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Giorgio Agamben

The Man Without Content.

Trans. Georgia Albert.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1999.

Pp. xi + 130.

US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3553-0);

US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3554-9).

Giorgio Agamben

The End of the Poem.

Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1999.

Pp. vii + 148.

US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3021-0);

US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3022-9).

In *The Man Without Content*, Giorgio Agamben, one of the most important contemporary European philosophers, does not simply confront problems in the existing field of aesthetics, but exposes this very field — the ‘terra aethetica’ into which we have wandered and to which our most familiar and fundamental terms for considering the nature of art belong — as itself essentially problematic. He thus resumes the task, begun by Hegel and Heidegger most notably, to consider the history of aesthetics from the perspective of the current crisis in its concepts, to delineate the concepts which inform every philosophy of aesthetics from the perspective of the present destiny of art — which is to say from its ‘death’ or end as an original site of man’s historical experience.

Aesthetics must thus be understood not simply as an academic field, but as the historical terrain in which ‘the essence of nihilism coincides with the essence of art at the extreme point of its destiny’ (58). Agamben is the cartographer of this terrain, whose map is designed not only to delimit the borders of our current cultural situation, but more importantly, by carefully stripping away the petrified terms of our ‘science of aesthetics’ — a process he names ‘destruction’ (6), borrowing Heidegger’s term — to open an experience of art which is still to come, to free art and with it the very mode of our historical and cultural experience from the categories of aesthetics most broadly understood.

As is implied in the very term *aesthesis*, the history of aesthetics — which is to say, nearly every reflection on the nature and experience of art since at least the middle of the seventeenth century — understands the work of art as divided between the complementary principles of the sensible apprehension of the spectator and the creative activity of the artist. It is this division which finds expression in our most common experience of the subject of art as divided between the man of good taste for whom the work of art is collected in museums as an occasion for his pleasure and for the exercise of his

aesthetic judgment, and of the eccentric figure of the artist whose work is merely the expression of his creativity, of the superiority of his will over any constraining content. And these two figures, Agamben argues, — the modern artist and the modern spectator, whose literary representatives populate his text, and whose first appearances he analyzes in a series of detailed historical studies — are figures of extreme negativity: they are the two forms in which art is stripped of any essential content or significance, at whose hands art can be said to die and to continue to die. For when the work of art is conceived as the willed creation of an artist-subject then it is but the expression of a free will which infinitely transcends its material, of an ironic subjectivity without content ‘which soars above the contents as over an immense repository of materials that it can evoke or reject at will’ (35); the artist is thus ‘the man without content’ whose creative freedom is but his own nothingness.

But it is to the man of taste to whom Agamben devotes most of his analyses: for the man of taste — Rameau’s nephew, at once a man of impeccable taste and a man ‘in whom every difference between good and evil, nobility and commonness, virtue and vice has disappeared’ (22) is for Agamben, as he was for Hegel, its most perfect exemplar — is the one for whom all historical content presents itself only in the form of its extreme alienation, suspended on the walls of his museum as ‘pure culture’, and thus as petrified and emptied. Taste is the ‘very principle of perversion’ which strips the work of art of any possible importance, reducing it to nothing but an object of its own aesthetic enjoyment and judgment.

In fact, the very concept of aesthetic judgment — the peculiarly modern response to a work of art which worries above all else whether it is in good taste or bad, whether it is real art or non-art — can only properly be understood in terms of this movement of negativity. It is this which is captured in Lautréamont’s precise formulation — ‘judgments in poetry are worth more than poetry’: the work of art as an object of aesthetic experience only has ‘worth’ as an occasion for the judgment of taste. It thus has no worth: for ‘in the act of judgment that separates art from non-art, we turn non-art into the content of art’ (42). The art critic — the institutionalized figure of aesthetic judgment — precisely because art is for him but an occasion to separate art from non-art, transforms non-art into the only real truth of art. Judgment is but the performance of art’s negation.

It is thus on one hand our aesthetic categories and institutions themselves which preserve art only to perform its ritual murder: to empty it of content, to transform it into non-art, to replace it by subjective judgment; and on the other, it is precisely in the aesthetic conception of art that European nihilism, ‘the uncanniest of all guests’ in which all our traditions are subjected to an extreme emptying out of content, finds its most concrete expression. Agamben responds to this in two ways, which open the horizon of his considerations beyond the narrow confines of the ‘Western aesthetic project’ and its imposing borders. On one hand, through an analysis of Aristotle and through a reading of Hölderlin’s idea of rhythm, he undertakes a re-examination of the very concept of *poesis* — of production in its broadest sense — to show how the

concept of production, and thus of poetry, is irreducible to the modern figure of the will and willed creation. And on the other, he follows those strains in contemporary art such as Duchamp's ready-made and pop-art, which push to the limits, and point beyond, the contradictions of modern aesthetics, rendering impossible and disabling the 'faculty' of aesthetic judgment.

But it is in Kafka that Agamben finds the messenger of an art which is irreducible to the contradictions of aesthetics, the messenger, therefore, of an art to come. For if aesthetics names that mode in which all historical objects are emptied of their truth content, if the museum names precisely that space in which the past is accumulated as an object of aesthetic pleasure and thus transmitted only in the form of its extreme alienation and thus intransmissibility, then the experience of language and historical time proposed by Kafka must be understood as the extreme interruption of the negativity of aesthetics. For Kafka, in Benjamin's formulation, 'sacrificed truth for the sake of transmissibility' (114). The art which 'renounces the guarantees of truth for love of transmissibility' (114), whose only truth lies in the event of transmission, *has* no truth to be negated or alienated in an aesthetic appropriation; it thus points to an experience beyond or before aesthetics and the institutions of judgment in which it makes its home. The messenger whose message is nothing but the event of transmission is thus also — but in a decisively different manner — 'the man without content', in whom this epithet is, however paradoxically, redeemed.

And it is from this perspective that we can most profitably approach *The End of the Poem*, the collection of Agamben's essays devoted to the specific problems and categories of Italian literature from Dante to the present. For what animates his careful analyses of Italian poetry, of its authors and literary forms, is precisely the experience which the name Kafka had already announced: the experience of art without truth, of transmissibility without content, what Agamben here calls the experience of the event of language. The 'end' which Kafka had announced to the tradition of aesthetics is discovered in the very technical structure of the poem itself: in its techniques of negotiating the end of its verses, of its stanzas and of the end of each poem. Each philological or structural question which he encounters in the details of the history of poetry and poetics is resolved, with a consummate agility, on the plane of philosophy: Agamben shows us in the most forceful manner what it would mean to free art, and the philosophical consideration of art, from aesthetics.

If European philosophy — Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Benjamin, to name but a few names — can only think philosophy by thinking through its tradition, and can only think this tradition by considering it in some manner from its end, interruption, or impossibility, then Agamben is, as we began by stating, one of the most important contemporary European philosophers. For his work, which in one way or another always returns to the singular interruption or impossibility of the philosophical tradition, shows that this moment of impossibility coincides with the opening of ever more possibilities

of thinking. The task of thinking which Agamben assumes is a negotiation of this 'impossible possibility'.

Daniel Goldman
University of Toronto

Walter Benjamin
Selected Writings, Volume 2: 1927-1934.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1999. Pp. 870.
US\$37.50. ISBN 0-674-94586-7).

What are books for? What do we expect of them? 'Not all books are to be read in the same way' (727). If they are philosophical books must they contain some 'big' ideas, an adequate amount of scholarly erudition, and some thoughtful commentary? Whatever your expectations, here is a book that will meet them, surpass them, frustrate them, and probably transform their very nature altogether. However, to review this publication as a purely philosophical book would be to miss the immense range of subjects tackled between its covers as well as positing a restrictive limit to the methodological scope of Benjamin's analysis. This second volume of *Selected Writings* is considerably larger than the first, and shows just how widely Benjamin threw his critical and intellectual net. He engages with subjects as diverse as literature, language, film, cuisine, pornography, photography, radio, drugs, mental illness, and toys. The writers and thinkers he takes on include such luminaries as Brecht, Goethe, Kierkegaard, Adorno, George, Valéry, Proust, and Kafka, as well as more obscure or forgotten figures such as August Halm, the musicologist, and Fyodor Gladkov the author of postrevolutionary Russian novels, including, according to Benjamin, 'his masterpiece, *Cement*' (47). Although the diversity of material might suggest that Benjamin, at times, spread himself too thinly, it could just as well be used to support his position as a pioneer in the field that has come to be known as 'cultural studies'.

During the period covered by this volume Benjamin was developing, expanding and refining many of the philosophical and literary-critical themes expounded in the major essays contained in Vol. 1. The transition from a theological treatment of questions of language and experience to a more materialist analysis can be traced clearly in such indispensable inclusions as 'Experience and Poverty' (731-5), which continues the project of elucidating a new concept of experience that he had set out in the 1918 text *On the Program of the Coming Philosophy*. This volume enables us to piece

together a broader and more detailed picture of Benjamin the philosopher and critic from snippets dealing with storytelling that will later come to fruition in the 1936 essay *The Storyteller*, and discussions of technology and photography that obviously form the groundwork for his most famous work *The Work of Art in the Age of its Mechanical Reproducibility*.

This is a book to be mined, which offers the English-reading scholar a rich resource of mineral wealth. It contains previously translated precious gems such as the *Surrealism* essay which illuminates Benjamin's own 'poetic politics' (216) and his seminal essay on Kafka (794-816) as well as previously untranslated fragments like the 'Thought Figures' which give us new insights into Benjamin's own writing and criticism. It is in one of these thought figures that he sets his own criteria on how we should judge his writing: 'The talent of the good writer is to make use of his style to supply his thought with a spectacle of the kind provided for by the well-trained body. He never says more than he has thought. Hence, his writing redounds not to his own benefit, but solely to the benefit of what he wants to say' (724 & 728). Whether Benjamin's theories are ultimately convincing or not, there is no doubting that he was an outstanding writer. This mine also contains rough diamonds such as the obviously incomplete notes 'On Ships, Mine Shafts, and Crucifixes in Bottles' (554) which consists, solely, of a quotation from Franz Glück about an idea that 'anything that can be touched cannot be a work of art', and a one sentence comment by Benjamin that reads; 'Does this mean that these objects in bottles are works of art *because* they have been placed out of reach?' Some of these notes and comments cry out to be appropriated and polished by some bright young PhD students. There are also wide, rich seams of sound and solid philosophical and critical coal that will keep the post-Kantian boilers stoked for the foreseeable future.

There is a kind of scrap-book feel here in the temptingly browsable pages, which shows the true Benjaminian sensitivity of the editors. Benjamin was a thinker almost obsessively concerned with the fragment, the torso, and the 'trash of history'. The editors also provide useful notes for those of us not steeped in the culture of Weimar Germany, explaining who and what Benjamin's references were. There is also an informative chronology attached which fills in much of the biographical detail of this period.

While we are not given completely new translations of the pieces that have been published in English previously, the translations are at least revised in some places. The only real disappointment in this impressive collection is the glaring omission of Benjamin's *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels* of 1928, which although being a lengthy text, is essential to any understanding of Benjamin's methodology, and his thinking on allegory. Although there is a published version of this text in (a somewhat flawed) translation it would have been extremely useful to Benjamin scholars to have had a new translation of, at least, its influential 'Epistemo-Critical Prologue'.

Ewan Porter

University of Warwick

Leigh S. Cauman

First-order Logic, an Introduction.

New York: Walter de Gruyter 1998. Pp. 343.

US\$30.00. ISBN 3-11-015766-7.

Paul Tomassi

Logic: How to Think Logically.

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xv + 411.

Cdn\$113.00: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-16695-0);

Cdn\$37.99: US\$24.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-16696-9).

This book review compares two books, both written as text books for a first-year university course in logic given in a philosophy department. I shall begin with saying what it is these two books have in common, and then discuss the books in turn.

Both books are aimed at first-year arts students. That is, they neither assume any prior knowledge of formal logic, nor any sophistication in mathematics. Both authors are aware that arts students are intimidated by symbols, and spend time helping the student to overcome their fears. Cauman's strategy is to use a circumlocution for a long time, and then to suggest a shorthand in the form of a symbol. Tomassi's approach is to explain carefully what the symbols mean, and then introduce them. The positive aspect of this is that both books will help exactly where a lot of technical books fall short. They provide accounts and explanations which arts students understand. For this same reason, neither book would be ideal for engineering students, computer science students or mathematics students who are learning logic as part of their course work.

The material covered by both is enough for one first-year course. Both books teach the students about formally representing sentences in natural language. They introduce the student first to propositional calculus, to truth tables, to first-order predicate calculus without quantifiers, and then to quantifiers. They have ample examples and exercises. Courses taught on the basis of either of these books will leave the students with a familiarity with rudimentary formalisation and a sense of familiarity with notions of what constitutes a valid argument and a good grounding in a standard proof method. Here, the similarity ends.

The proof method in Tomassi is natural deduction. Tomassi takes the students a little further in the study of first-order logic by teaching them about the semi-decidability of first-order logic. The book is quite big, and this might be a little intimidating in itself. However, it reads very easily, definitions are repeated, and explained carefully in alternative ways, in the hope that one version, or explanation, will stick.

The proof method in Cauman is a mixture of the tree method and natural deduction. Cauman's book is smaller. It has a good index, so a student can

look things up easily. There are fewer definitions given and fewer explanations. The explanations are not always as carefully written as in the Tomassi book.

One of the striking advantages of the Tomassi book over the Cauman book is the vocabulary and terminology used. Tomassi's book introduces the student to vocabulary used in the computer sciences, in mathematics and linguistics. Cauman's book introduces the student to vocabulary particular to the logic classroom in a philosophy department.

Tomassi's book leaves the doors open to further study, whereas Cauman's book is more restrictive. This is because one finishes Tomassi's book knowing that there is a lot more to learn; first-order logic is only the beginning. I have the impression that Cauman errs on the side of caution, and gives the impression that first-order logic is a finished product; that once one has studied this, one has a good grasp of all one needs to know about how people ought to construct arguments. This is so very misleading.

To be fair, Cauman mentions that certain issues are being left aside; that certain matters are simply not broached. These mentions are enough for the bright student to understand that there is something more, but even the bright student will have no idea as to what these further problems are. In this respect Tomassi might be too ambitious for some teachers of first year logic courses.

Cauman gives lengthy explanations of reasoning in arguments, sometimes even giving several ways of getting from the premisses to the conclusion. For example, from pp. 211-13, she explains an argument which has nested quantifiers. She gives an argument in English, and then runs through the argument formally in three ways: 'as it stands', 'in pure form' and 'in prenex form'. Allow me to quote Cauman at length to give a feel for the style. I shall make some comments on the quotation after. The argument to be discussed is:

There is someone such that everyone will be pleased if he comes to the meeting.

There is someone such that everyone will be surprised if she is pleased. Therefore there is someone such that everyone will be surprised if he comes to the meeting.

$$(\exists x)[Mx \rightarrow (\forall y)(Py)]$$
$$(\exists x)[Px \rightarrow (\forall y)(Sy)]$$

$$\therefore (\exists x)[Mx \rightarrow (\forall y)(Sy)]$$

A preliminary assessment of the validity of this argument would involve, I think, sketching a deduction. There are several ways in which this could be done.

First, *as it stands*:

Suppose there is someone, say, Alfred, such that everyone is pleased if he comes to the meeting, and someone, say Beatrice, such that everyone is surprised if she is pleased. Now suppose that Alfred comes to the meeting. Everyone will be pleased including Beatrice, and so, since Beatrice is pleased, everyone will be surprised. Alfred (by Conditional Proof) meets the criterion of the desired conclusion, and the argument is valid. Formally:

1. $(\exists x)[Mx \rightarrow (\forall y)(Py)]$	PREM
2. $(\exists x)[Px \rightarrow (\forall y)(Py)]$	PREM
To prove: $(\exists x)[Mx \rightarrow (\forall y)(Sy)]$	
3. $Ma \rightarrow (\forall y)(Py)$	1 EI (a)
4. $Pb \rightarrow (\forall y)(Sy)$	2 EI (b)
5. Ma	PREM
6. $(\forall y)(Py)$	1, 5, MP
7. Pb	6 UI
8. $Ma \rightarrow (\forall y)(Sy)$	4, 7 MP
9. $Ma \rightarrow (\forall y)(Sy)$	5-8 CP
10. $(\exists x)[Mx \rightarrow (\forall y)(Sy)]$	9 EG

Cauman then discusses another way of producing the proof, which she calls 'in pure form'. This makes appeal to a chain rule which allows one to cut out a common term, in this case the 'Px'. The formal rendition of this reasoning is shorter (7 lines), and appeals to a different set of rules. Cauman then both discusses and gives a formal argument in prenex form.

There are several things to note. It is probably impossible to pitch a logic text such that all students find it helpful and none find it tedious. However, what concerns me is that spending so long on one English-language argument might be overwhelming and confusing because so many alternative modes of reasoning are discussed and given equal attention. If the explanations work, then the student will have good grasp of reasoning and the connection between the formalisation and the English-language representation of an argument. However, it is more standard now a days to give a unique mechanical method of proof, so the student can at least emerge from the course with this, even if the explanations of the formalisation and the reasoning are not fully grasped. Thus, if the explanations are not entirely helpful, the student risks emerging confused and not even having some simple mechanical skills.

Another way in which Cauman is non standard is that it is quite rare (at least statistically) to see the form: $(\exists x)[Mx \rightarrow (\forall y)(Py)]$. What is unusual is to have a material conditional as the main connective in an existential sentence. We normally see 'and' as the main connective in an existential formula. Cauman should either devote some attention to this oddity or leave it out.

Let us leave Cauman and turn to Tomassi, to examine his style more closely. Tomassi is also verbose. He chooses to discuss the philosophical issues more than Cauman. This is a question of pitch. Some students will find this helpful, others will find it confusing. For example, consider Tomassi's discussion of universal introduction, also known as 'universal generalisation'. How does he explain this?

Tomassi begins by pointing out that we do not want unrestricted universal instantiation because arguments like the following are invalid:

1. Joan is female.
Therefore,
2. Everyone is female.

While this is invalid, there are arguments where it is valid to move from a statement about a specific instance to a general statement. Tomassi explains that within the right context, certain generalities hold. These are contexts where we know that there is nothing special about the particular instance under consideration, as when we reason in Euclidean geometry from a drawing showing a property of triangles, and realise that this applies to any triangle (in Euclidean space). Tomassi then motivates the rule he gives for universal introduction. The rule then appears in a 'study box' on page 280.

Universal Introduction: UI

UI informally: Given a formula containing a name on any line of proof you may replace each occurrence of that name with a variable, introduce the universal quantifier to that matrix and write the resulting formula on a new line *provided that the original formula containing the name does not include among its dependencies any formula containing that name*. Annotate the new line 'UI' together with the line number of the original line. The dependency numbers on the new line are identical with those of the line of the original formula.

UI formally: where ρ is any proper name, $\phi(\rho)$ is any expression in which ρ may occur, v is any variable and $\phi(v)$ is the result of substituting v for ρ :

$$\text{UI: } \frac{\phi(\rho)}{\forall v[\phi(v)]}$$

Restriction: provided that $\phi(\rho)$ does not include among its dependencies any formula containing ρ .

The dependency-numbers of the formula inferred by UI are identical with those of the formula from which it was inferred.

That is the end of the 'study box'. Dependencies are explained in terms of premisses on which the new formula ultimately depends. The 'dependency-number' is the number of the line on which the premiss appears.

In conclusion, I recommend the Tomassi book over the Cauman book for two reasons. One is that Tomassi is not misleading through the sin of omission in the way that Cauman sometimes is. The other reason is that students introduced to logic by means of the Tomassi book will find further studies in logic much more accessible. The reservation I have, in recommending the Tomassi book, is that it is long and verbose. This is suitable for the arts student, but I fear, might be frustrating for the more science-oriented student.

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Martin Cohen

101 Philosophy Problems.

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xvi + 213.

