the apparent problem dissolves. Another approach, strangely neglected by Margolis, would use the distinction between aptness and truth (the neglect is strange because Margolis himself uses the distinction to suggest 'apt' as one of the additional values for his supposed logic [50]). If aptness and truth are indeed distinct concepts, then there is nothing to prevent two interpretations of an artwork being equally apt, even if those same interpretations are also contradictory. Hence again, the supposed problem is unproblematic after all, and no non-standard logical structure is needed.

To conclude, my overall view of this very stimulating book is not that Margolis is wrong about art, but instead that he simply has not yet articulated a complete philosophy of art (in spite of his voluminous writings), nor offered sufficiently thorough arguments against the virtues of more economical hypotheses about art and intentionality.

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Mathieu Marion
Wittgenstein, Finitism, and the Foundations of Mathematics.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1998. Pp. xx + 260.
Cdn$100.00: US$65.00. ISBN 0-19-823516-X.

This is an important book in the ongoing reevaluation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, which should be read by Wittgenstein scholars and philosophers of mathematics alike. It is well known that Wittgenstein's ideas on mathematics were initially received quite negatively. Marion reminds us of the harsh reviews the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* received on its initial publication. Even sympathetic critics like Michael Dummett accused Wittgenstein of failure to understand technical issues in higher mathematics and logic, particularly regarding Gödel's theorems. The initial response by Wittgenstein scholars was simply to ignore Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and focus on his ideas about mind and language. The strange editing of Wittgenstein's remarks on mathematics and the long period of time when access to his unpublished work was limited did not help the situation. Over the past couple decades, however, scholars have begun to take Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics more seriously. Stuart Shanker, for instance, in *Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics*, has argued that Wittgenstein's remarks on Gödel need to be understood in the context of his critique of the foundationalist enterprise in mathematics in general. Marion's book contributes to this movement by showing how Wittgenstein's ideas carefully responded to the foundational issues of his day. In his pursuit of this project, Marion does not shy away from ascribing specific theses to Wittgenstein, despite Wittgenstein's much quoted remark that philosophy should advance no theses. As a result, he is able to portray Wittgenstein as a rigorous thinker philosophers of mathematics should pay attention to.

Marion focuses on the early and middle Wittgenstein, although three chapters at the end touch on aspects of the later Wittgenstein. One of Marion's broad goals for his treatment of Wittgenstein's early and middle philosophy of mathematics is to place it in the context of a larger tradition he labels *intensionalism* or the *algorithmic viewpoint*. Intensionalism has its roots in the reaction to the expansion of the notion of a function in the 19th century. Mathematicians such as Dirichlet had begun to call anything a function if it returned a unique value for every object in its domain. This lead to people thinking of a function as being at heart a set of ordered pairs. Kronecker, among others, opposed this movement, claiming that a legitimate function must contain a rule for transforming its input into its output. Marion thinks of the belief that functions are essentially ordered pairs as emphasizing the extension of a function, while the rule-based view emphasizes its intension. The intensionalist view persists in the 20th century in the form of Church's ●-calculus. Marion argues that when Wittgenstein makes claims

like 'In mathematics *everything* is algorithm and *nothing* is meaning' he is expressing his allegiance to this movement. He also draws some fascinating parallels between Wittgenstein's ideas on the relationship between a proof and the prose that surrounds it and similar ideas in Kronecker.

Marion's specific treatment of the early Wittgenstein builds on the interpretation of the *Tractatus* given by Pasquale Frascolla in his *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics*. Marion points out ways in which, on this interpretation, the *Tractatus* treatment of operations prefigures the ●-calculus. He also described the intensionalist twist the *Tractatus* puts on Russell's treatment of quantifiers and the roots of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the *Principia Mathematica* in the ideas of Poincaré.

Marion offers two chapters specifically on the middle Wittgenstein. The first, more interesting chapter focuses on the role of Wittgenstein's ideas on quantification and inductive proof in his rejection of the system of the *Tractatus* around the time of his return to Cambridge in 1929. The *Tractatus* treated quantifiers as strings of conjunctions or disjunctions. After 1929, Wittgenstein came to believe that quantified sentences are not proper judgments at all but rules for generating judgments. Marion traces this move to Wittgenstein's conversations with Frank Ramsey, as well as Weyl's paper 'Über die neue Grundlagenkriese der Mathematik'. Wittgenstein similarly came to view inductive proofs as prooflike templates for generating proper proofs. Here Marion draws the connection to the primitive recursive arithmetic developed by Skolem and argues, *pace* Shanker, that Wittgenstein was very much in agreement with Skolem's finitism. The second chapter on the middle Wittgenstein gives an overview of the changes in Wittgenstein's whole philosophy from 1929 through the writing of the Blue and Brown Books. His account is not earth shaking. He discusses the color exclusion problem and the growing awareness of the multiplicity of logical forms. To a large degree, he follows the account given by Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka.

The final three chapters, which talk about both the middle and late Wittgensteins, focus on Wittgenstein's relationship to finitism and intuitionism. Wittgenstein has been described as a friend of both, and Marion's task is to sort out the ways that this is and isn't true. Marion argues that Wittgenstein came to many of the same conclusions as the intuitionists, including the belief that the meaning of a mathematical statement is determined by its proof and that the law of the excluded middle has only limited applicability. Wittgenstein's motivations for these views, however, were very different than the motivations of Brouwer and others. For instance, Brouwer thought that there was something special about infinite domains that ruled out the use of the law of the excluded middle. For Wittgenstein, the problem came from the nature of mathematical proof itself. The law of the excluded middle cannot apply where there is no effective decision procedure. Marion also argues that Wittgenstein was a finitist, but not a strict finitist. Roughly, a finitist denies the legitimacy of any mathematical statements that require an actual infinity. Wittgenstein's agreement with the intuitionists qualifies him as a finitist. Moreover, Wittgenstein's concern for the continuum make

no sense unless you assume he is a finitist. On the other hand, a strict finitist extends worries about infinite sets to very large finite numbers like $67^{257^{729}}$, to take Bernays' example. Such numbers are simply too huge to ever be physically instantiated, calculated as Arabic numerals, or grasped mentally. Dummett has claimed that Wittgenstein's remarks about surveyability indicate a sympathy to strict finitism. Marion argues that this interpretation is not consistent with the correct understanding of Wittgenstein's view of rules, and that the passages Dummett quotes really only support ordinary finitism.