Cdn\$90.00: US\$60.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-19126-2);

Cdn\$22.99: US\$14.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-19127-0).

As the title suggests, *101 Philosophy Problems* consists of one-hundred-and-one philosophical problems all described in clear and simple terms. The first half of the book, the problem section, is meant to introduce the reader to what the problems are, while the second half of the book, the discussion section, is meant to introduce the reader to the history and the philosophical significance of the problems. The problems are grouped and divided into fifteen sections, each section corresponding to a different area of philosophy.

The first section of the book, titled 'Ten Logical Loops and Paradoxical Problems to Get Started With', contains a variety of epistemological and logical problems, such as the problem of justified true belief and Russell's barber paradox. Problems such as these would be discouraging to anyone inexperienced in philosophy but Cohen is able to explain and discuss their significance in an engaging and accessible style.

Cohen then moves on to a section on ethical theory, which introduces the reader to such problems as ethical relativism, some of the problems with utilitarian calculations, as well as social-political ethical problems like individual liberty and paternalism.

Following the section on ethical theory are several shorter sections, introducing the reader to, among others, some philosophy of mathematics problems, some aesthetic and value theory problems, several paradoxical visual puzzles, as well as some philosophical problems with time (such as the Twins Paradox).

Section seven, titled 'Personal Problems', is a hodgepodge of problems that do not seem to fit into any other general category. This section includes a freedom versus determinism problem, a problem introducing the reader to Aristotle's theory of character virtue, as well as an artificial intelligence problem. This section is followed by another small section with more paradoxical picture puzzles.

Section ten is a larger section, humorously titled 'Twelve Traditional Philosophy Problems No One Really Cares About Anyway'. In this section, the reader is asked such questions as whether snow is white and whether all bachelors really are unmarried males. This section is followed by a section containing several bioethical problems, introducing the reader to such issues as abortion and organ transplantation.

The book ends with four more groups of problems, including a section dealing with theological questions as well as a section dealing with problems of natural philosophy (such as Schrodinger's cat). The book also contains a glossary of important philosophical names and terms, as well as a section containing suggested further readings, both of which are important and valuable additions to an introductory philosophy book. However, one somewhat major weakness of the book is that it can appear at times to be too unphilosophical. That is, Cohen sometimes goes too far in the direction of trying to make the book as accessible as possible to beginners in philosophy, resulting in a book that might make a better *introduction to an introduction* to philosophy. For example, one is left wondering why Cohen devotes as much space in the book as he does to picture puzzles and optical illusions. Nevertheless, since Cohen's book is engaging, accessible and does discuss numerous interesting philosophical problems, it would make an excellent choice for anyone looking to begin a journey into philosophy.

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Rebecca Comay and John McCumber, eds.

Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger.

Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press

1999. Pp. vii + 245.

US\$79.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1506-9);

US\$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8101-1507-7).

This anthology consists of five new essays, four previously published essays, a revised version of a previously published essay, and an essay-length introduction by McCumber. All ten authors and both editors are distinguished experts in Continental thought. That given, an essay by Comay is conspicuously absent. This already excellent collection could only have been enhanced by a few words from her.

The cryptic title could refer to many aspects of Western philosophy. Perhaps most plausible is that it refers to the conclusions of two 'stories': the Platonic myth that the reality of things is outside them and the Aristotelian myth that their reality is within them. According to McCumber, Kant's 'Third Antinomy destroyed both the Platonic and the Aristotelian stories once and for all' (2), not by refuting them, but by turning them into each other. Thus Hegel and Heidegger, as post-Kantians each philosophizing in the wake of these significant 'endings', had to remember them and philosophize about them.

The title might also allude to the so-called 'end of history', the topic of Michel Haar's 'The History of Being and Its Hegelian model' and David Kolb's 'Circulation and Constitution at the End of History', or to the alleged 'end of art', discussed by Jacques Taminiaux in 'The Hegelian Legacy in Heidegger's Overcoming of Aesthetics', Martin Donougho in 'Hegel's Art of Memory', and John Sallis in 'Stone'.

Since the book's focus is 'memory', its title might also suggest that a state of affairs must 'end' before it can be remembered — or grasped at all. Hegel's famous metaphor, 'The Owl of Minerva takes flight only when dusk falls', means that philosophy can consider neither the present nor the future, but only what is either past or timeless.

David Farrell Krell's 'Stuff • Thread • Point • Fire: Hölderlin on Historical Memory and Tragic Dissolution' finds counterpoint in Hölderlin to Hegel's *Erinnerung* and Heidegger's *Andenken*. For Hölderlin, the past is consumed, so that what is remembered, if at all, is only the ashes of the past, not the past itself. Krell's analysis is thorough and amazing, even going so far as examining Hölderlin's doodles (178-9). Krell's references are wide-ranging, as they typically are in his works, but apparently he missed connecting Hölderlin's psycho-pyromania to T.S. Eliot: 'To Frankfurt then I came / Burning burning burning burning.'

In 'We Philosophers: *Barbaros mêdeis eisitô*', Robert Bernasconi considers the esoteric nature of philosophy in general and of Hegelian and Heideggerian philosophy in particular. Many philosophers have given advice to their

readers, e.g., Schopenhauer: 'Read every word of me'; Nietzsche: 'Read me slowly'; etc., but Heidegger went a step further, claiming that we cannot even begin to understand a work such as Hegel's *Phenomenology* until we have reached its end, and thus already have it in our memory when we start reading it (77). In 'Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung', Heidegger referred to himself and Hegel together as 'we', thus revealing to Bernasconi (92-3) the 'kinship' that Heidegger felt with Hegel as sympathetic heirs of Greek philosophy, each willing to perform multiple readings of a text and to bring certain special kinds of presuppositions and experiences to those readings. The Heideggerian philosophical elite are those who will not admit 'barbaric', i.e., 'non-Greek' influences (79).

In 'Heidegger on Hegel's Antigone: The Memory of Gender and the Forgetfulness of the Ethical Difference', Kathleen Wright argues that Heidegger's reading of Sophocles forgets the 'ethical difference' between the law of the state and the law of the family, on which Hegel based his analysis, and instead uses the 'sexual difference' between the lone woman and the patriarchy 'to undermine the very possibility of an ethics' (162). Antigone is 'ec-centric' for Heidegger because she stands out of her proper center, removes herself from her home, her familiar world, her *Alltäglichkeit*, and is therefore 'unsettling' (*unheimlich*) (168-9). Wright reads Heidegger's treatment of Antigone as a politically conservative, quietistic disclosure: 'Heidegger fails to gain the woman Antigone, since he succeeds against Hegel only by silencing Antigone as a voice of resistance against the inhumanity of hubris. This Greek woman's voice of resistance is silenced by Heidegger ... in 1942 in Germany just when it was so much needed. It remains missing and forgotten along with an ethics in Heidegger's thinking' (173). Wright hereby underscores a key point which must arise in any meaningful comparison of Hegel and Heidegger, i.e., Hegel's first philosophy, his logic, epistemology, and metaphysics of spirit and being, leads naturally into an ethics, a coherent philosophical account of cohesive social morality (*Sittlichkeit*); but Heidegger's first philosophy, his *Seinsanalytik* and even his *Daseinsanalytik*, whatever their noteworthy ontological and psychological insights, seem not to lead toward any kind of an ethics at all, and thus cannot fulfill the duty of philosophy to edify.

Dennis J. Schmidt's 'Ruins and Roses: Hegel and Heidegger on Sacrifice, Mourning, and Memory' considers the meaning of death for each thinker. He discusses both Hegel's Antigone, whose fatal act of solidarity with the dead forced the state to confront death (107-8) and so represented 'the death of illicit death' (109), and Heidegger's, whose tragedy offers 'no higher reconciliation, no recompense' (111), and whose death is only 'confession' (111). Schmidt also notes the dependence of Heidegger's interpretation of Sophocles on Hölderlin's translation.

Dominique Janicaud argues in 'Heidegger-Hegel: An Impossible "Dialogue"'? that the confrontation which was once somewhere between impossible and ruthless is now only problematic. The dialogue does not need to proceed in the language of either Heideggerian hermeneutics or Hegelian

dialectic. Both camps can recognize each other's philosophy as essentially 'dialogical,' with tolerably similar ontologies. The Hegelian *Wendungspunkt* resembles the Heideggerian *Kehre*.

The book's subtitle is not 'Questions in Memory of Hegel and Heidegger'. The authors consistently treat these two giants of German thought as viable philosophers rather than historical figures. The continuing dialogue between the two shows them as reasonable alternatives to each other and — together — as an antidote to other species of philosophy.

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Gene Fendt and David Rozema

Platonic Errors: Plato, a Kind of Poet.

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1998.

Pp. xiv + 176.

US\$55.00. ISBN 0-313-30765-2.

The title of this book is misleading: it does not deal with errors made by Plato and it does not offer an extensive argument in support of viewing him as a literary artist. This book argues that what we have traditionally regarded as platonic doctrines are in fact constructions based upon readings of Plato that erroneously fail to regard the dialogues as fully formed poetic works (1). This argument is developed in the form of a series of separate readings of particular dialogues. The seven central chapters — introduced by a Preface (an Apology), a Polemical Introduction and a Scholarly Introduction and followed by a Tentative Conclusion: On Lyric Joy and Philosophic Wisdom deal in turn with *Ion*, *Republic* (two chapters), *Meno*, *Theaetetus*, *Euthyphro* and *Laws*. While the analyses are generally well referenced, they rely most heavily on recent continental literature. While this has the advantage of rendering the book more appealing to the postmodern audience, it has the greater disadvantage of rendering it (i) obscure or nonsensical to the classical scholar and (ii) extremely prone to speculative exaggeration and dubious claims. For example, we read in note 13 to chapter 7, Pagan Politics, War, and the Construction of *Nomoi*, that (161): It will perhaps make this note clearer if I confess that *Republic* does not seem to me to be, as it is for Strauss and Pangle among others, an outline of an ideal state. Rather, with the help of a wise soul, Glaucon prescribes the kind of regimen that can cure him of his Glaucoisity (611d). An ideal medicine for his disease, yes; an ideal state, no. Derrida and Kristeva aside, this claim seems to be dangerously dismissive

of the obvious. Their continental commitment also leads the authors into regrettable prolixity; we read in the Scholarly Introduction, for example, immediately following their discussion of Kristeva's mention of Bahktin's view of Socratic truth (it's about to get worse): Kristeva's distinctions between the Platonistic (or Platonic) a distillate from several compounds in the pharmacy and the Socratic dialogue the original complex organic compound from which the distillate through mysterious processes comes to be, and that between a writer (even a poet) with a political program and a mimetic form of writing (associated with tragedy, comedy and novel) which by its very structure is carnivalesque and antipolitical, eschewing, as Northrop Frye (1957) says, the outward direction of meaning (73-4) while inviting us to sit within it and discover, are, like distinctions between criticism and poetry or tenor and vehicle, among the first necessities in any critical discussion, including any discussion of Plato's dialogues.

Such features of the book greatly detract from what it might otherwise have achieved. The approach is novel and, in itself, quite promising: I know of no other book-length treatment of Plato that argues to such a strong conclusion and from such a forceful assumption regarding the nature of his authorship. But the final product does not fulfill that promise, and ultimately proves disappointing given the scholarship demanded of any such work.

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Samuel Fleischacker

A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and Adam Smith.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1999. Pp. xiv + 336.

US\$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-00265-7);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-00446-3).

A certain view of freedom often underlies a person's commitment to a theory of justice. Following Isaiah Berlin, Fleischacker suggests that libertarianism is derived from a negative concept of liberty and that communitarianism follows from a positive concept of liberty. Seeking to ground a new politics of freedom, Fleischacker explores the works of Immanuel Kant and Adam Smith and claims to discover in them a 'third concept of liberty,' namely, a view of freedom as the ability to act on one's own judgment. Thinking of liberty in terms of living by one's own lights, according to Fleischacker, not only is more plausible than either pole of the Berlin dichotomy, but also

supports a liberalism that is more richly contoured than what can be grounded by, e.g., Rawls' theory.

Much of Fleischacker's book is historical, aiming to interpret Smith and Kant in a way that brings to the fore their views of freedom and judgment. Fleischacker often puts forth contentious readings of these figures: e.g., he claims that Smith was a perfectionist (not a utilitarian) and that aesthetic judgment for Kant involves using several concepts at once (rather than no concept at all). Fleischacker also pursues many tangential issues: e.g., he argues that the particularity recently discussed in the literature on virtue is understood better in terms of judgment than perception. Here I will address neither Fleischacker's exegesis nor his asides, both of which are often interesting. I will instead focus on Fleischacker's ultimate goal of providing a new theory of freedom which can ground liberalism with more specificity than Rawls' framework.

Fleischacker's theory of freedom is well understood by contrasting it with the negative and positive theories. The theory of negative liberty maintains that liberty amounts to being free from interference to fulfill one's desires. This account is thought to underwrite a libertarian theory of justice according to which the state may punish people only for coercing, deceiving, and taking from others (and not for failing to help others or themselves). In contrast, the theory of positive liberty holds that liberty is a matter of being free from both interference and a lack of resources to realize one's true self, often conceived as a social nature. This view of freedom is deemed to support communitarianism, the view that the state may punish people for failing to uphold a certain way of life deemed best, typically one of communal solidarity or active citizenship.

Against the positive concept, Fleischacker maintains that, in the modern era, we cannot justifiably claim to know now what the final end, true self, or highest good is. The positive concept of liberty is simply unavailable to us, and it tends toward unjustifiable intrusiveness when state policy is based upon it. Against the negative concept, Fleischacker holds that it cannot easily accommodate the intuition that freedom includes the ability to change one's desires. And basing state policy on the negative concept of liberty entails that, so long as the poor are not manipulated, they are as free as the rich and are done no injustice. However, Fleischacker thinks that the poor lack freedom in a sense relevant to justice.

Seeking a theory which avoids these problems, Fleischacker contends that freedom is a matter of being able to act on one's own judgment without facing interference or a lack of resources. Fleischacker's theory of liberty *qua* judging for oneself therefore differs principally from the negative concept in holding that freedom can be impaired by conditions such as poverty and ignorance, while it differs from the positive concept in holding that freedom can be impaired even if there are no objectively worthwhile projects. Fleischacker's view is that one is free just insofar as others do not manipulate one's ability to act on one's own considered understanding of how one should act and one has the time, money, and information to actualize this capacity.

For Fleischacker, justice is a matter of evenhandedly promoting people's freedom so construed. His political vision is that of a 'world where everyone can develop and use their own judgment as much as possible' (243). Specifically, according to Fleischacker, honoring the ability to act on one's judgment forbids state paternalism and moralism, since such policies would actively interfere with that ability. It also requires a market-based distribution of goods, since in a competitive economy 'individuals are faced daily with the need to make judicious choices,' thereby fostering a 'sense of daily responsibility so important to developing judgment' (238). Market allocations may be regulated and taxed, however, when necessary to promote people's judgment in other ways, e.g., in order to furnish a guaranteed minimum to the poor, teach new skills to the unemployed, provide a substantial amount of vacation time to workers, and distribute information about products to consumers.

We might wonder whether Fleischacker's theories of freedom and justice are as novel as he seems to think. Fleischacker often wants to contrast his views with those of Rawls, but his theories of freedom and justice are arguably Rawlsian at bottom. For Rawls, autonomy is a matter of being able to evaluate and change one's moral and nonmoral ends and to act on the basis of the ends one endorses. Rawls conceives of citizens as reasonable and rational choosers, or as 'free and equal moral persons', and he aims to develop a theory of justice which is fair to citizens so construed. Rawlsian justice at the core is a matter of substantial civil liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and maximization of wealth and bases of self-esteem for those with the least, where these conditions are justified because they are useful for reflection on and revision of ends and for the realization of ends which have been adopted. I see nothing qualitatively different between Rawls' conceptions of freedom and justice and Fleischacker's.

Fleischacker maintains that Rawls' approach 'remains too oriented toward satisfying desires rather than enhancing action' (x), which is unsubstantiated in the text and strikes me as patently false. Other times, Fleischacker contends that Rawls' framework is inherently too abstract to guide public policy. Fleischacker admirably does more than Rawls to apply his theory of freedom to concrete issues. However, insofar as their theories of freedom are not much (if at all) different, Rawls could make the same kinds of recommendations as Fleischacker. For example, Rawls considers leisure time to be a primary good, and hence, like Fleischacker, can prescribe much more vacation time for American workers. And if Fleischacker were correct that a market is crucial for developing people's ability to act on their judgment, Rawls could likewise deem a market to be essential for cultivating people's capacities to evaluate, change, and pursue their ends.

Readers may also question whether Fleischacker's theory of freedom has the implications he claims for public policy. For example, might not participatory democracy in the workplace and reducing the workweek, which anarcho-syndicalists advocate, develop people's judgment at least as well as a capitalist economy plus worker sabbaticals? Even if such questions are not systematically answered, it is a virtue of Fleischacker's book that it raises

them. Fleischacker pushes Kantian liberals to deal with concrete issues to a greater extent than they typically have.

In sum, although I do not believe that Fleischacker's theories of freedom and justice are fundamentally all that novel, he has some new ideas which are worth considering. Setting aside judgment on the historical inquiries, I see the central contributions of Fleischacker's book to consist of a substantial articulation of the kind of freedom Kantian liberals should find attractive and a decent application of that account to pressing political concerns.

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Sebastian Gardner

Routledge Philosophy Guidebook To Kant and 'The Critique of Pure Reason'.

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xvi + 377.

Cdn\$84.00: US\$60.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-11908-1);

Cdn\$19.99: US\$12.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-11909-X).

Gardner's *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason* is the most recent addition to the Routledge Philosophy Guidebook series. As such, the intended audience largely comprises students who are likely first-time readers of the *First Critique*. To satisfy this audience is not an easy task, since any commentary on the *First Critique* is beset with numerous difficulties of which Kant himself is often the genesis. And these difficulties are only exacerbated if the commentary is brief and introductory in nature. At fewer than 400 pages, Gardner's commentary is much less comprehensive than N. Kemp Smith's but far superior to Walker's or Ewing's. He neither attempts to fight Kant 'tooth and nail,' as does Bennett, nor to provide 'an essay on the central arguments' of the *First Critique*, as does Walsh. Rather, he wishes to 'communicate a broad picture of what Kant says in the *Critique* which will provide a framework for the study of individual sections and, more importantly, make this task seem worth pursuing' (xiii). The picture Gardner paints is more faithful to Kant than most.

It should be well-noted that Gardner's interpretation of Kant is neither neutral nor exhaustive. He specifically credits the influence of Allison and Pippin and even a cursory reading will reveal his debt is great. Hence, although the contributions of the likes of Strawson and Guyer to Kantian scholarship are countenanced, Gardner freely admits his commentary is designed to highlight the strengths of transcendental idealism; interpreta-

tions which detract from these strengths are therefore offered primarily for the purposes of contrast. Moreover, some interpretations, such as the patchwork theory, and objections based on alleged inconsistencies between the 1781 and 1787 editions, are dismissed at the onset.

There are many points at which one might cavil. For example, regarding a brief discussion of the *Nova Dilucidatio*, Gardner claims that not only did Kant endorse 'the Leibniz-Wolffian conception of the world as a rational totality wholly determined by the principle of sufficient reason, ... [but he also] offered a new proof [of the PSR]' (14). Although it is true that Kant does offer an alternative (though fallacious) argument in favour of the PSR, Gardner's exposition hardly does justice to the extent of Kant's criticisms of Leibniz and Wolff in this early work. Indeed, this is representative of a species of objections that could effectively be leveled at Gardner throughout, *i.e.*, for the sake of brevity, Gardner omits or paints in too broad a stroke what other scholars might consider important or critical. Nevertheless, Gardner generally does a credible job balancing brevity with content.

The first two chapters of Gardner's work lay out the problem of metaphysics to which Kant is responding. To this end, Gardner briefly discusses Kant's Enlightenment predecessors and contemporaries, outlines the metaphysical thrust of some of Kant's precritical writings, identifies Kant's preoccupation with the issue of objectivity, and deals with the Copernican revolution and the transcendental turn. Chapters 3 and 4 concisely consider Kant's arguments concerning the possibility of synthetic judgments cognized *a priori* and the conditions of sensibility. That Gardner's commentary is extremely sympathetic has become, by this point, quite clear; that his interpretation owes much to Allison is similarly obvious.

However, perhaps addressing excessive complaints of brevity, in Chapter 5 Gardner steps back and assesses the doctrine of transcendental idealism, which requires a more extensive examination of the arguments of the Aesthetic. Gardner rightly emphasizes the epistemological nature of Kant's arguments and offers a valuable sketch of possible responses to various 'main-line' objections. Gardner also carefully sets the stage for the transcendental realist/transcendental idealist battle of the Dialectic.

Chapter 6 represents Gardner's most comprehensive exposition of any section(s) of the *First Critique*. He begins by discussing the methodology Kant employs in the Analytic and places it in the context of transcendental idealism. To this end, Gardner outlines both the progressive, anti-sceptical interpretation, and the regressive, anti-empiricist interpretation, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each. Following a short summary of the Transcendental Logic and the Metaphysical Deduction, Gardner provides a detailed analysis of the Transcendental Deduction. The notoriously difficult arguments of the Analytic of Concepts are presented clearly and various interpretations, *i.e.*, analytical and idealist, are treated fairly. Gardner notes that the analytic interpretation may have grave difficulties showing how the arguments of the Analytic of Concepts establish anything more than psychological necessity; but he maintains that a careful idealist analysis could

defuse the sceptical challenge. Gardner further argues: 'the *Critique* as a whole constitutes an adequate response to scepticism ... Kant does not refute scepticism so much as overtake it' (194-5). The remainder of the chapter offers a rather standard rendering of the Analytic of Principles, including a short discussion on Phenomena and Noumena (which nicely sets up the so-called existence problem regarding things in themselves).

Chapter 7, which concerns the Dialectic, is also quite strong. After emphasizing the scope and nature of transcendental illusion, Gardner offers a reasonable, non-question-begging exposition of the Paralogisms, Antinomy and Ideal. He then analyzes the major arguments of the respective dialectical inferences in terms of their relationship to transcendental idealism. These analyses climax in Gardner's reconstruction of the indirect proof of transcendental idealism, a reconstruction that will lead to determinate conclusions regarding our cognitive powers, while avoiding definitive assertions regarding the impossibility of things in themselves being spatio-temporal.

Chapter 8 offers a needed re-assessment of transcendental idealism. Much is covered in this chapter: the Jacobi objection, Kant's alleged Berkeleyan phenomenalism, the transcendental ideality of the self, affection and the problematic existence of things in themselves. Since Gardner wishes to show that 'Jacobi's contention that the Kantian system incorporates a paradox is not justified' (303), a resolution to the problems arising from the relationship between appearances and things in themselves is demanded. Gardner notes the consequences of holding that: (i) appearances and things in themselves refer to two ontologically distinct domains, (ii) the language of appearances and things in themselves expresses two aspects of the same object, or (iii) some things in themselves can be known to be ontologically distinct from appearances and others cannot. Gardner is clearly correct in denying (iii), but his analysis of the failings of both (i) and (ii) is more contentious. He argues that the success of either (i) or (ii) requires a demonstration that the opposing interpretation concerning the identity of objects (and, presumably, objecthood) is mistaken. But this, Gardner claims, is only available from a transcendent (and, presumably, transcendental realist) perspective. This leads Gardner to a most controversial conclusion: transcendental reflection reveals there is really nothing at issue between (i) and (ii), and 'aside from special contexts like human freedom, it is a matter of indifference whether one says that there is one world conceived in two ways, or two worlds' (298).

The final two chapters comment on the Canon, offer some remarks about teleology and proved a truncated examination of the reception and influence of the *First Critique*. Gardner concludes with a chapter-specific, extraordinarily extensive and annotated bibliography (which compensates for the lack of footnotes throughout). Cavils aside, the work is a suitable choice for those who wish to recommend a commentary for a course on the *First Critique*; Gardner communicates well the worthiness of the pursuit of Kant's philosophy.

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Robert P. George

In Defense of Natural Law.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1999. Pp. 343.

Cdn\$116.00: US\$65.00. ISBN 0-19-826771-1.

Robert P. George's *In Defense of Natural Law* is a collection of previously published essays expounding the natural law theory of Germain Grisez and John Finnis. The essays articulate and defend its general structure, as well as elaborate the conservative moral implications of the natural law.

The first part of the book responds to criticisms of the general theory of reasons for action. Against the Humean view that reason is the slave of desire, George argues in Chapter 1 that reason can help to shape desire by 'grasping the intelligible point of possible actions' (19) and thereby identifying the intrinsic value of such actions. Against Russell Hittinger's view that some moral problems cannot be resolved without a hierarchical ordering of basic goods, George argues in Chapter 2 it is a mistake to think natural law theory would 'provid[e] norms that would generate a single, uniquely correct answer to every practical dilemma' (71). The basic goods suggest an ideal of integral human fulfillment that 'can provide the standards by which choices may reasonably be guided' (51). But since the ideal is unattainable, these standards are occasionally indeterminate.

The next four chapters address miscellaneous theoretical issues. Chapter 3 argues that the basic goods and moral norms are grounded in human nature but cannot be deduced from it; these basic reasons for action 'are known in non-inferential acts of understanding in which we grasp ... purposes as worthwhile for their own sakes' (85). Chapter 4 defends the thesis that choices among incommensurable goods need not be arbitrary. Chapter 5 argues that natural law theory does not imply a theory of constitutional interpretation; an originalist theory 'is [as] fully compatible ... with natural law theory' (110) as a theory that allows judges to decide hard cases on the basis of moral considerations. Chapter 6 argues that moral legitimacy requires more than just procedural justice; on George's view, '[b]eings that are fit for the rule of law deserve, moreover, to be ruled by laws that are just' (121).

Much of the second and third parts of the book elaborate what George takes to be the normative implications of natural law theory. In Chapter 7, George argues that the common benefits of religion provide 'a reason for positive governmental action to encourage reflection, faith and practice' (135). In Chapter 12, he applies natural law theory to questions concerning international regulation and law. In Chapters 11 and 18, George attempts to determine 'the implications of moral disagreement for the conduct of civil life' (315).

Not surprisingly, George devotes most of the chapters applying natural law theory to sexual morality. Chapters 8 and 9 set out the view that marital intercourse between a man and a woman is the only form of sexual activity

capable of realizing the intrinsic good of 'a two-in-one-flesh communion of persons' (141). The idea here is that a male and female can 'become literally one organism' (168) through marital sexual intercourse — though why this unity is intrinsically good is never made entirely clear.

This central idea is then applied to a number of controversial issues. Chapter 10 argues for the suppression of pornography on the ground it is designed to arouse 'sexual desire that is utterly unintegrated with the procreative and unitive goods which give the sexual congress of men and women, as husbands and wives, its value, meaning and significance' (187). Chapter 15 attempts to refute the claim that homosexual acts are redeemably unitive among persons with a 'natural' same-sex sexual preference. Chapter 17 argues that Joel Feinberg's view that the state should not restrict sexual behavior between consenting adults falsely presupposes that the evils associated with sexual immorality are instrumental and not intrinsic.

Though George's views about sexual morality are clearly rooted in empirical claims about 'human well-being and fulfillment' (294), he offers surprisingly little in the way of empirical support for these crucial claims. For example, despite the obvious empirical character of the claim that 'sex ... which is wholly instrumentalized to pleasure or some other goal ... damages personal (and interpersonal) integrity' (147), George offers nothing in the way of inductive evidence, relying instead on a curiously metaphysical defense: such acts 'damage personal integrity ... [by] effect[ing] an existential alienation of the body from the conscious self' (151). Unfortunately, the connection between such 'existential alienation' and well-being is never explained.

Likewise, George simply assumes that treating one's own body as a source of pleasurable sexual experience inherently involves 'a certain contempt for the body' (164). If true, this claim would go a long way towards justifying the claim that sexual acts aiming only at pleasure are wrong; but George offers nothing in the way of empirical justification for this crucial claim beyond a dubious analogy. The chronic occurrence of this sort of omission in natural law writings on sexual morality lends credibility to the common complaint that natural law theorists uncritically read their sexual biases into natural law.

Of course, the fact that such claims are empirical implies that their negations are also empirical. While the latter are likely to strike liberal sensibilities as considerably more plausible, an adequate refutation of the natural law positions requires empirical support. For this reason, if George's arguments are sometimes problematic, his analysis nonetheless succeeds in raising a problem for liberal theories of sexual morality.

One minor problem with this otherwise excellent book is the absence of an introductory chapter acquainting the reader with the various theoretical and normative positions associated with the tradition. As a result, the lay reader is likely to experience some initial difficulty in understanding the positions as a coherent whole. Though the central tenets of the view eventually come out, a short introduction would have made life easier for readers unfamiliar with recent developments in natural law theory.

George's *In Defense of Natural Law* is strongly recommended for anyone wishing to understand modern natural law moral and legal theory. In many instances, George marshals plausible arguments for conclusions that will, quite frankly, seem repugnant to many readers. The combination makes for a fun and engaging read.

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Anthony Gottlieb *Socrates*. New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. 58.
US\$6.00. ISBN 0-415-92381-6.

Oswald Hanfling *Ayer*. New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. 53.
US\$6.00. ISBN 0-415-92379-X.

Anthony Quinton *Hume*. New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. 59.
US\$6.00. ISBN 0-415-92393-X.

Frederic Raphael *Popper*. New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. 59.
US\$6.00. ISBN 0-415-92391-3.

Aaron Ridley *Collingwood*. New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. 53.
US\$6.00. ISBN 0-415-92399-9.

These five mini-books appeared in Britain in 1997. Routledge has taken them over, and announced 19 further titles in THE GREAT PHILOSOPHERS SERIES, under the consulting editorship of Ray Monk and Frederic Raphael. Each is to deal with a man in the western tradition, from Democritus to Derrida. None of the volumes contains an introductory overview, so it is not clear whether the editors plan to expand these horizons.

Think of the 15,000-word booklet as a new genre, aimed roughly at readers of *Sophie's World*, intellectually challenging but with absolutely minimal scholarly apparatus (perhaps a page of end-notes or suggestions for further reading). A bright first-year university student should find them engaging and informative. The authors tend to have credentials as writers for a wider public: Raphael is a novelist, Gottlieb is executive editor of *The Economist*, and Hanfling pioneered text-writing for Open University students. Typically they manage to introduce key issues and arguments while presenting a broad

picture of the philosopher's accomplishments. Nonetheless, Raphael's Popper is essentially the political philosopher (of *The Poverty of Historicism* and *The Open Society and its Enemies*), not the philosopher of science, and Ridley's reading of *The Principles of Art* aims only to present Collingwood's aesthetics.

The latter is particularly successful, however. Although he quickly dismisses Collingwood's idealism as 'philosophical baggage', he brings to life the importance of art as an antidote to the corruption of consciousness, our ignorance of our own hearts. There is a mini-chapter on the distinction between art and craft, in which Ridley carefully shows how art is differently related to technique, and thus essentially different from craftwork. He also exposes the inaccuracy of a common reading: the work of art is not just an idea in the artist's head, despite Collingwood's sometimes saying so. Art's proper job is expression, usually of emotions, which is why it is so important to self-knowledge. It aids the proper function of consciousness, which is to bring what it is feeling and thinking to clear expression. Collingwood finished his book with a passionate reading of Eliot's 'The Waste Land'. Ridley echoes him in an appendix on the self-deceit of current British educators, who think that education is the imparting of 'transferable skills'. 'When it is properly so-called, education is aesthetic; it is something "of which there can be no technique"' (50-1).

Gottlieb's technique, since Socrates wrote nothing, is to quote from all of our main sources in order to present a very lively portrait of the man. He wears his learning lightly. Some 20 ancient and another 10 modern texts are identified at the end, but the quotations flow unimpeded in the text. The first date occurs on p. 10. The first argument is a parody, and Socrates loses. Even a first reader's sense that Socrates' defense speech was not very successful is encouraged. Gottlieb then uses the reader's complicity to search out better arguments (in *Meno*, *Euthyphro*, and elsewhere), or to see more in them than first appears. Ingeniously, this mini-book ends with a section on three followers who usually get overlooked, but who illustrate how *not* to interpret Socrates: Aristippus, the pleasure-seeking Cyrnaic; Antisthenes, the indifferentist, and his Cynical followers, Diogenes, Crates and Hipparchia; and Euclides the Megarian, with his 'frenzied love of controversy' (50).

Quinton's technique is different again. His premise is that a reader must read Hume's own prose in order to claim to have learned much about a 'wonderful man' who is 'at once the most admirable and the most lovable of philosophers ...' (58). Quinton's accounts are brilliantly concise, both evaluative and informative. Consider how much is conveyed in these two sentences about Hume's stay in Paris: 'He was agreeably lionized by the *philosophes*, had a serious romance, of unknown intimacy, with the comtesse de Boufflers and saw a good deal of Rousseau, whom he brought back to refuge in England. Rousseau soon fled, spreading implausible paranoid fantasies about Hume' (7). The accounts of Hume on empiricism, abstract ideas, causation, material things, the self, scepticism, morality, politics and religion, are equally deft, but in each case the Quinton is followed by at least as much well-chosen

Hume. For those who believe that introductory philosophy should introduce a student to great philosophers' own work, this volume could serve not just as a supplement, but as a textbook.

Raphael is less successful at justifying the inclusion of Sir Karl Popper. The book begins with conviction, as the story of a teenaged communist in Vienna, horrified by the violence of Béla Kun's brief régime in neighbouring Hungary, and determined to apply his philosophy of science to political affairs. Soon it turns ironic, however, as Raphael attempts to qualify the 'remorseless secularism' (46) with which Popper assailed his opponents: Marxists, Freudians and sociologists, as well as Plato and Hegel. Raphael is at his best in the critical sections toward the end, e.g., when he discusses the idea that 'how to export democracy to the Middle East' is a 'technological problem' (39) of piecemeal social-engineering, and wonders whether global corporations 'can be controlled by nation-state legislatures' (58). Unlike the other authors in the series, Raphael seems determined to teach his readers terms like 'banausic' and 'meliorism', and he drops names (e.g., 'Fukayama', 'C.H. Waddington', and on one page: 'what A.J. Ayer would call ...' and 'what George Steiner terms ...' (29). In contrast to the others, this volume has a few significant typographical errors, e.g., the author is named on the title page as Raphael Frederic. Some editorial intervention might have helped.

Hanfling's *Ayer* is a model of clear analysis. *Language, Truth and Logic* is exposed in all its youthful ambition, and its key theses very carefully taken apart, often modestly using Ayer's own later admissions of difficulty. Little doubt is left that the wreckage is total, but 'just as one must admire the bravado of his early book, so one must be impressed, when reading his later work, by his caution and painstaking treatment of the questions at issue, and his constant striving to do justice to alternative views before arriving at his own conclusion' (51). If the volumes of this series are intended for insertion in introductory philosophy classes when classic texts are taken up, then this volume is perfectly judged.

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Justice is Conflict.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1999. Pp. 93.

US\$18.95. ISBN 0-691-00933-3.

This short book, based on Hampshire's Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Harvard University in 1996-97, consists of three chapters on the theme of procedural justice. The first, entitled 'The Soul and the City', begins by proposing a 'reversal' of Plato's famous analogy in the *Republic*: Hampshire suggests that our experience of inner conflict is modeled on observable, public activities of deliberation and adjudication. (It is less clear to me than to Hampshire that Plato reasoned from the soul to the city; I doubt there's a simple answer to that question.) It's an interesting suggestion, but he doesn't explore it in great detail; the chapter quickly returns to public procedures of conflict resolution, arguing that fundamental moral conflict is a permanent feature of modern societies and that procedural unfairness — expressed generally, a violation of the prescription that one must 'hear the other side' — is always and everywhere unjust, without reference to any distinct conception of the good. We recognize this injustice, however — and here the soul reappears — precisely because we are all accustomed to weighing the pros and cons as fairly as possible when conflicts arise within our own minds. Hampshire goes so far as to characterize this fact about our internal deliberations as a transcendental argument for a 'fair hearing' as a universal principle of procedural justice.

In the second chapter, 'Against Monotheism', Hampshire provocatively asserts that people who believe in one God cannot consistently accept that many different conceptions of the good may be defensible, which militates against their appreciation of the universal force of norms of fairness and reasonableness in the regulation of conflicts. But again, the bulk of the chapter has a somewhat different concern. If the first chapter develops the principle that procedural justice consists, at a minimum, in 'hearing the other side', the second argues that particular procedures for conflict resolution (or the institutions that are the settings for those procedures) are likely to be considered fair and just only if they are also formed by recognized 'customs and habits', or in other words, if they earn 'respect and recognition; from their history in that society. Procedural justice therefore has both universal and contextual components; it must give a fair hearing to all the sides in a conflict, but the procedures and institutions that do so will depend on particular beliefs and traditions.

The final chapter is entitled 'Conflict and Conflict Resolution', and although it is essentially a brief conclusion, it offers some interesting observations on the line that divides evils that are the responsibility of human beings from those that belong to nature, and on the role that socialism has played in shifting this line to expand our recognition of the scope of human agency.

It remains unclear to me how much force the universal requirement of a fair hearing retains once it is combined with the second, contextual component, which leaves it to history and tradition to figure out what the first one really means. I suppose the model of internal deliberation may serve as a guide, although in Hampshire's account that guide has lost its independence, since he supposes it to be modeled on public procedures in the first place. And how could this internal model of deliberation serve as a 'transcendental' justification of public procedures that it only reflects?

Hampshire is too eager to read Plato's analogy between the soul and the city as a psychological ideology invented to support the rule of the philosophers, an ideology in which reason was the shining star. But I think Plato offered a richer and more ambiguous portrait of inner conflict, revealing both verbal and non-verbal elements, a shifting combination of conversation, trickery, and force, a struggle between conflicting world views — and this richness was mirrored in his understanding of politics. Hampshire declares himself a pessimist in this book, because he sees as the only constant against the horrors of human life the power of argument, and concedes that this probably furnishes weak protection. Plato's analogy between the soul and the city, ironically, may have offered us the most sober and sensitive assessment of just how weak it is.

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Eva Feder Kittay

*Love's Labor: Essays on Women,
Equality, and Dependency.*

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xvii + 238.

Cdn\$105.00: US\$70.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-90412-9);

Cdn\$29.99: US\$19.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-90413-7).

In *Love's Labor*, Kittay examines the issue of what she calls *dependency work* — which is a kind of care work done for those who are inevitably dependent, e.g., young children, the sick, the disabled, and many elderly persons — and the nature of those who perform dependency work, whom Kittay calls *dependency workers*. Kittay's main conclusion is that the dependency workers are intrinsically vulnerable because the nature of dependency work requires that they place the needs of those who are inevitably dependent above their own, and therefore, society has an obligation to ensure that they

do not fall into a cycle of dependency themselves. Kittay argues, moreover, that this issue is undertheorized in contemporary political theory, and inadequately treated by public policy makers in the United States. For example, Kittay examines the work of John Rawls, and argues that when developing his conception of justice, Rawls fails to take into account dependency concerns. Or, Kittay considers welfare policy, family and medical leave policies, and issues regarding the rights of disabled persons in the US, and argues that these policies are not adequate to help the dependency workers. Kittay concludes by proposing that this issue may be resolvable if one offers, among other things, universalized compensation for dependency work, that is, all who perform dependency work should be paid.