Wittgenstein was, throughout his life, a romantic writer. To my mind, romantic writers are always best served by rationalist commentators, and rationalist writers by romantic commentators. A commentator on Wittgenstein needs to impose order, to help the reader see the patterns in the remarks that keep circling back, approaching the same ideas from a different angle. Marion serves Wittgenstein well by attributing theses to him, and by showing how these theses relate to positions held by thinkers of a more rationalist bent. There are flaws to this book, however. It lacks a unifying thesis or theme. Marion says that he is simply trying to make connections between Wittgenstein and other philosophers of mathematics, but the connections are scattered and disorganized. Also, Marion takes almost no philosophical stances in his own voice and almost never challenges the arguments he gives in Wittgenstein's voice. This is a problem because many of Wittgenstein's claims, such as the idea that the meaning of a mathematical statement lies in its proof, are open to obvious objections. A better book on Wittgenstein would avoid mirroring his wide-ranging, seemingly unfocussed writing style, and be willing to argue with him. The task of understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics has just begun.

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Christopher Morris, ed.
The Social Contract Theorists.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1999. Pp. xiv + 244.
US$57.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8906-9);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8907-7).

This is a collection of twelve previously published modern essays on Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau by well-known commentators on social contract theory. The editor says that his aim is to help students reading these texts for the first time, but it is unlikely these sophisticated essays will help many first-time readers. The collection, however, will certainly be useful to advanced students, both undergraduate and graduate, engaged in sustained study of Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau. It will be useful to scholars and teachers, who will appreciate having all these pieces under one cover.

Three of the essays on Hobbes challenge essential elements of his theory. Gregory Kavka argues that Hobbes failed to show that the state of nature must be a state of war. This is because defensive coalitions in the state of nature are more rational than anticipatory violence. Jean Hampton claims that Hobbesean people could not erect an unlimited sovereign. Such sovereignty requires the surrender to the sovereign of one's 'private' right to interpret the law of nature, but in keeping the right to disobey the sovereign when one's self-preservation is endangered, private judgment is retained in a way fatal to Hobbes's project. M.M. Goldsmith holds that Hobbes fails to show there must be one single, undivided sovereign — although there must be a final decider for any social issue, it doesn't have to be the same person or group in every case.

These essays go to the heart of Hobbes's views — his reasons for thinking that the state is necessary, and that there needs to be an unlimited and single sovereign. The critics, however, retain their admiration for Hobbes. He asked the right questions, he saw the divergence between individual and collective rationality, he realized how the state was a solution to the problem of conflict. While they reject Hobbes's solution, Kavka and Hampton remain convinced that a *Hobbesean* theory of the state is the most promising.

Comparing Hobbes and Locke on God, David Gauthier argues that Locke's political theory is dependent on religious premises while Hobbes's is not, and they consequently represent the difference between religious and secular ethics. Their theoretical differences about God lead to differences, he argues, on the substance of morality: many 'plain duties' Locke puts forward cannot be defended on Hobbes's scheme. Many philosophers want Locke's substantive morality on Hobbesean secular premises but he is skeptical that such a 'middle way' can be found.

Two essays by A. John Simmons raise issues about the role of consent in Locke. Simmons believes that Locke's state of nature has been misunderstood as a state without effective government. Rather, a person is in a state of nature with respect to others when she hasn't voluntarily agreed to join

into political community with them. Thus children and insane people remain in a state of nature with regard to the state they live in. Given this *moral* understanding of the state of nature, it can exist under different social circumstances and thus, according to Simmons, Locke is not inconsistent when at times he makes the state of nature peaceful, at other times violent. In another essay, Simmons argues for taking seriously the Lockean idea that people have political obligations only when they have actually consented to government. He argues that modern hypothetical consent theories are only superficially consent theories and ultimately rest justification not on consent but on whether governments are 'sufficiently just, good, useful or responsive' (134). A third essay on Locke, by Joshua Cohen, considers whether free and equal people in the state of nature could consent to a state in which the franchise and eligibility for office is restricted to property owners. Locke seemed to hold this and Cohen argues that it could be in the interest of the propertyless to agree to a class state. He doubts, however, that this is so in a modern capitalist society with large-scale industry and so concludes that a *Lockean* theory is more compatible, in modern conditions, with a democratic state that grants the right of political participation to all.

Interestingly, the essays on Locke are not as critical as those on Hobbes. They tend to defend Locke against misinterpretations, trying to show that his theory does not founder in fairly obvious ways. Not so for Rousseau. The essays raise fundamental issues. Patrick Riley argues that Rousseau attempts to fuse two incompatible outlooks. The modern voluntarist view involves self-interested people agreeing on a state for self-protection. The ancient perfectionist view involves 'a common good' state in which individual well-being is found in community. The General Will is supposed to unite these — a common good state based on individual will or consent. But self-interested individuals cannot agree on the common good state. That agreement requires a change in their nature which presupposes the existence of a state. And once a common good state in which individual fulfillment comes through community exists, individual consent is unnecessary. The General Will is a hopeless attempt to achieve incompatible aims.

Two other essays embrace Riley's dilemma. John Charvet agrees with Riley that the contractarian perspective assumes self-interested people out to promote their ends. But people need to be able to decide whether the constitutional sovereign actually expresses the General Will. If their motivation is self-interest, they will continue to obey because of the dangers of disobedience. If they are moved to rebel it can only be on moral grounds, but that requires a perspective different from the self-interested one they brought to the contract. So the ability to rebel depends on psychological premises which undercuts the fundamental contractual situation. Arthur Ripstein believes that the contract must be dispensed with. A society for Rousseau is fundamentally a group of people who are committed to a certain common life and have achieved a consensus on fundamental values and procedures for making decisions. Ripstein uses this to suggest interesting interpretations of what Rousseau has in mind by the claim that people are

forced to be free when compelled to obey the law and how people who lose a majority vote can be said to be mistaken. But none of this, Ripstein says, has much to do with individuals making a social contract.

There is no overriding theme unifying these essays, but they raise fundamental issues in the understanding of the social contract theorists and will repay serious reflection.

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G. Felicitas Munzel
Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The 'Critical' Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1999.
Pp. xxii + 377.
US$53.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-55133-4);
US$26.00 (paper: ISBN 0-226-55134-2).

This is an excellent work which approaches Kant's thought from an important new perspective that can no longer be ignored. Munzel synthesizes all the current work in this area, demonstrates its vital significance for a proper understanding of Kant's Critical Philosophy, and seeks to stimulate additional similar investigations. Her basic intention is to demonstrate the synthetic unity of Kant's work by displaying the essential links between the epistemological and moral aspects of the Critical Philosophy on the one hand and the anthropological framework which they presuppose and ultimately require for their concrete fulfillment. Other writers have recently recognized that the anthropological dimension of Kant's thought is an essential component of his Critical scheme (3, 37). Kant himself acknowledged this relationship at times, but those writers who prefer to exaggerate the abstract purity of the transcendental perspective have long resisted any acknowledgment of content that would breathe life into the system.