Love's Labor is eclectic, as Kittay admits, but it is also knit together by her concern to understand and address the issue of dependency work. Kittay's main conclusion that we have an obligation to dependency workers is plausible, but her justification for this obligation is less so. Kittay's argument that public policies in the US do not adequately address dependency concerns also seems correct, but it is less clear that her proposal of universalized compensation for dependency work would resolve this problem. Kittay justifies our obligation to dependency workers on the ground that these workers have cared for other people and therefore we have an obligation to care for them in return. To support this claim, Kittay discusses a lawyer, whose mother expects that she cares for her. The daughter, as Kittay describes, accepts and justifies this obligation as follows: "[My mother] expects me to help her. And you know, she took care of her mother. So I have to help her" (67). According to Kittay, the daughter's reasoning explains why we have an obligation to dependency workers, namely, as the daughter has an obligation to her mother because her mother cared for her mother — the daughter's grandmother, we have an obligation to the dependency workers because they have cared for other persons. Kittay explains that the kind of reciprocity involved here is not the standard kind of reciprocity where 'I do something for you, then you have to reciprocate,' but is instead what she calls a 'connection-based' reciprocity. Kittay also explains that the justification she offers is neither deductive nor inductive, but is what she calls, *analogical*, although she does not explain this idea further (69).

It is doubtful that our obligation to dependency workers is justified this way. If it were so, it would mean that if someone, X, did not care for another person, one would not have an obligation to care for X. For example, suppose the mother in the previous example had not cared for the daughter's grandmother, if our obligation to dependency workers is justified on the ground that they have done something for some other persons, it would mean that the daughter or other people would not have an obligation to care for the mother. But this is surely not the case. Common sense morality tells us that the fact that a person is vulnerable is a sufficient reason for one to have an obligation to care for that person, irrespective of whether that person had done something for others. For example, if a person is drowning and one is nearby, then one has some obligation to help that person, even if that person

has never helped anyone else. If this is correct, Kittay's justification for this obligation is *not sound*.

Kittay, I should note, explicitly rejects the 'vulnerability' model of justification on the grounds that it is unclear, on such a model, who would have the obligation and what sort of vulnerability would impose an obligation (54-64). But these issues are not unique to a 'vulnerability' model, nor are they intractable. Kittay's preferred account would also have to address the questions of who has an obligation to dependency workers and to what extent one has such an obligation.

Kittay's reason for a scheme of universalized compensation for dependency work is that this 'would significantly alter the dependency workers' bargaining position ... A welfare program that universalizes compensation for dependency work ... would allow women to leave abusive relations without the stigma of current welfare participation' (144). Dependency workers who would be vulnerable as a result of dependency work certainly should be compensated. But not all dependency workers ought to be compensated, because not all dependency workers would be vulnerable as a result of dependency work; some might, due to natural advantages, have resources that would prevent them from being made vulnerable. For this group, it is not clear that others would still have an obligation to compensate them for their work. Of course, there is a practical problem of identifying such a group, and Kittay's critique of present welfare policy suggests that we have, at present, not done an adequate job in this regard. But, the principle that one's obligation ends when a person is not vulnerable is a correct one.

Kittay's *Love's Labor* is an important contribution to the feminist aspiration of greater equality and justice for women, because most dependency workers today are still women. It also contributes significantly to both the field of contemporary political theory and to present-day social policies, because adequate political theories and social policies must be able to account for dependency concerns, and this book provides a standpoint from which to examine these concerns.

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Joseph G. Kronick

Derrida and the Future of Literature.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1999. Pp. xiv + 216.

US\$54.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4335-3);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4336-1).

Nearly twenty years ago, I attended Derrida's lectures at the Ecole Normale in Paris. Although I had earlier attempted to read Derrida's work on my own, it was not until I met the man my thesis supervisor called 'le sorcier' that I was able to understand some of the central concepts and categories of deconstruction and grammatology. But such understanding was possible only because Derrida made his ideas accessible to students like myself in his weekly lectures. Rather than taking a cue from him, Joseph Kronick slavishly imitates his master's voice. In *Derrida and the Future of Literature*, Kronick has produced a work that makes no concessions to the great unwashed. His discussion of the future of literature is as forbiddingly hermetic and esoteric as Derrida's own.

Despite the shrine of words Kronick constructs to preserve Derrida from theoretical untouchables, the premiss of his reading of Derrida is an alarmingly simple one: Derrida uses the word 'literature' in a different way than most of us do. Preceded by a long introduction, the book's four loosely woven essays endeavour to distinguish between the conventional use of the word 'literature' and Derrida's. Not surprisingly, it turns out that Derrida uses the word 'literature' to refer to occult machinations in the meta-physical realm of 'archi-écriture' (arch-writing) — an entirely transcendental realm in which human experience itself is allegedly structured. So, the word 'literature' becomes a cipher for the operations of the trace. To put it in one of the many paradoxical formulations that can be found in *Derrida and the Future of Literature*, literature is the experience of what can never be the object of any experience (5).

Kronick not only bows down to the jargon king; he also pays extended and somewhat overdrawn homage to Rudolphe Gasché — the editor of the series in which his book appears. Yet, while Gasché's work should be recommended to anyone who expresses an interest in grammatology and deconstruction, *Derrida and the Future of Literature* falls far short of books like *The Tain of the Mirror*. Strung together in a series that defies even the fuzziest logic of association, all the Derridian buzz-words come out in riotous play in Kronick's writing. The word 'literature' is loosely linked to the words 'secret', 'promise' and 'god', to 'law', 'violence' and 'justice', as well as to 'example' and 'exemplarity'. In the third essay of the book, 'Deconstruction and the Future of Literature', Kronick also follows Derrida in associating literature with the nuclear holocaust. Needless to say, this heady pairing of ostensibly unrelated terms obscures rather than clarifies Derrida's view of literature. Moreover, by the close of the book, one is no closer to understanding Kronick's original claim that when he speaks of literature, he is speaking in the place of ethics

(28). Indeed, Derrida's turn towards ethics, which many commentators have observed and explored, remains hidden behind a veil of jargon dutifully regurgitated by Kronick.

For those who do not have much background in deconstruction and grammatology, *Derrida and the Future of Literature* will obscure rather than illuminate Derrida's thought. For initiates into the deeper mysteries of deconstruction, the book will not tell the reader much she did not already know. Although ethics is a highly significant aspect of Derrida's recent work, Kronick's treatment of Derridian ethics leaves this reader cold. In purely theoretical terms, Kronick offers nothing by way of explanation or critical commentary on Derrida's ethical turn (a turn which even sympathetic readers have found problematic). Rather than situating Derrida's ethical concerns within the context of his work as a whole, and exploring the ramifications of these concerns, Kronick seems blissfully unaware of the controversial nature of his topic. More importantly, the real work of showing how Derrida's 'ethics' can speak — even remotely — to the experience of genocide (Rwanda), civil war (Chechnya), and famine (Ethiopia) is never undertaken. In the face of the atrocities that continue daily to diminish our sense of ourselves as human, to ask 'literature' to stand in for the place of ethics is little short of obscene. Behind the scenes of the tremendous suffering that we are currently witnessing, Derrida's god seems to be disinterestedly paring its fingernails.

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Tamsin Lorraine

*Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments
in Visceral Philosophy.*

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1999.

Pp. 272.

US\$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3623-0);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8586-X).

Keith Ansell Pearson

*Germinal Life: The Difference and
Repetition of Deleuze.*

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xii + 270.

Cdn\$113.00: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-18350-2);

Cdn\$37.99: US\$24.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-18351-0).

The century just past, Foucault prognosticated, will be known as the 'Deleuzian century'. These two books attempt to appropriate the work of Gilles Deleuze for very different projects. Ansell Pearson (University of Warwick; *Viroid Life; Deleuze and Philosophy*, ed.) presents Deleuze as the cosmologist and metaphysician, placing his work within the context of evolutionary and biological theory. Lorraine (Swarthmore College) attempts a more modest project, bringing Irigaray and Deleuze together to suggest a path beyond mind-body dualism. Whether Foucault's reading of the tea leaves was accurate or not, each of these books illustrate the contemporary value of a fresh examination of Deleuze's opus.

Of the two books, Ansell Pearson's *Germinal Life* presents the more ambitious Deleuze, the Deleuze more likely to take us beyond Kant, Husserl and Heidegger. In the first chapter of his dense, close reading of Deleuze's work on 'Bergsonism', Ansell Pearson demonstrates how Deleuze finds in *Creative Evolution* an alternative to theism's transcendent and Kant's transcendental subject — both of which reify experience into Being at the expense of becoming. By bringing Deleuze's work into the context of neo-Darwinian science (Richard Dawkins' selfish gene makes recurring appearances), he makes clear the significant philosophical contribution Deleuze makes at a time when science is itself rejecting its own mechanistic and vitalist heritages. Viewing time as duration rather than linearity, all things are themselves transitional nows that participate in a being-as-becoming that is itself heterogeneous. Germinal life itself participates in its own becoming, and thus what is is not a result of mechanical, 'external' laws of nature. The Being-Non-being distinction ignores the fundamental flux that is characteristic of all existence. Hence, Deleuze posits an ontology that foregrounds difference and repetition at the expense of the predication of subjects and objects. He stresses multiplicity at the expense of unities that encompass all, and the flux of what is generally perceived as personal identity; 'a peculiarly Euro-

pean form of Buddhism' (127). It is on this point that Deleuze is most radical: the replacement of human subjectivity with a profound awareness of the permeable boundaries and the osmosis in those aspects of existing that we associate with the 'self'. Thus, with Guattari, he developed a strategy of resistance to all totalities known as 'schizoanalysis': calling attention to the fragmentary 'self' that is implicated with other fragments of reality. By calling attention to other ways of configuring social and physical existence, one becomes aware of the interaction and co-implication of humans with other aspects of their environment; their being cogs, collections of cogs, and even portions of cogs, in larger and smaller 'desiring machines'. The centrality of the self in Western philosophical discourse is part of our self-delusion and reification of our own selves into existence.

This alternative ontology is central to Deleuze's project of thinking beyond the human. Deleuze's Nietzschean task is to restore the vital and virtual power of life to humanity, indeed, to make possible an overhumanity, by the overcoming of all that devalues life by unifying and tyrannizing life's vitality. Among the all-that-devalues, of course, is traditional 'slave morality' and its penchant for placing limits on life's options by positing subjectivity and organism.

In contrast to *Germinal Life*, Lorraine's book appropriates selected aspects of Deleuze and Luce Irigaray to conceive subjectivity in a way that overcomes mind-body dualism. Such dualism, following a standard feminist critique (especially Elizabeth Grosz' *Volatile Bodies*), privileges the masculine-intellectual-rational-heavenly at the expense of the feminine-physical-bodily-emotional-earthly. The devaluation of the feminine in this schema provides the motivation for Lorraine's project. She spells out a conception of historically conditioned selfhood that seeks to take seriously both the corporeal and psychic character of the self. Intrinsic to this schema is the validation of the bodily character of one's experience of oneself as self. The disembodied notion of self needs to be replaced by a concept of self that recognizes the 'self' as a discursive and corporeal process, and the irreducible role of particular embodiment in our constructions of selfhood. Lorraine distinguishes 'conceptual logics', those 'background processes informing the conceptual awareness of ... the "rational" processes of logical and articulate thought' from 'corporeal logics', 'background processes informing the perceptual awareness of sensation, ... traditionally known as the "irrational" processes of mood, intuitive "gut" feelings, and emotions' (7). While these two logics may be distinguished, they are both of a piece. They cannot in any real sense be sifted out from one another, for both are a unitary expression of our bodily, social and narrative character as linguistic, corporeal creatures. Although we distinguish mind from body, knowledge is irreducibly somatic.

Lorraine seeks to spell out this subjectivity that is corporeal and conceptual, that 'is not a stable entity' (4) by appealing to Irigaray and Deleuze for support. She examines Irigaray's appreciation of and critique of Nietzsche. For Irigaray, Nietzsche fails to achieve the promise of his philosophy because of his misogyny, a 'blind spot [that] ultimately leads him to a somatophobia'

(16). Irigaray seeks to 'shatter mirrors' — in particular the specular male gaze that identifies self by distinguishing it from the female other. One of the most fruitful ways she does this is by giving close attention to the mucous, fluid, and permeable nature of what we take to be the real bodily boundaries between self and world. Irigaray invites us to pay close attention to the 'sensible transcendental', that which lies just outside our own boundaries, the real other with which we intimately interrelate. This sensible transcendental resonates with a 'feminine divine.' In contrast to the 'masculine divine' which is 'untainted by the corruption of the ever-changing states of material reality,' the 'feminine divine ... always touches on and yet exceeds whatever sensible reality the subject may be experiencing' (69). Like the relation of mother to the child in the womb, the sensible transcendental is 'radically other to the infant without being ... completely transcendent' (81). What Irigaray offers is a critique of masculine subjectivity which creates the illusion of a self-identical self by turning a blind eye to the essential otherness of the other.

From Irigaray Lorraine turns to Deleuze. First she draws on *Anti-Oedipus* for the way it makes the transparent subject complex, and then on Deleuze's appropriation of Nietzsche's eternal return as the return, not of the same, but of difference. This 'logic of multiplicity' which Deleuze finds in Nietzsche forms the basis of a radical critique of all programs of normalization that operate by denying multiplicity. Becoming is "below and above the threshold of perception," state Deleuze and Guattari: it is 'becoming-imperceptible,' as it lies at the edges of perception. Stressing the becoming-imperceptible allows one to shift attention from "everybody / everything ... the molar aggregate" to "the cosmos with its molecular components" (quoted at 189). What we call ourselves are events among events in *the Fold*.

While Lorraine reads Deleuze and Irigaray in order to 'shatter mirrors' of masculine subjectivity, she is also concerned to 'map lines of flight' toward more promising and empowering concepts of subjectivity. Missing from this thoughtful book is a fulfillment of the promise of its opening page: 'We live in a world in which the specific form our bodies take very much matters.' While attention to the feminine character of over half of those bodies does shatter specular subjectivity, the 'molecular' character of those bodies in all their diversity fails to become visible. So much promise rests on shaping a feminine subjectivity (for men as well as women) that the 'anti-racist, anti-heterosexist, and post-Marxist ... mappings of the social field' to which Lorraine pays lip service fail to materialize (237). Despite her opening sentence, only male and female seem to matter.

Likewise, Ansell Pearson recognizes in Deleuze the danger that real others, in the form of alcoholics, addicts and 'genuine schizophrenics', become philosophical props to be used as object lessons, such that genuine otherness disappears (133). If one of the difficulties with Lorraine's book is its failure to demonstrate the plurality it promises, Ansell Pearson promises little but delivers too much. Ansell Pearson holds Deleuze's work in very high esteem, recognizes the validity of some of the charges against him, but ably comes to

his aid on many points. However, he frequently raises important issues only to pass quickly on to another subject. His discussion of Deleuze's relation to Nietzsche's critique of nihilism is a case in point. While Ansell Pearson does a good job of succinctly clarifying some of the complexity of Nietzsche's views on nihilism, and places that within the context of Deleuze's emphasis on the eternal return of the different, he concludes the discussion with an affirmation of 'active nihilism' (127-9). Surely this is related to Deleuze's estimation of Fichte's 'beatitude' (135-7). Yet, while Deleuzian nihilism may seek to offer a 'reduction in the value of the human' that avoids 'turning the world into something ugly and reprehensible' (129), I found myself begging for an explanation of how, at least theoretically, the ugly and reprehensible is to be avoided. Ansell Pearson's text often prompts such questions about the significance of his material, but seldom addresses them, even when they seem quite obvious.

Both books introduce issues that are of profound significance to the living of human life. Whether Foucault's tea-leaf reading proves accurate or not will depend in part on the effectiveness of philosophers such as Ansell Pearson in making a persuasive case for the coherence of the Deleuzian ontology, and of Lorraine to integrate that ontology into on-going philosophical conceptions of human and more-than-human existence. In both cases, the authors point us toward what Foucault foretold would be a sea change in the conception of the self, or perhaps even the 'end of Man'. Whether or not such transformation occurs — by bringing together divergent voices such as those of Process thought and Eco-philosophy with speculative scientists and the likes of Deleuze and Irigaray — remains to be seen, of course. Were it to be so, Cartesian dualism may seem as strange to future thinkers as the four humours and Thales' fundamental moisture seem to us today.

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Alasdair MacIntyre

Dependent Rational Animals:

Why Human Beings Need the Virtues.

La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company

1999. Pp. xiii + 172.

US\$26.95. ISBN 0-8126-9397-3.

Angus Taylor

Magpies, Monkeys, and Morals: What Philosophers Say about Animal Liberation.

Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 1999.

Pp. 167.

Cdn\$14.95. ISBN 1-55111-202-7.

In recent years, there has been an upsurge of philosophical interest in the moral status of nonhuman animals, and this is usefully charted in Taylor's introductory text on the subject. This interest has also encouraged a renewed attention to questions of the naturalness and animality of humans, and that is a major theme of MacIntyre's book. Beyond this complementarity of topics, though, there is little basis for comparison between the two books, since their aims, approach and likely readerships are quite different. Taylor's is written for students and a general audience, seeking to present an even-handed overview of the range of philosophical argument that has been influential in recent years. MacIntyre, himself an influential philosopher of recent years, presents a sustained argument developed in a series of lectures originally delivered to a professional philosophical audience.

Because Taylor aims to present arguments of philosophers to a general readership he has understandably thought it necessary to start out with a simplifying frame, casting the book in terms of a 'debate about two radically different ways of viewing the world' (7), with philosophers who have written on the subject divided broadly into two camps, consisting of those who favour and those who oppose animal liberation. As anyone acquainted with the field knows, and as Taylor does acknowledge, the specific term 'animal liberation' has controversial connotations even within the wide spectrum of positions that in one way or another seek to promote the defence, protection, welfare or rights of animals; it thus has 'opponents' within the same camp, so to speak, rather than in a hostile one. The actual material of the book more faithfully reflects the reality that there is now one rather sparsely populated camp — essentially comprising a lingering handful of philosophers who consider the (alleged) absence of linguistic ability among (any) nonhumans to be a sufficient reason to deny them moral consideration — and another very large and diffuse camp within which numerous debates rage about how much and what sort of consideration is due to which sorts of beings for which sorts of reasons.

Most of the book surveys debates in the main camp, with the initial 'for and against animal liberation' framing giving way to more nuanced discus-

sions of various utilitarian, deontological and rights-based positions. Taylor also shows how concern for animals is in some ways compatible and in others conflicts with environmental concerns; and in the two chapters considering applications, some attention is paid to how different arguments apply differently to different animals. The accounts given for the most part quite faithfully reflect the basic terms of debate in recent years. In general, this is a useful introduction, and its usefulness is enhanced by its references for further reading: quite precise locations are given for the particular arguments and positions discussed.

One point that could have been brought out clearly, though, is the distinction between moral agents and 'moral patients': since so much turns in this book on who counts as a 'member of the moral community', this distinction is crucial. Hardly anyone would argue nonhumans can be moral agents, but this does not necessarily stop them being morally considerable. Failure to observe this distinction particularly vitiates the chapter which traces arguments about animals back to canonical philosophers whose — often merely incidental — remarks on the subject are simplified sometimes to the point of distortion; and I see little real point in bivouacking together philosophers so diverse as Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant and Mill.

Aristotle and Aquinas provide the philosophical bearings for MacIntyre's argument which, along its way, decisively routs any lingering unreconstructed Cartesians and neo-Wittgensteinians in the minority camp. Maybe Cartesians have already been routed by dogs: those who entertain scepticism about the mental life of animals are what MacIntyre refers to as 'natural bitees', who fail to appreciate how their own mental machinations communicate worrying doubts back to the animal. The neo-Wittgensteinians are on safer ground in denying only that animals have a capacity for propositional utterances; but MacIntyre questions how relevant, or even true, this is. A substantial part of his book discusses evidence that at least some animals have forms of life that are not so alien to our own, and some even have some linguistic competence. He argues that some nonhuman animals 'are already guided by a kind of practical reasoning that is exhibited in their taking *this* to be a reason for doing *that* ... Dolphins, gorillas, and members of some other species are no more merely responsive to the inputs of their senses than we are. They too inhabit a world whose salient features can have this or that significance for them. ... They too make and correct mistakes' (60-1). MacIntyre thus argues that animal flourishing is relevantly similar to human flourishing, and that certain animals can reasonably be said to 'have a good' in a morally relevant sense.

Comparisons with other animals illuminate in both directions. Humans may be *rational* animals, but they are animals, nonetheless, with animal identities and animal histories. This is something they are inclined to ignore or conceal from themselves. When philosophers define humans as independent practical reasoners they bracket out the fact that humans do not start life as such; and this neglect of childhood parallels their neglect of old

age and of experiences, at all stages of life, of disability and dependence (82). Independent practical reasoning is achieved through interactions with others; it requires skills, virtues and self-knowledge, the acquisition of which we owe to particular others on whom we have had to depend, and on whom we never altogether cease to be dependent (97).

Because the virtues are so inextricably bound up with relations of reciprocal dependence, they are not simply morally desirable, but are *needed*. So even other-regarding virtues are not to be equated with altruism as distinct from self-interest. This dichotomy obscures sight of those crucial goods that can only be mine insofar as they are also those of others. It also supports a distinction between what justice says we owe others and what we might supererogatively give others; MacIntyre wants to restore prominence to a virtue he finds in Aquinas which consists in a combination of generosity and justice (120-1).

In considering what types of political and social society can embody those relationships, MacIntyre depicts the conditions for what sounds like a communitarian utopia, although he criticises communitarians who attribute value to community *per se* rather than to the virtues they can manifest and foster. In placing the emphasis on general virtues that depend on particular circumstances for their meaning and exercise, MacIntyre in effect positions himself amongst those political philosophers who have revived an interest in republicanism as a preferable alternative to liberalism.

In the end, then, MacIntyre's consideration of human animality serves pretty much to bolster views already advanced in earlier works. He is certainly to be commended for showing how social practices themselves are embedded in relations that have to be explained by reference to human animality. Whether such an account necessarily entails his views about the primacy of virtue and community, though, or whether it might not as well or instead support a more justice-orientated political philosophy are questions that warrant further exploration. Also to consider further is how nonhuman animals fit in: an implication of the earlier chapters of the book is that they may have claims of justice on us; if so, theories with different trajectories may do as well or better than MacIntyre's.

To understand how and why humans should care about nonhuman animals I agree it is necessary to understand how and why they care about other humans. It is also necessary, though, to reckon with how little humans often care about one another. With this in mind, MacIntyre's account of why they *need* the virtues seems less robust than he presents it. He argues that his favoured virtues do not run counter to rational self-interest, since even calculating relationships, like those typical of the market, 'can only be sustained by being embedded in certain types of local nonmarket relationship, relationships of uncalculated giving and receiving, if they are to contribute to overall flourishing ...' (117). A basic problem, though, is that the calculating egoist can be dependent on virtuous others without having to be virtuous him- or herself: s/he needs the virtues — but in *others*. In short, if we accept that well-ordered, virtuous, relations are a norm to aspire to rather

than an empirical reality, then to point out that 'we need the virtues' is to point out a problem, not a solution. The problem is that modern societies are marked by crime, injustice and indifference; if the immanent truth about the underlying bases of human solidarity is to assume practical form, there is reason to think that political philosophers who prioritise the justice of society's basic institutions over conceptions of the good or virtue have a point that MacIntyre is not adequately addressing. In any society where there are marked discrepancies between degrees of need fulfillment, 'our' needs for the virtues are liable to vary; there are also significant social differences between who owes what to whom as a matter of justice and who can show generosity to whom. Moreover, an importantly relevant difference between the principles of justice and generosity is that coercion and state policy can be directed to the former in ways that are not appropriate for the latter. In short, to speak of a general but sociologically undifferentiated 'need' for the virtue of generosity may be to say something either too abstract or empirically false. It is also unlikely to give sufficient guidance for human relations to their nonhuman cohabitants of this world.

To be sure, traditional accounts of social justice and its implicit social contract can be criticised for appealing to a model of autonomous rational moral agents, as if this were an adequate description of the inhabitants of the social world. Nevertheless, in the designing of institutions and in the assignment of responsibilities, as well as in the formulation of norms, a distinctive role falls to those rational agents who are able to cognitively bracket out their particular dependencies. So, whether we are considering humans in their various phases and conditions of life, or whether we are considering our relations to nonhumans, the point already made in relation to Taylor remains: we cannot overlook the ways in which the idea of an autonomous moral agent is relevantly distinct from that of a moral patient.

Still, whether or not one is persuaded by MacIntyre's political philosophy, an undeniable achievement of this book is to make it abundantly clear that any account of humans as rational moral agents involves an abstraction, from the facts of their dependence and animality, that stands in need of justification.

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Mary Margaret McCabe

Plato's Individuals.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

First paperback printing 1999. Pp. xiii + 339.

US\$52.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07351-1);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02939-3).

McCabe argues that Plato was not primarily interested in what there is — famously, the perfect being of Forms and imperfect being of sensory objects. Rather, Plato's foremost interest was in the problem of individuation, to which he gave a solution radically different than Aristotle's. The problem of individuation includes questions about how to identify the conditions for something's being a unity — call this its *internal unity* — as well as questions about how to distinguish something from others around it — call this its *unity within a context*. Aristotle's solution is to make *being one* derivative upon *being one of some kind*. On Aristotle's account, it would be misguided to look for what is just one, as Plato does. For Aristotle, questions of unity must wait until we sort the world into kinds, each of which contains whole organisms. McCabe develops a reply on Plato's behalf: Aristotle's project of deciding which organisms fall into what kinds must itself wait upon prior questions of unity; for without knowing what makes any organism one, we cannot tell how to sort them.

McCabe tells a developmental story of Plato's henology. Given the middle period theory of Forms (chapters 2 and 3), problems about individuation emerge in the *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Timaeus*, and *Sophist* (chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7). The problems take the form of a dilemma: either unity is *austere*, in which case nothing can be said of the ones; or it is *generous*, in which case the unity is weakened to any bundle of properties. But neither alternative gives us an account of individuals as basic to the world.

The solution appears in the second half of the *Sophist* and the *Philebus* (chapter 8; presumably, the *Politicus* also has the solution in hand, but McCabe gives it almost no discussion). The dilemma assumed that properties of an object are parts of it in such a way that they pluralize the thing that has them (call this the *pluralizing predication* assumption). The solution is to make properties of individuation *contextual* rather than pluralizing: individuation of a thing occurs not through its own nature but against a background and in relation to other items also under consideration. Such a solution does not need Aristotelian sortals. In the *Sophist*, Motion, Rest and so forth are individuated by their differences from each other, as part of a *mesh of identity*, not by some further conception of what makes something a kind.

An additional chapter extends the Platonic solution to the problem of personal identity. The solution is in part stated in the account at *Theaetetus* 185 of the necessary unity of consciousness and hinted at in part by the wax tablet and aviary models of false belief, which make vivid to us the necessary autonomy of the mind. Unity of consciousness enables us to identify individu-

als in space and time; and personal autonomy produces systems of understanding that come together by reason.

The heart of the book is its reading of the *Parmenides* as full of valid argumentation for a philosophically significant end. Readers motivated by love of wisdom and charity to Plato will find McCabe's interpretation superior to those that dismiss Parmenides' arguments as muddles to be sorted out with grammatical distinctions (never considering that the muddle might come from an imported theory of predication). But McCabe achieves this superiority at a price: she attributes to the whole of the *Parmenides* an implausible assumption that is insufficiently grounded in the text, namely, the *pluralizing predication* assumption mentioned above. There is a better reading of that dialogue: Samuel C. Rickless's 'How Parmenides Saved the Theory of Forms' (*Philosophical Review* 107 [1998] 501-54). Rickless's reading is superior in fidelity to the text and charity to the author of the *Parmenides*. In particular, he avoids attributing the implausible *pluralizing predication* assumption to that dialogue and allows us to appreciate its philosophical virtuosity, rather than read it as a record of honest (if not clearly stated) perplexity. But on Rickless's reading, the goal of the *Parmenides* is after all centered upon the theory of Forms, refining that theory to eliminate the middle-period assumption of the radical purity of the Forms (namely, that no Form can have contrary properties). Thus McCabe's main thesis is cast into doubt.

Despite failing in its main thesis — that we should read Plato foremost as a henologist not ontologist — McCabe does, I believe, establish that Plato developed a defensible henology prior to and as plausible as Aristotle's. Her exposition and defense of Plato's henology is reason enough to praise the book and recommend it to scholars of ancient philosophy and philosophers of language.

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Patrick McNamara

Mind and Variability: Mental Darwinism, Memory, and Self. Human Evolution, Behavior, and Intelligence Series.

Westport, CT: Praeger 1999. Pp. x + 163.

US\$55.00. ISBN 0-275-96383-7.

McNamara approaches two major themes of the book, memory and self, from a selectionist standpoint. He explores a Bergsonian model of memory. The basic idea is that recollecting involves in the first instance relaxing the mind's inhibitory powers freeing a vast array of images. Those images are then subjected to a process of selection until a match is found with a cue (some current perception or clue). Such a match constitutes remembering. Similar selectionist accounts are given for the process of attention, waking perception and dreaming. McNamara appeals to selectionist principles again in an attempt to elucidate the idea of a self. Following James, he suggests that we select among self-concepts. The process of selection in this case does not lead to a discarding of the 'losers' but rather to a hierarchical organization of all the self-concepts. McNamara interprets some disorders in terms of the disinhibition of subordinate selves.

McNamara begins by introducing the fundamentals of selectionist theories (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 criticizes an 'instructivist' approach to memory. Bergson's selectionist theory of remembering is described in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 provide a summary of varied evidence for inhibitory and selective processes in cognition ranging from a variety of cognitive phenomena to neurological foundations thereof. Chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to selectionist ideas in James's work: the stream of consciousness provides the variety of ideas (be it the images being remembered or self-concepts) which are then subject to selection. Chapter 8 suggests a selectionist approach to self-regulation describing strategies for dealing with the excess mental variability. Chapter 9 provides a phenomenological account of recollection. Chapter 10 is devoted to a selectionist account of dreaming. McNamara argues that dreams help to construct the self through a process of editing in autobiographical memory. Chapter 11 presents a selectionist account of the relations between memory, self and culture.

The book does not quite live up to expectations. It does not present a unified *theory* of memory and self. Rather, it weaves two selectionist strands of thought together: Bergson's theory of memory and a James-inspired account of the selection of self-concepts. As far as the evidence for his account, McNamara makes connections with neurology, clinical psychology (particularly noteworthy is his discussion of the various disorders) and even with parapsychology and mythology. One cannot but have the impression that the evidence presented is all too frequently not specific enough (phenomena such as negative priming effects or false memories can at best be judged to be compatible with a broad selectionist account). Sometimes equivocations are in play: surely, the fact that inhibiting connections among nodes are a crucial

part of many neural networks in no way supports the sort of selective inhibition Bergson hypothesized in the case of memory. Still, the book is worthwhile for bringing to light the truly fascinating ideas of Bergson and for the attempt to tie them with contemporary research.

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Igor Primoratz

Ethics and Sex.

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xi + 205.

Cdn\$113.00: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-09333-3);

Cdn\$37.99: US\$24.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-09334-1).

Primoratz's purpose in this slim book is to correct moral philosophy's historical tendency to ignore, dismiss, or misunderstand what is undoubtedly a central part of human life. As such, it offers a useful review and commentary on historical and contemporary moral theories of sex and their application to central moral questions in human sexuality, well suited for an introductory course to sexual ethics.

The first third of the book considers and rejects three powerful perfectionist theories which attempt to show (variously) that sex is permissible only if it is (a) intended for procreation, (b) within a loving relationship, or (c) communicative. Against (c), Primoratz argues that neither God's will nor nature can define the natural purpose of sex in such a way that that purpose becomes normative (16-18). Nor, he says, does it follow that since sex with love is often very good, that loveless sex is no good at all (32-3). Finally, the idea that sex is communication fails because it is simply unable to explain instances of sex with strangers or with oneself where there is little or no effective communication (39-40). (And some commentators, we learn here, worry that if sex really is a form of communication, then — because of the private language argument — masturbation may simply be impossible as a sex act!)

Primoratz further concludes that since these three accounts all fail to provide coherent and persuasive sexual moralities, so too do accounts of sexual perversion which attempt to define perversion as sex which is non-procreative, non-loving, or non-communicative (50-66).

Most of this is, I think, clearly right, but I'd like to draw attention to Primoratz's somewhat questionable assertion that the purpose of sex is *not*

procreation. Primoratz offers three arguments to support this claim: (i) since any singly randomly timed act of heterosexual sex is statistically *unlikely* to result in pregnancy, the purpose of sex cannot be procreation, (ii) since the purpose of any act is only the purpose which some person has with regard to that act and since people do not always have sex for the purpose of procreation, it follows that the purpose of sex is not procreation, and (iii) since the use of contraception and artificial insemination effectively sever sex and procreation from each other, then (if 'function' means 'unique to' or 'definitional of') the function of sex is not procreation (16-7).

But this approach ignores several crucial complications. First, many forms of human and animal behavior (including sex, wing flapping, hunting, and scratching) admittedly do fail to achieve their purpose as *single* acts but nonetheless succeed when repeated. This does not mean the single acts have no purpose. Second, even though the *proximate* cause of a particular sex act is always some particular human intention(s) (which may or may not be procreative), this fact *in no way* demonstrates that there is no *distal* set of biological forces which have shaped human sexual capacity and dispositions to reliably procreate in most environments. Finally, it is perfectly reasonable to define 'function' (non-essentialistically) as that purpose which best describes why a thing is as it is. This definition captures our sense that the function of a polar bear's fur is to keep the bear warm (and this fact explains why it's so thick, etc.), regardless of any human intentions with regard to that fur. Once this is realized, it is easy to see that (iii) is just anachronistic, since if the natural function of sex *is* to procreate, this function evolved long before the advent of modern reproductive technologies.

Of course, even if the natural function of sex is procreative (with all this might entail about our physiology and psychology), this fact in no way settles our moral duties. We (and our sexual behavior) are shaped by our biological history, but we are certainly not slaves to it. But the fact that sex is so crucially linked to procreation is certainly nonetheless relevant to *understanding* human sexuality, and I think Primoratz, in arguing too strongly against this connection, impoverishes his treatment of particular sexual issues in the latter two-thirds of the book.

Overall, Primoratz adopts a critical, rather than positive, sexual morality, arguing that sex should be understood as 'plain sex', and really no different to any other human activity. Insofar as Primoratz has a normative position, it is liberal, and relies heavily on the Harm Principle. His conclusions on several challenging moral questions reflect this minimalist approach:

Thus adultery is not wrong as extramarital *sex*, but only when it involves breach of promise, or seriously hurts the feelings of the non-adulterous spouse, etc. Prostitution is not wrong as commercial *sex*, but if and when the prostitute is forced into this line of work by the lack of any real alternative. Pedophilia is not wrong as adult-child *sex*, but because even when the child is willingly participating, its willingness is extremely suspect in view of the radical asymmetries of matur-

ity, knowledge, understanding, and power of children and adults. Sexual harassment is not wrong because it is *sexual*, but because it is *harassment*. Rape is not wrong as *sexual* battery, but as *sexual battery*. (173-4)

Readers will have to decide for themselves if Primoratz's 'plain sex' view adequately captures their moral intuitions or (contrariwise) whether those moral intuitions retain their relevance. If 'sex sins' carry no special moral blame just in virtue of being sexual, then why do couples so frequently demand or expect *sexual* fidelity? Why not 'tennis-playing' fidelity? Why is it wrong to hurt someone's feelings through infidelity but *not* seriously wrong to hurt her feelings by, say, denying sex to another? Is it *really* no worse to be forced into prostitution than to be forced into, say, waitressing or telemarketing? And if children's powerlessness morally precludes their involvement in sex, why doesn't it also preclude their involvement in a host of other activities (like religion or risky sports like hockey)?

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Steven Rappaport
Models and Reality in Economics.
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing
1998. Pp. vi + 223.
US\$85.00. ISBN 1-85898-575-7.

Rappaport's goal is to give 'a description of the conduct of inquiry in economics' (2). He begins by dismissing McCloskey's view that economics is 'an exercise in rhetoric' (2), before moving on to discuss the 'Is it science?' approaches. These posit views of what science is, and then ask whether economics lives up to them. Rappaport argues that these approaches are barren. Some fail because they rest on inadequate conceptions of science. Others fail because exploring the issue of whether economics fits a proposed conception proves unilluminating.

Rappaport's positive view is that economists are in the business of constructing models for various purposes. Theoretical models are proposed to resolve conceptual and normative issues, and are claimed to have only a limited bearing on the real world. Applied models are proposed as (at least approximately) true, and are employed in explanation.

Rappaport does not discuss the work of Edgeworth directly, but the latter's work provides an apt illustration of a theoretical model. I draw on Sen's discussion in 'Rational Fools' (*Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6 [1977] 317-44) and Walsh's discussion in *Rationality, Allocation, and Reproduction* (Claren-

don 1996). Roughly speaking, Edgeworth established that egoistic traders in a competitive market will arrive at an exchange equilibrium in the 'core' of their economy — where outcomes in the core are: (1) Pareto-optimal (no one can be made better off without someone being made worse off); and (2) such that no one's resulting commodity bundle is less prized by her than her initial endowment.

Edgeworth, however, did not believe that agents are pure egoists. He was (as Sen points out) in part addressing (successfully) a hypothetical question through the construction of a model of contracts between egoists: is it possible that egoistic behavior can increase the general good? Such questions of possibility are what Rappaport dubs 'conceptual'. But what bounds the possibilities that economists allow in the construction of their theoretical models (Rappaport, 139)? The models must reflect reality to some extent.

Rappaport draws on a distinction between global and mini-theories (he favors Laudan's version of this distinction) to help here. Economic models are mini-theories constructed within the framework of an 'accepted' background global theory. In the case of theoretical models, there is a requirement to include 'one or more global statements belonging to a global theory [the modelers] accept' (139). Edgeworth did not see his work as entirely hypothetical: egoism might well apply in the case of contracts (Sen, 318). On Rappaport's view, then, this latter thought is part of a global theory Edgeworth accepted.

Rappaport acknowledges that this is only a partial account of how global theories frame theoretical models (139), and that we have no uncontroversial criteria for evaluating the acceptability of global theories (140). He does not acknowledge, however, an ambiguity inherent in his claim (131) that theoretical models resolve normative issues. He considers the following case: 'suppose the problem an economist is addressing is what should be done to combat the crime problem in the USA. Suppose that the (best supported) answer is "More prison capacity should be constructed in the USA and more offenders put in jail". As this answer is a normative claim, the problem it addresses is a normative one' (131).

The ambiguity is between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. The normative question above is the hypothetical: 'Given that crime should be combatted, how should we do it?', not the categorical: 'Should crime be combatted?' This might appear trivial, but in other cases it is more important to note that models do not resolve categoricals. If Pareto-optimality is our goal, then Edgeworth gives us (perhaps) a passably good account of how to achieve it. But is Pareto-optimality all we should be aiming for?

In an Edgeworth economy, those who are initially endowed with little to trade will potentially end up with little in the post-trade core distribution, its perfectly competitive Pareto-optimality notwithstanding. In response to this (see Walsh, 163-70) Edgeworth claimed that 'the concrete nineteenth-century man is for the most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian.' The idea is that wealthy traders will be satisfied with, even desirous of, trades in the core that benefit those with poor initial endowments. Edgeworth begins

with the notion of a self-interested trader, but then notes that ‘sympathy’ on the part of traders will result in Pareto-optimality with greater sum utility.