The entry point chosen for this display is the accepted central role of morality in Kant's work. Because it is the acknowledged purpose for which he undertook his Critical enterprise, the essential elements which both support and fulfill the moral dimension of his thought provide a sure guide to an understanding of how it is to be interpreted. In this interpretation, the concept of a 'counterimage' provides an important link between the empirical world of nature and the intelligible world of morality. It permits Kant to emphasize both that it must be our intention to bring about the actual states

of affairs first grasped as the moral design of reason, and that we must do this consistently if we are to achieve moral character.

In order to give concrete expression to moral design, i.e., to create its counterimage in the world of physical nature, we must coordinate the motivational aspects of our mental world with the physical environment within which we exist. In simplistic terms, this might be said to be Kant's way of dealing with the mind-body problem. But, of course, Kant would merely smile at our perversity in creating a problem by applying a label which in fact begs the question. What Munzel makes clear is that we must recognize the importance of the necessary synthetic unity of causality as the mental and physical aspects of its implementation are not just coordinated but in fact merged into a single realization or fulfillment in the effect (93). Kant is emphasizing the creative role of reason in producing a synthesis of intellectual and physical elements, the unity of which fulfills the highest potential of the human being. Just as in Plato's analogy of the divided line, the Good once recognized not only permits us to see more clearly the significance of our antecedently acquired 'knowledge' of reality, it actually transforms that reality into a totally new dimension which reveals the ultimate unity (the consistency and coherence) of the physical, moral and aesthetic components of human experience.

The title of Munzel's work should lead us to anticipate the direction of argument here. The consistent and prolonged imposition of moral design upon a purely neutral physical order is the means by which we work toward moral character which may simply be called 'good will' (23, n. 3). This is the ultimate goal toward which Kant intends to lead us, and it must not be taken as an abstract goal for humanity. It is rather the concrete achievement required of each individual person. This personal dimension permits us to recognize several essential ingredients which must play a role, either in the advancement of the particular moral acts which promote character development, or in the pedagogical framework through which this development is stimulated and nurtured.

That morality is the sole *factum* of pure reason is elucidated by showing it to be (not a mere fact, but) the *activity* of reason (87) — indeed, one might well say the exploit or achievement of reason. This helps us to focus on the process centered in the individual, struggling to actualize the form of morality among the non-moral structures of categorially constituted nature. It is then possible to see Kant's Critical Philosophy as a project within which the unity of consciousness and the unity of experience merely provide the rough framework within which the true vocation of the human being can be discerned: the unification of moral and aesthetic fulfillment in 'Character'. And we are helped to appreciate the hierarchy of maxims (57) which must govern this process within the individual to ensure that there is never a conflict of duty.

It was William H. Werkmeister who pointed out (*Kant: The Architectonic and Development of His Philosophy* [Open Court 1980], 195) that in his *Opus postumum* Kant conceived of the human being as the sole entity in reality

capable of bringing together the disparate elements of physical nature and the divine in a unified and harmonious grasp which fulfills the purpose of creation. Munzel has helped us to see how this insight is to be understood, and indeed how it is to be realized. This perfection of humanity is not a gift granted us by nature, but a mere possibility to be achieved through out own activity (108). The fulfillment of character is the only essential task which each human being must undertake; and in this single concept (properly understood) we are able to see how the epistemological, moral and aesthetic dimensions of the human being can be harmonized in order to achieve that fulfillment. The reconsideration of Kant's anthropological commitment permits us to recognize that his concern is not merely to display morality as a formally possible option, but rather to provide a detailed account of how an individual may realistically hope to attain the unity and integrity of personal fulfillment.

There is too much detail in this volume to capture in a simple review (certainly the pedagogical and political implications have been ignored), but its general impact should be readily recognized. Perhaps its primary contribution is to demonstrate conclusively that there *is* an essential unity to Kant's thought. The massive scholarly apparatus is therefore justified in the face of so many traditional complaints that Kant's work is incoherent, often contradictory, and burdened by an architectonic which is clumsy and unsuccessful as a unifying scheme. There is genuine pleasure in viewing Kant as formal and precise, and yet deeply committed to the complete presentation of his vision of the human moral agent as a concrete entity.

In effect, then, this work shows us how and why the system of Kant — warts and all — is worth the game. In large measure, Munzel has satisfied the anticipations of readers stimulated by a broad range of contributions to Kant scholarship in recent years. Her synthesis of these elements, and her own unique statement of its implications, are extremely well-planned and executed. It has been a long time since the seeds of this insight were first sown, and the harvest is most welcome. This is essential reading for every serious Kant scholar.

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Julien S. Murphy, ed.
Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Paul Sartre.
University Park: Pennsylvania State 1999.
Pp. ix + 346.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01884-4);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01885-2).

While many of the essays in this collection recognize a number of passages in Sartre's philosophy as misogynist, the authors are nonetheless willing to extend the Principle of Charity and re-read Sartre in a feminist light. This task is not a stretch of the imagination. Sartre never directly addressed issues of feminism; however, he did vehemently commit himself to addressing issues of oppression. Sartre was a prolific writer and although there is no unifying theme which guides this collection, it does an excellent job of incorporating with feminism, aspects from Sartre's earlier and later works.

Among the more interesting essays that one finds here: (1) Hazel E. Barnes' discussion of the examples that Sartre employs in which women are present. While acknowledging the aggressive masculinity and sexist language in Sartre's more well known writings, Barnes maintains that it is unfair to cite these examples and generalize that Sartre's philosophy is so predominantly masculine that it excludes women. Instead, by citing other examples, taken from a broad spectrum of his writings, Barnes demonstrates that Sartre's attitude toward women is one in which he is aware of their victimization by men. (2) Edward Fullbrook's and Kate Fullbrook's well researched argument presents, among other things, persuasive cross-textual evidence that shows de Beauvoir to be a direct influence on the concept of absence in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. (7) Sarah Lucia Hoagland's unique essay explores existential freedom within the context of a feminist framework. (8) Karen Green argues that one can understand the strengths and weaknesses of de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* much better, if it is read alongside Sartre's works from the same period.

The topic of objectification is one of great significance to feminist philosophy. Typically, feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon have cast this topic in a negative light, explaining it as an oppressive instrument of male thinkers. (3) Phyllis Sutton Morris advances the topic by acknowledging that it can be interpreted in a positive light. Morris argues that Sartre is not the good Cartesian he is commonly made out to be, as he maintains that consciousness has a direct experiential relation with the body — a conscious subject *is* a bodily subject. Morris suggests that feminists have failed to entertain the possibility that if objectification is an inevitable part of a bodily-subject's existence, then there exists the possibility that it may have a positive form.

Feminist theory prides itself on the attention that it gives to real-life situations and it should not be a surprise that feminism appeals to aspects of Sartre's union of existentialism and Marxism. In the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Sartre observes that more often than not, social relations are serial.