Alternatively, initial endowments can be modified by lump sum redistribution. Laissez-faire economists, of course, reject this suggestion on the grounds that it will distort incentives and leave the poor ultimately even worse off. The relevant point, however, is that no model is going to tell us that abject poverty is categorically bad, and none is required; models (at best) can only tell us whether poverty can be eliminated, and if so how.

Applied models, according to Rappaport, are designed to have a more direct bearing upon reality — they are ‘put forward [by economists] as true, or approximately true, descriptions’ (176). Rappaport’s discussion focusses upon two types of explanation: why and what. Explanation-why is causal, but not deductive nomological; Rappaport rejects a ‘Humean analysis of causation’ (by which he means ‘one that relies upon the idea of a scientific law in analysing the concept of causation’ [181-2]). (Rappaport does not discuss Davidson’s position: you might know that A caused B without there being any covering law that subsumes the events under the descriptions ‘A’ and ‘B’; yet there is a covering law that subsumes them under different descriptions.)

In his characterization of explanation-what, Rappaport borrows from Dray’s account of the notion as it applies in history. Rappaport’s own example (with help from Tregarthen) is the subsumption of ‘the Santa Monica rental housing market with rent control under the economist’s [model] of a competitive market with a price ceiling’ (202). Rappaport notes that ‘the application of the model to the Santa Monica situation does not even purport to say *why* rent control was imposed in Santa Monica in the late 1970s’ (202). However, this does not rule out the application as answering another why question — namely, as Rappaport himself points out (202), it would explain why a rental shortage exists. Surely both what and why questions are typically addressed: in order to apply a model, one must know what the phenomena are, and then the model is used to explain an outcome.

Interestingly enough, Rappaport notes that the price ceiling model also ‘*predicts* a shortage of rental units’ (202, italics mine). And even some theoretical models apparently predict — recall the discussion above concerning how to combat crime. Talk of prediction runs against the tenor of the book, however. Rappaport argues that tackling the issue of predictive success is uninformative vis-à-vis describing economics. But if this is true, then perhaps it highlights a flaw in the discipline. Certain economists think that prediction is important (see, e.g., Friedman’s ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’ in *Essays in Positive Economics* [University of Chicago Press 1953]). And economists advise on and set public policy. We should no more let economics off the predictive hook than we do rocket science.

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Realistic Pragmatism:

An Introduction to Pragmatic Philosophy.

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US\$65.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4407-4);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4408-2).

This book is an introduction to pragmatism, but also an explication of Rescher's own version of a realistic pragmatic philosophy. Rescher's realistic pragmatism is designed to dispel a number of traditional objections that figure prominently in the history of pragmatism from Peirce to the present day. Rescher contrasts a pragmatism of the 'left' — associated with James, Schiller, Dewey, Rorty — with a pragmatism of the 'right' — represented by Peirce and himself. Rescher carefully lays out a methodological version of pragmatism that is marked by metaphysical realism, objectivity, rationality, a hard-nosed theory of truth, but tempered with methodological flexibility and a healthy epistemological fallibilism. Rescher's distinction between truth-conditions and use-conditions in his discussion of language and logic presents an intriguing strategy for cleaning up a pragmatist theory of truth and meaning. Rescher applies equal attention to presenting a pragmatic moral theory that is objective, principled, rational, sensible, capable of accommodating the highest human values, while shunning the conventional, pluralistic, crass-materialistic, anything-goes socio-cultural relativism traditionally associated with pragmatists of the left. All in all, Rescher forcefully addresses well-known criticisms leveled against earlier forms of pragmatism, presenting an alternative view that fares well as a response to recalcitrant problems of modernist philosophy without succumbing to tenuous laxities of post-modernism. This book is to be recommended for its effective portrayal of a hard-nosed objectivist, realist pragmatism.

Unfortunately the book will disappoint readers familiar with classical pragmatist texts. Rorty is obviously the primary target of Rescher's polemics. Regrettably Rescher is willing to sacrifice James and Dewey in the process by putting them on Rorty's side of a simple left-right divide between different forms of pragmatism. Rescher has succeeded in drawing a line not between Rorty and Peirce so much as between Rorty and Rescher. The work of other pragmatists may be reasonably projected into this debate in various ways, but not in the way that Rescher prefers.

Rescher aligns himself with Peirce's realism and fallibilism. But there is little or nothing of Peirce's evolutionary cosmology here, nor his category system, nor his semiotics in general. More telling is the fact that the version of the pragmatic maxim that Rescher endorses is closer to James's than to Peirce's, even while lauding Peirce's objectivism while disparaging James's alleged subjectivism. Early on, Lovejoy identified an ambiguity in the pragmatic maxim, one reading emphasizing operational-evidential contents of terms (Peirce's initial focus as a 'laboratory man'), the other stressing the

functional efficacy of adopting and implementing beliefs (the primary focus of James's methodological pragmatism). Rescher heavily exploits the latter reading in developing his own position and in addressing various traditional objections to generic pragmatism. Especially notable are Rescher's careful distinctions among thesis pragmatism, system pragmatism, and method pragmatism. Allegedly James is a thesis pragmatist, Peirce a method pragmatist, while Lewis, Carnap, and Quine press different forms of system pragmatism. What is missing in this list is Peirce's early *term* pragmatism, which focuses on operational-evidential contents of intellectual concepts and 'hard words'. This seminal form of pragmatism is at best only implicit in Rescher's methodological pragmatism. His pragmatism is better understood as Jamesian but without James's occasionally precipitate rhetoric.

At the same time, there is no mention of James's revolutionary *radical empiricism* as a response to Hume's piecemeal empiricism based on 'simple impressions'. The latter view entails a detachment of reason and 'the passions' that Rescher attempts to refute in a manner that is not so convincing as it would be if he were to acknowledge and exploit James's insights. Also Rescher makes no attempt to defend James's often-misinterpreted cash-value metaphor (James's point being that we often invest credence in claims and implement beliefs that we are not in a position to immediately justify); and yet Rescher repeatedly exploits just this metaphor without proper recognition that he is using it precisely as James intended, not as part of a crass capitalist epistemology.

Rescher is at odds with himself by trying to align his own opposition to Rorty with the earlier opposition between Peirce and James. These conflicts are orthogonal to one another in many ways. The development of pragmatism almost immediately moved beyond the initial contention between Peirce and James, especially in the work of Dewey and Mead, though Rescher like many spectators of this drama does not get past the first act before trying to write his own finish to the play. Dewey is briefly and wrongly cast as a supporting player (with a turgid delivery style) who only adds elements of social consensus and communal authorization to James's relativistic, personalistic pragmatism. Rescher has so far waived support from an important ally insofar as he seems blind to all but a Jamesian reading of Dewey's social philosophy. One finds in Rescher's account nothing of Dewey's innovative conception of *experience* and its fundamental bearing on virtually any philosophical topic. Particularly germane to Rescher's interests are the implications of this view of experience for characterizing rationality as more than just a capacity to reason. One can reason in complex and refined ways and yet be irrational — failing to have sufficiently broad regard for non-immediate far-reaching consequences of one's judgments. Rescher clearly grasps this distinction, but he repeatedly treats reasoning ability and rationality as interchangeable notions.

Rescher also shows no appreciation of Mead's social psychology. In his historical survey Rescher includes just one paragraph on Mead, with remarks that are both flat and false to Mead's actual views. The repercussions are

evident in Rescher's moral theory, which could afford to better accommodate Mead's view that human selves and our capacities to reason are concretely rooted in an emergent reflexivization of social abilities. Mead was not the most insightful moral theorist, but his evolutionary social psychology is key to developing an objectivist, realist, pragmatist moral theory that hinges crucially on not-just-conventional social commitments. Rescher repeatedly insists that it is in our best interests to subscribe to such commitments, but Mead *explains* how it is, constitutively and not just regulatively, that we have no choice in the matter as rational agents.

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Wojciech Sadurski

Freedom of Speech and Its Limits.

Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999.

Law and Philosophy Library 38. Pp. viii + 231.

US\$114.00. ISBN 0-7923-5523-7.

Freedom of speech, especially as it is and has been handled by the U.S. Supreme Court in constitutional litigation interpreting the First Amendment, is the topic of a voluminous literature among legal scholars and philosophers. The challenge to find something new and important to say on freedom of speech is immense. We are all familiar with the standard rationales for freedom of speech, or of expression — the search for truth, autonomy and self-realization, democratic self-government. S. usefully reviews these standard arguments in his opening chapter, showing, as have many before him, that none of these values sufficiently accounts for our present range of liberal intuitions (let alone for First Amendment doctrine) about what restrictions on speech should be struck down and how. S. also rightly emphasizes two standardly under-emphasized points made by Frederick Schauer (see *Free Speech* [Cambridge U.P. 1982]) — first, that 'speech' in 'freedom of speech' cannot mean 'speech' in any ordinary sense, since we do not think of many cases of restricted speech (phoning bookies, extorting money, submitting an auditor's report, ...) as matters of freedom of speech (54-8), and, second, that the justification for freedom of speech must be special in that we value speech even though it clearly is harmful (2).

At the end of Chapter 1, S. introduces two notions familiar to students of First Amendment doctrine, the notions of 'viewpoint neutrality', held to be a *sine qua non* for any justifiable restriction on speech, and 'level of scrutiny',

a way of differentiating between 'low value' speech like pornography, hate speech, or advertising, and 'high value' speech like political, scientific, or artistic speech. These notions are prominent in the development of S.'s own views. He contrasts with these notions a purely harm-based justification for freedom of speech (40), and explores these issues further in Chapter 2. His conclusion is that a distinction between 'low value' speech with less-than-strict scrutiny of proposed restrictions and 'high value' speech with strict scrutiny is justified. The reason is not that such a distinction directly tracks the level of harm caused by the two categories; that, he thinks, is impossible to show. Rather, the distinction rests on a combination of the level of harm caused together with the presence of factors, such as pre-existing contempt for the speech, which lessen the likelihood of actual harm resulting (70-2).

Chapter 3 discusses speech and equality. S. reviews various arguments offered by Catherine MacKinnon and others that restrictions on pornography or hate speech, for example, are justified because of the role of the restrictions in promoting equality between citizens. He dismisses any straightforward outweighing of one constitutional value by another as not being compatible with freedom of speech — an argument which defenders of the equality approach will surely regard as question-begging. Most of the chapter is taken up with discussing the idea of an equal opportunity to speak, as cashed out in such regulations as equal time for different points of view in broadcasting, rights of reply in newspapers, and so forth. The problems of restricting speech in the name of freedom of speech are familiar. S. also discusses here the idea of speech being 'silenced', and likewise sees here no sound reason for restrictions on speech.

Chapter 4 is a brief discussion of J.L. Austin's theory of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, and its relevance to free speech theory. The discussion is too brief to satisfy. S. acknowledges Rae Langton's work on this point, and that work should be consulted; cf., e.g., *Legal Theory* 1 (1998) 21-38 (with Jennifer Hornsby). Chapter 5 returns to the issue of 'viewpoint neutrality'. S. discusses well the difficulties in distinguishing, as unfortunately the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence does, between 'content-neutrality' and 'viewpoint neutrality'; he shows how the distinction is 'highly context-sensitive' (168). He has more hopes for 'viewpoint neutrality' vs. 'subject-matter neutrality'. He suggests that, to the extent the latter distinction can be made out, it would underwrite the thought that subject-matter regulations are less morally objectionable than viewpoint regulations (177).

The final chapter 6 discusses at length what S. calls 'racial vilification' and freedom of speech. As he rightly says, this topic is perhaps the currently most controversial issue in freedom of speech, with Canada, the European Community and Australia permitting regulation of hate speech and the U.S. Supreme Court seemingly prohibiting regulation with ever-increasing dedication in recent decisions. S. shows clearly that restricting speech aimed generally at a group poses different questions from restricting speech aimed at an identifiable individual, and that, even though the 'fighting words' approach makes some sense in the latter case, it gains no ground in the

former. He is also sceptical of the 'psychic injury' idea, used to defend restriction by a harm-related argument. In the end, he sides with the non-restricters — 'liberal insensitivity to many psychic harms is the price of a broadened scope for individual autonomy' (224).

There are many good things in this book. The discussion of hate speech is thorough and careful, whatever one thinks of the conclusion. S. discusses at length several important recent U.S. decisions, and demonstrates clearly that the analytical skills of a philosopher and the absence of historical baggage by which an outsider is blessed can reveal problems with judicial reasoning the Court itself cannot see. Clarity is often brought to other individual tangled issues as well. But as a whole monograph and a sustained argument, the book disappoints. S. notes in the preface that it is based on several previously published and independently written articles. It has not made the transition to a monograph well. There are numerous instances of the same points being made in the same way, and even with the same words. Too much of the discussion, however interesting in itself, is ad hoc. As noted above, S. stresses early on the importance of a coherent *principle* for determining the boundaries of freedom of speech. Yet (as far as I can see, anyway) no such principle is either enunciated in, or discernible in, the text itself. If there is any such principle implicit, it would seem to be some version of a harm principle — that under the right circumstances, restriction is justified to prevent a suitably grave amount of harm, and only then. But there is no clear correlating of such a principle to the specific details of the specific issues and cases discussed. Without such correlating, such a vaguely worded principle lacks the substantive content which it needs.

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Niall Shanks, ed.

*Idealization IX: Idealization in
Contemporary Physics.*

Atlanta, GA: Editions Rodopi 1998.

Pp. vii + 238.

US\$69.00. ISBN 90-420-0642-0.

Of the previous 62 volumes in the Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities series, this collection is the tenth that deals with the notion of idealization. Given this long standing interest in idealization and science within Polish circles, one might have expected a tightly knit

series of essays on one or two specific topics. However, the eleven papers brought together here constitute a veritable catalogue of contexts in which idealizations are at issue. There is scarcely an area of interest in the philosophy of physics that escapes attention.

The first two essays are exclusively concerned with clarifying the concept of idealization, and examining how the notion relates to the use of thought experiments in physics. The next four essays discuss idealization in the context of Quantum theory. The following three essays address idealization as it relates to cosmology and relativity theory. And finally, the last two use implications of chaos theory and nonlinear dynamics to challenge the concept of idealization as it is commonly conceived.

This book would be particularly interesting for someone wishing to do a comparative study of the ways in which philosophers have attempted to account for idealization. It seems that each contributor has his or her own unique approach to what idealizations are, and what their status is. A general theme, however, is that most of the papers argue that idealizations are not simply what you would typically expect, but that they also play some sort of other highly important and unexpected role. For instance: Idealizations are not merely instrumentalist notional devices that selectively represent some features of real systems, or calculational tools that enable scientists to cope with otherwise intractable problems that result from extreme mathematical complexity, but deliberate distortions of real systems that aid in the construction of scientific theories, or devices with the cognitive function of providing the scientist with insights that enrich our understanding of physical processes.

A number of the papers draw implications for the realism/anti-realism debate, and *Idealization IX* might be worth looking at for those with an interest in thought experiments; models, approximation; abstraction; and idealized objects. In the remaining space I present a few snapshots of the more interesting papers.

'An Epistemological Role for Thought Experiments' by Michael Bishop defends a mental model account of thought experiments on grounds of utility and argues that they play a role in rational theory choice by facilitating the testing of the theoretical virtue of unification. Bishop suggests that his picture of thought experiments implies a commitment to realism about scientific theories (29).

'"Model(s)" and "Experiment(s)" as Homogeneous Families of Notions' by Izabella and Leszek Nowak attempts to disambiguate the terms 'model' and 'experiment' by presenting an account of the foundations of the scientific method based on idealization and concretization (42).

In contrast to Cartwright's distinction between phenomenological and theoretical laws (53), 'Semantic Perspective on Idealization in Quantum Mechanics' by Steven French and James Ladyman offers a unified account of theories and models by employing the devices of 'partial structures' and 'partial isomorphism'.

'Decoherence and Idealization in Quantum Measurement' by Chuang Liu looks at the decoherence approach to the measurement problem as a case study for the role of idealization and approximation in theory construction. As such, Liu argues that both the decoherence approach and the modal interpretation of QM are, for separate reasons, inadequate to explain (88) the non-ideal measurements that occur in virtually all actual experiments.

'Models and Approximations in Quantum Chemistry' by Robin Findlay Hendry asks whether idealized models of quantum chemistry can be thought of as approximations to exact quantum mechanical equations for molecules. His answer is that they cannot because idealized models involve explanatory features that are not present in exact mathematical treatments. Hence (136) modelling in quantum chemistry provides a counterexample to Hempel's covering-law model of scientific explanation. Alternatively, an account of model construction should evaluate models and exact treatments independently of their relationship to each other. And models are to be appraised by virtue of their ability to provide some understanding of the behaviour of what they model, as well as by virtue of their 'monotonic piecemeal improvability' (138).

In 'Astride the Divided Line: Platonism, Empiricism, and Einstein's Epistemological Opportunism' Don Howard presents a rational reconstruction of Einstein's epistemology according to which idealizations and the criterion of simplicity for theory choice are seen as 'Platonic moments in empirical science' (144). Taking as a point of departure a rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction, he comes up with an interpretation of Einstein's view of the relation between theory and experience.

A historical analysis of the development of The Cosmological Principle (which says that the large-scale universe is everywhere uniform) is found in 'Idealization in Cosmology: A Case Study'. Apart from presenting his own account of models, based on an analogy with maps, George Gale demonstrates how, through a debate between the kinematical relativist E.A. Milne and the relativistic cosmologist H.P. Robertson, one of the central idealizations of twentieth century cosmology was arrived at and how it contributed to the deployment of the Steady State Theory of the Universe (which is a serious competitor to the cosmology founded on the General Theory of Relativity). Gale argues that this debate can be seen as a manifestation of the age old methodological disagreement between inductivists and hypothetico-deductivists.

In 'Idealization, Heuristics and the Principle of Equivalence', Anna Maidens questions how the falling elevator thought experiment was used to motivate the principle of equivalence (which posits an equivalence between the effects of a gravitational field and those of uniform acceleration), and explains how the rotating disk thought experiment was used to arrive at the recognition that the principle of equivalence leads to the realization that the metric field is dynamic. Following John Norton, she argues that 'the principle of equivalence is not meant to establish a link between accelerated frames and gravitational effects, but instead to facilitate the extension of the special

principle of relativity to accelerated frames within Einstein's early work on extending special relativity' (190).

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Margrit Shildrick and Janet Price, eds.

Feminist Theory and the Body.

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. i + 487.

Cdn\$113.00: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-92565-7);

Cdn\$37.99: US\$24.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-92566-5).

What role does embodiment play in women's subjectivities? A large range of feminist literature from various disciplines and approaches now takes up this question, suggesting paradigms for understanding embodiment as a key feature in women's subjectivities and oppression, as well as offering possibilities for transgression and resistance. Shildrick and Price include selections from feminists who engage a wide range of issues related to women's embodiments, including work from disciplines that range from science studies to queer studies. Split into seven sections, each with its own introduction, the collection is positioned as one that offers readers a thorough survey of relevant feminist scholarship on the body.

At the book's core is a challenge to the 'natural' status bodies are often given. Many of the pieces adopt an Irigarayan understanding of the slippage between constructed bodily categories such as male/female and able-bodied/disabled and thus move away from fixed, binary categories toward an understanding of bodies as contested ground. In examining how the language used to speak of transsexualism reveals tendencies towards binary thinking, Judith Halberstam writes, 'Just as the idea of cross-dressing presumes an immutable line between two opposite sexes, so transsexualism, as a term, as an ideology, presumes that if you are not one you are the other' (130). Halberstam goes on to suggest that all body alterations, be they changes of sex or breast implants, be referred to as cosmetic surgery, in hopes that doing so will begin to blur the binaries between male and female, categories that serve as roots for concepts such as transsexualism. Thus the body is not accorded fixity but is instead conceptualized as a fluid entity constantly negotiated through discursive and material disciplinary practices.