Seriality is indicative of individuals being passively united by the practical field that surrounds them. Members of the series do not have a common identity; rather, they have an amorphous identity that is characterized by their individual behavior towards the already-there shared domain of objects.

(9) Iris Marion Young recognizes that feminist theory encounters a dilemma when conceptualizing women as a group. If there is not at least some minimal notion of gender, then it belittles any attempt to ground feminist politics. However, any conceptualization of gender is prone to extending normalizing behavior. 'Women' appear caught in a catch-22 that, Young insightfully argues, Sartre's conception of seriality can alleviate.

The series 'women', according to Young, is a reality constructed historically by the practical field of enforced heterosexuality. When gender is recognized as serial it does not fall into the trap of a false essentialism. Instead, it considers women as a social collective lacking a common identity, but having a social unity. Such a unity derives from the set of structural constraints and relations that distinctively shape action and meaning for each woman of the series. Young's innovative appropriation recognizes that while feminism has multiple layers, these layers must always be seen against the background of the series.

(10) Sonia Kruks demonstrates that Sartre's *Critique* provides insights that address epistemological concerns in feminist politics. While acknowledging the importance of identity politics within feminism, Kruks recognizes the threat that an 'epistemology of provenance' poses — it threatens to leave feminism without the connective link necessary to form any coalition. Like Young, Kruks appeals to Sartre's notion of seriality. However, Kruks stresses the epistemological features that seriality, along with dialectical reason, can offer.

Kruks argues that Sartrean dialectical reason entails that knowledge is situated within the historical world of human praxis. Maintaining that 'experiences are never as radically distinct as identity politics or postmodern notions of fracturing would imply' (239), Kruks maintains that situated knowledge is communicable because praxis takes place within a social field where individuals are materially and serially connected. This connection is reciprocal: when an individual encounters another, she recognizes that the other is also involved in the practical field. Kruks contends that even though individuals engage in a diversity of praxes, no matter how diverse these praxes may be, 'reciprocity and the possibility of a mutual comprehension of each other's actions always remains possible' (249).

The final two essays of this collection address Sartre's last interviews. (12) Guillermine de Lacoste maintains that Sartre's final interviews with Lévy and de Beauvoir, respectively published as *Hope Now* and *Adieux*, are reflective of Sartre's move from a masculine economy towards the beginnings of a feminine economy. (13) Stuart Z. Charmé maintains that Sartre's controversial interviews with Lévy signify a link with some of the central figures of feminist theology.

This collection is novel in the sense that although there are literally thousands of articles and works on Sartre, very few have successfully tried to engage him with feminism. Although Sartre may be currently out of philosophical fashion, the most enlightening essays in this collection are those that attempt to connect Sartre and feminism within the polemic of 'postmodernism'. There is no doubt that some of Sartre's writings are misogynist. However, as this collection demonstrates, one commits the fallacy of a hasty generalization if one reduces Sartre's philosophy to being so gender biased that it cannot contribute anything to feminism.

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Richard A. Posner
The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1999. Pp. xiv + 320.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-674-70771-0.

The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory ('PMLT') has two main aims. The first is negative: to criticize academic moral theorizing, or 'academic moralism' (5), as practiced both by moral philosophers and by those legal scholars attempting to give moral advice to judges. The second aim of PMLT is positive: to defend (or at least assert) a model of judging that Posner terms 'pragmatism' (227). The book is valuable: Whether academic moralism is pointless, and judges should be pragmatists, are matters that (at least on a certain view of academic and judicial motivation) themselves bear academic debate, and PMLT will certainly invigorate that debate. But the particular arguments advanced by Posner are inconclusive and, more damagingly, may be internally inconsistent.

'Academic moralism' is 'applied ethics as formulated by present-day university professors such as Elizabeth Anderson, Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis, Alan Gewirth [and others] ... . Some defend a complete moral system, such as utilitarianism or the ethics of Kant, and others specific applications of moral theory, for example to the moral and legal debates over abortion, euthanasia, and surrogate motherhood' (5). In short, it is substantive moral theory as opposed to, say, metaethics or descriptive jurisprudence. PMLT also draws a distinction between academic moralism and 'moral entrepreneurship', which latter activity Posner does not mean to criticize: 'Moral entrepreneurs [such as Jesus, Bentham, or Hitler] ... [use] emotional

appeals that bypass our rational calculating faculty and stir inarticulable feelings of oneness with or separateness from the people ... that are to constitute, or be ejected from, the community that the moral entrepreneur is trying to create' (42).

PMLT's case against academic moralism appears to consist of three main claims: (I) *moral relativism* ('I believe that the criteria for pronouncing a moral claim valid are given by the culture in which the claim is advanced rather than by some transcultural ("universal") source of moral values' [8]); (II) *non-convergence*, i.e., the failure of academic moral philosophers to agree upon universal moral truths ('Every move in normative moral argument can be checked by a countermove' [53]); and (III) *inertness*, i.e., the failure of a given academic moral theory to motivate action by persons who do not already share a pretheoretical commitment to the purported truths of the theory ('The ambition of the academic moralist is to change people's moral beliefs to the end of changing their behavior [but this] ambition is unrealistic' [38]).

Posner's central argument for moral relativism is the historical and cultural contingency of moral beliefs: different societies have held radically different views about matters that academic moralists take to be covered by universal moral laws, such as slavery, abortion, infanticide, and human sacrifice. But PMLT fails to do the metaethical work needed to show that the diversity of moral belief implies relativism; if, for example, universal moral laws are those propositions that all persons under sufficiently idealized conditions would assent to, the fact of actual disagreement (given that actual human deliberation is non-ideal) is consistent with moral universalism. Posner is somewhat more persuasive in arguing for nonconvergence; he identifies continuing disagreements among moral philosophers and shows how some famous philosophical scholarship (such as Judith Thomson's article on abortion) is vulnerable to counterarguments. But the argument is hardly conclusive: first, there could be some matters (not themselves matters of general consensus within our society) on which academic moral philosophers do agree, and Posner's survey of the scholarly terrain is not sufficiently comprehensive or impartial to persuade otherwise; second, academic moralists might not have reached agreement about particular moral assertions, but still have attained some consensus about the viability (internal consistency) of various moral theories; third, academic moralism is still arguably a very young field, given the relative novelty of crucial tools like quantificational logic. Posner is right that 'twenty-five hundred years is a long time to be standing at the starting gate' (83) — that we should not expect eventual convergence given 2500 years of nonconvergence — but if the appropriate time period is, say, 100 years, the hope of some eventual convergence seems less starry-eyed.