The collection also examines how the material and discursive intermingle by interrogating epistemological frameworks from both the 'hard' and 'soft'

sciences. Authors such as Anne Fausto-Sterling and Emily Martin reveal how the language used to describe biological processes such as human egg fertilization and menopause are far from objective descriptions. Rather, such descriptions are simultaneously reflective and constructive of notions of gender and gendered bodies. Martin points out in her piece, 'The Egg and the Sperm' that 'the egg is seen as large and passive. It does not *move* or *journey* ...' (181). However, the accounts given while observing sperm are filled with words such as 'velocity,' 'energy,' and having 'strong lurches' (181). Thus, the epistemological frameworks of some sciences mirror and help to recapitulate cultural notions of active males and passive females.

Feminists such as Elizabeth Grosz take such examinations of bodies in a slightly different direction by suggesting that the body has an active role in structuring physical spaces like, for example, cities. However, these accounts are also at pains to emphasize how material spaces affect bodies. Rather than seeing cities as merely the effects of laboring bodies, Grosz analyzes the ways certain tasks are exacted of bodies in physical spaces and how our phenomenological experiences of our bodies can be shifted by built environments. She writes that the city 'must have effects on the ways we live space and thus on our corporeal alignments, comportment, and orientations. It also affects the subject's forms of corporeal exertion ...' (385). Again, bodies are conceived of as capable of creating material spaces but also subject to certain performative constraints demanded by built environments.

Finally, a good portion of the reader engages those bodies that challenge feminist thinking. These unruly bodies are thought through in terms of their material and discursive specificity. Doing so suggests that feminism must move away from speaking about *the* body and instead come to terms with how various embodiments demand particular epistemologies and theoretical paradigms. For example, Evelyn Hammonds' article on black female sexuality calls for an understanding of black female embodiment that accounts for the co-constructions of race, gender, and sexuality by noting how black women's bodies were set against and helped to bolster concepts such as white beauty. She writes, '... the black female became the antithesis of European sexual mores and beauty and was relegated to the lowest scale of human development' (95). Similarly, queer theorists note that the sexual, discursive and material specificity of lesbian bodies demands that feminist scholarship be attuned to the needs of marginalized bodies when theorizing the corporeal.

The reader provides an adequate survey of the conversations taking place around bodies, incorporating work heavily influenced by theorists such as Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault, all of whom are invested in questioning how the material and discursive exist symbiotically as well as how bodies might be thought of as performative rather than pre-social. However, the collection's pieces most often provide descriptive accounts of conceptions of the body without thoroughly investigating how feminists might begin to further reconceptualize the body towards liberatory aims. While scholars such as Kathy Davis take up the (im)possibilities of using the body as a resistant and transgressive surface through practices such as

cosmetic surgery, the limits of the roles bodies play (or could possibly play) in radical politics remain largely unexamined. In order for women to usefully understand how embodiment forms subjectivity and what possibilities for radical transformation exist, the boundaries of performativity and categorical slippage must be pushed and tested more thoroughly.

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Mark J. Smith, ed.

Thinking Through the Environment.

New York: Routledge Press 1999. Pp. xii + 435.

Cdn\$135.00: US\$90.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-21171-9);

Cdn\$49.99: US\$29.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-21172-7).

This new reader in environmental ethics and politics was developed for a course entitled 'Ecology, Justice and Citizenship', part of the Open University Masters in Social Sciences Programme (U.K.). Judging by its quality and comprehensiveness, students in the programme are getting their money's worth. Editor Smith has brought together fifty-three diverse selections arranged in seven sections. An introductory section, 'Situating the Environment', provides an historical context for environmentalism. It includes good selections by Keith Thomas, David Pepper and Frank Golley, which trace changes in western attitudes and conceptions of nature, as well as excerpts from Rachel Carson's seminal *Silent Spring*.

The next three sections provide a sound introduction to main trends in environmental ethics. 'Rethinking obligations: future generations and inter-generational justice' gives a nice mix of theory and practical discussion on a key topic. 'Animal welfare and conservation: expanding the circle?' and 'Values and obligations: rethinking nature' provide good coverage of the foundational issue of non-human moral considerability. In these sections, as throughout the volume, the editor balances historical and contemporary analyses. Keith Thomas on changing views concerning cruelty towards animals is followed by much-anthologized selections from Peter Singer and Tom Regan. John Muir and Gifford Pinchot on preservation versus conservation lead onward to Aldo Leopold's classic exposition of the land ethic, Arne Naess on deep ecology and Holmes Rolston on the intrinsic value of species and ecosystems. This combination of the historical and contemporary should

prove helpful to students exploring these issues for the first time. The volume might have benefited from the inclusion of more skeptical pieces such as Roger Scruton's on the moral status of animals, although other anthologies ignore contemporary defenses of such traditional views altogether.

The final three sections consider the social and political ramifications of environmentalism. 'Ecology, order and individualism' reprints interesting, very different conservative takes on environmentalism by Peter Saunders and John Gray. It also includes three selections dealing with population growth — an important topic ignored in most environmental readers. This discussion is valuable; still, its focus on third-world population growth is likely to feed our complacency regarding continued population growth in many industrialized countries (for example, the U.S. population will double over the next fifty to sixty years if current trends continue, according to the U.S. Census Bureau). The section titled 'Ecology and emancipatory strategies' provides good coverage of social ecology and ecofeminist theories and their proposals for radical political change. 'Prospects for ecological citizenship' considers more reformist political proposals, such as 'ecological modernisation' and 'green democracy' theories.

As with any such anthology, there are pros and cons. The pros are generally strong selections, a nice mix of historical description and contemporary analysis, and a full discussion of the potential political ramifications of environmentalism. The cons include the absence of case studies — helpful in bringing the discussion home to undergraduates — and a certain lack of poetry. I would recommend this volume for undergraduate and graduate classes attempting to integrate environmental ethics with fundamental political critiques — but would supplement it with the most recent edition of *State of the World*, and either *A Sand County Almanac* or *Walden*.

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Yannis Stavrakakis

Lacan and the Political.

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. x + 188.

Cdn\$98.00: US\$65.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-17186-5);

Cdn\$31.99: US\$20.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-17187-3).

Jacques Lacan's reflections on the nature of subjectivity stretched the French love of paradox to its limits. If it was Jean-Paul Sartre who said that he and his comrades were never freer than during the Nazi occupation of Paris, it fell to Lacan to assert that there is no such thing as a sexual relation. Lacan seems an unlikely source of inspiration for political philosophy, as Yannis Stavrakakis cheerfully admits before going on to show, with crisp prose and clear arguments, why his readers should reconsider that prejudice. He provides a reliable introduction to Lacan and his politically-minded commentators and critics (Slavoj Žižek, Jean-Luc Nancy, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, William Connolly, and Judith Butler, for example), and a spirited defense of Lacanian political theory.

Embedded in Lacan's teaching, admittedly hard to disentangle from his tightly wound prose, is a narrative of selfhood that answers to a profound existential and metaphysical puzzle. How is it that a body, an 'it', can sport a self, which is an 'I'? Each of us, the narrative says, compensates for the absence of a substantial self, one given us by nature, by identifying with a projected image or form in which such a self is objectified. The self, and so by extension the whole human world, including politics, is an artifact created (albeit unconsciously) to serve as an illusory defense against the human condition of dependency, lack, *beance*. In Lacanian political theory, humans are 'naturally' artificial, and the political order, if it is to respect human nature, must respect the human fictions of identity we are by nature disposed to make, whether personal, sexual, ethnic, or national. But these should be respected *as* fictions, revisable and negotiable, not set up as inflexible principles. The Lacanian self is not unlike a democratic polity, in which the law that confers unity is kept open to revision as a way of recognizing that, in a society of diverse equals, no *real* communion is achieved. Lacanian theory thus offers a rationale for democracy (or, as Stavrakakis prefers, 'radical democracy') that does not rely on outmoded traditions of liberty or right.

This approach is not without problems. By its own account, Lacan's theory is a mere fiction, so there is no reason to accept it as true. If we do accept it, we are committed to regard such phenomena as love, friendship, loyalty, generosity, sacrifice, honor, and courage as nothing more than the maneuvers of illusory selves colluding to evade having to acknowledge their essential insufficiency. Culture, too, would appear to be an instrument designed to compensate for and disguise this lack. A Greek temple, which for Martin Heidegger is a manifestation of truth at work, becomes from a Lacanian point of view a mere 'symptom' of this flight from truth. The resulting political

vision is indeed radical in the sense that it is extreme, but it is also deflationary and even defamatory. The whiff of philistinism, as well as cynicism, that can be detected in Lacan, as in Freud, carries over into Lacanian political theory.

Stavrakakis, alert to such dangers, does what he can to arrive at a more congenial account. Most fruitfully, he emphasizes Lacan's understanding of 'the real'. This is less a metaphysical category than a term for our intuition that, although our symbolic depictions of self and world are organized around ideals of completeness and coherency, they necessarily fail to comprehend the whole of reality. It follows that reality, as that which eludes representation, cannot be described. Instead, it shows itself in our discourses as numb patches of incoherence, each one different. The alternative to description is what G. Spencer-Brown called 'injunction': pointing towards phenomena that test the limits of language, in the hope that eventually the reader (or analysand) will catch on. The symptoms of limit show up at moments of personal anxiety and doubt, for example, or in response to new art, or — why not — new political identities. They help convey the fact that the illusions that constitute oneself or one's polity are both of inestimable value and utterly groundless.

Despite Stavrakakis's precautions, Lacanian political theory remains unsatisfying. For the assumptions of Lacanian psychoanalysis are such that the status of all possible political identities is determined in advance. The theory assures us that however great the plurality of identities appears to be, each is a fake, cobbled together in denial and self-deception. Lacanian political theory pays a price for its provisional and negotiable identities: that of determining them in advance as mere instruments for the illusory satisfaction of an insatiable desire for wholeness and substantiality. Which calls to mind another French paradox: *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.

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Merl Storr, ed.

Bisexuality: A Critical Reader.

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. vii + 230.

Cdn\$113.00: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-16659-4);

Cdn\$37.99: US\$25.00

(paper: ISBN 0-415-16660-8).

In *Bisexuality: A Critical Reader*, Merl Storr has combined theoretical and empirical writings on bisexuality from a variety of disciplines, resulting in an excellent source for examining not only the subject of bisexuality, but also the research itself. As Storr states at the outset, this collection is not an exhaustive exploration of the work on bisexuality. However, it is a concise anthology of mostly extracted, previously-published works that pulls together much of the critical thought on bisexuality over the last century to focus on 'the question of what bisexuality is' (3). As Storr herself points out, although bisexuality seems continually to be regarded as a 'new' identity, it quickly becomes clear in reading through this collection that not only is the concept of bisexuality over 100 years old, but the debates over what bisexuality is and how bisexual behavior and identity ought to be viewed are as old as the term itself. What emerges consistently is confusion: there has never been a clear, common definition of bisexuality.

Storr's book is organized into four parts. The first section, 'Genealogy', traces the evolution of the concept of bisexuality, using writings by sexologists to follow the development of the term bisexual as its definition shifts in meaning from literally bi-sexed (hermaphroditic) to bi-sexual (being both homosexual and heterosexual), and looks at varying methods for measuring — or attempting to measure — bisexuality in individuals. The second section, 'Bisexual Identity and Bisexual Behaviour', distinguishes between identity and behavior, presenting bisexual identity as different for men and women, as culturally-specific, and as what contributor Jan Clausen calls an 'anti-identity', while also noting the consistency of actual bisexual practice across these boundaries (109). The third section, 'Bisexual Epistemologies', offers different theoretical models for understanding bisexuality, suggesting that bisexuality be used as a lens through which to view and disrupt dichotomous understandings of sexuality. These essays do not simply call for the recognition of bisexuality as yet another kind of queer sexuality; rather, they explore how the very notion of sexual identity can be reimagined from a bisexual standpoint, which must by definition challenge the notion of simple dichotomies and oppositional identity construction.

The last section, 'Differences', is disappointing in that it focuses on highly theoretical notions of difference, leaving out issues of race and class, which have been very real locations of difference — and tension — within bisexual communities. That these issues are largely unexamined throughout is the one flaw in this collection. To some degree, this omission reflects the available research, much of which has not examined race or class. Yet there are other

places to look for theorizing on sexuality by people of color. For example, Black women's theory about sexuality emerged in creative works outside of the academy. In order to present bisexuality in a more complex, raced way, then, it is necessary to cast a wider net, looking outside the academy as well as within it. Despite this, however, the collection is a worthwhile one, and would be quite useful for graduate and advanced undergraduate courses.

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Raymond Tallis

On the Edge of Certainty.

London: Macmillan 1999. Pp. xvii + 236.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-312-22416-8.

This book is a collection of five independently written essays. The last of them titled 'On the Edge of Certainty' stands independently as a description of Wittgenstein's final days before he succumbed to prostate cancer. The others are grouped loosely around the common theme of rejecting attempts by writers such as Laird-Johnson, Dennett, Fodor, and the Churchlands to describe human mentality in mechanistic terms derived from cognitive science. Tallis's view is that human consciousness has an ineffable subjective character that is such to make any such attempts impossible. They leave out, he thinks, 'what is essential to humanity — self-consciousness and deliberative, chosen action' (xiii).

The essays on this common theme are of uneven quality. By far the best of them, I think, is the second essay titled 'A Critical Dictionary of Neuromythology', which is a republished version of an earlier book. Here Tallis contends that mechanistic models of human consciousness derive their plausibility from a kind of verbal sleight of hand. Terms such as 'calculation', 'information', 'interpretation', 'memory', and 'rule' have their meaning derived from specific applications to conscious human activities. It is we who in our daily lives calculate, become informed, interpret, remember, and follow rules. These terms are then applied in what are initially metaphorical senses to computers as mechanical devices, and then later given technical engineering senses. Finally, based on their primary origins in human activities, these terms are used to make plausible the claim that human consciousness can be successfully described as a mechanical process. This transference of terminology from one domain to another is called by Tallis 'epithet transfer'.

It is, he says, the source of 'the myth that modern neurological science has somehow explained, or will explain, or has advanced our understanding of, what consciousness truly is' (73). Tallis argues with considerable skill for this conclusion, using a variety of examples.

Other essays are not as convincing. The opening essay titled 'Explicitness and Truth (and Falsehood)' argues, first, that statements do refer outside of themselves, contrary to the 'post-Saussurean claim that statements do not refer to realities outside of language' (18). Their truth is not the result, however, of the selective forces of evolution, contrary to the views of evolutionary epistemology, for evolutionary theory cannot explain 'why there are these centres of concern and self-concern called organisms' (38). This is because mechanical systems lacking consciousness would provide more reliable adaptations to environments, and hence the theory can explain only the emergence of unthinking survival mechanisms. Evolutionary epistemology cannot therefore account for the concepts of truth and falsity, he seems to argue, since these are dependent on conscious agents deciding what is true or false. Consciousness, he says, 'is the explicitness condition that makes truth-conditions possible' (18).

The reasoning to this conclusion is marred by uncertainties surrounding Tallis's use of 'consciousness' and 'explicitness'. To be conscious can be understood as being awake and having a qualitative perspective on things, that is, to have feelings, sensations, and perhaps thoughts. In this sense consciousness is not human-specific, but can be plausibly extended to lower animals and insects. 'Consciousness' can also be understood in the sense of not only having a sensation, feeling, or thought, but being aware of having them. This sense is sometimes distinguished with the term 'self-consciousness' (or Leibniz's *apperception* as contrasted with *perception*), and seems specific to us humans with our linguistic ability to report and express our sensations and thoughts. Tallis's frequent references to humanity seem to indicate that it is this latter human-specific sense of consciousness that he has in mind when constructing his theory of truth.

Consciousness is tied in a puzzling way to explicitness, and then explicitness is claimed to be the necessary condition for truth and falsity. The normative terms seem also to have for him human-specific applications, for they require the conventional expressions of human natural languages. But studies of vervet monkeys by Cheney and Seyfarth have demonstrated that these animals employ warning cries that are conventional, and at least in this sense are explicit. Suppose that an eagle warning cry is followed by the sight of an eagle recognized by other members of a tribe. Can the warning cry be said to be true? The monkeys are certainly unreflective, and thus lack consciousness in what seems to be Tallis's primary sense. But it seems arbitrary to withhold truth and falsity from forms of communication that seem to share basic features with our own natural languages.

This is only one of many puzzles in a work that touches on a variety of issues in philosophy. This collection of essays will not, I think, substantially advance discussion of these issues, the most central of which have been prime

topics for the past several decades. Mechanist materialists are unlikely to be converted by Tallis's arguments, and their opponents have the more carefully reasoned objections of writers such as Nagel, Jackson, and Searle. But there is a refreshing directness in Tallis's essays, and they express important insights. They are also written with a certain literary flair that conveys to them the advantage of appealing to an audience beyond academic circles. The participation of writers such as Tallis who can widen the scope of philosophy's appeal should be very much welcomed.

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Francisco Varela

*Ethical Know-How: Action,
Wisdom and Cognition.*

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1999.

Pp. ix + 85.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3032-6);

US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3033-4).

Varela's latest work comprises a series of three lectures, the focal point of which picks up where his 1991 book, *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* (co-written with Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch) leaves off, namely, with a discussion of the cognitive basis of ethical expertise. Departing from the dominant 'cognitivist' orientation of the cognitive sciences, these lectures cover — in an abbreviated, yet lucid, fashion — much of the conceptual terrain traversed in his earlier work on the subject of cognition as 'embodied action'. This research stresses the link between sensory and motor processes in lived cognition, and rejects the objectivist assumption that cognitive living systems are problem-solvers, re-presenting information recovered from an independent, pre-given world by means of symbolic computation. The *enactive* approach instead emphasizes an organism's history of 'structural coupling' with its environment, which allows it to distinguish a world of significance that is inseparable from its own embodied nature, as well as from the larger biological and cultural contexts of which it is a part. Expressed in more evocative terms, Varela maintains that organism and environment specify *each other*. The cognitive architecture that underlies this view takes seriously the notion of *emergence*, suggesting that behaviour is the product of coherent neural patterns which emerge from a background flux of brain activity as an organism confronts newly perceived situations. These distributed *ensembles* of neurons constitute what Varela

calls 'microidentities', which manifest themselves in readiness-for-action with respect to the corresponding 'microworlds' that the organism inhabits.

Varela's venture into ethics takes flight from this cognitive scientific backdrop, emphasizing a conception of knowledge as it is concretely lived (a notion that has tended to be either neglected or maligned in more traditional philosophical discourses), and accordingly, ethical understanding as a kind of *know-how*. An implication of his own research — and one that is shared by a growing number of cognitive scientists — is a fundamental inability to locate a substantial sense of 'self' underlying the manifold mental processes that govern human behaviour from one moment to the next. Consequently, Varela summons the resources of the 'wisdom traditions' of the East — specifically, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism — in an effort to crystallize a conception of ethical expertise in the absence of an ego. Linking these ancient schools of thought to his contemporary concern with the coping strategies that are ready-at-hand for all cognitive beings, Varela characterizes the immediate act of responding to the needs of others as a kind of skilled behaviour that can be cultivated through 'mindfulness/awareness meditation'.

One of the merits of Varela's research lies in his ability to discern 'middle ways' between dualistic categories that have framed much of the philosophical discourse of the West, e.g., objectivism and subjectivism, concrete and abstract, calculating and spontaneous. In particular, such discernment compliments his project of situating explanations of cognitive behaviour with respect to the biological and cultural contexts out of which they arise. Varela has, however, relied heavily on the texts of the 'wisdom traditions' in articulating his position on ethical understanding, without exploring potentially problematic implications for his view as a whole. For instance, a further dualistic tension to be overcome involves reconciling the culturally situated origins of ethical expertise, with the apparent universal significance of such know-how for all humankind.

Overall, the book outlines some very engaging research conducted at the crossroads of what are often taken to be disparate fields of study. It does not mark a significant departure from the position advanced in *The Embodied Mind*, however, where the central concepts can be found elaborated in greater depth.