PMLT's argument for *inertness* concedes that a person can be motivated to take 'altruistic' actions (31), actions adverse to her self-interest. It also concedes, apparently, that a person can be motivated to take an action which is both inconsistent with her self-interest, and supported by an idiosyncratic

moral view (rather than by the consensus moral views of the society in which the person lives). The existence and motivational force of idiosyncratic moral views is what Posner terms 'pluralism' (28). Why, then, insist that academic moralism lacks motivational force? Part of the argument seems to rest on a collectivist and nonrational view about moral motivation, namely that altruistic actions (even idiosyncratic ones) are supported by the norms of some group to which the actor belongs. Part of the argument is empirical: Posner points to a few studies of the factors that motivate rescuers, such as the German and Polish rescuers of the Jews from the Holocaust. But PMLT concedes that '[s]ystematic evidence concerning the edifying effects of moral philosophy is hard to come by' (69), and if so it is hard to see why Posner should be so confident about inertness. Both the underlying motivational theory, and the specific claim, would not yet seem to meet Posner's own standards for factual (paradigmatically, scientific) truth.

Even leaving this point, there is some question whether Posner's case against academic moralism is self-defeating. If academic moral claims lack motivational force, then how can Posner's (moral?) critique of academic moralism motivate academic philosophers to cease their theorizing? Posner might have a good answer to this objection — he might be able to say that the critique is not a moral critique, or that it is but properly appeals to a culturally relative and consensually accepted moral truth, e.g., the immorality of wasted effort — but the issue merits fuller treatment.

Turning from moral philosophy to the work of judges, PMLT grants the Dworkinian/Razian point that the activity of judges is not wholly constrained by promulgated legal texts. Some 'hard cases,' unresolved by statutes and other legal rules will arise; the judicial task includes both 'applying rules and making rules' (98). How should judges make rules? *Pragmatism* is Posner's answer. 'Pragmatist judges always try to do the best they can do for the present and future, unchecked by any felt *duty* to secure consistency in principle with what other officials have done in the past' (241). What, in particular, are the criteria by which judges should evaluate the goodness and badness of the consequences of their decisions? Posner's answer (like Oliver Wendell Holmes') is apparently this: '[w]hile the political process is ordinarily the right way to go, every once in a while an issue on which public opinion is divided so excites the judge's moral emotions that he simply cannot stomach the political resolution that has been challenged on constitutional grounds' (142). In short, pragmatism is a consequentialist and (within consequentialism) a democratic account of adjudicative rule-making.

Note that pragmatism does not follow from Posner's case against academic moralism. These non-pragmatic views of how judges should 'make rules' are equally consistent with the claimed absence of universal moral laws, the claimed nonconvergence of academic moral discourse, and its claimed motivational inertness: (1) *free-form judging* (the judge should make whatever rules he thinks are morally correct, including nonconsequentially justified rules if he is a nonconsequentialist); and (2) *nondemocratic consequentialism* (the judge should make whatever rules he thinks are consequentially justi-

fied in light of the moral goals he accepts, without reference to the goals that the democratic process has adopted or would adopt). PMLT does not attempt to make a substantial argument for pragmatism as against free-form judging or nondemocratic consequentialism, nor is it clear how Posner could do so consistent with his own views about academic moralism.

The conflict, here, is with nonconvergence and inertness rather than relativism. Posner could say — and indeed does say — that pragmatism is true for us, rather than being universally true. 'I would not like to leave the impression that I think pragmatic adjudication is the right way for all courts to go; to think it is would be to fall into the fallacy of jurisprudential universalizing' (264). But no actual consensus in favor of pragmatism exists; at best it is true 'for Americans' in the sense that it follows from other culturally-relative moral laws and values that *are* consensually accepted. In short, Posner's argument for pragmatism — if he is presenting one — would have to be that pragmatism rather than free-form judging or nondemocratic consequentialism is the best interpretation of American political culture. But why think that the community of academic (legal) scholars will converge on that claim; or that academic scholarship on the issue (convergent or not) will motivate nonpragmatist judges?

Perhaps the answer is that PMLT (in its positive portion, its defense of pragmatism) is not a work of academic scholarship. Rather, it is an attempt at moral entrepreneurship on Posner's part — an attempt to motivate his fellow judges to become pragmatists, not through rational argument but through stirring and emotionally appealing rhetoric (as in the rhetorically powerful statement, against nondemocratic views of adjudication, that 'sophisticates aren't always right, and judges in a democratic society must accord considerable respect to the deeply held beliefs and preferences of the democratic majority when making new law' [251]). Posner could deflect objections about the incompetence of scholars as moral entrepreneurs by pointing to his special prestige as a prominent judge and public intellectual. It is far from clear that Posner would actually accept this characterization of PMLT — at one point he seemingly urges judges to *ignore* moral entrepreneurs (141) — but it is the only characterization that saves the case for pragmatism from internal inconsistency. Which leaves a final question: Taken as an attempt at moral entrepreneurship, is PMLT successful? We'll have to wait and see, since the book was only just published; perhaps hitherto nonpragmatist judges will be moved by Posner's prose to become more consequentialist and democratic in their judging. For myself, however, I was left quite cold.

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Paul Redding
The Logic of Affect.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1999.
Pp. 204.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-8014-3591-9.

Continental and analytic philosophies have for such a long time existed like spiteful siblings that every attempt to build bridges between the two traditions must be more than welcome. Hence Paul Redding's book on the logic of affect that draws on the tradition of German idealism is a valuable enterprise that can only be applauded for its fairness and open-mindedness. Essentially, Redding undertakes it to square that branch of philosophy of mind and cognition that regards itself as rooted in a Darwinian evolutionism with the subjective and objective idealist tradition of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. While this might not look like an easy marriage (and one that in this version can only be had at the cost of eliminating some central features of the latter philosophy), the essay still manages to invite both analytic and continental thinkers to cross the bridge and take a look around inside the other camp.

Although Redding's study is one not so much on affect but more generally on the idealists as precursors of the philosophy of mind, he nevertheless emphasizes the subjective side of mental life manifested in affective states. In his account of twentieth-century analytic philosophy of affect, he comes down on the side of the thinkers who advocate a revision of the purely rationalist account of affect in favor of a renewed inclusion of somatic moments. For this purpose, Redding returns to the original proponent of a somatic theory of affect, namely William James, in order to demonstrate that his approach is by no means anti-rationalist and that James indeed acknowledges the fact that affects are always shot through with beliefs and desires. While this is a forcefully and convincingly argued chapter that presents James' anti-representational stance as a version of anti-Cartesianism and thus as anti-dualism, unfortunately not all chapters reach this level of cogency. The one on Kant for example mainly falls short because Redding engages less with Kant's texts directly, but offers a fifth order criticism instead (Redding on Henry Allison on Patricia Kitcher on Peter Strawson on Immanuel Kant). This chain of revisitations is simply too long to produce an enterprising conclusion. Still, Redding's argument to consider Kant's theory of an unconscious substratum of sensation as the basis for Freud's notion of the primary process brings out parallels between the two quite well, although it neglects to consider that Freud's unconscious comes into existence through repression whereas Kant's is an organic constant.