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Gianni Vattimo

Belief.

Trans. Luca D'Isanto and David Webb.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1999.

Pp. xvii + 78.

US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3918-8);

US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3919-6).

Gianni Vattimo has been one of the leading figures in the philosophical debates on post-modern religion and philosophy of religion. In this work, written in a very personal style, he gives a brief introduction to his thinking on 'the return of religion' in contemporary culture (e.g., in philosophy, politics, and in everyday life).

Vattimo's basic argument is that the process of secularisation is the vehicle for the return of religion in contemporary culture, at least for the return of the Christian religion. The Christian doctrine of 'kenosis', i.e., the 'self-emptying and self-abasing of God in Jesus Christ' in the incarnation, is even, according to Vattimo, the very essence of secularisation. The doctrine of incarnation, as he puts it, prepared the way for the nihilism of modernity: it is interpreted as 'the sign that the non-violent and non-absolute God of the post-metaphysical epoch has as its distinctive trait the very vocation for weakening of which Heideggerian philosophy speaks' (39). Accordingly, the core doctrine of Christianity is seen as the nexus of traditional western metaphysics and the emergence of nihilism in modern philosophy.

Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche is clearly recognisable in this thesis. 'God is dead' is interpreted as the death of a violent metaphysical appropriation of reality — a death that prepares the way for the 'weak ontology' of a secularised religion and conceptualisation of the real. Thus, the 'tolle Mensch' of Nietzsche's gay science is after the death of God, as Vattimo puts it, still searching for God and religious guidelines. But he is not searching for the metaphysical God and the religious conservative, metaphysical matrix of morality (e.g. sexual morality). Instead, the guiding principle of post-modern religion, after the end of metaphysics, is 'charity', which Vattimo sees as 'the norm of secularization'. Charity also expresses a spiritual search for 'the reduction of violence in all forms', according to Vattimo (88). In short, these are the main tenets of Vattimo's account on 'the return of religion' in contemporary culture.

But Vattimo's account is hardly convincing, if it is taken as an analysis of the contemporary religious situation in the west as a whole. First, the scope is far too limited. Contemporary religious culture in the west consists of a plurality of diverse religious themes, and not just watered-down versions of various Christian doctrines. Secondly, the historical process of secularisation in western culture is not just the internal theological history of the Christian religion. The process of secularisation was far more complex, even if Christian premises and presuppositions were dominating for a long time, in the natural sciences as well as in philosophy.

However, Vattimo seems to be aware of the fact that the scope of the argument in his book seldom reaches out of his own personal sphere and his own conception of belief. His main objective, he says, is just to explain why he 'believes that he believes'. But it is clear that he also wants to express something far more significant about the essential features of 'the religious turn' in contemporary culture, than simply stating a personal and intellectualised religious confession. This is a rather awkward tension in his book that diminishes its value.

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Valeria Wagner

*Bound to Act: Models of Action,
Dramas of Inaction.*

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1999.

Pp. xii + 276.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-8047-3330-9.

Valeria Wagner's first book is a slightly belated, but nonetheless welcome, contribution to the philosophy of action made popular by Davidson in the early 1980s. Wagner, however, while accepting Davidson's conclusion that our capacity for action is reduced to 'mere movements of the body', sees an aporia between this description of the initiation of an action and its end (in the senses both of aim and consequence): 'we do not just act but do specific things, and carry through specific projects that have more or less predictable ramifications' (23). Wagner is particularly interested in this aporia between initiation and end of action as a constituent of the human condition, and accordingly spends much of the book on examples of how the end of action is thwarted, leading to personal comedy of a bitter sort, or to tragedy, which is presented as the other side of the same coin.

The answer to the question of what causes this aporia is a Wittgensteinian one: it is 'the spell language puts on agents' (258). As the twentieth century has rediscovered (in the case of this book, through Bakhtin and Vološinov), it is language which defines the 'subject', and it is the intrusion of the subject meditating upon himself as 'I' which prevents him from acting as he should: reading *Hamlet*, Wagner concludes that 'to be, or not to be'

is to be read as 'to be a subject, or to act' (260), the two forming an irreconcilable dichotomy. This in turn is because being a subject places one under a (linguistic) obligation: Wagner flags up the promise in Austin's speech act theory as the category of performative that demands constancy of character from he who says 'I'. The subject, then, is subjected to a 'temporal defect' (259), a contradiction between the obligation to maintain character and to perform certain acts which, as the product of external happenstance, disrupt the temporal line of the subject's subjectivity. Faced with such a contradictory situation, clearly something has to give, and when that something is subjectivity the result is comedy (Beckett); when action the result is tragedy (*Hamlet*).

Wagner demonstrates this theory through a series of readings of texts which 'dramatise' this conflict between action and inaction: Aristotle, Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*, Locke, Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*, Milton's *Samson Agonistes*, *Hamlet*, Bakhtin/Vološinov, Nietzsche, Beckett and Wittgenstein, with helpings of Hannah Arendt, Aeschylus and St. Paul along the way. These readings are very useful in drawing out relationships between the individual and the political, and the aesthetic and the ethical. For example Aristotle, Wagner recalls, asserts in the *Nichomachean Ethics* that men should be judged by their actions, and in the *Poetics* that characters in tragedies should be precisely that — *characters*, who reveal (the constancy of) their character through their actions. Refusal to participate in events is reprehensible in its denial of the inevitable, since events are what *happen*. This explains why Faustus is a reprehensible character: his contract is a 'deed' in a double sense, but as a discursive act its only promise is not to break itself. Therefore, contrary to the Aristotelian tragic hero, Faustus can only accept necessity by *not* acting, while his reiterated, unfulfilled desire to act by breaking the deed marks an inconstancy in his character (60-1). Likewise, in *Waiting for Godot*, Vladimir's decision whether or not to help Pozzo 'is made as he deliberates, his choice is made before he can project his response — he does not help Pozzo, until he does, and deliberation is the way in which he does not help Pozzo' (207). The time of understanding or of deliberation, then, gets in the way of ethical acts — it is the *act* which is to be seen as primary. Hence the invocation of Wittgenstein: 'Wittgenstein refuses to treat understanding independently from behaviour — hence there is, properly speaking, no "when" for him in which understanding would "guide" our behaviour, beyond the time of our behaving' (218-19).

Wagner's book thus provides valuable insight into what happens when the individual is subjected to the temporal necessity of the *polis*. However, and ironically, its conclusion is framed negatively — we should not be *akratic* (incontinent in character). The only positive ethico-political plan of action the book's conclusion suggests is that we should open ourselves to the possibility — apparently denied by the Western tradition — that marginalised groups such as women, colonised peoples and so on are capable of *akrasia* too. Presumably this is because only someone who has character

can be held capable of inconstancy of character, but nevertheless this remains a somewhat dispiriting thought on which to end.

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Mark Warren, ed.

Democracy and Trust.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.

Pp. xi + 370.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-64083-0);

US\$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-64637-1).

This absorbing and important book contains essays by scholars from philosophy, psychology, political science, government, and sociology. The work arose from an interdisciplinary seminar at Georgetown University in 1995-96, followed by a conference the following fall. Authors include Jean Cohen, Russell Hardin, Rom Harré, Robin Inglehart, Jane Mansbridge, Claus Offe, Orlando Patterson, James Scott, Eric Uslander, and editor Mark Warren, who also provides a useful introduction and conclusion. Although all essays are rewarding, I most appreciated those of Warren, Cohen, and Offe.

Trust is paradigmatically construed as an interpersonal matter, built on experience and knowledge that establish bonds between individuals. Rich interpersonal trust requires interpersonal knowledge; yet complex societies are characterized by webs of interdependencies that require trust in strangers. Can 'trust' be defined so that it means the same thing, in these different sorts of contexts? How, if at all, can we develop and sustain the anonymous or institutional trust that modern democratic societies seem to require? Mark Warren argues that such questions are especially perturbing in the political domain, where (almost by definition) interacting persons may not share interests. Warren distinguishes three perspectives on trust and democracy: the neoconservative, the rational choice, and that of deliberative and discursive processes. He argues for the latter.

Russell Hardin claims that trust is necessarily based on evidence that the trusted person will act in one's interest. From the perspective of rational choice theory, Hardin seeks to analyze trust without moral content, maintaining that the basic issue is knowledge of the motivations of the person who might be trusted. 'If I have evidence that he will act in my interest, I will trust him; otherwise not.' Hardin argues that to trust a government or other

institution would make no sense, because one could not possibly have the requisite evidence. Against Hardin, Jane Mansbridge argues that trust does not arise solely from inductive evidence that the other person will act in one's interest. Rather, trust has moral dimensions and may be extended for moral or altruistic reasons. Robin Inglehart offers empirical evidence about trust and functioning democracies, suggesting that stability in a democracy does not require that its citizens trust their government or its fundamental institutions. Rather, the trust required is a kind of confidence that things will go tolerably well. This confidence is derived from interpersonal trust and a sense of subjective wellbeing.

Eric Uslander writes about democracy and social capital, arguing that trust is the key component of social capital, but not all forms of interpersonal trust contribute to social capital. (For example, an exclusivist trust based on a particular religious or ethnic affiliation might have negative consequences.) If trust can be generalized so as to extend from family and friends to strangers, then it will facilitate the development of interdependent social networks, and large scale economic and political institutions — as was claimed by Francis Fukuyama in his study of social trust and economic success. Empirical evidence suggests that optimism about one's economic security and (as has been famously argued by Robert Putnam) participation in civic associations outside the family facilitate the development of generalized trust.

Orlando Patterson questions the claim that willingness to trust strangers is declining in the United States. In 1960, 58% of Americans agreed that 'most people can be trusted,' whereas in 1995, only about 35% assented to that claim. (Though none of the authors take up the point, this research question seems intolerably vague and abstract. What proportion is 'most' people? In what respect would respondents be considering whether to trust 'those' people — to deliver a letter, save one's life, babysit a young child, obey the law most of the time, pay their taxes ... ?) Patterson says there is an apparent decline in trust in American society but that decline is of relatively little concern: throughout American history trust has tended to wax and wane. What is disturbing is that trust seems to be so low, and so relatively low, among African Americans. James Scott takes a position rather similar to that of Jane Jacobs, emphasizing that development and change will come about only when informal and apparently chaotic relations in local communities support the development of trust. These 'thick' relations are necessary and cannot be imposed from above. When top-down planning seems to work, this is usually because of unplanned, bottom-up supplements to it.

Jean Cohen explores in depth the concept of civil society and criticizes Robert Putnam for over-emphasizing face-to-face interpersonal relations and neglecting the role of legal institutions. Democracy presupposes individual responsibility and enough interpersonal trust for the discursive resolution of conflicts. Rom Harré argues that in politics consensual processes presuppose trust that others will abide by their agreement; whereas voting presupposes trust by the minority that the majority will not abuse its power. Harré accepts

the notion of trust in institutions and suggests that it may be modelled on person-to-person trust. Rules, institutions, and the development of social and political trust are treated in a most illuminating way by Claus Offe. He argues that rules will never eliminate the need for trust. First, by their nature, rules can never provide for all contingencies and emergencies; second, rules work only if most people voluntarily comply with them most of the time; and third, rules are 'positive' in the sense that they had been made and can be changed. In modern societies we cannot derive all the trust we need from personal relationships, so we have to trust institutions and the persons who work within them, but in many societies the basis for such trust is lacking. Institutions can render themselves worthy of trust insofar as their personnel and operations are characterized by promise-keeping, truth telling, impartiality, and efforts to compensate for fundamental social inequalities. Insofar as our fellow citizens operate with us in a society founded on 'shared institutional space,' they are not simply strangers.

One might wish occasionally that sentences, or even essays, had been shortened, or that authors' had addressed each other's concerns and claims to a greater extent than they do. But these are minor cavils in a book that offers excellent reading and many suggestions for future research for anyone interested in social philosophy or democratic theory.

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Meredith Williams

Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning:

Towards a Social Conception of Mind.

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xiii + 320.

Cdn\$113.00: US\$75.00. ISBN 0-415-18908-X.

Much recent literature on the later Wittgenstein has been of the exegetical sort — interesting and often fruitful discussion concerning such issues as the rule following considerations, the role the community plays in Wittgenstein's work, and the exact nature of the celebrated private language argument. Such work is important, and many of the papers collected together in Williams' book represent insightful contributions to our understanding of Wittgenstein. However, Williams' collection is more valuable for the connections she draws between Wittgenstein and current work in cognitive psychology.

Williams' book consists of ten papers, written over a span of twenty or so years. All the papers are, in one way or another, concerned with articulating

a particular conception of the later Wittgenstein's project. The book is usefully divided into two sections — the first critical, the second constructive. A key claim that Williams makes is that Wittgenstein's private language argument is not an isolated, separable component of the *Philosophical Investigations*, but rather, is connected in fundamental ways to his earlier discussions of ostensive definition and rule following. Motivating Wittgenstein in all of these cases, Williams claims, is his goal of critiquing denotational accounts of language and Cartesian accounts of the mind. In other words, Williams wants to argue that there is a tight connection between Wittgenstein's conception of language and his conception of mind, and that, because Wittgenstein is typically remembered more for his work in the former area, philosophers and psychologists ignore such a connection at their peril.

Williams also encourages a naturalistic reading of Wittgenstein (see especially Chapter 3). According to this sort of reading, Wittgenstein is not engaged in transcendental philosophy, but rather is more concerned with emphasizing the role and importance of training (into a language) and the role that our natural (social) reactions play in learning a language. These important notions come into play again in some of the later chapters of Williams' book.

Some of the most interesting papers in this collection center on Williams' challenge of computational approaches to explaining mental content. Taking the work of Jerry Fodor as her primary target, Williams argues that, far from being the only explanation for concept acquisition, computationalist approaches to concept acquisition (and the representational theory of mind that typically accompanies them) can in no way offer a sustainable account of language learning. Williams convincingly argues that Fodor (and other computationalists) face the following dilemma: either the hypothesis-formation model that Fodor advocates is the only way to explain how a child comes to acquire public concepts, and we are thus committed to positing innate beliefs (which are themselves explanatorily vacuous), or we restrict our language of thought to concepts only, and relinquish the hypothesis-formation model altogether.

Williams carries her critique of Fodor further, arguing that over the past two decades he has had to make a series of retrenchments, recastings of his position which have systematically moved him further and further away from his original goal of giving a narrow psychological account of mental content. Williams goes so far as to make the intriguing claim, in Chapter 9, that there is little difference between Fodor's later work and the work of such eliminativists as Steven Stich. In an effort to avoid the sorts of problems Wittgenstein raises, psychology becomes, in effect, merely a branch of neuroscience.

Several chapters towards the end of Williams' text deal with the thorny subject of making sense of a positive characterization of Wittgenstein's rule following discussion. Rejecting Kripke's sceptical communitarian account of meaning, Williams argues that only by focusing on Wittgenstein's account of learning can we understand how meaning can possess both a natural and a

normative dimension. According to Williams, learning plays for Wittgenstein three roles: first, it plays a causally grounding role, in that it fixes meaning for what Williams calls the novice (the first language learner). Second, it plays a methodological role, in so far as it discloses the source of the normativity of meaning by distinguishing between the context of the novice and context of the master. It is here that the notion of a community finds its proper home. Finally, learning plays a constitutive role with respect to meaning: how we learn (bedrock) concepts is constitutive of what it is that we learn. In other words, our shared sense of what counts as 'obvious', which is necessary for any meaningful disagreements to take place, is itself dependent on the social context in which the learning takes place.

Williams' articles together articulate a compelling argument, one whose primary claim is that Wittgenstein's writings on concept acquisition speak directly to much current work being done in cognitive psychology. Williams' attempt, in the final chapter, to connect up Wittgenstein with the work of the Russian psychologist Len Vygotsky also helps to highlight the relevance of Wittgenstein's work to psychology. This book will be of interest both to those interested in Wittgenstein's positive account of meaning and normativity and to cognitive psychologists, who could benefit from greater exposure to Wittgenstein's views.

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Philip Zhai

*Get Real: A Philosophical Adventure
in Virtual Reality.*

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

1998. Pp. xix + 215.

US\$24.95. ISBN 0-8476-8983-2.

Zhai's book is subtitled as 'A Philosophical Adventure in Virtual Reality'. I would describe it as a philosophical roller-coaster ride. Indeed, nearly every page is brimming with challenging philosophical ideas, but due to some significant problems, my overall assessment of the book is mixed.

Zhai's ultimate goal is to demonstrate the profound philosophical implications of virtual reality technology. In the first two chapters, he discusses at length the notion of telepresence (remotely observing and interacting with objects in the actual world through a connection with a robot body or another human body) and its conceptual connection with virtual reality (interacting

with a computer-generated world using sensory interfaces such as display goggles or a VR bodysuit). In chapter one, he introduces several fanciful thought experiments concerning telepresence and what he calls 'cross-communication situations' (situations where someone controls a part or all of another person's body).

On the basis of this discussion, Zhai argues for two key claims. First, he uses these thought experiments to support the claim that a person's 'self-identity' remains constant through changes in one's 'sensory framework'. He claims that such constancy is the case even if one is remotely controlling a different actual body through telepresence or a computer-generated virtual body existing in a virtual environment. Zhai's approach here is reminiscent of Daniel Dennett's in 'Where Am I', but, strangely, Zhai neither cites nor addresses this work.

Zhai goes on to defend what he calls 'The Principle of Reciprocity of Alternative Sensory Frameworks' or 'PR'. The basic idea of this principle is that we should not think of the actual world as real and virtual worlds as unreal or illusory. Instead, we should view the sensory frameworks of virtual worlds as 'parallel' to the actual world. Zhai seems to think that the only real differences are the addition of VR goggles and a bodysuit and the level of control that we would have over virtual worlds. He claims that virtual worlds are rich enough in principle to enable us to carry on all the activities of our lives. That is, through the mediation of what he calls the 'foundational part of VR' we could interact with processes in the actual world while experiencing the virtual. Thus, we could in principle build virtual worlds having the richness of the empirical world, and we could live in such worlds.

Zhai uses PR and the constancy of self-identity to address a number of significant philosophical issues. In chapter four, he argues against neurophysiological and computational views of the mind. Zhai holds that his discussion of VR demonstrates that 'the first-person perspective has ontological priority over the third-person perspective' (96), but that both views attempt to explain the mind through a third-person perspective. Moreover, he claims that proponents of both views have fallen into what he calls 'The Fallacy of Unity Projection'. That is, Zhai claims that each view 'assumes that the perceived spatial unity of the data is inherent among the data themselves in the object [brains or computers], but in truth the unity is projected from one's own observing mind' (101). Zhai seems to think that these objections are fatal for neurophysiological and computational views of mind.

In chapters five and six, Zhai addresses the consequences of VR for philosophical questions concerning happiness and the meaning of life, as well as the promise and possible perils of VR. Zhai includes, as an appendix, an interview with VR pioneer Jaron Lanier and a helpful glossary of terms and expressions.

Zhai does a fairly good job of raising crucial philosophical questions associated with VR. Also, he helps us recognize the important personal and social consequences of this technology in a challenging and creative way.

Overall, however, I was extremely disappointed in this book. First, I found the writing awkward, unclear, and somewhat disorganized. This often made the reasoning difficult to follow. The book simply needed more editing and rewriting.

Second, although it is clear Zhai has many creative and important insights, many conclusions he draws from these insights simply do not follow. This is especially the case in chapters two through four. I do not think his quasi-phenomenological approach demonstrates what he thinks it does. Also, he tends to rely too much on views expressed in his previous book without adequately explaining these views.

Finally, I was rather dismayed by Zhai's references to relativity theory and quantum mechanics in order to support his claims. Especially at the end of chapter four, he seriously misconstrues both of these theories when he speculates that 'the square root of -1 is the consciousness factor or psy-factor in both theories' (115). I did not expect a descent into quantum mysticism in a book of this sort.

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