More problematic is Redding's explication of Fichte and Schelling that seems to suffer from an insistence to cleanse the idealists of their 'unwanted metaphysical postulation[s]' (72). This, however, strikes one as a futile and maybe even unwelcome rereading that furthermore indicates an unfortunate unfamiliarity with recent continental scholarship on the intricate issues of

self-consciousness in German idealism. It is telling that Redding does not refer once to the important writings of Dieter Henrich and the *Heidelberger Schule* as well as those of Manfred Frank and others that argue convincingly that self-consciousness cannot be conceived without the recourse to a self that precedes empirical self-awareness. Self-consciousness as an essentially reflective process can never result from the identification of the subject-self and the object-self without presuming an already existing instance which judges the two to be identical.

Possibly it is Redding's unwillingness to engage in this discussion that leads to some misrepresentations in the thought of Fichte and Schelling. Thus, no distinction is made between Fichte's absolute and empirical I (96); the absolute I is then construed as the *telos* of strife (97), whereas for Fichte all striving *presupposes* an absolute I. Self-consciousness is exactly the problem of the relation of absolute and empirical I, not so much that of the relation of empirical I and non-I (101). Likewise, Schelling is not suggesting at all the triumph of the naturalistic world view when he states that nature has an inherent tendency toward intelligence, as Redding suggests (109), but Schelling rather argues that nature is a *form of mind*. Both in presuppositions and consequences, such idealism seems more opposed than akin to Redding's version of naturalism. That for Schelling 'intellectual intuition can never be satisfied' (120) is wrong; Schelling clearly states in the last part of the *System of Transcendental Idealism* that art grants 'infinite satisfaction;' thus the intellectual intuition finds its fulfillment in aesthetic intuition.

Strangely curtailed is the discussion of feeling in Hegel. Although Redding quotes Hegel's dismissal of feeling as the ground for an aesthetic judgement, he does not engage with the dialectic aspect of affect as elaborated in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*. There, Hegel argues against feeling as devoid of truth as well as for it as a necessary compliment of reason and thus indispensable for totality (§ 471).

That Redding's account of the idealist and post-idealist tradition ends with Hegel is to be regretted: much material that could have supported his argument of a somatic grounding of feeling might have been found for example in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. (In the 20th century, a rich continental tradition on the affective moment of human existence exists as well, e.g. in the phenomenology of Husserl and his students, Heidegger's analysis of mood in *Being and Time*, Helmut Plessner's philosophical anthropology and so on.) Despite these shortcomings, Redding still succeeds in placing the idealist tradition in a context in which exciting and fresh aspects of these thinkers appear. For those coming out of the continental schools, the text is a well argued invitation to discover the relevance of this tradition anew, this time from a challenging and very contemporary perspective. Yet the commentary on German idealism that the continentalists themselves have produced must not be neglected if distortions in the final picture shall be avoided.

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Louis A. Ruprecht, Jr.
Symposia: Plato, The Erotic, And Moral Value.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1999. Pp. xix + 183.
US$47.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2934-2);
US$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4264-0).

The scholarly heart of this book is an argument regarding the *Symposium*. Yet Louis Ruprecht comes to Plato with contemporary questions in mind — the social and educational significance of multiculturalism, in particular — and he will engage a broad audience with his intriguingly updated Platonism. It is based on two (partly historical and partly meta-ethical) claims. First, Ruprecht blurs the sharp line drawn by Nietzsche to divide Greek philosophy and drama. The 'notion of what "ethics" entails' for Socrates and Plato, he argues, is deeply indebted to the tragedians who preceded them because 'the singular insight' of the middle dialogues is that the discipline of ethics 'has everything to do with tragedy, with facing up to failure, and with erotic passion' (16). Second, the study of 'ethics' in contemporary universities, he believes, is too narrowly circumscribed by a Nietzschean skepticism about the possibility of grounding moral values. It is 'obsessed' with either the complexity of hard cases (such as abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty) or the calamities of Auschwitz and the Killing Fields (8-9).

Ruprecht's point is that by swinging between a fascination with the *impossibility* of truth in ethics and the *self-evidency* of ethical truths, 'the rich moral complexity of human social life' is left unexamined (11). Moreover, if the latter is primarily concerned with the permutations of 'desire' then it can be understood under the broad rubric of 'the erotic'. Plato, therefore, is well-positioned to provide us with ethical advice. For Plato's middle-period dialogues are more accurately described as those of his 'erotic period,' with 'moral failure' rather than 'moral certainty' his primary concern. This might seem at odds with the 'moral perfectionism' associated with Socrates (134). That perfectionism, however, is a response to the difficulty of understanding why someone would do something one knows to be wrong. And, according to Ruprecht, Platonic *eros* embodies a more sophisticated *psychological* response to this epistemological puzzle. The central image of a vulnerable, wounded and 'divided soul' in the *Symposium* (and the *Phaedrus*), for instance, provokes a profoundly revealing analysis of just how a person can fail or succeed in 'true love' — 'the one thing which has as large a claim as any to being an *unchanging* constant in human affairs' (124).

Both the descriptive and normative focus of his argument makes Ruprecht a natural ally of Martha Nussbaum. At one point, he says that the title of her book, *Love's Knowledge*, is 'singularly appropriate and instructive for my argument.' His explanation of the explicit and symbolic meaning of *metaxu* or state of 'radical in-between-ness' in chapter two, is a model of lucid and insightful scholarship, and it complements Nussbaum's hugely influential thesis regarding *eros* in *The Fragility of Goodness*. Yet Ruprecht criticizes

her conclusion that in the *Symposium*, a 'weird' and 'frigid' Socrates distorts the meaning of *eros*: 'he is in love with Love, but never lets himself love another person' (58). After arguing that Socrates has a better understanding of love than Alcibiades, he elaborates (in chapter three) on how Socrates embodies the 'one crucial Platonic craft, erotic loving,' with 'this one crucially Platonic image: the Two becoming Three, rather than being reduced to One' (78). Although this sounds a little new agey, Ruprecht makes good use of specific experiences (such as pregnancy and immersion in dialogue) and artworks (*No Exit* and *Romeo and Juliet*, for example) to press a very plausible case.

The moral of *Symposia*'s story is that 'human eroticism ... emerges from the hybrid synthesis of "nature" and "culture"'; hence a compelling analysis of *eros* can help us come to grips with contemporary questions of 'gender, race and sexual identity' (112) because all three are permutations of that synthesis. How helpful is this? *Symposia* began by admiring Nietzsche's 'diagnosis' of our cultural predicament but disagreeing with his 'cure' (15). Still, Ruprecht's 'true love' is too vague to have a curative effect. For instance, it is easy to agree with the idea that multiculturalism cannot be reduced to moral relativism, and that advocates have not explained with sufficient clarity that multiculturalism does not 'preach the tolerance of the intolerable' (124). Ruprecht, however, does not address the deep meta-ethical puzzle that has been embedded in the latter idea since Voltaire spoke out so enthusiastically against what he called the 'fanatical enthusiasm' of religion. Ruprecht's first-person ruminations about working in a highly diverse department of religious studies are certainly relevant, but evades the hard question. How can intractable religious debates regarding homosexuality, for example, be resolved without substantive changes in specific dogma? Nevertheless, if *Symposia* does not resolve any of the complex issues it raises, its cautious scholarly conclusion sums up why a diverse cross-section of philosophers will find this book well worth reading: 'Plato's erotic vision seems to me to provide us with a better sense of the full complexity of matters that *are* complex' (124).

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Thomas A. Szlezak
Reading Plato.
New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xii + 137.
Cdn$108.00: US$65.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-18983-7);
Cdn$31.99; US$20.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-18984-5).

Reading Plato is a short text that presents one alternative approach to interpreting Plato. In twenty-seven chapters, each ranging from 3-6 pages in length, Szlezak elaborates the view that Plato's dialogues are 'fragments of Plato's philosophy' in two related ways (118).

Separately considered, the dialogues are fragments in the sense that their correct interpretation sometimes demands appeal to passages found in other dialogues, which, in turn, serve to 'support' the logoi of the former (69, 72, 75). Characteristic of the activity of genuine philosophy, this process of supporting the content of one dialogue with that of another mirrors the written dialogue between Socrates and his interlocutors, where Socrates calls for and supports speech with speech in an effort to arrive at fundamental principles.

Taken collectively, the dialogues constitute a fragment in that they also call for supporting logoi that can only reside beyond the written text (55). This supporting logoi is the fundamental, 'oral' philosophy of Plato, the understanding of 'more valuable things' (51, 89, 109) which is the genuine, attainable end of all philosophical inquiry (49, 69, 90, 107).

According to Szlezak, the view that Plato's genuine philosophy is oral philosophy deductively follows from applying Plato's 'critique of writing' in the *Phaedrus* to the Platonic corpus (103). In the *Phaedrus*, Plato asserts that written logos is only 'an image of the spoken one' (*Phaedrus*, 275c6) and that while it is directed towards the goal of oral logos, namely 'clarity and certainty (or stability)' of knowledge, it cannot, unlike oral logos, attain that goal (35, 107).

There is a further motivation for thinking that the genuine philosophy of Plato is oral. Philosophy, for Plato, is esoteric (86). Philosophy must only be disclosed to suitable interlocutors, just as Socrates tailors his speeches and lines of discourse to the states of the souls of specific interlocutors. But written texts, which always contain the same words and which are available to everyone, cannot vary their contents to address specific readers; they cannot select suitable interlocutors and match them with suitable dialogues (43, 83, 109).

Rather than presenting a philosophy, the dialogues actually provide readers with mere paths into Plato's oral philosophy (116); they serve to turn the soul of the reader towards philosophy (118). Consider that the dialogues occur between persons with unequal skill (106), that some need to be led and some do not (105), and thus that some, e.g. Socrates, have nothing philosophi-

cal to gain from the discussion (107). Philosophy proper, that is, does not occur in the dialogues.

Thus, contrary to modern interpretations, Szlezak believes the dialogues are not 'self-sufficient forms of writing' containing 'logoi with double meanings' and intentional ambiguities to be resolved by appeal to structure or drama (66). Indeed, Szlezak believes such a view is manifestly 'unPlatonic' (109), and issues from 'modern' preconceptions, such as the 'modern' anti-esoteric view that everyone should have equal access to the truth (12, 17, 53).

Reading Plato has some troubling features. (1) To argue that Plato had a doctrine, be it oral or otherwise, Szlezak lifts the 'critique of writing' out of the *Phaedrus* and applies it to the dialogues. This move is legitimate on the assumption that, drama and structure aside, the critique represents Plato's definitive view of writing. This assumption, in turn, presupposes that Plato had a 'doctrine'. So, it appears that Szlezak's argument begs the question. (2) Paradoxically, if Szlezak is right and the dialogues do not contain Plato's genuine doctrine, then what Socrates says about writing may not be what Plato thought, but merely a logos suitable to the soul of Phaedrus; if Szlezak's reading is correct, perhaps Szlezak's reading of the *Phaedrus* is incorrect. (3) Szlezak's reading implies that the spoken word, unlike the written, can get to truth. However, recall that the referent of the dialogues is an 'oral' dialogue, and the 'oral' dialogue is often represented as inadequate, as when Socrates fears cutting 'a graceless figure' of the Good (506e-7a). Furthermore, consider the 'continuous' plot in Plato, the difference between appearance and reality, between a likeness and the thing of which it is the likeness. The written word is an 'image' of the oral, but the 'spoken' word is also an image, a symbol of something other than itself and which it cannot capture any more than the written word can capture the spoken.

Still, there is a sense that the dialogues of Plato demand completion by something beyond the texts themselves. The philosophy of Plato is not 'in' the texts *per se*, but 'in' the minds of readers who read the texts and who, being prompted by the symbols on the page, come to reflect on issues of philosophical importance.

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Mark C. Taylor
About Religion:
Economies of Faith in Virtual Culture.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1999.
Pp. 292.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-79161-0);
US$19.00 (paper: ISBN 0-226-79162-9).

According to Taylor, this book is about religion which is 'about a certain about,' what is slipping away, what remains obscure, never quite there (1). With this deflective opened, T. explores the meaning and presence of religion in contemporary culture using a breath-taking trans-disciplinary approach that ranges from poetry to evolutionary biology and cognitive science.

This is a book with something for everyone, but it will certainly not please everyone. As Taylor admits (4) the questions of faith and God, even when cast into nontraditional terms, makes students of religion uneasy but Taylor does make good on his promise to develop a nonreductivist account of religious behavior. However, his arguments are not cast into the linear forms of scientific rationality. This book that explores religious behavior in an information age is itself a hypertext that defies linear logic in favor of multiple links and connections that spin out and turn in on themselves.

The book begins with a charming essay ('Discrediting God') on trust and confidence drawn on the account of Herman Melville's *Confidence Man*. Reflections on the meaning of signs and roles carefully slices away layers of taken-for-granted meaning to explore the notion that faith is a confidence game whose stakes are fiduciary (7). When signs become ambiguous, so does trust in all meaning, including transcendent meaning (18). But then, in the second essay, he reverses his field to 'denegate God' as one who is a calling that approaches from beyond without ever arriving. In this essay T. explores the notion that God who is nothing has not finished with him (29). But how can 'no-thing' continue to make a meaningful claim on anyone? This is, T. argues, the call of the sacred that is heard in erring, a holy place created by the desertion of the sacred (45) that occurs when the sacred 'let's go'. In this reversed field, the question is not 'who is God?' but what is my response to the call that never arrives, that is nonetheless a 'rend(er)ing that open me infinitely response-able.' The next seven essays are written between these poles of 'discrediting and delegating' God. Through them, Taylor argues that, in the West, religion is most often not about God but our own meanings and values informing ways of life. In spite of this, T. affirms, there are religious vestiges that show that faith is inevitable even in contemporary culture. The concluding essay, 'Indifference,' is a philosophical reflection and personal mediation about loss and meaning that places the first two essays into T.'s lived experience of struggling to know if loss can be embraced in a manner that leads to creative engagement rather than the melancholy of loss. In true hypertext fashion, the work as a whole makes more sense if the last chapter is read first rather than in linear fashion last.

T.'s text is not an easy read. He demands a great deal from his reader but it is worth the effort to come to terms with the often overlooked, sometimes surprising ways God is embedded in culture. However, the reader looking for a standard discursive approach will be disappointed, because T. is elliptical, playful, indirect, and at times, elusive as his style mirrors his view that 'religion is at its most interesting where it is least obvious.' T.'s control of his sources is superb and the path he lays out over uncharted terrain is sure footed.

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Keith E. Yandell
Philosophy of Religion:
A Contemporary Introduction.
New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. viii + 399.
Cdn$105.00: US$70.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-13213-4);
Cdn$28.99: US$19.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-13214-2).

Keith Yandell's book is one in a series from Routledge's contemporary introductions to philosophy. As explained by the series editor, these books are written for students who have already completed an introductory course in philosophy. Each book is intended to guide the reader from a beginning level to a higher-level of comprehension of the subject matter.

Yandell's discussion of the philosophy of religion deviates from typical texts that focus only on the Western, Christian tradition. His scope is more ambitious. It includes Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. The Preface clearly sets the tone carried throughout the text — 'to describe the basic perspectives concerning ultimate reality and our relations to it as seen by several of the major religious traditions, and to ask what, if anything, there is by way of reason or evidence to think any of the claims that define these perspectives are true, or are false' (xvii). Including the introductory chapter, Yandell's book is comprised of five parts, with a total of fifteen chapters. No concluding chapter is included.

Part I, entitled 'Philosophy and Religion', is comprised of five chapters. Yandell begins by covering some introductory considerations over the nature of philosophy, religion, the philosophy of religion, and the role objectivity plays within these disciplines. Chapter 3 quickly describes the religions considered in later chapters: Christianity, Advaita Vendanta (one of three

main schools of Vedantic Hinduism), Jainism, and Theravada Buddhism. Citing passages from their respective religious texts, Yandell draws the reader's attention to another main consideration running throughout this study; namely, that the above religions are very different sorts of religion. As Yandell sees it, each of these religions has specific theological beliefs that diagnose our religious condition. He calls these accounts our sicknesses and the cure. Each religion addresses the sickness and cure according to its own account of the truth about what our nature is (32). Given the claims of each religion the *truth question* cannot be avoided. That is, if one is true, the others are not (34). Subsequent chapters compare and contrast these religions' truth claims.

Chapter 4 describes the sense of religious experience within these religions, with Chapter 5 setting forth the importance of their respective doctrine and apparent distinctiveness. Yandell, in Chapter 6, responds to the belief that various spiritual diagnoses and cures are, in the end, quite compatible. He will have none of this, arguing that if such a view of religious pluralism is held, it logically should speak about religious myth, not doctrine. Moreover, use of the word 'true' should be avoided by people holding to this view of plurality. Yandell concludes that religious pluralism totters on the border of being plainly false (77).

Part II is entitled 'Religious Conceptions of Ultimate Reality'. The two chapters making up this section cover understandings of ultimate reality that are monotheistic and nonmonotheistic. Part III and Part IV consist of chapters that examine in close detail arguments for and against monotheism and nonmonotheism.

Chapter 9, the first chapter in Part III, is concerned with the problem of evil and the various theodicies offered by various monotheistic traditions. Although this chapter does not develop historical background to the problem of evil, it is a high point in Yandell's study. He readily admits that the problem of evil is the 'most influential consideration against the existence of God' (124-5). But he believes, as well, that the 'existence of evil is evidence against the existence of God only if there is some sound and valid argument in which *There is evil* is an essential premise (one without which the argument is invalid) and *God does not exist* is the conclusion' (125). In the rest of this chapter Yandell goes on to examine in close detail variants of the problem of evil debate; for example, the claim *There is evil* is incompatible with the claim *God exists*. A more sophisticated argument covered is the 'unimaginably pointful' argument:

1 There are unimaginably pointful evils.

2 If there are unimaginably pointful evils than there are actually pointless evils.

3 There are actually pointless evils. (from 1, 2)

4 If there are actually pointless evils, then God does not exist.

5 God does not exist (from 3, 4). (136)

Yandell works through each argument with logical precision, maintaining that all fail to demonstrate that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of God. An interesting addition to this chapter is a discussion of animal suffering, as well as a discussion of evil and ecology.

Topics in chapters 10 and 11 cover arguments for theism: conceptual proofs (including the Ontological Argument), empirical proofs, arguments by Aquinas, and religious experience as evidence for the existence of God. Chapters 12 and 13, in Part IV, deal with arguments from a nonmonotheistic perspective. Jainist and Buddhist views of persons and personal identity are discussed. Appeals to enlightenment experience analogous to Advaita, Jain-type and Buddhist-type appeals to experience are, as well, included.

Part V covers the relationship between religion and morality, and faith and reason. Chapter 14 examines the difference between religious values and moral values, the compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human freedom, as well as determinism. Chapter 15 discusses standard issues in the philosophy of religion: faith, knowledge, scientism, and robust foundationalism.

Yandell includes a glossary, a list of 'Selected great figures,' extended bibliography, and fairly detailed endnotes. 'Questions for Reflection' and a list of recommended readings follow each chapter.

As a book entitled 'a contemporary introduction,' it is not clear how it is particularly contemporary or an introduction to the subject. As for its style, Yandell is continually formalizing, sometimes quite exhaustively, every subject covered (the book is, after all, dedicated to Alvin Plantinga). As for its tone, Yandell's point is seemingly to show that arguments against Christian belief do not, in the end, hold, and that other various religious positions are logically misguided. This is unfortunate, because where Yandell is descriptive his study is most informative.

There is no doubt that Yandell's investigation is a significant contribution to the philosophy of religion. But the level of analysis makes this study more suitable as a series of articles in a journal rather than an introductory text in the philosophy of religion.

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